Chapter XXXI: Section XXXIII: Chapter XII (2)

Brigade { 2nd Léger (3 batts.) 66 1,772 68 1,702
Fririon { 36th Ligne (3 batts.) 69 1,570 71 1,514

Brigade { 4th Léger (3 batts.) 63 1,219 63 989
? { 130th Ligne (absent) -- -- -- --

Artillery Train, &c. 5 238 5 214
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 203 4,799 207 4,419
--- ----- --- -----
5th DIVISION (Maucune):

Brigade { 15th Ligne (3 batts.) 52 1,615 46 1,229
Arnaud { 66th Ligne (2 batts.) 38 1,131 34 661

Brigade { 82nd Ligne (2 batts.) 41 966 39 729
Montfort { 86th Ligne (2 batts.) 30 1,155 28 961

Artillery Train, &c. 4 212 4 212
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 165 5,079 151 3,792
--- ----- --- -----
6th DIVISION (Brennier):

Brigade { 17th Léger (2 batts.) 46 1,074 42 855
Taupin { 65th Ligne (3 batts.) 59 1,527 52 1,302

{ 22nd Ligne (3 batts.) 61 1,486 40 716
? { Régiment de Prusse (remnant
{ of) 9 79 9 79

Artillery Train, &c. 4 213 4 213
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 179 4,379 147 3,165
--- ----- --- -----
7th DIVISION (Thomières):

Brigade { 1st Line (3 batts.)[775] 80 1,683 79 1,454
Bonté { 62nd Line (2 batts.) 47 1,076 45 1,048

{ 23rd Léger (absent)[776] -- -- -- --
? { 101st Line (3 batts.) 61 1,388 29 412

Artillery Train, &c. 5 203 nil nil
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 193 4,350 153 2,914
--- ----- --- -----
8th DIVISION (Bonnet):

Brigade { 118th Line (3 batts.) 53 1,584 37 1,024
Gautier { 119th Line (3 batts.) 64 1,265 48 831

{ 120th Line (3 batts.) 63 1,745 66 1,152
? { 122nd Line (3 batts.) 55 1,582 40 1,000

Artillery train, &c. 3 107 nil nil
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 238 6,283 191 4,007
--- ----- --- -----
LIGHT CAVALRY DIVISION (Curto):

{ 3rd Hussars (3 squadrons) 17 231 14 165
{ 22nd Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 17 236 18 233
? { 26th Chasseurs (2 squadrons) 16 278 18 225
{ 28th Chasseurs (1 squadron) 7 87 3 39

{ 13th Chasseurs (5 squadrons) 20 496 28 426
? { 14th Chasseurs (4 squadrons) 14 308 18 332
{ Escadron de marche 11 141 9 52
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 102 1,777 108 1,472
--- ----- --- -----
HEAVY CAVALRY DIVISION (Boyer):

{ 6th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 376 19 332
? { 11th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 19 411 18 359

Brigade { 15th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 15 328 16 294
Carrié { 25th Dragoons (2 squadrons) 18 314 18 282

Artillery attached to cavalry 3 193 3 148
--- ----- --- -----
Divisional Total 74 1,622 74 1,415
--- ----- --- -----
Total Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
--- ----- --- -----
Artillery Reserve, Park, &c. 50 1,450 22 707
Engineers and Sappers 17 332 16 345
Gendarmerie 6 129 6 186
_Équipages militaires_ 26 742 22 707
État-Major Général 54 -- 54 --
----- ------ ----- ------
{ Infantry Divisions 1,597 41,669 1,392 32,755
General Total { Cavalry Divisions 176 3,399 182 2,887
{ Auxiliary Arms 153 2,653 120 1,945
----- ------ ----- ------
1,925 47,721 1,694 37,587

[775] Not including 2nd battalion, about 450 strong, at Astorga
in garrison.

[776] In garrison at Astorga.

N.B.--Guns, July 15, 78; August 1, 58; lost 7 12-pounders, 3 8-pounders, 9 4-pounders, 1 3-pounder. Horses, July 15, 4,278; August 1, 3,231. Draught horses, July 15, 2,037; August 1, 1,847. _Équipages militaires_, horses, July 15, 800; August 1, 331.

To these two tables we must append, as a side-light, the results of a compilation of the totals of officers killed and wounded at Salamanca, from Martinien’s admirable _Liste des officiers tués et blessés pendant les guerres de l’Empire_. This of course does not include unwounded prisoners.

_Killed._ _Wounded._
Foy’s Division (including
losses at Garcia Hernandez
on July 23rd):
6th Léger 1 10 = 11
69th Line 2 8 = 10
39th Line -- 2 = 2
76th Line 1 7 = 8
--
Total 31

Clausel’s Division:
25th Léger 4 10 = 14[777]
27th Line 2 5 = 7
50th Line 9 17 = 26
59th Line 4 15 = 19
--
Total 66

Ferey’s Division:
31st Léger 1 6 = 7
26th Line -- 6 = 6
47th Line 5 13 = 18
70th Line 2 3 = 5
--
Total 36

Sarrut’s Division:
2nd Léger -- 3 = 3
36th Line -- 3 = 3
4th Léger -- 2 = 2
--
Total 8

Maucune’s Division:
15th Line 4 12 = 16
66th Line 2 15 = 17
82nd Line 1 7 = 8
86th Line -- 3 = 3
--
Total 44

Brennier’s Division:
17th Léger 1 3 = 4[778]
65th Line 1 8 = 9[779]
22nd Line 2 19 = 21[780]
--
Total 34

Thomières’s Division:
1st Line -- 4 = 4
62nd Line 1 14 = 15
101st Line 6 19 = 25
--
Total 44

Bonnet’s Division:
118th Line 2 18 = 20
119th Line 3 23 = 26
120th Line -- 8 = 8
122nd Line 3 13 = 16
--
Total 70

Curto’s Light Cavalry:
3rd Hussars -- 2[781]
13th Chasseurs -- 7
14th Chasseurs -- 5[782]
22nd Chasseurs -- 5
26th Chasseurs -- 4
28th Chasseurs -- 2
--
Total 25

Boyer’s Division of Dragoons:
6th Dragoons -- 9
11th Dragoons -- 2[783]
15th Dragoons -- 1[784]
25th Dragoons -- 6[785]
--
Total 18

Artillery, Horse -- 1
” Field -- 5
” Train -- 1
--
Total 7

Engineers -- 3 = 3
Staff 3 17[786] = 20
Miscellaneous
officers, whose
regiments were
not present at
Salamanca -- 2 = 2

[777] Plus 1 killed and 5 wounded at the combat of the Guarena,
July 18.

[778] Plus 2 killed 6 wounded at the Guarena.

[779] Plus 2 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena.

[780] Plus 5 wounded at the Guarena.

[781] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at Castrejon.

[782] Plus 3 wounded at Castrejon.

[783] Plus 1 wounded on July 21, and 2 wounded at Garcia
Hernandez, July 23.

[784] Plus 1 killed 1 wounded at the Guarena, July 18.

