Chapter XII: The Essentials in the Struggle (8)

This growth of Southern opinion is clearly to be followed in the newspapers and pamphlets of the day, in Congress, and in many significant movements. The Charleston _Standard_ in a series of articles strongly advocated the reopening of the trade; the Richmond _Examiner_, though opposing the scheme as a Virginia paper should, was brought to "acknowledge that the laws which condemn the Slave-trade imply an aspersion upon the character of the South.[14] In March, 1859, the _National Era_ said: "There can be no doubt that the idea of reviving the African Slave Trade is gaining ground in the South. Some two months ago we could quote strong articles from ultra Southern journals against the traffic; but of late we have been sorry to observe in the same journals an ominous silence upon the subject, while the advocates of 'free trade in negroes' are earnest and active."[15] The Savannah _Republican_, which at first declared the movement to be of no serious intent, conceded, in 1859, that it was gaining favor, and that nine-tenths of the Democratic Congressional Convention favored it, and that even those who did not advocate a revival demanded the abolition of the laws.[16] A correspondent from South Carolina writes, December 18, 1859: "The nefarious project of opening it [i.e., the slave trade] has been started here in that prurient temper of the times which manifests itself in disunion schemes.... My State is strangely and terribly infected with all this sort of thing.... One feeling that gives a countenance to the opening of the slave trade is, that it will be a sort of spite to the North and defiance of their opinions."[17] The New Orleans _Delta_ declared that those who voted for the slave-trade in Congress were men "whose names will be honored hereafter for the unflinching manner in which they stood up for principle, for truth, and consistency, as well as the vital interests of the South."[18]

85. ~The Question in Congress.~ Early in December, 1856, the subject reached Congress; and although the agitation was then new, fifty-seven Southern Congressmen refused to declare a re-opening of the slave-trade "shocking to the moral sentiment of the enlightened portion of mankind," and eight refused to call the reopening even "unwise" and "inexpedient."[19] Three years later, January 31, 1859, it was impossible, in a House of one hundred and ninety-nine members, to get a two-thirds vote in order even to consider Kilgore's resolutions, which declared "that no legislation can be too thorough in its measures, nor can any penalty known to the catalogue of modern punishment for crime be too severe against a traffic so inhuman and unchristian."[20]

Congressmen and other prominent men hastened with the rising tide.[21] Dowdell of Alabama declared the repressive acts "highly offensive;" J.B. Clay of Kentucky was "opposed to all these laws;"[22] Seward of Georgia declared them "wrong, and a violation of the Constitution;"[23] Barksdale of Mississippi agreed with this sentiment; Crawford of Georgia threatened a reopening of the trade; Miles of South Carolina was for "sweeping away" all restrictions;[24] Keitt of South Carolina wished to withdraw the African squadron, and to cease to brand slave-trading as piracy;[25] Brown of Mississippi "would repeal the law instantly;"[26] Alexander Stephens, in his farewell address to his constituents, said: "Slave states cannot be made without Africans.... [My object is] to bring clearly to your mind the great truth that without an increase of African slaves from abroad, you may not expect or look for many more slave States."[27] Jefferson Davis strongly denied "any coincidence of opinion with those who prate of the inhumanity and sinfulness of the trade. The interest of Mississippi," said he, "not of the African, dictates my conclusion." He opposed the immediate reopening of the trade in Mississippi for fear of a paralyzing influx of Negroes, but carefully added: "This conclusion, in relation to Mississippi, is based upon my view of her _present_ condition, _not_ upon any _general theory_. It is not supposed to be applicable to Texas, to New Mexico, or to any _future acquisitions_ to be made south of the Rio Grande."[28] John Forsyth, who for seven years conducted the slave-trade diplomacy of the nation, declared, about 1860: "But one stronghold of its [i.e., slavery's] enemies remains to be carried, to _complete its triumph_ and assure its welfare,--that is the existing prohibition of the African Slave-trade."[29] Pollard, in his _Black Diamonds_, urged the importation of Africans as "laborers." "This I grant you," said he, "would be practically the re-opening of the African slave trade; but ... you will find that it very often becomes necessary to evade the letter of the law, in some of the greatest measures of social happiness and patriotism."[30]

86. ~Southern Policy in 1860.~ The matter did not rest with mere words. During the session of the Vicksburg Convention, an "African Labor Supply Association" was formed, under the presidency of J.D.B. De Bow, editor of _De Bow's Review_, and ex-superintendent of the seventh census. The object of the association was "to promote the supply of African labor."[31] In 1857 the committee of the South Carolina legislature to whom the Governor's slave-trade message was referred made an elaborate report, which declared in italics: _"The South at large does need a re-opening of the African slave trade."_ Pettigrew, the only member who disagreed to this report, failed of re-election. The report contained an extensive argument to prove the kingship of cotton, the perfidy of English philanthropy, and the lack of slaves in the South, which, it was said, would show a deficit of six hundred thousand slaves by 1878.[32] In Georgia, about this time, an attempt to expunge the slave-trade prohibition in the State Constitution lacked but one vote of passing.[33] From these slower and more legal movements came others less justifiable. The long argument on the "apprentice" system finally brought a request to the collector of the port at Charleston, South Carolina, from E. Lafitte & Co., for a clearance to Africa for the purpose of importing African "emigrants." The collector appealed to the Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb of Georgia, who flatly refused to take the bait, and replied that if the "emigrants" were brought in as slaves, it would be contrary to United States law; if as freemen, it would be contrary to their own State law.[34] In Louisiana a still more radical movement was attempted, and a bill passed the House of Representatives authorizing a company to import two thousand five hundred Africans, "indentured" for fifteen years "at least." The bill lacked but two votes of passing the Senate.[35] It was said that the _Georgian_, of Savannah, contained a notice of an agricultural society which "unanimously resolved to offer a premium of $25 for the best specimen of a live African imported into the United States within the last twelve months."[36]

It would not be true to say that there was in the South in 1860 substantial unanimity on the subject of reopening the slave-trade; nevertheless, there certainly was a large and influential minority, including perhaps a majority of citizens of the Gulf States, who favored the project, and, in defiance of law and morals, aided and abetted its actual realization. Various movements, it must be remembered, gained much of their strength from the fact that their success meant a partial nullification of the slave-trade laws. The admission of Texas added probably seventy-five thousand recently imported slaves to the Southern stock; the movement against Cuba, which culminated in the "Ostend Manifesto" of Buchanan, Mason, and Soulé, had its chief impetus in the thousands of slaves whom Americans had poured into the island. Finally, the series of filibustering expeditions against Cuba, Mexico, and Central America were but the wilder and more irresponsible attempts to secure both slave territory and slaves.

