Chapter I: The War with France Till 1693 (2)

The winter afforded the English Government an opportunity to prepare for a vigorous campaign, but it was neglected. The first joy over the Revolution was followed by a reaction. The two sections of the victorious party, the Whig and the Tory, began to quarrel and to struggle for predominance. These factions were nowhere more acutely felt than at the Admiralty. It is said by several authorities, and denied by nobody, that Herbert had fallen back into the dissolute habits of his early life. He was addicted to excesses which are ruinous to a man’s nerve and energy. It is certain that the work of the Admiralty was so badly done that the French privateers were very successful against our trade. In the new establishment of pay, made in 1694, it was said that the increase of salary was given in order that the officers might no longer be able to make their poverty an excuse for not doing their duty. Given the moral level of the Restoration and the Revolution, it is not incredible that captains, who were sulky at the loss of their table money, did refuse to exert themselves in defence of the merchant ships unless they were bribed. The old complaints of bad rations, bad pay, and bad beer were loud in the fleet. At last it was found necessary to make a change at headquarters. The existing Board of Admiralty was dissolved, and replaced by another with the Earl of Pembroke at its head. Torrington was very indignant, and threatened to resign the command of the fleet in the Channel. He was pacified with gifts, and then showed his zeal as an officer by staying in London to enjoy himself. He afterwards said that he had warned the Government that a larger fleet must be prepared, but did not take the effectual step of insisting upon resigning unless he was supplied with sufficient force.

A strong fleet was indeed necessary, for the French king had at last decided on making a serious attack in the Channel. His Toulon squadron was to be brought round from the Mediterranean, and was to join the Vice-Admiral _du Ponant_, the Count de Tourville, at Brest. Then the whole force, which was intended to reach the imposing figure of 78 ships of the line, 30 fireships, and 15 galleys, besides frigates and other attendant small craft, was to come into the Channel. The French Government, exaggerating the meaning of the discontent in England, was under the impression that a Jacobite rising would take place upon the appearance of the French fleet. On our side there was no understanding of the gravity of the coming crisis. In March Admiral Killigrew was dispatched with thirteen sail of the line and two fireships to protect the Mediterranean convoy. He was joined by some Dutch men-of-war. The combined squadron met with bad weather, and put into Cadiz on the 3rd of April. While lying here Killigrew received information that Châteaurenault was to be expected shortly on his way out to the ocean. Killigrew left Cadiz, and went into Gibraltar Bay, where he was joined by Captain Skelton, who was also on convoy duty with six ships. The combined force stood over to the Barbary coast to look for Châteaurenault, who might be supposed to be likely to hug the shore of Africa in order to escape observation. The common fate of our fleets at that time attended this operation. Killigrew was too late. On the 11th of May, Châteaurenault was seen outside the allied fleets. Killigrew pursued, but his ships were foul with long cruising, perhaps by neglect, for some of them had not been cleaned for seventeen months. The French squadron easily outsailed its pursuers. Killigrew then returned to Cadiz, and collected the trade before returning home. He reached England at the beginning of July and there heard of a disaster further up channel, which left him no resource but to carry his ship into the Hamoaze, and there take shelter behind batteries.

This disaster was the Battle of Beachy Head, which the French call the Battle of Bévisier, a corruption of Pevensey Bay. As the year grew on, the English Government became aware that a large French force might soon be expected in the Channel. The crisis was a very dangerous one, since the king had sailed for Ireland with all the best troops. There were few left in England, and the discontent of the Jacobites was notorious. The naval preparations made to meet an enemy were insufficient. When Torrington was at last sent down to Portsmouth on the 28th May there were but thirty-two English ships and eighteen Dutch collected.

