Chapter XIV (2)

The king of Prussia had tried several times to bring the combined army under the princes Saxe-Hilburghausen and Soubise to an engagement upon fair ground, but finding them bent on declining it, notwithstanding the superiority of their numbers, he had recourse to one of those strokes in war, by which a general is better seen than by the gaining of a victory. He made a feint, soon after the beginning of October, as if he intended nothing more than to secure his own dominions, and march his army into winter-quarters back to Berlin, leaving mareschal Keith, with only seven or eight thousand men, to defend Leipsic. Upon this the enemy took courage, passed the Sala, and having marched up to the city, summoned the mareschal to surrender; to which he answered, that the king, his master, had ordered him to defend the place to the last extremity, and he would obey his orders. The enemy then thought of besieging the city; but, before they could prepare any one implement for that purpose, they were alarmed by the approach of the king of Prussia, who, judging that his feint would probably induce them to take the step they did, had, by previous and private orders, collected together all his distant detachments, some of which were twenty leagues asunder, and was advancing, by long marches, to Leipsic; upon notice of which the enemy repassed the Sala. The Prussian army was re-assembled on the twenty-seventh of October, and remained at Leipsic the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, when everybody expected a battle would be fought in the plains of Lutzen. On the thirtieth, the king drew nigh that place, and on the thirty-first, in his way through Weissenfells and Meresbourg, he made five hundred men prisoners of war. The combined army had repassed the Sala at Weissenfells, Meresbourg, and Halle, where they broke down the bridges; but these were soon repaired, and the whole Prussian army, amounting to no more than twenty thousand men, having passed that river, through these towns, in each of which they left a battalion, joined again on the third of November, in the evening, over against the enemy, whose forces consisted of forty thousand French, and twenty-five thousand Imperialists. On the fifth, about nine o’clock in the morning, the Prussians received intelligence that the enemy were every where in motion. They likewise heard the drums beating the march, and, so near were the two armies to each other, plainly perceived from their camp that their whole infantry, which had drawn nearer upon the rising grounds over against them, was filing off towards their right. No certain judgment could, however, yet be formed of the enemy’s real design, and as they were in want of bread, it was thought probable that they intended to repass the Un-strut; but it was soon perceived that their several motions were contradictory to each other. At the same time that some of their infantry were filing off towards their right, a large body of cavalry wheeled round towards their left, directing its march all along to the rising grounds with which the whole Prussian camp, that lay in a bottom between the villages of Eederow and Rosbach, was surrounded within the reach of large cannon. Soon after that the cavalry were seen to halt, and afterwards to fall back to the right; though some of them still remained where they were, whilst the rest marched back. About two in the afternoon the doubts of the Prussians were cleared up; it plainly appearing then that the enemy intended to attack them, and that their dispositions were made with a view to surround them, and to open the action by attacking them in the rear. A body of reserve was posted over against Eederow, to fall upon their routed troops, in case they should be defeated, and to prevent their retiring to Meresbourg, the only retreat which could then have been left them. In thiss situation the king of Prussia resolved to attack them. His majesty had determined to make the attack with one wing only, and the disposition of the enemy made it necessary that it should be the left wing. The very instant the battle was going to begin, his majesty ordered the general who commanded the right wing to decline engaging, to take a proper position in consequence thereof, and, above all, to prevent his being surrounded. All the cavalry of the right wing of the Prussians, except two or three squadrons, had already marched to the left at full gallop; and being arrived at the place assigned them, they formed over against that of the enemy. They then moved on immediately, the enemy advanced to meet them, and the charge was very fierce, several regiments of the French coming on with great resolution. The advantage, however, was entirely on the side of the Prussians. The enemy’s cavalry being routed, were pursued for a considerable time with great spirit, but having afterwards reached an eminence, which gave them an opportunity of rallying, the Prussian cavalry fell upon them afresh, and gave them so total a defeat, that they fled in the utmost disorder. This happened at four in the afternoon. Whilst the cavalry of the Prussians charged, their infantry opened. The enemy cannonaded them briskly during this interval, and did some execution, but the Prussian artillery was not idle. After this cannonading had continued on both sides a full quarter of an hour, without the least intermission, the fire of the infantry began. The enemy could not stand it, nor resist the valour of the Prussian foot, who gallantly marched up to their batteries. The batteries were carried one after another, and the enemy were forced to give way, which they did in great confusion. As the left wing of the Prussians advanced, the right changed its position, and having soon met with a small rising ground, they availed themselves of it, by planting it with sixteen pieces of heavy artillery. The fire from thence was partly pointed at the enemy’s right, to increase the disorder there, and took their left wing in front, which was excessively galled thereby. At five the victory was decided, the cannonading ceased, and the enemy fled on all sides. They were pursued as long as there was any light to distinguish them, and it may be said, that night alone was the preservation of this army, which had been so formidable in the morning. They took the benefit of the darkness to hurry into Fribourg, and there to repass the Unstrut, which they did on the morning of the sixth, after a whole night’s inarch. The king of Prussia set out early in the morning to pursue them with all his cavalry, supported by four battalions of grenadiers, the infantry following them in two columns. The enemy had passed the Unstrut at Fribourg, when the Prussians arrived on its banks, and as they had burnt the bridge, it became necessary to make another, which, however, was soon done. The cavalry passed first, but could not come up with the enemy till five in the evening, upon the hills of Eckersberg. It was then too late to force them there, for which reason the king thought proper to canton his army in the nearest villages, and to be satisfied with the success his hussars had in taking near three hundred baggage waggons, and every thing they contained. The whole loss of the Prussians in this important engagement, did not exceed five hundred men killed and wounded. Among the former was general Meincke, and among the latter prince Henry and general Seydelitz. The enemy lost sixty-four pieces of cannon, a great many standards and colours, near three thousand men killed on the field of battle, and upwards of eight thousand taken prisoners, among whom were several generals, and other officers of distinction. Three hundred waggons were sent to Leipsic, laden with wounded French and Swiss. Upon the approach of the Prussians towards Eckersberg, the enemy retreated with great precipitation; and, after marching all night, arrived the next day at Erfurth, in the utmost want of every necessary of life, not having had a morsel of bread for two days, during which they had been obliged to live upon turnips, radishes, and other roots, which they dug out of the earth. The French, under the duke de Richelieu, were preparing to go into winter-quarters; but, upon the news of this defeat of the combined army, they again put themselves in motion, and a large detachment of them advanced as far as Duderstadt, to favour the retreat of their countrymen under the prince de Soubise, who, with great precipitancy, made the best of their way from Erfurth to the county of Hohenstein, and from thence bent their march towards Halberstadt. Of the remains of the imperial army, which was now almost entirely dispersed, whole bodies deserted, and went over to the king of Prussia soon after the battle.

