Chapter XVII: Appendix: Sphoṭavāda

Another point to be noted in connection with the main metaphysical theories of Patañjali is the Sphoṭa theory which considers the relation of words with their ideas and the things which they signify. Generally these three are not differentiated one from the other, and we are not accustomed to distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet they are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view when we consider the process of auditory perception of words. Thus if we follow the _Bhāshya_ as explained by Vijñāna Bhikshu we find that by an effect of our organs of speech, the letters are pronounced. This vocal sound is produced in the mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in contact with which it produces the audible sound called dhvani (_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 17). The special modifications of this dhvani are seen to be generated in the form of letters (_varṇa_) and the general name for these modifications is nāda. This sound as it exists in the stage of varṇas or letters is also called varṇa. If we apply the word śabda or sound in the most general sense, then we can say that this is the second stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage being that of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. The third stage of śabda is that in which the letters, for example, g, au, and ḥ, of the word “gauḥ” are taken together and the complete word-form “gauḥ” comes before our view. The comprehension of this complete word-form is an attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense of hearing senses the letter-forms of the sound one by one as the particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as they approach the ear one by one in air-waves. But each letter-form sound vanishes as it is generated, for the sense of hearing has no power to hold them together and comprehend the letter-forms as forming a complete word-form. The ideation of this complete word-form in the mind is called sphoṭa. It differs from the letter-form in this that it is a complete, inseparable, and unified whole, devoid of any past, and thus is quite unlike the letter-forms which die the next moment after they originate. According to the system of Patañjali as explained by the commentators, all significance belongs to this sphoṭa-form and never to the letters pronounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and heard in a particular order serve to give rise to such complete ideational word-images which possess some denotation and connotation of meaning and are thus called “sphoṭas,” or that which illuminates. These are essentially different in nature from the sounds in letter-forms generated in the senses of hearing which are momentary and evanescent and can never be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning, and have the sense of hearing as their seat.

_The Vaiśeshika view._—Saṅkara Miśra, however, holds that this “sphoṭa” theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the supporters of sphoṭa agree that the sphoṭa stands conventionally for the thing that it signifies; now if that be the case what is the good of admitting sphoṭa at all? It is better to say that the conventionality of names belongs to the letters themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a thing; and it is when you look at the letters from this aspect—their unity with reference to their denotation of one thing—that you call them a pada or name (_Upaskāra_, II. 2, 21). So according to this view we find that there is no existence of a different entity called “name” or “sphoṭa” which can be distinguished from the letters coming in a definite order within the range of the sense of hearing. The letters pronounced and heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when they denote a particular meaning or object.

_Kumārila’s view_:—Kumārila, the celebrated scholar of the Mīmāṃsa school, also denies the sphoṭa theory and asserts like the Vaiśeshika that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any special sphoṭa or name. To prove this he first proves that the letter-forms are stable and eternal and suffer no change on account of the differences in their modes of accent and pronunciation. He then goes on to show that the sphoṭa view only serves to increase the complexity without any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to the so-called defect of the letter-denotation theory that the letters cannot together denote a thing since they do not do it individually, applies to the name-denotation of the sphoṭa theory, since there also it is said that though there is no sphoṭa or name corresponding to each letter yet the letters conjointly give rise to a sphoṭa or complete name (_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 91–93).

The letters, however, are helped by their potencies (saṃskāras) in denoting the object, or the meaning. The sphoṭa theory has, according to Kumārila and Pārthasārathi, also to admit this saṃskāra of the letters in the manifestation of the name or the śabda-sphoṭa, whereas they only admit it as the operating power of the letters in denoting the object or the thing signified. Saṃskāras according to Kumārila are thus admitted both by the sphoṭa theorists and the Kumārila school of Mīmāṃsa, only with this difference that the latter with its help can directly denote the object of the signified, whereas the former have only to go a step backwards in thinking their saṃskāra to give rise to the name or the śabda-sphoṭa alone (_Nyāyaratnākara_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 104).

Kumārila says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity of the sphoṭa theory only because if the sphoṭa view be accepted then it comes to the same thing as saying that words and letters have no validity, so that all actions depending on them also come to lose their validity (_Ślokavārttika_, Sphoṭavāda, śl. 137).

_Prabhākara._—Prabhākara also holds the same view; for according to him also the letters are pronounced in a definite order; though when individually considered they are momentary and evanescent, yet they maintain themselves by their potency in the form of a pāda or name, and thus signify an object. Thus Śāliknātha Miśra says in his _Prakaraṇa Pañcikā_, p. 89: “It is reasonable to suppose that since the later letters in a word are dependent upon the perception of a preceding one some special change is wrought in the letters themselves which leads to the comprehension of the meaning of a word.... It cannot be proved either by perception or by inference that there is any word apart from the letters; the word has thus for its constituents the letters.”

_Śabara._—The views of Kamārila and Prahhākara thus explicated are but elaborate explanations of the view of Śabara who states the whole theory in a single line—_pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakaḥ_.

“The last letter together with the potency generated by the preceding letters is the cause of significance.”

_Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa._—After describing the view of those who are antagonistic to the sphoṭa theory it is necessary to mention the Vaiākaraṇa school which is in favour of it; thus we find that in explaining the following passage of Mahābhāshya,

“What is then a word? It is that which being pronounced one can understand specific objects such as those (cows) which have tail, hoofs, horns, etc.”

Kaiyata says: “The grammarians think that denotation belongs to words, as distinct from letters which are pronounced, for if each of the letters should denote the object, there would be no need of pronouncing the succeeding letters....”

The vaiyakaraṇas admit the significant force of names as distinguished from letters. For if the significant force be attributed to letters individually, then the first letter being quite sufficient to signify the object, the utterance of other letters becomes unnecessary; and according to this view if it is held that each letter has the generating power, then also they cannot do it simultaneously, since they are uttered one after another. On the view of manifestation, also, since the letters are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected together in due order; if their existence in memory is sufficient, then we should expect no difference of signification or meaning by the change of order in the utterance of the letters; that is “_sara_” ought to have the same meaning as “_rasa_.” So it must be admitted that the power of signification belongs to the sphoṭa as manifested by the nādas as has been described in detail in _Vākyapadīya_.

As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the object of perception is a constant one so also is the relation between the sphoṭa and the nāda as the manifested and the manifestor (_Vākyapadīya_ 98). Just as the image varies corresponding to the variation of the reflector, as oil, water, etc., so also the reflected or manifested image differs according to the difference of the manifestor (_Vāk._ 100). Though the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs at one and the same time yet there seems to be a “before and after” according to the “before and after” of the nāda utterances (_Vāk._ 102). That which is produced through the union and disunion (of nādas or dhvanis) is called sphoṭa, whereas other sound-perceptions arising from sounds are called dhvanis (_Vāk._ 103). As by the movement of water the image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt the movement of the water and thus seems to move, so also the sphoṭa, though unchanging in itself, yet appears to suffer change in accordance with the change of nāda which manifests it (_Vāk._ 49). As there are no parts of the letters themselves so the letters also do not exist as parts of the name. There is again no ultimate or real difference between names and propositions (_Vāk._ 73). It is only in popular usage that they are regarded as different. That which others regard as the most important thing is regarded as false here, for propositions only are here regarded as valid (_Vāk._ 74). Though the letters which manifest names and propositions are altogether different from them, yet their powers often appear as quite undifferentiated from them (_Vāk._ 89). Thus when propositions are manifested by the cause of the manifestation of propositions they appear to consist of parts when they first appear before the mind. Thus, though the pada-sphoṭa or the vākya-sphoṭa does not really consist of parts, yet, as the powers of letters cannot often be differentiated from them, they also appear frequently to be made up of parts (_Vāk._ 91).

