Chapter X: Part 10

Were you to say, _Is it worth while to commit an injustice in order to grow rich, when we can consume but so little, and when the means are so numerous of pilfering so lawfully all that is wanted for consumption?_ I could then understand you;—but since you are in possession of 500 _properties_ without having been guilty of injustice, it is something to reflect that they are really to you, the source of numberless enjoyments which you have it in your power to render worthy of a rational being: and, as the continuance of those enjoyments depends entirely on the health and bodily strength of so many others who are to contribute thereto, it is something to be conscious that we find our own pleasures in the interest of others; it is something to reflect, that these pleasures are a very gentle mean, devised most probably by an universal _Watchfulness_, to induce you to provide men destitute of every thing, with that _modicum_ of goods which was not granted to them, and which, nevertheless, being necessary for their sustenance, is sufficient to their moderation, and prevents their feeling the privation of all the rest: it is something to reflect, that you feed in fact 50, 100, 500 perhaps of your brethren, amongst whom there are 10, 15, 30, as well fed as yourself, since they live on what comes from your table. As to the others, whose faces you will never see, since some of them are at _Pekin_, in _Arabia_, at _Constantinople_, and others in _France_, _Russia_, &c. be assured that, with much less meat than you, but more bread, potatoes, or rice, and a few glasses of an acid liquor, the idea of which, whilst I venture to speak of it, is enough to crisp all your nerves, they are as contented, as happy as you, because they consume, without any reflection, without any solicitude for the morrow, all they want, in order to view that morrow with the same tranquillity.—Would it not be unjust in that Being, _who weigheth the mountains in a balance_, if there were, amongst men, one condition more unfortunate than another? Would he not be unjust, if amongst men, there were one condition more blessed than another? I suppose, indeed, that there exists a Being, _who weigheth the mountains in a balance_, as others have supposed that there is a future life, where happiness is more visibly equal; and I have hitherto ventured upon so many suppositions!—yet I would beg leave to offer one more, relating though indirectly perhaps to the object now under consideration; but this shall be the last: I will ask (upon the supposition that there really exists a Being, not only Estimator, Moderator, but Creator also of all that thinks, wishes, and can be happy) ... yes, I presume to ask, whether the created being, capable of conceiving the idea of giving immortality to the creature capable of wishing for it, of fostering the hopes, and feeling the value of it, would not be greater than the Creator himself, if the Creator had not conceived such an idea?—I freely confess, that I should think myself better than the Creator, had the Creator conceived such an idea without putting it in execution.

I now return to the point which requires no kind of supposition, I mean the real consumption.—Let us pass from that very insignificant possessor of 500 _properties_, to the greatest Monarch upon earth.—What difference is there between his consumption and that of the meanest of his subjects?—He has the choice of every thing, such is the _ne plus ultra_ of his power: three, four, or five pounds weight of nourishing food, are really as sufficient for the one as they are necessary to the other;—and on all points, what is the object that procures to the Monarch either advantage or pleasure, the price of which as paid by him, _were it even of fourfold the value_, is not exactly composed, both of the amount of the sustenance that was necessary to the production of that object, and of a sum which will infallibly pay for other productions, which must be purchased to forward new ones—_from which the people will constantly have deducted their necessaries, before they are permitted to satisfy the superfluities, the luxury of any whosoever_?—Such is that never-ending screw, that adorable chain, which nothing can stop or break, unless it be the insanity of a monster, who should receive that fourfold price, and bury it under ground, lest it should prove useful to society.—That wretch was very consistent with his feelings, who wished the _Roman_ people to have but one head, that he might exterminate the whole nation at a single blow; but the phœnix will ever rise from its ashes; and Humanity, with all her resources, all her rights, would be reproduced from the very stones, were it possible that not a single head should escape the sword of that _consistent being_ who might wish to cut them all off.

_Thoughts on the Colonies._

The question concerning luxury leads to the investigation of some ideas on the Colonies; I do not mean that of taxing them, either in a direct or indirect manner, for the reason truly specious, that the wars undertaken for their protection, having loaded the nation with taxes to an enormous amount, it is but just that they should come in for a share of the burden.

It has been observed, that a national debt contracted, no matter for what, occasioning in every thing an indispensable increase of price, the Colonies pay their quota of such a debt (notwithstanding the drawbacks) when they purchase goods at the rate to which the said debt has advanced them: it must also have been noticed, even how necessary it was that the price of commodities from the Colonies should increase in proportion to the price of those of the Mother-country, in order that the former might be able to answer that advance of prices, without hurting the two essential points, consumption and re-production; whence it follows, that if new taxes are introduced, _either directly or indirectly_, to defray their pretended proportion in the interest of the national debt, neither harm nor good will result, _if the price of their commodities be increased in the same proportion_; but that if they be taxed, without that increase in the price of their commodities, they will consume by so much less of national goods _or of foreign ones paid for in national merchandise_, that is, to the amount of the sum which the tax shall have taken from them: this point is evident. Thus it is, that after the war in 1755, all _Europe_ was obliged, as has been shewn, to increase her prices, so as to put them on a level with those in _England_; and had not _Great Britain_ submitted to that reciprocal advance, and all the rest of _Europe_ condescended to receive only, for the 13 _effective_ millions of their own goods, the 13 _nominal_ millions of that quantity of _English_ commodities which was worth 14, on account of the taxes only, the nominal million which would have remained in the hands of _England_, would have been without value, _and no longer reproduced for want of consumption, for want of means to pay for it, and to encourage such a reproduction_.