Tourville had sailed from Brest on the 13th of June. The reinforcements brought him by Châteaurenault raised his fleet to something over seventy ships of the line, with thirty fireships and some small craft. He sailed into the Channel, and his approach was first known to Torrington on the 22nd. The English admiral was completely surprised by the appearance of the enemy. At a later period, when his conduct was called into question, he endeavoured to throw the blame for his want of knowledge on the ministers, who, as he complained, had not sent him down till the last of May, when it was too late for him to station look-out ships off Brest. It does not, however, appear why he thought it necessary to stay in London till he was driven out by a special order. After the change in the Admiralty Board he had no official duties in the capital, and if he stayed there till he earned from the sailors the nickname of Lord Tarry-in-Town, it was presumably because he did not wish to leave. Even so, he was with the fleet on the 30th of May, and might have detached look-out ships to the mouth of the Channel. He said he did, and then immediately afterwards said he did not, because all his frigates were engaged in shipping Lord Pembroke’s newly raised regiment of marines. The Dutch, to whom he entrusted the duty, without taking the trouble to see whether it were executed, were too busy shipping their stores to have leisure for anything else. The allied fleet, in fact, presented a picture of sloth and carelessness. When the enemy was known to be in the immediate neighbourhood, it weighed anchor, and dropped down to Dunnose. Here it was joined by two English and three Dutch ships of the line, which raised it to fifty-five. Torrington anchored and remained at anchor until the 25th. On that day he again weighed with the wind at N.E. and on the afternoon sighted the French to the south of the Isle of Wight. They were much scattered, and some of them were far to leeward. In such circumstances Monk would at once have attacked the enemy within striking distance in the hope of crippling him severely before he could be reinforced. Torrington drew his fleet into a line of battle and made towards the enemy. But he soon came to the conclusion that “they had enough in a body to have given us more than sufficient work.” He could not understand why they had not attacked him. It is probable that they abstained because he was to windward and they were scattered. To Monk the fact that the enemy was shy would have been an extra reason for attacking. To Torrington it only suggested dismal reflections as to what might happen if the French became enterprising, and therefore he retired. During the 26th he worked back from the south of the Isle of Wight to the N.E. A letter which he wrote on this day to the Council is marked on every line with glee over the embarrassment the crisis was likely to cause to his political opponents. He did indeed say that he would watch the enemy, and get to westward of them if he could; but before this he had expressed his opinion that the best course was to fall back to the Gunfleet, and then the ships from the west might come up to Portsmouth, and join him over the “Flats,” that is the shallows at the mouth of the Thames. The ships from the west were Killigrew’s squadron. Torrington knew that they had been cruising and must be foul, and it was certainly within his knowledge that they were less numerous than his own fleet. Yet he proposed to subject them to the risk of passing the French fleet, which he thought too great to be run by himself. This was not how Tromp had behaved when he united the fleets of the Maas and the Texel in defiance of Monk at the end of the First Dutch War.

It would seem that there are two types of fighting man. The first when in presence of the enemy instinctively thinks, “How can I strike with the most effect.” The great race are of this type. To it belong Blake and Monk, Hawke, Hood, Nelson, and their like, among our admirals; and, among our enemies, Tromp, De Ruyter, and Suffren. Then there is another kind of fighting man who may be brave enough personally, but who, when he is a commander, instinctively says, “How can I prevent the enemy from hurting me.” This kind of leader has fortunately been rare with us at sea, but Herbert was of the race, and so was Byng. Such men are always looking over their shoulders, always making the most of the enemy’s force, always exaggerating the defects of their own command. They seek for excuses to do nothing, and when they do come to the resolution to fight, the opposite determination to retreat forms itself underneath, as it were spontaneously. This was the natural tendency of Herbert as he had already shown in Bantry Bay, and it was strengthened by his wish to punish those political rivals in London who had refused to take his advice, and had turned him out of the Admiralty.

When his letter of the 26th reached the Council it was not unnaturally interpreted by them as indicating a wish to retire to the Gunfleet at once. This may have been a mistake, but an admiral who said that he had “heartily given God thanks” that the enemy declined battle, and added, “I shall not think myself very unhappy if I can get rid of them without fighting,” had no ground to complain if he was thought to be wanting in spirit. No member of the Council was more bitter against Herbert than his brother seaman Edward Russell, a rancorous man, and an extreme Whig. He was very probably moved by jealousy, but the queen and the civil members of the Council can hardly be severely blamed for not entirely trusting one admiral, when another admiral condemned him without stint. On general grounds the Council was justified in expecting more energy from Torrington. The danger was not that a great French army could land, this the queen’s counsellors knew to be impossible, but that a small corps of French troops might be thrown on shore which could act as a rallying point to the partizans of King James. It was a great object to rouse the general patriotic feeling of the country, and there was no more effectual method of doing that than a battle. The case was one in which it was better to fight, and be beaten, than not to fight at all. A letter was written in the queen’s name to Torrington. It was worded with no apparent want of confidence, and it left him free not to fight if he preferred; but it ordered him strictly not to lose sight of the French, to get to windward of them if he could, but to fight on the first advantage rather than to go to the Gunfleet.

The letter reached Torrington on the 29th of June. He called a council of war which agreed with him that it implied an order to fight on the first advantage. A previous council of war had confirmed his opinion that it was better not to fight. It may be laid down as a general rule that a council of war is a mere blind for the commander-in-chief. When it does not consist of his dependants it must still necessarily be full of his inferiors in rank, who have been trained by the habits of their life not to contradict the commanding officer. Besides, when he wants to fight, it looks cowardly to recommend retreat, and, when he wants to retreat, it looks like a reflection on his courage to insist upon fighting.

