Chapter XVI: Book II (6)

YOU’ll say, it may be, the Frame of the World was not the Result of Counsel and Consultation, but of _Necessity_; Matter being once in Motion under the Conduct of those Laws that are essential to it, it wrought it self by Degrees from one State into another, till at length it came into the present Form which we call the World. These are Words thrown out at Random, without any Pretence of Ground, only to see if they can be confuted; and so they may easily be; for we have shewn already, that if Matter had innate Motion, it would be so far from running into the orderly and well dispos’d Frame of the World, that it would run into no Frame at all, into no Forms or Compositions, or Diversity of Bodies; but would either be all fluid, or all solid; either every single Particle in a separate Motion, or all in one continued Mass, with an universal Tremor, or Inclination to move without actual Separation; and either of these two States is far from the Form of a World. Secondly, As to the Laws of Motion, as some of them are essential to Matter, so others are not demonstrable, but upon Supposition of an Author of Nature. And thirdly, Tho’ all the Laws of Motion be admitted, they cannot bring Matter into the Form of a World, unless some Measures be taken at first by an intelligent Being; I say, some Measures be taken to determine the primary Motions upon which the rest depend, and to put them in a Way that leads to the Formation of a World. The Mass must be divided into Regions, and Centers fixt, and Motions appropriated to them; and it must be consider’d of what Magnitude the first Bodies, or the first Divisions of Matter should be, and how mov’d: Besides, there must be a determinate Proportion, and certain Degree of Motion imprest upon the universal Matter, to qualify it for the Production of a World; if the Dose was either too strong or too weak, the Work would miscarry; and nothing but infinite Wisdom could see thro’ the Effects of every Proportion, or every new degree of Motion, and discern which was best for the Beginning, Progress, and Perfection of a World. So you see the Author of Nature is no Way excluded, or made useless by the Laws of Motion; nor if Matter was promiscuously mov’d, would these be sufficient Causes of themselves to produce a World, or that regular Diversity of Bodies that compose it.

BUT ’tis hard to satisfy Men against their Inclinations, or their Interest: And as their Regularity of the Universe was always a great Stumbling-stone to the _Epicureans_; so they have endeavour’d to make Shifts of all Sorts to give an Account and Answer to it, without Recourse to an intelligent Principle; and for their last Refuge, they say, that Chance might bring that to pass, which Nature and Necessity could not do; the Atoms might hit upon a lucky Set of Motions, which, tho’ it were casual and fortuitous, might happily lead them to the forming of a World. A lucky hit indeed, for Chance to frame a World: But this is a mere Shuffle and Collusion; for if there was nothing in Nature but Matter, there could be no such Thing as _Chance_, all would be pure _Mechanical Necessity_; and so this Answer, tho’ it seem very different, is the same in effect with the former, and _Epicurus_ with his anatomists are oblig’d to give a just mechanical Account, how all the Parts of Nature, the most compound and elaborate Parts not excepted, rise from their Atoms by pure Necessity: There could be no accidental Concourse or Coalition of them, every step, every motion, every composition was fatal and necessary, and therefore ’tis Nonsense for an _Epicurean_ to talk of Chance, as Chance is oppos’d to Necessity; and if they oppose it to _Counsel_ and _Wisdom_, ’tis little better than Nonsense, to say the World and all its Furniture rose by Chance, in that Notion of it. But it will deserve our Patience a little, to give a more full and distinct Answer to this, seeing it reacheth all their Pleas and Evasions at once.

WHAT Proof or Demonstration of Wisdom and Counsel can be given, or can be desir’d, that is not found in some Part of the World, animate or inanimate? We know but a little Portion of the Universe, a mere Point in Comparison, and a broken Point too; and yet in this broken Point, or some small Parcels of it, there is more of Art, Counsel and Wisdom shewn, than in all the Works of Men taken together, or than in all our _Artificial_ World. In the Construction of the Body of an Animal, there is more of Thought and Contrivance, more of exquisite Invention, and fit Disposition of Parts, than is in all the Temples, Palaces, Ships, Theatres, or any other Pieces of Architecture the World ever yet saw: And not Architecture only, but all other Mechanism whatsoever, Engines, Clock-work, or any other, is not comparable to the Body of a living Creature. Seeing then we acknowledge these artificial Works, wheresoever we meet with them, to be the Effects of Wit, Understanding and Reason, is it not manifest Partiality, or Stupidity rather, to deny the Works of Nature, which excel these in all Degrees, to proceed from an intelligent Principle? Let them take any Piece of humane Art, or any Machine fram’d by the Wit of Man, and compare it with the Body of an Animal, either for Diversity and Multiplicity of Workmanship, or Curiosity in the minute Parts, or just Connexion and Dependance of one Thing upon another, or fit Subserviency to the Ends propos’d, of Life, Motion, Use and Ornament to the Creature; and if in all these Respects they find it superior to any Work of humane Production, (as they certainly must do) why should it be thought to proceed from inferior and senseless Causes? Ought we not in this, as well as in other Things, to proportion the Causes to the Effect, and to speak Truth, and bring in an honest Verdict for Nature as well as Art?