I think also that it is useless to examine whether the colonies can add any thing to the real power of a nation, since, in order to be convinced of the very reverse, it is enough to observe, that if 2 or 300 ships mounting from 10 to 120 guns be required, in order to protect effectually an extent of between 1500 and 2000 leagues of _colonial_ coasts, distant 1000, 1500, nay 4000 leagues from the mother-country, the 100,000 men employed in time of war, on those floating citadels, are always furnished by the Metropolis, and do not in any manner exempt her either from erecting those permanent citadels which must be scattered along the coasts of the mother-country, or from providing the number of men necessary to defend them in case of an invasion. In this point of view, the colonies would therefore rather diminish than increase the national power.

On the other hand, experience has just taught us, that as soon as those very colonies, for which it is pretended so much blood has been spilt, and so much money wasted, are in a situation to stand up in their own defence, there is no depending upon them, but inasmuch as they are on the footing of allies; and interest alone fixes the duration of every alliance.

The above three objects deserve not, methinks, any further dissertation: the question that merits a more particular scrutiny, is that which concerns the utility of those very colonies, when their weakness is a pledge of their fidelity.

That utility consists in securing to the mother-country, 1st, an exclusive mart for such goods as she thinks proper to export there; and 2dly, the exclusive sale of the returns, in which, it is said, she finds a compensation for the expence she is at to carry her goods to that market.

I shall investigate, under various points of view, all relative to those two objects, the utility of those colonies whose commerce is fully ascertained, before I speak of any other; and I shall only draw the necessary inferences from the most incontrovertible facts.

_1st._

We find in the Statements of Sir _Charles Whitworth_, that the exports from _England_ to the colonies, whose independence can no longer be disputed, amounted annually, upon a medium of 5 years, taken from 1769 to 1773, to the sum of 2,491,230_l._

Now the two wars of 1739 and 1755, undertaken, it is said, for the protection of those colonies, that is, _to preserve_ to the mother-country _the monopoly of them_, have cost _Great Britain_ 99,141,625_l._; and these 99 millions, though the interest has been reduced as often as possible, still cost _England_ annually 3,500,000_l._

It is then a sum of 3,500,000_l._ which, even so early as the year 1762, _England_ had resolved to pay annually, in order to preserve, and the better to secure to herself the exclusive privilege of exporting annually to _North-America_, _European_ goods to the amount of 2,491,230_l._

_2dly._

The imports from those colonies into _Great Britain_, upon a medium of the said 5 years, did not exceed the sum of 1,208,665_l._—_Great Britain_, therefore, has enjoyed during the space of 5 years, a pretended balance of 1,282,565_l._ against those colonies;—but is that glorious balance any thing more than the advantage of having given to those colonies, in the space of 5 years, a credit in the sum of 6,412,825_l._ supposing that such sum was the amount of her claims in that part of _America_, or of the half, if in fact half only of that sum remained due to her, notwithstanding the enormous appearance in Sir _Charles Whitworth_’s Statements?

_3dly._

If the colonies, now independent, will henceforth call in all the other nations of _Europe_ to a share in the advantage of crediting them in the same manner, can it be supposed that _England_ will not find in _Europe_, some other nation willing to receive that part of the _English_ credit, which the independent colonies shall no longer think proper to make use of? In this case, can any thing more be required, on the part of _England_, than to manufacture in less quantity such goods as suit only the inhabitants of _America_, and somewhat more of those that may suit the different nations of _Europe_; and to this first operation to add the complaisance of receiving a greater quantity of their goods than she has imported hitherto?—In this case likewise, what ruinous consequences could _England_ experience by exporting her goods to her neighbours, instead of sending them to _America_?

_4thly._

If the complaints set up by _England_ against the United States, are grounded only on their incapacity of making returns proportionate to the value of the goods exported there since the peace, are the United States to blame if _European_ cupidity has exported to _America_, in the space of six months, as much as its inhabitants could consume and pay for in two years? Does such an event, almost infallibly the result of a long interruption of correspondence, prove any thing more than the necessity of a balance between production and consumption, the advantage of knowing as soon as possible the difference from the one to the other, the inconvenience of a trade, in which we lose sight of our capital for whole years together, and the advantage of a trade which would 5 or 6 months after return to the hands of the _capitalist_ the stock he had laid out?

_5thly._

Had even those colonies remained in, or returned to a state of subjection to _England_, would not the same interruption of correspondence have been productive of the same inconvenience?—During the war, which terminated by the treaty of _Aix-la-Chapelle_, all the _French_ colonies had remained under the dominion of _France_, and yet during all the first, and great part of the second year of peace most of the _French_ goods were sold at _Martinique_ and _St. Domingo_, 15 and 20 _per cent._ below the prime cost in _Europe_;—between dependent and independent colonies, then, in this respect, who can perceive a shadow of difference?

_6thly._

If the _English_ merchants, after having over-stocked the _American_ markets with _European_ goods, have attempted to strip _America_ of the little money she had to boast of, and to leave her goods on her own hands, do the complaints set up in _England_ on this subject, prove any thing essential either to _England_, or to the rest of the world, more than the impossibility of carrying into execution beyond a certain degree, the plan, as destructive as it is absurd, of any other trade but that which is founded on a reciprocity of advantages, on _an exchange of the gifts with which Nature and Art have favoured one country, against those with which Nature and Art have favoured another country_? And even, upon a supposition, that _America_ should have returned under the domination of _England_, if the _English_ merchants had, in this case, attempted to wrest from her the little money she was possessed of, would not the _American_ colonists have been justified in taking every measure necessary to preserve it?—Would they in enforcing that right have been free from the misfortune, common to mankind, of always doing, in order to guard against an injury, much more than is either just or necessary?—The impossibility of making returns adequate to the extravagant invoices sent by the _French_ traders to their colonies in _America_, after the war I have mentioned, determined also the agents of the _French_ trade to strip those colonies of all the money they could lay their hands upon: no other way to put a stop to that spoliation was left, but to bore in the middle of their dollars a large hole, which restoring the equilibrium between the rapacity of the foreign trader, and the wants of the interior commerce, preserved within those colonies the trifling sum in specie that still remained there. Soon after, the equilibrium was also restored between the imports and the consumption; and from that instant an end was put to the thirst after money, as well as to the necessity of boring the dollars.—What difference then can exist, in this respect also, between a colony and a free State?

