Chapter V: Book II (2)

If the imperial ministers, or those of the other allies, should object against the preliminaries as no sufficient ground for opening the conferences, and insist that France should consent to such articles as were signed on the part of the allies in the year one thousand seven hundred and nine, the Earl of Strafford was in answer directed to insinuate, "That the French might have probably been brought to explain themselves more particularly, had they not perceived the uneasiness, impatience, and jealousy among the allies, during our transactions with that court." However, he should declare to them, in the Queen's name, "That if they were determined to accept of peace upon no terms inferior to what was formerly demanded, Her Majesty was ready to concur with them; but would no longer bear those disproportions of expense, yearly increased upon her, nor the deficiency of the confederates in every part of the war: That it was therefore incumbent upon them to furnish, for the future, such quotas of ships and forces as they were now wanting in, and to increase their expense, while Her Majesty reduced hers to a reasonable and just proportion."

That if the ministers of Vienna and Holland should urge their inability upon this head, the Queen insisted, "They ought to comply with her in war or in peace; Her Majesty desiring nothing, as to the first, but what they ought to perform, and what is absolutely necessary: and as to the latter, that she had done, and would continue to do, the utmost in her power towards obtaining such a peace as might be to the satisfaction of all her allies."

Some days after the Earl of Stafford's departure to Holland, Mons. Buys, pensionary of Amsterdam, arrived here from thence with instructions from his masters, to treat upon the subject of the French preliminaries, and the methods for carrying on the war. In his first conference with a committee of council, he objected against all the articles, as too general and uncertain; and against some of them, as prejudicial. He said, "The French promising that trade should be re-established and maintained for the future, was meant in order to deprive the Dutch of their tariff of one thousand six hundred and sixty-four; for the plenipotentiaries of that crown would certainly expound the word _rétablir_, to signify no more than restoring the trade of the States to the condition it was in immediately before the commencement of the present war." He said, "That in the article of Dunkirk, the destruction of the harbour was not mentioned; and that the fortifications were only to be razed upon condition of an equivalent, which might occasion a difference between Her Majesty and the States, since Holland would think it hard to have a town less in their barrier for the demolition of Dunkirk; and England would complain to have this thorn continue in their side, for the sake of giving one town more to the Dutch."

Lastly, he objected, "That where the French promised effectual methods should be taken to prevent the union of France and Spain under the same king, they offered nothing at all for the cession of Spain, which was the most important point of the war.

"For these reasons, Mons. Buys hoped Her Majesty would alter her measures, and demand specific articles, upon which the allies might debate whether they would consent to a negotiation or no."

The Queen, who looked upon all these difficulties, raised about the method of treating, as endeavours to wrest the negotiation out of her hands, commanded the lords of the committee to let Mons. Buys know, "That the experience she formerly had of proceeding by particular preliminaries towards a general treaty, gave her no encouragement to repeat the same method any more: That such a preliminary treaty must be negotiated either by some particular allies, or by all. The first, Her Majesty could never suffer, since she would neither take upon her to settle the interests of others, nor submit that others should settle those of her own kingdoms. As to the second, it was liable to Mons. Buys's objection, because the ministers of France would have as fair an opportunity of sowing division among the allies, when they were all assembled upon a preliminary treaty, as when the conferences were open for a negotiation of peace: That this method could therefore have no other effect than to delay the treaty, without any advantage: That Her Majesty was heartily disposed, both then and during the negotiation, to insist on every thing necessary for securing the barrier and commerce of the States; and therefore hoped the conferences might be opened, without farther difficulties.

"That Her Majesty did not only consent, but desire to have a plan settled for carrying on the war, as soon as the negotiation of peace should begin; but expected to have the burthen more equally laid, and more agreeable to treaties; and would join with the States in pressing the allies to perform their parts, as she had endeavoured to animate them by her example."

