Chapter XVI: The Eastern Question--Treaty of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin

At the beginning of 1878 Parliament was summoned a month earlier than usual to tranquillize public feeling--a result not thereby attained, for the Russians, now completely victorious, were but a short distance from Constantinople.

Sir Charles returned from Toulon, 'breakfasting with Gambetta on the 14th January,' and on the 15th delivered to his constituents the speech already quoted, which gave a summary of the events leading up to the war, his judgment of the facts as they existed at the time of his speaking being that the Government's whole policy was "isolated, undignified, inconsistent, unsafe." [Footnote: See p. 205]

"We stand alone, absolutely alone, in face of terms of peace which we
dislike, but can't resist. Turkey is crushed, about whose integrity
the Tory party raved. Russian influence will have risen and English
influence fallen in the East. Greece, the anti-Russian friend of
England, is not to gain. Servia and Montenegro, the tools of Russia,
are to be rewarded. Bulgaria is to owe its freedom, not to Europe, but
to Russia."

So much was accomplished fact. It had still to be decided how much farther Russia should be allowed to push her advantage. Upon this he said, speaking "as a European Liberal,"

'I agree with what the first Napoleon said, in those St. Helena days
when he was acting Liberalism for the benefit of his historic
character and of his line, that "it is necessary to set up a
guaranteed kingdom, formed of Constantinople and its provinces, to
serve as a barrier against Russia." The open question for discussion
is whether the present Turkey serves the purpose....

'Were the choice between Russia at Constantinople and Turkey at
Constantinople, I should prefer the latter. The Turkish is in ordinary
times a less stifling despotism than the Russian....

'The Turks let any man go to any church and read any book, the
Russians do not, and in such a position of power as Constantinople I
should prefer the Turk if, as I do not think, the choice lay only
there.'

Where else, then, did the choice lie? The answer is that Dilke, in his own words, "dreamed of a new Greece." He spoke of the lands then blighted by the Sultan's Government--of "rose-clad Roumelia and glorious Crete"--of countries held back by Turkish incompetence, that were by Nature incredibly rich--"the choicest parts of Europe, perhaps of the world."

"The Greek kingdom is a failure, we are told. Greece, liberated by the
wise foresight of Mr. Canning, but left, on his ill-timed death,
without Thessaly, Epirus, Crete, has been starved and shorn by the
Great Powers. As once said Lafayette, "the greater part of Greece was
left out of Greece." What kind of Greece is a Greece which does not
include Lemnos, Lesbos, or Mitylene, Chios, Mount Olympus, Mount Ossa,
and Mount Athos? Not only the larger part, but the most Greek part of
Greece, was omitted from the Hellenic kingdom. Crete and the other
islands, the coast of Thrace, and the Greek colony at Constantinople,
are the Greek Greece indeed, for Continental Greece within the limits
of the kingdom is by race half Slav and half Albanian. We must not,
however, attach too much importance to this fact, for in all times the
Greeks have been a little people, grafting themselves on to various
barbaric stocks. Race is a small thing by the side of national spirit,
and in national spirit the Greeks are as little Slav as the Italians
are Teutonic. Even the corrupting influence of long slavery--and it
was deep indeed--had not touched this spirit, and the very thieves and
robbers of the hills of Greece made for themselves in Byron's days a
glorious name in history. I do not think that Greece has failed. I
believe in Greece, believe In the ultimate replacement of the Turkish
State by powerful and progressive Greece, attached in friendship to
France and England, her creators--an outpost of Western Europe in the
East; and I think the day will come when even Homer's city may once
more be Greek. Those who do not wish to see Slavonic claims pushed
much farther than justice needs should speak their word on behalf of
Greece."

From this ideal he never swerved, and the authority which he possessed in European politics helped to keep it present before the mind of Europe. Greece knew her friend, and after his death the Municipality of Athens gave his name--_hodos Dilke_--to a fine street in the true mother city of Hellas. [Footnote: "The name of Sir Charles Dilke is more highly prized in Greece than that of any living Englishman," wrote M. Zinopoulos, General Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior in Greece. "This feeling still survived in 1887, when we went to Athens," adds Sir Charles's note.] He never lived to see Hellenic government extend itself over Turkish fiefs, except in that poor strip of northern territory which, thanks greatly to his exertions, was secured for Greece in 1881. But before this memorial of him could be completed, while those who worked on it were still searching among his papers to reconstitute the projects he had shaped, came the realization of some of his premonitions, and the end of Turkish sway in "the most Greek parts of Greece."

'It was a good speech so far as concerned the position of Russia, of
Turkey, and of the Opposition, and in its protest against Manchester
Doctrine and in favour of a broader view of foreign policy, but it
proposed the annexation of Egypt, a view from which I soon afterwards
drew back, and which I did not hold at the time at which it became
popular some years later on.'

