Chapter XI: Front Matter (11)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Thoma, wouldn’t the best thing be for you to submit the volumes which have been translated to the Court so that they can consider them beforehand as we did with Dr. Horn’s books?

DR. THOMA: Yes, My Lord, that is possible. The documents have already been processed. With reference to my Document Books Number 2 and 3, I have discussed them with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, and we came to an agreement.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, well you could specify that agreement in the books. I suppose you could show which documents you were prepared to withdraw.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then, as soon as possible you will let the General Secretary have those books, showing the agreement which you have made with Captain Krieger; is that right?

DR. THOMA: But I do want to point out that I have come to an agreement with Captain Krieger, in Room 216, only with reference to Books 2 and 3 and that refers only to the Einsatzstab and the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

I have not yet come to an agreement regarding the philosophy and writings of Rosenberg, but I shall do that in due course.

THE PRESIDENT: No; one—is that in Book 1?

DR. THOMA: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you are unable to come to an agreement, you can specify that, and we will consider those matters. Possibly you could take some time with Captain Krieger—take time off from Court—in order to come to an agreement with reference to Book 1 and with reference to the other books.

How many more books have you got?

DR. THOMA: All together four document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Four more?

DR. THOMA: All together four document books.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh yes, I see. So there is only one more to be translated.

DR. THOMA: Yes.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 11 April 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH DAY
Thursday, 11 April 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. SAUTER: Dr. Sauter for the Defendant Funk.

Mr. President, on Saturday last, when sickness prevented me from attending the session, the question came up in which sequence the defense for the Defendants Dr. Funk and Dr. Schacht should be conducted, and the President has expressed the wish to hear my statement on the subject as soon as possible. I have discussed the matter with my client and the defense counsel for Dr. Schacht and I agree to and suggest that the defense for the Defendant Dr. Schacht come first and that the case of the Defendant Funk, for reasons of suitability, should follow after the evidence for the Defendant Schacht has been completed. For the information of the Tribunal I wanted to inform you of that, Mr. President. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly.

MR. DODD: If Your Honors please, I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to the fact with respect to the documents for the Defendant Rosenberg, we have finished our conversations with Dr. Thoma on a number of matters which will require a hearing before the Tribunal. We were not able to agree on a number of them and, as I said yesterday, we are prepared to be heard on the applications of Dr. Schacht.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will arrange a time for that. Now, Dr. Kauffmann.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I am now beginning the defense by presenting evidence in the case of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner. I need not emphasize how extraordinarily difficult this defense is, considering the unusual severity of the charges brought against him. I intend to present the evidence in the following way: With the permission of the Tribunal, I shall read two small documents first from the short document book; then, with the permission of the Tribunal, I shall call the defendant to the witness stand and after that I shall examine one or two witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks that that course would be appropriate but I wanted to draw your attention...

Dr. Kauffmann, there were four witnesses who were called for the Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, and Wisliceny—you asked for leave at an earlier stage to cross-examine witnesses called for the Prosecution, Ohlendorf, Höllriegel, Wisliceny, and Schellenberg; and the Tribunal then ordered that they might be recalled for cross-examination but that they must be called before your witnesses. Therefore, the Tribunal wants to know whether you wish to call any of those for cross-examination. You do not?

DR. KAUFFMANN: No, Mr. President, I do not wish to call Ohlendorf, Wisliceny, Höllriegel, or Schellenberg.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I now read these two documents? To begin with there is the affidavit of the witness Dr. Mildner in the document book. I am asking that notice be taken of it. It is Document Kaltenbrunner-1. I am now reading:

“Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Mildner, at present in
prison in Nuremberg, make the following affidavit in answer to
the questions put to me by attorney Dr. Kauffmann for
presentation to the International Military Tribunal in
Nuremberg:

“Question Number 1: Give particulars of your career.

“Answer: I was entrusted with certain tasks of the Gestapo for
about 10 years. From 1938 to 1945 I was subordinate to Amt IV,
which is the Gestapo of the Reich Main Security Office in
Berlin. I was in the RSHA in Berlin itself, for only about three
months, that is to say, from March to June 1944. The rest of the
time I was mostly chief of provincial branches of the Gestapo.

“Question Number 2: What can you say in regard to
Kaltenbrunner’s personality?

“Answer: From my own knowledge I can confirm the following: I
know the Defendant Kaltenbrunner personally. In his private life
he was beyond reproach. In my opinion his promotion from Higher
SS and Police Leader to Chief of the Security Police and the SD
was due to the fact that Himmler, in June 1942, after the death
of Heydrich, his chief rival, would suffer no man beside or
under him who might have endangered his position. The Defendant
Kaltenbrunner was, no doubt, the least dangerous man for
Himmler. Kaltenbrunner had no ambition to gain influence by
special deeds and eventually to push Himmler aside. There was no
question of lust for power in his case. It is wrong to call him
the little Himmler.

“Question Number 3: What attitude did Kaltenbrunner adopt toward
Amt IV (Gestapo)?

