Chapter V: The Palestine Detachment

I.

While the tanks of the 1st Brigade were fighting in mud and snow at Arras, climatic problems of a very different type confronted a little detachment of the Heavy Section nearer the Equator. After the Somme it was decided to send a company of twelve tanks to Egypt to assist in the advance on Syria.[14] Major Nutt, of E Company, who had been in Egypt before with the armoured cars, was given the command. E Company also supplied most of the personnel. The total combatant strength was 22 officers and 226 other ranks; while there was a workshop section provided with two 120-h.p. Holt tractors, a number of sponson trolleys and workshop trailers, two lorries, and the necessary complement of spare parts. The detachment, in spite of its diminutive size, would have to be self-supporting. It left Thetford in December 1916, the personnel sailing from Devonport, and the tanks and workshops from Avonmouth a week later. An extraordinary and inexcusable error signalised the embarkation. Instead of twelve Mark II.’s, fresh from the makers, eight old training machines, which had been in use for months and were due to proceed to the new camp in Dorset, were shipped at Avonmouth, while the Egyptian detachment’s tanks were on their way to Bovington! Before the Admiralty could be informed of the mistake, tons of cargo, including heavy guns, had been lowered on top of the changelings in the ship, and then permission to unload the latter was refused. The company, therefore, on its arrival in Egypt in January, found itself with only two-thirds of its establishment of tanks, and those not even new. Some of them, indeed, were nearly worn out, and all were dirty; and the Thetford mud, baked hard by a month in a ship’s hold close to the engine-room, had to be chipped out of the tracks with chisels. It was a week or more before some of the machines could be moved at all.

The secrecy which, in theory, shrouded their coming was so fallacious that within six weeks photographs of them were found on a captured Bedouin. This in itself was a small matter; but it was a pity that the demonstrations carried out on the desert at Gilban, which advertised to all and sundry the fact of the tanks’ arrival, were not devoted to a better purpose than the satisfaction of the natural curiosity of General officers and their staffs. No infantry took part in these displays. Only after the second battle of Gaza were combined rehearsals by the two arms instituted as a regular feature of training. Nevertheless, the army in Egypt seems to have realised far sooner than the army in France that without co-operation founded on mutual familiarity with each others’ tactics and limitations, tanks and infantry would never work together to the best advantage. In Egypt also there was from the start less of the jealousy and obstruction which hampered the heavy branch nearer home. The isolation of the detachment put it to some extent out of reach of meddling interference, and enabled it to solve its peculiar problems in its own way.

When the detachment arrived Sir Archibald Murray was already across the Sinai desert and had reached the Egyptian frontier. While the railway was being pushed up behind him along the coast to El Arish and Rafa, the Turkish Army commanded by the German General von Kressenstein withdrew to a prepared position in front of Gaza. This position we attacked on 26th March, but a dense sea-fog at dawn upset the time-table, and after suffering 4000 casualties, such ground as we had gained was abandoned under pressure of heavy counter-attacks and a threat against our flank by reinforcements from Beersheba. The tank detachment, rushed up at a few hours’ notice on Egyptian 30-ton trucks to take part in these operations, was delayed at El Arish, and it detrained at Khan Yunus, fifteen miles south-west of Gaza, only to find the battle over. At Khan Yunus it remained for ten days. On 6th April the tanks trekked for eight miles across soft sand to Deir-el-Belah, nearer to the line, preparatory to the second assault on the Gaza position.

Gaza, a city of great age, acquainted with numerous battles and sieges, stands amid vast fig-groves about two miles from the sea-shore, on the old coast-road from Egypt to Syria. The Turkish position, defended now by five infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and numerous batteries--in all, perhaps 30,000 men--was one of great natural strength, as we had discovered in March. Since our first attack miles of new trenches had been dug and the whole front was very heavily wired. It stretched from Sheikh Hassan, among the sand-dunes on the coast, by El Arish Redoubt and Samson’s Ridge, to the Cairo road two miles south of Gaza, and thence south-east along a series of hills to the Atawineh Ridge. Within this line was the strongly fortified Ali Muntar Ridge, immediately in front of Gaza. Detachments of cavalry and infantry at Hereira, sixteen miles from the coast, protected the left flank. The hills, seamed with gullies and old water-courses, where infantry and machine-guns found perfect cover, were admirably adapted to defence, and the trenches, under German supervision, had been skilfully sited.

