Chapter IX: Labouchere and Mr. Gladstone's Egyptian Policy (2)

In elucidation of the above letter Mr. Blunt writes to me on February 20, 1913: "The person referred to in your uncle's letter of February 20, 1885, is clearly Ismail Bey Jowdat, who acted as Prefect of Police at Cairo during the war of 1882.... Later he came to London in connection with negotiations I was attempting to get entered into by Gladstone with the Mahdi, through Sezzed Jamal ed Din, as to which I was in communication with your uncle.... I had, no doubt, sent Jowdat to your uncle, and, at one time, it seemed as if we were likely to succeed in getting a mission sent or negotiations of some kind entered into to stop the war.... Jowdat was never himself an agent of the Mahdi, but he was for the time with Jamal ed Din, who was in communication with Khartoum...."

Communication with the Mahdi was apparently not easy, for we find Mr. Labouchere writing again to Mr. Blunt the following month (March 4, 1885):

It appears to me that there will be a pause in our Soudan operations. It might therefore be desirable to take advantage of this in order to learn on what terms an agreement might be come to between us and the Soudanese. Those in Parliament who, like myself, see no reason why we should interfere in the internal affairs of that country would be greatly strengthened, were we to know the precise views of the Mahdi.

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I would therefore suggest to you that, if possible, his agent should let us know definitely, and after conversation with the Mahdi, whether the latter would agree to the following terms:

1. The recognition on the part of England of the independence of the Soudan, and of the Mahdi as its ruler.

2. The Northern frontier of the Soudan to be drawn at or near Wady Halfa; the Eastern frontier to exclude Suakim and the coast.

3. The Mahdi to pledge himself not to molest any Soudanese who have taken our side, and to allow all who wish to leave the country to do so.

4. The Mahdi to receive a Consular and Diplomatic Agent at Khartoum; to allow all foreigners to carry on their business unmolested in the Soudan.

5. The establishment of some sort of Consular Courts.

6. If possible some clause with regard to the export of slaves forbidding it.

It is our object to meet the assertion of the Government that the Mahdi is a religious fanatic with whom it is impossible to treat, because he does not regard himself, alone, as the temporal ruler of the Soudan, but as a spiritual leader of Islam against Christianity--a species of Oriental Peter the Hermit. What we want to show is that he is the proper ruler of the Soudan, and that, whilst it will be open to any one outside that country to regard him as a prophet, he seeks to establish no temporal sway beyond the Soudan. If the Mahdi would declare his assent to the above terms, I am convinced that popular feeling here, and the real wishes of the members of the Government, would soon bring this war to a close, and that in a very short time we and the Mahdi would be the best of friends.

It seems unlikely that the terms laid down in this letter were suggested by Mr. Labouchere without consultation with Mr. Herbert Gladstone.

He missed no opportunity in Parliament of fighting the good fight of Radical principles. At one moment he is pointing out the two cardinal heresies in the policy of the Government--one political and the other financial: "The {218} political heresy is that we insist on putting up the Khedive and maintaining him in power against his subjects. The result is that we are absolutely hated in Egypt, and wherever we are not hated we are regarded with contempt." The financial heresy is that "we always insist in our treatment of Egyptian finance that the payment of interest on the debt should come first, and the expenses of administration second. The result of this policy is over-taxation, the postponement of reform, and a deficit."[19] The policy of the Liberal Government was in reality, though not in profession, he asserted, Jingo policy, and the Radicals who had worked for Mr. Gladstone's return to power, relying on his Midlothian speeches, had been jockeyed. If only Mr. Gladstone would take his (Labouchere's) advice. No doubt the Prime Minister when thinking the matter over would say--Why did I not follow the member for Northampton? I should not have been in such a mess as I am now. For his own part Mr. Labouchere stood by the policy of the Midlothian campaign, when the Prime Minister denounced the Jingo policy of annexation and war. If any one had then said: "You will acquire power and become the most powerful Minister England has had for many a day; you will bombard Alexandria; you will massacre Egyptians at Tel-el-Kebir and Suakim, and you will go on a sort of wild-cat expedition into the wilds of Ethiopia in order to put down a prophet" the right honourable gentleman would have replied in the words of Hazael to the King of Syria--"Is thy servant a dog that he should do this thing?"[20]