Upon the main issue which in 1878 lay before the mind of Europe, he was for a partition of the Turkish Empire, though upon condition of keeping Constantinople secured to the Turk. But as to the question of England's going to war, he asked:

"For what are we to fight? Against an extension of Russian boundaries
in Armenia which will be slight, and which, if it were great, would be
better met by an even greater extension of English territories in
Egypt? Against 'the passage of the Dardanelles'--which means in time
of war its passage if Russia can--a passage which Russia would equally
attempt if she could, but had not the right. Against this we are to
fight without allies. Again, let us pray for peace. I will not
describe what war must mean--your sons and daughters killed, or lying
crippled amid horrors worse than death; the proceeds of your toil
wrung from you by new taxes; the dearness of your children's bread. I
have seen too much of war. ... No tongue can depict its horrors. ...
It is said that the constituencies are warlike, and that party wire-
pullers think that war would be "a good card to play." I hope and
believe that English constituencies would be warlike if real honour
and real interests were at stake. If they are warlike now, it is that
they know not war. Are those for war who know its face? ... The day
may come when England will have to fight for her existence, but for
Heaven's sake let us not commit the folly of plunging into war at a
moment when all Europe would be hostile to our arms--not one Power
allied to the English cause."

It seemed as if that folly were to be committed. When Parliament opened in January, a declaration of war was foreshadowed by the hint of a demand for funds to make "adequate preparation against some unexpected occurrence."

Nor was there any steady rallying point offered by the Opposition:

'January 17th was the day of the meeting of the House, the Radical
Club Dinner having replaced our private Queen's Speech Dinner of 1877.
But the disorganization of the Liberal party at this moment was so
complete that no Front Bench party was given on the night before
Parliament met, and Liberal politicians, or such of them as were
asked, had had to do their best to talk at a Tory house--Lady
Stanhope's in Grosvenor Place--where I met Harcourt and some of the
others. The situation in the debate on the Address was one which ought
to have led to successful attack upon the Government. The Queen's
Speech was neither of war nor of peace, but of perplexity and
division, and gravely informed us that poor Turkey had not interfered
with British interests. The discourses of the Ministers were peaceful
in the Lower House, and warlike in the Upper. Money was to be asked
for in the event of an "unexpected occurrence" happening.'

'Nothing, however, was made of the situation by the Opposition, and I
felt more interest therefore for the moment in my proposed political
reforms, in which I was on the point of a partial success, [Footnote:
'I introduced my two Bills of the previous year--both destined this
year to pass, though one of them after amalgamation with a
Conservative Bill--my Hours of Polling Bill and my Registration Bill.
I moved for my return, intended to facilitate my action in the
direction of redistribution, and got my Select Committee promised
me.'] and sheered off from the Eastern Question, with regard to which
I felt that in Parliament at the moment I could do no good.'

The speech to his constituents had attracted much attention. Among the personal congratulations which he received he valued most highly those of a great diplomatist and friend, 'high praise from Sir William White.' [Footnote: Sir William White (1821-1891): February 27th, 1875, British Agent and Consul-General in Servia; March 3rd, 1879, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Bucharest, Roumania; April 18th, 1885, Envoy Extraordinary at Constantinople; October 11th, 1886, Special Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Constantinople.] On January 17th he 'received a deputation of London merchants with regard to the Black Sea blockade.'

'On Friday the 18th I dined at Lady Waldegrave's to meet the old
Strawberry Hill set--the Duke of Argyll, the Duchess of Manchester,
Lord and Lady Granville, Harcourt, James, Ayrton, Lord William Hay,
and Mr. and Mrs. Tom Hughes--and some people came in after dinner, of
whom Sir J. Rose and his daughter (Mrs. Stanley Clarke) warmly
congratulated me on my speech. There was a discussion between the
Liberals and the Duchess of Manchester, who was in both camps, and Sir
John Rose, who as a financier was the same, as to the reasons for Lord
Carnarvon's absence from Lord Beaconsfield's Queen's Speech Dinner,
but we could not get farther than to learn that "Dizzy had made it
unpleasant for him. ..." [Footnote: 'Another matter as to which I was
personally interested, though the others seemed hardly to have heard
of it, was a communication which had been made to France about Egypt
with regard to joint inquiry into the state of finances, a
communication all but volunteered by us, and not, I thought, in the
least necessary, but which was so strong in terms as to appear to shut
the door in the future against any possibility of action on our part
other than joint action with the French.']

'On Saturday the 19th Mr. Gladstone sent Lefevre to me, and asked me
not to raise the case of Greece at present, as he thought that a
combined movement with regard to Greece might soon be made in the
House of Commons with some chance of success.