_The Yoga View._—As to the relation of the letters to the sphoṭa, Vācaspati says, in explaining the _Bhāshya_, that each of the letters has the potentiality of manifesting endless meanings, but none of them can do so individually; it is only when the letter-form sounds are pronounced in succession by one effort of speech that the individual letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from one another can manifest a complete word called the sphoṭa. Thus owing to the variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from other letter-form sounds any letter-form sound may manifest any meaning or word; for the particular order and the association of letter-form sounds depend upon the particular output of energy required in uttering them. The sphoṭa is thus a particular modification of buddhi, whereas the letter-form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It is well to note here that the theory that the letters themselves have endless potentiality and can manifest any word-sphoṭas, according to their particular combinations and recombinations, is quite in keeping with the main metaphysical doctrine of the Pātañjala theory.

_Vākya-sphoṭa._—What is said here of the letter-form sounds and the śabda-sphoṭas also applies to the relation that the śabda-sphoṭas bear to propositions or sentences. A word or name does not stand alone; it always exists as combined with other words in the form of a proposition. Thus the word “tree” whenever it is pronounced carries with it the notion of a verb “asti” or “exists,” and thereby demonstrates its meaning. The single word “tree” without any reference to any other word which can give it a propositional form has no meaning. Knowledge of words always comes in propositional forms; just as different letter-form sounds demonstrate by their mutual collocation a single word or śabda-sphoṭa, so the words also by their mutual combination or collocation demonstrate judgmental or propositional significance or meaning. As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words themselves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them side by side in a particular order that a meaning dawns in the mind. When single words are pronounced they associate other words with themselves and thus appear to signify a meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by association with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve to specialise that meaning (_niyamārthe anuvādaḥ_). Thus “cooks” means that any subject makes something the object of his cooking. The mention of the subject “Devadatta” and the object “rice” only specialises the subject and the object. Though the analysis of a sentence into the words of which it is constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word into the letter-form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary division of it as into cases, verbs, etc.

_Abhihitānvayavada and Anvitābhidhānavāda._—This reminds us of the two very famous theories about the relation of sentences to words, viz. the “Abhihitānvayavāda” and the “Anvitābhidhānavāda.” The former means that words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function abhidhā or denotation; these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter means that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with each other; they only express an action or something connected with action; in “sāmānaya”, “bring the cow”—“gām” does not properly mean “gotva” but “ānayanānvitagotva,” that is, the bovine genus as connected with bringing. We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb and vice versa—(Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, Cowell).

_The Yoga point of view._—It will be seen that strictly speaking the Yoga view does not agree with any one of these views though it approaches nearer to the Anvitābhidhāna view than to the Abhihitānvaya view. For according to the Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the only true thing; words only serve to manifest this idea but have themselves no meaning. The division of a sentence into the component word-conceptions is only an imaginary analysis—an afterthought.

_Confusion the cause of verbal cognition._—According to Patañjali’s view verbal cognition proceeds only from a confusion of the letter-form sounds (which are perceived in the sense of hearing), the śabda-sphoṭa which is manifested in the buddhi, and the object which exists in the external world. These three though altogether distinct from one another yet appear to be unified on account of the saṅketa or sign, so that the letter-form sounds, the śabda-sphoṭa, and the thing, can never be distinguished from one another. Of course knowledge can arise even in those cases where there is no actual external object, simply by virtue of the manifesting power of the letter-form sounds. This saṅketa is again defined as the confusion of words and their meanings through memory, so that it appears that what a word is, so is its denoted object, and what a denoted word is, so is its object. Convention is a manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confusion of words and their meanings. This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and their objects: such unity is imaginary and due to beginningless tradition. This view may well be contrasted with Nyāya, according to which the convention of works as signifying objects is due to the will of God.

INDEX

_abhihitānvayavāda_, 186

abhiniveśa, 101, 104

_abhivyaktikāraṇa_, 133

abhyāsa, 100, 101, 126, 128, 129, 130, 138, 143, 149, 162, 177

Absorption, 102

Abstraction, 135, 136, 148, 154, 174

Accessories, 135, 137, 145

Accidental variation, 77

_acit_, 162

Actual, 73

Actuality, 83

adharma, 85, 86, 88, 102, 106, 162

adhikārin, 123

adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 112

_adṛshṭa-janmavedanīya karma_, 105, 110, 111

advaita, 14

_Advaita-Brahmasiddhi_, 14

Afflictions, 100, 103, 104, 105, 123, 124, 128, 143, 173 n., 176, 177,
178

Agent, 4

Aggregation, 168

Agreement, 33

ahaṃkāra, 38, 40, 41, 53, 56, 58, 61, 82, 86, 87, 93

ahaṃkāra-sāttvika, rājasa, tāmasa, 55

ahiṃsā, 136, 138, 139, 144

_Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā_, 10

akhyāti, 164

aklishṭa, 101

aklishṭavṛtti, 128

_aliṇga_, 7, 41, 42, 62, 118

_anādisaṃyoga_, 28

_anāśrita_, 29 n.

anekabhavika, 107, 112, 113

Anger, 141

_anirvācyā_, 28

aniyatavipāka, 112

aniyatavipāka-adṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113

antaḥkaraṇa, 43 n.

_anukāreṇa paśyati_, 21

anupaśya, 21

anuvrata, 139

anuvyavasāya, 176

anvaya, 166, 167

anvayikāraṇa, 61

_anvitābhidhānavāda_, 186

anvitābhidhānavāda, Yoga view, near to, 186

_anyābhyāṃ ahaṃkārābhyām svakāryyopajanane rājasāhaṃkāraḥ
sahakārībhavati_, 55

anyathākhyāti, 164, 173 n.

_anyatvakāraṇa_, 134

_anyonyamithunāḥ sarvve naishāmādisamprayogo viprayogo vā úpalabhyate_,
7

aṅga, 145

aṇu, 43 n., 65

ap, 74, 75, 166, 167

ap atom, 65, 66

apara vairāgya, 127, 128

aparigraha, 141

_apavarga_, 29

apoha, 101, 176

Appearance, 36

apuṇya karma, 88

Aristotle, 1, 13

_artha_, 150

arthavattva, 166, 167

_arthena svakīyayā grāhyaśaktyā vijñānamajani_, 33

asamprajñāta, 124, 149

asamprajñāta samādhi, 125

Asceticism, 136, 139, 142, 144

asmitā, 51, 59, 100, 104, 118, 153, 154, 172, 175

asmitā-ego, 51

_asmitāmātra_, 50, 51, 59, 160

_asmitānugata_, 125, 153, 154

_asmītyetāvanmātrākāratvādasmitā_, 153

Assimilation, 101

Association of ideas, 37

asteya, 141, 144

Astral body, 93

aśukla, 140

aśuklākṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111

Atheistic, 90

Atomic change as unit of time, 43

Atoms, 4, 38, 39, 43, 65, 72, 74, 77, 81, 152, 167;
continual change, 71

Attachment, 99, 100, 176, 177

Avariciousness, 136, 141

avasthā, 76

avasthāpariṇāma, 71, 73, 82, 156, 165

Aversion, 98, 176, 177

_avibhāgaprāptāviva_, 17

avidyā, 2, 11, 12, 97, 99, 100, 101, 104, 114, 115, 116, 120, 123, 128,
131, 159, 172, 173 n., 178;
its definition, 11;
uprooting of, 115, 116

avidyā of yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164

aviśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 41, 60, 61, 62, 81, 82, 84, 165

_aviśesheṇopashṭambhakasvabhāvāḥ_, 6

aviveka, 173 n.

_avyapadeśyatva_, 77

_avyavasthitākhilapariṇamo bhavatyeva_, 85

_ayutasiddhāvayava_, 69

_ādisamprayoga_, 7

ākāra, 85

ākāśa, 14, 43 n., 56, 57, 58, 68, 80, 93, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170

ākāśa, two kinds of, 168

ākāśa atom, 65, 66;
Bhikshu and Vācaspati on, 65

ākāśa tanmātra, 66

ālocana, 176

āmalaka, 77, 78, 79

ānanda, 153,154

ānandānugata, 125, 153, 154

_āptikāraṇa_, 133, 135

āpūra, 93

_āpyakāraṇa_, 135

āsana, 136, 145

āśaya, 103

_āśerate sāṃsārikā purushā asminniti āśayaḥ_, 103

āvaraṇa śakti, 84

āyush, 105, 106, 115

Barabara muni, 64

bāhya karma, 102

Beginningless, 28

Behaviour, 6

Bel, 77

Benares, 11 n.

bhakti, 161

bhaktiyoga, 159, 161

bhava, 110

_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītam svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ
varttamānaṃ trayaṃ caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyam yadi caitat svarūpato
nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata tasmādatītamanāgataṃ
svarūpato’stīti_, 31 n.