The fleet was now lying off Beachy Head some nine or ten miles to the south. The enemy again were some eighteen miles off to the S.W. The fleet weighed anchor at nine o’clock at night, and remained beating to and fro till daybreak. The wind was off the shore. The enemy also was under way at sundown, but at two o’clock in the morning Tourville was heard to fire guns as a signal to anchor. The sound was heard and understood in the English fleet. An opportunity now presented itself for slipping between the French and the land, and getting to the westward of them for the sake of joining Killigrew. Tromp would have made a push, but Torrington seems to have been in a dogged and stupid mood with no very fixed intention in his mind, save to make all the trouble he could for other people. At daybreak the fleet had not much altered its position. Beachy Head was still twelve miles to the N.E. and the French were visible at anchor to the south. At four o’clock the signal was made to form the line, and at eight o’clock the “bloody flag,” the red flag hoisted at the fore-topmast-head, which was the signal to engage the enemy, was run up in the flagship. Two vessels had joined Torrington since he left Dunnose. His total force now consisted of thirty-five English, and twenty-two Dutch. According to the order established for the fleet, the Dutch led when it was upon the starboard tack. As the wind was N.E. and the enemy to the South and West, the fleet bore down with the wind on the right quarter, the Dutch led. Torrington himself was in the centre with the Red Squadron, with Sir John Ashby between him and the Dutch, and Sir George Rooke between him and the Blue Squadron in the rear. Sir Ralph Delaval commanded the Blue Squadron. The fleet it must be understood was not perpendicular, but parallel to the enemy though a little behind him. Thus the ships of the allied fleet had to bear down on the French in a number of lines which struck upon them at an angle, but were parallel to one another. When the allied fleet was seen to be approaching, the French weighed anchor and lay with their heads pointing to N. of W. in a long concave line. The official French list gives seventy-two vessels present in the line, but the English counted that there were thirty-four ahead of the French admiral and forty-eight behind him. In this there was probably exaggeration, and perhaps downright lying. Tourville himself had his flag in the _Soleil Royale_, a magnificent ship of 110 guns. The van was commanded by the Lieutenant-General Châteaurenault and Lieutenant-General the Marquis de Villette Mursay. The rear was under the command of Count D’Estrées, Vice-Admiral _du levant_, and the Lieutenant-General Gabaret, who had been promoted after the action of Bantry Bay.

Fire began at nine o’clock when the Dutch ships under Admiral Cullemburg came into action with the French van. Owing to the inferiority of the allies in numbers there was a danger that as they could not stretch all along the line of the French fleet some of the ships in the French line would turn to windward, and put either the Dutch or the English, according to circumstances, between two fires. The danger was one which De Ruyter had had to face in the battles of 1672 and 1673, and he had provided for it by telling off a squadron to watch the enemy’s van and had then thrown the bulk of his own force on the rear. It shows how useless experience is to naturally stupid men, that although all the senior officers present had served either with, or against, De Ruyter, none of them thought of following his example. All the allied leaders could do was to endeavour to get as near as they could to stretching themselves out to the same length as the enemy by sending the van down against the French van; by keeping the Red Division opposite the enemy’s centre; and by leaving the attack on the rear to Sir Ralph Delaval. While they were bearing down, Herbert changed his mind once, or twice, as to the exact point of the enemy’s line he wished to reach, and altered the course of his ship accordingly. The result was that Sir John Ashby became puzzled as to the intentions of his commander-in-chief, and finally ended by attaching himself to the Dutch. In the end Torrington placed himself opposite the rear of the French centre so that there came a gap between him and Ashby. Being afraid that the French would stand out of their own line, in order to pass through this opening, Herbert kept his ships a good distance from the enemy so that he might be the better placed to head off such as attended this movement. As the French began to move ahead slowly, just as the allies came down, the Dutch could not get abreast of the leading ship, and struck on them at the ninth.

The Dutch began to fire at nine, Sir Ralph Delaval at half-past nine, and the centre at ten. At the two extremities the fighting was hot. Sir Ralph Delaval pressed eagerly on the squadron of Count D’Estrées, and pushed his attack with such energy that the enemy seemed to flinch. Sir John Ashby in the van found himself abreast of Tourville. He fired two guns in order to see whether the Vice-Admiral _du Ponant_ would be a “reasonable enemy.” Tourville disdained to strike first at his inferior in rank, and it was not until Ashby’s first broadside had been delivered that the _Soleil Royal_ opened fire. The wind, which had been strong in the early morning was still blowing a good breeze. It was used by the ships at the head of the French line to work to windward. Between eleven and twelve o’clock they succeeded in doubling on the Dutch and putting them between two fires. Admiral Cullemburg’s squadron fought gallantly but was overpowered. What had happened was seen on the centre and rear. Torrington’s attention was called to the movement by his flag-captain who asked if he also intended to allow himself to be weathered. He answered that he did not, and began at once to work up to windward. As Sir Ralph Delaval had pressed closely on D’Estrées, he had fallen to leeward of the commander-in-chief, and there was an “elbow” in the English line. By two o’clock the wind fell away to a dead calm and movement became restricted on either side to what could be done by towing, or drifting along with the tide. Cannonading went on between the two stationary fleets for some time. At last the ebb-tide set up a strong westerly current. The Dutch dropped anchor with all sails set. As the French were not seamen enough to do the same thing they drifted to the west. One Dutch ship which was too much damaged to anchor floated away, and became a prize. Then Herbert drifted down to the neighbourhood of the Dutch and anchored close by them. The allies remained at anchor, till the easterly current began to flow with the flood-tide in the evening. Then they got up anchor and tided eastwards towards the Thames. The pursuit of Tourville was timid. He followed next day, but in line of battle which limited the speed of his fleet to that of the slowest vessel in it. To this timidity Torrington owed his safety from complete destruction. A few of the more severely crippled Dutch and English vessels were set on fire, but the great bulk of the allied fleet got safely into the Thames.

