Chapter XXII: Book IV (13)

Thus much for _Providence_: As to the _literal Sense_ of Scripture, I find, if what was noted before in the _Answer_, _p._ 82, 83, _&c._ had been duly consider’d, there would be little need of Additions upon that Subject. The Matter was stated freely and distinctly, and the Remarks or Reflections which the Exceptor hath made in his _Defence_ upon this Doctrine, are both shallow and partial. I say _partial_, in perverting the Sense, and separating such Things as manifestly depend upon one another. Thus the Exceptor falls upon that Expression in the _Answer_, _Def._ _p._ 202. _Let us remember that this contradicting Scripture, here pretended, is only in natural Things_, where he should have added the other Part of the Sentence, _and also observe how for the Exceptor himself, in such Things, hath contradicted Scripture_. Here he makes an odious Declamation, as if the Answerer had confess’d that he _contradicted Scripture in natural Things_; whereas the Words are contradicting Scripture, _here pretended_; and ’tis plain by all the Discourse, that ’tis the literal Sense of Scripture that is here spoken of, which the Exceptor is also said to contradict. Such an unmanly Captiousness shews the Temper and Measure of that Spirit, which, rather than say nothing, will misrepresent the plain Sense of an Author. In like manner, when he comes to those Words in the Answer, The Case therefore is this, whether _to go contrary to the Letter of Scripture in Things that relate to the natural World, be destroying the Foundation of Religion, affronting Scripture, and blaspheming the Holy Ghost. Def. p._ 206. He says, This is not to state the Case truly, for it is not, says he, _going contrary to the Letter of Scripture that draws such evil Consequences after it, but going contrary to the Letter of Scripture, where it is understood_: And _this the Theorist does_, he says, and the _Exceptor does not_. But who says so besides himself? This is fairly to beg the Question; and can he suppose the Theorist so easy as to grant this without Proof? It must be the Subject Matter that determines, what is, and what is not, to be literally understood. However, he goes on, begging still the Question in his own behalf, and says, Those Texts of Scripture, that speak of the Motion and Course of the Sun, are not to be understood literally. But why not? Because the literal Sense is not to his Mind? Of four Texts of Scripture which the Theorist alledg’d against him, for the Motion of the Sun, he answers but one, and that very superficially, to say no worse. ’Tis _Psal._ xix. where the Sun at his rising is said to be as a _Bridegroom coming out of his Chamber, and to rejoice as a strong Man to run his Race: And his going forth is from the end of the Heaven, and his Circuit to the end of it_, p. 207. which he answers with this vain Flourish: _Then the Sun must be a Man, and must be upon his Marriage, and must be dress’d in fine Clothes, as a Bridegroom is: Then he must come out of a Chamber, and must give no more Light, and cast no more Heat, than a Bridegroom does_, &c. If a Man should ridicule at this rate, the Discourse of our Saviour concerning _Lazarus_ in _Abraham_’s Bosom, and _Dives_ in Hell, with a great Gulph betwixt them, yet talking audibly to one another; _Luk._ xvi. and that _Lazarus_ should be sent so far, as from Heaven to Hell, only to _dip the Tip of his Finger in Water_, and cool _Dives_’s Tongue. He that should go about thus to expose our Saviour’s Parable, would have a thankless Office, and effect nothing: For the Substance of it would stand good still; namely, that Mens Souls live after Death, and that good Souls are in a State of Ease and Comfort, and bad Souls in a State of Misery. In like manner, his ridiculing some Circumstances in the Comparison made by the Psalmist, does not at all destroy the Substance of that Discourse; namely, that the Sun moves in the Firmament, with great Swiftness and Lustre, and hath the Circuit of its Motion round the Earth. This is the Substance of what the Psalmist declares, and the rest is but a Similitude, which need not be literally just in all Particulars.

After this, he would fain persuade the Theorist, that he hath excused the Exceptor for his receding from the literal Sense, as to the Motion of the Earth; _Def._ p. 208. Because he hath granted, that in certain Cases, we may and must recede from the literal Sense. But where, pray, hath he granted, that the Motion of the Earth was one of those Cases? Yet suppose it be so, may not the Theorist then enjoy this Privilege of receding from the literal Sense upon occasion, as well as the Exceptor? If he will give, as well as take this Liberty, let us mutually enjoy it; but he can have no Pretence to deny it to others, and take it himself. It uses to be a Rule in Writing, that a Man must not _stultum fingere Lectorem_. You must suppose your Reader to have common Sense. But he that accuses another of _Blasphemy_ for receding from the literal Sense of Scripture in natural Things, and does himself at the same Time, recede from the literal Sense of Scripture, in natural Things; one would think, _quo ad hoc_, either had not, or would not exercise common Sense, in a literal Way.

Lastly, he comes to the common known Rule, assign’d to direct us, when every one ought to follow, or leave the literal Sense; which is, _p. 215. not to leave the literal Sense, when the Subject Matter will bear it, without Absurdity or Incongruity_. This he repeats in the next Page thus. The Rule is, _when no kind of Absurdities or Incongruities accrue to any Texts, from the literal Sense_. If this be _his_ Rule, to what Text does there accrue any Absurdity or Incongruity, by supposing the Sun to move? For Scripture always speaks upon that Supposition, and not one Word for the Motion of the Earth. Thus he states the Rule; but the _Answerer_ supposed, that the Absurdity or Incongruity might arise from the _Subject Matter_. And accordingly he still maintains, that there are as just Reasons, (from the Subject Matter,) and better Authorities, for receding from the literal Sense in the Narrative of the six Days Creation, than in those Texts of Scripture, that speak of the Motions and Course of the Sun: And to affirm the _Earth to be mov’d_, is as much _Blasphemy_, and more contrary to Scripture, than to affirm it to have been _dissolv’d_, as the Theorist hath done.

