Chapter III

_Shewing how far human reason is able to judge of the
reasonableness, truth, and certainty of divine revelation._

THE former chapter has plainly shewn, from the state and relation between God and man, that we must be strangers to the true reasons on which a divine revelation is founded, both as to its _time_, _matter_, and _manner_.

But it is here objected, “If God by reason of his own perfections must be thus mysterious and incomprehensible, both in the matter and manner of divine revelation; how can we know what revelations we are to receive as divine? How can we be blamed for rejecting this, or receiving that, if we cannot comprehend the reasons on which every revelation is founded, both as to its matter and manner?”

If a man may be blameable, or commendable, for his right or wrong belief of a God; then a man may be accountable for a right or wrong belief of such matters, as are in their own nature too mysterious for his comprehension. And tho’ a man knows the reasons of a divine revelation, either as to its _matter_ or _manner_, as imperfectly as he knows the divine nature; yet he may be as liable to account for believing _false revelations_, as for _idolatry_; and as full of guilt for rejecting a _true revelation_, as for denying the only _true God_.

_Secondly_, Tho’ we are insufficient for comprehending the _reasons_, on which the particular _matter_ or _manner_ of any divine revelation is founded; yet we may be so far sufficient judges, of the reasons for _receiving_ or not _receiving_ a revelation as divine, as to make our conduct therein justly accountable to God.

For if God can shew a revelation to proceed from him, by the _same undeniable_ evidence, as he shews the _creation_ to be his work; if he can make himself as visible in a _particular extraordinary_ manner, as he is by his _general_ and _ordinary_ providence; then, tho’ we are as unqualified to judge of the mysteries of a _revelation_, as we are to judge of the mysteries in _creation_ and _providence_; yet we may be as fully obliged to receive a revelation, as to acknowledge the creation to be the work of God; and as highly criminal for disbelieving it, as for denying a general providence.

_Adam_, _Noah_, _Abraham_, and _Moses_, were very incompetent judges, of the reasons on which the particular revelations made to them were founded; but this did not hinder their sufficient assurance, that such revelations came from God, because they were proved to come from God in the same manner, as the creation is proved to be the work of God.

And as _Adam_ and _Noah_ must see every thing wonderful, mysterious, and above their comprehensions, in those new worlds into which they were introduced by God; so they could no more expect, that he should require nothing of them, but what they would enjoin themselves, than that their own _frame_, the _nature_ of the creation, the _providence_ of God, or the _state_ of human life, should be exactly as they would have it.

And if their posterity will let no _messages_ from heaven, no _prophesies_ and _miracles_ persuade them, that God can call them to any duties, but such as they must enjoin themselves; or to the belief of any doctrines, but such as their own minds can suggest; nor to any methods of changing their present state of weakness and disorder for a happy immortality, but such as suit their own _taste_, _temper_, and way of reasoning; it is because they are grown senseless of the mysteries of creation and providence with which they are surrounded, and forget the awful prerogative of infinite wisdom, over the weakest, lowest rank of intelligent beings.

* And as we can only know what is worthy of God in creation, by knowing what he has created; so we can no other way know what is worthy of God to be revealed, but by a revelation. And he that pretends independently of any relation, to shew _how_, and in what manner God ought to make a revelation worthy of himself, is as great a _visionary_, as he that should pretend independently of the creation, or without learning any thing from it, to shew how God ought to have proceeded in it, to make it worthy of himself. For as God alone, knows how to create worthy of himself, and nothing can possibly be proved to be worthy to be created by him, but because he has already created it; so God alone knows what is worthy of himself in a revelation, and nothing can possibly be proved worthy to be revealed by him, but because he has already revealed it.

Hence we may see how little this _writer_ is governed by the _reason_ and _nature_ of things, who proceeds upon this as an undeniable principle, that we could not know a revelation to be divine, unless we knew, antecedently to revelation, what God could teach or require of us by it. Thus, says he, “Were we not capable by our own reason of knowing what the divine goodness could command, or forbid his creatures, antecedently to any external revelation, we could not distinguish the true instituted religion, from the _many_ false ones.”¹

¹ Page 66.

