Chapter XIII: On the Oceans

Expeditions against the German Colonies—The Imperial
Reinforcements—The Admiralty at Full Strain—General situation in
the Outer Seas—The Price of Concentration at Home—The _Königsberg_
and the _Emden_ in the Indian Ocean—The Convoy System—General
situation in the Pacific—British dispositions—Japan Declares War
on Germany—Overwhelming Forces of the Allies—Difficulty of their
Task—Fox and Geese—Problem of Admiral von Spee—Limitations on his
Action—Plight of Cruisers without Bases—Tell-tale Coal—The
Admiralty Problem—The Capture of Samoa—The great Australasian
Convoy—The Capture of New Guinea—Depredations of the
_Emden_—Concentration against the _Emden_—Public Dissatisfaction
on Admiralty Statement—Sailing of the Australasian Convoy to
Colombo—The Canadians cross the Atlantic—First Imperial
Concentration Complete.

On an August morning, behold the curious sight of a British Cabinet of respectable Liberal politicians sitting down deliberately and with malice aforethought to plan the seizure of the German colonies in every part of the world! A month before, with what horror and disgust would most of those present have averted their minds from such ideas! But our sea communications depended largely upon the prompt denial of these bases or refuges to the German cruisers; and further, with Belgium already largely overrun by the German armies, every one felt that we must lose no time in taking hostages for her eventual liberation. Accordingly, with maps and pencils, the whole world was surveyed, six separate expeditions were approved in principle and remitted to the Staffs for study and execution. An enterprising Captain had already on the outbreak of war invaded the German colony of Togoland. We now proposed, in conjunction with the French, to attack the Cameroons—a much more serious undertaking. General Botha had already declared his intention of invading German South-West Africa. The New Zealand and Australian Governments wished at once to seize Samoa and the German possessions in the Pacific. An Anglo-Indian expedition was authorised for the attack of German East Africa. The Staff work in preparation for the military side of this last expedition was by no means perfect, and resulted in a serious rebuff. The transportation of the expeditionary forces simultaneously in all these different directions while the seas were still scoured by the German cruisers threw another set of responsibilities upon the Admiralty.

From the middle of September onwards we began to be at our fullest strain. The great map of the world which covered one whole wall of the War Room now presented a remarkable appearance. As many as twenty separate enterprises and undertakings dependent entirely upon sea power were proceeding simultaneously in different parts of the globe.[52] Apart from the expeditions set forth above, the enormous business of convoying from all parts of the Empire the troops needed for France, and of replacing them in some cases with Territorials from home, lay heavy upon us. It was soon to be augmented.

It had been easy to set on foot the organisation of the three Naval Brigades and other Divisional troops for the Royal Naval Division; but at a very early stage I found the creation of the artillery beyond any resources of which I could dispose. We could, and did, order a hundred field guns in the United States, but the training, mounting and equipping of the artillerymen could not and ought not to be undertaken apart from the main preparation of the Army. My military staff officer, Major Ollivant, at this stage had a very good idea which provoked immediately far-reaching consequences. He advised me to ask Lord Kitchener for a dozen British batteries from India to form the artillery of the Royal Naval Division, letting India have Territorial batteries in exchange. I put this to Lord Kitchener the same afternoon. He seemed tremendously struck by the idea. What would the Cabinet say? he asked. If the Government of India refused, could the Cabinet overrule them? Would they? Would I support him in the matter? And so on. I had to leave that night for the North to visit the Fleet, which was lying in Loch Ewe, on the west coast of Scotland. Forty-eight hours later, when I returned, I visited Lord Kitchener and asked him how matters were progressing. He beamed with delight. ‘Not only,’ he said, ‘am I going to take twelve batteries, but thirty-one; and not only am I going to take batteries, I am going to take battalions. I am going to take thirty-nine battalions: I am going to send them Territorial divisions instead—three Territorial divisions. You must get the transports ready at once.’ After we had gloated over this prospect of succouring our struggling front, I observed that I could now count on the twelve batteries for the Royal Naval Division. ‘Not one,’ he said. ‘I am going to take them all myself’; and he rubbed his hands together with every sign of glee. So the Naval Division was left again in the cold and had to go forward as infantry only.

This new development involved a heavy addition to our convoy work, and the situation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans must now be examined by the reader.

When war began the Germans had the following cruisers on foreign stations: _Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, _Emden_, _Nürnberg_, _Leipzig_ (China); _Königsberg_ (East Africa and Indian Ocean); _Dresden_, _Karlsruhe_ (West Indies). All these ships were fast and modern, and every one of them did us serious injury before they were destroyed. There were also several gunboats: _Geier_, _Planet_, _Komet_, _Nusa_ and _Eber_, none of which could be ignored. In addition, we expected that the Germans would try to send to sea upwards of forty fast armed merchantmen to prey on commerce. Our arrangements were, however, as has been narrated, successful in preventing all but five from leaving harbour. Of these five the largest, the _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, was sunk by the _Highflyer_ (Captain Buller) on August 26: the _Cap Trafalgar_ was sunk on September 14 by the British armed merchant cruiser _Carmania_ (Captain Noel Grant) after a brilliant action between these two naked ships; and the three others took refuge and were interned in neutral harbours some months later. Our dispositions for preventing a cruiser and commerce-raider attack upon our trade were from the outset very largely successful, and in the few months with which this volume deals, every one of the enemy ships was reduced to complete inactivity, sunk or pinned in port.