_7thly._

All the exports from _England_ to the colonies, the monopoly of which she has preserved by the peace, (including her trade to _India_) amounted, in 1773, to 2,430,420_l._ (for the details see Sir _Charles Whitworth_). Now the annual expence of the _British_ navy, and its accessaries, considering the increase in that of _France_, must be, at present, or will be soon, 2,000,000_l._ May it not be fairly concluded, that _England_ is about to pay the annual sum of 2 millions sterling, in order to maintain herself in the exclusive privilege of carrying annually to the distance of 1500, of 2000, of 4 or 6000 leagues, the value of 2,432,420_l._ in _European_ goods?—And would not that privilege be dearly bought, were not _France_ to lay out annually likewise 45 millions of livres _tournois_, in protecting her privileged exportation?

_8thly_,

I have at present before my eyes no other standard, whereby to estimate the exportation of _France_ to her sugar-colonies, than that of _England_ to hers; that exportation amounted, in 1773, to 197,236_l._ But the population of the _French_ colonies is far from being in a treble proportion to that of the _English_ colonies, and luxury is equal in both; yet let us suppose that the amount of the exports from _France_ to her colonies, including those she sends to _India_, be annually 80 millions _tournois_.—The interest of the national debt in _France_ is 202 millions _tournois_, (see _Administration des Finances de la France_) one half, or rather three fourths of which have been incurred for the protection of her establishments in those parts of the world.—May it not be said, that _France_ is at the yearly expence of 150 millions _tournois_, independently of the 45 millions for her navy, for the purpose of maintaining herself in the exclusive privilege of exporting every year the value of 80 millions _tournois_, in _European_ goods, to her possessions in _India_ and _America_?

_9thly_,

All the _European_ exports, carried by _England_ in the year 1773, either to _India_, _Africa_, or _America_, including the exports for which she held an exclusive privilege in the part of _America_ now independent, amounted to 4,975,192_l._ we shall say 5 millions:—if you value at 10 millions of the same currency, the exports of all the other nations of _Europe_ to those parts of the world, we shall find a capital of 15 millions sterling in goods annually exported from _Europe_:—but the yearly expence of a navy, which cannot be dispensed with for the protection of those exports, is valued at 8 millions sterling, 4 of which fall to the share of _England_ and _France_.

Exclusive of those 8 millions sterling, the interest paid by _England_ to acquire, preserve, and protect that part of _European_ exports that concerns her, amounts to about 6,500,000_l._ including that of the last war; the interest paid by _France_, comes nearly to the same sum; the interest paid by _Spain_ could not be computed, were the depopulation of that country to be taken into the account; but estimate them at 4 millions, including those which other _European_ nations have sacrificed to the same Idol: let us say nothing about _Holland_, who for many years (except the few last) has made some figure _Europe_, only by her good luck in alleviating the distresses of others, her sole motive for which was her own advantage: and we shall sum up, at last, an annual expenditure of 25 millions sterling, in interest and naval expences, incurred by _Europe_, in order to preserve the exclusive privilege, 1st, of exporting every year 15 millions sterling in _European_ goods to her colonies, both in _India_ and _America_; and, 2dly, of establishing in those colonies _the system of government best calculated to prevent that exportation from becoming more considerable_.

_10thly_,

We have observed, that the exports from _England_ to the colonies of _America_, and to _India_, amounted, in 1773, to 4,900 and some thousand pounds sterling, suppose 5 millions: now her importation of commodities from those various countries is about 5,900,000_l._ (see Sir _Charles Whitworth_); but we have also noticed, that she left yearly in _North America_ 1,282,000_l._ more than she received therefrom. This matter, considered in the most favourable light, that is, as a balance of trade, ought to be added to the former; and the whole together will give us a total of 7 millions, shewing an annual benefit of 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds sterling.

It appears then, that an annual benefit of 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds sterling costs _England_ annually 6,500,000_l._ interest for her debt, and 2 millions for the support of her navy.

_11thly_,

We have seen, that the annual and general exportation of _European_ goods to _America_ and _India_ amounted to about 15 millions sterling.—If 5 millions of _English_ exports return no more than 2 millions some hundred thousand pounds annual benefit to _England_, that _England_, who sets the highest price on her goods of all kinds, the general exportation of 15 millions, to which _England_ contributes only one third, cannot, of course, afford to the whole of _Europe_, a profit of above 6 millions and some hundred thousand pounds;—but it seems that a benefit of 6 millions and some hundred thousand pounds is dearly bought at the rate of 25 millions laid out annually by _Europe_, both in paying the interest of their respective national debts, and for the support of the _European_ navies designed to preserve, protect, and secure such a benefit.