87. ~Increase of the Slave-Trade from 1850 to 1860.~ The long and open agitation for the reopening of the slave-trade, together with the fact that the South had been more or less familiar with violations of the laws since 1808, led to such a remarkable increase of illicit traffic and actual importations in the decade 1850-1860, that the movement may almost be termed a reopening of the slave-trade.

In the foreign slave-trade our own officers continue to report "how shamefully our flag has been used;"[37] and British officers write "that at least one half of the successful part of the slave trade is carried on under the American flag," and this because "the number of American cruisers on the station is so small, in proportion to the immense extent of the slave-dealing coast."[38] The fitting out of slavers became a flourishing business in the United States, and centred at New York City. "Few of our readers," writes a periodical of the day, "are aware of the extent to which this infernal traffic is carried on, by vessels clearing from New York, and in close alliance with our legitimate trade; and that down-town merchants of wealth and respectability are extensively engaged in buying and selling African Negroes, and have been, with comparatively little interruption, for an indefinite number of years."[39] Another periodical says: "The number of persons engaged in the slave-trade, and the amount of capital embarked in it, exceed our powers of calculation. The city of New York has been until of late [1862] the principal port of the world for this infamous commerce; although the cities of Portland and Boston are only second to her in that distinction. Slave dealers added largely to the wealth of our commercial metropolis; they contributed liberally to the treasuries of political organizations, and their bank accounts were largely depleted to carry elections in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut."[40] During eighteen months of the years 1859-1860 eighty-five slavers are reported to have been fitted out in New York harbor,[41] and these alone transported from 30,000 to 60,000 slaves annually.[42] The United States deputy marshal of that district declared in 1856 that the business of fitting out slavers "was never prosecuted with greater energy than at present. The occasional interposition of the legal authorities exercises no apparent influence for its suppression. It is seldom that one or more vessels cannot be designated at the wharves, respecting which there is evidence that she is either in or has been concerned in the Traffic."[43] On the coast of Africa "it is a well-known fact that most of the Slave ships which visit the river are sent from New York and New Orleans."[44]

The absence of United States war-ships at the Brazilian station enabled American smugglers to run in cargoes, in spite of the prohibitory law. One cargo of five hundred slaves was landed in 1852, and the _Correio Mercantil_ regrets "that it was the flag of the United States which covered this act of piracy, sustained by citizens of that great nation."[45] When the Brazil trade declined, the illicit Cuban trade greatly increased, and the British consul reported: "Almost all the slave expeditions for some time past have been fitted out in the United States, chiefly at New York."[46]

88. ~Notorious Infractions of the Laws.~ This decade is especially noteworthy for the great increase of illegal importations into the South. These became bold, frequent, and notorious. Systematic introduction on a considerable scale probably commenced in the forties, although with great secrecy. "To have boldly ventured into New Orleans, with negroes freshly imported from Africa, would not only have brought down upon the head of the importer the vengeance of our very philanthropic Uncle Sam, but also the anathemas of the whole sect of philanthropists and negrophilists everywhere. To import them for years, however, into quiet places, evading with impunity the penalty of the law, and the ranting of the thin-skinned sympathizers with Africa, was gradually to popularize the traffic by creating a demand for laborers, and thus to pave the way for the _gradual revival of the slave trade_. To this end, a few men, bold and energetic, determined, ten or twelve years ago [1848 or 1850], to commence the business of importing negroes, slowly at first, but surely; and for this purpose they selected a few secluded places on the coast of Florida, Georgia and Texas, for the purpose of concealing their stock until it could be sold out. Without specifying other places, let me draw your attention to a deep and abrupt pocket or indentation in the coast of Texas, about thirty miles from Brazos Santiago. Into this pocket a slaver could run at any hour of the night, because there was no hindrance at the entrance, and here she could discharge her cargo of movables upon the projecting bluff, and again proceed to sea inside of three hours. The live stock thus landed could be marched a short distance across the main island, over a porous soil which refuses to retain the recent foot-prints, until they were again placed in boats, and were concealed upon some of the innumerable little islands which thicken on the waters of the Laguna in the rear. These islands, being covered with a thick growth of bushes and grass, offer an inscrutable hiding place for the 'black diamonds.'"[47] These methods became, however, toward 1860, too slow for the radicals, and the trade grew more defiant and open. The yacht "Wanderer," arrested on suspicion in New York and released, landed in Georgia six months later four hundred and twenty slaves, who were never recovered.[48] The Augusta _Despatch_ says: "Citizens of our city are probably interested in the enterprise. It is hinted that this is the third cargo landed by the same company, during the last six months."[49] Two parties of Africans were brought into Mobile with impunity. One bark, strongly suspected of having landed a cargo of slaves, was seized on the Florida coast; another vessel was reported to be landing slaves near Mobile; a letter from Jacksonville, Florida, stated that a bark had left there for Africa to ship a cargo for Florida and Georgia.[50] Stephen A. Douglas said "that there was not the shadow of doubt that the Slave-trade had been carried on quite extensively for a long time back, and that there had been more Slaves imported into the southern States, during the last year, than had ever been imported before in any one year, even when the Slave-trade was legal. It was his confident belief, that over fifteen thousand Slaves had been brought into this country during the past year [1859.] He had seen, with his own eyes, three hundred of those recently-imported, miserable beings, in a Slave-pen in Vicksburg, Miss., and also large numbers at Memphis, Tenn."[51] It was currently reported that depots for these slaves existed in over twenty large cities and towns in the South, and an interested person boasted to a senator, about 1860, that "twelve vessels would discharge their living freight upon our shores within ninety days from the 1st of June last," and that between sixty and seventy cargoes had been successfully introduced in the last eighteen months.[52] The New York _Tribune_ doubted the statement; but John C. Underwood, formerly of Virginia, wrote to the paper saying that he was satisfied that the correspondent was correct. "I have," he said, "had ample evidences of the fact, that reopening the African Slave-trade is a thing already accomplished, and the traffic is brisk, and rapidly increasing. In fact, the most vital question of the day is not the opening of this trade, but its suppression. The arrival of cargoes of negroes, fresh from Africa, in our southern ports, is an event of frequent occurrence."[53]