[785] Plus 4 wounded at the Guarena.

[786] Plus 1 general wounded July 16, died next day (Dembouski),
and 1 general wounded and taken July 18 (at the Guarena), Carrié,
and 1 officer wounded at Garcia Hernandez.

General total 60 officers killed, 347 wounded at Salamanca and Garcia Hernandez; plus 7 officers killed and 27 wounded at the Guarena on July 18, and 2 wounded in minor engagements.

Loss in killed and wounded, not including unwounded prisoners, during the campaign, 67 killed, 376 wounded = 443 officers in all.

After arriving at this general loss in killed and wounded officers, so far as is possible from Martinien’s tables, which are not quite complete for all corps, it only remains to estimate the unwounded prisoners. I searched the immense volumes of rolls of French officers in captivity at the Record Office, and found 63 names of prisoners taken at Salamanca, the Guarena, and Garcia Hernandez. A few of these duplicate the names of wounded officers to be found in Martinien’s tables, the remainder must represent the unwounded prisoners. Wellington in his Salamanca dispatch wrote that he had 137 French officers prisoners--evidently the larger number of them must have been wounded, as only 63 were sent off to England that autumn. Probably many died in hospital. Prisoners are most numerous from the 101st, 22nd, and from Foy’s two regiments cut up at Garcia Hernandez, the 76th and 6th Léger.

In the Library of the _Archives de la Guerre_ at the Paris Ministry of War I went through the regimental histories of all the French infantry regiments present at Salamanca. Like our own similar compilations, they differ much in value--some are very full and with statistics carefully worked out from regimental reports and pay-books; others are very thin and factless. Fourteen units give their losses, which I herewith annex:

Clausel’s Division: 25th Léger, 336; 27th Line, 159; 59th Line, 350.
Ferey’s Division: 70th Line, 111; 31st Léger, 340.
Sarrut’s Division: 2nd Léger, 202.
Maucune’s Division: 15th Line, 359.
Brennier’s Division: 17th Léger, 264; 65th Line, 359.
Thomières’s Division: 1st Line, 227; 62nd Line, 868; 101st Line, 1,000.
Bonnet’s Division: 120th, 458; 122nd, 527.

The total of this makes 5,560 for these fourteen corps; we leave fifteen others unaccounted for. As a rough calculation I suppose that we may hold that as these regiments lost, as we know from Martinien’s lists [which are not _quite_ complete], at least 152 officers out of 5,560 of all ranks, then the other fifteen regiments with 181 officers killed or wounded must have lost something like 6,000. The vagaries of the proportion between officers and men hit are extraordinary in individual units, but these tend to rectify themselves on a large total consisting of many regiments. I therefore believe that 11,560 would be something very like the total loss _killed and wounded_ in the French infantry. We have then to allow for some 40 unwounded officers taken prisoners, and corresponding to them perhaps 1,200 unwounded men. The total loss for the infantry would thus be 12,800. For cavalry and artillery, &c., 53 officers hit--as by Martinien’s tables--must imply something over a thousand men lost. We should thus arrive at a total of 14,000 for the casualties--the sum which I suggest in my text (p. 469).

To show the worthlessness of any attempt to deduce the French losses by a mere comparison of the official ‘morning states’ of July 15 and August 1, the following instances may suffice.

The 65th Line shows 59 officers and 1,527 men present on July 15, 52 officers and 1,302 men on August 1. The apparent loss is 7 officers and 225 men. But this unit’s regimental report shows 3 officers killed, 5 officers wounded, 204 men killed or prisoners, 106 men wounded, 39 missing; total, 8 officers and 349 men. Therefore, as is obvious, one officer and 124 men must have joined from somewhere (dépôt at Valladolid?) between the two dates, or the deficiency would be 125 greater between the ‘present under arms’ of the two dates than is shown.

A more striking case is the 62nd Line, of Thomières’s Division. It shows present on July 15, 47 officers and 1,076 men, on August 1st 45 officers and 1,048 men--the apparent loss is only 2 officers and 28 men. But Martinien’s lists show us that the regiment lost at least 15 officers, killed and wounded, and the regimental report gives 20 officers and 848 men killed, wounded, or missing! The real loss is 868 not 30! Therefore 18 officers and about 800 men, the equivalent of a strong battalion, must have joined between July 15 and August 1. This corresponds to the fact that the 62nd showed only 2 battalions[787] at Salamanca, while the ‘morning state’ of June 15th showed it as having at the front three battalions and 1,900 rank and file. Clearly the third battalion rejoined the colours after the battle--having presumably been quartered in the small garrisons of Castile evacuated after the disaster of July 22. Many men must also have rejoined the other two battalions.

[787] And one odd company of its 3rd battalion, 61 of all ranks,
while in the return of August 1, the 3rd battalion has 13
officers and 480 men.

But the most absurd case of all is that of the 47th Line, whose total figures actually _go up_ from 1,625 to 1,712 of all ranks between July 15th and August 1st--in despite of the fact that it lost (as Martinien’s lists show), 18 officers and not less therefore than 360 rank and file (20 men per officer is a low allowance) at Salamanca. It must have picked up from Valladolid and the small garrisons 13 officers and 452 men at least[788].

[788] The 2/47th shows on July 15, 310 of all ranks, on August 1,
513.

Clausel, writing to King Joseph on July 25, said that of the whole Army of Portugal he could not yet show in the field on that day 20,000 men. This tallies well enough with the conclusion that we have already drawn, that the total loss from the army, which on July 15 had about 48,000 men, must have been some 14,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and over 10,000 men dispersed who were only just rallying.

XII

BRITISH LOSSES AT THE COMBATS OF CASTREJON AND CASTRILLO[789], JULY 18, 1812

[789] The fight at Castrillo is often called the ‘Combat of the
Guarena’.

_Officers._ _Men._ _Missing_ _Total._
_Killed._ _Wounded._ _Killed._ _Wounded._ _Men._

G. Anson’s Brigade:
11th Lt. Dragoons -- 2 3 10 -- 15
12th Lt. Dragoons -- 1 5 11 1 18
16th Lt. Dragoons -- -- -- -- -- --

V. Alten’s Brigade:
1st Hussars K.G.L. -- 4 7 45 4 60
14th Lt. Dragoons -- 3 14 49 9 75

Bock’s Brigade:
1st Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- -- 1 -- 1
2nd Dragoons K.G.L. -- -- 5 1 1 7

Le Marchant’s Brigade:
3rd Dragoons -- 1 -- 9 -- 10

4th DIVISION.

W. Anson’s Brigade:
3/27th Foot 2 1 11 58 -- 72
1/40th Foot -- 1 8 59 1 69

Ellis’s Brigade:
1/7th Foot -- 1 1 14 3 19
1/23rd Foot -- -- -- 2 2 4
1/48th Foot -- -- -- 5 1 6

5th DIVISION.