_12thly_,

If it were very true, as it is to this day asserted, that those 25 millions of annual and indisputable expenditure, are in reality so many yearly losses to the nations who sustain it, might it not be reasonably concluded, would it not be impossible not to conclude, that all the colonies of _Europe_ were established only for her ruin?—If we only attend to the last war, which in fact loads the different nations who took a share in it, with an annual interest of 9 or 10 millions,—9 or 10 millions to be paid every year, partly to preserve the right, partly to obtain the permission of exporting _European_ commodities into a country, of which the inhabitants, besides their own importation, consume annually to the amount of only 2,491,230_l._ of those same commodities which are exported to them by others—who (to assume the trader’s phrase) cannot clear by that exportation, a greater annual profit than 3, 4, or even 500,000_l._! ... it seems indeed that one cannot see without surprise and concern, the shocking disproportion between the end proposed, and the sole means of obtaining it.

_13thly_,

If, on the contrary, it be true, as I maintain it to be, that after the peace, when a perfect equilibrium is restored to every thing, the 9 or 10 millions interest of the national debt, has no other effect but that of ADDING TO EVERY THING A NOMINAL VALUE WHICH INJURES NO ONE, THOUGH IT MAY BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MANY; A NOMINAL VALUE, WHICH, IN EVERY STATE, PROPORTIONS ITSELF, FIRST TO THE SUM OF ITS REVENUE COMPARED TO THAT OF ITS DEBT, AND SOON AFTER TO THE DIFFERENCE WHICH THE DEBT CONTRACTED BY THE NATION CALLED THE MOST LOADED, AND WHICH, IN FACT, IS ONLY THE GREATEST EXPORTER, HAS PRODUCED IN THAT ENORMOUS QUANTITY OF THE GOODS SHE EXPORTS;—if it appear more reasonable to adopt that idea, than to give up a trade, which, without that very idea, would prove the most absurd, as well as the most destructive that human genius could invent, (_the alternative seems to be forcibly established_);—in this case the regret will be heart-felt, when we consider the loss of men sacrificed during the last war: but if from this general aggregate of truths little suspected, and much less reflected upon, there should result a system of Politics in _Europe_, of Administration in her different States, of Government in her Colonies, which should procure to _Europe_, at the least expence, the greatest exportation of that of which she has a superabundance, and the greatest importation of that in which she is deficient ... then indeed, then, might we find consolation for the evil, in adverting to its consequences.—And, upon this principle, what can _England_ have suffered by losing her sovereignty over _America_?

_14thly_,

The contagion of example has been apprehended. Let us suppose the fact. What then would be the loss sustained by _Europe_? None, I believe, unless the consequence of the general independency of the colonies, should be that they would give up _European_ commodities they have been used to, and which they can so readily procure by means of a multitude of other articles, which would be of no value to them were they not calculated to procure them those _European_ commodities which they are in the habit of consuming.—But I beg leave to ask, what purpose could their independence answer?—It appears to me, they could not think of it without a palpable folly; and that it is impossible they should think of it, _without that kind of vexation which brings a man to the necessity of choosing between two extremes_.—Another consideration, which tends to make _Europe_ easy, at least in regard to the colonies situated beyond the tropic, is, that no rivalship can subsist between them and their mother-countries in any thing that concerns the soil and industry.

In regard to the productions of the soil, all that part of _America_ inclosed within even the 30th degree of north, and the 30th degree of south latitude, could not yield, without double and treble expence, any thing that can be produced in _Europe_, and in the other part of _America_, from the 30th degree to the pole. And, on the other hand, at what an amazing expence must all _Europe_, jointly with that part of _America_ now independent, produce, even in a kind of degradation, what the other part of _America_ yields naturally in the most perfect state!

In regard to industry, can it be feared that the _South Americans, even supposing them independent_, should be tempted to import rough materials from _Europe_, in order to have them wrought by _American hands, which are so naturally and so profitably employed in the production of American articles_? Is it even to be feared that they should aim at a competition with the _Europeans_ in the exportation of _American_ articles, when they are in need of ship-timber, or rather when in this, much more than in any other respects, there is no _European_ work, which, if done in _America_, would not cost three times as much as when imported from _Europe_?—All _European_ prejudices, relative to commerce, are founded on the following principle, which may be looked upon as the _quintessence_ of the Navigation-Act:—_To do every thing ourselves, in order that no one’s assistance may be wanted,—that no one may do without our assistance,—and that no assistance be given, but at the prices prescribed by the Lords of the Seas._—The Navigation-Act was, without doubt, the last effort of the human mind about the middle of the 17th century[11].

It seems to me, that the only point which essentially concerns all _Europe_, in regard to other parts of the world, where she can give law, would be to find out _what kind of Administration would be the best calculated to increase in all those parts the consumption of ~European~ _goods, and to procure to herself a more considerable stock of foreign goods and products,—which would, as they have ever done, give, ~either directly or indirectly~, a fresh encouragement to her agriculture and manufactures_. Let any one examine, whether the utility of the colonies be not strictly confined to this single point.