Negroes, newly landed, were openly advertised for sale in the public press, and bids for additional importations made. In reply to one of these, the Mobile _Mercury_ facetiously remarks: "Some negroes who never learned to talk English, went up the railroad the other day."[54] Congressmen declared on the floor of the House: "The slave trade may therefore be regarded as practically re-established;"[55] and petitions like that from the American Missionary Society recited the fact that "this piratical and illegal trade--this inhuman invasion of the rights of men,--this outrage on civilization and Christianity--this violation of the laws of God and man--is openly countenanced and encouraged by a portion of the citizens of some of the States of this Union."[56]

From such evidence it seems clear that the slave-trade laws, in spite of the efforts of the government, in spite even of much opposition to these extra-legal methods in the South itself, were grossly violated, if not nearly nullified, in the latter part of the decade 1850-1860.

89. ~Apathy of the Federal Government.~ During the decade there was some attempt at reactionary legislation, chiefly directed at the Treaty of Washington. June 13, 1854, Slidell, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, made an elaborate report to the Senate, advocating the abrogation of the 8th Article of that treaty, on the ground that it was costly, fatal to the health of the sailors, and useless, as the trade had actually increased under its operation.[57] Both this and a similar attempt in the House failed,[58] as did also an attempt to substitute life imprisonment for the death penalty.[59] Most of the actual legislation naturally took the form of appropriations. In 1853 there was an attempt to appropriate $20,000.[60] This failed, and the appropriation of $8,000 in 1856 was the first for ten years.[61] The following year brought a similar appropriation,[62] and in 1859[63] and 1860[64] $75,000 and $40,000 respectively were appropriated. Of attempted legislation to strengthen the laws there was plenty: e.g., propositions to regulate the issue of sea-letters and the use of our flag;[65] to prevent the "coolie" trade, or the bringing in of "apprentices" or "African laborers;"[66] to stop the coastwise trade;[67] to assent to a Right of Search;[68] and to amend the Constitution by forever prohibiting the slave-trade.[69]

The efforts of the executive during this period were criminally lax and negligent. "The General Government did not exert itself in good faith to carry out either its treaty stipulations or the legislation of Congress in regard to the matter. If a vessel was captured, her owners were permitted to bond her, and thus continue her in the trade; and if any man was convicted of this form of piracy, the executive always interposed between him and the penalty of his crime. The laws providing for the seizure of vessels engaged in the traffic were so constructed as to render the duty unremunerative; and marshals now find their fees for such services to be actually less than their necessary expenses. No one who bears this fact in mind will be surprised at the great indifference of these officers to the continuing of the slave-trade; in fact, he will be ready to learn that the laws of Congress upon the subject had become a dead letter, and that the suspicion was well grounded that certain officers of the Federal Government had actually connived at their violation."[70] From 1845 to 1854, in spite of the well-known activity of the trade, but five cases obtained cognizance in the New York district. Of these, Captains Mansfield and Driscoll forfeited their bonds of $5,000 each, and escaped; in the case of the notorious Canot, nothing had been done as late as 1856, although he was arrested in 1847; Captain Jefferson turned State's evidence, and, in the case of Captain Mathew, a _nolle prosequi_ was entered.[71] Between 1854 and 1856 thirty-two persons were indicted in New York, of whom only thirteen had at the latter date been tried, and only one of these convicted.[72] These dismissals were seldom on account of insufficient evidence. In the notorious case of the "Wanderer," she was arrested on suspicion, released, and soon after she landed a cargo of slaves in Georgia; some who attempted to seize the Negroes were arrested for larceny, and in spite of the efforts of Congress the captain was never punished. The yacht was afterwards started on another voyage, and being brought back to Boston was sold to her former owner for about one third her value.[73] The bark "Emily" was seized on suspicion and released, and finally caught red-handed on the coast of Africa; she was sent to New York for trial, but "disappeared" under a certain slave captain, Townsend, who had, previous to this, in the face of the most convincing evidence, been acquitted at Key West.[74]

The squadron commanders of this time were by no means as efficient as their predecessors, and spent much of their time, apparently, in discussing the Right of Search. Instead of a number of small light vessels, which by the reports of experts were repeatedly shown to be the only efficient craft, the government, until 1859, persisted in sending out three or four great frigates. Even these did not attend faithfully to their duties. A letter from on board one of them shows that, out of a fifteen months' alleged service, only twenty-two days were spent on the usual cruising-ground for slavers, and thirteen of these at anchor; eleven months were spent at Madeira and Cape Verde Islands, 300 miles from the coast and 3,000 miles from the slave market.[75] British commanders report the apathy of American officers and the extreme caution of their instructions, which allowed many slavers to escape.[76]