Nevertheless, it is a fair criticism that we ought to have had more fast cruisers in foreign waters, and in particular that we ought to have matched every one of the German cruisers with a faster ship as it was our intention to do.[53] The _Karlsruhe_ in the West Indies gave a chance to our hunting vessels at the outbreak of war, and the _Königsberg_ in the Indian Ocean was sighted a few days earlier. But our ships were not fast enough to bring the former to action or keep in close contact with the latter till war was declared. As will be seen, nearly every one of these German cruisers took its prey before being caught, not only of merchant ships but of ships of war. The _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ sank the _Monmouth_ and _Good Hope_, the _Königsberg_ surprised and destroyed the _Pegasus_, and the _Emden_ sank the Russian cruiser _Zemchug_ and the French destroyer _Mousquet_. Certainly they did their duty well.

The keynote of all the Admiralty dispositions at the outbreak of war was to be as strong as possible in home waters in order to fight a decisive battle with the whole German Navy. To this end the foreign stations were cut down to the absolute minimum necessary to face the individual ships abroad in each theatre. The fleet was weak in fast light cruisers and the whole of my administration had been occupied in building as many of them as possible. None, of the _Arethusas_ had, however yet reached the Fleet. We therefore grudged every light cruiser removed from home waters, feeling that the Fleet would be tactically incomplete without its sea cavalry. The principle of first things first, and of concentrating in a decisive theatre against the enemy’s main power, had governed everything, and had led to delay in meeting an important and well-recognised subsidiary requirement. The inconvenience in other parts of the globe had to be faced. It was serious.

Nowhere did this inconvenience show itself more than in the Indian Ocean. After being sighted and making off on the 31st of July, the _Königsberg_ became a serious preoccupation on all movements of troops and trade. Another fast German cruiser, the _Emden_, which on the outbreak of war was on the China station, also appeared in the middle of September in Indian waters, and being handled with enterprise and audacity began to inflict numerous and serious losses upon our mercantile marine. These events produced consequences.

By the end of August we had already collected the bulk of the 7th Division from all the fortresses and garrisons of the Empire. During September the two British Indian divisions with additional cavalry (in all nearly 50,000 men) were already crossing the Indian Ocean. On top of this came the plans for exchanging practically all the British infantry and artillery in India for Territorial batteries and battalions, and the formation of the 27th, 28th and 29th Divisions of regular troops. The New Zealand contingent must be escorted to Australia and there, with 25,000 Australians, await convoys to Europe. Meanwhile the leading troops of the Canadian Army, about 25,000 strong, had to be brought across the Atlantic. All this was of course additional to the main situation in the North Sea and to the continued flow of drafts, reinforcements and supplies across the Channel. Meanwhile the enemy’s Fleet remained intact, waiting, as we might think, its moment to strike; and his cruisers continued to prey upon the seas. To strengthen our cruiser forces we had already armed and commissioned twenty-four liners as auxiliary cruisers, and had armed defensively fifty-four merchantmen. Another forty suitable vessels were in preparation. In order to lighten the strain in the Indian Ocean and to liberate our light cruisers for their proper work of hunting down the enemy, I proposed the employment of our old battleships (_Canopus_ class) as escorts to convoys.

Besides employing these old battleships on convoy, we had also at the end of August sent three others abroad as rallying points for our cruisers in case a German heavy cruiser should break out: thus the _Glory_ was sent to Halifax, the _Albion_ to Gibraltar and the _Canopus_ to the Cape de Verde station. Naval history afforded numerous good examples of the use of a protective battleship to give security and defensive superiority to a cruiser force—to serve, in fact, as a floating fortress round which the faster vessels could manœuvre, and on which they could fall back. These battleships also gave protection to the colliers and supply ships at the various oceanic bases, without which all our cruiser system would have broken down. The reader will see the system further applied as the war advances.

At the beginning of September I decided that the whole convoy system in the Indian Ocean must be put on a regular basis.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson.

_September 5, 1914_.

There is no use in our sending escorts which are weaker than the
enemy’s ship from which attack is to be apprehended. Armed merchant
cruisers can in no case be counted on except as an additional
reinforcement. Single troopships may be escorted by one war vessel, if
that vessel is stronger than the _Königsberg_. No convoys of
transports are to go across the Indian Ocean or Red Sea unless
escorted by at least two war vessels, one of which must be stronger
than the _Königsberg_. In large convoys of over six vessels a third,
and in very large convoys a fourth, warship should be added. Military
needs must give way to the limitations of escort. Six ships, including
the _Fox_, are available; and it ought to be possible to organise
fortnightly if not 12–day convoys from Bombay.

Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, should be directed to submit, by
telegraph, a scheme for such convoys. All transports which may want
convoy must be held over till the next is ready.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.

_September 15, 1914._

In order to accelerate the despatch of the third Division from India
to France, and the seven battalions to German East Africa, it is
proposed that the transports now conveying the Territorial Division to
Egypt shall go on to Bombay. It has also been decided to exchange
thirty-one batteries of [British] Indian regular artillery for service
in Europe with an equal number of Territorial batteries which are to
embark shortly from home. The ships carrying the Territorial batteries
will also go on to Bombay and be available as additional transport.

Please concert these measures with the War Office. It is most
important that these double convoys each way should hit off our
fortnightly escorts which are the governing consideration.

Pray let me have a scheme showing how all this movement can be fitted
in with the greatest speed and smoothness.

W. S. C.

Secretary.
First Sea Lord.
Chief of Staff.
Sir Henry Jackson.

_September 18, 1914._

In addition to the 2 Divisions now coming from India and the
expedition for German East Africa, we must expect the following:—

(_a_) A third Indian Division.

(_b_) 31 batteries of field artillery from India, to be exchanged
for an equal amount of Territorial artillery from home.

(_c_) 39 battalions of British infantry from India, to be exchanged
for an equal number of Territorial battalions from home.

(_d_) As many more Indian troops as India in these circumstances
finds it convenient to despatch.

(_e_) Reinforcements to make good wastage of Indian troops in the
field.

These later movements are not all finally settled and approved, but it
is certain that from now till Christmas we shall require to maintain
regular fortnightly convoys. We cannot delay till then the work of
hunting down _Königsberg_ and _Emden_ by our own fast cruisers, nor
can we keep these vessels employed indefinitely on duties for which
they are unsuited. It is necessary that 3 old battleships, including
_Ocean_ from Gibraltar, should proceed at once to the East Indies
Station to relieve, as they arrive, first _Dartmouth_ and _Chatham_,
and next _Black Prince_. _Minerva_ should go on to India with the
transports she is now escorting to Egypt, and the East Indies convoy
force should be as follows:—

SUEZ: 2 _Majestics_[54] and _Minerva_.

BOMBAY: 1 _Majestic_, _Swiftsure_, and _Fox_.

These escorts should sail every fortnight to exchange transports at
the rendezvous 500 miles east of Aden. Modern ships would be released
for other duties as these came on the spot.

(2) In the Mediterranean the French should be asked to supply 4 old
battleships and 2 old armoured cruisers for convoy duty between
Marseilles and Port Said, and asked to arrange fortnightly sailings
via Malta to fit in with the Indian convoy service. We will escort all
transports from England to Malta at times which will enable the French
convoys to take them up _en route_.

(3) The force at the Dardanelles must be raised to a strength
sufficient to fight the Turco-German fleet. As soon, therefore, as the
French escort becomes available, _Indomitable_ should join
_Indefatigable_. Defence should also be ordered there from Malta.
_Weymouth_ should come home. The four destroyers from the Canal should
rejoin their flotilla at the Dardanelles.

(4) In view of the above, I agree that Fox should remain with the
Indian convoy and that _Dartmouth_ should take the three transports to
Mombassa, afterwards hunting _Königsberg_.

(5) The whole of this should be co-ordinated and worked out into a
regular time-table of sailings, to which the military must adhere,
sending more or less transports, according to their convenience. It
must be clearly understood that no intermediate sailings are possible.

W. S. C.

The position in the Pacific was also complicated.

When I went to the Admiralty at the end of 1911, arrangements were made to form the China squadron of the _Defence_, the _Minotaur_, and an armoured cruiser of the County class. These two first-named ships were in themselves a very satisfactory disposition against the powerful German armoured cruisers, _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_. They were approximately equal to the Germans in modernity, size and speed, but of heavier metal, firing a broadside of 2,520 pounds as against 1,725 pounds of their rivals.

But as time passed and the pressure upon us grew more severe, we had in 1913 to bring one of these ships (_Defence_) back to the Mediterranean. In order to fill the gap with the least possible inroad upon our home strength, Prince Louis being First Sea Lord, we devised a frugal scheme by which the _Triumph_—one of the two battleships which had been built for and bought from Chili to prevent their falling into Russian hands at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War—was made to serve as a depot ship manned on mobilisation from the crews of the river gunboats on the Yangtse and the West River. Her sister (the _Swiftsure_) shortly afterwards became the flagship in the East Indies. These two ships had the good speed for battleships of their date of 20·1 knots. They carried four 10–inch and no less than fourteen 7·5–inch guns. They were not heavily armoured, and according to our ideas they were a compromise between the battleship and the armoured cruiser. Differing in conception at many points from the standard types of the Royal Navy, these vessels did not fit homogeneously into any of our battle squadrons, and were conveniently employed on special duties. Without the _Triumph_ Admiral Jerram’s squadron (_Minotaur_ and _Hampshire_ with the light cruiser _Yarmouth_) would on the outbreak of war have had little or no margin, though the _Minotaur_ was the strongest of all our armoured cruisers. But once the _Triumph_ was mobilised, our superiority, except in speed, was overwhelming, and we could afford to see how greater matters went at home before deciding whether to reinforce the China station or not.