Sir, I beg your Excuse for this long letter, and leave it to you to judge whether the Occasion was just or no. I know such Jarrings as these must needs make bad Musick to your Ears: ’Tis like hearing two Instruments play, that are not in Tune, in Concert with one another: But you know Self-Defence, and to repel an Assailant, is always allow’d; and he that begins the Quarrel, must answer for the Consequences. However, Sir, to make amends for this I trouble, I am ready to receive your Commands upon more acceptable Subjects.

_Your most humble Servant_, &c.

FINIS.

REFLECTIONS UPON THE THEORY OF THE EARTH

REFLECTIONS UPON THE THEORY OF THE EARTH,

Occasion’d by a

_Late_ EXAMINATION _of it_.

_In a_ LETTER _to a_ FRIEND.

_LONDON:_

Printed for J. HOOKE, at the _Flower-de-Luce_ in
_Fleet-Street_. M.DCC.XXVI.

Advertisement of the Bookseller.

_The following Tract hath been much enquired after by some curious Persons, but was so scarce, that a Copy could not be procured at the Time of the Printing the former Edition of the Theory. Since that, an intimate Friend of Dr. Burnet’s hath favoured me with a Copy; so that the Reader may be assured, it it genuine, and was wrote by Dr. Burnet; and it is apprehended, it may very well deserve a Place in his Works._

REFLECTIONS, _&c._

Sir,

I Receiv’d the Honour of your Letter, with the Book you was pleas’d to send me, containing an Examination of _the Theory of the Earth:_ And, according as you desire, I shall give you my Thoughts of it, in as narrow a Compass as I can. The Author of the _Theory_, you know, hath set down in three Propositions, the Foundation of the whole Work; and so long as those Propositions stand firm, the Substance of the _Theory_ is safe, whatsoever becomes of particular Modes of Explication in some Parts; which are as Problems, and may be explained several Ways, without prejudice to the Principles upon which the _Theory_ stands.

The Theorist takes but one single Postulatum, _viz._ That the _Earth rose from a Chaos:_ This is not call’d into Question; and this being granted, he lays down three Propositions consecutively. First, _That the primitive or ante-diluvian Earth was of a different Form and Construction from the present Earth_. Secondly, _That the Face of that Earth, as it rose from a Chaos, was smooth, regular and uniform; without Mountains or Rocks, and without an open Sea_. Thirdly, _That the Disruption of the Abyss, or Dissolution of that primeval Earth, and its Fall into the Abyss, was the Cause of the universal Deluge, and of the Destruction of the old World_: As also of the irregular Form of the present Earth.

These are the three Fundamental Propositions laid down in the fourth, fifth and sixth Chapters of the _Theory_. And for a farther Proof and Confirmation of them, especially of the last, another Proposition is added (_Chap._ VII.) in these Words, _The present Form and Structure of the Earth, both as to the Surface, and as to the interior Parts of it, so far as they are accessible and known to us, do exactly answer to the foregoing Theory, concerning the Form and Dissolution of the first Earth, and is not so justly explained to any other Hypothesis yet known._ This is offer’d as a Proof _à Posteriori_, as they call it, or from the Effects; to shew the Consent and Agreement of the Parts and Construction of the present Earth, to that Supposition of its being a sort of Ruin, or the Effect and Remains of a Disruption or Dissolution. And to make this good, the Theorist draws a short Scheme of the general Form of the present Earth, and its Irregularity: Then shews more particularly the Marks or Signatures of Ruin or Disruption in several Parts of it; as in Mountains and Rocks, in the great Chanel of the Sea, and in subterraneous Cavities, and other broken and disfigur’d Parts of the Earth.

These Conclusions, with their Arguments, are the Sum and principal Contents of the first Book; but I must also mind you of a Corollary in the second Book, drawn from these primary Propositions, which concerns the Situation of the primitive Earth: For the Theorist supposes, that the Posture of that Earth, or of its Axis, was not oblique to to the Axis of the Sun, or of the Ecliptick, as it is now, but lay parallel with the Axis of the Sun, and perpendicular to the Plane of the Ecliptick; by reason of which Position, there was a perpetual Spring, or perpetual Equinox, in that primitive Earth. This, tho’ a Consequence only from the first Propositions, I thought fit to mind you of, as being one of the peculiar and distinguishing Characters of this _Theory_.

This being the State of the _Theory_, or of those Parts of it that support the rest, and wherein its Strength consists, he that will attack it to purpose, must throw down, in the first Place, these leading Propositions. If the Examiner had taken this Method, and confuted the Proofs that are brought in Confirmation of each of them, he needed have done no more; for the Foundation being destroyed, the Superstructure would fall of its own accord. But if, instead of this, you only pick out a loose Stone here or there, or strike off a Pinacle, this will not weaken the Foundation, nor have any considerable Effect upon the whole Building. Let us therefore consider, in the first Place, what this Examiner hath said against these fundamental Propositions, and accordingly you will better judge of the rest of his Work.