{GEORGE II. 1727-1760}

THE AUSTRIANS TAKE SCHWEIDNITZ.

Whilst his Prussian majesty was thus successful against the French and Imperialists, the Austrians, who had carefully avoided coming to an open engagement with him, gained ground apace in Silesia. A detachment of their army, under the command of count Nadasti, had already invested Schweidnitz, and opened the trenches before it on the twenty-sixth of October. The Prussian garrison, commanded by general de la Motte Fouquet, determined to defend the place as long as possible; and accordingly on the thirtieth they made a sally, in which they killed, wounded, and took prisoners, eight hundred of the besiegers, and did some damage to their works; but on the sixth of November the Austrians began to cannonade the city furiously, and on the eleventh made themselves masters of the ramparts by assault. The garrison, however, having taken care, during the siege, to throw up a strong in-trenchment in the market-place, retreated thither, and held out till the next day, when they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. After the reduction of this place, general Nadasti, leaving in it a sufficient garrison, marched with the remainder of his troops, and joined the main army of the Austrians, under the command of prince Charles of Lorraine and mareschal Daun, who, whilst he was busied in the siege of Schweidnitz, had invested Breslau on the left of the Oder; the prince of Bevern defending it on the right, where he was strongly encamped, with his little army, under the cannon of the city. The whole army of the Austrians being now re-assembled, and intelligence having been brought not only of the king of Prussia’s late victory near Leipsic, but also that he was advancing to the relief of the prince of Bevern, it was resolved immediately to attack the last in his intrenchments. Accordingly, on the twenty-second of November, about nine in the morning, the Austrians began a most furious discharge of their cannon, forty of which were twenty-four pounders, and this continued without ceasing till one, when it was succeeded by a severe fire of their small arms, which lasted till five in the evening. The Prussians, with undaunted resolution, stood two of the most violent attacks that were ever made; but at the third, overpowered by numbers, and assailed on both sides, they began to lose ground, and were forced to retire from one intrenchment to another. In this extremity, night coming on, the Prussian generals fearing their intrenchments would be entirely forced, and that they should then be totally defeated, thought proper to retreat. The prince of Bevern, with the greatest part of the army, retired to an eminence on the banks of the Oder, whilst the rest of the troops threw themselves into Breslau, which they might have defended, in all probability, till the king had come to its relief. But, on the twenty-fourth, their commander-in-chief, the prince of Bevern, going to reconnoitre the enemy, with only a single groom to attend him, fell in among a party of croats, who took him prisoner.*