Greville’s Brigade:
3/1st -- -- -- 2 -- 2
Detached Companies
of 5/60th -- -- -- 1 2 3
Horse Artillery -- 1 2 2 -- 5
German Artillery -- -- -- 2 -- 2
Portuguese 1 6 33 90 27 157
-- -- -- --- -- ---
Total 3 21 89 361 51 525

XIII

SPANISH TROOPS ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN THE SPRING OF 1812

(A) REMAINS OF THE 2ND (VALENCIAN) AND 3RD (MURCIAN) ARMIES, MARCH 1

_Officers._ _Men._
1st Division: Conde de Montijo, 1st of Badajoz (2
batts.), Cuenca (2 batts.), 2 squadrons cavalry 110 2,049
2nd Division: General Luis Riquelme, 2nd Walloon
Guards, Guadalajara (3 batts.), 1st of Burgos (3
batts.), Guadix (2 batts.), Baden (1 batt.),
Alpujarras (1 batt.), dismounted cavalry (1 batt.) 335 5,214
Reserve Division: General Philip Roche. Voluntarios
de Aragon, Canarias, Alicante, 2nd of Murcia,
Alcazar de San Juan, Chinchilla (1 batt. each), 2
squadrons of Husares de Fernando 7º 300 5,576
Cavalry: General A. Rich. Principe (2 squadrons),
España (2 squadrons), Reina (2 squadrons),
Carabineros Reales, Farnesio, Montesa, Dragones del
Rey, Cazadores de Valencia, Pavia, Rey, Granaderos
a caballo, Husares de Castilla (one squadron
each), three provisional squadrons 321 1,565
Cadres of dispersed battalions, now reorganizing:
Lorca, Velez Malaga, Almanza, America 98 1,079
Artillery (Field) 38 651
Artillery (Garrison) in Alicante and Cartagena 17 582
Engineers 8 202
----- ------
Total 1,227 16,918

(B) JOSEPH O’DONNELL’S ARMY, JULY 21, 1812, AND ITS LOSSES AT CASTALLA

[The figures of the former from _Los Ejércitos españoles_. The list of prisoners from Suchet’s dispatch in the Paris _Archives de la Guerre_.]

_Unwounded
_Strength._ prisoners
_Officers._ _Men._ _Total._ reported
by Suchet._
Michelena’s {Corona (1 Batt.) 24 630} 255
Brigade {Velez Malaga (1 batt.) 36 834} 2,035 --
{Guadix 24 487} 337

Montijo’s {2nd Walloon Guards (1 batt.) 20 569} 350
Brigade {Cuenca (2 batts.) 33 890} 2,152 112
{1st of Badajoz (1 batt.) 27 613} --

{Bailen (1 batt.) 32 708} 405
Mijares’s {Alcazar de San Juan (1 batt.) 31 855} 2,187 434
Brigade {Lorca (1 batt.) 25 536} 242

Cavalry (Provisional Regiment, 2 squadrons) 29 207 --
Engineers 26 325 --

Roche’s Division:
1st of Burgos (2 batts.) 27 786 --
Canarias (1 batt.) 34 818 --
Alicante (2 batts.) 35 1,110 --
Chinchilla (2 batts.) 26 918 --
--- ------ -----
Total 429 10,286 2,135

Suchet also reports 697 wounded prisoners, of whom 56 died of their wounds.

No figures are given for the detached cavalry division of Santesteban, which was not in action at Castalla.

XIV

THE BRITISH FORCES ON THE EAST COAST OF SPAIN IN 1812

[A NOTE BY MR. C. T. ATKINSON]

I. MAITLAND’S FORCE, EMBARKATION RETURN, JUNE 25, 1812

(War Office: _Secretary of State’s Original Correspondence_, Series I, vol. 311.)

_Officers._ _N.C.O.’s
and Men._
20th Light Dragoons 9 158
Foreign Troop of Hussars 3 68
R.A. (including drivers) 8 73
Marine Artillery 1 29
R.E. 5 42
Staff Corps 1 13
1/10th Foot 33 902
1/58th Foot 31 840
1/81st Foot 44 1,230
4th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 36 953
6th Line Battalion, K.G.L. 33 1,041
De Roll’s Regiment (3 companies) 11 320
Dillon’s Regiment (5 companies) 18 536
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division)[790] 14 338
--- -----
Total 247 6,543

[790] This corps was organized in five ‘divisions,’ each of three
companies.

II. CAMPBELL’S CORPS, EMBARKATION RETURN, PALERMO, NOVEMBER 14, 1812

(Ibid., vol. 312.)

_Officers._ _N.C.O.’s
and Men._
20th Light Dragoons -- 13
Guides -- 14
R.A. (including drivers) 4 131
Grenadier Battalion[791] 35 924
Light Infantry Battalion[792] 21 582
1/27th Foot 25 828
2nd Battalion, Anglo-Italian Levy[793] 33 1,184
Sicilian Artillery -- 155
Sicilian Grenadiers[794] -- 605
--- -----
Total 118 4,436[795]

[791] From 2/10th, 1/21st, 1/31st, 1/62nd, 1/75th, 3rd, 7th, and
8th K.G.L.

[792] Schwertfeger, i. pp. 480-1, says it was composed of the
light companies of De Roll’s, Dillon’s, De Watteville’s (this is
inaccurate, as De Watteville’s regiment had moved to Cadiz before
the end of 1811), and the 3rd, 7th, and 8th K.G.L.

[793] 150 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[794] 140 men were left behind from lack of room but sent later.

[795] A ‘division’ of the Calabrian Free Corps, 300 strong, was
left behind for want of room, as well as the Sicilian Regiment de
Presidi, 1,200 strong.

III. SUBSEQUENTLY EMBARKED, DECEMBER 25[796]

[796] In a letter to Lord Bathurst of December 9 Bentinck
announces his intention to add to this force 2/27th Foot and
1st Anglo-Italians, who had been 28 officers and 823 men and 40
officers and 1,153 men respectively, in the ‘state’ of October
25, but are not present in the ‘state’ of December 10 (except for
288 men of 1st Anglo-Italians).

_Officers._ _N.C.O.’s
and Men._
20th Light Dragoons 8 223
R.A. -- 60
2nd Anglo-Italians 2 176
Calabrian Free Corps (1 division) 14 325
Sicilian Cavalry 22 204
Sicilian Infantry (the Estero Regiment) 77 1,185
--- -----
Total 123 2,173

It may be well to give here the garrisons of Cadiz and Gibraltar in 1812, as both of them supplied troops to the field army during that year.

In Gibraltar, under General Campbell, there were the 2/9th, 2/11th, 37th, and the 4th and 7th Veteran Battalions throughout the year. The 1/82nd was there till the summer, when it was relieved by the 1/26th, sent back from Portugal by Wellington. The 1/82nd sailed for Lisbon and marched up to the front, but arrived just too late for the battle of Salamanca.