Sir Archibald Murray had four Territorial infantry divisions, the 52nd, 53rd, 54th, and 74th (dismounted Yeomanry), two mounted divisions, and the Camel Corps. His line of communications was a single railway track running for 150 miles across the Sinai Desert. Everything the army needed, even water, came by this line out of Egypt.

The plan of the second attack on Gaza fell into two phases, divided by an interval of forty-eight hours. In the first phase, while a desert column attended to the Turkish left at Hereira, three infantry divisions and the tank detachment were to carry the Sheikh Abbas and Mansura Ridges, east of the Cairo road. The attack was fixed for dawn on April 17th. After dusk on the 15th, the eight tanks trekked northward again from Deir-el-Belah, and before daybreak had reached their final lying-up positions along a dry water-course called the Wadi Ghuzze, which ran parallel to our front line. By this time, after three months’ experience in Egypt and Syria, all steps possible under the circumstances had been taken to cope with the novel conditions attending tank operations over sand. It was found, for example, that the ordinary process of soaking the track links and rollers in oil produced in the desert a perfect grinding mixture which wore out very rapidly the driving sprockets. All such lubrication, therefore, was abandoned. The tracks were run absolutely dry, and with satisfactory results; for although the sprocket wheels were of the early soft-steel type, they seem to have endured longer under these arid conditions than in the mud of European battlefields. While the mud stuck everywhere, and brought with it grit and stones which induced friction, sand merely ran out of the tracks like water. From every point of view, indeed, once this and a few other modifications of treatment and mechanism had been introduced, the tanks showed a surprising aptitude for desert warfare. Ditching was almost unknown: the sand ran away from under the belly of the machine, while the tracks, with their broad bearing surface, compressed it and got a grip; and for similar reasons the steepest sand-dunes and hills were climbed with ease and at any angle. The chief troubles were the heat and the difficulty of obtaining water, and these were felt by every other arm, although, at least as regards the former, not so severely. On account of the heat no movement of tanks, save in battle or some other exceptional circumstance, took place after eight o’clock in the morning.

Six tanks were detailed for the first phase of the battle. Four, if required, were to assist the 52nd Division in the capture of the Mansura Ridge. These advanced behind the assaulting infantry up the Wadi el Nukhabir, a gully with high banks affording perfect cover which ran, like a huge communication trench, downward from the ridge to the Wadi Ghuzze. The tanks were not needed, however, for the enemy, taken by surprise owing to the absence of any artillery preparation beyond the ordinary counter-battery work, fled in confusion from the ridge, which was in possession of the 157th Brigade soon after six o’clock. Meanwhile, on the right, the other two tanks had led the troops of the 54th Division toward Sheikh Abbas Ridge. Here also the Turks were surprised, but they put up a stouter resistance than their fellows on Mansura. The tanks, lacking such a covered approach as the big gully on the left provided, came under observation soon after dawn, before they had reached the enemy’s trenches, and one soon received a direct hit. Two of the crew were killed, and the officer lost an eye from a splinter. The hostile guns now concentrated on the derelict machine, which, after it had been abandoned, was hit again and again, set on fire and destroyed. The second tank, however, was able to carry out its task of clearing the trenches to the north and north-west of the ridge, giving the infantry valuable help. When the position was consolidated the tank returned and rallied in the Wadi el Nukhabir, having covered in all some 15,000 yards from the time it crossed the Wadi Ghuzze to its return. The crew, who had been in the tank for fourteen hours, were completely exhausted. In such conditions of heat as they suffered, their gallantry and endurance were remarkable.

The second phase of the battle, which opened at 5.30 A.M. on the 19th, was designed to capture the final positions covering Gaza--namely, El Arish Redoubt and Samson’s Ridge, between the sea and the Cairo road, and the Ali Muntar Ridge with its foot-hills to the south and south-east of the city. From left to right the divisions and tanks employed were as follows: 53rd Division (two tanks), 52nd (four tanks), 54th (one tank). To the right of the 54th, mounted divisions were to carry out subsidiary operations as before against the Turkish left. The French battleship _Réquin_ and two British monitors assisted from the sea.