His first Chapter is to shew, that the Deluge might be made by a Miracle: But whoever denied that? No doubt God by his Omnipotency may do whatsoever he pleases, to the utmost Extent of Possibilities. But he does not tell us wherein this Miracle consisted? Doth he suppose that the Deluge could be made without any Increase of Waters upon the Earth? If there was an Increase of Waters, either they were created a-new, or brought thither from some other Part of the Universe: So far is plain; and if he supposes a new Creation of Waters for this Purpose, and an Annihilation of them again at the end of the Flood, it had been fair to have answered the Arguments that are given against that Hypothesis, in the third Chapter of the _English Theory_. And seeing there is no mention made of any such thing in the sacred History, if he asserts it, he must bring some Proof of his Assertion; for we are not upon such Terms, as to trust upon bare Word. On the other Hand, if he proceed upon such Waters as were already in being, and for his purpose either bring down supercelestial Water, or bring subterraneous, he must tell us what those Waters are, and must answer such Objections as are brought against either sort in the second and third Chapters of the _Theory_; we must have some fix’d Point, some Mark to aim at, if the Case be argued. Upon the whole, I think this his first Chapter might have been spar’d, as either affirming nothing particularly, or giving no Proof of what is affirm’d.

In his next Chapter about the _Chaos_, I was in hopes to have found something more considerable, but (besides his long _excerpta_ out of the _Theory_, both here and elsewhere, which make a good part of his Book) I find nothing but two small Objections against the Formation of the first Earth, as it is describ’d by the Theorist. This Examiner says, _p. 37, 38._ That the little earthy Particles of the Chaos would not swim upon the Surface of Oil, or any such unctuous Liquor; for how little soever, yet being earthy, and Earth being heavier than Oil, they must descend through it. But he grants that Dust will swim upon Oil; and I willingly allow, if these descending Parts were _huge Lumps of solid Matter_, such as we shall meet with in his next Chapter, they would easily break through both the Oil and the Water under it; but that little tenuious Particles or small Dust should swim upon Oil, I think is no wonder: And he is so kind as to note an Instance of this himself; and to subjoin his Reasons for it. We see Dust, saith he, _p. 38, 39._ though specifically heavier than Oil, yet not to sink when cast upon it. And the Reason is, because all terrestrial Bodies, tho’ fluid in their kind yet in some degree resist Separation; and consequently, I add, viscous Liquors which have some sort of Entanglement amongst themselves, resist Separation more than others. Then he remarks farther, that according as Bodies are less, they have more Surface in Proportion to their Bulk, and consequently, that _small Bodies, whose Weight or Force to separate the Parts of the Fluid is but very little, may have a Surface so large, that they cannot overcome the Resistance of the Fluid: That is, they cannot make Way for their Descent through the Fluid, and therefore must swim upon the Surface of it_. Be it so, then the Particles here mentioned by the Theorist, being little, and of large Surfaces in Proportion to their Bulk, would swim upon the Surface of the Fluid, or mix with it, which is all the Theorist affirms or supposes: And as this tender Film grew into a Crust, and that into a solid Arch, the Parts of it would mutually support one another; the Concave Superficies of the Orb overspreading and leaning upon the Waters: And this also shews that his Instance of a solid Globe sinking in a Fluid, is little to the Purpose in this Case.

But he hath a second objection behind, _p._ 40. or another Consideration to prove that those little Particles would pierce and pass through this oily Liquid. This Consideration is, the great Height of the Place from which they descended; whereby, he thinks, they would acquire such a Celerity and Force in their Descent, that they must needs break through this Orb of oily Liquors when they came at it. But this is to suppose that they descended without Interruption, or without having their Course stopp’d, and their Force broken in several Parts of their journey. This is an arbitrary and groundless Supposition: For these floating Particles did not fall like a Stone, or a ponderous Body, in one continued Line, but rather like Fleaks of Snow, hovering and playing in the Air, their Course being often interrupted and diverted, and their force broken again and again, before they came to the end of their Journey; so that this Suggestion can be of no Force or Effect in the present Case. However, if that will gratify him, we can allow that thousands and millions of these little Particles might slip or creep through this clammy Liquor, yet there would enough of them entangled there to make it, first, a gross Liquid, then a sort of Concretion, so as to stop the succeeding Particles from passing through it.

I have done with all that is argumentative in this Chapter: But this Writer is pleased to go sometimes out of his way of Philosophising, to make Reflections of another kind. Accordingly, here and elsewhere he makes Insinuations and Suggestions, as if the Theorist did not own the Hand of Providence, or of a particular and extraordinary Providence in the Formation of the Earth; or as if all Things in the great Revolutions of the natural World were carried on solely by material and mechanical Causes. This Suggestion ought to be taken Notice of, as being contrary to the Sense of the Theorist, as it is express’d in several Places. In speaking of the Motions of the Chaos, the Theorist makes the _steady Hand of Providence which keeps all Things in Weight and Measure, to be the invisible Guide of all its Motions_, p. 45. And in concluding his Discourse about the Formation of the Earth (_Chap._ V. _p._ 45.) the Theorist says, _This Structure is so marvellous, that it ought rather to be consider’d, as a particular Effect of the Divine Art, than as the Work of Nature_; with many other Remarks there to the same purpose. Then as to the Dissolution of the Earth, and the Conduct of the Deluge, ’tis made miraculous also by the Theorist[22]: And upon that Occasion an Account is given of Providence, both ordinary and extraordinary, in reference to the Government of Nature; and that not only as to the formation and Dissolution of the Earth, but also as to its Conflagration and Renovation: For the Theorist always puts those great Revolutions under the particular Conduct and Moderation of Providence. Lastly, As to the whole Universe, he is far from making that the Product either of _Chance_ or _Necessity_, or of any purely material or mechanical Causes; as you may see at large in the two last Chapters of the _Theory_, _Book_ II. So that what this Author hath said (rudely enough, according to his Way) of _Mr. Wotton_, _Introd._ _p._ 15. that _he either understands no Geometry, or else that he never read_ D.C. _his Principles_, may with a little Change be apply’d to himself in this Case, that either he never read over, or does not remember, or, which is still worse, does wilfully misrepresent what the Theorist hath wrote upon this Subject. The Sum of all is this, _Deus non deficit in necessariis, nec redundat in superfluis_: God is the God of Nature; and the Laws of Nature are his Laws: These we are to follow so far as they will go, and where they fall short, we must rise to higher Principles; but we ought not to introduce a needless Exercise of the divine Power, for a Cover to our Ignorance.