The officials at Washington often remained in blissful, and perhaps willing, ignorance of the state of the trade. While Americans were smuggling slaves by the thousands into Brazil, and by the hundreds into the United States, Secretary Graham was recommending the abrogation of the 8th Article of the Treaty of Washington;[77] so, too, when the Cuban slave-trade was reaching unprecedented activity, and while slavers were being fitted out in every port on the Atlantic seaboard, Secretary Kennedy naïvely reports, "The time has come, perhaps, when it may be properly commended to the notice of Congress to inquire into the necessity of further continuing the regular employment of a squadron on this [i.e., the African] coast."[78] Again, in 1855, the government has "advices that the slave trade south of the equator is entirely broken up;"[79] in 1856, the reports are "favorable;"[80] in 1857 a British commander writes: "No vessel has been seen here for one year, certainly; I think for nearly three years there have been no American cruizers on these waters, where a valuable and extensive American commerce is carried on. I cannot, therefore, but think that this continued absence of foreign cruizers looks as if they were intentionally withdrawn, and as if the Government did not care to take measures to prevent the American flag being used to cover Slave Trade transactions;"[81] nevertheless, in this same year, according to Secretary Toucey, "the force on the coast of Africa has fully accomplished its main object."[82] Finally, in the same month in which the "Wanderer" and her mates were openly landing cargoes in the South, President Buchanan, who seems to have been utterly devoid of a sense of humor, was urging the annexation of Cuba to the United States as the only method of suppressing the slave-trade![83]

About 1859 the frequent and notorious violations of our laws aroused even the Buchanan government; a larger appropriation was obtained, swift light steamers were employed, and, though we may well doubt whether after such a carnival illegal importations "entirely" ceased, as the President informed Congress,[84] yet some sincere efforts at suppression were certainly begun. From 1850 to 1859 we have few notices of captured slavers, but in 1860 the increased appropriation of the thirty-fifth Congress resulted in the capture of twelve vessels with 3,119 Africans.[85] The Act of June 16, 1860, enabled the President to contract with the Colonization Society for the return of recaptured Africans; and by a long-needed arrangement cruisers were to proceed direct to Africa with such cargoes, instead of first landing them in this country.[86]

90. ~Attitude of the Southern Confederacy.~ The attempt, initiated by the constitutional fathers, to separate the problem of slavery from that of the slave-trade had, after a trial of half a century, signally failed, and for well-defined economic reasons. The nation had at last come to the parting of the ways, one of which led to a free-labor system, the other to a slave system fed by the slave-trade. Both sections of the country naturally hesitated at the cross-roads: the North clung to the delusion that a territorially limited system of slavery, without a slave-trade, was still possible in the South; the South hesitated to fight for her logical object--slavery and free trade in Negroes--and, in her moral and economic dilemma, sought to make autonomy and the Constitution her object. The real line of contention was, however, fixed by years of development, and was unalterable by the present whims or wishes of the contestants, no matter how important or interesting these might be: the triumph of the North meant free labor; the triumph of the South meant slavery and the slave-trade.

It is doubtful if many of the Southern leaders ever deceived themselves by thinking that Southern slavery, as it then was, could long be maintained without a general or a partial reopening of the slave-trade. Many had openly declared this a few years before, and there was no reason for a change of opinion. Nevertheless, at the outbreak of actual war and secession, there were powerful and decisive reasons for relegating the question temporarily to the rear. In the first place, only by this means could the adherence of important Border States be secured, without the aid of which secession was folly. Secondly, while it did no harm to laud the independence of the South and the kingship of cotton in "stump" speeches and conventions, yet, when it came to actual hostilities, the South sorely needed the aid of Europe; and this a nation fighting for slavery and the slave-trade stood poor chance of getting. Consequently, after attacking the slave-trade laws for a decade, and their execution for a quarter-century, we find the Southern leaders inserting, in both the provisional and the permanent Constitutions of the Confederate States, the following article:--

The importation of negroes of the African race, from any foreign
country other than the slaveholding States or Territories of the
United States of America, is hereby forbidden; and Congress is
required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the
same.

Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of
slaves from any State not a member of, or Territory not
belonging to, this Confederacy.[87]

The attitude of the Confederate government toward this article is best illustrated by its circular of instructions to its foreign ministers:--

It has been suggested to this Government, from a source of
unquestioned authenticity, that, after the recognition of our
independence by the European Powers, an expectation is generally
entertained by them that in our treaties of amity and commerce a
clause will be introduced making stipulations against the
African slave trade. It is even thought that neutral Powers may
be inclined to insist upon the insertion of such a clause as a
_sine qua non_.

You are well aware how firmly fixed in our Constitution is the
policy of this Confederacy against the opening of that trade,
but we are informed that false and insidious suggestions have
been made by the agents of the United States at European Courts
of our intention to change our constitution as soon as peace is
restored, and of authorizing the importation of slaves from
Africa. If, therefore, you should find, in your intercourse with
the Cabinet to which you are accredited, that any such
impressions are entertained, you will use every proper effort to
remove them, and if an attempt is made to introduce into any
treaty which you may be charged with negotiating stipulations on
the subject just mentioned, you will assume, in behalf of your
Government, the position which, under the direction of the
President, I now proceed to develop.

The Constitution of the Confederate States is an agreement made
between independent States. By its terms all the powers of
Government are separated into classes as follows, viz.:--

1st. Such powers as the States delegate to the General
Government.

2d. Such powers as the States agree to refrain from exercising,
although they do not delegate them to the General Government.

3d. Such powers as the States, without delegating them to the
General Government, thought proper to exercise by direct
agreement between themselves contained in the Constitution.