* We are told, that he mistook these croats for Prussian
hussars. But some of the circumstances of this mysterious
affair were interpreted into a premeditated design in the
prince to be taken prisoner. It cannot otherwise he supposed
that a man of his rank, a prince, a commander-in-chief,
should officiously undertake the always dangerous task of
reconnoitering the enemy with so slight an attendance as
only one man, and that but a groom, even if he had judged it
necessary to see things with his own eyes. Some secret
dissatisfaction, hitherto unknown to us, may possibly have
been the cause of his taking this step; or, which seems
still more probable, he might he ashamed, or, perhaps, even
afraid, to see the king his master, after having so
injudiciously abandoned the defence of Breslau, by quitting
his lines, which, it is asserted, his Prussian majesty had
sent him express orders not to quit on any account whatever,
for that he would certainly be with him by the fifth of
December, in which we shall find he kept his word.

His army, thus deprived of their general, retreated northward that night, leaving in Breslau only four battalions, who, the next day, surrendered the place by capitulation, one of the articles of which was, that they should not serve against the empress, or her allies, for two years. All the magazines, chests, artillery, &c, remained in the hands of the Austrians. The garrison marched out with all military honours, conducted by general Leswitz, governor of Breslau. Though the Austrians sung _Te Deum_ for this victory, they owned that such another would put an end to their army, for it cost them the lives of twelve thousand men; a number almost equal to the whole of the Prussian army before the battle. They had four almost inaccessible intrenchments to force, planted thick with cannon, which fired cartridge shot from nine in the morning till the evening, and the Prussians, when attacked, were never once put into the least confusion. Among the slain on the side of the Austrians, were general Wurben, and several other officers of distinction. The loss of the Prussians did not much exceed three thousand men, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, of which last there were about sixteen hundred. Their general Kleist was found dead on the field of battle.

MARESCHAL KEITH LAYS BOHEMIA UNDER CONTRIBUTION.

The king of Prussia, who, like Caesar, thought nothing was done while any thing was left undone, stayed no longer at Rosbach than till the routed forces of the French and Imperialists, whom he had defeated there on the fifth of November, were totally dispersed. Then he marched directly with the greatest part of his army for Silesia, and on the twenty-fourth of that month arrived at Naumburgh on the Queiss, a little river which runs into the Bobber, having in his route detached mareschal Keith, with the rest of his army, to clear Saxony from all the Austrian parties, and then to make an irruption into Bohemia, a service which he performed so effectually, as to raise large contributions in the circles of Satz and Leitmeritz, and even to give an alarm to Prague itself. His majesty reserved for himself only fifteen thousand men, with whom he advanced, with his usual rapidity, to Barchweitz, where, notwithstanding all that had happened at Schweidnitz and at Breslau, he was joined by twenty-four thousand more; part of them troops which he had ordered from Saxony, part the remains of the army lately commanded by the prince of Bevern, and part the late garrison of Schweidnitz, which had found means to escape from the Austrians, and accidentally joined their king upon his march.*