The forty-eight hours’ interval between our attacks, however unavoidable, was unfortunate. The Turks, to some extent demoralised on the 17th, had time to recover themselves again, and their main position on Ali Muntar was one of exceptional strength. This ridge, ten or more miles in length, is an attenuated spine of sandy hills, covered with cactus scrub, which runs parallel to the coast just east of Gaza. It forms roughly a right angle with the Mansura heights farther to the east. Its loftiest crest, 265 feet above the sea, looks down on the city from south of the Beersheba road. From this point the spine falls away southward, by successive narrow hillocks known to us as Outpost Hill, Lees Hill, Queen’s Hill, Kurd Hill, and so on, to the valley of the Wadi Ghuzze. Two thousand yards west of the ridge, and also parallel to it, is the Cairo road, beyond which Samson’s Ridge rises fairly steeply to a height of 200 feet before descending to the low sea-cliffs at Sheikh Ajlin. From Samson’s Ridge the Turkish trenches ran north-east by El Arish Redoubt up the coast to Sheikh Hassan. These seaward trenches were the objectives of the 53rd Division on the left, with whose operations we will deal first.

For the whole of this battle I will paraphrase or quote textually the official report on operations drawn up by Major O. A. Forsyth-Major, second in command of the tank detachment, who writes as follows of the events on the 53rd Division’s front. (Italics and interpolations in brackets are my own.)

“Of the two tanks allotted to this division, one broke a track
soon after going into action and remained _hors de combat_ for
the ensuing operations. The other tank, the ‘Tiger,’ therefore
undertook the advance alone, and proceeded (in front of the
infantry) across the sand-dunes to Samson Ridge, where it
captured the redoubts, awaited the infantry’s arrival, and
thence advanced to attack El Arish Redoubt, being all this
time under concentrated enemy machine-gun fire. Having reached
this second objective, the tank was unable to swing, and the
officer in command, receiving no support whatsoever from the
infantry, which advanced no farther, owing to the changed
tactical situation occurring in the centre of the general
attack, returned over the sand-dunes _in reverse_ under shell
and machine-gun fire till it reached a point near Regent’s
Park (upwards of 5000 yards S.W. of El Arish), having fired
_27,000 rounds_ of ammunition during this action. All the
crew, including the officer, were wounded, and all, except
the officer, who took the driver’s place, were in a state of
complete collapse as a result of six hours’ continuous strain
under heavy fire.”

Further advance on this flank had been postponed owing to the failure in the centre, where the 52nd Division, with four tanks, was to advance from Mansura Ridge against Outpost Hill, the strong-point known as the Labyrinth, and Ali Muntar itself. The tanks were ready, and their routes taped to avoid the gullies which abounded, when, at the last moment, the G.O.C. 52nd Division cancelled their orders. They were now told to move from Mansura Ridge to the foot of Kurd Hill, 3000 yards to the westward, and there await further orders. “It was pointed out to the G.S.O.I.,” says the report, “that such a move in complete darkness over unknown country might result in the tanks disappearing into the deep gullies which intersected the suggested route, and that even if the tanks reached Kurd Hill, it was highly impracticable to attack positions which had never been observed in daylight and over ground which had not been reconnoitred by the tank personnel.” The G.S.O.I. was obdurate, however, and at 9 P.M. the four tanks started. In the pitchy darkness which prevailed the cross-country route was considered too risky, and accordingly they moved by the Wadi Nukhabir and the Wadi Ghuzze--in other words, round three sides of a square. They did not reach Kurd Hill until 2 A.M., zero being at 6.30. As the officers were entirely ignorant as to what they were expected to do four hours later, they had the temerity to arouse the G.O.C. 155th Brigade from his sleep, but as he felt disinclined to discuss matters at that early hour, they were told that all necessary instructions would be issued at 5.30 A.M. At six o’clock no instructions had been received: a subaltern came from the brigade, however, to point out the route to the infantry starting-point. Without waiting any longer, the tanks moved forward to this line, reaching it just as the barrage fell at zero and the enemy began to reply. No further orders of any kind had arrived, and the second in command of the detachment spent the next hour galloping about under fire, collecting information from the infantry, and by these haphazard means determining what the tanks were expected to do. Two of them, it appeared, were to remain in reserve at Kurd Hill. Of the other pair, one was to help in the assault on Lees and Outpost Hills. This tank, however, fell into a gully whose sides collapsed, and did not get into action. The remaining machine, having been assigned an objective on Ali Muntar, was recalled to Outpost Hill owing to the breakdown of the tank on its left. It climbed the hill, killed a number of Turks in the trenches there, and was still waiting for the infantry when it was disabled by a direct hit. The infantry being unable to advance, one of the reserve tanks was summoned; but although, after repeated attempts and murderous losses, the crest at length was gained, it could not be held; and our line eventually fell back to its original position on Queen’s Hill. The first tank, lying derelict in the Turkish trenches, had already been abandoned by its crew. The second returned in safety to its companion in reserve.