IN the Composition of a perfect Animal, there are four several Frames or Compages join’d together, the natural, vital, animal and genital: Let them examine anyone of these apart, and try if they can find any Thing defective or superfluous, or any Way inept for Matter or Form. Let them view the whole Compages of the Bones, and especially the admirable Constitution, Texture, and Disposition of the Muscles, which are join’d with them for moving the Body, or its Parts. Let them take an Account of the little Pipes and Conduits for the Juices and the Liquors, of their Form and Distribution; or let them take any single Organ to examine, as the Eye, or the Ear, the Hand, or the Heart: In each of these they may discover such Arguments of Wisdom, and of Art, as will either convince them, or confound them; tho’ still they must leave greater undiscover’d. We know little the insensible Form and Contexture of the Parts of the Body, nor the just Method of their Action: We know not yet the Manner, Order and Causes of the Motion of the Heart, which is the chief Spring of the whole Machine; and with how little Exactness do we understand the Brain, and the Parts belonging to it? Why of that Temper and of that Form: How Motions are propagated there, and how conserv’d: How they answer the several Operations of the Mind: Why such little Discomposures of it disturb our Senses, and upon what little Differences in this the great Differences of Wits and Genius’s depend. Yet seeing in all these Organs, whose Make and Manner of Action we cannot discover, we see however by the Effects, that they are truly fitted for those Offices to which Nature hath design’d them, we ought in Reason to admire that Art which we cannot penetrate. At least we cannot but judge it a Thing absurd, that what we have not Wit enough to find out or comprehend, we should not allow to be an Argument of Wit and Understanding in the Author, or Inventor of it. This would be against all Logick, common Sense, and common _Decorum_. Neither do I think it possible to the Mind of Man, while we attend to Evidence, to believe that these, and such like Works of Nature came by _Chance_, as they call it, or without Providence, Forecast and Wisdom, either in the first Causes, or in the proximate; in the Design, or in the Execution; in the Preparation to them, or in the finishing of them.

WHEREFORE, in my Judgment, if any be of this Persuasion, it cannot be so much the Effect of their Understanding, as of their Disposion and Inclination; and in moral Things, Mens Opinions do as often spring from the one, as from the other. For my Part, I do generally distinguish of two Sorts of Opinions in all Men, _Inclination-opinions_, and _Reason’d-opinions_; Opinions that grow upon Mens Complexions, and Opinions that are the Results of their Reason; and I meet with very few that are of a Temperament so equal, or a Constitution so even pois’d, but that they incline to one Set of Opinions rather than another, antecedently to all Proofs of Reason: And when they have espous’d their Opinions from that secret Sympathy, then they find out as good Reasons as they can, to maintain them, and say, nay think sometimes, that ’twas for the sake of those Reasons that they first embrac’d them. We may commonly distinguish these Inclination-opinions from the rational, because we find them accompanied with more Heat than Light, a great deal of Eagerness and Impatience in defending of them, and but slender Arguments. One might give Instances of this, both in Sects of Religion and Philosophy, in _Platonists_, _Stoicks,_ and _Epicureans_, that are so by their Temper more than their Reason; but to our Purpose it will be sufficient to instance in one hearty _Epicurean_, _Lucretius_, who is manifestly such, more from his Inclination, and the Bent of his Spirit, than from the Force of Argument. For tho’ his Suppositions be very precarious, and his Reasonings all along very slight, he will many times strut and triumph, as if he had rested the Thunder out of _Jove_’s right Hand; and a Mathematician is not more confident of his Demonstration, than he seems to be of the Truth of his shallow Philosophy. From such a Principle of natural Complexion as this, I allow a Man may be Athestical, but never from the calm Dictate of his Reason; yet he may be as confident and as tenacious of his Conclusion, as if he had a clear and distinct Evidence for it. For I take it to be a true Maxim in humane Nature, that _a strong Inclination, with a little Evidence, is equivalent to a strong Evidence_. And therefore we are not to be surpriz’d if we find Men confident in their Opinions many times far beyond the Degree of their Evidence, seeing there are other Things, besides Evidence, that incline the Will to one Conclusion rather than another. And as I have instanc’d in natural Complexion, so _Interest_ hath the same Effect upon humane Nature, because it always begets an Inclination to those Opinions that favour our Interest, and a Disinclination to the contrary: And this Principle may be another Ingredient, and secret Persuasive to Atheism; for when Men have run themselves so deep into Vice and Immorality, that they expect no Benefit from a God, ’tis in a Manner necessary to their Quiet, and the Ease of their Mind, that they should fancy there is none; for they are afraid, if there be a God, that he will not stand neuter, and let them alone in another World. This, I say, is necessary to the Quiet of their Mind, unless they can attain that great Art, which many labour after, of _Non-reflection_, or an _unthinking Faculty_, as to God and a World to come. But to return to our Argument, after this short Digression——

AND as that regular Diversity which we see in the Forms of Nature, and especially in the Bodies of Animals, could not be from any blind Principle, either of Necessity or of Chance; so in the last Place, that _Subordination_ which we see in the Parts of Nature, and Subserviency to one another, the less Noble to the more Noble, the Inanimate to the Animate, and all Things upon Earth unto Man, must needs have been the Effect of some Being higher than Matter; that did wisely dispose all Things so at first, and doth still conserve them in the same order. If Man had been born into the World, and a numerous Host of Creatures, without any Provision or Accommodation made for their Subsistence and Conveniences, we might have suspected that they had come by Chance, and therefore were so ill provided for: But which of them can complain? Thro’ their various kinds and orders, what is there awanting? They are all fitted to their several Elements, and their ways of living, Birds, Beasts, and Fishes, both by the Form and Shape of their Bodies, the manner of their Covering, and the Quality of their Food. Besides, they are instructed in little Arts and Instincts for their Conservation; and not only for their proper Conservation, but also to find a way to make and bring up young ones, and leave behind them a Posterity: And all this in so fit a Method, and by such a pretty Train of Actions, as is really admirable.