* While the Austrians were conducting them to prison, on
their route they chanced to hear of the victory their master
had gained at Rosbach. Animated by these tidings, they
unanimously rose upon the escort that guarded them, which
happening not to be very strong, they entirely dispersed.
Thus freed, they marched on, not very certain of their way,
in hopes to rejoin some corps of the Prussian troops, their
countrymen. The same fortune which freed them led them
directly to the army commanded by the king himself, which
was hastening to their relief, as well as to that of the
prince of Bevern. This unexpected meeting was equally
pleasing to both, the prisoners not having heard any thing
of his majesty’s march; and, at the same time, this lucky
incident, whilst it added a considerable strength to the
army, added likewise to its confidence, for the slightest
occurrence is construed into an omen by an army at the eve
of an engagement.

With this force, though greatly inferior in number to that of the enemy, he resolved to attack the Austrians, who were intrenched at Lissa, near Breslau. On the fourth of December he seized upon their ovens at Neu-marck, and upon a considerable magazine, guarded by two regiments of croats, who retired to a rising ground, where his majesty ordered his hussars to surround them, and send a trumpet to summon them to surrender themselves prisoners of war. Upon their refusal, the hussars of Ziethen fell upon them sabre in hand, and some hundreds of them having been cut in pieces, the rest threw down their arms, begging for quarter on their knees. After this seizure, and after having distributed to his army the bread prepared for his enemies, he began again the next morning his march towards Lissa. General Ziethen, who led the vanguard of light-horse, about seven in the morning fell in with a body of Austrian hussars, and three regiments of Saxon dragoons, which were the very best cavalry the enemy had left after the battle of the twenty-second. They had been detached by the Austrians, in order to retard the king’s march, and to conceal their own, till their batteries should be completed; for, as they held the small number of the Prussians in contempt, their intention was to have met the king two German miles from their intrenchments. The Austrian cavalry having been vigorously repulsed to a considerable distance, general Ziethen perceived that their whole army was forming. He immediately acquainted the king with what he had discovered, and his majesty, after having himself observed the disposition of the enemy, made his own with that sagacity and despatch for which he has always been remarkable. The action began by attacking a battery of forty pieces of large cannon, which covered the right wing of the enemy. The two battalions of guards, with the regiments of the margrave Charles and of Itzenplitz, marched up amidst a most terrible fire to the very mouths of the cannon, with their bayonets screwed. In this attack the Prussians sustained their greatest loss, though the battery was carried as soon almost as they could reach it; then the enemy’s artillery, now turned against themselves, played furiously upon them with their own powder. From that instant the two wings and the centre of the Prussians continued to drive the enemy before them, advancing all the time with that firm and regular pace for which they have always been renowned, without ever halting or giving way. The ground which the Austrians occupied was very advantageous, and every circumstance that could render it more so had been improved to the utmost by the diligence and skill of count Daun, who, remembering his former success, was emboldened to enter the lists again with his royal antagonist. The Prussians, however, no way terrified by the enemy’s situation nor their numbers, went calmly and dreadfully forward. It was almost impossible in the beginning for the Prussian cavalry to act, on account of the impediments of fallen trees, which the enemy had cut down and laid in the field of battle, to retard their approach; but a judicious disposition which the king made overcame that disadvantage. When he first formed his army, he had placed four battalions behind the cavalry of his right wing, foreseeing that general Nadasti, who was placed with a corps of reserve on the enemy’s left, designed to take him in flank. It happened as he had foreseen, this general’s horse attacked the king’s right wing with great fury; but he was received with so severe a fire from the four battalions, that he was obliged to retire in disorder. The enemy gave way on all sides; out at some distance recovered themselves, and rallied three times, animated by their officers, and by the superiority of their numbers. Every time they made a stand, the Prussians attacked them with redoubled vigour, and with success equal to their bravery. Towards night, the enemy, still retreating, fell into disorder. Their two wings fled in confusion; one of them, closely pressed by the king, retired towards Breslau, and took shelter under the cannon of that city; the other, pursued by the greatest part of the light cavalry, took their flight towards Canth and Schweidnitz. Six thousand Austrians fell in this engagement, and the Prussians, who had only five hundred men killed, and two thousand three hundred wounded, made upwards of ten thousand of the enemy prisoners, among whom were two hundred and ninety-one officers. They took also an hundred and sixteen cannon, fifty-one colours and standards, and four thousand waggons of ammunition and baggage. The consequences that followed this victory declared its importance. Future ages will read with astonishment, that the same prince, who but a few months before seemed on the verge of inevitable ruin, merely by the dint of his own abilities, without the assistance of any friend whatever, with troops perpetually harassed by long and painful marches, and by continual skirmishes and battles, not only retrieved his affairs, which almost every one, except himself, thought past redress; but, in the midst of winter, in countries where it was judged next to impossible for any troops to keep the field at that season, conquered the united force of France and the empire at Rosbach, on the fifth of November; and on the same day of the very next month, with a great part of the same army, was at Lissa, where he again triumphed over all the power of the house of Austria. Pursuing his advantage, he immediately invested Breslau, and within two days after this great victory every thing was in readiness to besiege it in form. His troops, flushed with success, were at first for storming it, but the king, knowing the strength of the garrison, which consisted of upwards of thirteen thousand men, and considering both the fatigues which his own soldiers had lately undergone, and the fatal consequences that might ensue, should they fail of success in this attempt, ordered the approaches to be carried on in the usual form. His commands were obeyed, and Breslau surrendered to him on the twentieth of December in the morning. The garrison, of which ten thousand bore arms, and between three and four thousand lay sick or wounded, were made prisoners of war. Fourteen of these prisoners were officers of high rank. The military chest, a vast treasure, with eighty pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors, who lost only about twenty men in their approaches. During the siege, a magazine of powder was set on fire by a bomb, which occasioned great confusion among the besieged, and damaged one of the bastions. The strong fortress of Schweidnitz still remained in the enemy’s possession, defended by a garrison so numerous, that it might be compared to a small army, and whilst that continued so, the king of Prussia’s victories in Silesia were of no decisive effect. For this reason, though it was now the dead of winter, and the soldiers stood in need of repose, his majesty resolved, if possible, to become master of that place before the end of the year; but as a close siege was impracticable, a blockade was formed, as strictly as the rigour of the season would permit.*

