Chapter XVI: Part 16

"In short, when the foreign prince has faithfully fulfilled his engagements towards an unfortunate monarch, when he has done in his defence, or to procure his restoration, all he was obliged to perform in virtue of the alliance, if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned prince cannot require him to support an endless war in his favor, or expect that he will eternally remain the enemy of the nation or of the sovereign who has deprived him of the throne. He must think of peace, abandon the ally, and consider him as having himself abandoned his right through necessity. Thus Louis the Fourteenth was obliged to abandon James the Second, and to acknowledge King William, though he had at first treated him as an usurper.

[Sidenote: Case of defence against subjects.]

[Sidenote: Case where real alliances may be renounced.]

"The same question presents itself in real alliances, and, in general, in all alliances made with the state, and not in particular with a king for the defence of his person. An ally ought, doubtless, to be defended against every invasion, against every foreign violence, _and even against his rebellious subjects: in the same manner a republic ought to be defended against the enterprises of one who attempts to destroy the public liberty_. But it ought to be remembered that an ally of the state or the nation is not its judge. If the nation has deposed its king in form,--if the people of a republic have driven out their magistrates and set themselves at liberty, or acknowledged the authority of an usurper, either expressly or tacitly,--to oppose these domestic regulations, by disputing their justice or validity, would be to interfere in the government of the nation, and to do it an injury. (See § 54, and following, of this Book.) The ally remains the ally of the state, notwithstanding the change that has happened in it. _However, when this change renders the alliance useless, dangerous, or disagreeable, it may renounce it; for it may say, upon a good foundation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the present form of government._

[Sidenote: Not an eternal war.]

"We may say here, what we have said on a personal alliance: however just the cause of that king may be who is driven from the throne either by his subjects or by a foreign usurper, his aides are not obliged to support _an eternal war_ in his favor. After having made ineffectual efforts to restore him, they must at length give peace to their people, and come to an accommodation with the usurper, and for that purpose treat with him as with a lawful sovereign. Louis the Fourteenth, exhausted by a bloody and unsuccessful war, offered at Gertruydenberg to abandon his grandson, whom he had placed on the throne of Spain; and when affairs had changed their appearance, Charles of Austria, the rival of Philip, saw himself, in his turn, abandoned by his allies. They grew weary of exhausting their states in order to give him the possession of a crown which they believed to be his due, but which, to all appearance, they should never be able to procure for him."--Book II. ch. xii. §§ 196, 197.

DANGEROUS POWER.

[Sidenote: All nations may join.]

"It is still easier to prove, that, should this formidable power betray any unjust and ambitious dispositions by doing the least injustice to another, every nation may avail themselves of the occasion, and join their forces to those of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambitious power, and disable it from so easily oppressing its neighbors, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives a nation a right to provide for its future safety by taking away from the violator the means of oppression. It is lawful, and even praiseworthy, to assist those who are oppressed, or unjustly attacked."--Book III. ch. iii. § 45.

SYSTEM OF EUROPE.

[Sidenote: Europe a republic to preserve order and liberty.]

"Europe forms a political system, a body where the whole is connected by the relations and different interests of nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is not, as anciently, a confused heap of detached pieces, each of which thought itself very little concerned in the fate of others, and seldom regarded things which did not immediately relate to it. The continual attention of sovereigns to what is on the carpet, the constant residence of ministers, and _the perpetual negotiations, make Europe a kind of a republic, the members of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common interest, for the maintenance of order and liberty_. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political equilibrium, or balance of power, by which is understood such a disposition of things as no power is able absolutely to predominate or to prescribe laws to others."--Book III. ch. iii. § 47.

"Confederacies would be a sure way of preserving the equilibrium, and supporting the liberty of nations, did all princes thoroughly understand their true interests, and regulate all their steps for the good of the state."--Ibid. § 49.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S COUNTRY.

[Sidenote: To be moderate.]

"Instead of the pillage of the country and defenceless places, a custom has been substituted more humane and more advantageous to the sovereign making war: I mean that of contributions. Whoever carries on _a just war[41] has a right of making the enemy's country contribute to the support of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war_. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the subjects of the enemy, on submitting to this imposition, are secured from pillage, and the country is preserved. But a general who would not sully his reputation is to moderate his contributions, and proportion them to those on whom they are imposed. An excess in this point is not without the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity: if it shows less ferocity than ravage and destruction, it glares with avarice."--Book III. ch. ix. § 165.