Just as wild and visionary, as if it was said, Were we not capable by our reason of knowing what kind or orders of beings God _ought_ to create _independently_ of any thing we learn from the creation, we could never prove this or that creation to proceed from him. Did we not, antecedently to facts and experience, know by our own reason what ought to be the method and manner of divine providence, we could never prove that the providence which governs nations and persons is a divine providence.

Again, He proceeds to shew, that a revelation from God cannot contain any thing, but what human reason can prove from the nature of things; because if God could require any thing more of us, than what our own reason could thus prove, he must require _without_ reason, and then there is an end of all religion.

Now this argument proceeds thus; If God does not act according to the _measure_ of _human_ reason, he cannot act according to _reason itself_. If he requires any more of us, than what we _think_ the nature of things requires of us, then he cannot act according to the nature of things. If his wisdom is in any matters of revelation _greater_ than ours; if it is not in every thing he reveals _measurable_ by ours, it cannot be wisdom at all, much less can it be infinite wisdom.

That is, if he is _more powerful_ than we are, he cannot be _omnipotent_; if he is _more perfect_ than we are, he cannot be _all perfection_; if he acts upon _greater_, or _higher_, or _more_ reasonable motives than we do, he cannot be a _reasonable_ being.

Now if these absurdities are not plain and manifest to every common understanding, it is in vain to dispute about any thing; but if they are, then it is as plain, this writer’s great argument against Christianity, and first principle of his _rational religion_, is in the same state of undeniable absurdity.

Thus says he, “Natural religion takes in all those duties which flow from the reason and the nature of things.”¹ That is, natural religion takes in all those things that bare human reason can discover from the nature of things. This is granted; but what follows? Why, says he, “Consequently, was there an instituted religion which differs from that of nature, its precepts must be arbitrary, as not founded on the nature and reason of things, but depending on mere will and pleasure, otherwise it would be the same with natural religion.”²

¹ Page 114.

² Page 16.

Here you see all the absurdities just mentioned, are ♦expressly contained in this argument, God is all _humour_ and _caprice_, if his revelation is not strictly, in every respect, the same with human reason. That is, he is _without_ wisdom, _without_ reason, if his wisdom and reason exceed ours. He has _no reason_, nor _wisdom_, if his reason and wisdom are _infinite_.

♦ “expresly” replaced with “expressly” for consistency

_Secondly_, This argument, if it were allowed, leads directly to _atheism_. For if a revelation cannot be divine, if it contains any thing mysterious, whose fitness and necessity cannot be explained by human reason, then neither _creation_ nor _providence_ can be proved to be divine, for they are both of them more mysterious than the Christian revelation.

And if every thing is _arbitrary_, whose _fitness and experience_ human reason cannot _prove_ and _explain_, then surely an _invisible over-ruling providence_ that orders all things in a manner, and for reasons, known only to itself; that subjects human life, and human affairs, to what changes it pleases; that confounds the best-laid designs, and makes great effects arise from folly and imprudence; that gives not the race to the swift, nor the battle to the strong; that brings good men into affliction, and makes the wicked prosperous; surely such a providence must be highly arbitrary.

And therefore if this argument is to be admitted, it leads directly to _atheism_, and brings us under a greater necessity of rejecting divine providence, on the account of its mysteries, than of rejecting a revelation that is mysterious in any of its doctrines. And if, God cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he requires any thing of us, that our reason cannot prove to be necessary; surely he cannot be said to deal with us as rational agents, if he over-rules our persons and affairs, and disappoints our counsels, makes weakness prosperous, and wisdom unsuccessful, in a _secret_ and _invisible_ manner, and for reasons and ends that we have no means of knowing.

* There is nothing therefore half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, as there is in that _invisible_ providence, which all must hold that believe a God. And tho’ there is enough plain in providence, to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock of _atheism_ to those, who make their own reason the measure of wisdom.

Again, Tho’ the _creation_ plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God; yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness, human reason cannot comprehend, than are to be found in scripture.