The subsequent movements of Tourville may be dismissed in a few lines. He remained in the Channel until the early days of August, ranging at will up and down and of course paralysing commerce, but he did nothing more against our coast than burn the little town of Teignmouth in South Devon. There was nothing in fact that he could do. The Jacobite rising did not take place because he had no troops to land to help the country gentlemen, who were resolved not to move until they were secure against being attacked by the Government’s forces before they were sufficiently organised to offer any resistance. In August Tourville returned quietly to Brest. There had been a furious outbreak of anger in the country against Torrington and a great movement of patriotism which was unspeakably to the advantage of King William’s government. Yet when Torrington was brought to trial in December he was acquitted. The acquittal was intelligible. King William’s victory at the Boyne, gained just after the battle of Beachy Head, had put the country into good humour, and the admiral’s most bitter accusers were the Dutch who were not popular in England. But it was none the less a misfortune. Torrington had not done his utmost. His position indeed was a difficult one, but it was not worse than Monk’s in 1666, or De Ruyter’s in 1672, ’73, and he had not behaved as these men had done. When a court martial could find no fault with his management it lowered the whole standard of conduct expected of an English naval officer. It showed that a man who leaned to the side of timidity would not be condemned by other officers. Then, too, the court, which could see nothing to blame in his feeble effort of attack on the 30th June, must have been composed of men of a lower level of intelligence than the sea chiefs, whether Dutch, or English of the previous wars. It laid the foundation of that pedantic adherence to the line and the practice of engaging from van to rear which afterwards led to the monstrous sentence on Admiral Mathews, to the helpless weakness of Byng, and to the stupidity of Graves. Perhaps the ugliest feature of the whole transaction was this, that the English excused Torrington very largely on the ground that the chief sufferers in the battle had been the Dutch. There was something very base in the code of honour of people who did not think it ignoble to throw the burden of battle on an ally.

While Tourville was ranging the Channel the English government had fitted out a fresh armament. It was put under the combined command of Sir Richard Haddock, Sir John Ashby, and Admiral Killigrew. This fleet could, however, do little. The French were no longer at sea, and the great ships were laid up as usual before the beginning of autumn. Yet one good piece of service was done before the year was closed. Marlborough had suggested that an expedition might be sent to act against the partisans of King James in the south of Ireland. The scheme was approved by King William, and Marlborough sailed in September, under an escort of third and fourth rates commanded by the admirals. Cork was taken on the 29th September, and the bulk of the ships then returned to the Channel, leaving a few to co-operate with Marlborough in the attack on Kinsale. This completed the expedition. A separate squadron of ships had cruised during this year on the coast of Ireland, under the command of Sir Cloudesley Shovell, and had co-operated in the taking of Duncannon.

In this year the French had again made very little use of their naval force. In spite of Tourville’s victorious cruise in the Channel, the English cause had advanced as a whole. King James had been beaten from the north and east of Ireland, and deprived of two very important ports in the south. That this was so was due to the little help afforded him by the French navy. King Louis seems never to have thought of keeping a squadron permanently on the coast of Ireland, though it would have been easy and manifestly advantageous so to do. In the Channel, Tourville had really effected very little. He is perhaps not to be blamed for retiring in August. Nobody then thought of keeping the great ships out in autumn, and the French ports in the Channel are very poor. But he had shown undeniable want of enterprise against Torrington. His pursuit had been so feeble after Beachy Head that we may doubt whether he was the man to have taken advantage of the weather-gage of the change of wind which Herbert feared had occurred. His own countrymen were ill-satisfied with him. The famous epigram of Seignelay that he was _poltron de tête mais non de cœur_, is well known. If this was all the French could do when their powers were at the best it would be the fault of the allies if they did not some day turn the tables on their enemy.

The operations of 1691 were of a nature to confirm this belief. A powerful fleet was sent to sea by the allies under the command of Russell. Its movements throughout the summer were wearisome and unimportant. It went to and fro between May and the beginning of autumn. In the meantime Tourville was at sea with a fleet of eighty sail of the line. His cruise is rather a famous passage in French naval history. He contrived to keep the sea without allowing himself to be forced to battle—and at last, by making clever use of a shift of wind, managed to get into Brest untouched by the allied fleet. The pride of the French of the time with this achievement, and the satisfaction they have expressed at it since, are the condemnation of a navy, and a method of conducting war. Tourville was quite strong enough to fight the allies, yet his movements were directed to avoiding battle and to capturing merchant ships. As a matter of fact, he missed his great prize, the Smyrna convoy, and in the meantime Limerick, King James’s last stronghold in Ireland, was taken, and the country thoroughly subdued. The great French fleet had preserved itself, but the King of France had lost an ally who kept up a useful diversion of the resources of England. A fighting force which makes it a principal object to avoid battle is doomed to defeat when it comes across an enemy who makes it a steady rule to fight. But the French never took the view that if you wish to use the sea you must drive your enemy off it, and if you want to do that you must smash him. In the dullest times the English navy has always understood that the beating of the French navy was the preliminary to everything else. The French government, which was much distressed by lack of money, was angry with Tourville for missing the convoy, and accused him of timidity.