This kind of sword-play went on day after day in the House, and it is impossible to doubt that, although Mr. Labouchere was unquestionably sincere in deploring the policy of the Government, he must have greatly enjoyed the opportunity which it afforded him of displaying his wit and humour. Mr. Gladstone did not always appreciate these {219} qualities, and on one occasion, when Mr. Labouchere was attempting to divide the House against the Government, his object being, as he said, "not adverse to the Government, but to strengthen the good intentions of the Prime Minister in future," that much enduring statesman turned and solemnly rebuked him for making an "inopportune and superficial speech."[21]

The case against the Government from the Radical point of view was, of course, very obvious and easy to put, nor was there anything particularly original about Mr. Labouchere's arguments. He rang the changes incessantly on three points: the essential injustice of our position in Egypt towards the Egyptians--the underlying venality of the Government's position owing to their connection with the bondholders--and the monstrous expense to the British taxpayer of British military intervention. It was not the matter of his charges, but the manner in which he made them that delighted the House. Sometimes he would lay aside his dialectical weapons and let the facts speak for themselves. One day he asks the Secretary for War if his attention has been drawn to the following statements in the _Times_ of May 7:

Daylight broke almost imperceptibly. We were nearer the village of Dhakool, when the friendly scouts came running in with the news that the inhabitants were at prayer, and that if we attacked at once we should catch them. General Graham pushed on with a troop of the Bengal Lancers.... The enemy fled on camels in all directions, and the Mounted Infantry and Camel corps, coming up, gave chase. Some two hundred attempted to stand, and showed a disposition to come at us, but evidently lost heart and disappeared, not before having at least twenty men killed.... It was curious to witness the desperate efforts of the enemy to drive their flocks up the steep mountain side, turning now and again to fire on the Bengal Lancers. The "Friendlies" tried to cut off the flocks, and succeeded in catching {220} some thousands of animals.... The village was looted and burnt.... We also destroyed the well with gun-cotton.... But, for our being unaware of the existence of some narrow hillock walks up which the enemy retired, we might have exterminated them. Our loss has been hitherto only two Mounted Infantry men wounded.... We have done the enemy all the harm we could, thus fulfilling the primary object of war.

Lord Hartington could find nothing to say, but that such incidents were unfortunately inseparable from war.[22]

It may be doubted, however, whether Mr. Labouchere's advocacy did very much for his cause, or for his own reputation as a serious politician. The British public (and the House of Commons is a sort of microcosm of the British public) finds it hard to believe in sincerity accompanied by banter and persiflage. Not so are Englishmen wont to express their conscientious convictions. Mr. Labouchere was, of course, not an Englishman. He was a Frenchman and, as I have said before, in his mentality a lineal descendant of Voltaire. He could hardly hope to succeed where John Bright had failed.

That Mr. Labouchere's attitude on the subject of Egypt was appreciated by the Egyptians is proved by a perusal of the letters he received from Arabi in exile, long after the subject had ceased to be a stone on which the Radical axe could be ground. I append some of these, and another letter from Mr. Labouchere to Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on the subject of the Exiles.

COLOMBO, September 15, 1891.

MY DEAR SIR,--I beg the liberty to trouble you with this in the hope of your being able to learn more of the state of our health than you have been hitherto. One of the most eminent medical practitioners in Ceylon, Dr. Vandort, left for England in the last week in the German mail steamship _Preussen_. I have asked him to call on you and Sir William Gregory and inform you of {221} the actual state of such of us as he has attended on. By the death of Dr. White we lost our best evidence, and it pleased those in authority not to heed at all the opinion of our regular medical advisers and to rely on that of gentlemen who, whatever their high standing and attainments, had but one opportunity of seeing us. Had they questioned also those who attended on us and our families for years they might have been better able to form an opinion.

I am now suffering very much from my eyes, being scarcely able to read anything, and am waiting until an oculist from Madras could examine them and tell me what I may expect.

Pray forgive me for troubling with this letter. We have so few of your kind feelings and position to look up to--and if we are too importunate we would only beg to be pardoned.

In the hope that you are in the enjoyment of the blessing of health, and begging the kind acceptance of all respectful regards--I remain, yours most obediently,

A. ARABI, the Egyptian.

COLOMBO, December 9, 1891.

