Chapter XL: Section XXXVIII: Chapter VI (2)

Wellington had only 12,000 men available in front of a very formidable position--hills 1,500 or 1,800 feet high, with the peaks which formed the flank protection rising to 2,100 or 2,300. Under ordinary circumstances an attack would have been insane. Moreover, his troops were almost as way-worn as those of Soult: the Light and 4th Divisions had received no rations since the 30th, and the latter had lost a good third of its strength in the very heavy fighting in which it had taken the chief part between the 25th and the 30th. But their spirits were high, they had the strongest confidence in their power to win, and they were convinced that the enemy was ‘on the run’--in which idea they were perfectly right.

The plan of attack was that the 4th and 7th Divisions should assail the enemy’s centre, on each side of the village of Echalar, while the Light Division turned his western flank. This involved long preliminary marching for Alten’s men, despite of their awful fatigues of the preceding day. They had to trudge from the bridge of Yanzi and Aranaz to Vera, where they turned uphill on to the heights of Santa Barbara, a series of successive slopes by which they ascended towards the Peak of Ivantelly and Reille’s flank. Just as they began to deploy they got the first regular meal that they had seen for two days: ‘The soldiers were so weak that they could hardly stand; however, our excellent commissary had managed to overtake us, and hastily served out half a pound of biscuit to each individual, which the men devoured in the act of priming and loading just as they moved off to the attack[1043].’ The morning was dull and misty--a great contrast to the blazing sunshine of the preceding day, and it was hard to get any complete view of the position--clouds were drifting along the hills and obscuring parts of the landscape for many minutes at a time. This chance put Wellington himself in serious danger for a moment--pushing forward farther than he knew, with a half-company of the 43rd to cover him, he got among the French outposts, and was only saved by the vigilance of his escort from being cut off--he galloped back under a shower of balls--any one of which might have caused a serious complication in the British command--it is impossible to guess what Beresford would have made of the end of the campaign of 1813.

While the Light Division was developing the flank attack, the front attack was already being delivered--somewhat sooner than Wellington expected or intended. The plan had been for the 4th Division to operate against the French right--the 7th against their centre and left centre. Cole, however, was delayed in getting forward by the immense block of French débris along the narrow defile from Sumbilla to the bridge of Yanzi. ‘For two miles there were scattered along the road papers, old rugs, blankets, pack-saddles, old bridles and girths, private letters, hundreds of empty and broken boxes, quantities of entrenching tools, French clothes, dead mules, dead soldiers, dead peasants, farriers’ tools, boots and linen, the boxes of M. le Général Baron de St. Pol[1044] and other officers, the field hospital of the 2nd Division (Darmagnac’s), and all sorts of things worth picking up--which caused stoppage and confusion[1045].’

Now the 7th Division did not follow the spoil-strewn river road, but cut across from Sumbilla towards Echalar, over the same hill-tracks which Clausel’s divisions had taken on the preceding afternoon, when they escaped from the pursuit of Cole’s skirmishers. Hence it chanced that they arrived in front of Echalar on a route where the enemy was keeping no good watch, long before the 4th Division came up from the bridge of Yanzi and the Vera cross-roads. The mists on the hills had kept them screened--as Clausel complains in his report. Lord Dalhousie now carried out a most dangerous manœuvre--a frontal attack on an enemy in position by a series of brigades arriving at long intervals--without any co-operation having been sought or obtained from the troops known to be on his left. ‘Bravery and success,’ as a Light-Division neighbour observed, ‘certainly far exceeded judgement or utility[1046].’ What led the commander of the 7th Division to this astounding escapade was the obvious unpreparedness of the enemy. ‘We caught them,’ he wrote, ‘cooking above, and plundering below in the village. I thought it best to be at them instantly, and I really believe Barnes’s brigade was among them before their packs were well on[1047].’

The leading troops, and the only ones which really got into action, were the three battalions (1/6th, 3rd Provisional[1048], and Brunswick-Oels) of Barnes’s brigade--led by that same fighting general who had stopped the rout at Maya with two of these same battalions. Barnes got his line formed, and attacked uphill against the front of Conroux’s division, long before Inglis’s brigade was ready to follow, or Lecor’s Portuguese had even got down from the hill path into the narrow valley of the Sari stream. With such speed and vigour was the assault delivered, under a frontal fire from Conroux’s men, and a flank fire from Vandermaesen’s on the right, that Inglis’s brigade, which was aiming at the village of Echalar, never had the chance of getting near its enemy. The advancing line suffered severely as it climbed--nearly 300 casualties--but when it came against the front of Conroux, and delivered its first volley, the enemy simply melted away[1049]. As Clausel writes in apology, ‘the resistance ought to have been greater, and in the ordinary state of the army, that is to say when a better spirit prevailed, it would never have been possible for the enemy to establish himself in this fashion on a section of the main chain of the Pyrenees. This day the morale of the troops was bad[1050].’ It must be remembered that Conroux’s was the division which had suffered so heavily in the village of Sorauren both on the 28th and the 30th of July. Several of its battalions were skeletons--all much thinned. Still there must have been 3,000 men yet present out of the original 7,000--and they turned and fled before the uphill attack of 1,800 or less. Nor was this the end of the disaster. Clausel tried to hurry Vandermaesen’s division to the succour of Conroux’s. But the manœuvre failed: the French General says that Conroux’s flying troops ran in upon Vandermaesen’s, that confusion followed, and that he was obliged to let the whole mass roll back to seek shelter with Taupin’s division in the reserve line[1050].

At this moment the leading brigade of the 4th Division, that of Ross, at last appeared on Dalhousie’s left, and began to skirmish with Lamartinière’s line[1051]: demonstrations began--probably by Lecor’s Portuguese--against the front of Maransin[1052], D’Erlon’s right-hand division. But these were of no importance in comparison with the effect of the turning of Reille’s end of the line by the Light Division. This was almost as startling in effect as Barnes’s dealings with the French centre. Having reached the front on the heights of Santa Barbara, below the Peak of Ivantelly, Alten brushed aside Maucune’s feeble skirmishing line, and let loose five companies of the Rifle Brigade supported by four of the 43rd against the dominating peak of the Ivantelly, the most prominent feature of the French position. Clouds swept down along the hills at this moment, and the supporting companies lost sight of the front line. ‘An invisible firing commenced, and it was impossible to ascertain which party was getting the better of the fight: the combatants were literally contending in the clouds[1053].’ But when the 43rd came up, they found that the rifle companies had dislodged the 2nd Léger, Lamartinière’s flank regiment, from the precipitous crest, and were in full possession of it. As they lost only 1 officer and 26 men in taking a most formidable peak, it is clear that the enemy’s resistance must have been very ineffective[1054].