“Answer: I know of no specific limitation of the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner’s power with regard to the offices which were
under the RSHA. On the other hand, I can say that Müller, the
Chief of Amt IV, acted independently by virtue of his long
experience and did not give to anyone, not even the chiefs of
the other offices of the RSHA, any insight into his tasks and
methods of his Amt IV. He had, after all, immediate protection
from Himmler.

“Question Number 4: Did you ever see any executive orders by
Kaltenbrunner?

“Answer: I have never seen any original order—that is to say,
something signed in handwriting—from the Defendant
Kaltenbrunner. I know quite well that orders for protective
custody bore facsimile signatures or typewritten signatures.
This was a routine initiated during Heydrich’s time.

“Question Number 5: Did orders for executions rest in
Kaltenbrunner’s or Himmler’s hands? Who was responsible for the
setting up and running of concentration camps?

“Answer: I know that execution orders rested in Himmler’s hands.
So far as I know no other officials of the RSHA could issue such
orders without his permission. I know, furthermore, that
concentration camps were run by a special main department,
namely, the SS Main Office for Economy and Administration, the
chief of which was Pohl. The concentration camps had nothing to
do with the RSHA. This applies to the whole administration,
food, treatment, camp regulations, _et cetera_. The inspector of
concentration camps was Glücks. The official channels were
therefore: Himmler, Pohl, Glücks, camp commandant.

“Question Number 6: Did Kaltenbrunner order any of the
concentration camps to be evacuated?

“Answer: It is not known to me that the Defendant Kaltenbrunner
had issued any orders regarding the evacuation of concentration
camps.

“Question Number 7: Did Kaltenbrunner issue the order to arrest
all Danish citizens of Jewish religion and transport them to the
concentration camp at Theresienstadt?

“Answer: No. The reason why I can answer this question exactly
is because I, myself, as a member of the Gestapo, was concerned
with this matter in Denmark in September 1943. The Chief of the
Security Police and the SD had received the order in September
1943 to arrest all Danish Jews and transport them to
Theresienstadt. I flew to Berlin to have this order canceled.
Shortly afterwards an order of Himmler arrived in Denmark
according to which the anti-Jewish action was to be carried out.
Kaltenbrunner, therefore, did not issue the order. I did not
speak to him; in fact he was not even in Berlin.

“Read and found correct.

“Nuremberg, 29 March 1946; signed, Dr. Mildner.”

Then follows the certification.

The next affidavit comes from Dr. Höttl.

MR. DODD: We are faced with a new problem. I do not think this question has arisen heretofore. The Prosecution submitted a cross-interrogatory to this man Dr. Mildner, and we are not quite certain as to just how we should proceed. Should we now offer our cross-interrogation, or at a later stage?

THE PRESIDENT: We think you should read it now.

MR. DODD: Very well.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, may I just say one thing about that. This is the first time that I hear that the Prosecution have also put questions which have been answered by the same witness. I think this is the first case of this kind which has been put before the Tribunal.

Would it not have been appropriate to have these answers communicated to me, since I have put my affidavit at the disposal of the Prosecution a very long time ago?

THE PRESIDENT: They certainly should be. The Tribunal thinks they certainly should have been communicated to you at the same time that they were received.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is the answer to be read nevertheless? I would rather like to raise formal objection to that and ask the Tribunal for a decision.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, why were these not submitted to Dr. Kauffmann?

MR. DODD: This cross-affidavit and interrogatory was taken only yesterday, and the material just was not ready until this morning. We regret that, and had it been ready it would, of course, have been turned over to him. If he would like to have some time to look it over, we, of course, would not object.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, in the circumstances we will postpone the reading of these cross-interrogatories in order that you may consider them, and, if you think it right, you may object to any of the questions or answers and we will then consider that matter.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.

May I now read the second and last document:

“Affidavit. I, the undersigned, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, make the
following affidavit in answer to the questions put to me by
attorney Dr. Kauffmann for presentation to the International
Military Tribunal.”

THE PRESIDENT: Can you give a number to this document?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes, Document Kaltenbrunner-2.

“Question Number 1: Give details about yourself. What was your
official position in the SD? Where did you know Dr.
Kaltenbrunner?

“Answer: I was born on 19 March 1915, in Vienna; by profession,
a historian. My occupation up to the time of the German collapse
was that of a sub-department chief in Amt VI, Foreign
Intelligence Department, of the RSHA. After Austria’s Anschluss
in 1938, I voluntarily joined the SD. Coming from the National
Catholic Youth Movement, I made it my aim to achieve a moderate
political course for my country.

“I made the acquaintance of Kaltenbrunner in 1938; he knew that
the above was my aim.

“In 1941, on personal orders of Heydrich, I was called before
the SS and Police Court for having religious ties and for lack
of political and ideological reliability, and I had to join the
ranks as an ordinary private. After Heydrich’s death I was
pardoned and, at the beginning of 1943, I was detailed to the
office of Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI of the RSHA. Here I was
in charge of matters relating to the Vatican, as well as of
matters relating to some states in the Balkans.

“When Kaltenbrunner was appointed Chief of the RSHA at the
beginning of 1943, I was continually in touch with him at work,
particularly since he was endeavoring to draw the group of
Austrians in the RSHA nearer to him.

“Question Number 2: Give an estimate of the numbers involved at
the Main Office of the RSHA in Berlin.