If therefore he reasons right, who says, “If there may be some things in a true religion, whose fitness and expedience we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s laws all of a piece? And if the having of these things is no proof of its falshood, how can any things fit and expedient (which no religion is without) be a proof of the truth of any one religion?”¹ _If, I say, this is the right reasoning, then it may be said_, “If there are things in the creation whose fitness we cannot see, why not others: nay, why not the whole; since that would make God’s works of a piece? And if the being of such things as these in the creation, is not a proof of its not being divine, how can the fitness and expedience of any creation prove that it is the work of God?”

¹ First address to the inhabitants of London, Page 57.

Thus does this argument tend wholly to _atheism_, and concludes with the same force against _creation_ and _providence_, as it does against revelation.

Either therefore there is nothing in the work of the creation, whose fitness and expedience cannot be proved; nothing in God’s providence over whole nations, and particular persons, whose fitness and expedience cannot be explained and justified by human reason, or else neither creation nor providence can be ascribed to God.

The credibility of an external divine revelation with regard to human reason, rests wholly upon _such external_ evidence, as is a sufficient proof of the divine interposition. If there be no such external evidence possible; if God has no ways of acting so _peculiar_ to himself, as to be a _sufficient_ proof to human reason of his action; then no revelation can be sufficiently proved to be a divine, external revelation from God.

I appeal therefore to the miracles and prophecies on which Christianity is founded, as a sufficient proof, that it is a divine revelation. And shall here consider, what is objected against the sufficiency of this kind of proof.

1. It is objected, That miracles cannot prove a _false_, or _bad_ doctrine, to be _true_ and _good_; therefore miracles, _as such_, cannot prove the truth of any revelation.

But though miracles cannot prove false to be true, or bad to be good; yet they may prove, that we ought to receive such doctrines, both as true and good, which we could not know to be true and good without such miracles. Not because the miracles have any influence upon the things revealed, but because they are God’s testimony to the truth of that which he reveals.

But our author brings a farther objection against this use of miracles.

“If, _says he_, evil beings can impress notions in mens minds as strongly as good beings, and cause miracles to be done in confirmation of them; is there any way to know to which of the two, notions thus impressed are owing, but from their internal marks of wisdom and goodness?”

This objection supposes, that no miracles, can be a sufficient proof of the divinity of a revelation; because we do not know the extent of that power, which evil spirits have, of doing miracles. But this objection is groundless. For, granting that we do not know the extent of that power which evil spirits may have; yet if we know _enough_ of it to affirm, that the _creation_ is not the work of evil spirits; if we can securely appeal to the creation, as _a sufficient proof_ of God’s action and ♦operation; then we are secure in appealing to miracles, as a sufficient proof of a divine revelation.

♦ “opperation” replaced with “operation”

For, if the creation must be allowed to be the work of God, notwithstanding any _unknown degree_ of power in evil spirits; if we can as certainly ascribe it to God, as if there were no _such_ spirits; then miracles may be as full a proof of the interposition of God, as if there were no such spirits in being.

I do not ask, Whether the _same divine_ perfection is necessary to foretel such things as are foretold in scripture, and work such miracles as are there related, as is necessary to _create_? I do not ask, Whether any power less than divine can do such things? I only ask, Whether there is any certainty, that the creation is the work of God? Whether we can be sure of the divine operation, from the existence of that creation? Or, Whether we are in _doubt_ or _uncertainty_ about it, because we do not know the _degree_ of power, that may belong to evil spirits.

For if it can be affirmed, that the creation is the work of God, notwithstanding our uncertainty about the degree of power that may belong to evil spirits; then we have the same certainty, that the _prophecies_ and _miracles_ recorded in scripture, are to be ascribed to God, notwithstanding our uncertainty of the power of evil spirits.

For every reason for ascribing the creation to God, is the same reason for ascribing such miracles and prophecies to God; and every argument against the certainty of those miracles and prophecies coming from God, is the same argument against the certainty of the creation’s being the work of God; for there cannot be more or less certainty in one case than in the other.