ASYLUM.

"If an exile or banished man is driven from his country for any crime, it does _not_ belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to punish him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For Nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of punishing only for their defence and safety (§ 169): whence it follows that he can only be punished by those he has offended.

"But this reason shows, that, if the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed in its own territories, we ought to except from this rule the villains who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all public security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations by trampling under foot the foundations of their common safety. Thus pirates are brought to the gibbet by the first into whose hands they fall. If the sovereign of the country where crimes of that nature have been committed reclaims the authors of them in order to bring them to punishment, they ought to be restored to him, as to one who is _principally_ interested in punishing them in an exemplary manner: and it being proper to convict the guilty, and to try them according to some form of law, this is a _second_ [not sole] reason why malefactors are usually delivered up at the desire of the state where their crimes have been committed."--Book I. ch. xix. §§ 232, 233.

"Every nation has a right of refusing to admit a stranger into the country, when he cannot enter it without putting it in evident danger, or without doing it a remarkable prejudice."[42]--Ibid. § 230.

FOREIGN MINISTERS.

"The obligation does not go so far as to suffer at all times perpetual ministers, who are desirous of residing with a sovereign, though they have nothing to negotiate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the sentiments which nations owe to each other, that these resident ministers, _when there it nothing to be feared from their stay_, should be friendly received; but if there be any solid reason against this, what is for the good of the state ought unquestionably to be preferred: and the foreign sovereign cannot take it amiss, if his minister, who has concluded the affairs of his commission, and has no other affairs to negotiate, be desired to depart.[43] The custom of keeping everywhere ministers continually resident is now so strongly established, that the refusal of a conformity to it would, without _very good reasons_, give offence. These reasons may arise from _particular_ conjunctures; but there are also common reasons always subsisting, and such as relate to _the constitution of a government and the state of a nation_. The republics have often very good reasons of the latter kind to excuse themselves from continually suffering foreign ministers who _corrupt the citizens in order to gain them over to their masters, to the great prejudice of the republic and fomenting of the parties_, &c. And should they only diffuse among a nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous, a taste for luxury, avidity for money, and the manners of courts, these would be more than sufficient for wise and provident rulers to dismiss them."--Book IV. ch. v. § 66.

FOOTNOTES:

[38] This is the case of France:--Semonville at Turin,--Jacobin clubs,--Liegeois meeting,--Flemish meeting,--La Fayette's answer,--Clootz's embassy,--Avignon.

[39] The French acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the people.

[40] By the seventh article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, between France, England, and Holland, signed at the Hague, in the year 1717, it is stipulated, "that, if the kingdoms, countries, or provinces of any of the allies are disturbed by intestine quarrels, or _by rebellions, on account of the said successions_," (the Protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain, and the succession to the throne of France, as settled by the Treaty of Utrecht,) "or _under any other pretext whatever_, the ally thus in trouble shall have full right to demand of his allies the succors above mentioned": that is to say, the same succors as in the case of an invasion from any foreign power,--8,000 foot and 2,000 horse to be furnished by France or England, and 4,000 foot and 1,000 horse by the States-General.

By the fourth article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, between England, France, Holland, and the Emperor of Germany, signed in the year 1718, the contracting powers "promise and oblige themselves that they will and ought to maintain, guaranty, and defend the right of succession in the kingdom of France, according to the tenor of the treaties made at Utrecht the 11th day of April, 1713; ... and this they shall perform _against all persons whosoever who may presume to disturb the order of the said succession_, in contradiction to the previous acts and treaties subsequent thereon."

The above treaties have been revived and confirmed by every subsequent treaty of peace between Great Britain and France.--EDIT.

[41] Contributions raised by the Duke of Brunswick in France. Compare these with the contributions raised by the French in the Netherlands.--EDIT.

[42] The third article of the Treaty of Triple Alliance and the latter part of the fourth article of the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance stipulate, that no kind of refuge or protection shall be given to rebellious subjects of the contracting powers.--EDIT.

[43] Dismission of M. Chauvelin.--EDIT.

END OF VOL. IV.