MY DEAR SIR,--I had the great pleasure to receive your kind letters of the 2d and 8th October, and should have replied earlier but for having had to communicate with my brethren in exile, and for there being time before the next meeting of Parliament. We beg your kindly acceptance of our grateful thanks.

We have been officially informed of the decision of H.M.'s Government on our memorial to Lord Salisbury, but for which we were prepared by yourself and Sir William Gregory; and also by Lord de la Warr, who very kindly sent to me copies of the papers (Egypt, No. 1, 1891), printed for both Houses of Parliament, in March last, and of his speeches and Lord Salisbury's reply in May and June last. I now send copies as requested of the medical certificates had by Toulba Pasha and the late Abdulal Pasha since the memorial, also the Colonial Secretary's letter to us and my reply. [All these were enclosed with this letter.]

You will permit me to ask your notice of Riaz Pasha's Memorandum of July 9, 1890, to the Foreign Office concluding with: "H.M's Government should in any case remember that the exiles were pardoned and allowances granted to them on the express {222} condition that they should remain at some distant spot, such as the island of Ceylon." On this rather qualified assertion it would quite do to refer to Mr. Broadley's book _How we Defended Arabi and his Friends_, where the terms of the arrangement which put an end to the proceedings in connection with our "trial" will be found. Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier could not, as I cannot, in honour reveal more than they have done, but my steadfast friend, Mr. Blunt, was not so constrained to be reticent, and his communications to the _Pall Mall Gazette_ showed what even the great noble-minded General Gordon believed the nature and extent of our exile to be.

We should not perhaps however complain of our not being permitted to end our days in the land of our birth, although what harm that, or our being in Cyprus, could now do I cannot conceive. That none of us have desired or sought in the least to be disloyal to our parole the testimony of Sir Arthur Gordon to our conduct should be sufficient. If all my correspondence, family and other, for the last nine years were read, or any of the hundreds of my visitors, from every part of the world, were questioned, nothing would there be to show the least wish to disturb or stay the progress of my loved native land since my poor efforts failed.

If you would kindly refer to Mr. Broadley's book you will find Lord Dufferin's scheme in 1883 for the reorganisation of my country, and my views on Egyptian reform in 1882. After nine years, when almost the whole of that scheme and so many of my humble views have been successfully carried out, is it possible that any one beyond my personal enemies in my own country could deem me capable of even dreaming of doing anything to see her in misery again? My greatest trust is yet what it was when I wrote to the _Times_ from my prison in 1882: "I hope the people of England will complete the work which I commenced. If England accomplishes this task, and thus really gives Egypt to the Egyptians, she will then make clear to the world the real aim and object of Arabi the Rebel" (Mr. Broadley's book, p. 349). I cannot hope to see the time, but it must come under such auspices when Egypt will cease to be a "reproach to the nations," Islam although she be.

My fellow exiles and I have considered much on the subject {223} of the parole you suggest in regard to Cyprus. Our simple parole was all that Lord Dufferin required of us when exiled. We gave it, and he was satisfied. We have honourably kept our word, and it is only now, when we find our place of sojourn proving so increasingly injurious to the health of most of us and our families, that we pray for a change to a more congenial climate. In every other respect we could not dream nor hope for a better home of exile. We leave everything to your judgment. If you think a repetition of our parole necessary, or of any use, we shall gladly give it again, although our first, religiously observed, has been so slighted; and we shall send it to you as soon as you may desire it. You have done much for us, and our return for it all could only be gratefully felt, not expressed; and you will permit us to leave it to you to do for us whatever more in your judgment may be expedient, and, whatever that may be, permit us to assure you of our fullest trust.

If any prospect of the change of residence we seek is hopeless, and Lord Salisbury should adhere to his wish to keep us here, I may but beg your best endeavour to obtain the increase of allowance I have applied for in my letter to the Colonial Secretary, to enable me to have the benefit of such change as the variable climate of this island could in some degree afford.