“Answer: The Main Office in Berlin, Amt IV (Gestapo) had
approximately 1,500 members; Amt V (Criminal Police) 1,200; Amt
III and Amt VI (intelligence service at home and abroad) 300 to
400 each.

“Question Number 3: What is understood by SD and what were its
tasks?

“Answer: Heydrich organized the so-called Sicherheitsdienst
(known as the SD) in 1932. Its task was to give to the highest
German authorities and the individual Reich ministries,
information on all events at home and abroad.

“The SD was purely an information service and had no sort of
executive authority. Only individual persons belonging to the SD
were drafted to the so-called special action commands
(Einsatzkommandos) in the East. They thereby assumed executive
positions, and they resigned from the SD during that period.
There were special action groups and special action commands of
the Security Police and the SD up to the last; also in Africa,
and in Hungary, and Czechoslovakia even up to 1944. These
Kommandos had nothing to do with executions. Their tasks had in
the meantime assumed the nature of general security police
matters. As far as I know, executions were carried out only in
Russia, due to the so-called ‘Commissar Order’ by Hitler.
Whether these Kommandos stopped or continued their activity
after Kaltenbrunner was named Chief of the RSHA, I do not know.

“Question Number 4: Do you know about the ‘Eichmann Operation’
to exterminate the Jews?

“Answer: I learned details of the Eichmann Operation only at the
end of August 1944. At that time Eichmann himself gave me
detailed information. Eichmann explained, among other things,
that the whole action was a special Reich secret and was known
to only very few people. The total number of members of this
Kommando, in my opinion, could hardly have exceeded 100.

“Question Number 5: What do you know about the relations between
Eichmann and Kaltenbrunner?

“Answer: I know nothing about the official relations between the
two. However, Eichmann may well have had no direct official
contact with Kaltenbrunner. He often asked me to arrange a
meeting with Kaltenbrunner for him. Kaltenbrunner always
refused.

“Question Number 6: What was the relationship between
Kaltenbrunner and Müller, the Chief of the Secret State Police
(Gestapo)?

“Answer: I cannot give any details about their official
relations. It is certain, however, that Müller acted quite
independently. He had gained great experience in Secret State
Police matters over a period of many years. Himmler thought a
great deal of him. Kaltenbrunner did not think very much of him.
Kaltenbrunner had neither technical schooling in police problems
nor any interest in them. The intelligence service took up the
main part of his attention and all his interest, especially
insofar as it concerned foreign countries.

“Question Number 7: Who was in charge of the concentration
camps?

“Answer: The SS Main Office for Economy and Administration had
sole charge of the concentration camps; that is, not the RSHA,
and therefore not Kaltenbrunner. He, consequently, had no power
to give orders and no competency in this sphere. According to my
opinion of him as a man, Kaltenbrunner certainly did not approve
of the atrocities committed in the concentration camps. I do not
know whether he knew about them.

“Question Number 8: Did Kaltenbrunner issue or transmit an order
according to which enemy aviators who made forced landings were
to be given no protection in the event of lynch justice being
carried out by the population?

“Answer: No, I never heard about anything of the kind from
Kaltenbrunner, although I was with him a great deal. As far as I
can remember, however, Himmler issued an order of this kind.

“Question Number 9: Did Kaltenbrunner issue orders that Jews
were to be killed?

“Answer: No, he never issued such orders, and in my opinion, he
could not issue such orders on his own authority. In my opinion
he was opposed to Hitler and Himmler on this question, that is,
the physical extermination of European Jewry.

“Question Number 10: What church policy did Kaltenbrunner
pursue?

“Answer: As adviser on Vatican matters, I often had the
opportunity of speaking to him officially on this subject. He
immediately supported my suggestion, made to Hitler in the
spring of 1943, that a change in church policy should be
effected so that the Vatican could be won over as a peace
negotiator on this basis. Kaltenbrunner had no success with
Hitler, as Himmler opposed him violently. Baron Von Weizsäcker,
German Ambassador to the Holy See with whom I discussed the
matter, failed likewise in his efforts, the result of which was
that Bormann had an eye kept on him.

“Question Number 11: Did Kaltenbrunner intervene in foreign
policy in the interest of peace?

“Answer: Yes; in the Hungarian question, for example. When, in
March 1944, the German troops occupied Hungary, he succeeded in
persuading Hitler to be moderate and to prevent Romanian and
Slovak units from marching in as planned. Due to his support, I
was able to prevent a National Socialist government from being
formed in Hungary as planned, for another 6 months.”

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Now, Dr. Kauffmann, are you going to call the defendant?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I have committed a small oversight. I did not read Page 5 of my document book. Those are Questions 12 and 13 of the affidavit, which I, inadvertently, did not read. I wish to apologize and ask your permission to finish it.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I continue on Page 5:

“Kaltenbrunner wanted the old Austria-Hungary to be
re-established on a federative basis. Since 1943 I had told
Kaltenbrunner that Germany must endeavor to end the war by a
peace at any price. I had informed him about my connection with
an American office in Lisbon. I also informed Kaltenbrunner that
I had recently made a contact with an American office in a
neutral country through the Austrian resistance movement. He
also declared his willingness to travel to Switzerland with me
and start personal negotiations with an American representative
in order to avoid further senseless bloodshed.