_By permission of_ Major O. A. FORSYTH-MAJOR.

Tank on Outpost Hill, Gaza.]

The report gives the following account of the loss of the remaining tank, in action with the 54th Division on the right:--

“To the tank operating on this front had been assigned the
capture of the large redoubt north-west of Khirbet Sihan
(north of the Sheikh Abbas Ridge on the Beersheba road). As
instructions to this effect had only reached the tank commander
during the previous night, he was likewise confronted with
the task of attacking an unfamiliar objective over unfamiliar
ground. However, this tank finally reached the redoubt in
question and captured its Turkish garrison. Our infantry
then arrived and consolidated the new position. The tank had
no sooner swung round to return to its rallying-point at
Abbas, when a shell struck one of its tracks, whereupon it
was subjected to a systematic bombardment. The enemy then
counter-attacked and captured the British infantry and tank.
The commander and several members of the crew had meanwhile
been severely wounded. The officer and one other rank
subsequently died of wounds in a Turkish hospital.”

Except for a modified success on the left, the attack, although pressed with extreme gallantry, had definitely failed. Sir Archibald Murray wished to renew it the following morning, but was dissuaded from making the attempt. With no superiority of numbers in the beginning, we had lost 12,000 men: every one was exhausted: we were short of water; and the Ali Muntar position, notwithstanding a bombardment by heavy guns of every calibre, including those of the _Réquin_ and the 11-inch pieces on the monitors, seemed little damaged, and plainly was impregnable to a frontal assault with the means at our disposal. The army, therefore, settled down on the ground it occupied at the close of the fighting. For the next six months no further attempt was made to capture Gaza.

The tank detachment, after withdrawing across the Wadi Ghuzze to some fig-groves west of Sheikh Nebhan, returned eventually to its old quarters near Deir-el-Belah railhead. Its proportionate losses had been heavy. Twenty-eight officers and men were killed, wounded, or missing--40 per cent of the total engaged. Three tanks out of eight were permanently disabled or lost. The report which I have used so freely already concludes with some general observations on the work of tanks in the battle. This work was fully appreciated by the infantry, who “generously attributed their own success to the opportunities created by the tanks.” The three divisional commanders also expressed their admiration. That some of the fleeting openings made by the tanks were not promptly seized “was less due to lack of initiative on the part of infantry leaders than to the wholly unexpected intensity of the enemy’s well-directed fire.” At the same time, further co-operative training was shown to be very necessary. Reference, of course, is made to the faulty staff work through which, on 19th April, the centre section was left without any instructions after its original orders had been cancelled at the eleventh hour. It is pointed out also (although this perhaps was unavoidable) that the task allotted to the tanks was far too ambitious for their numbers. The eight operated on a five-mile front, where thirty or forty would not have been too many. The successful assembly prior to zero was held to prove that “tanks which are properly looked after by competent crews need not necessarily be placed in forward positions,” as they can be trusted (accidents apart) to accomplish up to time final approach-marches of considerable length. And this brings us to what were, perhaps, the most notable features of the operations--the actual distances covered by these obsolete and worn-out machines and the absence of any mechanical breakdowns. In both respects the work of the little detachment compares very favourably indeed with that performed by the larger units in France. Some of the tanks travelled forty miles and fought two actions between the time they left Deir-el-Belah on the 15th and their final withdrawal behind the Wadi Ghuzze five days later; and every machine which left England got into action, or was ready to do so, on zero morning. Such efficiency is a high testimonial to the labours of the commanding officer and his combatant and engineering personnel.