_Bhāshya_, 16, 17, 18, 19, 33, 61, 62, 67, 71, 76, 78, 80, 91, 95, 99,
109, 110, 131

bhāvanā, 161

Bhikshu, 6, 9, 12 n., 43 n., 45 n., 46 n., 50, 65, 67, 85, 86, 88, 90,
94, 109, 110, 112, 126, 129, 145, 153, 168

_bhoga_, 29, 105, 106, 115

bhoga-śarīra, 105

Bhoja, 126

Bhojavṛtti, 95

bhrama, 173 n.

bhūta, 60, 69, 166

bhūtādi, 54, 56, 58, 63, 64;
accretion from, 65, 66

Biological, 2

Birth, 133, 161

Body, sattvamaya, 160

Bondage, 19

Brahmacaryya, 141

Brahman, 27, 28, 139

Breath, 146, 147

Breath regulation, 135, 136

_buddheḥ pratisaṃvedi purushaḥ_, 19

_buddhi_, 16, 18, 21, 27, 28, 40, 51, 52, 61, 115, 116, 118, 152, 173
n.

Buddhist, 33, 45 n.

Buddhists, their theory of _sahopalambhaniyama_ refuted, 33

Caitra, 173

Caraka, 11

Caste, 139

Categories of existence, 41

Category, 6, 117

Caturdaśī, 139

Causal activity, 4

Causal operation, 4

Causal transformation, 4

Causality, 152

Causation, 132, 133;
Sāṃkhya view of, 81

Cause, 79, 81, 85, 133, 134;
nine kinds of, 133

Cessation, 19

Change, 43, 44;
Buddhist and Yoga idea contrasted, 45 n.;
units of, 45, 46

Changeful, 18

Characterised, 37

Characteristic, 37

_Chāyā-vyākhyā_, 63, 93

Chemical, 2

Chowkhamba, 11 n.

Circumstance, 139

cit, 15, 162

citta, 36, 81, 92, 93, 94, 96, 101, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 125, 132,
147, 154, 161, 175;
different forms of, 92, 93;
different states of, 170;
its nature, 94

_cittamayaskāntamaṇikalpaṃ sannidhimātropakāri dṛśyatvena svaṃ bhavati
purushasya svāminaḥ_, 22

_cittaprasāda_, 127

Clairaudience, 144

Class-characteristics, 4 n.

Cleanliness, 136, 143, 144

Coco-nut, 77

Co-existence, 34

Cognitive states, 48

Coherent, 7, 37

Collocation, 37

Commentary, 4

Compassion, 137

Complacency, 137

Compounds, 3, 166

Conceived, 3

Conceiver, 3

Concentration, 17, 94, 95, 96, 123, 126, 128, 135, 136, 147, 148, 150,
152, 153, 155, 163, 170

Concept, 150, 162, 173

Conceptual, 23, 25

Concomitant causes, 85

Condensation, 10

Conscious-like, 19

Consciousness, 17, 18, 20, 21, 25, 45, 92, 93, 122, 149, 151, 154, 173

Consciousness contentless, 50

Conscious states, 17

Conservation, 132, 133

Contact, 27, 29 n.

Contemplation, 97

Contentment, 136, 139, 144

Continence, 136, 139, 141, 144

Contrary, 141

Co-operation, 5

Cosmic evolution, 47

Cosmic matter, 74

Country, 139

Creation, 114, 115, 160, 161

_Critique of Judgment_, 14

_Critique of Practical Reason_, 14

_Critique of Pure Reason_, 14

Davies, 25

Decision, 53

Demerit, 86, 87, 88, 93, 102, 103

Denotation, 7 n.

deśa, 85, 170

Descartes, 13

Desire, 141

Determinate, 7

Determined, 3, 37

Determiner, 3

Devotion, 139, 142, 145, 161

dhāraṇā, 101, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 138, 145, 147, 148, 176

dharma, 42, 71, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 103, 106, 162

dharmamegha-samādhi, 117

_dharmapariṇāma_, 69, 71, 74, 80, 81, 156, 165

dharmin, 71, 73, 74, 76

_dharmisvarūpamātro hi dharmaḥ, dharmivikriyā eva eshā dharmadvārā
propañcyate_, 37, 71

dharmī, 42

_dhātu_, 11

_dhṛtikāraṇa_, 135

dhyāna, 117, 130, 135, 136, 138, 139, 145, 147, 148

Difference, 33

Differentiated, 7, 37, 62

Differentiation, 53, 66, 101

dik, 170

Discrimination, 8, 116, 120, 164

Distractions, 126, 148

Doubt, 172

_drashṭā dṛśiṃātraḥ śuddho’pi pratyayānupaśyaḥ_, 16

dravya, 4 n., 29 n., 168

Droṇa, 140 n.

_dṛgdarśanaśaktyorekātmateva asmitā_, 16, 51

dṛk, 17

_dṛkśakti_, 20

dṛshṭajanma karmāśaya, 105

_dṛshṭajanmavedanīya_, 105, 110, 112

duḥkha, 175

dvesha, 104

Earth, 167

Effect, 81, 82, 85, 132

Efficient cause, 82

Ego, 3, 4, 27, 28, 38, 42, 51, 52, 53, 60, 61, 99, 152, 153, 175;
a modification of buddhi, 53;
evolution in three lines from, 54;
three kinds of, 55

Egohood, 50, 124

Ego-universal, 50

ekabhavika, 105, 110, 111, 112

ekabhavikatva, 109

_ekāgra_, 95, 96, 123, 126

ekātmatā, 17

_ekātmikā saṃvidasmitā_, 51

ekendriya, 128

Elements, 3, 166

Emancipation, 164

Energy, 3, 5, 8, 132

Enjoyment, 28, 29

Equilibrium, 6, 7, 8, 9, 42, 43, 87

Error, 173 n.

Eternal, 8, 91

Eternity, two kinds of, 118

Ethics, 92

European, 10

Evolutes, 11

Evolution, 7, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 62, 65, 69, 72, 76, 81, 84,
87, 89, 114;
as change, 43;
as change of qualities and as derivation of categories, 69;
definite law of, 82;
its limitations by time and space, 79;
measured by units of spatial motion, 44;
of manas, 55;
of the senses, 54;
of categories, difference between Sāṃkhya and Yoga view, 58–62;
of similars, 10

Evolutionary process, 77, 85, 91

Exhalation, 146

Existence as capacity of effecting, 8

Expiratory, 136

Extension, 34

Externality, 34

External reality, 34;
Buddhist objection to, 32;
has more than a momentary existence, 36;
its ground, 36;
not due to imagination, 35;
not identical with our ideas, 35

External world, 31;
refutation of Buddhist objections, 33

Faith, 102

Fichte, 50

Fisherman, 139

Force, 82

Freedom, 123, 125, 127;
of will, 177

Friendliness, 137

Future, 31, 32, 46, 72

Gaṇḍa, 15

gandha, 38, 152, 167

gandha-tanmātra, 58, 64

Gauḍapāda, 24

Generalisation, 154

Generic, 168

_ghaṭāvacchinna ākāśa_, 14

_Gītā_, 12

_Gītābhāshya_, 4 n.