MAN is the Master of all, and of him a double Care is taken; that he should neither want what Nature can afford, nor what Art can supply. He could not be provided of all Conveniences by Nature only, especially to secure him against the Injuries of the Air; but in Recompence, Nature hath provided Materials for all those Arts which she saw would be needful in humane Life, as Building, Cloathing, Navigation, Agriculture, _&c._ that so Mankind might have both wherewithal to answer their Occasions, and also to employ their Time, and exercise their Ingenuity. This Oeconomy of Nature, as I may call it, or well ordering of the great Family of living Creatures, is an Argument both of Goodness and of Wisdom, and is every way far above the Powers of Brute Matter. All regular Administration we ascribe to Conduct and Judgment: If an Army of Men be well provided for, in things necessary both for Food, Cloaths, Arms, Lodging, Security and Defence, so as nothing is awanting in so great a Multitude, we suppose it the Effect of Care and Forecast in those Persons that had the Charge of it: They took their Measures at first, computed and proportion’d one thing to another, made good Regulations, and gave Orders for convenient Supplies. And can we suppose the great Army of Creatures upon Earth, managed and provided for with less Fore-thought and Providence, nay, with none at all, by mere Chance? This is to recede from all Rules and Analogy of Reason, only to serve a Turn, and gratify an unreasonable Humour.

TO conclude this Argument; there are two general Heads of things, if I recollect aright, which we make the Marks and Characters of Wisdom and Reason, Works of Art, and the Conduct of Affairs or Direction of Means to an End; and wheresoever we meet, either with regular material Works, or a regular Ordination of Affairs, we think we have a good Title and Warrant to derive them from an intelligent Author: Now these two being found in the natural World, and that in an eminent Degree, the one in the Frame of it, and the other in the Oeconomy of it, we have all the Evidence and Ground that can be, in arguing from Things visible to Things invisible, that there is an Author of Nature, superior both to humane Power and humane Wisdom.

BEFORE we proceed to give any further Proofs or Discoveries of the Author of Nature, let us reflect a little upon those we have already insisted upon; which have been taken wholly from the material World, and from the common Course of Nature. The very Existence of Matter is a Proof of a Deity, for the _Idea_ of it hath no Connexion with Existence, as we shall shew hereafter; however we will take leave now to set it down with the rest in Order as they follow one another.

1. _The Existence of Matter._

2. _The Motion of Matter._

3. _The just Quantity and Degree of that Motion._

4. _The first Form of the Universe upon Motion imprest; both as to
the Divisions of Matter, and the Leading Motions._

5. _The Laws for Communication and Regulation of that Motion._

6. _The regular Effects of it, especially in the Animate World._

7. _The Oeconomy of Nature, and fit Subordination of one part of the
World to another._

_The_ five first of these Heads are Prerequisites and Preparatives to the Formation of a World, and the two last are as the Image and Character of its Maker, of his Power, Goodness and Wisdom, imprest upon it. Every one of them might well deserve a Chapter to it self, if the Subject was to be treated on at large; but this is only an occasional Dissertation, to state the Powers of Matter, lest they should be thought boundless, and the Author of Nature unnecessary, as the _Epicureans_ pretend; but notwithstanding their vain Confidence and Credulity, I defy them, or any Man else, to make Sense of the material World, without placing a God at the Center of it.

TO these Considerations, taken wholly from the corporeal World, give me leave to add one of a mix’d Nature, concerning the _Union of our Soul and Body_. This strange Effect, if rightly understood, doth as truly discover the Author of Nature, as many Effects that are accounted more supernatural. The Incarnation, as I may so say, of a spiritual Substance is to me a kind of standing Miracle; that there should be such an Union and Connexion reciprocally betwixt the Motions of the Body, and the Actions and Passions of the Soul; betwixt a Substance intellectual, and a Parcel of organiz’d Matter, can be no Effect of either of those Substances; being wholly distinct in themselves, and remote in their Natures from one another. For Instance, when my finger is cut, or when ’tis burnt, that my Soul thereupon should feel such a smart and violent Pain, is no Consequence of Nature, or does not follow from any Connexion there is betwixt the Motion or Division of that Piece of Matter, I call my Finger, and the Passion of that Spirit I call my Soul; for these are two distinct Essences, and in themselves independent upon one another, as much as the Sun and my Body are independent; and there is no more Reason in strict Nature, or in the essential Chain of Causes and Effects, that my Soul should suffer, or be affected with this Motion in the Finger, than that the Sun should be affected with it; nay, there is less Reason, if less can be, for the Sun being corporeal, as the Finger is, there is some remote Possibility that there might be Communication of Motion betwixt them; but Motion cannot beget a Thought, or a Passion, by its own Force; Motion can beget nothing but Motion, and if it should produce a Thought, the Effect would be more noble than the Cause. Wherefore this Union is not by any Necessity of Nature, but only from a positive institution or Decree, establish’d by the Author of Nature, that there should be such a Communication betwixt these two Substances for a time, _viz._ during the Vitality of the Body.