'On the Sunday Drummond Wolff dined with me, very full of the
intrigues to get rid of Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon from the
Conservative Front Bench, and very hopeful of success, for at this
moment the Conservatives were so angry with their two peaceful men
that they made no secret of their intention to force them out, and
used freely to discuss the situation with the Liberals.

'On January 22nd I started an attempt to get up a Greek Committee, an
attempt which was successful, for our little meeting of this day, of
Fitzmaurice and Lefevre and myself, with the adhesion by letter of
Lansdowne and of Rosebery, led to the private formation of a
Committee, afterwards made public, and much enlarged, of which I made
Lewis Sergeant secretary, and which was able to do much good in the
course of the three next years. ...That night I dined with Mrs. Inwood
Jones (Lady Morgan's niece), and met Mr. and Mrs. Stansfeld, Browning,
Charles Villiers, Lady Hamilton Gordon, and another man whom I will
not name, because I wish to mention that I received from him on that
occasion a document relating to Greek affairs, from which I was
afterwards able to show how badly our Government had treated Greece,
but the origin of which I ought not to reveal.

'On January 23rd Evelyn Ashley, Chamberlain, and I had a meeting with
regard to Greek matters, at which we drew up the public declaration to
be made on behalf of the friends of Greece.

'On the next day, January 24th, a good many startling events occurred.
A War Ministry was formed at Athens; the vote of money was announced
in the British Parliament. Lord Carnarvon resigned in the morning, and
Lord Derby at night; but Lord Derby's resignation was for a time
withdrawn.'

In 'the great debate' on Mr. Forster's motion against the vote of six millions sterling for 'adequate preparation'--a debate which opened on January 31st, and was prolonged to the second week in February--Sir Charles took part on the fourth day. Great interest attaches to this speech in view of all his later work:

'I pointed out that we spend normally on defence or war far more than
any other Power: at that time twenty-five millions sterling at home
and seventeen millions in India, or forty-two millions in all, swelled
in that year by the extraordinary vote to forty-eight millions, while
France and Germany spent much less. I was to return to this subject
after many years, and when I wrote upon it in 1890, while the Indian
expenditure stood at the same sum, the annual expenditure in England
had risen to over thirty-eight millions, making the whole fifty-five,
and with the rest of the Empire nearly fifty-seven millions sterling.'

A side-note adds: 'It is now (1905) vastly greater.'

As he was the first non-military politician to devote himself to the question of defence and to call public attention to the subject, so this question of wasteful expenditure always occupied his attention. He laid stress on the inadequate return received for naval and military outlay, not only on the popular ground that money was thus deflected from projects of internal reform, but pre-eminently because the nation in time of peace resents heavy defence expenditure, and he feared that the necessary money might not be forthcoming for that naval equipment which he held to be essential to our existence as a Great Power.

But the main burden of his complaint was that now when a Conference was proposed, and when England ought to have gone into the Conference with all the weight of a unanimous people, the bringing forward of a "sham war vote," which was a contradiction of the alleged desire to negotiate, had produced inevitable division of counsels. Before the debate closed came the rumour of an occupation of Constantinople by the Russians, and under the belief that the war vote might be needed in good earnest, Mr. Forster's motion was withdrawn.

'On February 6th ... I dined with Lady Brett and went on to Mrs.
Brand's, and at the Speaker's House heard that the Russians had
occupied a fort in the Constantinople lines. This lie got out the next
day, and was universally believed; and after a panic in the City,
Hartington decided, also in a panic, to make W. E. Forster drop the
resolutions which he had brought forward at Hartington's request.
Hartington saw me, and told me this behind the Speaker's chair before
questions. Within an hour after the withdrawal of the resolutions had
been mentioned in the House the whole story had been blown into the
air by the Russian Ambassador.'

At this period Sir Charles Dilke had entered into relations with Lord Randolph Churchill, who was virtually against the policy of the Government and yet 'open-mouthed in his general dislike of Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, though in complete agreement with their principles.' The Fourth Party did not yet exist. Nor was it in this Parliament that Lord Randolph achieved ascendancy.

'As late as the autumn of 1880 Lord Beaconsfield was to style Randolph
"only Dilke and water"; but had he lived for another twelvemonth
longer he would not have used this language, for Churchill had then
developed a very different "Moloch of Midlothian" style, and had made
himself through his party a greater power than I ever was.'

The attempt to concert action between independent Tory and independent Radical began after the great scare of February 6th. [Footnote: This correspondence was placed at Mr. Winston Churchill's disposal by Sir Charles Dilke, and used by him in the _Life of Lord Randolph Churchill._ Sir Stafford Northcote was leader of the House of Commons and Chancellor of the Exchequer.]