I had the pleasure last week of two kind visits by Mr. J. R. Cox, M.P., on his return home from Australia in the _Orizaba_. He mentioned your request and his promise to see me if he came to Colombo, and your desire that he should learn from me all I had to say; and he asked me to give him a statement, which I have done to the best of my ability both by word of mouth and in writing. He said he had been long away, and had not seen the papers Lord de la Warr sent me until then. I need not say how deeply gratifying it was to hear from him of your interest in us and of your exertions on our behalf, and of the wide feelings of sympathy you have raised for us.

You will forgive me for trespassing on your time and work with this long letter; and if I have been led to say anything that I have troubled your attention with before, I may only beg the extension of your indulgence for it. Placed as I am now, able to think only of the past, and with no hope for life's future on earth, and deprived more and more of my greatest solace, study, {224} by the growing weakness of sight, I fear that my communications to you and to those who have likewise generously extended sympathy to us in our strait are of too melancholy a tinge. As any prospect of better days seems all but closed to us, we may but bow in humble resignation and submission to the Divine Will. When this letter comes to you it will be your great season of joy and peace. Permit me and my family to offer you our best regards and wishes for many a happy enjoyment together and return of the things to you and all dear to you.--And believe me, yours most gratefully and sincerely,

AHMED ARABI, the Egyptian.

5 OLD PALACE YARD, S.W., Feb. 1, 1893.

MY DEAR BLUNT,--Jingoism under Rosebery reigns supreme. I will, however, see if anything can be done about Arabi. Your details are very interesting respecting the late events in Egypt. Cannot the Khedive be induced to do this?: Get his Chamber to pass a resolution declaring that Egypt wishes for independence of all European intervention, and trusts that the British occupation will cease. If it did this we should be able to meet the persistent statements that the Fellaheen wants us and loves us. The Turkish Pashas might agree so as to spite us, but if once the country were left to itself, the Chamber could assert (?) itself.

It is difficult to say how long the Government will last. Probably through the session.--Yours truly,

H. LABOUCHERE.

[1] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, _Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt_.

[2] I have taken this account of the Cyprus Convention and its results at the Berlin Congress from Mr. Blunt's _Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt_. He says in a footnote (_op. cit._, p. 277): "I have given the story of the arrangement made with Waddington as I heard it first from Lord Lytton at Simla in May, 1879. The details were contained in a letter which he showed me written to him from Berlin, while the Congress was still sitting, by a former diplomatic colleague, and have since been confirmed to me from more than one quarter, though with variations. In regard to the main feature of the agreement, the arrangement about Tunis, I had it very plainly stated to me in the autumn of 1884 by Count Corti, who had been Italian Ambassador at the Congress. According to his account, the shock of the revelation to Disraeli had been so great that he took to his bed, and for four days did not appear at the sittings, leaving Lord Salisbury to explain matters as he best could. He said that there had been no open rupture with Waddington, the case having been submitted by Waddington to his fellow-ambassadors, who agreed that it was not one that could possibly be publicly disputed: _Il faut la guerre ou se taire_. The agreement was a verbal one between Waddington and Salisbury, but was recorded in a despatch subsequently written by the French Ambassador in London in which he reminded Salisbury of the Convention conversation held in Berlin, and so secured its acknowledgment in writing."

[3] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv., p. 247.

[4] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv., p. 247.

[5] _Hansard_, May 12, 1882, vol. 269.

[6] Vote of credit for forces in the Mediterranean.

[7] _Hansard_, July 27, 1882, vol. 272.

[8] _Hansard_, October 30, 1882, vol. 274.

[9] _Truth_, October 5, 1882.

[10] _Truth_, October 12, 1882.

[11] _Truth_, December 7, 1882.

[12] _Hansard_, February 15, 1883, vol. 276.

[13] _Hansard_, March 2, 1883, vol. 276.

[14] _Ibid._, June 11, 1883, vol. 280.

[15] Herbert Paul, _A History of Modern England_, vol. iv.

[16] _Hansard_, February 14, 1884, vol. 284.

[17] Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, _Gordon and Khartoum_.

[18] _Hansard_, May 19, 1884, vol. 288.

[19] _Hansard_, March 26, 1885, vol. 295.

[20] _Ibid._, Feb. 27, 1885, vol. 294.

[21] _Hansard_, April 13, 1885, vol. 296.

[22] _Hansard_, May 8, 1885, vol. 298.

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