4th. All remaining powers of sovereignty, which not being
delegated to the Confederate States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people thereof.... Especially in
relation to the importation of African negroes was it deemed
important by the States that no power to permit it should exist
in the Confederate Government.... It will thus be seen that no
power is delegated to the Confederate Government over this
subject, but that it is included in the third class above
referred to, of powers exercised directly by the States.... This
Government unequivocally and absolutely denies its possession of
any power whatever over the subject, and cannot entertain any
proposition in relation to it.... The policy of the Confederacy
is as fixed and immutable on this subject as the imperfection of
human nature permits human resolve to be. No additional
agreements, treaties, or stipulations can commit these States to
the prohibition of the African slave trade with more binding
efficacy than those they have themselves devised. A just and
generous confidence in their good faith on this subject
exhibited by friendly Powers will be far more efficacious than
persistent efforts to induce this Government to assume the
exercise of powers which it does not possess.... We trust,
therefore, that no unnecessary discussions on this matter will
be introduced into your negotiations. If, unfortunately, this
reliance should prove ill-founded, you will decline continuing
negotiations on your side, and transfer them to us at
home....[88]

This attitude of the conservative leaders of the South, if it meant anything, meant that individual State action could, when it pleased, reopen the slave-trade. The radicals were, of course, not satisfied with any veiling of the ulterior purpose of the new slave republic, and attacked the constitutional provision violently. "If," said one, "the clause be carried into the permanent government, our whole movement is defeated. It will abolitionize the Border Slave States--it will brand our institution. Slavery cannot share a government with Democracy,--it cannot bear a brand upon it; thence another revolution ... having achieved one revolution to escape democracy at the North, it must still achieve another to escape it at the South. That it will ultimately triumph none can doubt."[89]

91. ~Attitude of the United States.~ In the North, with all the hesitation in many matters, there existed unanimity in regard to the slave-trade; and the new Lincoln government ushered in the new policy of uncompromising suppression by hanging the first American slave-trader who ever suffered the extreme penalty of the law.[90] One of the earliest acts of President Lincoln was a step which had been necessary since 1808, but had never been taken, viz., the unification of the whole work of suppression into the hands of one responsible department. By an order, dated May 2, 1861, Caleb B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior, was charged with the execution of the slave-trade laws,[91] and he immediately began energetic work. Early in 1861, as soon as the withdrawal of the Southern members untied the hands of Congress, two appropriations of $900,000 each were made to suppress the slave trade, the first appropriations commensurate with the vastness of the task. These were followed by four appropriations of $17,000 each in the years 1863 to 1867, and two of $12,500 each in 1868 and 1869.[92] The first work of the new secretary was to obtain a corps of efficient assistants. To this end, he assembled all the marshals of the loyal seaboard States at New York, and gave them instruction and opportunity to inspect actual slavers. Congress also, for the first time, offered them proper compensation.[93] The next six months showed the effect of this policy in the fact that five vessels were seized and condemned, and four slave-traders were convicted and suffered the penalty of their crimes. "This is probably the largest number [of convictions] ever obtained, and certainly the only ones for many years."[94]

Meantime the government opened negotiations with Great Britain, and the treaty of 1862 was signed June 7, and carried out by Act of Congress, July 11.[95] Specially commissioned war vessels of either government were by this agreement authorized to search merchant vessels on the high seas and specified coasts, and if they were found to be slavers, or, on account of their construction or equipment, were suspected to be such, they were to be sent for condemnation to one of the mixed courts established at New York, Sierra Leone, and the Cape of Good Hope. These courts, consisting of one judge and one arbitrator on the part of each government, were to judge the facts without appeal, and upon condemnation by them, the culprits were to be punished according to the laws of their respective countries. The area in which this Right of Search could be exercised was somewhat enlarged by an additional article to the treaty, signed in 1863. In 1870 the mixed courts were abolished, but the main part of the treaty was left in force. The Act of July 17, 1862, enabled the President to contract with foreign governments for the apprenticing of recaptured Africans in the West Indies,[96] and in 1864 the coastwise slave-trade was forever prohibited.[97] By these measures the trade was soon checked, and before the end of the war entirely suppressed.[98] The vigilance of the government, however, was not checked, and as late as 1866 a squadron of ten ships, with one hundred and thirteen guns, patrolled the slave coast.[99] Finally, the Thirteenth Amendment legally confirmed what the war had already accomplished, and slavery and the slave-trade fell at one blow.[100]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1854-5, p. 1156.

[2] Cluskey, _Political Text-Book_ (14th ed.), p. 585.

[3] _De Bow's Review_, XXII. 223; quoted from Andrew Hunter of
Virginia.

[4] _Ibid._, XVIII. 628.

[5] _Ibid._, XXII. 91, 102, 217, 221-2.

[6] From a pamphlet entitled "A New Southern Policy, or the
Slave Trade as meaning Union and Conservatism;" quoted in
Etheridge's speech, Feb. 21, 1857: _Congressional Globe_, 34
Cong. 3 sess., Appendix, p. 366.

[7] _De Bow's Review_, XXIII. 298-320. A motion to table the
motion on the 8th article was supported only by Kentucky,
Tennessee, North Carolina, and Maryland. Those voting for
Sneed's motion were Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Tennessee. The appointment of a slave-trade committee was at
first defeated by a vote of 48 to 44. Finally a similar motion
was passed, 52 to 40.

[8] _De Bow's Review_, XXIV. 473-491, 579-605. The Louisiana
delegation alone did not vote for the last resolution, the
vote of her delegation being evenly divided.

[9] _De Bow's Review_, XXVII. 94-235.

[10] H.S. Foote, in _Bench and Bar of the South and
Southwest_, p. 69.

[11] _De Bow's Review_, XXVII. 115.

[12] _Ibid._, p. 99. The vote was:--

_Yea._ _Nay._
Alabama, 5 votes. Tennessee, 12 votes.
Arkansas, 4 " Florida, 3 "
South Carolina, 4 " South Carolina, 4 "
Louisiana, 6 " Total 19
Texas, 4 "
Georgia, 10 " Virginia, Maryland, Kentucky, and
Mississippi, 7 " North Carolina did not vote; they either
Total 40 withdrew or were not represented.

[13] Quoted in _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p.
38. The official organ was the _True Southron_.

[14] Quoted in _24th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p.
54.

[15] Quoted in _26th Report_, _Ibid._, p. 43.

[16] _27th Report_, _Ibid._, pp. 19-20.