All was now confusion on the French right wing--Reille speaks of himself as wandering about in a fog with three battalions of Lamartinière’s, and meeting no one save the brigadier Montfort, who was bringing up a mere 200 men to try to reinforce the troops on the Ivantelly. The soldiers were profiting by the mist to go off to the rear, and could not be kept together. ‘On se tirailla faiblement, et nos troupes se retirèrent sur la route de Sarre.’ With his centre smashed in, and his right dispersed, Soult could do nothing but retire. The remains of Clausel’s and Reille’s divisions fell back on the road to Sarre. D’Erlon, who had never been attacked, could not use this route, but made his way along the crest of the mountains to Zagaramurdi, Urdax, and Ainhoue. What would have been his fate if he had found there not the picquet which (by Wellington’s order) Byng had thrown forward to Urdax, but the whole of Byng’s and Hill’s troops blocking his retreat--as would have been the case if the great scheme drawn up on the night of August 1 had been carried out? But the Pass of Maya had not been utilized that day, and D’Erlon had only to drive away 50 men.

There was no pursuit: if there had been it would seem that the whole French army would have broken up, for it had shown itself this day no longer able to fight. ‘The spirit not only of the men but of the officers,’ wrote Reille next morning, ‘has been very bad during these last days. The absolute want of food must be the excuse for this state of things.’ The condition of the army was deplorable--Maucune’s division showed less than 1,000 men holding together. The 1st Line of Vandermaesen’s had precisely 27 men with the eagle--yet had lost only 4 officers and 193 men in action--where were the remaining 400? Other units could show a few hundred men but absolutely or practically no officers--the 55th Line of Conroux had lost every one of 13 officers, the 51st Line of Darmagnac 12 out of 17, the 34th Léger of Maucune 30 out of 35; these were exceptionally hard cases, but in all the divisions save those of Foy and Abbé (the least engaged during the short campaign), the proportion was appalling. For the infantry of the whole army it was 420 casualties among 1,318 officers present. Soult wrote to Clarke on the last day of the campaign: ‘I deceived myself in the strangest way when I told your Excellency that the troops had their morale intact, and would do their duty. I mistook the sentiment of shame for their recent disaster (Vittoria) for that of steadfastness. When tested, they started with one furious rush, but showed no power of resistance.... Since I first entered the service I have seen nothing like this. It reminded me of the behaviour of the levy _en masse_ of 1792. The spirit of these troops must be terribly broken to have permitted them to behave in this fashion. One general told me that he had overheard men remarking, when we were near Pampeluna, that they had better not fight too hard, because it would be preferable to get back to the frontier rather than to be led off into the middle of Spain[1055].’ These were cruel and spiteful words--the army had fought with excellent courage, till after July 30th it had convinced itself that the Marshal had got wrong with all his calculations, that the game was up--that they were being taken on a wild goose chase without rations in the most desolate and rocky region of Europe. But by August 2 Soult was not far out in his statement--on that day the greater part of his army was a spent force. If Wellington had resolved to pursue with vigour, he could have pushed it as far as he pleased. Perhaps the great encircling scheme with which his mind dallied for a few hours on the night of August 1 might have resulted in its surrender or complete dispersion.

This was not to be. On August 3 Wellington halted, and commenced to rearrange his troops on much the same principles, and in much the same positions, that he had selected before. He wrote to Graham next day that he was perfectly well aware of the objection to taking up a defensive position in the Pyrenees, but that an advance was too risky[1056]. It was not so much the prospect of the wastage of his troops, even in successful operation, that deterred him, though this was the point on which he insisted in his letter to Graham, but the general political situation of Europe. The eternal Armistice of Plässwitz was still holding up operations in Germany: it was still possible that the Allied Sovereigns might make a selfish peace with Napoleon, and permit the Emperor to expand Soult’s army _ad infinitum_ with sudden reinforcements. What would then become of the Anglo-Portuguese host, even if it had won its way not only to Bayonne but to Bordeaux? All this he had considered, and wrote to the Secretary for War in Whitehall that ‘as for the immediate invasion of France, from what I have seen of the state of negotiations in the North of Europe, I have determined to consider it only in reference to the convenience of my own operations.... If peace should be made by the Powers of the North, I must necessarily withdraw into Spain.’ No advance, however tempting the opportunity, should be made until he was certain that war had recommenced in Saxony[1057]. Meanwhile, ‘Soult will not feel any inclination to renew his expeditions--on this side at least.’

So the army settled down to hold once more the line of the Pyrenees, and to resume the siege of St. Sebastian. On August 3 the Head-quarters were once more at Lesaca, as they had been on July 25--how many things had happened in the interval! Hill and the 2nd Division, now rejoined by the long-missing brigade of Byng, as also Silveira’s Portuguese, were in the Maya passes once more. The 3rd Division was holding the Roncesvalles defiles, the 4th and 7th were at Echalar, the 6th in the Alduides (replacing Campbell’s Portuguese in that remote valley); the Light Division lay on the heights opposite Vera. Morillo’s Division was in the Bastan behind Hill, the part of the Army of Reserve of Andalusia which O’Donnell had carried to the front, when he left the rest before Pampeluna, was at the moment near the bridge of Yanzi. The remainder of that army and Carlos de España were continuing the blockade of Pampeluna.

The total losses of the Allies during the nine days’ ‘Campaign of the Pyrenees’ had amounted to slightly over 6,400 officers and men for the English and Portuguese[1058]. The Spanish loss could not add over 600 more--at Sorauren it was 192; Morillo’s casualties at Altobiscar, and those of the regiment of Asturias at Yanzi bridge are the only unknown quantities, and can hardly have reached 400. The distribution among divisions and corps was odd--the 3rd and Light Division had practically negligible casualties: the former under 120, the latter under 50. The main stress fell on the 2nd and 4th Divisions, the former with 2,000 British and 350 Portuguese casualties, the latter with 1,400 and 300 respectively. But it must be remembered that the 2nd Division had (including Byng) four brigades, the 4th Division only three. Every unit in both was severely tried; the most terrible return was that of the 1/92nd with its 26 officers and 445 men killed, wounded, and missing. But this was a strong battalion of 750 bayonets, and I am not sure that the 284 casualties of the 20th and the 296 casualties of the 3/27th, both in the 4th Division, do not represent almost as great a proportional loss, as these were both much smaller corps.

The 6th Division was engaged on two days only, at the two battles of Sorauren, and had the appreciable number of 450 British and 370 Portuguese casualties. The 7th Division fought on three days--at second Sorauren, at the Combat of the Venta de Urroz, and at Echalar, and three of its battalions also saved the day at Maya--with a loss in all of 750 British but only 60 Portuguese. Lastly, we must name the two Portuguese brigades of Silveira’s division, of which Campbell’s fought at Sorauren, Da Costa’s at Beunza, with a loss to the former of 350 and to the latter of 280 men. The general fact emerges that the 2nd and 4th Divisions lost between them 4,350 men out of the total 7,000--no other division had so many as 1,000 casualties.

The official list of French losses is not quite complete, as it includes only the infantry and cavalry units--but such casualties as may have been suffered by the general staff, the artillery (very little engaged) sappers, and train can have added comparatively little to the total, though a good many men of the train were taken at Yanzi on August 1. The figures given work out to 12,563--1,308 killed, 8,545 wounded, and 2,710 prisoners. The last-named total should probably be brought up to 3,000 in order to include individuals of the non-combatant corps captured in the retreat. The divisions suffered in very unequal measure: Foy and Abbé got off very lightly, because the one was practically not engaged at first Sorauren, nor the latter at Maya--they lost respectively only 550 and 750 men. Vandermaesen’s and Maucune’s Divisions--each a small unit of only 4,000 men, had the crushing losses of 1,480 and 1,850 respectively, and were dissolved when the campaign was over, and re-formed to a large extent with battalions drawn from the Bayonne reserve. Darmagnac and Conroux each lost well over 2,000 men out of 7,000--their divisions having been terribly cut up, the one at Maya the other at Sorauren. Maransin and Taupin each return over 1,000 men lost out of 6,000; Lamartinière just under 1,000 out of 7,000. The cavalry, barely engaged and quite useless, had only 67 casualties to report.