II.

It will be convenient, at the expense of strict chronological sequence, to carry the story of the Palestine detachment to its conclusion in one chapter. Six months supervened between the second and third battles of Gaza. During this period our dispositions were readjusted, reinforcements arrived (including French, Italian, Indian, and West Indian details), and Sir Archibald Murray having returned home, Sir Edmund Allenby came from the 3rd Army in France to take over the command. The surviving tanks, meanwhile, were overhauled and provided with some especial roller-sprockets, constructed in the workshops of the Egyptian State Railways. Requests for more and newer tanks had been sent to England; but the only reinforcement received consisted of three Mark IV.’s. One or more others of this type, together with a supply of much-needed spare parts for the original Mark I.’s, were lost in a torpedoed transport.

Towards the end of the autumn preparations for a renewed attempt on Gaza had reached completion. Our line in front of the city still ran where the second battle had left it--from Sheikh Ajlin, on the coast, by Samson’s Ridge and the Mansura and Abbas Ridges, down to the Wadi Ghuzze, and thence to the new railhead at Shellal on the right. The Turkish defences on Ali Muntar had been strengthened still further; and now that our increased forces permitted us to choose, it was decided to avoid the hazards of another frontal assault. Instead, while the enemy’s centre was kept employed with demonstrations, the main attacks were to develop between Hereira and Beersheba and on the western flank, from Gaza to the sea. The whole area of operations extended over forty miles. “The Australian Corps and desert column were responsible for the operations from Beersheba north-westwards to Hereira. Numerous mounted and dismounted divisions were entrusted with the frontage from and around Hereira towards Gaza, while a composite force of French, Italian, and West Indian troops were assigned the task of executing minor raids near Outpost Hill. The operations around Gaza were entrusted to the 21st Army Corps, which began to make the necessary preparations for a general assault on the defences between Umbrella Hill (north of Samson’s Ridge) and the sea.”[15] This was to be the main attack, with its left resting on the coast and its right on the Cairo road. In the second phase of the last battle our only permanent success had been won on this flank; and our extreme left at Sheikh Ajlin was due west of Gaza. The general line of the assault therefore was north-eastward, with the idea of so far enveloping the city as to threaten its communications from the north. The distance from the Cairo road to the sea was less than 5000 yards; and the initial penetration aimed at was moderate--two miles up the coast on the extreme left, and elsewhere an average of a mile. For this narrow frontage and depth of attack four infantry brigades were available (the whole 54th Division and one brigade of the 52nd), assisted by an Indian cavalry division, the 54th Divisional Artillery, a machine-gun company, and the tank detachment of eight machines. (The presence of a number of anti-tank guns of 1¹⁄₂-inch calibre about Green and Outpost Hills led to the tank operations being confined to the left sector.) The Navy again was to co-operate from the sea. The whole area over which this advance was to take place was a wilderness of sand-dunes, covered here and there with coarse grass and cactus, and rising in places to a height of 150 feet.