Mons. Buys seemed to know little of his masters' mind, and pretended he had no power to conclude upon any thing.[1] Her Majesty's minister proposed to him an alliance between the two nations, to subsist after a peace. To this he hearkened very readily, and offered to take the matter _ad referendum_, having authority to do no more. His intention was, that he might appear to negotiate, in order to gain time to pick out, if possible, the whole secret of the transactions between Britain and France; to disclose nothing himself, nor bind his masters to any conditions; to seek delays till the Parliament met, and then observe what turn it took, and what would be the issue of those frequent cabals between himself and some other foreign ministers, in conjunction with the chief leaders of the discontented faction.

[Footnote 1: Buys's mission seemed to have been to act on behalf of the States General for the purpose of preventing England obtaining any commercial advantage which the States did not share, and for causing delays. He certainly had no powers to treat definitely, and Swift's remark is emphasized by the statement in the Bolingbroke Correspondence (vol. ii. p. 25) about him, he could "only speak as Monsieur Buys." [T.S.]]

The Dutch hoped, that the clamours raised against the proceedings of the Queen's ministers towards a peace, would make the Parliament disapprove what had been done; whereby the States would be at the head of the negotiation, which the Queen did not think fit to have any more in their hands, where it had miscarried twice already; although Prince Eugene himself owned, "that France was then disposed to conclude a peace upon such conditions, as it was not worth the life of a grenadier to refuse them." As to insisting upon specific preliminaries, Her Majesty thought her own method much better, for each ally, in the course of the negotiation, to advance and manage his own pretensions, wherein she would support and assist them, rather than for two ministers of one ally to treat solely with the enemy, and report what they pleased to the rest, as was practised by the Dutch at Gertruydenberg.

One part of Mons. Buys's instructions was to desire the Queen not to be so far amused by a treaty of peace, as to neglect her preparation for war against the next campaign. Her Majesty, who was firmly resolved against submitting any longer to that unequal burthen of expense she had hitherto lain under, commanded Mr. Secretary St. John to debate the matter with that minister, who said he had no power to treat; only insisted, that his masters had fully done their part, and that nothing but exhortations could be used to prevail on the other allies to act with greater vigour.

On the other side, the Queen refused to concert any plan for the prosecution of the war, till the States would join with her in agreeing to open the conferences of peace; which therefore, by Mons. Buys's application to them, was accordingly done, by a resolution taken in Holland upon the twenty first of November, one thousand seven hundred and eleven, NS.

About this time the Count de Gallas[7] was forbid the court, by order from the Queen, who sent him word, that she looked upon him no longer as a public minister.

[Footnote 7: The Austrian ambassador [T.S.]]

This gentleman thought fit to act a very dishonourable part here in England, altogether inconsistent with the character he bore of envoy from the late and present emperors, two princes under the strictest ties of gratitude to the Queen, especially the latter, who had then the title of King of Spain. Count Gallas, about the end of August, one thousand seven hundred and eleven, with the utmost privacy, dispatched an Italian, one of his clerks, to Frankfort, where the Earl of Peterborough was then expected. This man was instructed to pass for a Spaniard, and insinuate himself into the Earl's service, which he accordingly did, and gave constant information to the last emperor's secretary at Frankfort of all he could gather up in his lordship's family, as well as copies of several letters he had transcribed. It was likewise discovered that Gallas had, in his dispatches to the present emperor, then in Spain, represented the Queen and her ministers as not to be confided in, that when Her Majesty had dismissed the Earl of Sunderland, she promised to proceed no farther in the change of her servants, yet soon after turned them all out, and thereby ruined the public credit, as well as abandoned Spain, that the present ministers wanted the abilities and good dispositions of the former, were persons of ill designs, and enemies to the common cause, and he (Gallas) could not trust them. In his letters to Count Zinzendorf[8] he said, "That Mr. Secretary St John complained of the house of Austria's backwardness, only to make the King of Spain odious to England, and the people here desirous of a peace, although it were ever so bad one," to prevent which, Count Gallas drew up a memorial which he intended to give the Queen, and transmitted a draught of it to Zinzendorf for his advice and approbation. This memorial, among other great promises to encourage the continuance of the war, proposed the detaching a good body of troops from Hungary to serve in Italy or Spain, as the Queen should think fit.

[Footnote 8: The Austrian envoy at The Hague, characterized by Mr Walter Sichel as "a martyr to etiquette, and devoured by zeal for the Holy Roman Empire" ("Bolingbroke and his Times," p 392) [T.S.]]