Goal, 115, 121, 124, 127, 129

God, 2, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 115, 136, 139, 142, 143, 145, 148, 149,
161, 163, 164, 172, 178, 187

Gold, 134

grahaṇa, 101, 153, 175

_grahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvajñānābhiniveśā buddhau varttamānā purushe
adhyāropitasadbhāvāḥ_, 53

grahītṛ, 153

grāhya, 54, 153

Gross elements, derivation of, 65 _et seq._

Grossness, 34

_guṇā eva prakṛtiśabdavācyā na tu tadatiriktā prakṛtirasti_, 10

_guṇānāṃ hi dvairūpyaṃ vyavasāyātmkatvam vyavaseyātmakatvaṃca_, 53

_guṇānāṃ paramaṃ rūpaṃ na dṛshṭipathamṛcchati, yattu drshṭipathaṃ
prāptam tanmāyeva sutucchakaṃ_, 12, 37

guṇas, 3, 4 n., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 24, 26, 37, 38, 39, 42, 53, 76, 78,
81, 82, 98, 101, 118, 120, 121, 131, 155, 167, 170

guṇas, three classes, 5;
as causal effect, 6;
evolution of the cognitive and conative senses and tanmātras, 38;
identity of qualities and substances, 5;
relative preponderance of, 7;
special affinity of each class, 6;
special behaviour of each class of, 6;
their atomic qualities consistent with their all-pervasiveness, 43
n.;
their common purpose, 7;
their co-operation, 38;
their mode of combination, 6;
their mode of mutual operation, 5;
their mode of evolution, 7;
their nature as feelings, 68;
their twofold nature, 53;
their threefold course of development, 38;
their want of purpose in the state of equilibrium, 7;
two classes of their evolution, _aviśesha_ and _viśesha_, 40

Hariharāraṇya, 96

Heaven, 86 n.

_hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekāśritaṃ liṅgaṃ sāvayavamparatantraṃ
vyaktaṃ viparītamavyaktaṃ_, 42

Hibiscus, 15 n.

hiṃsā, 140, 141

_History of Hindu Chemistry_, 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.

Horn of a hare, 8

Hume, 37

Idealistic Buddhists, 31

Ignorance, 141, 145

Illumination, 5

Illusion, 173 n.;
of Yoga and Sāṃkhya, 164

Illusive, 28

Imagination, 34

Immanent purpose, 90

Independence, 95, 128, 134

Indeterminate, 8

India, 14

Indra, 86 n.

Inertia, 3, 5, 8, 37, 167

Inference, 1, 2, 81, 96, 154, 156, 162, 163, 170, 171

Infra-atomic, 3

Infra-atoms, 4

Inhalation, 146

Injury, 139

Inorganic, 74

Inspiratory, 136

Intellection, 6

Intelligence, 2, 48

Intelligence-stuff, 3, 8, 49

Iron, 6

Īśvara, 14, 79, 87, 88, 90, 103, 126, 144, 145, 159, 160, 161, 162,
164, 172;
removal of barriers, 87

Īśvarakṛshṇa, 7 n.

Īśvarapraṇidhāna, 142, 145, 161

_Īśvarasyāpi dharmādhisṭhānārthaṃ pratibandhāpanaya eva vyāpāro_, 87

_janmamaraṇakaraṇānāṃ pratiniyamādayugapat pravṛtteśca purushabahutvam
siddhaṃ traiguṇyaviparyyayācca_, 26

_japāsphaṭikayoriva noparāgaḥ kintvabhimānaḥ_, 15

_jāti_, 105, 106, 115

Jealousy, 143

jīva, 14

jīvanmukta, 117

jīvanmukti, 120

jñāna, 150

jñānayoga, 130, 142, 143, 159

Judgmental, 23

kaivalya, 22, 23, 27, 31, 95, 96, 116, 118, 121, 122, 139, 140, 142,
143, 177

kalpa, 160

Kant, 14, 37

Kapila, 25

karma, 86, 98, 117, 159, 160, 177;
its classification and divergence of views, 109–113

karma-sannyāsin, 103

karmāśaya, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 160

karmayoga, 159

karuṇā, 137, 138, 139

Kaumudī, 64

kāla, 85

kāma, 104

kāraṇa, 168

kāraṇacitta, 93

_kārikā_, 7 n., 11, 24, 26, 42, 64, 165

Kārya, 168

kārya vimukti, 120

kāryya citta, 92

kāryyakarī śakti, 84

Kāśmīra, 79

_kevalapurushākārā saṃvit_, 153

kevalī, 117, 118

kirātā, 101

kleśa, 99, 100, 104, 114

klishṭa, 128

klishṭavṛtti, 100

Knowable, 5, 27, 32, 38

Knower, 27, 50

Knowledge, different kinds of, differentiated, 163

Known, 27

_kriyā_, 37, 175

kriyāyoga, 129, 130, 142, 143, 161

krodha, 104

kṛshṇa, 102, 103, 111

kṛshṇa karma, 103, 111

_kṛtārthaṃ prati nashṭamapyanashṭaṃ tadanyasādhāraṇatvāt_, 26

_kshaṇa_, 43, 44, 45, 46 n., 146, 170

_kshaṇabhaṅguram_, 12 n.

_kshaṇapracayāśraya_, 46 n.

_kshaṇapratiyogi_, 46 n.

_kshaṇatatkramayornāsti vastusamāhāraḥ iti buddhisamāhāraḥ
muhūrttāhorātrātrādayaḥ. sa tvayaṃ kālaḥ vastuśūnyo’pi
buddhinirmāṇah_, 44

_kshipta_, 95, 122

kshiti, 74, 75, 166

kshiti atom, 66

kuntī, 14, 15 n.

kuśala, 121

kuśalī, 121

kūṭastha nitya, 118

lakshaṇa, 76, 82

lakshaṇa-pariṇāma, 71, 72, 73, 74, 156, 165

Latent, 46, 73, 81, 96, 108

_laukikamāyeva_, 12 n.

liberation, 7, 25, 167, 175, 177

Light, 167

Limitation theory, 14, 15

liṅga, 7, 41, 42, 51, 62, 118

_liṅgamātram mahattatvaṃ sattāmātre mahati ātmani_, 50

_lobha_, 104

Locke, 37

Lokācāryya, 11, 55, 58

Lotus, 9

_madhumatī_, 125

_madhupratīka_, 125

Magnet, 6, 89, 171

mahat, 9, 11, 40, 41, 42, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61, 82;
its potential existence in prakṛti, 9

_Mahābhārata_, 15 n., 80, 140

mahāpralaya, 118

mahāvrata, 139

maitrī, 137, 138, 139

manas, 40, 51, 55, 60, 81, 100, 118, 133, 175, 176

Manifested, 72

mantra, 161

Many, 27, 28

_Maṇiprabhā_, 65

marut, 75, 166

Mass, 3

Material cause, 61, 81

Matter, 2, 3, 166

mānasa karma, 102

mātrā, 146

māyā, 2, 11, 12, 14, 27, 28

_māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu maheśvaraṃ_, 11

_māyeva_, 12 n.

Mechanical, 2

Meditation, 102, 135, 136, 145, 148, 149, 161, 176

Memory, 53, 98

Mental, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 37, 48

Mental states, analysis of, 48

Merit, 85, 86, 87, 88, 93, 103

Metaphysics, 30

Method of agreement, 33, 35;
of difference, 33

Mind, 2, 3, 18, 19, 81;
its seven qualities, 156

Mind-modification, 20, 22;
-transformations, 18

_moha_, 104, 175

_Mokshadharmādhyāya_, 140

Moment, 44, 45

Momentary, 12, 35

Moral, 2

Moral ideal, 26

Movement, 48

muditā, 137, 139

_mūḍha_, 95, 122

Nahusha, 86

Naiyāyika, 58

Name, 150, 173;
and thing, 173

Nandī, 85

_na tu kshaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ kaścidishyate taistu
kshaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_, 45 n.

_Naturalism and agnosticism_, 2 n.