“Question Number 12: Do you know that Kaltenbrunner instructed
the Commandant of Mauthausen Concentration Camp to hand over the
camp to the approaching troops?

“Answer: It is correct that Kaltenbrunner did give such an
order. He dictated it in my presence, to be forwarded to the
Camp Commandant.

“Question Number 13: Can you say something briefly about
Kaltenbrunner’s personality?

“Answer: Kaltenbrunner was a man completely different from
Himmler or Heydrich. He was therefore by conviction strongly
opposed to both of them. He was appointed Chief of the RSHA, in
my opinion, because Himmler did not want to run the risk of
having a rival like Heydrich. It would be wrong to call him
‘little Himmler.’ In my opinion, he was never in complete
control of the large office of the RSHA and, being very little
interested in police and executive tasks, he occupied himself
preponderantly with the intelligence service and with exerting
influence on general policy. This he regarded as his particular
sphere.”

This is followed by signature, date, and certification.

THE PRESIDENT: Have you any more documents?

DR. KAUFFMANN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Now you wish to call the defendant?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Yes.

[_The Defendant Kaltenbrunner took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

ERNST KALTENBRUNNER (Defendant): Ernst Kaltenbrunner.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing—so help me God.”

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. KAUFFMANN: During the last 2 years of the war, since 1943, you have been the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service and the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, the RSHA. You are aware, of course, that you are under extremely serious charges. The Prosecution charge you with having committed Crimes against Peace, and with having intellectually aided and abetted or participated in the crimes against the law of war and against humanity, and finally, the Prosecution connect your name with the Gestapo terror and the atrocities of the concentration camps. I now ask you, do you assume responsibility for the Counts charged as outlined and which are known to you?

KALTENBRUNNER: In the first place, I should like to state to the Tribunal that I am fully aware of the serious character of the charges against me. I know the hatred of the world is directed against me; that I—particularly since Himmler, Müller, and Pohl are no longer alive—must here, alone, give an account to the world and the Tribunal. I realize that I shall have to tell the truth in this courtroom, in order to enable the Court and the world to fully recognize and understand what has been going on in Germany during this war and to judge it with fairness.

In 1943—that is to say, 2 years before the ending of this war—I was called into an office, which fact I shall explain in detail later on.

Right at the beginning, I would like to state that I assume responsibility for every wrong that was committed within the scope of this office since I was appointed Chief of the RSHA and as far as it happened under my actual control, which means that I knew about it or was required to know about it.

May I ask permission for my defense counsel to put questions to me so as to direct my line of thought?

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you briefly describe, in rough outlines, your career until you entered public life, and Austrian politics, that is until about 1934.

KALTENBRUNNER: I was born in 1903. My father and my grandfather were lawyers of repute; for the rest I am a descendant of farmers and scythemakers. My mother is of modest descent. She was adopted by the Belgian Ambassador to Romania and lived there for 25 years. During my childhood, which I spent in the country with a family which took very good care of me, I enjoyed on the one hand the best education and on the other hand I became familiar with the life of the simple people. I attended secondary school, high school, graduated, and in 1921 went to Graz University. First I studied chemico-technical sciences at the Institute of Technology and later on, when my father returned from the war seriously ill and when the possibility arose that I might have to take over his solicitor’s practice, I studied law. I completed these studies with the degree of Doctor of Law and Political Science in 1926.

I had a hard time. I had to earn my own living and the expenses for my studies. I had to work while I studied and for 2 years I worked as a coal miner during the night shift; and I have to thank my fate that thus I got to know the German workman much better than people usually do.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Would you be slightly more brief? Please get as quickly as possible to the period after 1934.

KALTENBRUNNER: After leaving the University I had to complete 7 or 8 years work as a candidate for the bar examination in accordance with the Austrian law, of which I spent one year in court as assistant and the rest of the time in lawyers’ offices in Salzburg and Linz.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for one moment with a question. Is it correct that in 1932 you became a member of the Party?

KALTENBRUNNER: I became a member of the Party in 1932 after I had belonged for several years to the Non-Partisan Movement for the Protection of the Austrian Homeland.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you join the SS in that same year?

KALTENBRUNNER: I think it was at the end of 1932 or maybe at the beginning of 1933.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it correct that even before 1933, as maintained by the Prosecution, you were public speaker of a Gau and legal adviser of an SS sector?

KALTENBRUNNER: That statement requires clarification. It is true that I made speeches in my own home province, the Gau Upper Austria, at National Socialist meetings but primarily—or rather exclusively—to promote the Anschluss movement. I was a legal adviser just as any other lawyer of any party who, at that period of economic emergency, was willing to give legal information and advice free of charge for some hours at the end of the day to the needy, who in this case were National Socialists.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Is it true that later, in 1934, the Dollfuss Government had you arrested and that you, together with other leading National Socialists, were sent to the Kaisersteinbruch Concentration Camp? What was the cause for that?

KALTENBRUNNER: That is correct. I think that with regard to this point I must briefly describe the political situation in Austria at the time.