In the first hours of the crisis, my thoughts had turned to the China station. As early as the 28th July I proposed to the First Sea Lord the discreet mobilisation of the _Triumph_ and the concentration of the China squadron upon her; and this was accordingly effected in good time. Five thousand miles to the southward was the Australian squadron, consisting of the battle-cruiser _Australia_, and the two excellent modern light cruisers _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_. The _Australia_ by herself could, of course, defeat the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, though by running different ways one of the pair could have escaped destruction. Our last look round the oceans before the fateful signal, left us therefore in no immediate anxiety about the Pacific.

On the outbreak of war the French armoured cruisers _Montcalm_ and _Dupleix_ and the Russian light cruisers _Askold_ and _Zemchug_, in the Far East, were placed under British command, thus sensibly increasing our predominance. A few days later an event of the greatest importance occurred. The attitude of Japan towards Germany suddenly became one of fierce menace. No clause in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty entitled us to invoke the assistance of Japan. But it became evident before the war had lasted a week that the Japanese nation had not forgotten the circumstances and influences under which they had been forced, at the end of the Chinese War, to quit Port Arthur. They now showed themselves resolved to extirpate all German authority and interests in the Far East. On the 15th, Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany demanding within seven days the unconditional surrender of the German naval base Tsing Tau [Kiaochau], couching this demand in the very phrases in which nineteen years before they had been summoned to leave Port Arthur at the instance of Germany. In reply the German Emperor commanded his servants to resist to the end; and here, as almost in every other place where Germans found themselves isolated in the face of overwhelming force, he was obeyed with constancy.

The advent of Japan into the war enabled us to use our China squadron to better advantage in other theatres. The _Newcastle_ was ordered across the Pacific, where our two old sloops (the _Algerine_ and _Shearwater_) were in jeopardy from the German light cruiser _Leipzig_. The _Triumph_ was sent to participate with a small British contingent in the Japanese attack upon the fortress of Tsing Tau. General arrangements were made by the British and Japanese Admiralties whereby responsibility for the whole of the Northern Pacific, except the Canadian Coast, was assumed by Japan.

The table following sets forth the rival forces in the western Pacific at the outbreak of war. Even without the ships employed by Japan or the great Japanese reserves which lay behind them, the superior strength of the Allies was overwhelming. But the game the two sides had to play was by no means as unequal as it looked. It was indeed the old game of Fox and Geese. The two powerful German cruisers _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, with their two light cruisers, formed a modern squadron fast and formidable in character. Our battle-cruiser _Australia_ could catch them and could fight them single-handed. The _Minotaur_ and the _Hampshire_ could just catch them and, as we held, could fight them with good prospects of success; but it would be a hard fought action. If the _Triumph_ were added to _Minotaur_ and _Hampshire_, there was no risk at all in the fight but almost insuperable difficulty in bringing the enemy to action. Among the light cruisers, the _Yarmouth_, _Melbourne_, _Sydney_ and the Japanese _Chikuma_ could both catch and kill _Emden_ or _Nürnberg_. Of our older light cruisers _Fox_ and _Encounter_ could have fought _Emden_ or _Nürnberg_ with a chance of killing or at least of crippling them before being killed: but neither was fast enough to catch them. Our remaining cruisers could only be used in combination with stronger vessels. With our forces aided by two French and two Russian ships and by the Japanese to the extent which will be described, the Admiralty had to protect all the expeditions, convoys and trade in the Pacific. To wit—

WARSHIPS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC[55]

AUGUST TO OCTOBER, 1914

German. British. Japanese.[56] French. Russian.

Battle-cruisers _Australia_ _Ibuki_
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----
--------- -----

Battleships _Triumph_
-------
-------
-------
-----

Armoured _Scharnhorst_ _Minotaur_ _Montcalm_
Cruisers
----------- -------- --------
----- -------- -----
--------
_Gneisenau_ _Hampshire_ _Dupleix_
--------- --------- -------
--------- -----
-----

Fast Light _Emden_ _Yarmouth_ _Chikuma_
Cruiser
_Nürnberg_ _Melbourne_
_Sydney_
_Philomel_

Older Light _Encounter_ _Askold_
Cruisers
_Pioneer_ _Zemchug_
_Pyramus_
_Psyche_

_Ships on fixed patrolling beats not available for offensive action_:--

Armed Merchant _Prince _Empress of
Cruisers Eitel_ Asia_
_Friedrich_ _Empress of
Japan_
_Cormoran_ _Empress of
Russia_
_Himalaya_

Gunboats _Geier_ _Cadmus_ _Kersaint_
_Clio_ _Zélée_

The New Zealand convoy to Australia.