In 1692 the French at last learnt by a painful experience the truth of Bacon’s saying that “_Occasion turneth a bald noddle after she has presented her locks in front, and no hold taken_, or at least turneth the handle of the bottle first to be received and afterwards the belly which is hard to clasp.” After wasting three years either in delivering their blows wide, or hitting feebly when the direction was good, the French at last made a serious effort to strike England to the heart. But what they might have done with a fair prospect of success in ’89, ’90, or ’91, they attempted with insufficient means in ’92. Their deficiencies were due to causes which a little foresight would have made them understand were sure to operate sooner or later. The events of ’90 had taught the English Government the necessity for vigorous preparations. At the same time an accident, such as was always likely to occur, prevented a timely concentration of their own forces. The Toulon fleet, under Châteaurenault, ought to have joined Tourville at Brest early in the year, but it was delayed by bad weather. It was, and always has been, a cause of weakness to the French that their two seacoasts on the Mediterranean and the Atlantic are separated from one another by the Spanish Peninsula. An enemy who is in a position to occupy the Straits of Gibraltar with a strong naval force is admirably placed, to prevent one-half of the French fleet from uniting with the other. Even when there was no hostile squadron in the Straits, persistent bad weather might confine the French in the Mediterranean. At a later date, attempted concentrations of the French fleet broke down from these very causes. But this was a probability which ought to have been provided for. Louis XIV. ought either to have made his officers act with more spirit or not to have allowed an important part of his fleet to go back to the Mediterranean at the close of ’91. As it was, his effort to carry out a scheme of invasion with a part of his naval force, when the whole of them would not have been too many, ended, as it was bound to end, in disastrous failure.

The allied Dutch and English fleets were out early. Their Governments had a double motive for wasting no time. They were aware that an army of invasion, consisting in part of Irish regiments in the service of France, was being collected in Normandy for the invasion of England. In spite of many disappointments King James was still hopeful, and he had persuaded the King of France to make an effort to help the Jacobites in England. The army of invasion, some 30,000 strong, was collected in the Côtentin. They were quartered at La Hougue, on the eastern side of the Côtentin. Another object for which the allies had to provide was the safe return of the ships, Dutch and English, composing the Smyrna convoy. It was coming home under the protection of a squadron commanded by Sir Ralph Delaval. In order to discharge the double duty of covering the return of the convoy and watching the French, a detached squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Carter cruised on the coast from Brest to Cape La Hague, the north-westerly point of the Côtentin. Delaval brought his convoy back in March and then joined Carter on the coast of France. In later times the English navy would have prepared to prevent the concentration of the French fleet by cruising off Brest, but at the end of the seventeenth century our officers had not yet acquired that confidence in their vessels, and the vessels had not been so far perfected, as to make cruising in spring on so dangerous a coast as that about Brest appear practicable for the great ships. The grand fleet was not in fact fully ready for sea till May, when Russell called in the detached squadrons, and united his whole force at St. Helens.

There was another reason for bringing the fleet together. The Government had decided on making a demonstration. During the last few months, as indeed at all times in King William’s reign, the Jacobite agents had been very busy. The great discontent undoubtedly existing among the naval officers, and partly due to the grievances as to their pay, had appeared to give the friends of the exiled king an opportunity. Captain David Lloyd had been running to and fro with great zeal. His old comrades were too much attached to him to betray him to the Government even when they were opposed to his party, and there were no doubt great numbers of English naval officers who were as well disposed as other Englishmen to restore the exiled king if only he would not be his own worst enemy. These men would not be shocked by arguments in his favour. As they had themselves been praised and in some cases rewarded for deserting King James, it would be unreasonable to expect that they should have been greatly offended when asked by an old brother officer to desert back to him from King William. The activity of Lloyd was perfectly well known to the English Government. He had spoken to Carter, who had immediately reported the whole of the conversation to the queen. Lloyd himself does not appear to have taken all the grumblings he heard among his brother seamen very seriously, and the Council of Regency was probably not very frightened. But it wisely decided to bring all doubts to the test. On the 15th May a letter drawn up in the queen’s name by the Secretary, Nottingham, was sent down to the flag officers and captains of the fleet. In this letter the queen informed them that she had heard stories accusing them of disloyalty but she did not believe the accusations, and continued to repose the most complete confidence in their fidelity. This profession of a confidence it would have been wise to assume, even if it had not been sincerely felt, was at once communicated by Russell to his subordinates. It had the effect which had been hoped for. The fleet answered by unanimous expression of loyalty. An address expressing the perfect readiness of all the officers to venture their lives, with all imaginable “alacrity and resolution,” in defence “of the Government and of the religion and liberty of the country and against all Popish invaders whatsoever,” was drawn up and signed on behalf of the fleet by sixty-four flag officers and captains.