’TIS true indeed, if Thought, Apprehension, and Reason, was nothing but corporeal Motion, this Argument would be of no Force; but to suppose this, is to admit an Absurdity to cure a Difficulty; to make a Thought out of a local Motion is like making a God out of a Stock, or a Stone; for these two are as remote in their Nature, and have as different _Idea’s_ in the Mind, as any two desperate Things we can propose or conceive; Number and Colour, a Triangle and Virtue, Free-will and a Pyramid, are not more unlike, more distant, or of more different Forms, than Thought and local Motion. Motion is nothing but a Body’s changing its Place and Situation amongst other Bodies, and what Affinity or Resemblance hath that to a _Thought_? How is that like to Pain, or to a Doubt of the Mind? To Hope or to Desire? To the _Idea_ of God? To any Act of the Will or Understanding, as judging, consenting, reasoning, remembring, or any other? These are Things of several Orders that have no Similitude, nor any Mixture of one another. And as this is the Nature of Motion, so, on the other Hand, in a _Thought_ there are two Things, _Consciousness_ and a _Representation_; Consciousness is in all Thoughts indifferently, whether distinct or confus’d, for no Man thinks but he is conscious that he thinks, nor perceives any Thing but he is conscious that he perceives it; there is also in a Thought, especially if it be distinct, a Representation; ’tis the Image of that we think upon, and makes its Objects present to the Mind. Now what hath local Motion to do with either of these two, Consciousness or Representativeness? How doth it include either of them, or hold them any way affix’d to its Nature? I think one may with as good Sense and Reason ask of what Colour a Thought is, Green or Scarlet, as what Sort of Motion it is; for Motion of what Sort soever can never be conscious, nor represent Things as our Thoughts do. I have noted thus much in general, only to shew the different Nature of Motion and Cogitation, that we may be the more sensible that they have no mutual Connexion in us, nor in any other Creature, from their Essence or essential Properties, but by a supervenient Power from the Author of Nature, who hath thus united the Soul and the Body in their Operations.

WE have hitherto only consider’d the ordinary Course of Nature, and what Indications and Proofs of its Author, that affords us: There is another remarkable Head of Arguments from Effects, extraordinary and supernatural, such as Miracles, Prophecies, Inspirations, Prodigies, Apparitions, Witchcraft, Sorceries, _&c._ These, at one Step, lead us to something above Nature, and this is the shortest way and the most Popular; several Arguments are suited to several Tempers, and God hath not left himself without a proper Witness to every Temper that is not willfully blind. Of these Witnesses we now speak of, the most considerable are Miracles, and the most considerable Records of them are the Books of Scripture; which if we consider only as an History, and as having nothing sacred in them more than other good Histories, that is, Truth in Matter of Fact, we cannot doubt but there have been Miracles in the World: That _Moses_ and the Prophets, our Saviour and his Apostles, wrought Miracles, I can no more question, than that _Cæsar_ and _Alexander_ fought Battles, and took Cities. So also that there were true Prophecies and Inspirations, we know from Scripture, only consider’d as a true History. But as for other supernatural Effects that are not recorded there, we have Reason to examine them more strictly before we receive them, at least as to particular Instances; for I am apt to think they are like Lotteries, where there are ten or twenty Blanks for one Prize; but yet if there were no Prizes at all, the Lottery would not have Credit to subsist, and would be cry’d down as a perfect Cheat: So if amongst those many Stories of Prodigies, Apparitions, and Witchcrafts, there were not some true, the very Fame and Thought of them would die from amongst Men, and the first Broachers of them would be hooted at as Cheats. As a false Religion, that hath nothing true and solid mix’d with it, can scarce be fix’d upon Mankind; but where there is a Mixture of true and false, the Strength of the one supports the Weakness of the other. As for Sorcery, the Instances and Examples of it are undeniable; not so much those few scatter’d Instances that happen now and then among us, but such as are more constant, and in a manner National, in some Countries, and amongst barbarous People. Besides, the Oracles, and the Magick that was so frequent amongst the Ancients, shew us that there have been always some Powers more than Humane, tampering with the Affairs of Mankind. But this Topick from Effects, extraordinary and supernatural, being in a great measure Historical, and respecting evil Spirits as well as the Author of Nature, is not so proper for this Place.