At Cadiz General Cooke commanded, at the commencement of the year, the 3/1st Guards (which had arrived and relieved the ‘composite battalion of Guards’ before the end of 1811), also the 2/47th, 2/67th, 2/87th, two companies of the _Chasseurs Britanniques_, De Watteville’s regiment (which arrived before the end of 1811), the strange corps sometimes called the ‘battalion of Foreign Deserters,’ sometimes the ‘battalion of Foreign Recruits,’ two companies of the 2/95th, and a squadron of the 2nd Hussars K.G.L., also the 20th Portuguese.

Early in the year the 2/67th and five companies of De Watteville’s regiment were sent off to Cartagena.

In September the 3/1st Guards, 2/47th, 2/87th, two companies 95th, and 20th Portuguese marched to join Hill at Madrid, taking with them the German squadron and two field-batteries: they were just 4,000 strong.

The 2/59th came out from home about the same time, and was in October the only _British_ battalion at Cadiz. With them remained the ‘Foreign Deserters,’ seven companies of De Watteville, and two companies of _Chasseurs Britanniques_, as also some artillerymen.

XV

THE SCOVELL CIPHERS

By the very great kindness of Mr. G. Scovell of Brighton, I have had placed at my disposition the papers of his great-uncle, General Sir George Scovell, G.C.B., who served during the Peninsular War in the Intelligence branch of the Quartermaster-General’s department. In the beginning of 1812 the number of intercepted French dispatches in cipher which came into Wellington’s hands, through the happy activity of Julian Sanchez and other guerrillero chiefs, began to be so considerable that the Commander-in-Chief thought it worth while to detail a member of his staff to deal with them. Captain Scovell was selected because of his ingenuity in this line, and became responsible for attempting to interpret all the captured documents. They were made over to him, and, having done what he could with them, he placed the fair-copy of the ‘decoded’ result in Wellington’s hands, but seems to have been allowed to keep the originals--which were, of course, unintelligible because of their form, and therefore useless to his chief. The file of documents which thus remained with him is most interesting: they range in size from formal dispatches of considerable bulk--eight or ten folio pages long--down to scraps of the smallest size written on thin paper, and folded up so as to go into some secret place of concealment on the bearer’s person. Some of them look as if they had been sewed up in a button, or rolled under the leather of a whip handle, or pushed along the seam of a garment. I take it that these must all have been entrusted to emissaries sent in disguise, _Afrancesados_ or peasants hired by a great bribe. Presumably each of these scraps cost the life of the bearer when it was discovered--for the guerrillero chiefs did not deal mildly with Spaniards caught carrying French secret orders. The large folio dispatches, on the other hand, must no doubt have been carried by French aides-de-camp or couriers, whose escorts were dispersed or captured by the _partidas_ at some corner of the mountain roads between Madrid and the head-quarters of the Armies of Portugal and Andalusia.

The cipher letters are of two sorts--in the first (and more numerous) class only the names of persons and places, and the most important sentences are in cipher--invariably a numerical cipher of arbitrary figures. In the other class the whole dispatch is written in figures, not merely its more weighty clauses. The reason for adopting the former method was that it saved much time; the transliterating of unimportant parts of the dispatch (such as compliments, and personal remarks of no strategical import) would have taken many extra hours, when it was necessary to get a letter sent off in a hurry. But, as we shall see later on, there was grave danger in using this system, because the context might sometimes allow the decipherer to make a good guess at the disguised words, after reading that part of the letter which was not so guarded.

Occasionally a French dispatch is ciphered after the same infantile system that readers of romances will remember in Poe’s _Gold Bug_ or Conan Doyle’s _Sherlock Holmes_, where letters or numbers are merely substituted for each other--where, for example, 2 always means letter _e_, or 25 letter _r_. This sort of cipher is dangerously easy to an expert reader, especially if the words are separated from each other, so that the number of letters in each can be counted. Take, for example, a letter sent to Soult in 1813 by Cassan, the blockaded governor of Pampeluna[797]. Only one precaution had been taken in this cipher-epistle, viz. that elaborate care has been taken to defeat the attempt of the reader to arrive at results by counting what figures appear most frequently, and so deducing by their repetition that these must be _e_ (the most frequently used letter in French, as in English), _s_, _i_, _a_, _t_, and other common letters. This is done by having six alternative numbers for _e_, four each for _a_ and _i_, three for _t_, _s_, and _n_. Taking the simple phrase

47.50.40.41.14.26
58.24
3.51.10.36.44.23.17.24.10.50.53.27
47.46
11.18.39.17.46.21,

which deciphers into ‘depuis le commencement du blocus,’ we see that _e_ appears five times, but is represented by both 50, 24, and 44; _u_ three times, but varied as 14 and 46; _m_ thrice, varied as 10 and 36. This made the reader’s work harder, but not nearly so difficult as that required for certain other ciphers: for the whole set of signs, being not much over 60 in number, there was a limited amount of possibilities for each figure-interpretation. And the words being separated by spaces, there was a certainty that some of the two-letter units must represent _et_, _de_, _ce_, _eu_, _du_, and similar common French two-letter words. As a matter of fact this particular dispatch was deciphered in a few hours owing to the lucky guess that its initial words

10.45.23.21.16.2.41.25
5.24
10.4.25.24.3.9.8.5

might be ‘Monsieur le Maréchal,’ the preliminary address to the intended recipient. This hypothesis was verified at once by finding that this rendering made good sense for the two-letter words 23.24 = _ne_, and 10.2 = _me_, lower down in the letter. After this all was plain sailing.

[797] This particular letter is _not_ one of the Scovell file.

But the usual French cipher, the ‘Great Paris Cipher’ as Scovell called it, was a very much more complicated and difficult affair, as the list of figures, instead of being only a few score, ran to many hundreds. And of these only some few represented individual letters, more were parts of a syllabary: _ma_, _me_, _mi_, _mo_, _mu_, for example, had each a figure representing them, and so had _ab_- _ac_- _ad_- _af_- _ag_- &c. Moreover, there was a multitude of arbitrary numbers, representing under a single figure words that must often be used in a dispatch, such as _hommes_, _armée_, _général_, _marche_, _ennemi_, _corps d’armée_, _canons_. In addition there was a code of proper names, e.g. 1216 meant the River Douro, 93 Portugal, 1279 Talavera, 585 King Joseph, 1391 General Dorsenne, 1327 the Army of the South, 1280 Soult, 1300 Wellington, 400 Ciudad Rodrigo, &c. If the King wished the Duke of Dalmatia to send 9,000 men of the Army of the South to Talavera, he had only to write

‘585 désire que 1280 dirige 1156 (neuf) 692 (mille) 1102 (hommes)
de 1327 sur 1279.’

He would then cut up _désire_ and _dirige_ into the syllables _de-si-re_ and _di-ri-ge_, for each of which the syllabary had set figures; there were also arbitrary numbers for _sur_, _de_, and _que_. So the whole sentence would take up only fourteen numbers when written out.