An opportunity was speedily given to these officers to show that they could be as good as their word. A council of war decided to take the initiative against the French. A body of troops was to be landed at St. Malo, while the allied fleet was to lie to the westward of that place in order to provoke a battle. On the 18th May, Russell sailed from St. Helens, and on the following day when he was about twenty miles off Cape Barfleur, the easterly corner of the Côtentin, the look-out ships to the westward of the fleet made the signal for seeing the enemy. In fact, while the allies had been talking of invading France, Tourville had sailed from Brest with the intention of covering an invasion of England, and after suffering some delay from the weather had come so far. The two fleets now opposed to one another were divided as follows, and consisted of the elements shown on these lists:—

+-------------------------+----------------------------------------------+ | THE DUTCH | THE ENGLISH | +-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+ | The White Squadron | Red Squadron | Blue Squadron | +-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+ | Guns | Guns | Guns | | _The Zealand_ 90 | =The Royal | =The Victory= 100 | | _Konig Wilhelm_ 92 | William= 100 | =Albemarle= 90 | | _Brandenburg_ 92 | =London= 100 | =Windsor Castle= 90 | | _West Friesland_ 84 | =Britannia= 100 | =Neptune= 90 | | _Printz_ 92 | =St. Andrew= 100 | =Vanguard= 90 | | _Printzess_ 92 | =Royal Sovereign= 100 | =Duchess= 90 | | _Bexhirmer_ 84 | =St. Michael= 90 | =Ossory= 90 | | _Casteel Medenblick_ 86 | =Sandwich= 90 | =Duke= 90 | | _Captain General_ 84 | =Royal Catherine= 90 | =Resolution= 70 | | _North Holland_ 68 | =Cambridge= 70 | =Monk= 60 | | _Erste Edele_ 74 | =Plymouth= 60 | =Expedition= 70 | | _Munickendam_ 72 | =Breda= 80 | =Royal Oak= 74 | | _Gelderland, A._ 72 | =Kent= 70 | =Northumberland= 70 | | _Stadt Meeyden_ 72 | =Swiftsure= 70 | =Lion= 60 | | _Etswout_ 72 | =Hampton Court= 70 | =Berwick= 70 | | _Printz Casimir_ 70 | =Grafton= 70 | =Defiance= 70 | | _Frisia_ 70 | =Restoration= 70 | =Montague= 60 | | _Riddershap_ 72 | =Eagle= 70 | =Warspight= 70 | | _De 7 Provintzen_ 76 | =Rupert= 60 | =Monmouth= 70 | | _Zurick Zee_ 60 | =Elizabeth= 70 | =Edgar= 70 | | _Gelderland, R._ 64 | =Burford= 70 | =Stirling Castle= 70 | | _Vere_ 62 | =Captain= 70 | =Dreadnought= 60 | | _Zealand, A._ 64 | =Devonshire= 80 | =Suffolk= 70 | | _Haerlem_ 64 | =York= 60 | =Cornwall= 80 | | _Leyden_ 64 | =Lenox= 70 | =Essex= 70 | | _Amsterdam_ 64 | =Ruby= 50 | =Hope= 70 | | _Velew_ 64 | =Oxford= 50 | =Chatham= 50 | | _Maegd van Dort_ 64 | =St. Albans= 50 | =Advice= 50 | | _Tergoes_ 54 | =Greenwich= 50 | =Adventure= 50 | | _Medenblick_ 50 | =Chester= 50 | =Crown= 50 | | _Gaesterland_ 50 | =Centurion= 50 | =Woolwich= 54 | | _Ripperda_ 50 | =Bonaventure= 50 | =Deptford= 50 | | _Schattershoff_ 50 | | | | _Stadden Land_ 52 | | | | _Hoorn_ 50 | | | | _Delft_ 54 | | | +-------------------------+-----------------------+----------------------+

The list of the French fleet given by Monsieur Troude is as follows:—

+-------------------+---------------------+------------------+ | Guns | Guns | Guns | | _Bourbon_ 64 | _Fort_ 60 | _Content_ 64 | | _Monarque_ 90 | _Henri_ 64 | _Souverain_ 84 | | _Aimable_ 68 | _Ambitieux_ 96 | _Illustre_ 70 | | _Saint Louis_ 60 | _Couronne_ 76 | _Modéré_ 52 | | _Diamant_ 60 | _Maure_ 52 | _Excellent_ 60 | | _Gaillard_ 68 | _Serieux_ 68 | _Prince_ 60 | | _Terrible_ 76 | _Courageux_ 58 | _Magnifique_ 76 | | _Merveilleux_ 94 | _Perle_ 56 | _Laurier_ 64 | | _Tonnant_ 76 | _Glorieux_ 64 | _Brave_ 58 | | _Saint-Michel_ 60 | _Conquerant_ 84 | _Entend_ 60 | | _Sans-Pareil_ 62 | _Soleil Royal_ 104 | _Triomphant_ 76 | | _Foudroyant_ 82 | _Saint-Philippe_ 84 | _Orgueilleux_ 94 | | _Brilliant_ 68 | _Admirable_ 90 | | +-------------------+---------------------+------------------+