But to get at Soult’s fighting strength on the last day of the retreat, it is not sufficient merely to deduct the 12,563 casualties from the 59,000 which took the field in Navarre. The eight divisions collected on the 2nd August were short not only of their own casualties, but of Foy’s division, which had gone off on an eccentric line of retreat, as had several smaller detachments[1059]. But the great deficit was that of at least 8,000 or 10,000 stragglers, who rejoined at their leisure during the next ten days. The cavalry and artillery had all gone to the rear, and it is doubtful if the last stand at Echalar was made with so many as 25,000 weary infantry. If the Marshal had been faced with an opponent who had no political _arrière pensée_ to hold him back, he would have been doomed to absolute destruction. Only a wreck of his army would have escaped, and Wellington might have driven the remnants as far as he pleased--even to the gates of Bordeaux.

But the British General had made his ‘great refusal’ on the night of August 1st-2nd, and had resolved that the tempting scheme for invading France, which had flitted before his eyes for a few evening hours, must be postponed. He would risk nothing till he should get certain information that the war had begun again in Germany. And as the news of the rupture of the Armistice did not reach him till September 3rd, he was condemned to another month of waiting. He turned back to his old policy of June--St. Sebastian and Pampeluna must be reduced. When they should have fallen, it would be time enough to see whether the general European situation had made the invasion of France a feasible enterprise.

APPENDICES

I

BRITISH LOSSES AT THE SIEGE OF BURGOS SEPTEMBER 20-OCTOBER 21, 1812

Sept. 20th, storm of the Hornwork of St. Michael. Total casualties
421 (of whom the 42nd lost 2 officers and 33 men killed, 5 officers
and 164 men wounded = 204; the 79th lost 5 men killed, 2 officers
and 32 men wounded = 39; the Portuguese lost 3 officers and 17 men
killed, 5 officers and 88 men wounded = 113; the other 67 casualties
were divided among the remaining battalions of the 1st Division).

Sept. 21st, casualties 42; Sept. 22nd, 39; Sept. 23, 158 (of which
76 in the Guards Brigade and 44 in the K.G.L. brigade of the 1st
Division, and 29 among the Portuguese).

Sept. 24th, casualties 39; Sept. 25th, 38; Sept. 26th, 32; Sept.
27th, 53; Sept. 28th, 26; Sept. 29th, 9; Sept. 30th, 29; Oct. 1st,
11; Oct. 2nd, 29; Oct. 3rd, 9; Oct. 4th, 16; Oct. 5th, 224 (of these
224, which really belong to the storm of the outer enceinte on the
evening of Oct. 4th, the 2/24th had 68 casualties, no other battalion
more than 15).

Oct. 6th, casualties (French sortie of night of 5th) 142; Oct. 7th,
33; Oct. 8th (2nd French sortie in which 133 in the K.G.L. Brigade
were killed or wounded), 184; Oct. 9th, 18; Oct. 10th, 61; Oct. 11th,
24; Oct. 12th, 17; Oct. 13th, 9; Oct. 14th, 3; Oct. 15th, 18; Oct.
16th, 12; Oct. 17th, 18; Oct. 18th, 48; Oct. 19th (the last assault),
170 (of whom 85 in the Guards Brigade and 84 in the K.G.L. Brigade of
the 1st Division).

Oct. 20th, 47; Oct. 21st, 9.

GENERAL TOTAL: 24 officers and 485 men killed
68 ” ” 1,445 ” wounded
42 ” missing = 2,064

II

THE FRENCH ARMIES IN SPAIN: OCTOBER 15, 1812

[From the return in the _Archives Nationales_, Paris.]

I. ARMY OF THE SOUTH. MARSHAL SOULT

_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division, Conroux: 9th Léger, 24th, 96th Line
(each 3 batts.): 3 battalions Marine Troops 203 5,615
2nd Division, Barrois[1060]: 8th Line, 16th Léger, 51st,
54th Line (each 3 batts.) 201 4,801

3rd Division, Villatte: 27th Léger, 63rd, 94th, 95th Line
(each 3 batts.) 209 5,888
4th Division, Leval: 32nd, 43rd Line (4 batts. each),
55th, 58th Line (3 batts. each) 259 7,794
5th Division, D’Erlon[1061]: 12th Léger (4 batts.), 45th
Line (3 batts.), 28th Léger, 88th Line (2 batts. each) 202 5,016
6th Division, Daricau: 21st Léger, 100th Line (3 batts.
each), 64th, 103rd Line (2 batts. each) 187 4,308
Cavalry Division, Perreymond: 2nd Hussars, 5th, 10th,
21st, 27th Chasseurs, 7th Lancers (in all, 20 squad.) 144 2,349
Cavalry Division, Digeon: 2nd, 4th, 14th, 17th, 26th,
27th Dragoons (in all, 20 squadrons) 148 2,956
Cavalry Division, Pierre Soult: 5th, 12th, 16th, 21st
Dragoons (14 squadrons) 121 1,712
Artillery, and Artillery Train and Park 122 3,511
Engineers and Sappers 17 851
Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 9 592
État-Major 313 --
----- ------
Total present 1,816 45,393

Gross total of Army including 64 officers and 1,904 men
detached, and 60 officers and 6,293 men in hospital: 1,940 53,590

II. ARMY OF THE CENTRE
_Officers._ _Men._

The King’s French Guards: no figures given, but about 2,500
Darmagnac’s Division: 28th and 75th Line (3 batts.
each), 2nd Nassau and Baden (2 batts. each),
Frankfort (1 batt.) 199 5,039
Palombini’s Division: 4th and 6th Italian Line (2 batts.
each), 2nd Italian Léger (3 batts.), Dragoons of
Napoleon and two batteries 142 3,050
Casapalacios’ Spanish Division (3 batts., 3 squadrons) 167 1,263
Treillard’s Cavalry Division: 13th, 18th, 19th, 22nd
Dragoons, Westphalian _chevaux légers_, Nassau
_chasseurs_ 114 1,679
Artillery, Engineers, and Train 12 596
Various detachments 12 403
--- ------
Total present 646 14,530

Gross total of Army, including État-Major 55 officers,
32 officers and 655 men detached, and 14 officers
and 1,900 men sick, is 747 17,075