* Such was the rigour of the season, that some hundreds of
the sentinels dropped down dead on their several posts,
unable to sustain the severity of the cold. The Germans lie
under the general reproach of paying very little regard to
the lives of their soldiers, and indeed this practice of
winter campaigns, in such a cold country, bespeaks very
little regard to the dictates of humanity.

It was not, however, till the beginning of the ensuing campaign that this place was taken. The Prussians opened their trenches before it on the third of April, one thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight, and erected two large batteries, which kept a continual fire upon the town. The artillery of the besiegers consisted of three hundred pieces of cannon, of different dimensions, and eighty mortars; an amazing artillery, and such as we have never heard of in former campaigns. On the night of the fourteenth, the Prussians carried one of the chief works by assault, and lodged themselves therein: the commandant capitulated the next day, with the garrison, which was now greatly reduced in number, being not half of what it amounted to at the beginning of the blockade. Thus, all the parts of Silesia which the king of Prussia had lost by one unfortunate blow, fell again into his possession; and his affairs, which but a few months before seemed irretrievable, were now re-established upon a firmer basis than ever. The Prussian parties not only re-possessed themselves of those parts of Silesia which belonged to their king, but penetrated into the Austrian division, reduced Jagerndorf, Troppau, Tretchen, and several other places, and left the empress-queen scarce any footing in that country, in which, a few days before, she reckoned her dominion perfectly established.

HOSTILITIES of the SWEDES in POMERANIA.