It would seem at first sight that to interpret such a dispatch would be a perfectly hopeless task, to any one who had not the key to the cipher before him. That the admirably patient and ingenious Scovell at last made out for himself a key from the laborious comparison of documents, was nevertheless the fact. He was started on the track by the fortunate circumstance that most of the intercepted dispatches were only _partly_ in cipher. Marmont would write

‘Avec les moyens que j’ai, et 798, 1118, 602, 131,
1112.663.1135.502 au delà de Sabugal,’

or

‘J’avais donné l’ordre que 1003, 497, 1115, 1383, 69,711, 772,
530, de descendre cette rivière et de se mettre en communication
avec moi.’

Clearly the cipher-figures in the first case have something to do with a march on Sabugal, in the second with orders to some general or body of troops (to be identified hereafter) to march down a river which the context shows must be the Tagus. This is not much help, and the task looked still very hopeless. But when intercepted dispatches accumulated in quantities, and the same cipher-figures kept occurring among sentences of which part was written out in full, it became evident that various cryptic figures must mean places and persons who could be guessed at, with practical certainty. Occasionally a French writer completely ‘gives himself away’ by carelessness: e.g. Dorsenne wrote on April 16 to Jourdan,

‘Vous voulez de renseignement sur la situation militaire et
administrative de 1238:’

obviously the probable interpretation of this number is ‘the Army of the North,’ and this is rendered almost certain by passages lower down the same letter. Equally incautious is King Joseph when he writes to Marmont,

‘J’ai donné l’ordre au général Treillard de 117.8.7 la vallée du
1383, afin de marcher à 498.’

Considering the situation of the moment 117.8.7 must almost certainly mean _evacuate_, 1383 _Tagus_, and 498 some large town.[798] [The particular dispatch in which this occurs is on a most curious piece of paper, half an inch broad, a foot long, and excessively thin. It is bent into twelve folds, and would fit into any small receptacle of one inch by half an inch. I fear the bearer who had it on his person must have come to a bad end.] Suchet also made Scovell the present of some useful words when he wrote on September 17 to Soult,

‘Le Général Maitland commande l’expédition anglaise venue de 747:
O’Donnell peut réunir 786 692 1102 en y comprenant le corps de
l’Anglais Roche. Le 19 août je n’avais que 135 692 1102 à lui
opposer.’

Here it is quite clear that ‘747’ means _Sicily_; that ‘692.1102’ in the two statements of forces means _thousand men_. A little guessing and comparison with other cryptic statements of forces would soon show that 135 meant 7 and 786 meant 12.

[798] Wellington wrongly guessed Plasencia: it was Aranjuez.

Notwithstanding much useful help it was still a marvellous feat of Scovell to work out by the end of 1812 no less than _nine hundred_ separate cipher-numbers, ranging in complexity from the simple vowel a to the symbol that represented ‘train des équipages militaires’! He must have had a most ingenious brain, and unlimited patience. Down to the end there remained numbers of unsolved riddles, figures that represented persons or places so unfrequently mentioned that there was no way of discovering, by comparison between several documents, what the number was likely to mean.

Sometimes very small fish came into the net of the guerrilleros, and were sent on to Wellington; take, for example, the tiny scrap containing the pathetic letter of the young wife of General Merlin, of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre--I fear that the bearer must have fallen into the hands of Julian Sanchez or one of his lieutenants, and have had short shrift:--

‘Mon cher Ami,--Depuis ton départ je n’ai reçu qu’un seul mot de toi--pendant qu’il arrive des courriers (c’est-à-dire des paysans) du quartier général. Mon oncle qui écrit régulièrement dit toujours qu’on se porte bien, mais tu peux te mettre à ma place! Je crains que ta goutte ne soit revenue, je crains tant de choses, qui peut-être passent le sens commun, mais qui me tourmentent. Je ne dors plus, et n’ai d’autre plaisir que celui de regarder ma fille, qui se porte bien. Encore si elle pouvait m’entendre et me consoler! Adieu! Je suis d’une tristesse insupportable, parce que je t’aime plus que moi-même.--Mercédes.’

It may suffice to show the general character of a typical cipher-dispatch if we give a few lines of one, with the interpretation added below--the following comes from a dispatch of Marmont written on April 22, 1812, to Berthier, from Fuente Guinaldo:--

Le roi après m’avoir donné l’ordre

1060 462 810 195 1034 1282
de faire par- tir deux divisions

971 216 13 192 614 20 90 92
et plus de la moi- ti- é de la

1265 582 637 851 809 388 177
cavalerie dis- po- ni- ble, et avoir

669 112 923 2 786 692 1102
ré- du- it à douze mille hommes

le nombre de troupes que j’ai disponible m’ordonne

13 1040 1003 370 860 400 817 69 862 718 1100
de chercher à pren-dre Ciudad Rodrigo lors que je ne ai

423 815 591 710 850
pas un canon de siège!

It will be noted that of all the words only _partir_, _moitié_, _disponible_, _réduit_, _prendre_, required to be spelled out in the syllabary: single fixed numbers existing for all the common words, and for the military terms _siège_, _cavalerie_, and _division_.

It was, of course, only by degrees that Scovell succeeded in making out the bulk of the French phrases. In Wellington’s dispatches there is often, during the spring and summer of 1812, an allusion to information only partly comprehensible, obtained from captured letters. On June 18 (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 241) Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool that he ‘is not able entirely to decipher’ the intercepted papers that have been passing between King Joseph and Soult and Marmont. On June 25th he sends to the same recipient the happy intelligence that he has now the key to King Joseph’s cipher. Yet again, on July 16th (_Dispatches_, ix. p. 290)--with No. 36 of the file catalogued below before him--he says: ‘I have this day got a letter from the King to Marmont of the 9th inst. in cipher, which I cannot entirely decipher: it appears, however, that he thinks Drouet will not cross the Tagus, and I suspect he orders General Treillard to collect some troops in the valley of the Tagus, and to move on Plasencia.’ The interpretation was correct, save that Treillard was to move not on Plasencia but on Aranjuez. The code-numbers for the two places were neither of them known as yet. But by September all essential words were discovered, and Wellington could comprehend nearly everything, unless Joseph or Soult was writing of obscure places or distant generals.

A list of the whole of Scovell’s file of 52 French dispatches may be useful: those whose number is marked with a star are wholly or partly in cipher, the remaining minority are in plain French without disguise. It is clear that Wellington had many more French papers not in cipher, which did not get into Scovell’s portfolio.

_Date._ _Sender._ _Recipient._ _Contents._
1. Mar. 6, 1812 Col. Marmont Long interview with
Jardet Berthier. He says you
must ‘contain’
Wellington in the
North. All else in Spain
matters comparatively
little.
2*. April 11 ” Marmont Brennier See that Silveira does not
molest my communications.
3*. April 14 ” Soult Berthier Marmont has betrayed me, and
caused the loss of Badajoz.
Synopsis of Andalusian affairs.
4*. April 16 ” Marmont Berthier As I prophesied, my raid into
Portugal produces no effect:
we begin to starve.
5*. April 16 ” Dorsenne Jourdan I refuse to acknowledge the king
as controlling my army.
6*. April 17 ” Soult Berthier Details of the fall of Badajoz,
‘événement funeste.’
7*. April 22 ” Marmont Berthier I have been starved out of
Portugal. Have seen no
British troops, save a few
cavalry.