THERE is a third Set or Head of Arguments, that to some Tempers are more cogent and convictive than any of these, namely, Arguments _Abstract_ and _Metaphysical_; And these do not only lead us to an Author of Nature in general, but shew us more of his Properties and Perfections; represent him to us as a supreme Deity, infinitely perfect, the Fountain of all Being, and the steady Center of all Things. But Reasons of this Order being of a finer Thread, require more Attention, and some Preparation of Mind to make us discern them well and be duly sensible of them. When a Man hath withdrawn himself from the Noise of this busy World, lock’d up his Senses and his Passions, and every thing that would unite him with it; commanded a general Silence in the Soul, and suffers not a Thought to stir, but what looks inwards; let him then reflect seriously, and ask himself, _What am I_, and _How came I into Being_? If I was Author and Original to my self, surely I ought to feel that mighty Power, and enjoy the Pleasure of it; but, alas, I am conscious of no such Force or Virtue, nor of any thing in my Nature, that should give me necessary Existence; it hath no Connexion with any part of me, nor any Faculty in me, that I can discern. And now that I do exist, from what Causes soever, _Can I secure my self in Being_? Now that I am in Possession, am I sure to keep it? Am I certain that three Minutes hence I shall still exist? I may or I may not, for ought I see; either seems possible in it self; and either is contingent as to me; I find nothing in my Nature that can warrant my Substance for one Day, for one Hour, for one Moment longer. I am nothing but Thoughts, fleeting Thoughts, that chase and extinguish one another; and my Being, for ought I know, is successive, and as dying as they are, and renew’d to me every Moment. This I am sure of, that so far as I know my self, and am conscious what I am, there is no Principle of Immutability, or of necessary and indefectible Existence in my Nature; and therefore I ought in Reason to believe, that I stand or fall at the Mercy of other Causes, and not by my own Will, or my own Sufficiency.

BESIDES, I am very sensible, and in this I cannot be mistaken, that my Nature is in several Respects weak and imperfect, both as to Will and Understanding. I _Will_ many Things in vain and without effect, and I Wish often what I have no Ability to execute or obtain. And as to my Understanding, how defective is it? How little or nothing do I know in Comparison of what I am ignorant of? Almost all the intellectual World is shut up to me, and the far greatest Part of the corporeal; and in those Things that fall under my Cognizance, how often am I mistaken? I am confin’d to a narrow Sphere, and yet within that Sphere I often err; my Conceptions of Things are obscure and confus’d, my reason short-sighted; I am forc’d often to correct my self, or to acknowledge that I have judg’d false, and consented to an Error. In sum, all my Powers I find are limited, and I can easily conceive the same kind of Perfections in higher Degrees than I possess them, and consequently there are Beings, or may be, greater and more excellent than my self, and more able to subsist by their own Power, (Τὸ τέλειον πρότερον τῇ Φύσει τοῦς ἀτελοῦς Arist.) Why should I not therefore believe that my Original is from those Beings rather than from my self? For every Nature, the more great and perfect it is, the nearer it approaches to Necessity of Existence, and to a Power of producing other Things. Yet, the Truth is, it must be acknowledg’d, that so long as the Perfection of those other Beings are limited and finite, tho’ they be far superior to us, there is no Necessity ariseth from their Nature that they should exist; and the same Arguments that we have us’d against our selves, they may, in Proportion, use against themselves; and therefore we must still advance higher to find a self-originated Being, whose Existence must flow immediately from his Essence, or have a necessary Connexion with it.

AND indeed all these different Degrees of higher and higher Perfections, lead us directly to an highest, or supreme Degree, which is infinite and unlimited Perfection. As subordinate Causes lead to the first, so Natures more perfect one than another lead us to a Nature infinitely perfect, which is the Fountain of them all. Thither we must go, if we will follow the Course of Reason, which cannot stop at one more than another, till it arrive there; and being arriv’d there at that sovereign and original Perfection, it finds a firm and immovable Ground to stand upon; the steady Centre of all Being, wherein the Mind rests and is satisfied. All the Scruples or Objections that we mov’d against our selves, or other Creatures, take no Place here: This Being is conscious of an Allsufficiency in it self, and of Immutability as to any Thing else; including in it all the Causes of Existence, or, to speak more properly, all Necessity of Existence. Besides, that _we exist our selves_, notwithstanding the Imperfection and Insufficiency of our Nature, is a just, collateral Proof of the Existence, of this supreme Being; for such an Effect as this cannot be without its Cause, and it can have no other competent Cause but what we mention. And as this Being is its own Origin, so it must needs be capable of producing all Creatures; for whatsoever is possible, must be possible to it; and that Creatures or finite Beings are possible, we both see by Experience, and may also discern by Reason; for those several Degrees of Perfection or Limitations of it, which we mention’d before, are all consistent Notions, and consequently make consistent Natures, and such as may exist; but contingently indeed, and in Dependance upon the first Cause.

THUS we are come at length to a fair Resolution of that great Question, _Whence we are_, and _how_ we continue in Being? And this hath led us by an easy Ascent to the supreme Author of Nature, and the first Cause of all things; and presents us also with such a Scheme and Draught of the Universe, as is clear and rational; every thing in its Order, and in its Place, according to the Dignity of its Nature, and the Strength of its Principles. When the Mind hath rais’d it self into this View of a Being infinitely perfect, ’tis in a Region of Light, hath a free Prospect every Way, and sees all Things from Top to Bottom, as pervious and transparent. Whereas without God and a first Cause, there is nothing but Darkness and Confusion in the Mind, and in Nature; broken Views of Things, short interrupted Glimpses of Light, nothing certain or demonstrative, no Basis of Truth, no Extent of Thought, no Science, no Contemplation.