To conclude this Chapter, I will leave one Advertisement with the Examiner concerning the Chaos. When he speaks of the World’s rising from the _Mosaick_ Chaos, if by _World_ he understand the whole Universe, as he seems to do; not this inferior World only, but the fix’d Stars also, and all the Heavens: If that, I say, be his Meaning and Opinion, he will meet with other Opponents besides the Theorist, that will contest that Point with him.

We come now to the third Chapter, concerning the _Mountains_ of the Earth, which is a subject indeed that deserves Consideration, seeing it reaches to the three fundamental Propositions before mentioned, and the Form of the ante-diluvian Earth; which Form the Examiner would have to be the same with that of the present Earth, to have had Mountains and Rocks, an open Chanel of the Sea, with all the Cavities and Irregularities within or without the Surface of it, as at present. If he can prove this, he needs go no farther; he may spare his Pains for the rest: I’ll undertake that the Theorist shall make no farther Defence of his Theory, if the Examiner can make good Proof of this one Conclusion. But, on the other Hand, the Examiner ought to be so ingenuous as to acknowledge that all that he hath said besides, till this be prov’d, can be of little or no Effect, as to the Substance of the Theory. Let us then consider how he raises Mountains and Rocks, and gives us an Account of all the other Inequalities that we find in the present Form of the Earth, by an immediate Formation or Deduction from the Chaos.

To shew this, he supposes, _p._ 49, 51. that the Chaos had Mountains and Rocks swimming in it, or, according to his Expression, _huge Lumps of solid Matter_. These are Things, I confess, which I never heard of before in a Chaos; which hath been always describ’d and suppos’d a Mass of fluid Matter all over. But this Author confidently says, p. 48. _We must conclude THEREFORE, that the Chaos was not so fluid a Mass, &c._ This _therefore_ refers us to an antecedent Reason, which is this; he says, _ibid._ to make the Chaos an entirely fluid Mass is hard to be granted, _since the greatest Parts of Bodies we have in the Earth, at least so far as we can discern, are hard and solid, and there is not such a Quantity of Water in the Earth, as would be requisite to soften and liquify them all; besides a great part of them, as Stones and Metals, are uncapable of being liquified by Water_. Very good, what is this to the _Theory_? Does the Theorist any where affirm or suppose that there were Stones or Metals in the Chaos; or that they were liquified by Water? This must refer to some Hypothesis of his own, or to some other Author’s Hypothesis that ran in his Mind: The Theorist owns no such Doctrine or Supposition.

However, let’s consider how this new Idea of a Chaos is consistent with the Laws of Nature: What made these _huge Lumps of solid Matter_, whether Stone or Metal, to swim in the fluid Mass? This is against all Rules of Gravity, and of Staticks, as he seems to acknowledge, and urged it when he thought it to his Purpose. In the precedent Chapter (_p._ 42.) when he speaks of Stones and Minerals, he says, _’Tis certain that these great heavy Bodies must have sunk to the Bottom, if they were left to themselves_: And he that will not allow Dust or little earthy Particles, to float upon an oily Liquor, I wonder how he will make, not little Particles, but these huge solid Lumps of Stone, Metals, or Minerals, to float in the Chaos.

He seems to own and be sensible of this Inconvenience, (_p._ 50) and thereupon finds an Expedient or Evasion which a lesser Wit would not have thought on. He supposes, _p._ 51 that these _huge_ firm solid Lumps were hollow, like empty Bottles, and that would keep them from sinking. But who told him they were hollow? Is not this precarious? Or, if one would use such Terms as he does, is not this _chymerical and ridiculous_? What made those solid firm Lumps hollow? When, or where, or how were their inward Parts scrap’d out of them? Nor would this Hollowness, however they came by it, make them swim, unless there was a mere Vacuum in each of them. If they were filled with the liquid Matter of the Chaos, they would indeed be lighter than if wholly solid; but they would still be heavier than any equal Bulk of the fluid Chaos, and consequently would sink in it; the Preponderancy that would arise from the Shell or solid Part still remaining.