[17] Letter of W.C. Preston, in the _National Intelligencer_,
April 3, 1863. Also published in the pamphlet, _The African
Slave Trade: The Secret Purpose_, etc., p. 26.

[18] Quoted in Etheridge's speech: _Congressional Globe_, 34
Cong. 3 sess. Appen., p. 366.

[19] _House Journal_, 34 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 105-10;
_Congressional Globe_, 34 Cong. 3 sess. pp. 123-6; Cluskey,
_Political Text-Book_ (14th ed.), p. 589.

[20] _House Journal_, 35 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 298-9. Cf. _26th
Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 45.

[21] Cf. _Reports of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, especially
the 26th, pp. 43-4.

[22] _Ibid._, p. 43. He referred especially to the Treaty of
1842.

[23] _Ibid._; _Congressional Globe_, 35 Cong. 2 sess., Appen.,
pp. 248-50.

[24] _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 44.

[25] _Ibid._; _27th Report_, pp. 13-4.

[26] _26th Report_, _Ibid._, p. 44.

[27] Quoted in Lalor, _Cyclopædia_, III. 733; Cairnes, _The
Slave Power_ (New York, 1862), p. 123, note; _27th Report of
the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 15.

[28] Quoted in Cairnes, _The Slave Power_, p. 123, note; _27th
Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 19.

[29] _27th Report_, _Ibid._, p. 16; quoted from the Mobile
_Register_.

[30] Edition of 1859, pp. 63-4.

[31] _De Bow's Review_, XXVII. 121, 231-5.

[32] _Report of the Special Committee_, etc. (1857), pp. 24-5.

[33] _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 40. The
vote was 47 to 46.

[34] _House Exec. Doc._, 36 Cong. 2 sess. IV. No. 7, pp.
632-6. For the State law, cf. above, Chapter II. This refusal
of Cobb's was sharply criticised by many Southern papers. Cf.
_26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 39.

[35] New York _Independent_, March 11 and April 1, 1858.

[36] _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 41.

[37] Gregory to the Secretary of the Navy, June 8, 1850:
_Senate Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66, p. 2. Cf.
_Ibid._, 31 Cong. 2 sess. II. No. 6.

[38] Cumming to Commodore Fanshawe, Feb. 22, 1850: _Senate
Exec. Doc._, 31 Cong. 1 sess. XIV. No. 66, p. 8.

[39] New York _Journal of Commerce_, 1857; quoted in _24th
Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 56.

[40] "The Slave-Trade in New York," in the _Continental
Monthly_, January, 1862, p. 87.

[41] New York _Evening Post_; quoted in Lalor, _Cyclopædia_,
III. 733.

[42] Lalor, _Cyclopædia_, III. 733; quoted from a New York
paper.

[43] _Friends' Appeal on behalf of the Coloured Races_ (1858),
Appendix, p. 41; quoted from the _Journal of Commerce_.

[44] _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, pp. 53-4;
quoted from the African correspondent of the Boston _Journal_.
From April, 1857, to May, 1858, twenty-one of twenty-two
slavers which were seized by British cruisers proved to be
American, from New York, Boston, and New Orleans. Cf. _25th
Report_, _Ibid._, p. 122. De Bow estimated in 1856 that forty
slavers cleared annually from Eastern harbors, clearing yearly
$17,000,000: _De Bow's Review_, XXII. 430-1.

[45] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 33 Cong. 1 sess. VIII. No. 47, p.
13.

[46] _House Exec. Doc._, 34 Cong. 1 sess. XII. No. 105, p. 38.

[47] New York _Herald_, Aug. 5, 1860; quoted in Drake,
_Revelations of a Slave Smuggler_, Introd., pp. vii.-viii.

[48] _House Exec. Doc._, 35 Cong. 2 sess. IX. No. 89. Cf.
_26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, pp. 45-9.

[49] Quoted in _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p.
46.

[50] For all the above cases, cf. _Ibid._, p. 49.

[51] Quoted in _27th Report_, _Ibid._, p. 20. Cf. _Report of
the Secretary of the Navy_, 1859; _Senate Exec. Doc._, 36
Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 2.

[52] _27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 21.

[53] Quoted in _Ibid._

[54] Issue of July 22, 1860; quoted in Drake, _Revelations of
a Slave Smuggler_, Introd., p. vi. The advertisement referred
to was addressed to the "Ship-owners and Masters of our
Mercantile Marine," and appeared in the Enterprise (Miss.)
_Weekly News_, April 14, 1859. William S. Price and seventeen
others state that they will "pay three hundred dollars per
head for one thousand native Africans, between the ages of
fourteen and twenty years, (of sexes equal,) likely, sound,
and healthy, to be delivered within twelve months from this
date, at some point accessible by land, between Pensacola,
Fla., and Galveston, Texas; the contractors giving thirty
days' notice as to time and place of delivery": Quoted in
_26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, pp. 41-2.

[55] _Congressional Globe_, 35 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1362. Cf. the
speech of a delegate from Georgia to the Democratic Convention
at Charleston, 1860: "If any of you northern democrats will go
home with me to my plantation, I will show you some darkies
that I bought in Virginia, some in Delaware, some in Florida,
and I will also show you the pure African, the noblest Roman
of them all. I represent the African slave trade interest of
my section:" Lalor, _Cyclopædia_, III. 733.

[56] _Senate Misc. Doc._, 36 Cong. 1 sess. No. 8.

[57] _Senate Journal_, 34 Cong. 1-2 sess. pp. 396, 695-8;
_Senate Reports_, 34 Cong. 1 sess. I. No. 195.

[58] _House Journal_, 31 Cong. 2 sess. p. 64. There was still
another attempt by Sandidge. Cf. _26th Report of the Amer.
Anti-Slav. Soc._, p. 44.

[59] _Senate Journal_, 36 Cong. 1 sess. p. 274; _Congressional
Globe_, 36 Cong. 1 sess. p. 1245.

[60] Congressional Globe, 32 Cong. 2 sess. p. 1072.