The Government was in the hands of a group of men who had very few followers among the people. There were two large groups of size which did not participate in the Government; the first being the leftist group, that is, the Social Democrats and Austro-Marxists, and the second being the National Socialists, which was at that time a very small group. The Government, then, did put not only the National Socialists but also Social Democrats and Communists into their detention camps in order to eliminate any political strife originating from meetings or demonstrations. I was one of those National Socialists who were arrested at that time, whose number was approximately 1,800.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Did you have another conflict with them? And were you eventually subjected to a trial for conspiracy against the Government and thereupon discharged from the custody under which you had been placed? Give in a few sentences the reasons for this procedure.

KALTENBRUNNER: This was considerably later. I was arrested in May 1935. I should say first of all that in the meantime the National Socialist attempt at revolt had taken place in Austria in July 1934. This attempt at revolt, which unfortunately also included the murder of Dollfuss, was defeated and avenged by most severe measures against a large number of National Socialists. One particularly severe measure was the law by which many thousands of National Socialists lost their jobs or professional license and the necessity arose to bring about a pacification, I should say a mitigation in principles of the Government policy. That was primarily done by two men: Langot, then the Chief Deputy of Upper Austria, and Reinthaller, a farmer and engineer. That appeasement action started at the end of 1934 in September or October, and I was invited to join that action.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Will you please, if possible, get to the period of 1938, in rough outlines?

KALTENBRUNNER: I was in no way implicated in this attempted revolt of July 1934 and that is why I was invited to join in that appeasement action. Within that program the Government themselves demanded that certain men should maintain connections with the Party leaders, with the SA, SS, and all organizations of the then forbidden movement. With the knowledge and consent of the Government and the proper police departments, I took up the connection with the SS.

In May 1935 I was arrested, suspected of establishing an illegal connection with the SS and of being engaged in high treason activity. I remained in custody for 6 months and was arraigned before the military tribunal in Wels on a charge of high treason. I was, however, acquitted of this crime since the Government themselves admitted that this assignment had been granted to me with their knowledge. All that was left over was a minor sentence for conspiracy which, however, was served by my custody.

DR. KAUFFMANN: How did you participate in the Austrian revolution which occurred in March 1938 and how did the SS participate?

KALTENBRUNNER: Shortly after my activities in connection with the Reinthaller-Langot appeasement action, I got in touch first with circles of the Anschluss movement clubs and second with those circles whose aim it was to improve conditions in Austria peacefully, by an evolutionary movement and development, and, on the other hand, to enlarge the Anschluss movement so as to win over the government themselves to that idea.

In 1937 and 1938 I attempted to come into closer personal contact with Seyss-Inquart, later Minister, and I completely adopted his political conceptions.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Are you of the opinion that the plebiscite in Austria in April 1938 corresponded with the wish of the nation?

KALTENBRUNNER: The plebiscite of 10 April 1938 was completely in accordance with the will of the Austrian population. The result of 99.73 percent for Anschluss to the German Reich was perfectly genuine.

DR. KAUFFMANN: On the occasion of the Anschluss is it right that you were promoted to SS Brigadeführer and leader of an SS sector?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, but first I would like to add the following to the question of the Anschluss:

The representation and opinion of the Prosecution are completely incorrect when they think that National Socialism in Austria at that time could in any way be compared with the development which had already taken place in Germany. The development of Austrian National Socialism was on the contrary completely different. The starting point was the abnormal economic depression in Austria and beyond that the Anschluss movement, and finally National Socialism made the Anschluss come true. This course, from economic depression via Anschluss movement to National Socialism, was the road of nearly all National Socialists, and the ideology of the Party program of the time was in no way responsible.

I believe this has to be taken for granted and I believe I also ought to say it first, that the Anschluss movement in Austria was backed by the people; the fact that the plebiscite in the various provinces, like the Tyrol or Salzburg, had already in previous years—I believe from 1925 to 1928—shown a result of more than 90 percent of the votes in favor of the Anschluss should now be taken into consideration.

Back in 1928 the National Council of Austria and the Austrian Federal Council signed the decree of the National Council of the year 1918 which said that both these assemblies had resolved to join the Reich; and they did not swerve from that resolution.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, I do not think you need go into these subjects as to reasons why they were in favor of the Anschluss in such detail. Will you try to confine the witness to less detail and get on to the material period?

DR. KAUFFMANN: I thought that the defendant was being held responsible for his participation in the change of regime. Therefore I wanted to have at least a few sentences said about that before this Tribunal, but I am now prepared to change the subject.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness was giving us the figures in particular plebiscites long before the Anschluss, and that seems to be quite irrelevant detail.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Then, in September 1938, you were promoted to SS Gruppenführer; is that correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes. After the ensuing Anschluss I had to take over the leadership of the General SS in Austria, namely, the SS Main Sector Danube. At that time I had been promoted to brigade leader without going exactly through the preceding ranks of SS leaders. And I think it was in September that I was appointed Gruppenführer, so that my rank was made the same as that of all the other main SS sector leaders in the entire Reich.

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I question you regarding your further career in the SS? Were you in 1941 appointed Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria?