'On February 7th negotiations between Randolph Churchill and myself
began as to moving an address to the Crown praying that the objects
with which England should enter any Conference that might be held,
should be European and civilized rather than pro-Turkish. On this day
he wrote to me:

'"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES DILKE,

'"As I suppose this debate will come to a close with an enormous and
disproportionate majority for the Government, and as I think the
Opposition have made their stand on an unfortunate ground, and that
another fight might yet be fought with far greater chances of
commanding sympathy in the country, I want to know whether, if an
address to the Crown praying Her Majesty to use her influence at the
Conference in favour of the widest possible freedom to Bulgaria,
Bosnia, Herzegovina, Thessaly, and Epirus, and in favour of totally
and finally putting an end to all direct Turkish Government in these
provinces, was moved by me on the Tory side of the House, it would be
supported by the Liberal party. I think I could almost make sure of a
strong Home Rule vote on this. I think some Conservatives would
support it. If Northcote does not give some very clear intimation of
what is going to be the policy of the Government, I think a motion of
this sort should be made on the Report. The real cry for the country
is not sympathy with Russia, still less with Turkey, but complete
freedom for the Slav and Hellenic nationalities. I am off to Ireland
to-night. I don't care enough for the Government to vote for them. ...
I shall see Butt in Dublin, and shall sound him on what I have written
to you. My address is Phoenix Park, Dublin. Please excuse this lone
letter.

'"Yours truly,

'"RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL."

'The reference to Butt is curious, and the address of "Phoenix Park,"
for Lord Randolph was at this time private secretary to his father,
who was Viceroy of Ireland, and was living in the Viceregal Lodge,
which, of course, is in the Phoenix Park. How far the Duke of
Marlborough was cognizant of the intrigues between his son and the
Irish I never knew, but at one time relations were very close."
[Footnote: Sir John Gorst read this chapter in 1913 and wrote:

"With Randolph's negotiations with the Irish at this time I had
nothing to do. I was not cognizant of them; I never acted with R.
before 1880.

"So far as I knew, the alliance between the Fourth Party and the Irish
leader arose in this way: In the 1880 Parliament Parnell had not
enough men to move an adjournment of the House--in those days the most
effective form of obstruction. Forty members must stand up. On one
occasion after 1880, P., wanting to move an adjournment, sought an
interview with us--Balfour may or may not have been present. He stated
his case, and we replied that the matter was a proper case for an
adjournment, and we and those we could influence would stand up in
support. He thanked us and was leaving the room, when R., twirling his
moustache, said: 'I suppose, Mr. Parnell, that in cases of this kind
there will be a little reciprocity.' After that, when we moved
adjournments, the Parnellite members always stood up for us.--J. E.
G."]

'On February 8th Lord Randolph wrote:

'"THE CASTLE, DUBLIN.

'"DEAR SIR CHARLES DILKE,

'"Many thanks for your two letters. As you say, things remain in such
an uncertain state nothing can be done. The Government have too great
an advantage, but I think if we are led into taking any decisive steps
hostile to Russia, a great effort should be made for an authoritative
declaration that the ultimate aim and object of any move on our part
is the complete freedom and independence of the Slav nationality, as
opposed to any reconstruction of the Turkish Empire. This I am sure
should be the line for the Liberal party, and not the peace-at-any-
price cry which it is evident the country won't have. In this I shall
be ready to co-operate heartily as far as my poor efforts can be any
good. It is just possible that if any movement of this kind be made it
would be better for it to originate from the Conservative side of the
House. I regret to see so much excitement getting up among the masses.
It is dangerous matter for Beaconsfield to work on. Would you think me
very foolish or visionary if I say that I look for a republican form
of Government for Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, as far more to be
preferred than some German, Russian, or other Prince set up as a
puppet under the name of constitutional monarchy? Perhaps if these
ideas seem at all to your liking, and if you think they would command
the support of the Liberal party, you would advise me what appeared to
you the most favourable moment for bringing them forward. I shall have
some conversation with Butt, and have great hope of securing a solid
Irish vote on any proposition which might seem to favour the self-
government of nationalities.

'"Yours truly,

'"_February 8th_.
'"RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

'A few days later Lord Randolph telegraphed to me from Careysville,
Fermoy: "I shall be in London Monday morning. Am not ambitious of
taking any prominent part unless it might contribute to the advantage
of ideas which I think we have in common that a motion should be made
from my side of the House. I leave it absolutely to your judgment."

'On this telegram I wrote to Lord Granville, who replied, dating his
letter "September 13th" by mistake for February 13th:

'" 18, CARLTON HOUSE TERRACE.