[61] I.e., since 1846: _Statutes at Large_, XI. 90.

[62] _Ibid._, XI. 227.

[63] _Ibid._, XI. 404.

[64] _Ibid._, XII. 21.

[65] E.g., Clay's resolutions: _Congressional Globe_, 31 Cong.
2 sess. pp. 304-9. Clayton's resolutions: _Senate Journal_, 33
Cong. 1 sess. p. 404; _House Journal_, 33 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
1093, 1332-3; _Congressional Globe_, 33 Cong. 1 sess. pp.
1591-3, 2139. Seward's bill: _Senate Journal_, 33 Cong. 1
sess. pp. 448, 451.

[66] Mr. Blair of Missouri asked unanimous consent in
Congress, Dec. 23, 1858, to a resolution instructing the
Judiciary Committee to bring in such a bill; Houston of
Alabama objected: _Congressional Globe_, 35 Cong. 2 sess. p.
198; _26th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, p. 44.

[67] This was the object of attack in 1851 and 1853 by
Giddings: _House Journal_, 32 Cong. 1 sess. p. 42; 33 Cong. 1
sess. p. 147. Cf. _House Journal_, 38 Cong. 1 sess. p. 46.

[68] By Mr. Wilson, March 20, 1860: _Senate Journal_, 36 Cong.
1 sess. p. 274.

[69] Four or five such attempts were made: Dec. 12, 1860,
_House Journal_, 36 Cong. 2 sess. pp. 61-2; Jan. 7, 1861,
_Congressional Globe_, 36 Cong. 2 sess. p. 279; Jan. 23, 1861,
_Ibid._, p. 527; Feb. 1, 1861, _Ibid._, p. 690; Feb. 27, 1861,
_Ibid._, pp. 1243, 1259.

[70] "The Slave-Trade in New York," in the _Continental
Monthly_, January, 1862, p. 87.

[71] New York _Herald_, July 14, 1856.

[72] _Ibid._ Cf. _Senate Exec. Doc._, 37 Cong. 2 sess. V. No.
53.

[73] _27th Report of the Amer. Anti-slav. Soc._, pp. 25-6. Cf.
_26th Report_, _Ibid._, pp. 45-9.

[74] _27th Report_, _Ibid._, pp. 26-7.

[75] _26th Report_, _Ibid._, p. 54.

[76] _British and Foreign State Papers_, 1859-60, pp. 899,
973.

[77] Nov. 29, 1851: _House Exec. Doc._, 32 Cong. 1 sess. II.
pt. 2, No. 2, p. 4.

[78] Dec. 4, 1852: _House Exec. Doc._, 32 Cong. 2 sess. I. pt.
2, No. 1, p. 293.

[79] _Ibid._, 34 Cong. 1 sess. I. pt. 3, No. 1, p. 5.

[80] _Ibid._, 34 Cong. 3 sess. I. pt. 2, No. 1, p. 407.

[81] Commander Burgess to Commodore Wise, Whydah, Aug. 12,
1857: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1857-8, vol. LXI. _Slave Trade_,
Class A, p. 136.

[82] _House Exec. Doc._, 35 Cong. 1 sess. II. pt. 3, No. 2, p.
576.

[83] _Ibid._, 35 Cong. 2 sess. II. pt. 1, No. 2, pp. 14-15,
31-33.

[84] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 36 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 24.
The Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1859, contains this
ambiguous passage: "What the effect of breaking up the trade
will be upon the United States or Cuba it is not necessary to
inquire; certainly, under the laws of Congress and our treaty
obligations, it is the duty of the executive government to see
that our citizens shall not be engaged in it": _Ibid._, 36
Cong. 1 sess. III. No. 2, pp. 1138-9.

[85] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 36 Cong. 2 sess. III. pt. 1, No. 1,
pp. 8-9.

[86] _Statutes at Large_, XII. 40.

[87] _Confederate States of America Statutes at Large_, 1861,
p. 15, Constitution, Art. 1, sect. 9, §§ 1, 2.

[88] From an intercepted circular despatch from J.P. Benjamin,
"Secretary of State," addressed in this particular instance to
Hon. L.Q.C. Lamar, "Commissioner, etc., St. Petersburg,
Russia," and dated Richmond, Jan. 15, 1863; published in the
_National Intelligencer_, March 31, 1863; cf. also the issues
of Feb. 19, 1861, April 2, 3, 25, 1863; also published in the
pamphlet, _The African Slave-Trade: The Secret Purpose_, etc.
The editors vouch for its authenticity, and state it to be in
Benjamin's own handwriting.

[89] L.W. Spratt of South Carolina, in the _Southern Literary
Messenger_, June, 1861, XXXII. 414, 420. Cf. also the
Charleston _Mercury_, Feb. 13, 1861, and the _National
Intelligencer_, Feb. 19, 1861.

[90] Captain Gordon of the slaver "Erie;" condemned in the
U.S. District Court for Southern New York in 1862. Cf. _Senate
Exec. Doc._, 37 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, p. 13.

[91] _Ibid._, pp. 453-4.

[92] _Statutes at Large_, XII. 132, 219, 639; XIII. 424; XIV.
226, 415; XV. 58, 321. The sum of $250,000 was also
appropriated to return the slaves on the "Wildfire": _Ibid._,
XII. 40-41.

[93] _Statutes at Large_, XII. 368-9.

[94] _Senate Exec. Doc._, 37 Cong. 2 sess. I. No. 1, pp.
453-4.

[95] _Statutes at Large_, XII. 531.

[96] For a time not exceeding five years: _Ibid._, pp. 592-3.

[97] By section 9 of an appropriation act for civil expenses,
July 2, 1864: _Ibid._, XIII. 353.

[98] British officers attested this: _Diplomatic
Correspondence_, 1862, p. 285.

[99] _Report of the Secretary of the Navy_, 1866; _House Exec.
Doc._, 39 Cong. 2 sess. IV. p. 12.