I speak of all _Europe_, it is true, as if she formed but one State, whilst she is supposed to exhibit so many interests, and these so very opposite to each other. This question deserves a deeper discussion than I am able to give it; yet I presume to think that the answer I could give, might be susceptible of demonstration, had we, on all the countries in _Europe_, statements only similar to those which Sir _Charles Whitworth_ has given of the _British_ trade, and were we to add thereto the means and faculties which are to be met with in _England_ of procuring the details and proofs of every particular that concerns the public. Destitute however of an advantage so precious, so worthy of a nation sufficiently enlightened to dread nothing but being left in the dark on any part of her own interests, of a nation judicious enough not to disdain a ray of light, from whatever quarter it may come, and generous enough to perceive, with pleasure, that by enriching herself, she has, to this day, enriched all _Europe_;—

If it were admitted, that money is only the representation of value; that multiplying the sign, without multiplying the articles which it is calculated to represent, is debasing fruitlessly the representation; and that, on the contrary, multiplying the article is the most infallible means of attracting the sign and keeping it up to its value:

If it were acknowledged, that nothing contributes so much to the multiplying of the articles, as the multiplicity of the channels through which they can be introduced:

If it were acknowledged, that the multiplicity of channels in another nation, for the introduction of our own goods, is necessarily inseparable from the multiplicity of channels opened in our own country for the introduction of foreign goods:

If it were acknowledged, that with the fullest persuasion that money ought to be the sole aim of trade, it has only proved, hitherto, the means of supporting it:

If it were acknowledged, that notwithstanding the prejudices to the contrary, as deeply rooted in the heads of Ministers, as they are in the hearts of Merchants, and notwithstanding all the national cupidities, private interest in all countries has always proved sufficient to reject effectually all the _useless_, and procure all the _necessary_ money:

If it should result, not from arguments, which very seldom contain what they ought to contain, in order to become uncontrovertible, but from the experience of a whole century, sufficient to estimate the effect of the passion the most ardent, and the most attached to its object, that contrary to the common ideas, and in spite of the general rage for money, the whole of commerce has, to this day, been ultimately confined to _its true balance_, i. e. _to bartering goods for goods_, except the little money which is wanted every where, and which has constantly penetrated every where, to answer either to the new productions when they had actually increased in their quantity, or to the advance of prices when the taxes had at last produced every where, and on the generality of prices, their effect, as equitable as it is necessary and harmless:

If the same experience should evince, that the richest individual, or he who becomes such the soonest, has no other advantage in point of commerce, than the choice of the men whom he is pleased to admit to a share of his wealth without impairing it; and that the inference to be drawn therefrom is, _that such a man must be a dupe who confines his choice to ten, when he can make it from among thirty_:

If it were acknowledged, that riches and ease, like the light, stand in want of no assistance whatever, to propagate themselves equally in every direction, _as general interest requires_; that the private interest of one man, or of a body of men, is always sufficiently opposed, protected, balanced, by the interest of another man, or of another body of men, _wherever administration confines its attention to the maintenance of strict justice and good order_; and that from this equilibrium in which they mutually keep, or soon replace one another, there results, for both, the greatest advantage they can hope for, and for the State the highest prosperity it can attain:

If it were acknowledged, that on all these various objects, no difference whatever can subsist between one nation and another:

If it were acknowledged also, that all _Europe_, as well as each State in particular, is essentially, finally, strictly, composed only of three kinds of _capitalists_, or proprietors, the _landed capitalist, the capitalist of industry, and the proprietor of money_, considered either as a dependant or as a _capitalist_:

If it were acknowledged, that those three interests center in the greatest quantity, as well as the greatest variety and best quality, of the products both of agriculture and industry, and in the greatest consumption of both at the most reasonable rate:

If it were acknowledged, that the _Fisc_, or Exchequer, owes the whole of its revenue to the produce of the taxes only; and that this produce rising of course as the productions and consumption increase, the interest of the Exchequer can no where be different from that of the three capitalists or proprietors:

If it were acknowledged, that _at present_ nothing can result from several institutions, pretended very wise, but a great diminution in the products and consumption, as well as in the revenue of the Exchequer; because there is nothing so easy as to balance, every where, institutions pretended very wise, by others not less so:

If it were acknowledged, that the _necessary_ expenditure of the Exchequer once ascertained, all diminution of its revenue, occasioned by the pretended very wise institutions, carries with it the necessity of imposing new taxes, in order to make up the _deficit_ of former ones:

If it were acknowledged, that each new tax, increasing necessarily the price of every thing in the nation, _for the purpose of supporting, at least, the interior consumption, on which depends the discharge of the taxes_, would add to the inconvenience brought about by those pretended very wise regulations, _and would soon lead to a decrease in the external consumption, which the nation might have preserved_, if other countries did not raise their own prices accordingly, in order to pay with the same products the same quantity of articles which they used to take before the advance occasioned by the taxes; that therefore such a general propagation of increase in prices, being of a general interest to the production and consumption every where, would not fail to take place every where as it has always done, and to dwindle again into a childish play, much beneath the adolescence of the age we live in:

If it were acknowledged, that the general repeal of those pretended very wise institutions could, at the worst, be productive of no other effect _within the State_, but that of a general rise in the prices, wherever they are not in due proportion to the real values, and a general fall in all the prices, wherever they are fixed by monopoly, and not by the natural equilibrium; but that, whereas nothing but profit can accrue to those who raise their prices, it is very probable that the prices would increase much more almost _every where_, than they would decrease _any where_:

If it were, besides, acknowledged that such an increase, or decrease, (it matters not which) soon becoming general and proportionate, (without any other agent to work that miracle, but that reciprocal pressure which establishes a perfect symmetry in a bee-hive,) then no alteration could arise therefrom in the circumstances of the two essential capitalists, since it is perfectly indifferent whether we purchase the labour of others at 5 or 6 _per cent._ dearer, if we sell our own labour in proportion:

If it were acknowledged, that in regard to the money proprietor, _whether dependant or capitalist_, nothing can result from it but the certainty of procuring henceforth and for ever, at the most equitable price, that which he had paid for hitherto according to the rate set on it by monopoly, and often by a scarcity cunningly prepared and managed:

If it were acknowledged, that _as to the external interests of the State_, no other effect can result from the general repeal of those pretended very wise institutions, but the facilitating of all the branches of foreign correspondence, the opening of new channels of consumption, the encouragement of all kinds of production, of which consumption is the very soul, and the power of obtaining every where, at the most equitable prices, _by means of competition_, the most equitable share we have a right to expect in those gifts which nature, in all probability, has not bestowed on any part of the world, to confine them to that particular spot:

If all the foregoing points, I say, were acknowledged, it would be a hard matter to conceive that there is, not only in _Europe_, but all over the globe, any other enemy to destroy but Monopoly, or any other interest to favour but Labour.