Now let’s consider how such Mountains, or long Ridges of Mountains as we have upon the Earth, were formed and settled by these floating Lumps. He says, _p._ 50, 51. _Part of these Lumps or Masses standing out, or being higher than the Fluid, would compose a Mountain_, as there are _Mountains of Ice that float upon the Northern Seas_. But are not Mountains of Rock and Stone, such as ours commonly are, heavier than Mountains of Ice, that is specifically lighter than Water? This might have been consider’d by the Examiner in drawing the Parallel: And still I’m at a Loss what _Fluid_ it is he means, when he says, These Lumps or Masses _standing out, or being higher than the Fluid_. Does he mean by this Fluid the Whole Chaos? Did these Mountains stand at the Top of the Chaos, partly within, and partly above it? Then what drew them down below, if they stood equally pois’d there in their Fluid, and as high as the Moon, if the Chaos reach’d so high. This, one would think, could not be his Meaning, ’tis so extravagant; and yet there was no other Fluid than the general Chaos, till that was divided and distinguish’d into several Masses. Then, indeed, there was an Abyss, or Region of Waters that covered the interior Earth, and was separate from the Air above. Let us then suppose this Abyss to be the Waters or Fluid this Author means, upon which his Mountains stood; then the rest of the Earth, as it came to be form’d, must be continu’d and join’d with these Mountains, and in like Manner laid over the Waters; so as in this Method, you see, we should have an Orb of Earth built over the Abyss. This is a very favourable Stroke for the Theorist, and grants him in Effect his principal Conclusion, _viz._ That the _first ante diluvian Earth was built over the Abyss_: This being admitted, there could be no universal Deluge without a Disruption of that Earth, and an Eruption of the Abyss, which is a main Point gain’d. And ’tis plain we make no false Logick in collecting this from his Principles and Concessions: For, as we said before, if these Mountains were founded upon the Abyss, they must have a Continuity and Conjunction with the rest of the Surface of the Earth, if they were such as our Mountains are now, and so all the habitable Earth must be spread upon the Abyss.

But still he hath another Difficulty to encounter, how the great Chanel of the Sea was made upon this Supposition: Why was not that Part of the Globe fill’d up by the Descent of the earthy Particles of the Chaos as well as the rest? The Chanel of the Ocean is commonly suppos’d to take up half of the Globe, how came this gaping Gulph to remain unfill’d, seeing it was encompass’d with the Chaos as well as any other Parts? Was the Motion of the Particles suspended from descending upon that Part of the Globe; or were they fill’d up at first, and afterwards thrown out again to make room for the Sea? This may deserve his Consideration, as well as the Mountains: And how dextrous soever this Author may be in other Things I know not, but, in my Mind, he hath no good Hand in making Mountains; and I’m afraid he would have no better Success in forming the Chanel of the Sea, which he is wisely pleased to take no Notice of.

And indeed the Examiner seems to be sensible himself that he hath no good Luck in assigning the _efficient Causes_ of Mountains from the Chaos, and therefore he is willing to bear off from that Point, and to lay the whole Stress upon their _final Causes_, without any regard to their Origin, or how they came first into being. His Words are these, _p._ 52. _But supposing the efficient Causes of Mountains unknown, or impossible to be assign’d, yet still there remain the final Causes to be enquir’d into, which will do as well for our Purpose_, with what follows there concerning those Authors that exclude final Causes. If there be such Authors, let them answer for themselves, the Theorist is not concern’d. Grant the first Point, that Mountains could not arise from any known efficient Causes in the first Concretion of the Chaos, or in the first habitable Earth that rose from it, the Theorist readily allows (as appears fully in the two last Chapters of the second Book of the _Eng. Theor._) the Use of final Causes in the Contemplation of Nature, as being great Arguments of the Wisdom and Goodness of God. But this ought not to exclude the efficient Causes in a _Theory_, otherwise it would be no _Theory_, but a Work of another Nature. Though a Man knew the final Cause of a Watch or Clock, namely, to tell him the Hour of the Day, yet, if he did not know the Construction of its Parts, what was the Spring of Motion, what the Order of the Wheels, and how they mov’d the Hand of the Dial, he could not be said to understand that little Machine; or at least not to understand it so well as he that knew the Construction and Dependence of all its Parts, in virtue whereof that Effect was brought to pass. In many Cases we do not understand the final Causes, and in many we do not understand the efficient; but, notwithstanding, we must endeavour, so far as we are able, to join and understand them both; the End and the Means to it: For by the one, as well as the other, the divine Power and Wisdom are illustrated; and seeing every Effect hath its efficient Cause, if we cannot reach it, we must acknowledge our Speculations to be so far imperfect.

After this Excursion about final Causes, he concludes, _p._ 54. _That it is impossible to subsist or live without Rocks or Mountains_; consequently no Earth is habitable without Rocks and Mountains. But how can he tell this? Hath he been all over the Universe to make his Observations? or hath he had a Revelation to tell him that there is no one habitable Planet throughout all the Works of God, but what is of the same Form with our Earth as to Rocks and Mountains. Who hath ever observ’d Mountains and Rocks in _Jupiter_, or in the Remains of _Saturn_? I should think such a general Assertion as he makes, a bold and unwarrantable Limitation of the divine Omniscience and Omnipotency. Who dares conclude that the infinite Wisdom and Power of God is confin’d to one single Mode or Fabrick of an habitable World? We know there are many Planets about our Sun besides this Earth, and of different Positions and Constructions: Neither do we know but there may be as many about other Suns, or fix’d Stars: Must we suppose that they are all cast in the same Mold? that they are all formed after the Model of our Earth, with Mountains and Rocks, and Gulphs and Caverns?