[100] There were some later attempts to legislate. Sumner
tried to repeal the Act of 1803: _Congressional Globe_, 41
Cong. 2 sess. pp. 2894, 2932, 4953, 5594. Banks introduced a
bill to prohibit Americans owning or dealing in slaves abroad:
_House Journal_, 42 Cong. 2 sess. p. 48. For the legislation
of the Confederate States, cf. Mason, _Veto Power_, 2d ed.,
Appendix C, No. 1.

* * * * *

_Chapter XII_

THE ESSENTIALS IN THE STRUGGLE.

92. How the Question Arose.
93. The Moral Movement.
94. The Political Movement.
95. The Economic Movement.
96. The Lesson for Americans.

92. ~How the Question Arose.~ We have followed a chapter of history which is of peculiar interest to the sociologist. Here was a rich new land, the wealth of which was to be had in return for ordinary manual labor. Had the country been conceived of as existing primarily for the benefit of its actual inhabitants, it might have waited for natural increase or immigration to supply the needed hands; but both Europe and the earlier colonists themselves regarded this land as existing chiefly for the benefit of Europe, and as designed to be exploited, as rapidly and ruthlessly as possible, of the boundless wealth of its resources. This was the primary excuse for the rise of the African slave-trade to America.

Every experiment of such a kind, however, where the moral standard of a people is lowered for the sake of a material advantage, is dangerous in just such proportion as that advantage is great. In this case it was great. For at least a century, in the West Indies and the southern United States, agriculture flourished, trade increased, and English manufactures were nourished, in just such proportion as Americans stole Negroes and worked them to death. This advantage, to be sure, became much smaller in later times, and at one critical period was, at least in the Southern States, almost _nil_; but energetic efforts were wanting, and, before the nation was aware, slavery had seized a new and well-nigh immovable footing in the Cotton Kingdom.

The colonists averred with perfect truth that they did not commence this fatal traffic, but that it was imposed upon them from without. Nevertheless, all too soon did they lay aside scruples against it and hasten to share its material benefits. Even those who braved the rough Atlantic for the highest moral motives fell early victims to the allurements of this system. Thus, throughout colonial history, in spite of many honest attempts to stop the further pursuit of the slave-trade, we notice back of nearly all such attempts a certain moral apathy, an indisposition to attack the evil with the sharp weapons which its nature demanded. Consequently, there developed steadily, irresistibly, a vast social problem, which required two centuries and a half for a nation of trained European stock and boasted moral fibre to solve.

93. ~The Moral Movement.~ For the solution of this problem there were, roughly speaking, three classes of efforts made during this time,--moral, political, and economic: that is to say, efforts which sought directly to raise the moral standard of the nation; efforts which sought to stop the trade by legal enactment; efforts which sought to neutralize the economic advantages of the slave-trade. There is always a certain glamour about the idea of a nation rising up to crush an evil simply because it is wrong. Unfortunately, this can seldom be realized in real life; for the very existence of the evil usually argues a moral weakness in the very place where extraordinary moral strength is called for. This was the case in the early history of the colonies; and experience proved that an appeal to moral rectitude was unheard in Carolina when rice had become a great crop, and in Massachusetts when the rum-slave-traffic was paying a profit of 100%. That the various abolition societies and anti-slavery movements did heroic work in rousing the national conscience is certainly true; unfortunately, however, these movements were weakest at the most critical times. When, in 1774 and 1804, the material advantages of the slave-trade and the institution of slavery were least, it seemed possible that moral suasion might accomplish the abolition of both. A fatal spirit of temporizing, however, seized the nation at these points; and although the slave-trade was, largely for political reasons, forbidden, slavery was left untouched. Beyond this point, as years rolled by, it was found well-nigh impossible to rouse the moral sense of the nation. Even in the matter of enforcing its own laws and co-operating with the civilized world, a lethargy seized the country, and it did not awake until slavery was about to destroy it. Even then, after a long and earnest crusade, the national sense of right did not rise to the entire abolition of slavery. It was only a peculiar and almost fortuitous commingling of moral, political, and economic motives that eventually crushed African slavery and its handmaid, the slave-trade in America.

94. ~The Political Movement.~ The political efforts to limit the slave-trade were the outcome partly of moral reprobation of the trade, partly of motives of expediency. This legislation was never such as wise and powerful rulers may make for a nation, with the ulterior purpose of calling in the respect which the nation has for law to aid in raising its standard of right. The colonial and national laws on the slave-trade merely registered, from time to time, the average public opinion concerning this traffic, and are therefore to be regarded as negative signs rather than as positive efforts. These signs were, from one point of view, evidences of moral awakening; they indicated slow, steady development of the idea that to steal even Negroes was wrong. From another point of view, these laws showed the fear of servile insurrection and the desire to ward off danger from the State; again, they often indicated a desire to appear well before the civilized world, and to rid the "land of the free" of the paradox of slavery. Representing such motives, the laws varied all the way from mere regulating acts to absolute prohibitions. On the whole, these acts were poorly conceived, loosely drawn, and wretchedly enforced. The systematic violation of the provisions of many of them led to a widespread belief that enforcement was, in the nature of the case, impossible; and thus, instead of marking ground already won, they were too often sources of distinct moral deterioration. Certainly the carnival of lawlessness that succeeded the Act of 1807, and that which preceded final suppression in 1861, were glaring examples of the failure of the efforts to suppress the slave-trade by mere law.

95. ~The Economic Movement.~ Economic measures against the trade were those which from the beginning had the best chance of success, but which were least tried. They included tariff measures; efforts to encourage the immigration of free laborers and the emigration of the slaves; measures for changing the character of Southern industry; and, finally, plans to restore the economic balance which slavery destroyed, by raising the condition of the slave to that of complete freedom and responsibility. Like the political efforts, these rested in part on a moral basis; and, as legal enactments, they were also themselves often political measures. They differed, however, from purely moral and political efforts, in having as a main motive the economic gain which a substitution of free for slave labor promised.