The Australian and New Zealand convoy from Australia to Europe.

The convoy of the British Far Eastern garrisons to Europe.

The convoy of Indian troops to relieve our Far Eastern garrisons.

The expedition to Samoa.

The expedition to New Guinea.

All these were in addition to the general trade, which continued uninterruptedly.

Admiral von Spee, the German Commander in the Pacific, had therefore no lack of objectives. He had only to hide and to strike. The vastness of the Pacific and its multitude of islands offered him their shelter, and, once he had vanished, who should say where he would reappear? On the other hand, there were considerable checks on his action and a limit, certain though indefinite, to the life of his squadron. With the blockade of Tsing Tau he was cut from his only base on that side of the world. He had no means of docking his ships or executing any serious repairs, whether necessitated by battle or steaming. The wear and tear on modern ships is considerable, and difficulties multiply with every month out of dock. To steam at full speed or at high speed for any length of time on any quest was to use up his life rapidly. He was a cut flower in a vase; fair to see, yet bound to die, and to die very soon if the water was not constantly renewed. Moreover, the process of getting coal was one of extraordinary difficulty and peril. The extensive organisation of the Admiralty kept the closest watch in every port on every ton of coal and every likely collier. The purchase of coal and the movement of a collier were tell-tale traces which might well lay the pursuers on his track. His own safety and his power to embarrass us alike depended upon the uncertainty of his movements. But this uncertainty might be betrayed at any moment by the movement of colliers or by the interception of wireless messages. Yet how could colliers be brought to the necessary rendezvous without wireless messages? There existed in the Pacific only five German wireless stations, Yap, Apia, Nauru, Rabaul, Angaur, all of which were destroyed by us within two months of the outbreak of war. After that there remained only the wireless on board the German ships, with which it was very dangerous to breathe a word into the ether. Such was the situation of Admiral von Spee.

The problem of the Admiralty was also delicate and complex. All our enterprises lay simultaneously under the shadow of a serious potential danger. You could make scare schemes which showed that von Spee might turn up with his whole squadron almost anywhere. On the other hand, we could not possibly be strong enough every day everywhere to meet him. We had, therefore, either to balance probabilities and run risks, or reduce our movements and affairs to very narrow limits. Absolute security meant something very like absolute paralysis; yet fierce would have been the outcry attendant either upon stagnation or disaster. We decided deliberately to carry on our affairs and to take the risk. After all, the oceans were as wide for us as for von Spee. The map of the world in the Admiralty War Room measured 20 feet by 30. Being a seaman’s map, its centre was filled by the greatest mass of water on the globe: the enormous areas of the Pacific filled upwards of 300 square feet. On this map the head of an ordinary veil-pin represented the full view to be obtained from the masts of a ship on a clear day. There was certainly plenty of room for ships to miss one another.

As has been stated, the British China squadron mobilised and concentrated at Hong-Kong, and the Australian Navy at Sydney. Admiral von Spee was at Ponape in the Caroline Islands when Great Britain declared war upon Germany. From Hong-Kong and Sydney to Ponape the distances were each about 2,750 miles. Although Japan had not yet entered the war, the German Admiral did not attempt to return to Kiaochau, as this might have involved immediate battle with the British China Squadron. He proceeded only as far as the Ladrone Islands (German), where the _Emden_ from Kiaochau, escorting his supply ships, met him on August 12. He sent the _Emden_ into the Indian Ocean to prey on commerce and turned himself eastward towards the Marshall Islands. On August 22 he detached the _Nürnberg_ to Honolulu to obtain information and send messages, to cut the cable between Canada and New Zealand, and to rejoin him at Christmas Island on September 8. Here he was in the very centre of the Pacific.

The Admiralty knew nothing of these movements beyond a report that he was coaling at the Caroline Islands on August 9. Thereafter he vanished completely from our view. We could know nothing for certain. The theory of the Admiralty Staff, however, endorsed by Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, who was making a special and profound study of this theatre, was that he would go to the Marshall Islands and thereafter would most probably work across to the west coast of South America, or double the Horn on his way back to Europe. This theory, and the intricate reasoning by which it was supported, proved to be correct. In the main, though we could by no means trust ourselves to it and always expected unpleasant surprises, it was our dominant hypothesis. It is on this basis that the operations in the Pacific should be studied.

As early as August 2 the New Zealand Government—ever in the van of the Empire—had convinced themselves that war was inevitable, and had already made proposals for raising forces and striking at the enemy. The Operations Division of the War Staff proposed in consequence the capture of Samoa and the destruction of the wireless station there; and this was recommended to me by the First Sea Lord and the Chief of the Staff as a feasible operation. By August 8 New Zealand telegraphed that if a naval escort could be furnished the expedition to attack Samoa could start on August 11. The staff concurred in this, holding that the _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_ were adequately covered by the Australian squadron. I assented the same day. It was arranged that the expedition should meet the battle-cruiser _Australia_ and the French cruiser _Montcalm_ at or on the way to Noumea.