Zinzendorf thought this too bold a step, without consulting the Emperor: to which Gallas replied, that his design was only to engage the Queen to go on with the war; that Zinzendorf knew how earnestly the English and Dutch had pressed to have these troops from Hungary, and therefore they ought to be promised, in order to quiet those two nations, after which several ways might be found to elude that promise; and, in the mean time, the great point would be gained of bringing the English to declare for continuing the war: that the Emperor might afterwards excuse himself, by the apprehension of a war in Hungary, or of that between the Turks and Muscovites: that if these excuses should be at an end, a detachment of one or two regiments might be sent, and the rest deferred, by pretending want of money; by which the Queen would probably be brought to maintain some part of those troops, and perhaps the whole body. He added, that this way of management was very common among the allies; and gave for an example, the forces which the Dutch had promised for the service of Spain, but were never sent; with several other instances of the same kind, which he said might be produced.

Her Majesty, who had long suspected that Count Gallas was engaged in these and the like practices, having at last received authentic proofs of this whole intrigue, from original letters, and the voluntary confession of those who were principally concerned in carrying it on, thought it necessary to show her resentment, by refusing the count any more access to her person or her court.

Although the Queen, as it hath been already observed, was resolved to open the conferences upon the general preliminaries, yet she thought it would very much forward the peace to know what were the utmost concessions which France would make to the several allies, but especially to the States General and the Duke of Savoy: therefore, while Her Majesty was pressing the former to agree to a general treaty, the Abbé Gaultier was sent to France with a memorial, to desire that the Most Christian King would explain himself upon those preliminaries, particularly with relation to Savoy and Holland, whose satisfaction the Queen had most at heart, as well from her friendship to both these powers, as because, if she might engage to them that their just pretensions would be allowed, few difficulties would remain, of any moment, to retard the general peace.

The French answer to this memorial contained several schemes and proposals for the satisfaction of each ally, coming up very near to what Her Majesty and her ministers thought reasonable. The greatest difficulties seemed to be about the Elector of Bavaria, for whose interests France appeared to be as much concerned, as the Queen was for those of the Duke of Savoy: however, those were judged not very hard to be surmounted.

The States having at length agreed to a general treaty, the following particulars were concerted between Her Majesty and that republic:

"That the congress should be held at Utrecht.

"That the opening of the congress should be upon the twelfth of January, N.S. one thousand seven hundred and eleven-twelve.

"That, for avoiding all inconveniences of ceremony, the ministers of the Queen and States, during the treaty, should only have the characters of plenipotentiaries, and not take that of ambassadors, till the day on which the peace should be signed.

"Lastly, The Queen and States insisted, that the ministers of the Duke of Anjou, and the late Electors of Bavaria and Cologne, should not appear at the congress, until the points relating to their masters were adjusted; and were firmly resolved not to send their passports for the ministers of France, till the Most Christian King declared, that the absence of the forementioned ministers should not delay the progress of the negotiation."

Pursuant to the three former articles, Her Majesty wrote circular letters to all the allies engaged with her in the present war: and France had notice, that as soon as the King declared his compliance with the last article, the blank passports should be filled up with the names of the Maréchal d'Uxelles,[9] the Abbé de Polignac, and Mons. Mesnager, who were appointed plenipotentiaries for that crown.

[Footnote 9: In his "Letter to Sir William Windham," Bolingbroke thus refers to M. d'Uxelles: "The minister who had the principal direction of foreign affairs I lived in friendship with, and I must own to his honour, that he never encouraged a design which he knew that his court had no intention of supporting" (p. 141). This was written of the time when Bolingbroke was in Paris, an adherent of the Pretender. [T.S.]]

From what I have hitherto deduced, the reader sees the plan which the Queen thought the most effectual for advancing a peace. As the conferences were to begin upon the general preliminaries, the Queen was to be empowered by France to offer separately to the allies what might be reasonable for each to accept; and her own interests being previously settled, she was to act as a general mediator: a figure that became her best, from the part she had in the war, and more useful to the great end at which she aimed, of giving a safe and honourable peace to Europe.