III. ARMY OF PORTUGAL. GENERAL SOUHAM
_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division, Foy: 6th Léger (1 batt.), 39th, 69th,
76th Line (2 batts. each) 151 3,492
2nd Division, Clausel: 25th Léger, 27th, 50th, 59th
Line (2 batts. each) 130 4,506
3rd Division, Taupin [late Ferey], 31st Léger, 26th,
70th Line (2 batts. each), 47th Line (3 batts.) 184 6,064
4th Division, Sarrut: 2nd and 4th Léger, 36th Line
(2 batts. each) 130 4,000
5th Division, Maucune: 15th, 66th, 82nd, 86th Line
(2 batts. each) 165 5,097
6th Division, Pinoteau [late Brenier]: 17th Léger,
65th Line (2 batts. each), 22nd Line (1 batt.) 87 2,730
7th Division, Bonté [late Thomières]: 1st and 62nd Line
(2 batts. each), 101st Line (1 batt.) 109 2,425
8th Division, Chauvel [late Bonnet]: 118th, 119th,
120th Line (2 batts. each), 122nd Line (3 batts.) 180 4,437
(Each infantry division includes its artillery and train.)
Cavalry Division, Curto: 3rd Hussars, 13th, 14th,
22nd, 26th, 28th Chasseurs 115 2,048
Cavalry Division, Boyer: 6th, 11th, 15th, 25th Dragoons 70 1,303
Horse Artillery and train attached to cavalry 5 292
Artillery Reserve and Park 37 1,822
Engineers 7 274
Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 33 1,102
Attached to the Army of Portugal--
Cavalry Brigade, Merlin, of the Army of the North,
1st Hussars, 31st Chasseurs 53 693
Infantry Brigade, Aussenac, detached from the
Bayonne Reserve: 3rd and 105th Line (2 batts.
each), 64th, 100th, 103rd (1 batt. each) 110 3,308
----- ------
Total present 1,566 43,860

Gross total of Army with 150 officers and 4,574 men
detached, and 53 officers and 11,113 men in hospital: 1,769 59,547
--------------
61,316

IV. ARMY OF ARAGON AND VALENCIA. MARSHAL SUCHET

_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division, Musnier: 1st Léger (3 batts.), 114th
Line (2 batts.), 121st Line (3 batts.), Neapolitans
(2 batts.) 180 5,403
2nd Division, Harispe: 7th, 44th, 116th Line (2 batts.
each) 104 4,011
3rd Division, Habert: 14th, 16th Line (2 batts. each),
117th Line (3 batts.) 158 4,817
Cavalry Division, Boussard: 14th Cuirassiers, 24th
Dragoons, 4th Hussars, 1st Neapolitan Chasseurs 91 1,831
Artillery and train 21 858
Engineers 11 411
Gendarmerie and Équipages Militaires 6 529

TROOPS ATTACHED TO THE ARMY OF ARAGON

Reille’s Division: 10th Line (4 batts.), 81st (3 batts.),
9th _bis_ of Hussars, artillery 147 4,393
Severoli’s Division: 1st Italian Line and 1st Italian
Léger (2 batts. each), 5th Léger (French) (1 batt.),
and Italian artillery 151 3,758
Brigade from Catalonia: 3rd Léger, 11th, 20th Line
(2 batts. each), 1st Italian Chasseurs 130 3,719
----- ------
Total present 1,038 30,980

Gross total of Army, including 131 officers and 3,884 men
detached, and 24 officers and 4,287 men in hospital: 1,193 39,151

V. ARMY OF THE NORTH. GENERAL CAFFARELLI

_Officers._ _Men._
Division Abbé: 5th Léger (3 batts.), 10th Léger, 3rd,
52nd, 105th Line (2 batts. each), 20th Dragoons, and
artillery 219 6,378
Division Vandermaesen: 34th Léger (1 batt.), 34th,
40th Line (3 batts. each), 113th, 130th Line (2 batts.
each), 4th Suisse (1 batt.), 6 _bataillons de marche_
= 18 battalions in all 388 12,197
Brigade Dumoustier: 4 batts. Young Guard, and 2 of
National Guards 100 3,976
Cavalry Brigade Laferrière: Lancers of Berg (2 squadrons),
15th Chasseurs (3 squadrons), Gendarmerie (6 squadrons) 37 1,625
Government of Navarre (garrison of Pampeluna) detachments 45 1,644
Government of Biscay, all _régiments de marche_ and
detachments 264 9,431
Government of Castile (garrison of Santoña) detachments 43 1,342
------ ------
Total present 1,151 36,465

Gross total of Army, including 41 officers and 5,176 men
in hospital, is 1,192 41,641

VI. ARMY OF CATALONIA. GENERAL DECAEN

_Officers._ _Men._
Division Quesnel (at Puycerda), 102nd Line (2 batts.),
116th Line (1 batt.), and detachments 123 3,502

Division Lamarque: 60th and 79th Line (3 batts. each),
Regiment of Wurzburg, and detachments 137 3,491

Brigade Petit: 67th Line (3 batts.), 32nd Léger (1 batt.) 66 1,553

Division Maurice Mathieu (Barcelona): 115th Line
(4 batts.), 18th Léger (2 batts.), 1st of Nassau
(2 batts.), and detachments 185 6,180

Garrisons of Figueras, &c.: 60th, 86th Line, and 32nd
Léger (1 batt. each), and detachments 160 3,646

Garrison of Tarragona (Bertoletti): 20th Line (1 batt.),
7th Italian Line (1 batt.) 63 1,451

Garrison of Lerida (Henriod): 42nd Line (3 batts.),
and detachments 70 1,639

Brigade Espert (flying column): 5th Line (3 batts.),
23rd Léger (2 batts.) 89 2,988

Artillery, Sappers, Gendarmes, Équipages Militaires, &c. 55 4,194
--- ------
Total present, under arms 948 28,514

Gross total of Army, including 107 État-Major, 26 officers
and 369 men detached, and 44 officers and 6,045 men
in hospital, is 1,125 34,928

VII. BAYONNE RESERVE

_Officers._ _Men._
All consisting of detachments or _régiments de marche_ 172 7,072
Adding 134 detached and 600 in hospital, gross total is: 7,978

Total Army of Spain, therefore, on October 15 amounts to:
7,516 officers, 206,814 men present with the colours
326 ” 11,520 ” detached
236 ” 35,414 ” in hospital.

GENERAL GROSS TOTAL = 8,185 officers and 253,748 men.

III

STRENGTH OF WELLINGTON’S ARMY DURING AND AFTER THE BURGOS RETREAT

The subjoined statistics show the marching strength of the Anglo-Portuguese divisions of Wellington’s army at the commencement of the Burgos Retreat (Oct. 23) and some days after its termination (Nov. 29). There had been, immediately after the army reached Ciudad Rodrigo, certain transferences of units from one division to another, which are duly noted. The figures give only rank and file; to get the fighting strength one-eighth should be added to cover officers, sergeants, and drummers.

_Present _Present
under arms. under arms.
Oct. 23._ Nov. 29._

1st Cavalry Division 2,827 2,909 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.
has joined.)
2nd Cavalry Division 1,947 1,625 (2nd Hussars K.G.L.
has left.)
1st Division 3,970 4,002 (1st & 3rd battalions
First Guards have
joined, but Stirling’s
brigade has been
transferred to the
6th Division.)
2nd Division 7,915 6,591
3rd Division 4,229 3,860 (2/87th from Cadiz
has joined.)
4th Division 4,487 3,861 (1/82nd has joined.)
5th Division 3,638 3,732 (2/47th from Cadiz
has joined.)
6th Division 3,380 5,228 (The division has been
joined by Stirling’s
brigade and also by
the 1/91st.)
7th Division 4,298 3,358
Light Division 3,428 3,775 (2 companies 3/95th
and the 20th Portuguese
have joined.)
Hamilton’s Portuguese Division 4,719 4,076
Pack’s Portuguese Brigade 1,681 1,105
Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade 1,645 881
------ ------
48,124 45,003

Artillery, Train, Staff Corps, &c. 2,500 2,300

The fall in numbers would have been much greater but for the joining of Skerrett’s force from Cadiz (3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, 20th Portuguese, and two companies 3/95th) and of the 1/1st Guards and 1/91st from England, and the 1/82nd from Gibraltar--in all, nearly 6,000 men.