KALTENBRUNNER: In March 1938 I became a member of the Austrian Government; that is, I had to take over the position of State Secretary for Security in Austria, which was under the Ministry of the Interior. That Austrian Government was dissolved in 1941; that is to say, their activity was discontinued in favor of such bodies of administration which prevailed in the Reich; consequently, the Office of State Secretary for Security was also dissolved, and in order to retain me at the same level in the budget, I was appointed Higher SS and Police Leader, I think in July 1941.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And on 30 January 1943 you were appointed Chief of the Security Police and the SD, that is, of the so-called Reich Security Main Office. How did that appointment come about? Did you have connections with Himmler? What was said between you and Himmler on the occasion of your appointment?

KALTENBRUNNER: I must describe briefly my activities from 1941 to 1943, that is, 2 years, so as to make it clear why I was called to Berlin.

The Prosecution charge that I had led the Security Police already in Austria. In that respect the Prosecution are mistaken.

The State Police and the Criminal Police as well as the Security Service in Austria were directed centrally from Berlin and were completely removed from the power of Seyss-Inquart, then the responsible Minister, and his deputy, Kaltenbrunner. My activity as Higher SS and Police Leader in Austria—unlike the activity of the same men in the Reich—was therefore limited merely to the task of representing or leading the General SS, which in no way took up all my time.

During these 2 years I therefore followed out my intentions concerning political activity and developed a rather large political intelligence service radiating from Austria toward the southeast. I did that because, in the first place, I regretted that the Reich did not make use of at least the political and the economic resources, of all the resources which Austria could have put at the disposal of the Reich, and because the Reich with unequalled shortsightedness did not fall back upon Austria’s most significant mission as an intermediary with the Southeast. Thus, my reports met with increased interest in Berlin, and since Himmler was continuously reproached by Hitler that his intelligence service, which was run by Heydrich in the Reich, did not furnish adequate reports on political results, Himmler, 8 months after Heydrich’s death, felt obliged to look for a man who could free him from Hitler’s reproaches that he had no intelligence service worth mentioning.

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did you discuss with Himmler?

KALTENBRUNNER: In December 1942 he ordered me to come to Berchtesgaden, where he resided at the time, because the Führer’s headquarters were in the neighborhood, on the Obersalzberg. He told me first of Hitler’s reproaches and demanded that I create a central intelligence service in the Reich. We had a lengthy discussion on this subject with reference to my reporting activity of the previous years. He was then of the opinion that the best solution would be if I were to take over the Reich Security Main Office as a transition basis for the creation of such an intelligence service. I refused to do that, giving detailed reasons, namely, that I had maintained a watching and critical attitude in Austria toward the over-all development in the Reich, especially the inner political development. I explained to Himmler in detail why the Germans in Austria were disappointed and where I saw dangers that the same Austrians, who 4 years ago had turned with enthusiasm to the Reich, would become tired of the Reich. I have...

DR. KAUFFMANN: May I interrupt you for just one moment. It is correct, of course, that you were made the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. Are you trying to say that you did not take over the executive powers?

KALTENBRUNNER: I am coming to that immediately. But, I must now describe that first conference with Himmler; the second one took place 2 weeks later. On that occasion I was given the order; I am referring to the first order.

But I should like to state right now—and this is drawn like a red thread through my entire career to the last days of the war—that even then I explained to Himmler on which essential points I differed with National Socialism as to the home policy of the Reich, the foreign policy, the ideology, and the violations of law by the Government themselves. I declared to him, specifically, that the administration in the Reich was too centralized; that Austria was violently criticizing that centralized system, particularly since a federative status had been granted to other countries, such as Bavaria. I told him that the creation of a new German criminal law, the way it was attempted, was wrong, and that German criminal law was casuistic. The Austrian criminal law, based on a tradition of more than one hundred years, had proved to be the best and had also been recognized abroad. I explained to him that the concepts of protective custody and of concentration camps were not approved of in Austria, but that every man in Austria wanted to be tried before a court of law.

I explained to him that anti-Semitism in Austria had developed in a completely different way and also required a different handling. No one in Austria, I said, had ever thought of going beyond the limits of anti-Semitism as laid down in the Party program. I also said that there was hardly any understanding in Austria for the fact that the Nuremberg Laws went beyond the Party program in this respect. In Austria, since 1934, there had been a peaceful, regulated policy to allow the Jews to emigrate. Any personal or physical persecution of Jews was completely unnecessary. I am referring to a document, which is somewhere in the court record. It is a report from the Chief of Police in Vienna, dated, I believe, December 1939, which proves in accordance with statistics that between 1934 and 1939, I think, of a total of 200,000 Jews more than half had emigrated to foreign countries. Those were the problems which I discussed at that time...

DR. KAUFFMANN: And what did Himmler tell you?

KALTENBRUNNER: And I told Himmler at that time that he knew very well that I had not only no training in police matters at all, but that all my activity up to then had been in the field of political intelligence work, and that therefore, when taking over the Reich Security Main Office I did not only refuse to have anything to do with such executive offices as the Gestapo and the criminal police, but that my task to which he was appointing me, namely to set up and cultivate an intelligence service, would in fact be impeded by that. I also said that I was not only extremely different from Heydrich personally but that also material differences existed insofar as Heydrich was an expert in police matters, whereas I was not, and that the policy with which he, Himmler, and Heydrich had already discredited the Reich could not be carried on by me. My name, my honor, and my family were too sacred to me for that.