The Swedes, after many debates between their king and senate, had at length resolved upon an open declaration against the king of Prussia, and, in consequence of that resolution, sent so many troops into Pomerania, that by the end of August, their army in that country amounted to twenty-five thousand men. Their first act of hostility was the seizure of Anclam and Dem-min, two towns that lay in the way to Stetin, against which their principal design was levelled. But before they proceeded farther, general Hamilton, their commander, by way of justifying the conduct of his master, published a declaration, setting forth, “That the king of Sweden, as guarantee of the treaty of Westphalia, could not help sending his troops into the upper part of the duchy of Pomerania belonging to the king of Prussia; and that, therefore, all the officers appointed to receive the public revenue in that country must pay what money they had in their hands to him, who was commissioned to receive it for his Swedish majesty; that, moreover, an exact account was required, within eight days, of the revenues of the country; but that no more than ordinary contributions would be demanded of the inhabitants, who might rest assured that the Swedish troops should observe the strictest discipline.” After this declaration, they attacked the little fortress of Penemunde, upon the river Pene, and on the twenty-third of September, after a siege of nine days, obliged the garrison, which consisted only of militia, to surrender themselves prisoners of war. This alternative the commanding officer chose, rather than engage not to serve for two years, observing, that such an engagement was inconsistent with his honour, whilst his prince had so much occasion for his service; and the Swedish general, touched with this noble way of thinking, was, on his part, so generous as to give him his liberty. On the other hand, general Manteuffel, who commanded the Prussian forces then in Pomerania, amounting to twelve thousand men, with whom he was encamped before Stetin, to cover that place, published in answer to this a declaration, enjoining the inhabitants of Pomerania to remain faithful to the king of Prussia, their lawful sovereign, under pain of incurring his just indignation, and absolutely forbidding them to pay any regard to the Swedish manifesto.

In the meantime, maresehal Lehwald, immediately after the battle of Norkitten, when the Russians began their retreat, detached prince George of Holstein-Got-torp, with a considerable body of forces, to the relief of Pomerania; and, shortly after, the Russian forces having totally evacuated every part of Prussia, except Memel, and most of them being actually gone into winter-quarters, he himself followed with an additional reinforcement of sixteen thousand men. Upon his approach, the Swedes, who were then encamped at Ferdinandshoff, and had begun to fill up the harbour of Swinnemunde, by way of previous preparation for the siege of Stetin, retired with such precipitation, that they did not allow themselves time to draw off a little garrison they had at Wollin, consisting of two hundred and ten men, who were made prisoners of war. Dem-min was cannonaded by the Prussians on the twenty-ninth of December; and the Swedes having lost one officer and forty men, desired to capitulate. As, in order to ease the troops, it was not thought proper to continue the siege in so sharp a season, their request was granted, and they had leave to retire with two pieces of cannon. The Prussians took possession of the town on the second day of January, after the Swedes had, on the thirtieth of December, likewise given up Anclam, where the conquerors took an hundred and fifty prisoners, and found a considerable magazine of provisions and ammunition. Maresehal Lehwald then passed the Pene, entered Swedish Pomerania, and reduced Gutzkow, Loitz, Tripsus, and Nebringen. At the same time, lieutenant-general Schorlemmer passed with his corps from the isle of Wollin into the isle of Usedom, and from thence to Wolgast, the Swedes having abandoned this town, as well as Schwinemunde, and the fort of Penemunde. The prince of Holstein advanced as far as Grimm and Grieffwalde, and the Swedes, losing one town after another, till they had nothing left in Pomerania but the port of Stralsund, continued retreating till they had reached this last place. The French party in Sweden, to comfort the people, called this retreat, or rather flight, going into winter-quarters. The Prussian hussars were not idle wherever they penetrated; for, besides plundering and pillaging, they raised a contribution of an hundred and sixty thousand crowns in Swedish Pomerania. The Mecklenburghers, who had joined the Swedes with six thousand of their troops, now found cause to repent of their forwardness, being left quite exposed to the resentment of the victors, who chastised them with the most severe exactions. The army of the Swedes, though they did not fight a battle, was, by sickness, desertion, and other accidents, reduced to half the number it consisted of when they took the field. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, soon after his territories were invaded by the French, in consequence of their advantage in the affair of Hastenbeck, had applied to the king of Sweden, as one of the guarantees of the treaty of Westphalia, desiring him to employ his good offices with the court of France, to obtain a more favourable treatment for his dominions; but his Swedish majesty, by the advice of the senate, thought proper to refuse complying with this request, alleging, that as the crown of Sweden was one of the principal guarantees of the treaty of Westphalia, it would be highly improper to take such a step in favour of a prince who had not only broke the laws and constitution of the empire, in refusing to furnish his contingent, but had even assisted, with his troops, a power known to be its declared enemy. The Aulic council too, seeing, or pretending to see, the behaviour of the landgrave in the same light, issued a decree against his serene highness towards the end of this year.