8*. April 23 ” Foy Jourdan Send me food. My division is
nearly starved.

9*. April 25 ” King Dorsenne I am your Commander-in-Chief.
Joseph Send me a report of your army.

10. April 26 ” Gen. Lafon- Gen. News from Andalusia at last:
Blaniac[799] Treillard[800] Soult has failed to save
Badajoz.

11*. April 28 ” Marmont Dorsenne Send me 8,000 quintals of wheat
at once.

12*. April 28 ” Marmont Berthier I have sent Bonnet, as ordered,
to invade the Asturias.

13. April 28 ” Gen. Clarke I send parole of Colquhoun
Lamar- Grant, a suspicious character.
tinière[801] The police should look to
him[802].

14*. April 29 ” Marmont Jourdan If I keep troops on the Tagus,
I am too weak on the Douro
and Tormes. I must draw my
divisions northward.

15*. April 29 ” Marmont Berthier I find that five British divisions
were chasing me last week.
Wellington is very strong in
the North.

16*. April 30 ” Marmont Berthier Send me a siege-train, I am
helpless without one: also
plenty of money.

17. April 30 ” Marmont Gen. Come up at once to join my
Tirlet[803] army.

18*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont We will keep unhorsed guns for
you at Talavera, so when
moving South bring gunners
and horses only.

19*. May 1 ” King Dorsenne You are placed under my command.
Joseph Obey my orders.

20*. May 1 ” Jourdan Dorsenne Send a division to Valladolid,
to support Marmont.

21*. May 1 ” Jourdan Marmont You must send more troops to
the Tagus: Drouet is hard
pressed in Estremadura.

22*. May 1 ” Jourdan Berthier Wellington is advancing in
Estremadura. Marmont must
send troops southward.

23*. May 1 ” King Berthier Observations on the
Joseph military situation.

24. May 1 ” Col. Gen. Technical artillery
Bousseroque Doguerau[804] matters.

25. May 20 ” Proclamation by Suchet The King is appointed
Commander-in-Chief in Spain.

26*. May 26 ” King Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz.
Joseph Why was not Drouet
near enough to save it?

27*. May 26 ” Jourdan Soult Hill has stormed Almaraz. Try
to re-open communications
with Foy.

28*. June 1 ” Marmont Jourdan The fall of Almaraz means that
Wellington will attack me next.
He is not threatening Soult,
but me.

29*. June 22 ” Marmont King I stop in front of Salamanca
Joseph manœuvring. I dare not attack
Wellington till Caffarelli’s
reinforcements arrive.

30*. June 24 ” Marmont Caffarelli I am manœuvring opposite
Wellington. Your reinforcements
are required _at once_.

31*. July 1 ” Marmont King When the Salamanca forts fell,
Joseph I retreated to the Douro.
I cannot fight Wellington till
I get 1,500 more horse and 7,000
more infantry.

32. July 1 ” Suchet King Narrative of guerrilla war
Joseph in Aragon.

33. July 1 ” Suchet King Favour shall be shown to
Joseph _Afrancesados_.

34*. July 6 ” Marmont Jourdan I had to retreat to the Douro
because Caffarelli sent no
help. Can you lend me
Treillard’s cavalry division?

35*. July 7 ” King Soult Send 10,000 men to Toledo
Joseph _at once_.

36*. July 9 ” King Marmont I shall march to your aid in a
Joseph few days, when my troops are
collected.

37*. July 22 ” Suchet King I am much worried by Maitland’s
Joseph approach. Have beaten Joseph
O’Donnell at Castalla.

38. July 29 ” Gen. Lafon- King Madrid remains tranquil.
Blaniac[805] Joseph

41*. July 30 ” Marmont King We can never hope to unite.
Joseph My army retires via Lerma on
Burgos.

42. Aug. 2 ” Gen. King Wellington is marching on
Espert[806] Joseph Segovia.

43*. Aug. 7 ” King Marmont Communicate with me by the
Joseph Somosierra Pass.

44*. Aug. 12 ” Suchet King I am much alarmed at the possible
Joseph results of Maitland’s landing.

45*. Aug. 12 ” Soult Clarke The King is betraying the Emperor
and negotiating with the Cadiz
Cortes[807].

46*. Sept. 17 ” Suchet Soult Explains situation in Valencia.

47*. Dec. 9 ” King Napoleon Plans for reorganizing
Joseph the armies.

48*. Dec. 22 ” King Napoleon Plans for next year. Should I
Joseph make Burgos my capital, and hold
Madrid only as an outpost?

49*. Jan. 8, 1813 King Napoleon Soult is intolerable. Let D’Erlon
Joseph replace him. Send us money.

50*. Jan. 28 ” King Napoleon Your decision about Soult shocks
Joseph me. I shall send him away on
my own authority.

51*. Mar. 14 ” King Gen. D’Erlon shall look after Salamanca.
Joseph Reille Send two divisions to hunt the
guerrilleros.

52. Mar. 16 ” Col. King Discouraging news from Paris. No
Lucotte Joseph men or money for Spain!

[799] Governor of La Mancha.

[800] Commanding cavalry on the Tagus.

[801] Marmont’s Chief-of-the-Staff.

[802] See above, p. 293.

[803] Commanding artillery of the Army of Portugal, on leave.

[804] Commanding artillery of the Army of the Centre.

[805] Now governor of Madrid.

[806] Governor of Segovia.

[807] For the story of this letter see above, pp. 538-9.

In addition to the ciphers, the Scovell papers consist of short diaries of Major Scovell for the Corunna Campaign, and for 1809-10-11-12-13, as also a large bundle of reports and maps of roads and passes in Portugal, all the papers concerning the raising of the Corps of Guides, a number of notes and reports on suggested travelling forges for the artillery and engineers, and some whole or mutilated contemporary Spanish newspapers. There is some curious and interesting information scattered through all of them.

XVI

BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY IN THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1812

[DETAILS COLLECTED BY MAJOR J. H. LESLIE, R.A.]

I. ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY

The following troops were serving in the Peninsula in 1812:--

_Troop._ _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._
Peninsula._
A Brevet Major H. D. Ross July 1809 ‘A’ Battery, R.H.A.
D Captain G. Lefebure[808] March 1810 ‘V’ Battery, R.H.A.
[Later 2nd Captain E. C.
Whinyates]
E Captain R. Macdonald August 1811 ‘E’ Battery, R.H.A.
I Brevet Major R. Bull August 1809 ‘I’ Battery, R.H.A.

[808] Lefebure died of sickness in October, and the battery was
commanded till next spring by Whinyates.

A, E, and I were serving with Wellington’s main army in 1812, attached respectively to the Light Division, the 7th Division, and the 1st Division of Cavalry (Stapleton Cotton). All three were present at Salamanca, but A was left at Madrid in August with the Light Division, and did not take part in the Burgos Campaign. D was attached to Erskine’s ‘2nd Cavalry Division,’ and served under Hill in Estremadura from the beginning of the year till Hill marched up to Madrid in October.