Natural selection, 76

Nāgeśa, 61, 63, 66, 86, 87, 94, 107, 109, 117, 168

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, 90, 126

_nāsadāsīt na sadāsīt tadānīm_, 12

_nāstyasataḥ saṃbhavaḥ na cāsti sato vināśāḥ_, 31

Nectar, 85

Nescience, 14, 15, 97, 99;
its different forms, 172 n.

nidrā, 101

Nihilists, 2

_niḥsaṅge’pi uparāgo vivekāt_, 15

_niḥsattāsattam niḥsadasat nirasat avyaktam aliṅgam pradhānam_, 8

niḥsattāsattaṃ, 12

nirasmitā, 153

nirmāṇa citta, 160, 161

nirānanda, 153

nirodha, 19, 96, 118, 149, 155, 156, 170

_nirodhaja saṃskāra_, 97

nirodha samādhi, 139

_niruddha_, 95, 123

nirvicāra, 149, 153, 154

nirvīja, 122, 125

nirvīja samādhi, 154

nirvitarka, 150, 151, 153, 154

niścaya, 50

niyama, 136, 139, 142, 143, 148

niyata vipāka, 112

niyatavipākadṛshṭajanmavedanīya, 113

Nīlakaṇṭha, 80, 88, 89

Non-being, 2

Non-covetousness, 139, 144

Non-discrimination, 15

Non-distinction, 173 n.

Non-existence, 8, 12

Non-injury, 139, 140, 144;
its classification, 141

Non-stealing, 139

Noumenon, 8, 14

Observance, 135, 136

oṃkāra, 161

Omniscience, 95

oshadhi, 161

Pain, 98, 121, 122, 126, 137, 142

Palm, 77

Pantheism, 13

Pañcaśikha, 17, 52, 103 n.

parama mahat, 68

paramāṇu in Sāṃkhya and Yoga, 43 n., 66, 67, 165, 167

para vairāgya, 120, 127, 128

parikarma, 129, 130, 135, 137

pariṇāma, 98

_pariṇāmaduḥkhatā_, 98

_pariṇāmakramaniyama_, 62, 82

pariṇāmi, 19

pariṇāminityatā, 119

Past, 31, 32, 46, 72

Patañjali, 1, 2, 5 n., 16, 26, 30, 35, 51, 119

Patent, 81

pāda, 54

Pāñcāla, 79

pāṇi, 54

pāpa karma, 100

pāpakarmāśaya, 105

Pātañjala, 1, 12, 90, 115

pāyu, 54, 58

Perceived, 3

Perceiver, 3

Percept, 19

Perception, 3, 53, 96, 154, 162, 170, 171, 175

Permanent, 21

Phenomena, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 95

Phenomenal, 29, 84, 125, 155

Philosopher, 2

Philosophical, 2

Physical, 2, 3, 4, 5, 37, 166

_Physical, Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_, 63
n.

Plant: its possession of life and senses, 80

Plato, 13

Pleasure, 98

Plurality, 26–29, 30

Poison, 85

Posture, 135, 136, 145

Potency, 19, 82, 96, 98, 101, 106, 116, 124, 125, 154, 155;
destroying other potencies, 117

Potential, 9, 32, 73, 77, 83, 84, 85

Potentiality, 5, 83, 84

Potentials, 3

Power, 82

pradhāna, 118

prajñā, 102, 116, 117, 120, 122, 125, 126, 128, 136, 151, 154, 170,
171;
its seven stages, 119–120

prajñāsaṃskāra, 101

prajñāloka, 149

prakāśa, 37, 175

prakṛti, 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 22, 25, 27, 28, 29, 40, 41,
42, 54, 59, 62, 77, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 94, 95, 114,
115, 117, 118, 120, 122, 125, 143, 152, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165,
170, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
as undifferentiated cosmic matter, 12;
as equilibrium of dharma and dharmī, 42;
avidyā and vāsanā lie merged in it, 114;
different views of, 10, 11;
different from avidyā, 12;
evolution of the second category of asmitā, 51;
its difference from māyā, 12;
its difference from purusha, 20;
its first evolutionary product, mahat, 50, 51;
its goal, 116;
its identity with guṇa reals, 9;
its relation with guṇas, 6;
its similarity with purusha, 20;
Lokācāryya’s view of, 11;
nature in the state of equilibrium, 8;
refilling from, 86;
roused by God, 87;
Venkaṭa’s view of, 10

prakṛtilīna, 127

_prakṛtivikṛti_, 7 n.

_prakṛtiṛityucyate vikārotpādakatvāt avidyā jñānavirodhitvāt māyā
vicitrasṛshṭikaratvāt_, 11

prakṛtyāpūra, 106

pralaya, 114

pramāṇa, 101, 170, 176

praṇava, 161

prāṇāyāma, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 148, 175

prasupta, 176

_pratipaksha bhāvanā_, 141

_pratisambandhī_, 46 n.

pratiyogī, 46 n.

pratyāhāra, 136, 137, 147, 148

pratyaksha, 171, 175

pratyaya, 119, 134

_pratyayakāraṇa_, 133

_pratyayaṃ bauddhamanupaśyati tamanupaśyannatadātmāpi tadātmaka iva
pratibhāti_, 17

_pratyayānupaśya_, 17, 18

_Pravacana-bhāshya_, 64

_prāmāṇyaniścaya_, 134 n.

Pre-established harmony, 2

Present, 31, 32, 46, 72

Presentative ideation, 101

Presentative power, 33

Pride, 143

Primal, 3

Primal cause, 3, 6

pṛthivī, 57

Psychological, 2

Psychology, 81

Psychosis, 3, 16

puṇya, 100

puṇya karma, 88, 100

puṇya karmāśaya, 105

Purāṇa, 64

Purification, 138

Purificatory, 129, 130, 136

Purity, 139

purusha, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 23, 28, 29, 42, 48, 53, 61, 76,
89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 100, 104, 116, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125,
131, 133, 143, 154, 159, 162, 164, 173, 173 n., 175, 177, 178;
arguments in favour of its separate existence, 24;
contrast with vedantic Brahman, 26;
different from the mental states, 17;
fulfilment of its objects, 7, 8;
its connection with prakṛti real, 28;
its final separation from prakṛti, 118;
its permanence, 21;
its plurality, 26–30;
its reflection in the mind, 18;
its relation with concepts and ideas, 49;
its similarity with sattva, 49;
meaning determined from the sūtras, 16, 17;
nature of its reflection in buddhi, 21, 22

purushārtha, 89

purushārthatā, 120, 164;
its relation with avidyā, 115

pūrvadeśa, 43 n.

rajas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 24, 37, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 62, 95, 96,
116, 175

Rarefaction, 10

rasa, 38, 152

rasa-tanmātra, 58, 64

Ray, P. C., 7 n., 63 n., 170 n.

Rādhā, 14, 15 n.

rāga, 97, 99, 104, 172

_Rājamārtaṇda_, 65

_rājaputtravattattvopadeśāt_, 15

rājasa, 38

Rāmānuja, 64, 162

Realisation, 137

Reality, 2, 4, 30, 118, 154

Reals, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 28

Reason, 50

Reasoning, 53

Rebirth, 93, 107

Reflection, 18, 28

Reflection theory, 14, 15

Release, 28, 29, 123, 128

Religious, 2

Reperception, 18

Restraint, 135, 136

Retention, 101

Right knowledge, 53

rūpa, 38, 65, 152, 167

rūpa tanmātra, 57, 64

Ṛgveda, 11

ṛshi, 144

ṛtambharā, 154

_sadṛśapariṇāmā_, 10

sahakāri, 55

_sahopalambhaniyama_, 33

_sahopalambhaniyamaś ca vedyatvañca hetū
sandigdhavyatirekatayānaikāntikau_, 34

_sahopalambhaniyamādabhedo nilataddhiyoḥ_, 32

Salvation, 145, 159, 162

samādhi, 81, 96, 102, 118, 122, 124, 126, 128, 130, 135, 136, 137, 140,
142, 143, 145, 147, 148, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161, 162;
classification of, 153, 154

samādhipariṇāma, 155

samāna tantra, 67

samprajñāta, 96, 124, 125, 126, 137, 144, 149, 153, 155, 156

samprajñāta samādhi, 138, 145, 150, 154

_sampratyaya_, 134 n.

_saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyyayādadhishṭhānāt purusho’sti
bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteśca_, 24

saṃsāra, 115, 121

saṃskāra, 19, 81, 96, 98, 101, 108, 109, 125, 174, 176, 177

_saṃskārāḥ vṛttibhiḥ kriyante saṃskāraiśca vṛttayaḥ evaṃ
vṛttisaṃskāracakram aniśamāvarttate_, 97

saṃskāraśesha, 125

_saṃskāryyakāraṇa_, 135

_saṃsṛshṭā vivicyante_, 62

_saṃvega_, 129

saṃyama, 149, 157

_saṃyoga_, 27, 29 n.

sannyāsāśrama, 103

santosha, 143

saṅketa, 187

Sarasvatī Rāmānanda, 126

_sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ_, 77

satkāraṇavāda, 81

satkāryyavāda, 81

sattva, 3, 4, 5, 6, 22, 24, 37, 38, 40, 43, 47, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55,
56, 96, 116, 143, 144, 153, 160, 161

_sattvapurushayoḥ śuddhisāmye kaivalyaṃ_, 16, 22

_sattvapurushayoratyantāsaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayāviśesho bhogaḥ parārthatvāt
svārthasamyamāt purushajñā, nam_, 16

savicāra, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154;
prajñā, 151

savitarka, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154

_sā ca ātmanā grahītrā saha buddhirekātmikā saṃvid_, 51

_sāmānya guṇa_, 29 n.

Sāṃkhya, 4, 7 n., 10, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29 n., 30, 58, 62, 67,
89, 90, 94, 140, 164, 165;
Jaina influence on, 94 n.

_Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 55, 56 n., 67

Sāṃkhya-Pātañjala, 24, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 85

Sāṃkhya philosophy, 4 n.

_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, 4 n.

_Sāṃkhya-sūtra_, 11, 15, 169

_Sāṃkhya-Yoga_, 4, 26, 27, 50 n., 57

Sāṃkhyists, 12

sānanda, 153

sāttvika, 38, 56

sāttvikaahaṃkāra, 63

_Science of Ethics_, 50

Seal, Dr. B. N., 7, 37, 63 n., 66–169

Seeming reflection, 22, 23

Seer, 17, 19, 23, 24, 28, 47, 51

Self, 8, 18, 21, 26, 49, 51, 54

Self-consciousness, 52, 54

Self-control, 24

Self-intelligent, 3

Self-subsistent, 36

Sensation, 166

Sense, 141

Sense faculties, 56

Sense organs, 56

Senses, 3, 40, 41, 47, 54, 60, 86, 87, 100, 102, 135, 147, 167, 171;
divergent views about their evolution, 57

Separation, 29 n.

Sex restraint, 144

_Shashṭitantraśāstra_, 10, 12

siddha, 144

_Siddhānta-candrikā_, 65, 95

_Siddhāntaleśa_, 14

Sign, 7, 41

Simultaneous revelation, 33

Sins, 103

Sleep, 174

smṛti, 19, 64, 101, 102, 108, 126, 128, 136

Social, 2

Soul, 13, 14, 24, 25

Sound, 169

Space, 79, 146, 152;
as relative position, 169

Space order, 170

sparśa, 38, 65

sparśâtanmātra, 57, 64

Specialised, 7, 8

Specific, 168

sphoṭavāda, 178–187;
_Kumāril’s view_, 181;
Mahābhāshya and Kaiyaṭa, 182;
Prabhākara, 182;
Śabara’s view, 182;
_Vaiśeshika view_, 180;
Vākya-sphoṭa, 185;
_Yoga view_, 184

Spinoza, 13

Spirits, 7, 13

Spiritual principle, 24, 28

_sthiti_, 37, 175

_sthitikāraṇa_, 133

sthūla, 166

sthūlavishayaka, 154

Strength, 102

Studies, 136, 139

Subconscious, 81

Sub-latent, 46, 73

Substance, 4 n., 29 n., 40, 47, 73, 74, 76, 81, 168;
its nature, 37

Substantive entities, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 82, 84

Substratum, 36, 37, 49

Succession, 44, 45

_summum bonum_, 121

Susheṇa, 135

_sutucchaka_, 12

_sūkshma_, 61, 67, 166, 167

sūkshmavishayaka, 154

_sūkshmavṛttimantaḥ_, 6

Sūtra, 15, 17, 22, 26, 31, 62, 64, 108, 137, 147

_Sūtrārthabodhinī_, 65, 90

svarūpa, 166, 167, 175

svādhyāya, 136, 142, 161

_Svetāśvatara_, 11

Sympathy, 137, 138

śabda, 38, 65, 150

_śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ_, 174

śabda-tanmātra, 57, 64

_śabdādīnām mūrttisamānajātīyānām_, 66 n.

śakti, 17, 82, 83

śaktimān, 82, 83

Śaṅkara, 4 n., 135, 162

śānta, 73

_Sānti-parva_, 80, 88, 89

śāstra, 172

śauca, 143, 144

śīla, 6

śraddhā, 102, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 135, 138, 158

śruti, 57

śukla, 102, 111, 140, 175

śukla karma, 103, 140

śukla karmāśaya, 111

śuklakṛshṇa, 102, 111

Śūnyavādi Buddhists, 2

_svalpasaṅkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_, 103 n.

_svasvāmiśaktyoḥ svarūpopalabdhihetuḥ saṃyogaḥ_, 16

_tadartha eva drśyasya ātmā_, 16

_tadabhāvāt saṃyogābhāvo hānaṃ taddṛśeḥ kaivalyaṃ_, 16

taijasa, 56

tamas, 3, 4, 5, 6, 37, 39, 40, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 94, 95,
117, 169, 176

tanmātra, 38, 40, 42, 54, 59, 61, 65, 66, 67, 70, 82, 83, 124, 151, 167

tanmātras, evolution of grosser elements from, 65;
their difference from paramānus, 68;
their evolution, _et seq._, 64;
their relation to ahaṃkāra, 40, 41

tanmātrāvayava, 66

_tanmātrāṇāmapi parasparavyārvṛttasvabhāvatvamastyeva tacca
yogimātragamyam_, 68

tanu, 176

_tapaḥ_, 136

tapas, 161

_tasmāt svatantro’rthaḥ sarvapurushasādhāraṇaḥ svatantrāṇi ca cittāni
pratipurushaṃ, pravarttante_, 36

Taste, 167

_tatradṛshṭajanmavedanīyasya niyatavipākasya_, 109

tattva, 40, 94

tattvajñāna, 101, 176

_Tattva-kaumudī_, 25, 56 n., 103 n.

_Tattva-nirūpaṇa_, 66

_Tattvatraya_, 11 n., 55, 58, 64, 66

_Tattvavaiśāradī_, 3 n., 5 n., 9 n., 33 n., 46, 53, 56 n., 64, 75, 78,
79, 93, 135, 154

tattvāntara, 68

_tattvāntara-pariṇāma_, 40, 41, 69

tāmasa, 38, 56

tāmasa ahaṃkāra, 60, 62

_te vyaktasūkshmā guṇātmānaḥ ... sarvamidaṃ guṇānāṃ
Sanniveśaviśeshamātramiti paramārthato guṇātmānaḥ_, 38

tejas, 65, 75, 166, 167

tejas atom, 66

Teleological, 86, 121

Teleology, 24, 76, 77, 89

Temptation, 141

Theft, 136, 141

Theists, 90

Theories, 2

Thing, 150

Thing-in-itself, 2, 37

Thought, 2

Time, 79, 139, 152, 169;
as discrete moments, 44;
as unit of change, 43;
element of imagination in, 44;
unit of, 46;
order, 170

Tinduka, 77

Trance, 135, 136, 143;
Trance-cognition, 95

Transcendent, 18

Transformations, 20, 24

trasareṇu, 66

_triguṇamaviveki vishayaḥ sāmānyamacetanaṃ prasavadharmi vyaktaṃ tathā
pradhānaṃ, tadviparītastathā pumān_, 42

Truth, 141

Truthfulness, 139, 140, 144

_Tulyajātīyātulyajātīyaśaktibhedānupātinaḥ_, 6

udāra, 176

udbodhaka, 174

udghāta, 146, 147

udita, 73

Ultimate state, 7

Unafflicted, 176

Understanding, 19

Undetermined, 8

Undifferentiated, 12, 162

Unindividuated, 12

Universe, 1, 13;
a product of guṇa combinations, 37

Unknowable, 2, 37

Unmanifested, 4, 8, 72

Unmediated, 8

Unpredicable, 73

Unreal, 28

Unspecialised, 7

Unwisdom, 142

Upanishads, 11

upastha, 54, 58

upādāna, 61

upādāna kāraṇa, 61, 133

upekshā, 137, 139

_utpādyakāraṇa_, 135

uttaradeśa, 43 n.