It will be seen that the force of the two fleets was extremely unequal; the allies being in fact more than twice as strong as their enemy. If this was a surprise to the French, the information supplied to Louis XIV. by the Jacobites in England, and by his agents in the Low Countries, must have been far less accurate than is commonly supposed. If, on the other hand, he really did believe that the grumblers in the English fleet, and that Russell the admiral, who was undoubtedly in communication with the exiled court at St. Germain, would betray their country to its hereditary enemy on the field of battle, and under the eyes of all the world, he must have been singularly impervious to experience. Tourville received peremptory orders, dated the 26th March, and worded in a style insulting to him. He was told to go near enough to the enemy to see them for himself, and not to be misled into believing that merchant-ships were men-of-war, as he was accused of doing during the off-shore cruise of 1691. If on reaching La Hougue he found the allies already there, he was to attack them whatever their numbers might be. If victorious, he was to cover the passage of the army to England. If defeated, he was to save his fleet as he best could. Should the allies not be near La Hougue when he arrived, he was to transport the army without waste of time. If the allies attacked him during the passage, he was to fight with obstinacy, so as to give the army time to land. In case the allies appeared after the landing, he might avoid a battle if they exceeded in number by ten ships.

When the French were signalled by the guns of the look-out ships at three o’clock on the morning of the 19th, the weather was foggy. Fearing that the enemy might stretch past him to northward, Russell signalled to the rear to tack and close the space between him and the coast of England. At four o’clock the mist lifted and the enemy were seen to the westward with their heads pointing to the south. As this showed that they had no intention of attempting to turn him on the north side Russell countermanded the order to the Rear or Blue Division. The allied fleet was not in order of battle but scattered some ahead, some to windward, and some to leeward of the admiral. The wind was blowing from the S.W., and the French therefore had the weather-gage. The line was formed at eight o’clock with the Dutch or White Squadron in the van, and to the south of the Red Squadron which formed the centre, then came the Blue Squadron farthest to the north. There must have been a distance of many miles between the first and last ship of this great fleet of ninety-nine sail, and the Blue Squadron was still to leeward. Having made his simple disposition to meet the attack Russell lay with his topsail to the mast waiting for the enemy to come on. With a resolution of character which shows his innate superiority to Herbert, Tourville charged home. He directed his attack on the centre of the allied line, telling off a few ships in his van and rear to watch the van and rear of the allies, and prevent them from doubling on his own fleet.

The battle began about ten o’clock, and lasted till about five in the afternoon. The French ships engaged with the Red Division made no attempt to break through the English line. The battle was conducted entirely by cannonading at short ranges, and the English claimed that their fire was more rapid than the French. When the enemy’s attack was fully developed Russell ordered the van to tack for the purpose of getting to windward of the French, and putting them between two fires, and at the same time signalled to the Blue Division to come closer to the centre. Neither order could be obeyed, for the wind was very light so that the ships were unable to manœuvre. The real battle was always between the Red Squadron and the ships immediately around Tourville. About two o’clock in the afternoon the wind, after falling altogether, rose again, but from the N.W., thus giving the weather-gage to the allies, and by five o’clock Tourville began to draw off. He doubtless felt that enough had been done for honour, and he hoped that the Red Squadron had been sufficiently mauled to cripple it from pursuing him. The wind was light and variable. As the French ships drew away to the westward it fell calm and the mist arose again; then there was a short squall from the east. Sir Cloudesley Shovell with the rear division of the Red Squadron broke through the French in the interval between the centre and the ships which had been stretched out to observe the rear of the allies. Captain Hastings of the =Sandwich= was killed at this phase of the action. The two fleets became mingled in the fog, and drifted to the westward with the ebb-tide. Both anchored at the flood, but at this moment a portion of the Blue Squadron which had worked to the westward of the French drifted back through them in the mist and darkness. They were fired on as they came through, and Rear-Admiral Carter, whose division made this movement, was killed. The sound of the cannonading was heard by the rest of the allied fleet, but it could take no part in the action. When he saw that the enemy was in retreat Russell had ordered a general chase, that is to say he left each ship free to go at its utmost speed. But no great rapidity of movement was possible. The wind had fallen, and the fog made it impossible to see.

This was the end of what strictly speaking is called the battle of La Hogue, from the old spelling of La Hougue. The name is improperly used, for the actual battle was fought off Cape Barfleur. The battle of Barfleur was in fact the title commonly given by our ancestors, but it has been displaced by the name of the place which was the last scene of the four days’ pursuit following on the action. The pursuit began like a nightmare, in strenuous effort to act without the power to move. Both fleets had anchored during the night. When daylight came there was a thick haze and the French were invisible to the allied fleet. What little wind there was, was from the N.N.E. At about eight o’clock some of the Dutch ships caught sight of the enemy to the W.S.W. The pursuit was resumed, but, as the ships could not move more quickly than they were carried by the tide, the progress was very slow. At four o’clock in the afternoon the ebb-tide ceased, and both fleets again anchored, the French in order to avoid the risk of being carried among their pursuers, and the allies so that they should not lose ground. They had moved so little during the ebb-tide that they were still off Cape Barfleur, and at no great distance from the scene of the battle. As long as the tide was flowing it was useless to move, but at ten in the evening, when it turned, both fleets again got under way and began to drift to the west. About this time the fore-topmast of the =Britannia=, which had been seriously injured in the action, came down, and as Russell did not transfer his flag to another vessel, this delayed the Red Squadron under his immediate command. Many of them must have suffered in the action. Whether because they felt bound to remain about their admiral, or because they could not move any faster, the ships of the Red Squadron fell somewhat behind in the pursuit while the Blue and White pressed on ahead. At four in the morning of the 21st both fleets anchored again. They had now tided so far that they were almost off Cape La Hague. Both were much scattered. A part of the French had passed the Cape, the others had not. Among those which had failed to get beyond the headland was the _Soleil Royal_, Tourville’s flagship. She had suffered very severely in the action from the fire of the =Britannia= and the ships just ahead and astern. It has been said with some appearance of truth that if Tourville had had the resolution to set her on fire he might have brought the whole of his fleet round Cape La Hague. But she was the pride of the French Navy, and had been named from the king himself who was the royal sun of France, and the admiral could not make his mind up to sacrifice her. He had, however, transferred his flag to another ship the _Ambitieux_.