_Urbem, quam dicunt Romam, Melibœe, putavi
Stultus ego, huic nostræ similem._

This was the Judgment of the Shepherd, who could imagine nothing different, or nothing better than his own Town or Village; those may imitate him that please. ’Tis true, _Suum cuique pulchrum_, is an usual Saying, but we think that to proceed from Fondness rather, and Self-Conceit, than from a true and impartial Judgment of Things. In contemplating the Works of God, we ought to have Respect to his Almighty and Infinite Wisdom, τῆν πολυπαίκιλον σοφίαν, _multiformem sapientiam Dei_, rather than to the Measures of our own Experience and Understanding. We may remember how an[23] Heathen hath upbraided and derided that Narrowness of Spirit, _Quæ tantæ sunt animi angustiæ, ut si Seryphi natus esses, nec unquam egrossus ex Insulá, in quâ Lepusculos Vulpeculasque sæpe vidisses, non crederes Leones & Pantheras esse, cúm tibi quales essent diceretur: Si verò de Elephanto quis diceret, etiam rideri te putares._ We may as well say, that there can be no Animals of another Form from those we have upon this Earth, as that there can be no Worlds, or habitable Earths of another Form and Structure from the present Earth. _An quicquam tam puerile dici potest_, says the same Author, _quám si ea genera belluarum quæ in Rubro mari, Indiâve gignantur, nulla esse dicamus? Atqui ne curiosissimi quidem homines exquirendo andire tam multa possunt, quam sunt multa quæ Terræ, Mari, Paludibus, Fluminibus existunt; quæ negemus esse quia nunquam vidimus?_ I mention such Instances to shew, that ’tis Rashness or Folly, to confine the Varieties of Providence and Nature, to the narrow Compass of what we have seen, or of what falls under our Imagination. This is a more _strange and assuming Boldness_, as he terms it, _p._ 54 than what he ascribes to the Theorist for saying, We can observe no Order in the Situation of Mountains, nor Regularity in their Form and Shape. If the Examiner knows any, why does he not tell us what it is, and wherein it consists? Is it necessary that Mountains should be exact Pyramids or Cones, or any of the regular Bodies? or rang’d upon the Earth in Rank and File, or in a quincuncial Order, or like pretty Garden-Knots? If they had been design’d for Beauty, this might have done well; but Providence seems on Purpose to have left these Irregularities in their Figure and Site, as Marks and Signatures to us, that they are the Effects of a Ruin.

But to shew farther and more particularly the Necessity of Mountains, the Examiner says, _p._ 55. and 61. Without them ’tis impossible there should be Rivers, or without Rivers an habitable World. Neither of these Propositions seems to me to be sure; they run still upon Impossibilities, which is a nice Topick, and lies much out of our Reach. I think Vapours may be condens’d other Ways than by Mountains, and an Earth might be so fram’d, as to give a Course to Rivers, though there were no particular Mountains, if the general Figure of it was higher in one Part than another. Then as to the absolute Necessity of Rivers, to make an Earth habitable, that is questionable too. We are told by good Authors, of some Countries or Islands that have no Rivers or Springs, and yet are habitable and fruitful, being water’d by Dews. This may give us an Advertisement, from a Part to the Whole, that an Earth may be made habitable without Rivers. If at first Vapours ascended, and fell down in Dews, so as to _water the whole Face of the Earth_, _Gen._ ii. 6. God might, if he had pleas’d, have continued the same Course of Nature. And it is the Opinion of many Interpreters, and seems to have been an antient Tradition, that there was no Rain till the Deluge. If there was no Rainbow in the first Earth, (which I think the Theorist hath undeniably prov’d, _Theor._ _Book_ II. _c._ 5.) it will be hard to prove that there were then any watery Clouds in the habitable Parts of the Earth. And our best[24] Observators will allow no Clouds or Rains in the Moon, (and some of them no Rivers,) yet will not suppose the Moon unhabitable. To conclude, ’tis a great Vanity to say no worse, for short-sighted Creatures, and of narrow Understandings, to prescribe to Providence what is necessary and indispensable to the Frame and Order of an habitable World.

We proceed to his fourth Chapter; which is to shew the Inconveniencies that would fall upon the Inhabitants of the Earth, in case it had such a Posture as the Theorist hath assign’d to the ante-diluvian Earth: Namely, that its Axis was parallel to the Axis of the Ecliptick, or perpendicular to its Plane, and not oblique as it stands now. But will this Author vouch, that there are no habitable Planets in the Universe, or even about our Sun, that have this Posture which he blames so much? _Jupiter_ is known to have a perpetual Equinox, and his Axis parallel to the Axis of the Ecliptick; and _Mars_ hath little or no Obliquity that is observable. And must this be a Reflection upon Providence? Or must we suppose, that these Planets have no Inhabitants, or that their Habitations are very bad and incommodious? _Jupiter_ is the noblest Planet we have in our Heaven, whether you consider its Magnitude, or the Number of its Attendants. If then a Planet of that Order and Dignity, have such a Position and Aspect to the Sun, why might not our Earth have had the same, proper to that State, and agreeable to the Divine Wisdom? Yet he is so bold as to say, or suppose, _p._ 66. That _this cannot well agree with the infinite Wisdom of its Maker_; as if he was able to make a Measure or Standard for all the Works of God. ’Tis a crude and injudicious Thing, from a few Particulars, the rest unknown, to make an universal Conclution, which forward Wits are apt to do. Πρὸς ὀλίγα ἐπιθλεψάμενετ.—_Ad pauca respiciens, facile pronuncias_, was _Aristotle_’s Observation of old, and it holds in all Ages.