FINIS.

_The judgement of the Public, on the ideas thrown out in this Essay, will determine the fate of some others, which are nothing else but the consequences or developement of these._

PRÉFACE _DE L’ÉDITEUR_.

Ce n’est point un _Traité_ que l’Auteur annonce: ce n’est rien de plus que des _Considérations sur le Méchanisme des Sociétés_. Un pareil titre n’astreint point à un plan régulier, & sauve même le risque de préparer les Lecteurs à un enchaînement d’idées qui n’échappera point à leur sagacité, s’il existe; & sur lequel on ne les abuseroit point, s’il n’existe pas. Mais dans un tableau consacré au monde comme à la patrie, aux peuples comme à leurs maîtres, il falloit que l’objet saillant, l’objet sur lequel on dirigeoit leur première attention, fût d’un intérêt assez général pour les engager progressivement à l’examen de tous ceux de ses détails qui méritent d’être approfondis, & dont les rapports sont méconnus ou mal jugés.

L’objet qui fixe aujourd’hui l’attention de tous les États de l’_Europe_, tous débiteurs & créanciers, c’est la dette publique de l’_Angleterre_, & les mesures que va prendre à ce sujet, l’Assemblée du monde la plus éclairée sur les intérêts du peuple, la plus jalouse de ses droits, & la plus libre du moins dans ses débats. C’est par l’examen de cette formidable dette, & de son influence sur la richesse de l’État & l’aisance du peuple, que l’Auteur ose commencer. Mais avant d’en expliquer le méchanisme, dont le résultat présente des idées trop contraires à l’opinion générale, l’Auteur tàche de familiariser peu à peu ses Lecteurs avec la sienne, par des _Réflexions générales sur la situation actuelle de l’~Angleterre~_; ces réflexions ne lui permettant pas de douter, que la nation ne fût en 1779, malgré la dette nationale, plus riche qu’au commencement du siècle, du quadruple, ou du double seulement, suivant le calcul de population auquel on sera le plus attaché.—On voit que l’Auteur, relativement à son plan, n’attache aucune importance à la différence des opinions sur cet article.

_Une vue plus particulière du sujet_, présente à l’Auteur de nouvelles raisons qui lui paroissent capables de tranquilliser le créancier le plus inquiet.—Ce n’est à la vérité que par le moyen _des épargnes_ faites & à faire journellement sur 8 sols, portion exacte qui revient à chaque individu dans le revenu général, qu’on a pu parvenir à l’opulence, & qu’il est possible de s’y maintenir; mais l’Auteur cherche _les épargnes_ qu’on ne peut méconnoître dans l’agriculture & dans l’industrie: il trouve que celles de l’agriculture ont suffi depuis un siècle, non-seulement pour satisfaire aux charges publiques, mais encore pour doubler le revenu territorial; & il détaille ensuite une quantité d’objets, faciles à vérifier, qui semblent démontrer le même progrès dans l’industrie.

Ici l’Auteur commence à se croire assez ferme sur son terrein, pour convenir qu’il ne voit rien dans la situation actuelle de l’_Angleterre_ qui puisse justifier l’idée d’une banqueroute, quoique les papiers publics de cette nation en insinuent très-souvent la commodité. L’Auteur s’oublie même jusqu’à examiner sérieusement, _s’il seroit avantageux de rembourser ou de ne pas rembourser, même dans la supposition que les 238 millions empruntés & disparus, reparoîtroient dans les coffres de l’Échiquier_.

Après avoir présenté la question sous plusieurs points de vue, l’Auteur n’hésite point à se décider pour la négative, & tâche ensuite de prouver qu’une _Thésaurisation_ antérieure qui eût mis la Nation en état de soutenir la dernière guerre sans imposer aucune taxe additionelle, auroit fait beaucoup plus de mal que les nouvelles taxes n’ont été capables d’en faire.

L’Auteur devenu plus hardi, parce que personne ne le contredit lorsqu’il est seul (& en vérité il est seul bien souvent), entreprend de réconcilier le genre humain avec les taxes, au moyen d’une première décomposition de l’impôt; il abandonne à la vérité une de ses parties comme onéreuse, (il est fâcheux réellement qu’elle soit indispensable, heureusement c’est la moindre;) mais il défend hautement l’autre partie, comme une ressource très-précieuse pour cette portion du peuple qui mérite le plus de captiver l’intérêt du Gouvernement.