Another expedition from Australia to attack German New Guinea had also been organised by the Government of the Commonwealth. The uncertainty about the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ invested all movements in those waters with a certain hazardous delicacy. It was thought, however, that the light cruisers _Melbourne_[57] and _Sydney_ could convoy the Commonwealth New Guinea expedition northward, keeping inside the Barrier Reef, and that before they came out into open waters the New Guinea convoy could be joined by _Australia_ and _Montcalm_, who would by then have completed the escort of the New Zealand expedition to Samoa. We thought it above all things important that these expeditions, once they had landed and taken possession of the German colonies, should be self-sufficing, and that no weak warships should be left in the harbours to support them. Any such vessels, apart from the difficulty of sparing them, would be an easy prey for the two large German cruisers.

Samoa was occupied on the 30th August. The wireless station at Nauru was destroyed on the 10th September. The Australian contingent was picked up by the battle-cruiser _Australia_ on September 9 and arrived at Rabaul safely two days later.

We had now to provide for the Australian convoy to Europe which was due to leave Sydney on September 27 for Port Adelaide, where they would be joined by the New Zealand contingent and its own escort as well as by the ‘Australian Fleet’ (_Australia_, _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_) as soon as they were free from the New Guinea expedition. Our original proposal for the escort of the Australian Army was, therefore, _Australia_, _Sydney_ and _Melbourne_, with the small cruisers from New Zealand. To cover the Commonwealth during the absence of all her Fleet, it was arranged that the _Minotaur_, together with the Japanese _Ibuki_ and _Chikuma_, should come south to New Britain Islands.

In the middle of September the New Zealand contingent was due to sail for Adelaide. The _Australia_ and her consorts were still delayed in New Guinea, where some delay was caused by the German resistance. Great anxiety was felt in New Zealand at the prospect of throwing their contingent across to Australia with no better escort than the two P class cruisers. They pointed out the dangers from the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, which on September 14 had been reported off Samoa. The Admiralty view was that it was most improbable the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ could know of the contemplated New Zealand expedition, still less of the date of its sailing; that in order to deliver an attack in New Zealand waters they would have to steam far from their coaling bases north of the Equator, and would indeed have to be accompanied by their colliers, greatly reducing their speed and hampering their movements. In these circumstances the Admiralty foresaw but little danger to the New Zealand convoy in the first part of their voyage, were unable to provide further protection for this stage, and expressed the opinion that the risk should be accepted. To this decision the New Zealand Government bowed on September 21, and it was settled that the New Zealand convoy should sail on the 25th. Meanwhile, however, renewed exploits by the _Emden_ in the Bay of Bengal created a natural feeling of alarm in the mind of the New Zealand and Australian public; and without prejudice to our original view, we decided to make arrangements to remove these apprehensions.

On the 24th news arrived that the New Guinea expedition had successfully overcome all opposition, and we then determined on the following change of plans, viz. _Minotaur_ and _Ibuki_ to go to Wellington and escort the New Zealanders to Adelaide, while _Australia_ and _Montcalm_, after convoying the auxiliaries and weak warships back from New Guinea to within the shelter of the Barrier Reef, should hunt for the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ in the Marshall Islands, whither it seemed probable they were proceeding. This decision altered the composition of the escort of the Australian convoy, and their protection across the Pacific and Indian Oceans was to an important extent confided to a vessel which flew the war flag of Japan. This historic fact should be an additional bond of goodwill among the friendly and allied nations who dwell in the Pacific.

Meanwhile the depredations of the _Emden_ in the Bay of Bengal continued. On the 22nd she appeared off Madras, bombarded the Burma Company’s oil tanks, and threw a few shells into the town before she was driven off by the batteries. This episode, following on the disturbance of the Calcutta-Colombo trade route and the numerous and almost daily sinkings of merchant ships in the Bay of Bengal, created widespread alarm, and on October 1 I sent the following minute to the First Sea Lord, proposing, _inter alia_, a concentration on a large scale in Indian waters against the _Emden_. This concentration would comprise _Hampshire_, _Yarmouth_, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_, _Chikuma_ (Japan), _Zemchug_ and _Askold_ (Russian), _Psyche_, _Pyramus_ and _Philomel_—a total of ten—and was capable of being fully effective in about a month.

_October 1, 1914._

Secretary.
Chief of Staff.
First Sea Lord.