II. ROYAL (FOOT) ARTILLERY

A.

The seven companies shown in the following tables were serving in the Peninsula in 1812 with the field army.

NOTE.--In 1812 there were ten battalions of Royal (Foot) Artillery, the companies of which were always designated by the name of the commanding officer, whether he was actually present with his company or no.

_Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._
talion._ Peninsula._

1st Captain J. May[809] March 1809 2nd Battery, R.F.A.
4th Captain S. Maxwell October 1810 72 Company, R.G.A.
5th Captain F. Glubb[810] March 1809 48 Company, R.G.A.
8th Brevet Major R. W. April 1811 78 Company, R.G.A.
Gardiner
8th Captain R. Lawson August 1808 87th Battery, R.F.A.
8th Captain J. P. Eligé[811] October 1810 Reduced in 1819.
[Later, Captain T. A.
Brandreth]
9th Captain R. Douglas March 1812 45th Battery, R.F.A.

[809] Actually under command of 2nd Captain H. Baynes.

[810] Actually under command of 2nd Captain W. G. Power.

[811] Eligé was shot through the heart on the second day of the
siege of the Salamanca forts. 2nd Captain W. Greene commanded the
company at the battle of Salamanca.

Of these, Gardiner’s company was attached to the 1st Division, Maxwell’s to the 2nd, Douglas’s to the 3rd, Lawson’s to the 5th, Eligé’s to the 6th. May’s company accompanied the main army without guns, in charge of the Reserve ammunition train.

Glubb’s company was attached to the heavy 18-pounders and 24-pounder howitzers of the Reserve Artillery.

Gardiner’s, Douglas’s, Lawson’s, and Eligé’s [now temporarily under 2nd Captain W. Greene, Eligé having been killed at the Salamanca forts] companies were present at Salamanca, as was also the Reserve Artillery, but the last-named was not engaged.

Maxwell’s company was with Hill in Estremadura from January till the march to Madrid in September-October. Part of it was present at the capture of Almaraz on 19 May.

B.

The following additional companies were in Portugal in 1812, but did not join the field army:--

_Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._
talion._ Peninsula._
6th Brevet Major H. F. April 1811 102 Company, R.G.A.
Holcombe
1st Captain A. Bredin September 1808 37th Battery, R.F.A.
6th Captain G. Thompson March 1809 18th Battery, R.F.A.
5th Captain H. Stone March 1812 92 Company, R.G.A.
6th Captain W. Morrison October 1812 51 Company, R.G.A.

Of these Holcombe’s company was employed at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz. The other companies present at these leaguers were Glubb’s and Lawson’s at Rodrigo, and Glubb’s and Gardiner’s at Badajoz.

In June Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies were sent round by sea to the east coast of Spain, and there joined the Anglo-Sicilian expedition of General Maitland, with which they continued to serve.

C.

At the beginning of 1812, there were present at Cadiz, Cartagena, and Tarifa, doing garrison duty, the following companies under Lieut.-Col. A. Duncan:--

_Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._
talion._ Peninsula._
2nd Captain P. Campbell[812] March 1810[813] 62 Company, R.G.A.
5th Captain H. Owen January 1810 60 Company, R.G.A.
9th Captain P. J. Hughes January 1810 Reduced in 1819.
10th Captain W. Roberts March 1810 63 Company, R.G.A.
10th Major A. Dickson April 1810 21 Company, R.G.A.
10th Captain W. Shenley April 1810 11 Company, R.G.A.

[812] This company went to Cartagena from Cadiz at the end
of January 1812, where it remained until the end of the war.
Campbell was not with it, having command of an infantry regiment
in the Spanish Army.

[813] From Gibraltar.

Of these Hughes’s company was detached to Tarifa, and took a brilliant part in its defence in Dec. 1811-Jan. 1812. The rest were in Cadiz and the Isle of Leon. Owen’s and Dickson’s companies (the latter until July 1812 being commanded by Captain R. H. Birch, whose own company of the 10th battalion was at Gibraltar, as Dickson, with the rank of Major, was serving with the Portuguese Army) marched from Cadiz to Madrid with Skerrett’s column at the end of September 1812, and in October joined Wellington’s main field army. Hughes’s, Roberts’s, and Shenley’s companies remained in garrison at Cadiz, and Campbell’s was divided between Cartagena and Tarifa.

D.

At Alicante, under General Maitland, there were present during the later months of the year not only Holcombe’s and Thompson’s companies, which had come round from Lisbon, but also the two following British companies from Sicily:--

_Bat- _Under Command of_ _Arrived in _Designation in 1914._
talion._ Peninsula._
8th Captain J. S. Williamson August 1812 40th Battery, R.F.A.
4th Captain R. G. Lacy December 1812 25 Company, R.G.A.

III. KING’S GERMAN LEGION ARTILLERY

Of the three companies of the Legionary Artillery in the Peninsula only one (No. 4) was with the field army, that of Captain F. Sympher, attached to the 4th Division. This unit was present at the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and also at the battle of Salamanca.

Captain K. Rettberg’s (No. 1) and Captain A. Cleeves’s (No. 2) companies were doing garrison duty in the Lisbon forts; but Rettberg himself, with a detachment of two officers and thirty men of his company, came up to the siege of Badajoz in March-April.

IV. PORTUGUESE ARTILLERY

[The details are taken from Major Teixeira Botelho’s _Subsidios_.]

Only three field batteries accompanied the allied field army during the campaign of 1812, though seven had been at the front in 1811. These batteries were:--

Captain J. da Cunha Preto’s 6-pounder [from the 1st regiment] and Captain W. Braun’s 9-pounder [from the 2nd regiment] batteries, both attached to General Hamilton’s Portuguese division, which always acted with Hill in Estremadura, and Major S. J. de Arriaga’s 24-pounder howitzer battery, which formed part of the Artillery Reserve, and accompanied Wellington’s own army to Badajoz, Salamanca, and Burgos. This company came from the 1st (Lisbon) regiment.

But in addition the 2nd or Algarve regiment supplied one company, under Captain J. C. Pereira do Amaral for the siege of Badajoz.

The 4th or Oporto regiment gave two companies (200 men) under Captain J. V. Miron for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, and one (70 men) under Captain William Cox for the siege of Badajoz. Cox’s company was sent round to Alicante in June, along with the British companies of Holcombe and Thompson, and joined Maitland’s Anglo-Sicilian corps for the rest of the war.

Another company of the 4th regiment under Captain D. G. Ferreri formed the divisional artillery of Silveira’s Militia corps, and was present at the blockade of Zamora in June-July 1812.

The 1st or Lisbon regiment sent a company under Captain M. A. Penedo to Alicante, along with the company of Cox mentioned above from the 4th regiment. It also supplied one company under Lieutenant A. da Costa e Silva for the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The 3rd or Elvas regiment supplied three companies, under the command of Major A. Tulloh[814], for the siege of Badajoz--they were those of Captains A. V. Barreiros, J. Elizeu, and J. M. Delgado.