It may be worth while to give here the statistics of the Spanish troops which were acting with Wellington’s and Hill’s armies during this period. They were by their October morning states:

‘6th Army’ or Galicians (Santocildes):

1st Division (Barcena) 6,810 (5 of the 15 battalions of this
division were not at the front.)
2nd Division (Cabrera) 4,749
3rd Division (Losada) 4,213
Cavalry Brigade (Figuelmonde) 1,356 (5 of the 9 squadrons of this
brigade were not at the front.)

5th Army (Estremadurans and Castilian):

Morillo’s Division 2,371 (Acting with Hill’s Corps.)
Carlos de España’s Division 3,809 (ditto.)
Penne Villemur’s cavalry 992 (ditto.)
Julian Sanchez’s cavalry 1,159 (Acting with Main Army.)
------
Total Spanish troops 25,459

IV

LOSSES IN THE BURGOS RETREAT

The casualties in action between October 23rd and November 19th are easily ascertainable, and quite moderate. But the loss in ‘missing’ by the capture of stragglers, marauders, and footsore men, was much higher than is generally known. I believe that the annexed table, from the morning state of November 29th, is now published for the first time. It gives only the _rank and file_ missing, but these are almost the whole list: officers and sergeants did not straggle or drop behind like the privates. I believe that the total of officers missing was 25, of sergeants 56 British and 29 Portuguese: we have also to add 43 British and 32 Portuguese drummers, &c., to the general list, which runs as follows:

_British._ _Portuguese._ _Total._
1st Cavalry Division 192 -- 192
2nd Cavalry Division 101 8 109
1st Division Infantry 283 -- 283
2nd Division Infantry 302 260 562
3rd Division Infantry 184 230 414
4th Division Infantry 308 19 327
5th Division Infantry 453 359 812
6th Division Infantry 96 74 170
7th Division Infantry 357 243 600
Light Division Infantry 92 163 253
Portuguese. Hamilton’s Division -- 221 221
Portuguese. Pack’s Brigade. -- 293 293
Portuguese. Bradford’s Brigade -- 514 514
----- ----- -----
Total 2,368 2,374 4,752

The abnormally high totals of the 5th Division and 7th Division are to be accounted for in different ways. The former had 150 prisoners taken in action on the day of the combat of Villa Muriel (October 25); the latter contained the two battalions that always gave a high percentage of deserters, the foreign regiments of Brunswick-Oels and _Chasseurs Britanniques_. It will be noted that the 2nd Division has also a high total, but as it had nearly double the numbers of any other division (7,500 men to an average 4,000 for the others) it did not lose out of proportion to its strength. It will be noted that the Portuguese lost more heavily in relation to their total numbers than the British--their ‘missing’ were about the same as those of the British, but they only had about 20,000 rank and file in the field as against about 30,000 British. This excessive loss in missing was due entirely to the fact that the cold and rain of the last ten days of the retreat told much more heavily upon them. They were not so well clothed or fed as the British, and fell behind from exhaustion. Bradford’s brigade, though never seriously in action, lost 500 men out of 1,600 by the roadside, much the heaviest percentage in the whole army.

The losses in killed and wounded as opposed to ‘missing’ seem to make up the following moderate figures, to which the heavy fighting about Venta del Pozo and Villa Muriel during the first days of the retreat made much the heaviest contribution.

Killed: 9 officers, 189 men. Wounded: 54 officers, 699 men--i. e. the total of 951. This does not, of course, include the _prisoners_ taken at Venta del Pozo or Villa Muriel, who are counted among the ‘missing’ reckoned in the prefixed table. The losses in killed and wounded at Alba de Tormes and San Muñoz are less than might have been expected; those in the other skirmishes at Valladolid, Tordesillas, &c., quite negligible.

V

THE CAMPAIGN OF CASTALLA: APRIL 1813

Sir John Murray reports his army to have consisted of the following elements:

Infantry: British, German, Anglo-Italian, Calabrese 8,274 officers and men
Sicilian ‘Estero’ Regiment 1,136 ” ”
Whittingham’s Spanish Division (6 batts.) 3,901 ” ”
Roche’s Spanish Division (5 batts.) 4,019 ” ”
Cavalry: British, Spanish, and Sicilian 886 ” ”
Artillery, &c. 500 ” ”
------
18,716 ” ”

The units appear to have been brigaded as follows:
Advance Guard, General Adam: 2/27th, 1st Italian Levy, Calabrese Free
Corps, Rifle Companies of 3rd and 8th K.G.L.
J. Mackenzie’s Division: 1/27th, 4th and 6th Line K.G.L., Sicilian
Estero Regiment (2 batts.).
Clinton’s Division: 1/10th, 1/58th, 1/81st, De Roll-Dillon, 2nd
Italian Levy.
Cavalry: 20th Light Dragoon (2 squadrons), Foreign Hussars (1 troop),
1st Sicilian Cavalry, four Spanish squadrons[1062].
Whittingham’s Spaniards: Cordova, Mallorca, Guadalajara, 2nd of
Burgos, 5th Grenadiers, 2nd of Murcia.
Roche’s Spaniards: Volunteers of Aragon, Alicante, Chinchilla,
Volunteers of Valencia, Canarias.
Artillery: British companies of Holcombe, Thompson, Williamson and
Lacy; Portuguese company of Cox, one Sicilian company (three of these
companies were holding the forts of Alicante).

VI

SUCHET’S ARMY AT CASTALLA: APRIL 13, 1813

[RETURN OF APRIL 1.]