YOU will say, it may be, ’tis true, something must be _eternal_, and of _necessary Existence_, but why may not _Matter_ be this eternal necessary Being? Then our Souls and all other Intellectual Things must be Parts and Parcels of Matter; and what Pretensions can Matter have to those Properties and Perfections that we find in our Souls, how limited soever? Much less to _necessary Existence_, and those Perfections that are the Foundation of it? What _exists_ eternally, and from it self, its Existence must flow immediately from its Essence, as its Cause, Reason, or Ground; for as Existence hath always something antecedent to it in Order of Nature, so that which is antecedent to it, must infer it by a necessary Connexion, and so may be call’d the Cause, Ground, or Reason of it. And nothing can be such a Ground, but what is a Perfection; nor every Perfection neither, it must be sovereign and infinite Perfection; for from what else can necessary Existence flow, or be infer’d? Besides, if that Being was not infinitely perfect, there might be another Being more powerful than it, and consequently able to oppose and hinder its Existence; and what may be hinder’d is contingent and arbitrary. Now _Matter_ is so far from being a Nature infinitely perfect, that it hath no Perfection at all, but that of bare _Substance_; neither Life, Sense, Will or Understanding; nor so much as Motion from it self; as we have shew’d before. And therefore this brute inactive Mass, which is but, as it were, the Drudge of Nature, can have no Right or Title to that sovereign Prerogative of Self-existence.

WE noted before, as a Thing agreed upon, _that something or other must needs be Eternal_. For if ever there was a Time or State when there was no being, there never could be any. Seeing _Nothing_ could not produce _Something_. Therefore ’tis undeniably true on all Hands, that there was some Being from Eternity. Now, according to our Understanding, _Truth_ is _Eternal_: Therefore, say we, some intellect or intelligent Being. So also the Reasons of _Goodness_ and _Justice_ appear to us Eternal; and therefore some good and just Being is Eternal. Thus much is plain, that these Perfections which bear the Signatures of Eternity upon them, are Things that have no Relation to _Matter_, but relate immediately to an intellectual Being: Therefore some such Being, to whom they originally belong, must be that _Eternal_. Besides, We cannot possibly but judge such a Being more perfect than Matter. Now every Nature, the more perfect it is, the more remote it is from _Nothing_; and the more remote it is from Nothing, the more it approaches to Necessity of Existence, and consequently to eternal Existence.

THUS we have made a short Survey, so far as the Bounds of a Chapter would permit, of those Evidences and Assurances which we have from abstract Reason and the external World, that there is an Author of Nature; and that a Being infinitely perfect, which we call _God_. We may add to these, in the last Place, that universal Consent of Mankind, or natural Instinct of Religion which we see, more or less, throughout all Nations, barbarous or civil. For tho’ this Argument, ’tis true, be more disputable than the rest, yet having set down just Grounds already from whence this natural Judgment or Persuasion might spring, we have more Reason to impute it to some of those, and their insensible Influence upon the Mind, than to the Artifices of Men, or to make it a Weakness, Prejudice, or Error of our Nature. That there is such a Propension in humane Nature, seems to be very plain; at least so far as to move us to implore, and have recourse to invisible Powers in our Extremities. Prayer is natural in certain Cases, and we do at the mere Motion of our natural Spirit, and indeliberately, invoke God and Heaven, either in case of extream Danger, to help and assist us; or in case of Injustice and Oppression, to relieve or avenge us; or in case of false Accusations, to vindicate our Innocency; and generally in all cases desperate and remediless as to humane Power, we seem to appeal and address our selves to something higher. And this we do by a sudden Impulse of Nature, without Reflexion or Deliberation. Besides, as Witnesses of our Faith and Veracity, we use to invoke the Gods, or superior Powers, by Way of Imprecation upon our selves, if we be false and perjur’d; and this hath been us’d in most Nations and Ages, if not in all. These Things also argue, that there is a natural Conscience in Man, and a Distinction of moral _Good_ and _Evil_; and that we look upon those invisible Powers as the Guardians of Virtue and Honesty. There are also few or no People upon the Earth but have something of external Religion, true or false; and either of them is an Argument of this natural Anticipation, or that they have an Opinion that there is something above them, and above visible Nature; tho’ what that _something_ was, they seldom were able to make a good Judgment. But to pursue this Argument particularly, would require an historical Deduction of Times and Places, which is not suitable to our present Design.

TO conclude this Chapter and this Subject; if we set Religion apart, and consider the Deist and Atheist only as two Sects in Philosophy, or their Doctrine as two different _Hypotheses_ propos’d for the Explication of Nature, and in Competition with one another, whether should give the more rational Account of the Universe, of its Origin and _Phænomena_? I say if we consider them only thus, and make an impartial Estimate whether System is more reasonable, more clear, and more satisfactory; to me there seems to be no more Comparison than betwixt Light and Darkness. The _Hypothesis_ of the Deist reacheth from Top to Bottom, both through the intellectual and material World, with a clear and distinct Light every where; is genuine, comprehensive, and satisfactory; hath nothing forc’d, nothing confus’d, nothing precarious; whereas the _Hypothesis_ of the Atheist is strain’d and broken, dark and uneasy to the Mind, commonly precarious; often incongruous and irrational, and sometimes plainly ridiculous. And this Judgment I should make of them abstractly from the Interest of Religion, considering them only as Matter of Reason and Philosophy. _And_ I dare affirm with Assurance, if the Faculties of our Souls be true, that no Man can have a System of Thoughts reaching thorough Nature, coherent and confident in every Part, without a Deity for the Basis of it.