ūha, 101, 176

vaikārika, 56

vairāgya, 100, 101, 127, 129, 130, 135, 136, 143, 149, 162, 177

Vaiśeshika, 43 n., 71, 168

Vaiśeshika atoms, 70

vaishṇava, 10

Vanity, 143

vaśīkāra, 128

_vastupatitaḥ_, 44

_vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ_, 35 n.

Vācaspati, 3, 5 n., 8, 12, 32, 33, 35, 44, 46 n., 51, 55, 62, 65, 66,
67, 75, 78, 87, 89, 93, 109, 110, 112, 118, 126, 129, 144, 153, 154

vāk, 54

_Vākyapadīya_, 183

vāsanā, 99, 106, 108, 114, 116, 177;
contrasted with karmāśaya, 107

Vāyu, 167

Vāyu atom, 65

Vedas, 154, 160, 162, 170, 177

Vedānta, 11, 14, 24, 27, 28, 29, 162

Vedāntism, 14

Vedāntists, 12, 26, 66, 81

Vedic, 103

Vehicles of actions, 103

Venkaṭa, 10

Veracity, 136, 140

Verbal cognition, cause of, 186;
view of Nyāya, 187

vibhu, 43 n.

_vibhu parimāṇa_, 29 n.

vibhūti, 158

Vibhūtipāda, 22

vicāra, 153

vicārānugata, 125, 153

vicchinna, 176

Vice, 86, 87

_videha_, 127

vidyā, 177

_vidyāviparītam jñānāntaraṃ avidyā_, 11, 97

_Vijñanāmṛta-bhāshya_, 88, 90

Vijñāna Bhikshu, 4, 15

vikalpa, 101, 150, 173, 174

_vikārakāraṇa_, 133

_vikāryyakāraṇa_, 135

_vikṛti_, 7 n., 165

_vikshipta_, 95, 123

vikshiptacitta, 96, 130

vipāka, 105, 107

viparyyaya, 101, 172, 173, 176

_viprayoga_, 7

Virtue, 86

_Vishṇu Purāṇa_, 66

viśesha, 7, 7 n., 40, 59, 81, 84, 165, 171

_viśeshapariṇāma_, 60

_viśeshāviśeshaliṅgamātrāliṅgāniguṇaparvāṇi_, 59

visokā, 125

vitarka, 153

vitarkānugata, 125, 154

_viyoga_, 29 n.

_viyogakāraṇa_, 134, 135

vīryya, 102, 126, 128, 135, 136

Vomit, 141

_Vṛtti_, 56, 92, 96, 97, 101, 102, 122, 171

vyaṇgya, 57

vyaṅjaka, 57

vyatireka, 128

_vyavasāyātmakatva_, 3

_vyavaseyātmakatva_, 3

Vyāsa, 5, 7, 8, 8 n., 22, 53, 121, 133, 135

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, 3 n., 5 n., 7 n., 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 33, 36, 37,
43 n., 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 66 n., 68 n., 70, 71 n., 79, 84, 85, 94,
99, 101, 117, 119, 121, 133, 171

vyoman, 75

vyutthāna, 155, 156, 170

_vyutthāna citta_, 95

Ward, 2 n.

Wicked, 102

World-phenomena, 16

World-process, 91

_yadyaliṅgāvasthā śabdādyupabhogaṃ vā sattvapurushānyatākhyātim vā
purushārtham nirvarttayet tannrvarttane hi na sāmyāvasthā syāt_, 8

Yama, 136, 138, 139, 142, 143, 148

Yatamāna, 127

_yathā rathādi yantradibhiḥ_, 25

_yathāyaskāntamaṇiḥ svasminneva ayaḥsannidhīkaraṇamātrāt
śalyanishkarshaṇākhyam upakāram kurvat purushasya svāminaḥ svam
bhavati bhogasādhanatvāt_, 22

_ye cāsyānupasthitā bhāgaste cāsya na syurevaṃ nāsti pṛshṭhamiti
udaramapi na gṛhyeta_, 36

Yoga, 14, 29, 48, 62, 89, 96, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 140, 144,
147, 155, 162, 177;
its points of difference with Sāṃkhya, 163–165

Yoga metaphysics, 1

_Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian systems of thought_, 165

Yoga system, 2

Yoga theory, 5

yogāṅga, 122, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 144, 145, 149

_Yoga-sūtra_, 5 n., 11, 17, 35 n., 43 n., 45, 47, 108, 117, 142, 153

_Yoga-vārttika_, 4 n., 6 n., 9, 10, 12 n., 22, 29 n., 43 n., 45 n., 60,
61, 65, 66, 67, 87, 110, 126, 127, 129, 134 n., 143, 154, 176

Yogins, 79, 87, 95, 97, 98, 121, 125, 127, 128, 129, 136, 139, 143,
147, 153, 155, 156, 158, 160;
nine kinds of, 129

_yogyatāvacchinnā dharmiṇaḥ śaktireva dharmaḥ_, 82

Yudhishṭhira, 140

_yutasiddhāvayaba_, 168

-----

Footnote 1:

See Ward’s _Naturalism and Agnosticism_.

Footnote 2:

Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on the _Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 47.

Footnote 3:

_Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāshya_, I. 120.

Footnote 4:

It is indeed difficult to say what was the earliest conception of the
guṇas. But there is reason to believe, as I have said elsewhere, that
guṇa in its earliest acceptance meant qualities. It is very probable
that as the Sāṃkhya philosophy became more and more systematised it
was realised that there was no ultimate distinction between substance
and qualities. In consequence of such a view the guṇas which were
originally regarded as qualities began to be regarded as substantive
entities and no contradiction was felt. Bhikshu in many places
describes the guṇas as substantive entities (_dravya_) and their
division into three classes as being due to the presence of three
kinds of class-characteristics. This would naturally mean that within
the same class there were many other differences which have not been
taken into account (_Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18). But it cannot be said
that the view that the guṇas are substantive entities and that there
is no difference between qualities and substances is regarded as a
genuine Sāṃkhya view even as early as Śaṅkara. See _Ghābhāshya_, XIV.
5.

Footnote 5:

See _Vyāsa-bhāshya_ on Patañjali’s _Yoga-sūtras_, II. 18, and
Vācaspati’s _Tattvavaiśāradī_ on it.

Footnote 6:

See Bhikshu’s _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 18.

Footnote 7:

_History of Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, by P. C. Ray, p. 66.

Footnote 8:

The usual Sāṃkhya terms as found in Iśvarakṛshṇa’s _Kārikā_, having
the same denotation as aviśesha and viśesha, are _prakṛtivikṛti_ and
_vikṛti_.

Footnote 9:

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.

Footnote 10:

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.

Footnote 11:

_Tattvavaiśāradī_, II. 19.

Footnote 12:

_Tattvatraya_, p. 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.

Footnote 13:

Bhikshu in his _Yoga-vārttika_ explains “_māyeva_” as “_laukikamāyeva
kshaṇabhaṇguram_” evanescent like the illusions of worldly experience.

Footnote 14:

_Siddhāntalleśa_ (Jīveśvara nirūpaiṇa).

Footnote 15:

Princess Kuntī of the Mahābhārata had a son born to her by means of a
charm when she was still a virgin. Being afraid of a public scandal
she floated the child in a stream; the child was picked up by the wife
of a carpenter (Rādhā). The boy grew up to be the great hero Karṇa and
he thought that he was the son of a carpenter until the fact of his
royal lineage was disclosed to him later in life.