Three transports, empty but fitted for carrying cavalry, are delayed
in Calcutta through fear of _Emden_. This involves delaying transport
of artillery and part of a cavalry division from Bombay. The Cabinet
took a serious view, and pressed for special convoy. Have you any
ship? I should be very sorry to interrupt the offensive operations
against _Emden_ for the sake of convoying three empty transports. I
was inclined to recommend that the three should put to sea at night
with lights out and steer wide of the track. It is 100 to 1 that they
would get round safely, and a 1,000 to 1 that two out of the three
would get round safely. Let me have your proposals at once. It is
clear that the transports have got to go.[58]

* * * * *

Now that _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ have been located in the
Society Islands there is no need for _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_ to
remain in Australasian waters. _Sydney_ should immediately be ordered
to join _Hampshire_, _Yarmouth_ and _Chikuma_ in the _Emden_ hunt, and
_Melbourne_ should come there with the Australasian convoy. As soon as
_Zemchug_ and _Askold_ have finished with their convoy, they should
return and join _Hampshire_. This will give seven ships searching for
_Emden_ and avoid the necessity of moving one of the three Light
Cruisers now hunting _Königsberg_. Numbers are everything, and the
extirpation of these pests is a most important object.

What is the use of _Psyche_, _Pyramus_ and _Philomel_ in New Zealand
waters after the convoy has started? There is nothing but the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ to be considered, and they are
sufficiently dealt with by—

(1) _Australia._

_Montcalm._

(2) First Japanese Squadron.

(3) Second Japanese Squadron.

On the other hand, these three vessels, together with _Pioneer_, would
be good for searching for _Emden_ in company with the faster and more
powerful ships. I propose, therefore, that they should accompany the
Australian and New Zealand convoys home to Indian waters, and should
then join up with the seven Cruisers which will then be under
_Hampshire_ in hunting _Emden_, making a total of ten vessels
available a month from now. The necessary arrangements to enable them,
in spite of their limited fuel capacity, to get to Colombo can easily
be made. In the event of _Emden_ being captured before this
concentration is complete, all these vessels should be sent to assist
in the hunt for _Königsberg_, or, conversely, if _Königsberg_ is
caught, the three Light Cruisers should turn over to the _Emden_. It
is no use stirring about the oceans with two or three ships. When we
have got Cruiser sweeps of 8 or 10 vessels ten or fifteen miles apart
there will be some good prospect of utilising information as to the
whereabouts of the _Emden_ in such a way as to bring her to action.
Such large and decisive measures are much the cheapest and most
satisfactory in the end.

W. S. C.

And again on October 15.

_Sydney_ should escort Australians and thereafter hunt _Emden_.

This shot as will presently be seen went home.

* * * * *

The press and the public were not in a position to understand all that the Admiralty were doing nor to appreciate the general results achieved. All they saw at this time was that a few German cruisers were apparently doing whatever they chose upon the oceans and sinking British merchantmen day after day. A great deal of discontent began to make itself heard and felt. I therefore prepared a note for publication in the hopes of placating our critics.

_October 24, 1914._

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following statement in regard
to the capture and destruction of British merchant ships by German
warships:—

Eight or nine German cruisers are believed to be at large in the
Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. Searching for these
vessels and working in concert under the various Commanders-in-Chief
are upwards of 70 British (including Australian), Japanese, French,
and Russian cruisers, not including auxiliary cruisers. Among these
are a number of the fastest British cruisers. The vast expanses of sea
and ocean and the many thousand islands of the archipelagos offer an
almost infinite choice of movement to the enemy’s ships. In spite of
every effort to cut off their coal supply, it has hitherto been
maintained by one means or another in the face of increasing
difficulties.

The discovery and destruction of these few enemy cruisers is therefore
largely a matter of time, patience, and good luck. The public should
have confidence that the Commanders-in-Chief and the experienced
captains serving under them are doing all that is possible and taking
the best steps to bring the enemy to action. They have so far been
also occupied in very serious and important convoy duty, but this work
has somewhat lessened and the number of searching cruisers is
continually augmented.

Meanwhile, merchant ships must observe Admiralty instructions, which
it is obviously impossible to specify, and use all the precautions
which have been suggested. On routes where these instructions have
been followed, they have so far proved very effective. On the other
hand, where they have been disregarded captures have been made. The
same vastness of sea which has so far enabled the German cruisers to
avoid capture will protect the trade.

The only alternative to the methods now adopted would be the
marshalling of merchantmen in regular convoys at stated intervals. So
far it has not been thought necessary to hamper trade by enforcing
such a system. The percentage of loss is much less than was reckoned
on before the war. Out of 4,000 British ships engaged in foreign trade
only 39 have been sunk by the enemy, or just under 1 per cent. in all.

The rate of insurance for cargoes, which on the outbreak of war was
fixed at 5 guineas per cent., has now been reduced to 2 guineas per
cent. without injury to the solvency of the fund. For hulls, as apart
from cargoes, the insurance has also been considerably reduced.
Between 8,000 and 9,000 foreign voyages have been undertaken to and
from United Kingdom ports, less than five per thousand of which have
been interfered with, and of these losses a large number have been
caused by merchant vessels taking everything for granted and
proceeding without precautions as if there were no war.