CHAP. XI.

_Several Incroachments upon natural Providence, or
Misrepresentations of it, and false Methods of Contemplation. A true
Method propos’d, and a true Representation of the Universe. The
Mundane Idea, and the universal System of Providence. Several
subordinate Systems. That of our Earth and sublunary World. The
Course and Periods of it. How much of this is already treated of,
and what remains. The Conclusion._

WE have set Bounds to Nature in the foregoing Chapter, and plac’d her Author and Governor upon his Throne, to give Laws to her Motions, and to direct and limit her Power in such Ways and Methods as are most for his Honour. Let us now consider Nature under the Conduct of Providence, or consider _Natural Providence_, and the Extent of it; and as we were cautious before not to give too much Power or Greatness to Nature, consider’d apart from Providence; so we must be careful now, under this second Consideration, not to contract her Bounds too much; lest we should, by too mean and narrow Thoughts of the Creation, eclipse the Glory of its Author, whom we have so lately own’d as a Being infinitely Perfect.

AND to use no further Introduction, in the _first Place_, we must not by any Means admit or imagine, that all Nature, and this great Universe, was made only for the sake of Man, the meanest of all intelligent Creatures that we know of; nor that this little Planet, where we sojourn for a few Days, is the only habitable Part of the Universe: These are Thoughts so groundless and unreasonable in themselves, and also so derogatory to the infinite Power, Wisdom and Goodness of the first Cause, that as they are absurd in Reason, so they deserve far better to be mark’d and censur’d for Heresies in Religion, than many Opinions that have been censur’d for such in former Ages. How is it possible that it should enter into the Thoughts of vain Man to believe himself the principal Part of God’s Creation, or that all the rest was ordain’d for him, for his Service or Pleasure? Man, whose Follies we laugh at every Day, or else complain of them; whose Pleasures are Vanity, and his Passions stronger than his Reason? who sees himself every Way weak and impotent, hath no power over external Nature, little over himself; cannot execute so much as his own good Resolutions, mutable, irregular, prone to Evil. Surely, if we made the least Reflection upon our selves with Impartiality, we should be asham’d of such an arrogant Thought. How few of these Sons of Men, for whom, they say, all Things were made, are the Sons of Wisdom? How few find the Paths of Life? They spend a few Days in Folly and Sin, and then go down to the Regions of Death and Misery. And is it possible to believe that all Nature, and all Providence, are only or principally for their sake? Is it not a more reasonable Character or Conclusion which the Prophet hath made, _Surely every Man is Vanity_? Man that comes into the World at the Pleasure of another, and goes out by an hundred Accidents; his Birth and Education generally determine his Fate here, and neither of those are in his own Power; his Wit also is as uncertain as his Fortune; he hath not the moulding of his own Brain, however a Knock on the Head makes him a Fool, stupid as the Beasts of the Field; and a little Excess of Passion or Melancholy makes him worse, Mad and Frantick. In his best Senses he is shallow, and of little Understanding; and in nothing more blind and ignorant than in Things sacred and divine; he falls down before a Stock or a Stone, and says, Thou art my God; he can believe Nonsense and Contradictions, and make it his Religion to do so. And is this the great Creature which God hath made _by the Might of his Power, and for the Honour of his Majesty_? Upon whom all Things must wait, to whom all Things must be subservient? Methinks we have noted Weaknesses and Follies enough in the Nature of Man; this need not be added as the Top and Accomplishment, _That with all these he is so vain as to think that all the rest of the World was made for his sake._

AND as due Humility and the Consideration of our own Meanness ought to secure us from any such vain Opinion of our selves, so the Perfection of other Beings ought to give us more Respect and Honour for them. With what Face can we pretend that Creatures far superior to us, and more excellent both in Nature and Condition, should be made for our Sake and Service? How preposterous would it be to ascribe such a thing to our Maker, and how intolerable a Vanity in us to affect it? We that are next to the Brutes that perish, by a sacrilegious Attempt would make our selves more considerable than the highest Dignities. It is thought to have been the Crime of _Lucifer_, who was thrown down from Heaven to Hell, that he affected an Equality with the Almighty; and to affect to be next to the Almighty is a Crime next to that. We have no Reason to believe but that there are, at least, as many Orders of Beings above us, as there are Ranks of Creatures below us; there is a greater Distance sure betwixt us and God Almighty, than there is betwixt us and the meanest Worm; and yet we should take it very ill, if the Worms of the Earth should pretend that we were made for them. But to pass from the invisible World to the visible and corporeal——