Footnote 16:

_Kārikā_ 17.

Footnote 17:

Gauḍapāda’s commentary on _Kārikā_ 17.

Footnote 18:

Purusha is a substance (_dravya_) because it has independent existence
(_anāśrita_) and has a measure (_vibhu parimāṇa_) of its own. So it
always possesses the common characteristics (_sāmānya guṇa_) of
substances, contact (_saṃyoga_), separation (_viyoga_) and number
(_saṃkhyā_). Purusha cannot be considered to be suffering change or
impure on account of the possession of the above common
characteristics of all substances. _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 17.

Footnote 19:

Thus the _Bhāshya_ says:
_bhavishyadvyaktikamanāgataṃanudbhūtavyaktikamatītaṃ
svavyāpāropārūḍhaṃ varttamānaṃ trayaṃ, caitadvastu jñānasya jñeyaṃ
yadi caitat svarūpato nābhavishyannedaṃ nirvishayaṃ jñānamudapatsyata
tasmādatītamanāgataṃ svarūpato’ stīti_.

Footnote 20:

_Tattvavaiśāradī_, IV. 14.

Footnote 21:

_Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayor vibhaktaḥ panthāḥ._ _Yoga-sūtra_, IV.
15.

Footnote 22:

“_Tattvāntara-pariṇāma_” means the evolution of a wholly new category
of existence. Thus the tanmātras are wholly different from the ego
from which they are produced. So the atoms are wholly different from
the tanmātras from which they are produced, for the latter, unlike the
former, have no sense-properties. In all combinations of atoms, there
would arise thousands of new qualities, but none of the products of
the combination of atoms can be called a tattvāntara, or a new
category of existence since all these qualities are the direct
manifestations of the specific properties of the atoms.

Footnote 23:

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 52, says that the smallest indivisible part of a
thing is called a paramāṇu. Vijñāna Bhikshu in explaining it says that
paramāṇu here means guṇa, for if a thing say a stone is divided, then
the furthest limit of division is reached when we come to the
indivisible guṇas. But if the prakṛti is all-pervading (_vibhu_) how
can the guṇas be atomic? Bhikshu says (_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52) in
reply that there are some classes of guṇas (e.g. those which produce
mind _antaḥkaraṇa_ and _ākāśa_) which are all-pervading, while the
others are all atomic. In Bhikshu’s interpretation a moment is to be
defined as the time which a guṇa entity takes to change its own unit
of space. Guṇas are thus equivalent to the Vaiśeshika paramāṇus.
Bhikshu, however, does not deny that there are no atoms of earth,
water, etc., but he says that where reference is not made to these
atoms but to guṇa atoms for the partless units of time can only be
compared with the partless guṇas. But Vācaspati does not make any
comment here to indicate that the smallest indivisible unit of matter
should mean guṇas. Moreover, _Yoga-sūtra_, I. 40, and _Vyāsa-bhāshya_,
I. 45, speak of _paramāṇu_ and _aṇu_ in the sense of earth-atoms, etc.
Even Bhikshu does not maintain that paramāṇu is used there in the
sense of atomic guṇa entities. I could not therefore accept Bhikshu’s
interpretation that paramāṇu here refers to guṇa. Paramāṇu may here be
taken in the sense of material atoms of earth, water, etc. The atoms
(paramāṇu) here cannot be absolutely partless, for it has two sides,
prior (_pūrvadeśa_) and posterior (_uttaradeśa_).

Footnote 24:

Bhikshu regards the movement of a guṇa of its own unit of space as the
ultimate unit of time (_kshaṇa_). The whole world is nothing else but
a series of _kshaṇas_. This view differs from the Buddhist view that
everything is momentary in this that it does not admit of any other
thing but the _kshaṇas_ (_na tu kskaṇātiriktaḥ kshaṇikaḥ padārthaḥ
kaścidishyate taistu kskaṇamātrasthāyyeva padārthaḥ ishyate_.
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52).

Footnote 25:

There is a difference of opinion as regards the meaning of the word
“_kshaṇapratiyogi_” in IV. 33. Vācaspati says that it means the
growth associated with a particular _kshaṇa_ or moment
(_kshaṇapracayāśraya_). The word _pratiyogī_ is interpreted by
Vācaspati as related (_pratisambandhī_). Bhikshu, however, gives a
quite different meaning. He interprets _kshaṇa_ as “interval” and
pratiyogī as “opposite of” (_virodhī_). So “_kshaṇapratiyogī_” means
with him “without any interval” or “continuous.” He holds that the
sūtra means that all change is continuous and not in succession.
There is according to his interpretation no interval between the
cessation of a previous character and the rise of a new one.

Footnote 26:

Nothing more than a superficial comparison with Fichte is here
intended. A large majority of the texts and the commentary literature
would oppose the attempts of all those who would like to interpret
Sāṃkhya-yoga on Fichtean lines.

Footnote 27:

_Tattvakaumudī_ on _Sāṃkhya-kārikā_, 25.

Footnote 28:

_Tattvavaiśāradī_, III. 41.

Footnote 29:

This was first pointed out by Dr. B. N. Seal in his _Physical,
Chemical and Mechanical Theories of the Ancient Hindus_ in Dr. P. C.
Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II.

Footnote 30:

_Yoga-vārttika_, I. 45.

Footnote 31:

I have already said before that Bhikshu thinks that the guṇas (except
the all-pervading ones) may be compared to the Vaiśeshika atoms. See
_Yoga-vārttika_, III. 52.

Footnote 32:

Cf. _Vyāsa-bhāshya_—“_sabdādīnāṃ mūrttisamānajátīyānāṃ_,” IV. 14.

Footnote 33:

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, II. 19.

Footnote 34:

_Vyāsa-bhāshya_, III. 13.

Footnote 35:

_Ibid._

Footnote 36:

Nahusha an earthly king became Indra the king of the gods by the
fruition of his virtues, but on account of gross misdeeds fell from
Heaven and was turned into a snake.

Footnote 37:

_Tattravaiśāradī_, IV, 3.

Footnote 38:

I have translated both citta and buddhi as mind. The word buddhi is
used when emphasis is laid on the intellective and cosmical functions
of the mind. The word citta is used when emphasis is laid on the
conservative side of mind as the repository of all experiences,
memory, etc.

Footnote 39:

If this is a Sāṃkhya doctrine, it seems clearly to be a case of Jaina
influence.

Footnote 40:

Compare Pañcaśikha, _svalpasaṇkaraḥ saparihāraḥ sapratyavamarshaḥ_,
_Tattvakaumudī_, 2.

Footnote 41:

Pratyaya is explained in _Yoga-vārttika_, II. 28, as _sampratyaya_ or
_prāmāṇyaniścaya_.

Footnote 42:

Yudhishṭhira led falsely Droṇa to believe that the latter’s son was
dead by inaudibly muttering that it was only an elephant having the
same name as that of his son that had died.

Footnote 43:

This book has, however, not yet been published.

Footnote 44:

Dr. Ray’s _Hindu Chemistry_, Vol. II, p. 81.

Footnote 45:

Avidyā manifests itself in different forms: (1) as the afflictions
(_kleśa_) of asmitā (egoism), rāga (attachment), dvesha (antipathy)
and abhiniveśa (self-love); (2) as doubt and intellectual error; (3)
as error of sense. All these manifestations of avidyā are also the
different forms of viparyyaya or bhrama (error, illusion, mistake).
This bhrama in Yoga is the thinking of something as that which it is
not (_anyathākhyāti_). Thus we think the miserable worldly existence
as pleasurable and attribute the characteristics of prakṛti to purusha
and vice versa. All afflictions are due to this confusion and
misjudgment, the roots of which stay in the buddhis in all their
transmigrations from one life to another. Sāṃkhya, however, differs
from Yoga and thinks that all error (_avidyā_ or _bhrama_) is due only
to non-distinction between the true and the untrue. Thus
non-distinction (_aviveka_) between prakṛti and purusha is the cause
of all our miserable mundane existence. Avidyā and aviveka are thus
synonymous with Sāṃkhya.

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.