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
1st Division, General Robert [for Musnier, absent]:
1st Léger (2 batts.) 38 1,443 1,481
114th Ligne (2 batts.) 36 1,498 1,534
121st Ligne (2 batts.) 34 1,252 1,286
3rd Léger (2 batts.)[1063] 16 767 783
--- ----- -----
124 4,960 5,084
2nd Division, General Harispe:
7th Ligne (2 batts.) 31 1,298 1,329
44th Ligne (2 batts.) 26 1,160 1,186
116th Ligne (2 batts.) 35 1,502 1,537
--- ----- -----
92 3,960 4,052
3rd Division, General Habert:
14th Ligne (2 batts.) 42 1,189 1,231
1/16th Ligne[1064] 21 614 635
1/117th Ligne[1064] 27 829 856
--- ----- -----
90 2,632 2,722
Cavalry, General Boussard:
Two squadrons 4th Hussars 21 408 429
13th Cuirassiers 25 523 548
24th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 20 427 447
--- ----- -----
66 1,358 1,424

Artillery: four batteries 10 282 292
--- ----- ------
TOTAL 376 13,192 13,568

VII

BIAR AND CASTALLA LOSSES: APRIL 12-13, 1813

_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Total._

Staff 1 -- 2 -- -- -- 3
Adam’s Brigade:
2/27th Foot -- 18 2 90 -- 2 112
1st Italian Levy 23 3 49 -- 28 103
Calabrese Free Corps -- 8 2 49 -- -- 59
Rifle Companies 3rd & 8th K.G.L. 1 7 2 23 -- 2 35
Mackenzie’s Division:
1/27th Foot -- 2 -- 18 -- -- 20
4th Line K.G.L. -- 3 -- 9 -- -- 12
6th Line K.G.L. -- 1 -- 5 -- -- 6
Sicilian ‘Estero’ Regiment -- 1 -- 8 -- -- 9
Clinton’s Division:
1/58th Foot -- 1 -- 5 -- -- 6
De Roll-Dillon -- 4 1 20 -- 9 34
Whittingham’s Spanish Division:
Cordova, Mallorca, Guadalajara,
2nd Burgos, 5th Grenadiers,
2nd of Murcia 2 73 4 183 -- -- 262
20th Light Dragoons -- -- -- 1 -- -- 1
Sicilian Cavalry -- -- -- -- -- 1 1
R.A. and drivers -- -- -- 5 -- -- 5
Portuguese Artillery -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3
-------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 4 141 16 468 -- 42 671

VIII

WELLINGTON’S ARMY IN THE VITTORIA CAMPAIGN

MARCHING STRENGTH, MAY 25, 1813[1065]

CAVALRY
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
R. Hill’s Brigade: 1st & 2nd Life Guards, Horse
Guards 42 828 870
Ponsonby’s Brigade: 5th Dragoon Guards, 3rd &
4th Dragoons 61 1,177 1,238
G. Anson’s Brigade: 12th & 16th Light Dragoons 39 780 819
Long’s Brigade: 13th Light Dragoons 20 374 394
V. Alten’s Brigade: 14th Light Dragoons, 1st
Hussars K.G.L. 49 956 1,005
Bock’s Brigade: 1st & 2nd Dragoons K.G.L. 38 594 632
Fane’s Brigade: 3rd Dragoon Guards, 1st Dragoons 42 800 842
Grant’s Brigade: 10th, 15th, 18th Hussars 63 1,561 1,624
D’Urban’s Portuguese Brigade: 1st, 11th, 12th
Cavalry -- 685 685
6th Portuguese Cavalry (Campbell) -- 208 208

Cavalry Total 354 7,963 8,317

INFANTRY
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
1st Division, General Howard:[1066]
Stopford’s Brigade: 1st Coldstream, 1st Scots }
Guards, one company 5/60th 56 1,672 }
Halkett’s Brigade: 1st, 2nd, 5th Line K.G.L., } 4,854
1st & 2nd Light K.G.L. 133 2,993 }

2nd Division, Sir Rowland Hill:
Cadogan’s Brigade: 1/50th, 1/71st, 1/92nd, one }
company 5/60th 120 2,657 }
Byng’s Brigade: 1/3rd, 1/57th, 1st Prov. }
Batt.,[1067] one company 5/60th 131 2,334 } 10,834
O’Callaghan’s Brigade: 1/28th, 2/34th, 1/39th, }
one company 5/60th 122 2,408 }
Ashworth’s Portuguese: 6th & 18th Line, 6th }
Caçadores -- 3,062 }

3rd Division, General Sir Thomas Picton:
Brisbane’s Brigade: 1/45th, 74th, 1/88th, three }
companies 5/60th 125 2,598 }
Colville’s Brigade: 1/5th, 2/83rd, 2/87th, 94th 120 2,156 } 7,437
Power’s Portuguese Brigade: 9th & 21st Line, }
11th Caçadores -- 2,460 }

4th Division, General Sir G. Lowry Cole:
W. Anson’s Brigade: 3/27th, 1/40th, 1/48th, }
2nd Prov. Batt.,[1068] one company 5/60th 139 2,796 }
Skerrett’s Brigade: 1/7th, 20th, 1/23rd, one }
company Brunswick 123 1,926 } 7,816
Stubbs’s Portuguese Brigade: 11th & 23rd Line, }
7th Caçadores -- 2,842 }

5th Division, General Oswald [for General Leith]:
Hay’s Brigade: 3/1st, 1/9th, 1/38th, one company }
Brunswick 109 2,183 }
Robinson’s Brigade: 1/4th, 2/47th, 2/59th, one }
company Brunswick 100 1,961 } 6,725
Spry’s Portuguese Brigade: 3rd & 15th Line, 8th }
Caçadores -- 2,372 }

6th Division, General Pakenham [for General Clinton]:
Stirling’s Brigade: 1/42nd, 1/79th, 1/91st, one }
company 5/60th 127 2,327 }
Hinde’s Brigade: 1/11th, 1/32nd, 1/36th, 1/61st 130 2,288 } 7,347
Madden’s Portuguese Brigade: 8th & 12th Line, }
9th Caçadores -- 2,475 }

7th Division, General Lord Dalhousie:
Barnes’s Brigade: 1/6th, 3rd Prov. Batt.[1069], }
nine companies Brunswick-Oels 116 2,206 }
Grant’s Brigade: 51st, 68th, 1/82nd, Chasseurs }
Britanniques 141 2,397 } 7,287
Lecor’s Portuguese Brigade: 7th & 19th Line, }
2nd Caçadores -- 2,437 }

Light Division, General Charles Alten:
Kempt’s Brigade: 1/43rd, 1st & 3rd/95th 98 1,979 }
Vandeleur’s Brigade: 1/52nd, 2/95th 63 1,399 } 5,484
Portuguese 17th Line, 1st & 3rd Caçadores -- 1,945 }

Silveira’s Portuguese Division:
Da Costa’s Brigade: 2nd & 14th Line -- 2,492 }
A. Campbell’s Brigade: 4th & 10th Line, 10th } 5,287
Caçadores -- 2,795 }

Pack’s Portuguese Brigade: 1st & 16th Line, 4th
Caçadores -- 2,297 2,297

Bradford’s Portuguese Brigade: 13th & 24th Line,
5th Caçadores -- 2,392 2,392

R.H.A. and Drivers 23 780
Field Artillery, Train, Ammunition column, &c. 100 2,722
K.G.L. Artillery 17 335
Portuguese Artillery -- 330
Engineers and Sappers 41 302
Staff Corps 21 126
Wagon Train 37 165

_British._ _Portuguese._ _Total._
Total Cavalry 7,424 893 8,317
” 1st Division 4,854 -- 4,854
” 2nd Division 7,772 3,062 10,834
” 3rd Division 4,977 2,460 7,437
” 4th Division 4,974 2,842 7,816
” 5th Division 4,353 2,372 6,725
” 6th Division 4,872 2,475 7,347
” 7th Division 4,850 2,437 7,287
” Light Division 3,539 1,945 5,484
” Silveira’s Division -- 5,287 5,287
” Pack’s and Bradford’s Brigades -- 4,689 4,689
” Artillery and Train 3,977 330 4,307
” Engineers, Staff Corps, &c. 892 -- 892
------ ------ ------
52,484 28,792 81,276

This is, I believe, the first complete return of Wellington’s army in the Vittoria campaign ever published. My predecessors in Peninsular history sought in vain for the ‘morning states’ which should have accompanied Wellington’s dispatches to Lord Bathurst, and which are mentioned in those dispatches. In previous years, down to December 1812, they are generally found annexed to the covering letter, in the bound volumes at the Record Office. I should have fared no better than other seekers, but for the admirable knowledge of the contents of the Office possessed by Mr. Leonard Atkinson. He remembered that there existed some separate packages of ‘morning states’, which had been divorced from the rest of Wellington’s sendings, and not bound up with them. When sought, they turned out to be the missing figures of 1813, tied up unbound between two covers of cardboard. Mr. Atkinson’s happy discovery enables me to give the prefixed statistics, which permit us to know Wellington’s exact strength just as the campaign of Vittoria was starting.