[814] Captain R.A., but now serving in the Portuguese Artillery,
with the rank of Major.

INDEX

Abadia, Francisco Xavier, general, orders for, 220;
tiresome conduct of, 337.

Abbé, general, governor of Navarre, his proclamation against
guerrilleros, 102;
defeated by Mina, 198.

Alba de Tormes, Carlos de España fails to hold castle of, 415, 466.

Albuera, Hill in position at, 269;
combats in front of, 527-30.

Alcantara, bridge of, restored by Wellington, 333.

Aldaya, combat of, 64.

Alicante, occupied by Mahy, repulses Montbrun, 78, 79;
Maitland lands at, 573.

Almaraz, forts of, stormed by Hill, 322-30.

Almeida, re-fortified by Wellington, 160;
repulses the attack of Clausel, 281.

Almendralejo, seized by Hill, 132.

Altafulla, combat of, 96.

Alten, Victor, general, fails to assist Carlos de España at Rodrigo, 280;
retreats to Villa Velha, 284;
results of his action, 290;
with Wellington’s advance into Spain, 352;
at Salamanca, 365, 369, 372-3;
at Pollos, 389, 399, 401;
his successful charge at Castrillo, 405-6;
wounded at Salamanca, 422.

America, Spanish colonies in, troubles of, 136-8, 337.

Andalusia, position of Soult in, 80, 108, 109, 110, 274, 305;
evacuation of, proposed by Jourdan, 307, 308;
resisted by Soult, 309-10;
operations in, during June-August, 521, 522, 535, 536;
evacuation of, by Soult, 539-43.

Andriani, Luis, colonel, defends Saguntum, 13, 17-30;
surrenders, 45-6.

Anson, George, major-general, operations of his cavalry, 401, 402;
at Salamanca, 449, 461;
at Garcia Hernandez, 501.

Anson, William, major-general, his brigade at Castrillo, 406;
at Salamanca, 457, 458.

Aragon, French army of, 5;
Suchet’s garrisons in, 6;
operations of Duran and the guerrilleros in, 21-3;
French reinforcements for, 51-2;
Palombini’s and Severoli’s campaigns in, 98-101.

Arentschildt, Friedrich, colonel, takes command of a brigade at
Salamanca, 442-5, 454, 461, 494;
marches on Madrid, 504.

Artificers, Royal Military, at siege of Badajoz, 225, 255-6;
converted into Royal Sappers and Miners, 256.

Artillery, the allied, table of the, in 1812, Appendix, pp. 619-22.

Astorga, siege of, 337-8, 388, 502.

Asturias, the, evacuated by Bonnet, 196-8;
reconquered by him, 338;
evacuated again, 390, 391.

Aubert, colonel, governor of Almaraz, slain there, 324-6.

Ayerbe, skirmish at, 22.

Baccelar, Manuel, general, commands Portuguese of the North, 219-21;
concentrates to keep off Marmont, 282-3;
dissuades Trant from attacking Marmont, 285.

Badajoz, siege of, 217-56;
disgraceful sack of, 256-64.

Ballasteros, Francisco, general, harasses Soult in south Andalusia, 111;
harasses the besiegers of Tarifa, 116-17;
unwilling to receive orders from British, 230;
threatens Seville, 274;
retires prematurely, 275;
his ineffective raids on Zahara and Osuna, 275;
routs Rey at Alhaurin, 276;
checked at battle of Bornos, 336, 348, 385;
instructed by Wellington to threaten Seville, 519;
defeated at Bornos, 521, 522;
surprises Malaga, 535;
and Osuna, 536;
harasses retreating French, 542, 544.

Barcelona, alleged poisoning plot at, 565.

Barnard, Andrew, colonel, at the storm of Ciudad Rodrigo, 179;
becomes commander of the Light Division on Craufurd’s death, 182, 184.

Barrié, general, governor of Ciudad Rodrigo, 165, 173, 188.

Barrois, general, takes part in siege of Tarifa, 116;
sent to Drouet’s aid by Soult, 525, 531.

Bathurst, Henry, second earl, his correspondence with Wellington on
financial difficulties, 350, 351.

Bentinck, Lord Frederick, negotiates with Wellington, 344.

Bentinck, Lord William, commander of British forces in Sicily,
proposes expedition against east coast of Spain, 342, 343;
sends only a small force, 346, 347;
his indecision, 386, 408;
the expedition starts, 499, 565.

Beresford, William Carr, marshal, his strict discipline for Portuguese
army, 149;
at siege of Badajoz, 217, 228;
leads centre of army advancing into Leon, 352;
nominated by Wellington second in command in event of his being
disabled, 353;
before Salamanca, 359;
with Wellington involved in skirmish of Castrejon, 402;
urges delay in attack at Salamanca, 427;
in the battle, 459;
wounded, 471.

Berkeley, admiral, sends Russian guns for siege of Badajoz, 224.

Berthier, Louis Alexander, marshal, his dispatch to Marmont on
reorganization of army of Portugal, 189;
sends news of Joseph’s appointment as Commander-in-Chief to the
marshals in the Peninsula, 298-9.

Bertoletti, general, governor of Tarragona, 96.

Bilbao, taken by Popham and Mendizabal, 556;
recaptured by Caffarelli, 557.

Blake, Joaquim, general, Spanish commander-in-chief in Valencia,
assumes defensive against Suchet, 10;
his plans, 19-23;
advances against Suchet, 31;
defeated at battle of Saguntum, 36-43;
besieged by Suchet in Valencia, 47-72;
surrenders, 73;
imprisoned at Vincennes, 73.

Blaniac, H. Lafon, general, appointed governor of Madrid on Joseph’s
departure, 488;
defends the Retiro against Wellington, 507;
surrenders, 516.

Bock, Eberhard, major-general, commanding Heavy Dragoons K.G.L. at
Badajoz, 219, 229;
with army advancing into Leon, 352;
at Salamanca, 365, 372, 373;
at Pollos, 389;
at Castrillo, 399;
at Salamanca, 403, 425;
at Garcia Hernandez, 476-7;
marches on Madrid, 504;
goes north with Wellington, 581.

Bonnet, general, his expedition into the Asturias, 338;
summoned by Marmont before Salamanca, 354;
joins him, 381, 390, 391;
his feigned advance against Wellington, 397;
at Salamanca, 424-39;
assumes command on Marmont’s being disabled, 440;
wounded, 440, 469.

Bornos, battle of, 336, 385.

Bourke, general, defeated by Eroles at Roda, 98.

Boussard, general, wounded at Aldaya, 64.

Brennier, Antoine François, general, blockades Rodrigo, 281;
beaten at Castrillo, 405, 406;
his division routed at Salamanca, 451.

Burgoyne, John, major of engineers, takes charge of assault on
castle of Badajoz, 251;
besieges the forts of Salamanca, 362.

Cadiz, bombardment of by the French, 167, 168;
politics at, 137-44;
siege of, raised, 539, 540.