'"MY DEAR DILKE,

'"Such a motion as Lord R. C. proposes, supported by a certain number
of Conservatives, might be well worth consideration. But I doubt his
getting any Conservative support, and a contingent of Home Rulers
would hardly justify us in making another attack upon Plevna just yet,
with the probable alternative of either a crushing defeat or a second
withdrawal in face of the enemy. I gather that you are doubtful. What
did Hartington think?

'"Yours sincerely,

'"GRANVILLE.

'"If R. Churchill could give you evidence on which you felt you _could
rely_ that he would have real Conservative support, the case would be
different."

'Hartington thought nothing, merely recommended acceptance of Lord
Granville's advice. Lord Granville's mistake in date was
characteristic, for, while a most able man who did not, in my opinion,
decline in intellectual vigour during the many years in which he took
a great part in public affairs, he always had the habit of
substitution of words, and I have known him carry on a long
conversation with me at the Foreign Office about the proceedings of
two Ambassadors who were engaged on the opposite sides in a great
negotiation, and call A "B," and B "A," through the whole of it, which
was, to say the least, confusing. He also sometimes entirely forgot
the principal name in connection with the subject, as, for example,
that of Mr. Gladstone when Prime Minister, and had to resort to the
most extraordinary forms of language in order to convey his meaning.

'Randolph wrote after his telegram from a fishing lodge on the Irish
Blackwater:

'"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

'"I have sent you a telegram which I think you will understand. I am
sure that my views, whatever they are worth, are in accordance with
your speech, and Harcourt's, and Gladstone's, on the question of the
future policy of this country. I am convinced that under the present
circumstances no motion should be unduly hastened on. There is lots of
time. If I was asked to move a resolution my speech would be an attack
on Chaplin, Wolff, and the rest of the Pro-Turkish party, confidence
in the Government and invitation to the Liberal party to act as a
whole. I feel I am awfully young to endeavour to initiate such a line;
but I am so convinced of the soundness of our views that I would risk
a smash willingly to have them properly brought forward. If only your
party would agree as a whole to support a resolution moved from my
side, the Government would only at the best have a majority of 80,
after 190, and that would be a check. I shall see Butt before arriving
in London, and endeavour to make him take up a position upon this
question. The Government are apparently doing their 'level best' to
keep the peace, and perhaps another debate might not be unwelcome to
them.

'"Yours very truly,

'"_February 15th._
'"RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

'In reply, and in consequence of Lord Granville's suggestion, I
pressed him closely as to who would vote with him, and he wrote:

'"CASTLE BERNARD,
'"BANDON.

'"MY DEAR SIR CHARLES,

'"In reply to your letter I shall be over in London on the 26th inst.,
and I think it will be time enough then to make my motion. I should
not like to make it unless it would command the support of a large
number of members. Such support could only come from your side. I
think the Conservative party are gone mad. Their speeches are
calculated to provoke war. As it is so uncertain whether we shall go
to war or to a Conference, I think I had better wait a little, as,
though the motion should, I think, be made in any case, the terms of
it would vary very much according to either alternative.... I know of
no one except Forsyth whom I could ask to ballot for me. If the motion
commanded much support, I should certainly like to press it even to a
division. Cowen's speech (and the vociferous cheers of the C. party)
evidently shows that the idea of the integrity and independence of the
Turkish Empire is still predominant on our side, and against that I
would try to go a great way. I should, of course, be very glad if you
would second any motion of the nature of those sketched.... I send a
sketch of it.

'"Yours very truly,

'"RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL."

'"_Draft of Motion._

'"That in view of the extreme sufferings so long undergone by the
Slav, Bulgarian, and Hellenic nationalities of Bosnia, Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Thessaly, and Epirus, and considering that the Turkish rule
over these provinces has now been definitely put an end to, the
efforts of Her Majesty's Government, in the opinion of the House of
Commons, should be principally directed towards the establishment of
the complete freedom and independence of the populations of these
provinces."

'I have in my diary on Friday the 15th the note: "See Chamberlain as
to Churchill's plan, and say I won't go to a meeting." Evidently I had
seen that Churchill was unsafe.

'When Randolph Churchill came back to town I discovered, or rather he
discovered and told me, that old Walpole, the ex-Home Secretary, was
the only member upon his own side who would even pretend that he would
vote with him, and when it came to the point on one occasion, Walpole
himself said that he should go away.'

Preparations for war were pressed on till, on March 3rd, the signing of the Treaty of San Stefano, which put an end to Turkish rule in Bulgaria, seemed to close the crisis. But instantly the trouble broke out again. The British Government claimed that this new treaty, since it altered the European settlement ratified in 1856 by the Treaty of Paris, must be submitted to and endorsed by a Congress of the Powers. Russia declined to be thus bound, and a new crisis arose in which Lord Derby, who had withdrawn his previous resignation, now finally gave up the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs, being succeeded by Lord Salisbury.