Malgré toutes les précautions que l’Auteur a prises jusqu’ici pour ne pas effaroucher ses Lecteurs, il lui reste un tel pas à franchir, qu’on le voit presque à genoux pour supplier qu’on lui permette de le franchir en vingt fois s’il n’y réussit pas en dix; c’est-à-dire, qu’il desire beaucoup que son Ouvrage ne soit pas condamné _définitivement_, avant d’avoir été lu jusqu’à la fin; en effet il n’est pas impossible qu’une proposition détachée, dont le ridicule est frappant à l’exposition, devienne cependant très-raisonnable lorsqu’elle aura été successivement rapprochée de toutes celles qui doivent la suivre.—

Un Editeur doit encore plus au Public qu’à un Ouvrage auquel il seroit même assez flatté de procurer une petite fortune; je crois donc être obligé (_in foro conscientiæ_) de prévenir que ce n’est qu’après avoir parcouru cinquante & quelques pages qu’on soupçonne pourquoi l’Auteur n’a pas annoncé dès la première, les singularités qu’il se proposoit insidieusement d’établir pied à pied dans sa brochure: mais enfin on peut alors pressentir ce qu’on doit attendre d’un homme qui vient de conter _que les taxes ne sont qu’un petit mal, que la Thésaurisation en seroit un très-grand, qu’un remboursement est au moins inutile_,—& qui aussi-tôt annonce modestement qu’il pourra bien, _par la suite_, lui échapper quelques bizarreries,—comme s’il pouvoit y en avoir de plus complettes que les trois propositions dont je viens de rendre compte.

Cependant il ne faut pas être trop sévère;—le Lecteur a-t-il été seulement amusé par le coin du Tableau jusques-là découvert?—qu’il se prête à la petite manie de l’Auteur; on renonceroit à montrer des curiosités, si l’on n’avoit pas la liberté de lever le rideau à sa fantaisie, si l’on n’avoit pas le droit de ne montrer, à chaque annonce, que la petite partie de la curiosité, sur laquelle on veut fixer pour le moment les yeux du Spectateur:—

Mais si le Lecteur n’a pas encore observé la moindre variation dans le compas malgré la différence des positions; s’il n’a pas été un peu ébranlé par les raisonnemens dont on l’aura bercé jusqu’alors,—qu’il jette la brochure au feu; car l’Auteur, dont je ne prétends point imiter la circonspection, ou adopter les craintes, ou justifier l’audace, ou partager le délit, n’entreprend rien moins que d’engager _toute l’Europe_, (toute Europe!) à examiner:

1ᵒ.

S’il seroit possible qu’il en coutât à l’_Angleterre_ au-delà de 5 millions sterling, _une fois trouvés_, pour assurer, _à perpétuité_, de la façon la plus solide, le paiement de l’intérêt d’une dette de 238 millions, cet intérêt fixé à 9 millions même monnoie.

2ᵒ.

S’il n’y a pas sans qu’on l’imagine, dans le Systême de Finance de l’_Angleterre_, quelquesunes des imperfections si bien observées, si justement, si amèrement critiquées dans celui de la _France_; & si un remboursement national n’est pas le plus facile de tous les jeux avec lesquels un Ministre de Finance peut amuser la Société, sans la servir.

3ᵒ.

Si la possibilité d’une balance de commerce toujours favorable, n’est pas aussi douteuse que la nécessité d’une banqueroute, & l’avantage d’un remboursement.

4ᵒ.

Si l’équilibre en tout & par tout, n’est pas indispensable; & si, pour maintenir ou rétablir cet équilibre, il faut de grands efforts d’imagination de la part de ceux qui croient tenir la balance.

5ᵒ.

Si la différence des prix est quelque chose ou rien; & s’il a fallu en _France_ au-delà de 66 millions tournois, _une fois trouvés_, pour assurer, _à jamais_, l’intérêt à 5 p. cent d’un emprunt national de 1500 millions.

6ᵒ.

Si le monstre d’une concurrence en fait de commerce, prétendue invincible graces à la légèreté des prix dont elle seroit armée, n’est pas aussi fantastique que celui d’une balance toujours favorable.

7ᵒ.

Si le _præmium_ d’exportation le plus pardonnable, est autre chose qu’une injustice devenue nécessaire pour en balancer une infinité d’autres.

8ᵒ.

S’il ne résulte pas du rétablissement toujours infaillible & purement méchanique de l’équilibre dans tous les prix, que les taxes sont d’une innocence absolue en elles-mêmes;—s’il est au-delà d’une espèce de taxation, qui n’augmente la masse générale des prix que du montant précis de la taxe;—si toutes les autres n’en triplent pas l’effet;—si la plus pernicieuse, _après la capitation_, n’est pas celle _du luxe_;—& si du moment où toutes les taxes _bonnes ou mauvaises_, ont réagi sur tout, le fardeau de la dette nationale n’est pas évidemment NUL dans tous les pays.

9ᵒ.

Si le crédit n’est pas, _après le Monopole_, l’effet de la richesse qui enchérisse le plus tous les produits de la terre & de l’industrie.

10ᵒ.

Si tel pays où la contrebande fut défendue sous peine des galères, ne doit pas _à la contrebande_ un cinquième des produits de son agriculture, dont le commerce profite avec aussi peu de scrupule que s’il n’eût pas sollicité la loi abominable contre les contrebandiers.

11ᵒ.

Si l’absurdité de l’idée générale sur le moyen le plus propre pour établir une concurrence avantageuse en fait de commerce, n’est pas démontrée par l’Histoire d’une révolution singulière en _France_; révolution aussi peu douteuse que les deux guerres de 1755 & de 1779.

12ᵒ.

Si l’impossibilité des deux balances prétendues par la _France_ & par l’_Angleterre_, n’est pas prouvée par les faits allégués dans les deux pays pour établir l’existence de ces deux monstres;—si cette impossibilité n’est pas démontrée par d’autres faits aussi peu équivoques;—& s’il n’est pas de l’intérêt de l’_Angleterre_ & de la _France_, d’abjurer au plus tôt l’idole, & de renoncer authentiquement à ses œuvres comme à ses pompes.

13ᵒ.