IX

SPANISH TROOPS UNDER WELLINGTON’S COMMAND JUNE-JULY 1813

STATES OF JUNE 1

I. FOURTH ARMY (GENERAL GIRON)
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
Morillo’s Division 172 4,379 4,551
Losada’s Galician Division (6 batts.) 295 5,560 5,855
P. Barcena’s Galician Division (7 batts.) 235 4,908 5,143
Porlier’s Asturian Division (3 batts.) 124 2,284 2,408
Longa’s Division (5 batts.) 130 3,000 3,130
Penne Villemur’s Cavalry (7 regts.) 194 2,434 2,628
Julian Sanchez’s Cavalry (2 regts.) 90 1,200 1,290
Artillery 20 400 420
----- ------ ------
Total of June 1 1,263 24,165 25,425

II. LEFT IN CASTILE, REJOINED ON JULY 28

Carlos de España’s division of 4th Army
(5 batts.) 175 3,167 3,342

III. JOINED ON JULY 16

THE ‘ARMY OF RESERVE OF ANDALUSIA’ (CONDE DE ABISPAL)

Echevarri’s Division (7 batts.) 237 6,380 6,617
Creagh’s Division (7 batts.) 273 6,181 6,454
C. G. Barcena’s Cavalry Brigade (2 regts.) 39 789 828
Artillery 10 274 284
--- ------ ------
Total of later arrivals 734 16,791 17,525

The General Total of the Spanish troops which actually joined Wellington between May 26 and July 28 was therefore 46,292. This does not include Mina’s irregulars operating in Aragon and Eastern Navarre.

X

THE FRENCH ARMY AT VITTORIA

ARMY OF THE SOUTH. RETURN OF MAY 29, 1813.

[From Paris Archives, lent me by Mr. Fortescue.]

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
1st Division, Leval:
Brigade Mocquery: 9th Léger, 24th Line 63 2,516 2,579
Brigade Morgan: 88th Line, 96th Line 43 2,056 2,099
Divisional battery and train 3 163 166
--- ----- -----
Divisional Total 109 4,735 4,844

2nd Division, Cassagne: lent to Army of the Centre.
3rd Division, Villatte:
Brigade Rignoux: 27th Léger, 63rd Line 39 2,539 2,578
Brigade Lefol: 94th Line, 95th Line 50 3,063 3,113
Divisional battery and train 4 179 182
-- ----- -----
Divisional Total 93 5,781 5,874

4th Division, Conroux:
Brigade Rey: 32nd and 43rd Line 78 3,591 3,669
Brigade Schwitter: 55th and 58th Line 47 2,670 2,717
Divisional battery and train 4 189 193
--- ----- -----
Divisional Total 129 6,460 6,589

5th Division, brigade Maransin only:
12th Léger, 45th Line 58 2,869 2,927

6th Division, Daricau:
Brigade St. Pol: 21st Léger, 100th Line 53 2,658 2,711
Brigade Remond: 28th Léger, 103rd Line 45 2,939 2,984
Divisional battery and train 3 237 240
--- ----- -----
Total 101 5,834 5,935

TOTAL 4½ INFANTRY DIVISIONS 490 25,679 26,169

Cavalry:

Pierre Soult’s Division:
2nd Hussars, 5th, 10th, 21st Chasseurs 74 1,428 1,502
One battery H.A. and train 4 165 169

Tilly’s Division:
2nd, 4th, 14th, 17th, 26th, 27th Dragoons 88 1,841 1,929

Digeon’s Division:
5th, 12th, 16th, 21st Dragoons 80 1,612 1,692
One battery H.A. and train 3 174 177
--- ----- -----
Total cavalry 249 6,220 6,469

Artillery Reserve: two batteries and train 5 365 370
Artillery Park: two companies Field Artillery,
one company pontoniers, artificers, train 17 696 713
Engineers: two companies sappers, two miners,
and train 11 619 630
Gendarmerie 4 101 105
Wagon train 2 63 65
--- ----- -----
Total auxiliary troops 39 1,844 1,883

État-Major of the Army and the divisions 115 -- 115

GENERAL TOTAL OF ARMY OF THE SOUTH 893 33,743 34,636

ARMY OF THE CENTRE AT VITTORIA

RETURN OF MAY 29 FOR CASSAGNE’S DIVISION; OF MAY 1 ONLY FOR THE REST,
EXCEPT FOR THE ROYAL GUARDS AND SPANIARDS, AS SEE NOTE.

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
1st Division, Darmagnac:
Brigade Chassé: 28th & 75th Line 35 1,759 1,794
Brigade Neuenstein: 2nd Nassau, 4th Baden,
Frankfort 101 2,577 2,678
--- ----- -----
Divisional Total 136 4,336 4,472

2nd Division, Cassagne:
Brigade Braun: 16th Léger, 8th Line }
Brigade Blondeau: 51st Line, 54th Line } 95 5,114 5,209
--- ----- -----
Total Infantry 231 9,450 9,681

Cavalry:
Treillard’s Division: 13th, 18th, 19th,
22nd Dragoons 44 994 1,038
Avy’s Light Cavalry: 27th Chasseurs,
Nassau Chasseurs 22 452 474
--- ----- -----
Total Cavalry 66 1,446 1,512

Artillery (3 batteries) and train 13 488 501
Engineers (1 company sappers) 2 129 131
Wagon train, &c. 3 195 198
--- ----- -----
Total Auxiliary Arms 28 812 830

The King’s Spanish Army:[1070]
Royal Guards, General Guy:
Grenadiers, tirailleurs, voltigeurs
of the Guard 80 2,300 2,380
Hussars and Lancers of the Guard 25 400 425

Line:
Regiments of Castile, Toledo,
_Royal Étranger_ 70 2,000 2,070
Cavalry: 1st & 2nd Chasseurs, Hussars
of Guadalajara 70 600 670
Artillery: one battery 3 90 93
--- ----- -----
Total King’s Army 248 5,390 5,633

TOTAL ARMY OF THE CENTRE 603 17,098 17,691

ARMY OF PORTUGAL

NO RETURN AVAILABLE LATER THAN MAY 1.