In 1881 Sir Charles, while Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, became aware that Lord Derby's retention of office after his first resignation had been little more than nominal. He says in the Memoir for that year:

'In the course of my researches among the Tunis papers I discovered
the curious fact that in February and March, 1878, foreign affairs
were being conducted by a committee of the Cabinet, consisting of Lord
Beaconsfield, Lord Cairns, and Lord Salisbury, and that Lord Derby,
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was virtually shelved for
the whole period. At this moment Lord Beaconsfield proposed the
creation of a Mediterranean league for the maintenance of the _status
quo_ in the Mediterranean: England, France, Italy, and Greece to be
first consulted, and Austria to come in afterwards if she pleased.
Italy declining, the scheme collapsed. Foolish Italy!'

While in Parliament the Tory party was ridding itself of its 'peace men,' party feeling out of doors ran to unusual heights. These were the days when a music-hall song added a word to the political vocabulary, and the "jingo" crowd signalized its patriotism by wrecking Mr. Gladstone's windows at 73, Harley Street, where he went to live after his retirement from the Liberal leadership.

'On Sunday, March 10th, in coming back from the Grosvenor Gallery, I passed a great mob, who were going to howl at Mr. Gladstone--at this time the ordinary Sunday afternoon diversion of the London rough.'

Schouvalof, the Russian Ambassador, had on March 4th summed up the situation in an epigram: "England has challenged Russia to a duel, and has chosen for her weapon swords at fifteen paces" (_l'épée à quinze pas_). But the preparations for this combat were menacing.

'On March 29th the Eastern Question blazed up again with Lord Derby's
resignation, the discussion of which enlivened a party at Lady
Waldegrave's, there being before us a Queen's Message alleging the
existence of imminent national danger and great emergency as a reason
for calling out the reserves. On Saturday the 30th Trevelyan ...
informed me of a resolution which had been prepared by Lubbock on
behalf of those Whigs who had not gone with Gladstone, but wished to
make some movement of their own. Later in the evening I saw Childers,
who proposed a better motion in the form of an addition to the Message
in the sense of a strong desire for peace. The object of both
suggestions, of course, was by a moderate middle course to prevent a
division for and against the Message in which Gladstone and Bright and
eighty others would vote No, while eighty would follow Hartington in
voting Yes, and the majority of the party run away, thus destroying
the Liberal party, as it was destroyed in the time of Pitt and the war
with France. Later, again, in the evening I saw Montgélas (who told me
that Russia had held different language to Austria and to England, and
that she had drawn back and did not mean war) [Footnote: 'On February
9th I went to a party at the Austrian Embassy "to meet the Archduke
Rudolf." Beust was gone away and Montgélas was host. ... On February
12th I met again the Crown Prince of Austria.'] and Randolph
Churchill, who made an appointment to come to me on Sunday about the
papers, which he agreed with me in thinking damaging to the
Government, and full of evidence of their total isolation. When he
came, we decided only that the Government ought to be asked for
further papers.'

This demand Sir Charles accordingly made on April 1st. His position was at this point extremely difficult. He was not prepared to acquiesce in the aggrandisement of Russia, and therefore could not go with his habitual associates, who had formed a Committee upon the Eastern Question. On the other hand, he was determined to join with them in opposing the calling out of the reserves, because this step implied that England would go to war alone, and he did not believe either that England was likely to do so, or that she ought, as a member of the European Concert, to take such a step.

'There was a moment after the fall of Lord Derby when I became a
supporter of the Government in their Eastern policy, for they appeared
to me to adopt my own, but it did not last long. "Lord Salisbury's
circular" (so-called, but written by Lord Cairns), issued upon the
accession of Lord Salisbury to the Foreign Office, contained the
statement of this policy. ... Speaking in the House on April 9th ...,
I repudiated the defence which came from some on the Liberal side, of
the conduct of Russia, and, looking upon the Government despatch as a
vindication primarily of general European interests, and, in the
second place, of Hellenic interests, against Russian violence and
universal Slav dominion throughout the Levant, I separated myself from
my party and praised the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. I was
afterwards bitterly disappointed at finding the policy of the April
circular abandoned by its authors in the Congress of Berlin. ...

'On April 4th Gennadius, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires (afterwards
Minister), the American Minister, Matthew Arnold, W. E. Forster, Grant
Duff, Lubbock, George Sheffield (Lord Lyons' factotum), Tom Hughes,
and my old friend Sir David Wedderburn dined with me. And in this Whig
and Hellenic party a general agreement with my views was met with; but
the same was not the case amongst my brother Radicals of "Mr.
Dillwyn's Committee upon the Eastern Question."'