He reassured me in this respect by saying:

“You know that in June 1942 Heydrich was assassinated and that
I, myself, since his death”—and this was about 6 or 7 months
after Heydrich’s death—“have been handling his entire office
myself. This is to continue insofar that I”—this means
Himmler—“will retain the Executive Offices for myself in the
future. For this purpose I have at my disposal my well-trained
experts, Müller and Nebe. You will not have to concern yourself
with it. You take over the Intelligence Service, that is Amt III
and Amt VI, as the transition basis for your Intelligence
Service.”

I told him at that time that an intelligence service could not be built up on the SD alone. An intelligence service which until that time had been so narrow-minded because of Heydrich, and which had been forced more and more into executive work, is _a priori_ unfit to search for intelligence material.

Secondly, I told him an intelligence service ought to be smaller and, in particular, I considered it madness to have political and military intelligence separated from each other. No country in the whole world except Germany and France has adopted a two-division set-up for an intelligence service. I therefore demanded from him that he first procure a Führer order on the strength of which the intelligence system of the Armed Forces, which rested in the OKW counterintelligence office (Amt Abwehr), should be united with the SD and should be furnished a new body of personnel, which ought to be selected and carefully screened...

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am interrupting you for a moment. Can you tell me in one sentence whether that unification which you just mentioned took place?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes, it did.

DR. KAUFFMANN: With Amt VI?

KALTENBRUNNER: Yes...

DR. KAUFFMANN: And then another question...

KALTENBRUNNER: [_Continuing._] The union was achieved by an order of Hitler dated 14 or 15 February 1944.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Now, I am asking you: After what you have just explained, did Himmler relieve you of the executive tasks and was it made known to your section chiefs and others within the Reich Security Main Office that you had been so relieved? Did this exemption of executive powers become apparent outside the office; if so, how?

KALTENBRUNNER: After this conference with Hitler in December 1942, he discharged me because I did not want to take over the Reich Security Main Office under those conditions which he had offered to me, namely, that the executive departments should be managed by himself as previously. He was so angry with me that he did not give me his hand and made me aware of his indignation in various other ways during the subsequent weeks. Toward the middle of January, the 16th or 18th, I was ordered by telegram to report to headquarters, which in the meantime had been transferred to East Prussia. I assumed that I was to get a post at the front because I had asked him for such a post. I went to headquarters with complete front equipment because I thought I had finally to expect the same fate that had been the fate of my brothers and of my other male relatives. But I was wrong. He told me:

“I have talked to the Führer and the Führer believes that the
centralization and reorganization of the Intelligence Service is
the right thing to do. He will initiate the necessary
negotiations with the Armed Forces, and you will have to
organize and build up this Intelligence Service. It still holds
that I, with Müller and Nebe, will have direct charge of the
executive offices.”

If you ask me now whether this limitation must have become apparent at once outside of the office, I have to answer that it was not publicized. Therefore, formally the Prosecution are right in charging me: “As far as the outside world is concerned, you never drew a demarcation line.” To that I can say only that I believed I could rely on the words of my then superior. He had stated it to me in the presence of Nebe and Müller and had given them the personal order to communicate with him directly and to report to him and receive the orders from him directly, just as it had been done for the 8 months since Heydrich’s death.

I am stating here emphatically that the special assignments which had been given to Heydrich, such as, for instance, the assignment with regard to the final solution of the Jewish problem, were not only not known to me at the time but were not taken over by me. Nominally I was the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office. As such, I considered the Intelligence Service and the reorganization of this Intelligence Service my proper sphere, as I have said before. The directives were given by Himmler, but in State Police and Criminal Police matters things were often done, as I found out very much later, in the name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office, that is, in my name, without my knowing of or seeing these orders when they were issued.

The chiefs of the Gestapo office and the Criminal Police office sometimes carried out these orders from Himmler, as I said, in such a way that they also signed my name as Chief of the Reich Security Main Office and, as I probably might have to state in detail later, they so continued routine habits which prevailed during Heydrich’s time, who united all executive powers in his hand and who could delegate the respective powers to Müller and Nebe. But I never had those powers from the beginning, and therefore I could never delegate any partial powers. Perhaps I ought to supplement the declaration of my responsibility in this respect by saying that possibly I have not taken the necessary care to make it clear that no order of the State Police or the Criminal Police should bear my name. That I did not concern myself with that sufficiently is Himmler’s fault but probably also my fault.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I draw your attention to the testimony given by Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III, on 3 January 1946, here in court. I am putting this testimony to you briefly, and will you please make your comment. This testimony refers to the question of the executive power. The witness Ohlendorf said, in reply to my question:

“If you ask the question whether Kaltenbrunner could bring about
executive actions I must answer in the affirmative. If you then
name Müller and Himmler, to the exclusion of Kaltenbrunner, then
I must point out that according to the organization of the Reich
Security Main Office Müller was the subordinate of
Kaltenbrunner, and consequently orders from Himmler to Müller
were also orders to Kaltenbrunner, and Müller was obliged to
inform Kaltenbrunner of them.”