This Examiner, _p._ 76. censures the Theorist very rudely, for making use of _physical Causes_, and not arguing from _final Causes_, which, he says, _are the true Principles of natural Philosophy_. But, if this be the Use he makes of final Causes, to tell God Almighty what is best to be done, in this or that World, I had rather content myself with _physical Causes_, to know what God hath done, and conclude it to be the best, and that we should judge it so, if we had the same Extent of Thought and Prospect its Maker had. There are indeed some _final Causes_ that are so manifest, that I should think it Sottishness or Obstinacy for a Man to deny them; but I should also think that Man presumptuous, that should pretend to draw the Scheme and Plan of every World, from his Idea of _final Causes_. There are some Men that mightily cry out against _Reason_, yet none more fond of it than they are, when they can get it on their Side: So some Men inveigh against _physical Causes_, when others make use of them, and yet as gladly as any make use of them themselves, when they can make them serve their Purpose; and when they cannot reach them, then they despise them, and are all for _final Causes_. This Author says, _p._ 63. God always _chuses such Constitutions and Positions of Things, as bring with them the greatest Good and Utility to the Universe_. Very true, to the _Universe_? but who made him judge what is best to the Universe? Does he look upon this Earth as the Universe, whereof it is but a small Particle, or an Atom in comparison? Must there be no Variety in the numberless Worlds which God hath made? Must they all be one and the same Thing repeated again and again? That I’m sure does not _well agree with the infinite Wisdom and Power of God_.

But suppose we did confine our Thoughts to this Earth, we may be assur’d that it hath undergone and will undergo, within the Compass of its Duration, very different States, and yet all accommodate to Providence. Those that suppose the Heavens and the Earth never to have had any other Constitution and Construction than what they have now, or that there hath never been any great Change and Revolution in our natural World, follow the very Doctrine which St. _Peter_ opposes and confutes in his _second Epistle_, Chap. 3. I mean the Doctrine of those _Scoffers_, as he calls them, who said, _All Things_, the Heavens and the Earth, _have remained in the same State they are in now, from the Beginning_, or from the Creation, and are to continue so. In Confutation of this Opinion, St. _Peter_ there minds them of the Change made at the Deluge, and of the different Constitution and Construction of the Heavens and the Earth, before and after the Deluge, whereby they were dispos’d to undergo a different Fate, one by Water, and the other by Fire. And he tells us in the same Place, that after the Conflagration, there will be _new Heaven_; and a _new Earth_: So that there is no one fix’d and permanent State even of this Earth, according to the Will and Wisdom of Providence. But enough hath been said by the Theorist upon this Subject (_Theor. Lat._ _l._ 1. _c._ 1 & 2. _Review_, p. 160. _&c._ _Archæol._ _l._ 2. _c._ 3, 5, 6.) And if they will not consider the Arguments propos’d there, ’twould be in vain to repeat them here.

These Things premis’d, let’s consider what Inconveniencies are alledged, or what Arguments against that Equality of Seasons, or the grand Cause of them, the Parallelism of the Axis of the Earth, with the Axis of the Sun. He says, upon this Supposition, there is more Heat now in the Climates of the Earth, than could have been then. And what if there be? Whether his Computation (which is aim’d against another Author) be true or false, ’tis little to the _Theory_: If the Heat was equal and moderate in the temperate and habitable Climates, who would desire the extreme Heats of Summer? But he says, _p._ 66. That Heat would not be sufficient for the Generation of Vegetables. How does that appear? supposing that Heat constant throughout the whole Year. Does he think there are no Vegetables in _Jupiter_, which hath still the same Position the Theorist gave to the ante-diluvian Earth. And as to Heat, that Planet is at vastly a greater Distance from the Sun than our Earth, and consequently hath so much less Heat; yet I cannot believe that great Planet to be only a huge Lump of bald and barren Earth. As to our ante-diluvian Earth, ’tis probable that the Constitution of Plants and Animals, was different then from what it is now, as their Longevity was different, to which any Excesses of Heat or Cold are noxious; and the Frequency and Multiplicity of Generations and Corruptions in the present Earth, is Part of that Vanity to which it was subjected. But this Examiner says moreover, If the first Earth had that Position, the greatest Part of it would not be habitable. But how much less habitable would it be than the present Earth? where the open Sea, which was not then, takes up half of its Surface, and makes it unhabitable. ’Tis likely the torrid Zone was unhabitable in that Earth; but ’tis probable the Poles or Polar Parts were more habitable than they are now, seeing they would have the Sun, or rather Half-Sun perpetually in their Horizon: And as to the temperate Climates, as we call them, they would be under such a gentle and constant Warmth, as would be more grateful to the Inhabitants, and more proper and effectual for a continual Verdure and Vegetation, than any Region of the present Earth is now.

But this Objector does not consider, on the other hand, what an hard Life they would lead in those Days, at least in many Parts of the Earth, if the Seasons of the Year were the same they are now, and they confin’d to Herbs, Fruits, and Water; for that was the Diet of Mankind till the Deluge. Should we not think it an unmerciful Imposition now, to be interdicted the Use of Flesh-Meat all the Year long? Or rather is it possible that the Life of Man could be supported by Herbs and Fruits, and Water in the colder Climates, where the Winters are so long and barren, and the Cold so vehement? But, if you suppose a perpetual Spring throughout the Earth, the Heavens mild, and the Juices of Fruits and Plants more nutritive, that Objection would cease, and their Longevity be more intelligible.