There had been ample time on this occasion for reconnaissance and other preliminaries. All tank commanders and N.C.O.’s surveyed the enemy’s position both from the land and from a drifter off the coast. In addition to combined rehearsals by tanks and infantry already carried out during the summer, “officers and other ranks of the tank detachment and the various infantry brigades with whom they were to work were attached to each other for ten days in order personally to get to know each other and study the characteristics of the other’s particular arm.” _O si sic omnes!_ An adequate supply of large-scale maps and aeroplane photographs was provided by the 21st Corps “I,” together with a barrage table and map for every tank commander. Each tank was to carry two pigeons, to be released at pre-arranged points; and also a ton of R.E. supplies and ammunition for the infantry. The whole question of supply was a serious one, as the only roads behind our line in this coastal area were constructed by the simple process of laying down wire-netting on the sand, which provided a surface suitable for marching infantry or even light cars, but of no use for heavy vehicles. The detachment workshops rendered a signal service by improvising a number of tractor trucks out of old track-plates, driving sprockets, and iron girders. The necessary dumps of oil and ammunition were then formed near Sheikh Ajlin, lorries and tractors conveying the material thither after dark by way of the beach. Finally, as the attack itself was due to start in the night-time, the tanks were variously camouflaged to suit the conditions amid which they might expect to find themselves at dawn. Two were daubed with different colours, and another pair were painted white and splashed with sand, while the remaining four were disguised with imitation cactus.

As little as possible had been left to chance; and I have enumerated the main features of this preparatory work both on account of its thoroughness and forethought, and because it is a characteristic example of the preliminaries to a tank action. Before such an action there are always a hundred odd things of this kind to be seen to; and in this case, unlike some others nearer home, they were seen to. The labour expended over them was fully justified in the results.

The coming attack was divided into four phases, known on the map as the Blue, Red, Green, and Yellow--a polychromatic scale which was to proceed in succession from the south. The first or Blue phase was concerned with the capture of Umbrella Hill, and was to start an hour before midnight on 1st November. This was a distinct operation, to be accomplished by the 156th Brigade without the help of tanks. At 3 o’clock in the morning a second zero would launch the second and subsequent phases, constituting the main attack, the final or Yellow phase pushing our left flank two miles up the coast to Sheikh Hassan, north-west of Gaza. The tanks were allotted as follows: one with the 156th Brigade on the right, one with the 163rd in the centre, and four with the 161st and 162nd on the left. Two in reserve were to follow up 1000 yards in rear and replace any disabled machines.

The detachment trekked from Deir-el-Belah to Sheikh Ajlin on the night of 22nd October. On the last day of the month routes were taped to the assembly positions selected for the battle. The following evening, as the roar of the first zero broke out on the right, the tanks moved forward under a full moon and reached these positions at 1.30 A.M. At 2.15 the six detailed to lead crept away again, and, passing through the infantry starting line, drew up a couple of hundred yards ahead in No Man’s Land. All were in position half an hour before the second zero. In the meantime, under cover of a heavy barrage, Umbrella Hill had been carried and the Blue phase was over. The enemy, anticipating a general attack, at first retaliated by shelling violently the whole of our front line; and the tanks experienced an unpleasant half-hour while moving toward their assembly posts. None, fortunately, were hit. As we made no further movement, the Turkish gunners presently concentrated their fire on the captured hill, and about 2 o’clock, misled by the continued quiet, ceased altogether. An hour later they were disillusioned when our main barrage crashed down upon their whole line, and tanks and infantry went forward under its cover.

A thick mist had risen, which, with the smoke of the barrage, completely obscured the moon, upon whose light we had been counting. The tanks, however, advancing on compass-bearings, successfully reached their first objectives within three minutes, well ahead of the infantry. In the prevailing gloom some of the latter lost direction almost at once; and a tank officer, observing from a point called Windy Post, on our front line, collected some hundreds of men of one battalion and directed them to their objective. The first Turkish line, nevertheless, was carried without difficulty, the attack coming as a complete surprise. Behind the creeping barrage the tanks and infantry pressed on; and although the two brigades in the centre met with stiff opposition on the second line, and lost ground before a succession of counter-attacks, on both flanks, and especially on the all-important left, everything went more or less according to programme. By 6 o’clock the 162nd Brigade had consolidated its final objective at Sheikh Hassan. On the right El Arish Redoubt had at last been captured, and our troops were on the edge of the fig-groves which shelter Gaza to the south-west.