And then he goes on to say:

“I can say that I know absolutely that”—I refer to the
expression that often came up, namely—“‘to the last
washerwoman’ Himmler reserved the final decision for himself. As
to whether or not Kaltenbrunner had no authority at all in this
regard, I can make no statement.”

I am asking you now: Are the essential points of Ohlendorf’s testimony correct?

KALTENBRUNNER: It needs clarification. He is right insofar as nothing in the construction, or rather organization of the Reich Security Main Office had changed since Heydrich’s time. Therefore he could immediately assume that there was an official channel Himmler-Kaltenbrunner-Müller. But during the conferences, that is, when Himmler gave orders, it was specifically not the case. And to the other remark, that Himmler reserved for himself the decision to the last washerwoman, that proves that the situation actually had changed insofar as, contrary to that of Heydrich’s time, I, the medium between Himmler and Müller, was not active, so that orders from Himmler went immediately to Müller.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now coming to the individual charges preferred by the Prosecution and first submit to you a document for your statement. It is the Document L-38, Exhibit USA-517. It is now Kaltenbrunner-3. This deals with the charge preferred against Kaltenbrunner...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kauffmann, has this already got an exhibit number? You do not want to give it another exhibit number.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Very well. If it is not necessary I shall be glad to drop that.

[_Turning to the defendant._] The question here is, first, whether all signed orders for protective custody bore your name either in facsimile or typewritten; and the second question is whether you have given such orders—that means whether these orders are authentic; and further, in case both these questions are to be answered in the negative, whether you had knowledge of these orders. Please, will you comment on this document?

KALTENBRUNNER: I must say that not once in my whole life did I ever see or sign a single protective custody order. During the interrogations before the Trial a number of protective custody orders which bear my name were put before me when I was being questioned. Every one of these protective custody orders had this signature, that is, my name, either typewritten or in teletype, and I think in one or two cases it was a facsimile.

DR. KAUFFMANN: You will admit that, naturally, this statement of yours is not very credible. It is a monstrosity that the office chief should not know that such orders were signed with his name. How do you explain this fact, a fact which appears from the documents which bear your signature?

KALTENBRUNNER: I had not finished my explanation. I stated that this signature “Kaltenbrunner” on protective custody orders can only have come about through the fact that the office chief, Müller, signed the name of the Chief of the Reich Security Main Office on these protective custody orders, as he had done during Heydrich’s time when he was allowed to do so, and that in addition he instructed his sections, for instance, the protective custody section. Accordingly quite obviously he continued to do so during my time, because otherwise these orders could not have been put before me now. But he has never informed me of this and he never had authority from me to do this. To the contrary, this was out of the question and, on the other hand, superfluous, because he was immediately under Himmler and he had authority from Himmler, so that he just as well might have written “Himmler” or “By order of Himmler” or “For Himmler.” I admit that this remains a fact about which the Tribunal will not believe me, but nevertheless it was so and Himmler never gave me a cause to define my attitude in this respect, since he had told me that I was not to carry out these executive tasks.

DR. KAUFFMANN: This means you are trying to say that the use of your signature was in fact a misuse?

KALTENBRUNNER: Müller did not have authority to use it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: Was it known to you that protective custody was possible at all, that it was admissible, and that it has been carried out very often?

KALTENBRUNNER: As I stated, I discussed the concept “protective custody” with Himmler as early as 1942. But I think even before that, already on two occasions in detail, I have had correspondence about this concept once with him and once with Thierack; I consider protective custody as it was handled in the German Reich as being a necessity in the interests of the State, or rather a measure which was justified by the war, only in a small number of cases. Apart from that, I have declared myself against and protested against this concept and against the application of any protective custody as a matter of principle, and have often used profound legal historical arguments as reasons. On several occasions I had reported on that subject to Himmler and also to Hitler. I have, in a meeting of public prosecutors—I think it was in 1944—publicly voiced my views against it, since I have always been of the opinion that a man’s liberty must be counted among his highest privileges and that only a judgment of a court, firmly rooted in a constitution, should be allowed to infringe on that liberty or to deprive him of it.

DR. KAUFFMANN: I am now discussing with you the reasons stated in such orders for protective custody. The following, among others, were given as reasons: activities hostile to the Reich; spreading of atrocity rumors; assault; refusal to work; religious propaganda. Please, will you express your views on the reasons for these protective custody orders. Are they to be approved of?

KALTENBRUNNER: No. I consider these reasons for protective custody to be wrong. I think I had better explain in detail. My attitude is due to the fact that all the offenses which have been enumerated here might just as well have been dealt with by due process of law in the state courts. For that reason I consider protective custody as such to be wrong, and more so if ordered for the reasons mentioned.

DR. KAUFFMANN: So that, if I understand you rightly, I can summarize your attitude as follows: You want to say that you had no knowledge of the protective custody orders, that you had no authority to issue them, and that you did not sign them, but since these protective custody orders were issued within the Amt IV, you ought to have had knowledge of them. Is this summary correct or is it not?

KALTENBRUNNER: It is correct.