We come now to the Causes of the Change in the Posture of the Earth, where the Theorist hath set down his Conjectures, what he thought the most probable to be the Occasion of it: Namely, either some Inequality in the Libration of the Earth, after it was dissolved and broken; or a Change in the Magnetism of its Body, consequent upon its Dissolution, and the different Situation of its Parts. But this Examiner will neither allow any Change to have been made in the Position of the Earth since the Beginning of the World; nor, if there was a Change, that it could be made from such Causes. The first of these Points you see is Matter of Fact; and so it must be prov’d, partly by History, and partly by Reason. Some Things are noted before, which argue that the ante-diluvian Earth was different from the present, in its Frame and Constitution, as also in reference to the Heavens; and the Places are referred to, where the Matter is treated more largely by the Theorist. If it be granted, that there was a permanent Change made in the State of Nature at the Deluge, or any other Time, but deny’d that it was made by a Change of the Situation of the Earth, and the Consequences of it, then this Writer must assign some other Change made, which would have the same Effects; that is, which will answer and agree with the Phænomena of the first Earth, and also of the present. When this is done, if it be clear and convictive, we must acquiesce in it: But I do not see that it is so much as attempted by this Author.

This suppos’d Change, I say, is Matter of Fact, and therefore we must consult History and Reason for the Proof or Disproof of it. As to History, the Theorist hath cited to this Purpose _Leucippus_, _Anaxagoras_, _Democritus_, _Empedocles_, _Plato_ and _Diogenes_. These were the most renowned Philosophers amongst the Antients; and all these speak of an Inclination of the Earth or the Poles, which hath been made in former Ages. These, one would think, might be allow’d as good Witnesses of a former Tradition concerning a Change in the Situation of the Earth, when nothing is brought against them. And this Change is particularly call’d by _Plato_ ἀναρμοσία or ἀνωμαλία, a Disharmony or Disconcerting of the Motions of the Heavens, which he makes the Source and Origin of the present Evils and Inconveniencies of Nature. Besides, he dates this Change from the Expiration of the Reign of _Saturn_, or when _Jupiter_ came to take the Government upon him: And this, you know, in the Style of those Times, signifies the End of the Golden Age. Thus far _Plato_ carries the Tradition: Now, the Poets tell us expressly that there was a _perpetual Spring_, or a perpetual Equinox in the Time of _Saturn_, and that the Inequality of the Year, or the Diversity of Seasons was first introduc’d by _Jupiter_. The Authors and Places are known and noted by the Theorist; I need not repeat them here. You see what this Evidence amounts to, both that there hath been a Change, and such a Change, as alter’d the Course of the Year, and brought in a Vicissitude of Seasons; and this according to the Doctrines or Traditions remaining amongst the Heathens. The _Jews_ and _Christians_ say the same Thing, but in another Manner: They do not speak of the Golden Age, nor of the Reign of _Saturn_ or _Jupiter_, but of the State of Paradise, or _Gan-Eden_; and concerning that, they say the same Things, which the Heathen Authors say, in different Words. The _Jews_ make a perpetual Equinox in Paradise, the _Christians_ a perpetual Serenity, a perpetual Spring; and this cannot be without a different Situation of the Earth from what it hath now. He may see the Citations if he please, in the _Theory_, or _Archæologia_.

It were to be wish’d, that this Examiner would look a little into Antiquity, when he hath Time: It may be, that would awaken him into new Thoughts, and a more favourable Opinion of the Theory as to this Particular. Give me leave to mind him in his own Way, what some antient Astronomers have said relating to this Subject. _Baptista Mantuanus_, speaking of the Longevity of the Ante-Diluvians, says, _Erant illis, ut Astronomia & Experimento constat, Cœli propitiores; volunt namque Astronomi_, _&c._ This he explains by an uniform and concentrical Motion of the Heavens and the Earth, at that Time; to which he imputes the great Virtue of their Herbs and Fruit, and the long Lives of their Animals. _Petrus Aponensis_, who liv’d above an Age before _Mantuan_, give us much what the same Account: For making an Answer to this Question, _utrum natura humania sit debilitata ab eo quod antiquitus, necne?_ He says, _Cum capita Zodiaci mobilis & immobilis ordinati & directè concurrebant, tunc virtus perfectiori modò à primo principio per medias causastaliter ordinatas fortiori modo imprimebatur in ista inferiora, cum causæ tunc sib invicem correspondeant——Propter quod concludendum est, tunc naturam humanam illo tempore, ut sic fortiorem & longæviorem extitisse._ I give it in his own Words as they are in his _Conciliator. Differ. 9._

_Georgius Pictorius_, or an Author under his Name, unto the same Question about the Longevity of the Ante-diluvians, gives a like Answer from the same Astronomer, in these Words: _Petrus Aponensis adsert rationem, & pro vario cursu & dispositione coelorum modo vitam humanam breviari, modo produci seribit. Ex Astronomiá argumentum colligens, cùm ait duos Zodiacos, unum in noná sphærâ, alterum in octava (quam Firmamentum vocani) in initio rerum & temporum, sic à Deo fuisse dispositos, ut Aries Arieti, Taurus Tauro, Geminis Gemini jungerentur: & amborum cocuntibus in unum viribus fortior in Terras fieret fluxus. Unde herbas tunc salubriores & fructus terræ meliores, & longiores vitas animantium fuisse affirmat. Sed dennò illá syderali dissolutá ab invicem per motum societate, totum ait inferiorem mundum ægrotare, atque per decrementum claudicare cæpisse._ This, you see, is Astronomy in an old-fashion’d Dress; but you can easily take off the Disguise, and apply it to the true System of the Heavens. The same Author refers you, for a more full Explication of that Matter, to his _Lectiones succisivæ, Dial. prim._ which Book I have not yet had an Opportunity to see. I believe it is in his _Opera Philologica_, printed in _Octavo_ at _Basil_.