For, if evil spirits have so the creation in their hands, that by reason of their power over it, no _miracles_ can prove the operation of God, then the operation of God cannot be proved from the creation itself.

For the creation cannot be proved to be the operation of God, unless it can be proved that God _still presides_ over it.

And if _all that_ which is extraordinary and miraculous may be accounted for, without the interposition of God; then nothing that is ordinary and common according to the course of nature, can be a proof of the action of God. For there can be no reason assigned, why that which is _ordinary_ shall be ascribed to God, if all that is, or has been, or can be miraculous, may be ascribed to evil spirits.

Either therefore it must be said, that there are, or may be miracles, which cannot be the effects of evil spirits; or else nothing that is ordinary and common can be a proof of the operation of God. For if nothing miraculous can be an undeniable proof of God’s action, nothing created can be a proof of it.

The matter therefore stands thus: There are, and may be miracles, that cannot be ascribed to evil spirits, without ascribing the creation to them; and which can no more be doubted to come from God, than we can doubt of his being the Creator of the world. There may be miracles therefore, which, are as full a proof of the _truth_ of that which they attest, as the creation is of the _fitness_ of that which is created.

And though the _matter_ of a revelation is to be attended to, that we may fully understand it, and be rightly affected with it; yet the reason of our receiving it, must rest upon that _external authority_, which shews it to be of God.

And the authority of miracles, sufficiently plain and apparent, are of themselves a full reason for receiving a revelation, which both as to its _matter_ and _manner_, would not be approved by us without them.

The history of magical wonders, and extraordinary things done by evil spirits, is no objection against the sufficiency of that proof, that arises from miracles. For the question is not, whether nothing that is extraordinary can be done by evil spirits, but whether nothing that is miraculous can, be a proof of its being done by God. For these two cases are very consistent. It may be very possible for evil spirits, to do things extraordinary in _some circumstances_, as ♦where people enter into contracts with them, and resign themselves up to their power, and yet that miracle may in _other circumstances_, be a sufficient proof of their being done by God.

♦ “were” replaced with “where”

And as miracles are the highest and most undeniable evidence of the truth and divinity of any external revelation; so Christianity stands fully distinguished from all other religions, by the highest and most undeniable evidences; since it has all the proof that the _highest state_ of miracles can give, and every other religion is without any support from them.

And though this writer, with a boldness worthy of himself, often puts all _traditional religion_ upon a level; yet he might have shewn himself as much a friend to truth as sobriety, by asserting, that all _arguments_ are equally conclusive, all _tempers_ equally virtuous, all _designs_ equally honest, and all _histories_ and _fables_ equally supported by evidences of fact.

To give you one instance more of this writer’s extravagant and inconsistent notions.

He makes _reason_, or _natural religion_, to be God’s _internal revelation_, differing _only_ from _external revelation in the manner of its being communicated_. He rejects _external revelation_ as unworthy of God, because it has not been sufficiently made known at _all times_, and in _all places_; yet he sets up an internal revelation, as worthy of God, which has never been made known to any _one man_ of any _time_ or _place_ in the world. For what one man ever knew that _reason_ was God’s _internal revelation_, to which nothing could be added by any external revelation?

It is a mighty complaint with our author against Christianity, that so much happiness should be deferred till the time of _Tiberius_, and that it should be communicated to no greater a part of the world, than Christianity hath been. But is not this a _judicious_ complaint in the mouth of a person, that is setting up a religion, that has been communicated to no body but himself.

I know nothing that can be said for our author, in excuse of so much confusion and self-contradiction, unless it be the particular hardships of his _sect_. The _free-thinking few_, he says, _are forced into an outward compliance_; and that which _forces_ a man into a state of hypocrisy, may force him into a great deal of confusion and self-contradiction.

To return: I have from a consideration of the state of man, and the several relations which God stands in towards his creatures, shewn that it is utterly impossible for human reason to be a competent judge of the fitness, or unfitness, of all that God may, or may not require of us. The two following chapters shall state the nature and perfection of reason, as it is a faculty, or principle of action in human nature.