On the other hand, the German oversea trade has practically ceased to
exist. Nearly all their fast ships which could have been used as
auxiliary cruisers were promptly penned into neutral harbours or have
taken refuge in their own. Among the comparatively few German ships
which have put to sea, 133 have been captured, or nearly four times
the number of those lost by the very large British mercantile marine.

In these circumstances, there is no occasion for anxiety and no excuse
for complaint. On the contrary, the more fully the facts concerning
our oversea trade and its protection by the Royal Navy can be
disclosed, and the more attentively they are studied, the greater will
be the confidence and satisfaction with which the situation can be
viewed.

The various changes of plan necessary to meet the natural anxieties of the New Zealand Government entailed a delay of three weeks in the sailing of the Australian convoy. This, Lord Kitchener declared, made no difference, as they could continue their indispensable training equally well in Australia. By October 25, when the convoy was about to sail, the rebellion in South Africa introduced another disturbing element. It was decided by the Cabinet on that date to make arrangements for the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps to come via the Cape instead of via the Suez Canal, so as to be available in South Africa if need be. Alternative arrangements of a complicated nature were therefore prepared. On the 30th, however, in view of later advices from South Africa, it was arranged for the whole convoy to proceed together to Colombo and for the decision about the last part of the route to be delayed until then. The convoy started on November 1 under the escort of the _Minotaur_, _Ibuki_, _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_.

Before they reached Colombo the Sydney found her quarry and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps was more needed in Egypt than at the Cape. But this will appear in its proper place.

* * * * *

It remained to carry the Canadian Army across the Atlantic. Upwards of 25,000 volunteers of a very high individual quality, partially trained in Valcartier camp, were embarked in the St. Lawrence in a convoy of thirty-one ships, to which were added two ships carrying the Newfoundland contingent and a British battalion from Bermuda. Rear-Admiral Wemyss with a squadron of light cruisers was entrusted with the actual duties of escort, but the essential protection of the convoy was secured by far more distant and powerful agencies. All the Cruiser Squadrons of the Grand Fleet were spread in two lines between the coasts of Norway and Scotland to guard against a sortie by the German fast vessels, and the Grand Fleet itself remained at sea in their support to the northward. The North American Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hornby covered the German merchant cruisers which were lurking in New York Harbour. Two old battleships, the _Glory_ and the _Majestic_, were ordered to meet the convoy at a rendezvous well off the beaten track, and Admiral Hornby himself in the _Lancaster_ accompanied them the first portion of the route. Lastly, the _Princess Royal_ was detached from the Grand Fleet to meet the convoy in mid-Atlantic and thus guard against any German battle-cruiser which might conceivably have slipped through the wide areas patrolled by Sir John Jellicoe. The movements of the _Princess Royal_ were kept secret from everybody, and even the Canadian Government, in spite of their natural anxiety, were denied this reassurance.

The convoy sailed on October 3 and ten days later safely approached the mouth of the English Channel. The intention had been to disembark the Canadian troops at Portsmouth, where all arrangements had been made for them. But on the very day they were due to arrive a German submarine was reported off Cherbourg and another was sighted off the Isle of Wight by the Portsmouth Defence Flotilla. On this we insisted, whatever the military inconvenience, on turning the whole convoy into Plymouth. During October 14 this armada bearing the first flower of the martial spirit of Canada was safely berthed in Plymouth Sound.

GENERAL SITUATION OVERSEAS EARLY IN OCTOBER 1914.

The chart includes battleships, battle-cruisers, cruisers, light
cruisers, sloops and armed merchant cruisers.

Armoured vessels are shown in capitals, but otherwise no attempt has
been made to discriminate between classes.

Allied vessels have been included where their presence affects the
situation. They are distinguished by having the initial letter of
their nationality placed after their names.

F. French.
J. Japanese.
R. Russian.
]

With this event, all the initial movements in the Imperial concentration had been completed. They had comprised the transportation of the equivalent of 5 divisions from India to Europe and their replacement by 3 divisions of Territorials from England; the collection of the 7th and 8th divisions from all the garrisons and fortresses of the British Empire with consequential replacements from home and from India; the transportation of approximately two divisions from Canada to England; and lastly—though this was not finished till December—that of approximately two divisions from Australia and New Zealand to Egypt. The effect of this concentration was to add a reinforcement of 5 British regular divisions (7th, 8th, 27th, 28th and 29th) and 2 Anglo-Indian divisions to the regular forces immediately available to support the 6 regular divisions with which we had begun the war, raising our Army in France by the end of November to approximately 13 divisions of highly trained long-service troops. In addition the 4 Canadian and Australian divisions were completing their training in England and Egypt, and were held to be in a more advanced state of preparation than the 10 divisions of Territorials which remained in England or the 24 divisions of the New Armies which Lord Kitchener was raising. The whole business of transportation by sea while all the enemy’s cruisers were still at large had been conducted without accident of any kind or without the loss of a single ship or a single life.