The tanks had done all, and more than all, that was expected of them. On the right two had helped in the taking of El Arish. It was still dark when they pushed on into the maze of trenches beyond, and both became ditched, one eventually being disabled by a shell. The crews took out their machine-guns and joined the infantry. Numbers 3 and 4, next on the left, working with the 161st Brigade, attacked and carried with the latter the Rafa Redoubt and the trenches to the north-west. Owing to the mist they had great difficulty in reaching their further objectives, and finding that the infantry had been unable to advance beyond the redoubt, they returned to the rallying-point, having deposited their spare ammunition and R.E. stores. Number 5 broke a track at Beach Post, its first objective, and was unable to assist in the next phase. On the extreme left Number 6 had a varied and exciting career. To quote from the report, it “captured Sea Post (close to the beach), moved along the enemy’s trench line, crushing the wire as far as Beach Post, turned north and attacked Cricket Redoubt, then proceeded to Gun Hill and Tortoise Hill, both of which positions it subjected to 6-pounder and machine-gun fire, and finally reached Sheikh Hassan, where it deposited its load of R.E. stores. Thence it descended to the beach and endeavoured to attack A5 (a Turkish strong-point on the coast beyond our farthest objective), but in scaling the cliff broke a track. The crew removed all machine-guns, rendered the engine useless, removed the 6-pounder wedges, and retired to Sheikh Hassan, where they reported to the infantry commander.” As the abandoned tank was several hundred yards in advance of our front, the enemy was able during the ensuing night to creep up and place a charge beneath it, the explosion of which, in addition to effecting other damage, bent the crank-shaft. When, after the retreat of the Turkish Army a few days later, it was possible to move the machine, it was found necessary to remove the engine and tow the hull back to Deir-el-Belah.

In the meantime the reserve tanks, Numbers 7 and 8, had come into action. At 4 A.M. they received orders to support the infantry on the right, beyond El Arish redoubt. Both tanks were loaded with R.E. material, and, unfortunately, were carrying empty sandbags on the roof. Number 7 was set on fire from this cause as it reached its first objective, east of the captured redoubt. While it was attempting to return to shelter, the tracks jumped and broke the switches, and the tank was left ablaze between the lines. Number 8 also caught fire. It was now broad daylight, and the tank was in view of the enemy, who proceeded to shell it; but being screened to some extent by vegetation, with which its own camouflage blended, it was never hit.

By 8 o’clock, three tanks had rallied at Sheikh Ajlin, and a fourth returned three hours later. During the battle some machines had been in action for five hours, and had covered upwards of 10,000 yards; but the casualties in personnel were extraordinarily light, only one man being killed and two wounded. At this trifling cost the tank detachment had helped materially to place our left flank in such a position that the Turkish Army around Gaza was seriously endangered. On the right, progress had been made also, and the double threat was enough. Within a few days the enemy evacuated the city and the position he had held so long, and retreated toward Jaffa and Jerusalem.

With the third battle of Gaza the work of the tanks in Palestine came to a fitting end. Although most of the machines were soon prepared for action again, all were manifestly worn out, and it was felt that they would be of little use in the limestone hills of Judah, amid which the army was now advancing. On the other hand, the need was felt for some light and swift machine to help the mounted columns in the desert area; and to this end Major Nutt and the second in command were sent to France early in 1918 to ask for a detachment of the new Medium A’s, or Whippets, which were then lying idle. The arrival of this mission at Bermicourt, however, coincided with the great German offensive on 21st March. In the strain consequent upon that blow, and the others which followed it, not a Whippet could be spared. The two officers returned to Syria, and after further consideration it was decided to disband the detachment. The tanks were handed in to the ordnance depot at Alexandria, where probably they still remain, while the personnel returned to England.

I have gone at some length into these oriental adventures for various reasons. One of the chief, perhaps, was the pleasure to be gained in working from a narrative so lucid and well arranged as the official “Report on Operations,” &c., which I have used with such freedom. This may not be a good reason for discursiveness, but after exhausting struggles with the loose jumble of irrelevancies and misstatements which constitute the normal unit history, much may be forgiven. And, indeed, the Palestine detachment has other and far better claims to a resurrection from the obscurity in which its accomplishments have lain hidden. There is no need to labour those claims again here. They speak for themselves in the energy and courage, the foresight, adaptability, and fertility of invention which overcame all the obstacles that a strange country and climate could add to an initial poverty of means.