_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._
4th Division, Sarrut:
Brigade Fririon: 2nd Léger, 36th Line }
Brigade Menne: 4th Léger, 65th Line } 146 4,656 4,802
Divisional field battery and train }

6th Division, Lamartinière:
Brigade Gauthier: 118th Line, 119th Line 71 2,496 2,567
Brigade Menne: 120th Line, 122nd Line 102 3,866 3,968
Divisional field battery and train 3 173 176
--- ------ ------
Total Infantry Divisions 322 11,191 11,513

Cavalry:
Division Mermet:
Brigade Curto: 13th & 22nd Chasseurs 39 863 902
Brigade ? : 3rd Hussars, 14th &
26th Chasseurs 42 857 899
Division Boyer:
6th, 11th, 15th, 25th Dragoons 67 1,404 1,471
--- ----- -----
Total Cavalry 148 3,324 3,472

Reserve Artillery:
One H.A., four field batteries 11 379 390
One company Pontoniers, train,
artificers, &c. 10 763 773
Engineers: two companies sappers 5 190 195
Gendarmerie 5 169 174
Wagon train, mule train, &c. 35 898 933
--- ----- -----
Total auxiliary arms 66 2,389 2,455

GENERAL TOTAL OF ARMY OF PORTUGAL 536 16,904 17,440

Allowing for wastage May 1 to June 21, there may probably have been 14,000 of all arms at Vittoria--say 9,500 infantry, 2,800 cavalry, 1,700 auxiliary arms.

Adding the totals of the three armies as above, we should get 2,032 officers and 68,231 men. But deductions of course must be made:

(1) For decrease from May 1 to June 21 in the Armies of Portugal and
the Centre, and from May 29 to June 21 in the Army of the South by
normal wastage, and in the two former by drafts sent back to France
in May.

(2) For casualties in action since the campaign opened.

The latter would not be large, only Digeon’s Dragoons and Villatte’s and Sarrut’s infantry divisions having been seriously engaged during the retreat. The Burgos explosion cost Villatte over 100 men. We need not allow more than 1,500 as an ample estimate for casualties in action.

The normal wastage, and the deduction for drafts sent to France in May are more difficult to calculate, but I think we shall not be far out in taking 3,000 as an outside allowance for the latter--which affects only the Armies of Portugal and the Centre, since we have a May 29th Return for Gazan’s Army, which of course sent nothing away after that date. And in healthy months, such as May and early June, the deficit from extra sick would not be large--indeed as many men may have rejoined as convalescents as went into hospital, since (except Villatte at Salamanca) the troops had never been pressed or overmarched. It would be generous to allow 5,000 for ‘wastage’.

If so, the French had 63,000 men at Vittoria, but deducting non-combatants (train, artificers, &c.) there would be 9,000 horse, over 46,000 men in the infantry divisions, and about 1,300 gunners with the field and horse batteries not included in the infantry divisions, also 1,000 sappers. This makes over 57,000 fighting men actually available. There must also be a small addition for stray units of the Army of the North known to have been present--not less than 500 nor more than 1,000. All attempts to bring down the French force present to 45,000 men (_Victoires et Conquêtes_, vol. xxii) or 39,000 infantry and 8,000 horse (Jourdan) or ‘barely 50,000 men’ (Picard) are inadmissible.

XI

BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE LOSSES AT VITTORIA

I. BRITISH LOSSES
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Missing._
_Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Off._ _Men._ _Total._
1st Division, General Howard:
Stopford’s { 1st Coldstream Guards, }
Brigade { 1/3rd Guards } No casualties.
Halkett’s { 1st, 2nd, 5th Line K.G.L. -- 1 -- 1 -- -- 2
Brigade { 1st Light K.G.L. -- 1 1 7 -- -- 9
{ 2nd Light K.G.L. -- 4 -- 39 -- -- 43
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total -- 6 1 47 -- -- 54

2nd Division, General Sir W. Stewart:
Cadogan’s { 1/50th Foot -- 27 7 70 -- -- 104
Brigade { 1/71st Foot 3 41 12 260 See below[1071] 316
{ 1/92nd Foot -- 4 -- 16 -- -- 20
Byng’s { 1/3rd Foot -- 8 7 96 -- -- 110
Brigade { 1/57th Foot -- 5 2 21 -- -- 28
{ 1st Prov.[1072] Batt. -- 3 2 35 -- -- 40
O’Callaghan’s { 1/28th Foot -- 12 17 171 -- -- 199
Brigade { 2/34th Foot -- 10 3 63 -- -- 76
{ 1/39th Foot -- 26 8 181 -- -- 215
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total 3 136 58 913 -- -- 1,110

3rd Division, General Sir Thomas Picton:
Brisbane’s { 1/45th Foot -- 4 4 66 -- -- 74
Brigade { 74th Foot -- 13 4 66 -- -- 83
{ 1/88th Foot -- 23 5 187 -- -- 215
{ 5/60th Foot (3 comp.) -- 2 2 47 -- -- 51
Colville’s { 1/5th Foot 2 22 6 133 -- -- 163
Brigade { 2/83rd Foot 2 18 4 50 -- -- 74
{ 2/87th Foot 1 54 12 177 -- -- 244
{ 94th Foot -- 5 6 56 -- -- 67
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total 5 141 43 782 -- -- 972

4th Division, General Sir Lowry Cole:
W. Anson’s { 3/27th Foot -- 7 3 32 -- -- 42
Brigade { 1/40th Foot -- 5 3 34 -- -- 42
{ 1/48th Foot -- 1 -- 18 -- -- 19
{ 2nd Provisional[1073] -- 4 -- 6 -- -- 10
Skerrett’s { 1/7th Foot -- 2 -- 2 -- -- 4
Brigade { 20th Foot -- 3 -- 1 -- -- 4
{ 1/23rd Foot -- 1 -- 3 -- -- 4
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total -- 23 6 96 -- -- 125

5th Division, General Oswald:
Hay’s { 3/1st Foot -- 8 7 96 -- -- 111
Brigade { 1/9th Foot 1 9 -- 15 -- -- 25
{ 1/38th Foot -- -- 1 7 -- -- 8
Robinson’s { 1/4th Foot 1 12 6 72 -- -- 91
Brigade { 2/47th Foot 2 18 4 88 -- -- 112
{ 2/59th Foot -- 11 8 130 -- -- 149
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total 4 58 26 408 -- -- 496

7th Division, General Lord Dalhousie:

Barnes’s Brigade No casualties.
{ 51st Foot 1 10 -- 21 -- -- 32
Grant’s { 68th Foot 2 23 9 91 -- -- 125
Brigade { 1/82nd Foot 1 5 3 22 -- -- 31
{ _Chasseurs Britanniques_ -- 29 2 109 -- -- 140
Light Company Brunswick-Oels[1074] 1 -- -- 5 -- -- 6
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total 5 67 14 248 -- -- 334

Light Division, General Charles Alten:
{ 1/43rd Foot -- 2 2 27 -- -- 31
Kempt’s { 1/95th Rifles -- 4 4 37 -- -- 45
Brigade { 3/95th Rifles 1 7 -- 16 -- -- 24
Vandeleur’s { 1/52nd Foot 1 3 1 18 -- -- 23
Brigade { 2/95th Rifles -- -- 1 8 -- -- 9
-------------------------------------------------
Divisional Total 2 16 8 106 -- -- 132

CAVALRY.