MEMORIAL PRESENTED TO THE DUTCH.

The court of Great Britain, justly displeased with the Dutch, on account of the extreme facility with which they had granted the French a free passage through Namur and Maestricht for their provisions, ammunition, and artillery, in the beginning of this campaign, had very properly remonstrated against that step, before it-was absolutely resolved on, or at least declared to be so; but in vain; a pusillanimous answer being all the satisfaction that was obtained. The tameness and indifference with which the states-general has since seen Os-tend and Nieuport put into the hands of the French, drew upon their high mightinesses a further remonstrance, which was delivered to them on the twenty-eighth of November of this year by colonel Yorke, his Britannic majesty’s plenipotentiary at the Hague, in the following terms, well calculated to awaken in them a due sense of their own danger, as well as to evince the injustice of the proceedings of the house of Austria:--Considering the critical situation which Europe has been in during the course of this year, in consequence of measures concerted to embroil all Europe, the king of Great Britain was willing to flatter himself that the courts of Vienna and Versailles, out of regard to the circumspect conduct observed by your high mightinesses, would have at least informed you of the changes they have thought proper to make in the Austrian Netherlands. It was with the utmost surprise the king heard, that without any previous consent of yours, and almost without giving you any notice, the court of Vienna had thought proper to put the towns of Ostend and Nieuport into the hands of the French troops, and to withdraw her own, as well as her artillery and stores, whilst France continues to send thither a formidable quantity of both. The conduct of the court of Vienna towards his majesty is indeed so unmerited and so extraordinary, that it is difficult to find words to express it; but whatever fallacious pretexts she may have made use of to palliate her behaviour towards England, it doth not appear that they can be extended so far as to excuse the infringement, in concert with France, of the most solemn treaties between her and your high mightinesses. The king never doubted that your high mightinesses would have made proper representations to the two courts newly allied, to demonstrate the injustice of such a proceeding, and the danger that might afterwards result from it. Your high mightinesses will have perceived that your silence on the first step encouraged the two courts, newly allied, to attempt others, and who can say where they will stop? The pretext at first was, the need which the empress-queen stood in of the troops for the war kindled in the empire, and the necessity of providing for the safety of those important places, and afterwards of their imaginary danger from England. But, high and mighty lords, it is but too evident that the two powers who have taken these measures in concert, have other projects in view, and have made new regulations with regard to that country, which cannot but alarm the neighbouring states. The late demand made to your high mightinesses, of a passage for a large train of warlike implements through some of the barrier towns, in order to be sent to Ostend and Nieuport, could not fail to awaken the king’s attention. The sincere friendship, and parity of interests, of Great Britain and Holland, require that they should no longer keep silence, lest in the issue it should be considered as a tacit consent, and as a relinquishment of all our rights. The king commands me, therefore, to recall to your high mightinesses the two-fold right you have acquired to keep the Austrian Netherlands under the government of the house of Austria; and that no other has a title to make the least alteration therein, without the consent of your high mightinesses; unless the new allies have resolved to set aside all prior treaties, and to dispose at pleasure of everything that may suit their private interest. In the treaty between your high mightinesses and the crown of France, signed at Utrecht on the eleventh of April, one thousand seven hundred and thirteen, in the fifteenth article are these words: “It is also agreed, that no province, fort, town, or city of the said Netherlands, or of those which are given up by his catholic majesty, shall ever be ceded, transferred, or given, or shall ever devolve to the crown of France, or any prince or princess of the house or line of France, either by virtue of any gift, exchange, marriage contract, succession by will, or by any other title whatever, to the power and authority of the most christian king, or of any prince or princess of the house or line of France.” In the barrier-treaty these very stipulations are repeated in the first article: “His imperial and catholic majesty promises and engages, that no province, city, town, fortress, or territory of the said country, shall be ceded, transferred, given, or devolve to the crown of France, or to any other but the successor of the German dominions of the house of Austria, either by donation, sale, exchange, marriage-contract, heritage, testamentary succession, nor under any other pretext whatsoever; so that no province, town, fortress, or territory of the said Netherlands shall ever be subject to any other prince, but to the successor of the states of the house of Austria alone, excepting what has been yielded by the present treaty to the said lords the states-general. A bare reading of these two articles is sufficient to evince all that I have just represented to your high mightinesses: and whatever pretext the courts of Vienna and Versailles may allege, to cover the infraction of these treaties, the thing remains nevertheless evident, whilst these two courts are unable to prove that the towns of Ostend and Nieuport are not actually in the power of France. If their designs are just, or agreeable to those treaties, they will doubtless not scruple, in the least, to make your high mightinesses easy on that head, by openly explaining themselves to a quiet and pacific neighbour, and by giving you indisputable proofs of their intentions to fulfil the stipulations of the said two treaties with regard to the Netherlands. The king hath so much confidence in the good sense, prudence, and friendship of your high mightinesses, that he makes not the least doubt of your taking the most efficacious measures to clear up an affair of such importance; and of your being pleased, in concert with his majesty, to watch over the fate of a country whose situations and independence have, for more than a century, been regarded as one of the principal supports of your liberty and commerce.” It does not appear that this remonstrance had the desired effect upon the states-general, who were apprehensive of embroiling themselves with an enemy so remarkably alert in taking all advantages. The truth is, they were not only unprepared for a rupture with France, but extremely unwilling to forego the commercial profits which they derived from their neutrality.