WAS that made only for our sake? King _David_ was more wise, and more just both to God and Man, in his viiith _Psalm_, where he says, _He wonders, when he considers the Heavens, that the Maker of them could think on Man_. He truly supposes the celestial Bodies, and the Inhabitants of them, much more considerable than we are, and reckons up only terrestrial Things as put in subjection to Man. Can we then be so fond as to imagine all the corporeal Universe made for our Use? ’Tis not the millioneth Part of it that is known to us, much less useful; we can neither reach with our Eye, nor our Imagination, those Armies of Stars that lie far and deep in the boundless Heavens. If we take a good Glass, we discover innumerable more Stars in the Firmament than we can with our single Eye; and yet if you take a second Glass, better than the first, that carries the Sight to a greater Distance, you see more still lying beyond the other; and a third Glass that pierceth further, still makes new Discoveries of Stars; and so forwards, indefinitely and inexhaustedly for any Thing we know, according to the Immensity of the divine Nature and Power. Who can reckon up the Stars of the Galaxy, or direct us in the Use of them? And can we believe that those and all the rest were made for us? Of those few Stars that we enjoy, or that are visible to the Eye, there is not a tenth Part that is really useful to Man; and no doubt if the principal End of them had been our Pleasure or Conveniency, they would have been put in some better Order in respect of the Earth. They lie carelessly scatter’d, as if they had been sown in the Heaven, like seed, by handfuls; and not by a skilful Hand neither. What a beautiful Hemisphere they would have made, if they had been plac’d in Rank and Order; if they had been all dispos’d into regular Figures, and the little ones set with due Regard to the greater, then all finish’d and made up into one fair Piece or great Composition, according to the Rules of Art and Symmetry; what a surprizing Beauty this would have been to the Inhabitants of the Earth? What a lovely Roof to our little World? This indeed might have given one some Temptation to have thought that they had been all made for us; but lest any such vain Imagination should now enter into our Thoughts, Providence (besides more important Reasons) seems on Purpose to have left them under that Negligence or Disorder, which they appear in to us.

THE second Part of this Opinion supposeth this Planet, where we live, to be the only habitable Part of the Universe; and this is a natural Consequence of the former: If all Things were made to serve us, why should any more be made than what is useful to us? But ’tis only our Ignorance of the System of the World, and of the Grandeur of the Works of God, that betrays us to such narrow Thoughts. (_See the Lat. Treat. lib. 1. c. 10. p. 108, 109_, _&c._) If we do but consider what this Earth is, both for Littleness and Deformity, and what its Inhabitants are, we shall not be apt to think that this miserable Atom hath engross’d and exhausted all the divine Favours, and all the Riches of his Goodness, and of his Providence. But we will not enlarge upon this Part of the Opinion, lest it should carry us too far from the Subject, and it will fall of its own Accord, with the former. Upon the whole we may conclude, that it was only the sublunary World that was made for the sake of Man, and not the great Creation, either material or intellectual; and we cannot admit or affirm any more without manifest Injury, Depression, and Misrepresentation of Providence, as we may be easily convinc’d from these four Heads; _The_ Meanness of Man and of this Earth; _The_ Excellency of other Beings; _The_ Immensity of the Universe, and the infinite Perfection of the first Cause. Which I leave to your further Meditation, and pass on to the second Rule concerning natural Providence.

_In the second Place_, then, If we would have a fair View and right Apprehensions of natural Providence, we must not cut the Chains of it too short, by having recourse without Necessity, either to the first Cause, in explaining the Origins of Things; or to Miracles, in explaining particular Effects. This, I say, breaks the Chains of natural Providence, when it is done without Necessity; that is, when Things are otherwise intelligible from second Causes. Neither is any Thing gain’d by it to God Almighty; for ’tis but as the Proverb says, _To rob Peter to pay Paul_; to take so much from his ordinary Providence, and place it to his extraordinary. When a new Religion is brought into the World, ’tis very reasonable and decorous that it should be usher’d in with Miracles, as both the _Jewish_ and _Christian_ were, but afterwards Things return into their Channel and do not change or overflow again but upon extraordinary Occasions or Revolutions. The Power _Extraordinary_ of God is to be accounted very sacred, not to be touch’d or expos’d for our Pleasure or Conveniency; but I am afraid we often make use of it only to conceal our own Ignorance, or to save us the Trouble of inquiring into natural Causes. Men are generally unwilling to appear ignorant, especially those that make Profession of Knowledge; and when they have not Skill enough to explain some particular Effect in a Way of Reason, they throw it upon the first Cause, as able to bear all; and so placing it to that Account, they excuse themselves, and save their Credit; for all Men are equally wise, if you take away second Causes; as we are all of the same Colour, if you take away the Light.

BUT to state this Matter, and see the Ground of this Rule more distinctly, we must observe and consider, That _the Course of Nature is truly the Will of God_; (_See Book 1. c. 8. at the End._) and, as I may so say, his first Will; from which we are not to recede, but upon clear Evidence and Necessity. And as in Matter of Religion, we are to follow the known reveal’d Will of God, and not to trust to every Impulse or Motion of Enthusiasm, as coming from the Divine Spirit, unless there be evident Marks that it is supernatural, and cannot come from our own; so neither are we, without Necessity, to quit the known and ordinary Will and Power of God, establish’d in the Course of Nature, and fly to supernatural Causes, or his extraordinary Will; for this is a kind of Enthusiasm or Fanaticism, as well as the other: And no doubt that great Prodigality and Waste of Miracles which some make, is no way to the Honour of God or Religion. ’Tis true, the other Extream is worse than this, for to deny all Miracles, is in effect to deny all Reveal’d Religion; therefore due Measures are to be taken betwixt these two, so as neither to make the Divine Power too mean and cheap, nor the Power of Nature illimited and all-sufficient.