When the fleets were ordered to anchor, only a portion of the French was able to obey. Whether it was because they had slipped their cables on the previous night, and therefore could not anchor, or whether their anchors would not hold, it is certain that they were unable to stop themselves from being carried to the eastward towards the allies. The position then in the early hours of the 21st was this, one part of the French fleet was ahead, to the west another part was drifting eastward between the land and the allies. The best sailing ships of the White and Blue Squadrons were well ahead of Russell, who with the Red Squadron was furthest of all to the east. The inability of the ships immediately about him to anchor showed Tourville that it was useless to endeavour to keep his now divided fleet acting as one body any longer. If he summoned the ships to the west to his assistance he would bring the whole fleet into a trap between the land and the enemy, who was in overwhelming numbers. Since he could no longer exercise his powers as commander to any advantage there remained nothing for him but to abdicate. He therefore hauled down his flag of command from the main-topmast-head, as a signal that every captain was free to act as he thought best for the safety of his ship. The French fleet now split into fragments. One part, under the Chef d’escadre Pannetier made a push for the Channel between the coast of France and the island of Alderney. The easterly current of the flood-tide splits at Cape La Hague. While the main body flows up Channel a branch turns off, and runs with great speed between the west side of the Côtentin and the island of Alderney. This makes what we call the Race of Alderney, and the French the Raz Blanchard. The navigation is dangerous, and would, under ordinary circumstances, have been avoided by the heavy ships, but circumstances only left the French a choice of evils, and they ran through the Race to seek refuge under the guns of St. Malo.

Russell, seeing that the division of the French and the distress of the vessels drifting towards him made it no longer necessary to keep his fleet together, signalled to Ashby, and the Dutch to pursue Pannetier. Meanwhile he, with the Red Division and the laggards of the White and Blue, prepared to deal with those of Tourville’s ships which had failed to round La Hague. Ashby could not reach the enemy. Pannetier had time to get his ships over the bar of the Rance, and take refuge under the guns of the corsair town of St. Malo, before his pursuers reached him. Ashby returned next day and joined Sir Ralph Delaval, who, in the meantime, had done a good stroke of work at Cherbourg. When it became clear that they were trapped the ships of Tourville had no resource but to endeavour to fly to the eastward between Russell and the land, to round Cape Barfleur and to take refuge at La Hougue. Three of them were too crippled for further flight. These were the famous _Soleil Royal_, for whose sake so much had been risked, the _Admirable_, and the _Triomphant_. All three were run ashore at Cherbourg, and the others fled eastward. Russell left Sir Ralph Delaval to deal with the stranded ships, and followed the rest. Delaval could do nothing on the evening of the 21st, but on the following morning he sent in the boats and fireships, under the command of Captain Heath, Captain Greenaway, and Captain Foulis. The _Admirable_ and _Triomphant_ were burnt. But the fireship with which Captain Foulis endeavoured to burn the _Soleil Royal_ was sunk by the Frenchmen’s fire. Hereupon, Delaval hauled in as close as he could and opened fire on the great stranded flagship. When he had battered her for some time, and found that no further resistance was made, he took his boats and boarded her. Sir Ralph Delaval’s report contains a detail which is discreditable to King Louis’s navy. He says he found many men and wounded men in the _Soleil Royal_, but no officers. She was burnt by the English. When the work was done Sir Ralph was disturbed by thirty sail approaching him from the west. This, however, turned out to be Sir John Ashby’s squadron, and the two officers united their forces, and followed the admiral to the east. A few of the French ships under command of Nesmond escaped by sailing round the British Isles.

Russell pursued Tourville round Cape Barfleur. The French admiral ran as close as he could to La Hougue, with the thirteen vessels still about him. It was not until the evening of the 22nd, so light was the wind and so slow were the ships of that time amid tides and variable breezes, that Russell was able to anchor in the neighbourhood of the fugitives. On the 23rd he sent in the boats and fireships under Rooke, who burnt six of the enemy. On the 24th the work was completed by the destruction of the other seven. The French indeed were panic-stricken, and the resistance was trifling. Not more than ten men were killed in this piece of service, which if attempted against an alert and resolute enemy must needs have been very costly.