Besides, it was absolutely necessary, for the interests of Britain, that the Queen should be at the head of the negotiation, without which Her Majesty could find no expedient to redress the injuries her kingdoms were sure to suffer by the Barrier Treaty. In order to settle this point with the States, the ministers here had a conference with Mons. Buys, a few days before the Parliament met. He was told, how necessary it was, by previous concert between the Emperor, the Queen, and the States, to prevent any difference which might arise in the course of the treaty at Utrecht: That, under pretence of a barrier for the States General, as their security against France, infinite prejudice might arise to the trade of Britain in the Spanish Netherlands; for, by the fifteenth article of the Barrier Treaty, in consequence of what was stipulated by that of Minister, the Queen was brought to engage that commerce shall not be rendered more easy, in point of duties, by the sea-ports of Flanders, than it is by the river Scheldt, and by the canals on the side of the Seven Provinces, which, as things now stood, was very unjust; for, while the towns in Flanders were in the hands of France or Spain, the Dutch and we traded to them upon equal foot; but now, since by the Barrier Treaty those towns were to be possessed by the States, that republic might lay what duties they pleased upon British goods, after passing by Ostend, and make their own custom-free, which would utterly ruin our whole trade with Flanders.

Upon this, the lords told Mons. Buys very frankly, "That if the States expected the Queen should support their barrier, as well as their demands from France and the house of Austria upon that head, they ought to agree, that the subjects of Britain should trade as freely to all the countries and places, which, by virtue of any former or future treaty, were to become the barrier of the States, as they did in the time of the late King Charles the Second of Spain; or as the subjects of the States General themselves shall do: and that it was hoped, their High Mightinesses would never scruple to rectify a mistake so injurious to that nation, without whose blood and treasure they would have had no barrier at all." Mons. Buys had nothing to answer against these objections, but said, he had already wrote to his masters for further instructions.

Greater difficulties occurred about settling what should be the barrier to the States after a peace: the envoy insisting to have all the towns that were named in the Treaty of Barrier and Succession; and the Queen's ministers excepting those towns, which, if they continued in the hands of the Dutch, would render the trade of Britain to Flanders precarious. At length it was agreed in general, that the States ought to have what is really essential to the security of their barrier against France; and that some amicable expedient should be found, for removing the fears both of Britain and Holland upon this point.

But at the same time Mons. Buys was told, "That although the Queen would certainly insist to obtain all those points from France, in behalf of her allies the States, yet she hoped his masters were too reasonable to break off the treaty, rather than not obtain the very utmost of their demands, which could not be settled here, unless he were fully instructed to speak and conclude upon that subject: That Her Majesty thought the best way of securing the common interest, and preventing the division of the allies, by the artifices of France, in the course of a long negotiation, would be to concert between the Queen's ministers and those of the States, with a due regard to the other confederates, such a plan as might amount to a safe and honourable peace." After which the Abbé Polignac, who of the French plenipotentiaries was most in the secret of his court, might be told, "That it was in vain to amuse each other any longer; that on such terms the peace would be immediately concluded; and that the conferences must cease, if those conditions were not, without delay, and with expedition, granted."

A treaty between Her Majesty and the States, to subsist after a peace, was now signed, Mons. Buys having received full powers to that purpose. His masters were desirous to have a private article added, _sub spe rati_, concerning those terms of peace; without the granting of which, we should stipulate not to agree with the enemy. But neither the character of Buys, nor the manner in which he was empowered to treat, would allow the Queen to enter into such an engagement. The congress likewise approaching, there was not time to settle a point of so great importance. Neither, lastly, would Her Majesty be tied down by Holland, without previous satisfaction upon several articles in the Barrier Treaty, so inconsistent with her engagements to other powers in the alliance, and so injurious to her own kingdoms.

The lord privy seal, and the Earl of Stafford, having, about the time the Parliament met, been appointed Her Majesty's plenipotentiaries for treating a general peace, I shall here break off the account of any further progress made in that great affair, until I resume it in the last book of this History.

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THE HISTORY OF THE FOUR LAST

YEARS OF THE QUEEN.