This Radical organization got into difficulties of its own while contemplating a motion to condemn explicitly the calling out of the reserves.

'On April 5th Dillwyn's Committee had had before it a letter from Lord
Hartington, saying that Mr. Gladstone on Monday wished to speak next
after Sir Stafford Northcote, and to deprecate the moving of an
amendment. It was in consequence resolved by a majority that no
amendment should be moved. Courtney then said that the intimation of
Mr. Gladstone's opinion had been obtained from him by gross pressure,
and that he himself should move an amendment if no one else did.
Wilfrid Lawson then said that he would move; and there were seven in
favour of an amendment. This broke up the Committee, and on Dillwyn
reporting to Hartington its dissolution, the latter said: "Well, Mr.
Dillwyn, you see it is not so easy to lead."

'On Sunday, April 7th, there dined with me, among others, Hartington,
Harcourt, Goschen, Lord Granville, and Lord Ripon, and we discussed
the position, on which Lord Ripon was far from agreement with me. I
warmly supported to them the Government circular (issued by Lord
Salisbury), as putting British action on European rather than on
British-interests grounds, and only differed from the policy of
calling out the reserves because this was an action of isolation.'

When Sir Wilfrid Lawson's amendment was moved, Sir Charles voted with the Radical minority of sixty-four against calling out the reserves, but 'differed from every word in which the Radical speakers supported their view.'

The pith of his speech was a powerful plea for allowing Greece to secure the emancipation of Greek populations, then under a Turkish rule heavy as that from which Russia claimed to liberate the Slavs of Bulgaria.

So far, the action of the Government had not united the Liberal party in any concentrated attitude of resistance. But during the Easter recess, which Sir Charles spent in France, meeting Gambetta, politics took a more dramatic turn.

'When Parliament adjourned for the holidays, not one word had been
said of an act long previously determined, which was announced the
next day. The fact that Parliament was allowed to learn from the
newspapers that it was intended by the Government for the first time
to employ Indian troops within the European dominions of the Crown in
time of peace, without the previous consent of Parliament, [Footnote:
By despatching 7,000 Sepoys to Malta.] was a singular commentary upon
the Government declaration at the beginning of the Session that
Parliament had been called together at an unusually early date in
order that under circumstances of delicacy the Ministry might have the
advantage of its advice.... Public feeling, I found from Chamberlain,
had gone round a good deal during my absence, and to satisfy the
opinion of our Radicals he was determined to move something. I
suggested to him (on May 6th) a resolution condemning "the policy of
menace and warlike demonstration which has been pursued by the
Government," and expressing the belief "that an honourable and
peaceful settlement of existing difficulties will be best promoted by
their consenting to state frankly the changes in the Treaty of San
Stefano which they consider necessary for the general good of Europe
and the interests of this country."'

But already the Government were in secret negotiation with Russia, and had entered into an agreement as to the modification of the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. Amongst other changes it was proposed to curtail the limits of Bulgaria by a division severing South from North, and to allow Austria-Hungary to occupy Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

'On Tuesday, May 7th, after the Radical Club, at a party at the
Harcourts', I learned what the Government intended to do at the
Conference or Congress--namely, limit Bulgaria on the south by the
Balkans. But I was informed at the same time that they would
themselves propose to give Thessaly and Epirus to Greece, an
undertaking which I think they did give to the King of Greece, but
from which, if so, they afterwards departed. The Greek Patriarch from
Constantinople came over at this time, as did the Armenian Patriarch
shortly afterwards, and I met both, although conversation with these
dignitaries was not easy, for their French was about as feeble as my
Greek; but through Gennadius I, of course, knew the views of the
Greeks, and in the Armenian question I took no special part.'

The question of employing the Indian troops was debated on May 20th. Lord Hartington opened; and Sir Charles replied to Sir Michael Hicks Beach, who followed Lord Hartington. Concerning the discussion, he says:

'The technical point which we argued was a narrow one. Had Cyprus been
in Asia, our arguments would not have applied to Cyprus; and it is
very likely that the Government thought Cyprus was in Asia, and did
not like to say that they had made a mistake, and having first ordered
the troops to Cyprus, and then ordered them to Malta (which was
undoubtedly in Europe), had forgotten the distinction. The real
objection to the bringing of the Sepoys was the same as the objection
to the calling out of the reserves--that it was isolated action, and
that these military measures and the expenditure which they involved
were mere bunkum, and mere waste if the Government intended to give
up, as they were secretly telling Russia they did intend to give up,
the main points of dispute. Moreover, Russia could do us hurt in
India, and Indian troops could not touch her at all....