Si les exportations & importations ne sont pas un jeu aussi innocent que celui de la paume; un jeu néanmoins dont tous les Gouvernemens pourroient tirer un grand parti, tous les sujets un grand avantage, & tous les États un accroissement de force & de richesse.

14ᵒ.

Si la généralité des exportations de l’_Angleterre_ en différens périodes, considérée relativement à la correspondance étrangère, ne démontre pas une espèce d’électricité dont on n’avoit pas encore l’idée, & qui n’est pas indigne d’amuser le loisir des plus grands Politiques.

15ᵒ.

Si le badinage du luxe n’est pas aussi innocent que le jeu des exportations & importations; & combien le plus fastueux, le plus prodigue, le plus sensuel de tous les Princes, consomme au-delà du plus avare de ses sujets.

16ᵒ.

Combien, en négligeant les sols & les deniers, l’_Angleterre_ a perdu en perdant ce qu’on appelloit son bras droit; & combien, en négligeant les sols & les deniers, toute l’_Europe_ perdroit si elle perdoit la souveraineté des deux _Amériques_.

17ᵒ.

Si tout ce qui avoit paru à l’Auteur fondé en raison & en justice, ne se trouve pas finalement, en dépit de la conjuration générale de tous les Peuples & de tous les Ministres, conforme aux faits les plus douteux;—& s’il ne résulte pas de la réunion des faits & des raisons, que l’assertion de l’Auteur la plus intéressante pour l’humanité, c’est-à-dire pour tous les Princes comme pour tous les Peuples, est de la vérité la plus incontestable, & la plus facile à mettre à la portée de tous les intéressés.

J’irai plus loin quoique Editeur. Je supposerai qu’il résultât aussi de cette réunion de raisons & de faits, que les moyens qu’on a crus jusqu’ici les plus propres à soulager le Peuple, étoient les plus infaillibles pour le vexer; qu’est ce que cela fait au Peuple pourvu qu’on ne le vexe plus? Le passé est-il autre chose qu’un songe?

Je supposerai encore qu’il en résultât qu’on n’a jamais travaillé plus solidement à diminuer les revenus du Prince, que lorsqu’on s’est flatté de les augmenter; qu’est-ce que cela fait au Prince, pourvu qu’il ne soit plus possible de se méprendre sur les vrais moyens de l’enrichir? N’est-ce pas de l’avenir sur tout, qu’un grand Prince doit s’occuper?

Je supposerai encore qu’il en résultât qu’on a eu grand tort de s’imaginer qu’il falloit diminuer le revenu du Peuple pour augmenter celui du Prince; qu’est-ce que cela fait au Prince & au Peuple, pourvu qu’ils soient l’un & l’autre bien convaincus qu’il n’est pas possible d’enrichir l’un, sans enrichir l’autre de la même manière, & dans la même proportion?

Je supposerai encore qu’il en résultât évidemment qu’il n’y a pas eu jusqu’ici dans les finances d’aucun pays, un seul principe, une seule idée qui en méritât le nom; qu’est-ce que cela fait aux Ministres qui dirigent aujourd’hui les finances? Le passé est-il à leurs ordres? Et n’est-ce pas dans la rectification des abus découverts, que consiste la vraie gloire d’un Ministère?

Je supposerai même, pour combler la mesure, qu’il en résultât pour un très-simple individu _Américain_, une petite branche de cet arbuste _Européen_ qu’on appelle laurier femelle; qu’est-ce que cela fait à tous les Ministres, à tous les Peuples, à tous les Princes de l’_Europe_? L’_Amérique_ consommera-t-elle moins de marchandises _Européennes_, & produira-t-elle moins d’or & d’argent, pour avoir produit une idée?

FOOTNOTES

[1] The 18 millions sterling in circulation, as calculated in 1688, by Dr. _Davenant_, were, in 1711, brought down to 12 millions, probably as we reduce now to 20 or 25, the 40 millions and upwards which might be supposed in _England_, were we to confine ourselves to the calculation of the coin struck in the present reign, and of the old pieces preserved on account of their weight being unimpaired. The sequel will shew, that it is next to an impossibility for a country, tolerably governed, to preserve, for any length of time, more or less money than its wants require.

[2] I have mentioned the fatal tree, as a consequence of the miseries attending war. This is more sensibly felt in _England_ than any where else, for reasons obvious to every one. During the first years that immediately follow a peace, a four-fold number of wretches, to what are executed at other times, are brought to the gallows. It is with much ado that a man returns within the sphere of the confined and daily occupations of the handicrafts or husbandmen, when he has for some years rioted in that licentiousness permitted, in a manner, to soldiers and sailors, in every thing that does not concern their respective service.

[3] This idea is the more to be attended to, as, supposing it were possible that an increase of coin, within the nation, should enhance the produce of industry alone, the landed proprietors would certainly be obliged to petition for an act of parliament, _prohibiting the importation of bullion, for fear it should be turned into coin_; just as they would be obliged to pray for a tax on the productions of the earth, if none but the taxed articles were to increase in price.—We now petition against taxes; we should then pray to be taxed. This would be no bad subject for a Comedy, if attempted by a writer who would handle it properly. I hope the labouring man would be allotted a very bustling part; that is, he would engross the best wishes of all good men, and command the attention of all those who do not think themselves entitled to that appellation.

[4] Since my writing the above I have seen the account-book (_Bilan_) of another nation; I shall notice it in its proper place.

[5] Under the idea of labour, I comprise all kinds of capitals necessary to keep in action the labouring man; a stock, or capital, is but an accumulation of savings, made from former labours, whether it represents the savings of a certain number of years, in regard to one man, or those of some centuries, in regard to the nation or some privileged individuals.