'The Government were said to have only "conquered by giving way," for
they agreed to put the number of men into the Estimate, and thus avoid
making a precedent, according to our contention, absolutely
unconstitutional. On the other hand, Lord Beaconsfield's speech in the
House of Lords was defiant in the extreme, and Holker's [Footnote: The
Attorney-General.] in the Lower House was an assertion of higher
prerogative doctrine than had been heard in Parliament since the days
of Elizabeth.'

'On May 30th I dined with Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, and met Lord
Northbrook (the former Viceroy of India) and his daughter, Lady Emma
Baring, Lord Rosebery, Lord and Lady Napier (he a most distinguished
man, the best of Ambassadors to Russia and the best of Governors of
Madras, too little known),[Footnote: Baron Napier and Ettrick.] Lord
Macduff (afterwards Duke of Fife), and Monty Corry, afterwards Lord
Rowton, Lord Beaconsfield's private secretary.' Corry 'told me what
was at the moment a startling secret--that Lord Beaconsfield was going
to the Congress himself. "Can he speak French?" I asked with wonder,
to which he shook his head.'

On the day after the meeting of the Congress a sensational disclosure revealed to the world that it met; only to register foregone conclusions.

'At the end of the month (May) the secret agreement was signed with
Russia, and revealed to us by the _Globe_ [Footnote: The Globe
disclosure came from Mr. Marvin, a civil servant in temporary employ.
Dilke noted: "Besides the 'Marvin Memorandum' and an annex, there was
a curious stipulation insisted on by Russia, that the annex should
never be published, even if No. 1--that is, the 'Marvin Memorandum'--
should become public; and this looks very much as though Marvin was
really the Russian Government, which I have always suspected. They had
this to gain by publishing the Memorandum--that they showed themselves
the real victors in the Congress of Berlin, in spite of all our
bluster, and they damaged Lord Beaconsfield, who was their enemy.
Marvin could never have got a copy, and always pretended that he had
learned the whole document by heart, which, considering its length and
the total absence in the copy published in the _Globe_ of the
slightest error, even of punctuation, is incredible. The annex, which
was dated May 31st, only said that the Russians had no intention of
extending their conquests in Asiatic Turkey: 'The Emperor of Russia
... not having the intention of extending Ids conquests in Asia ...
the Imperial Government does not refuse to conclude with the British
Government a secret engagement for the purpose of reassuring it upon
this point.'"] on June 14th; and it then appeared that the military
preparations of the country must have been intended to keep up the
spirits of the Jingoes while their cherished principles were being
sacrificed behind their backs. The _Daily Telegraph_, which was the
Jingo organ, said: "If _such_ a compact has been concluded, this
country has fatally descended from the lofty position occupied by the
Salisbury despatch." Not only was the compact authentic, but there
were two other secret compacts of the same date which did not come
out. What the Government had done was to give up all the points for
which they had made their enthusiastic followers believe that they
would fight, and at the same time in the Anglo-Turkish Convention to
declare that their successors should fight for what was left. This may
have been a prudent policy, but it was not a policy which carried with
it the necessity for bringing Indian troops to Europe or spending
eight or nine millions sterling upon apparent preparations for
immediate war. The third agreement, in addition to the Salisbury-
Schouvalof agreement and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, the first of
which came out by chance and the second of which was ultimately
published by the Government, was an Anglo-Austrian secret agreement
which has never been printed, the character of which is revealed by
the fact that the English plenipotentiaries themselves proposed at
Berlin, in spite of the strong dissent of Turkey, to make to Austria
the gift of Bosnia and Herzegovina.'

To this note, written in 1890, there is added in the margin of the manuscript: 'There was also a secret supplementary agreement with Russia, of which later.' And also this: "The compact giving Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria is now (1908) known to Lucien Wolf." [Footnote: See Thomas Erskine Holland, _The European Concert in the Eastern Question_, 292, 293.]

Before the Berlin Congress met, Sir Charles had pressed by way of questions to secure if possible a representation for Greece at the Congress, and failed; and the speech which he made in the debate (opened on July 29th) on the Treaty of Berlin was mainly a censure on Great Britain for having failed to support the Hellenic claims. He dwelt specially on Crete, the government of which by Turkey was, he said, "a perpetual menace to European peace."

Replying in the debate for the Liberal party to Mr. David Plunket (afterwards Lord Rathmore), he notes that he

'spoke, and spoke well, making the best of my debating speeches, but
was overshadowed by one speech which would have caused better speeches
than mine to have been easily forgotten. Mr. Gladstone's speech on
this occasion, like all his speeches, does not read; but it was the
finest that I ever heard him make with one exception--the Bradlaugh
speech in the next Parliament.'