The king of Prussia, about this period, began to harbour a suspicion that certain other powers longed eagerly to enjoy the same respite from the dangers and inconveniences of war, and that he ran the risk of being abandoned by his sole patron and ally, who seemed greatly alarmed at his defeat in Bohemia, and desirous of detaching himself from a connexion which might be productive of the most disagreeable consequences to his continental interest. Stimulated by this opinion, his Prussian majesty is said to have written an expostulatory letter [433] _[See note 3 L, at the end of this Vol.]_ to the king of Great Britain, in which he very plainly taxes that monarch with having instigated him to commence hostilities; and insists upon his remembering the engagements by which he was so solemnly bound. From the strain of this letter, and the Prussian king’s declaration to the British minister when he first set out for Saxony, importing that he was going to fight the king of England’s battles, a notion was generally conceived that those two powers had agreed to certain private pacts or conventions, the particulars of which have not yet transpired. Certain it is, a declaration was delivered to the Prussian resident at London, which appears to have been calculated as an answer to the letter. In that paper the king of Great Britain declared, that the overtures made by his majesty’s electoral ministers in Germany, touching the checks received on the continent, should have no influence on his majesty as king; that he saw, in the same light as before, the pernicious effects of the union between the courts of Vienna and Versailles, threatning a subversion of the whole system of public liberty, and of the independence of the European powers; that he considered as a fatal consequence of this dangerous connexion, the cession made by the court of Vienna of the ports in the Netherlands to France, in such a critical situation, and contrary to the faith of the most solemn treaties; that, whatever might be the success of his arms, his majesty was determined to act in constant concert with the king of Prussia in employing the most efficacious means to frustrate the unjust and oppressive designs of their common enemies. He concluded with assuring the king of Prussia, that the British crown would continue to fulfil, with the greatest punctuality, its engagements with his Prussian majesty, and to support him with firmness and vigour. Such a representation could not fail of being agreeable to a prince, who, at this juncture, stood in need of an extraordinary cordial. He knew he could securely depend, not only on the good faith of an English ministry, but also on the good plight of the British nation, which, like an indulgent nurse, hath always presented the nipple to her meagre German allies. Those, however, who pretended to consider and canvas events, without prejudice and prepossession, could not help owning their surprise at hearing an alliance stigmatized as pernicious to the system of public liberty, and subversive of the independence of the European powers, as they remembered that this alliance was the effect of necessity, to which the house of Austria was reduced for its own preservation; reduced, as its friends and partisans affirm, by those very potentates that now reproached her with these connexions.

{GEORGE II. 1727-1760}

DISPUTES CONCERNING THE CONVENTION OF CLOSTER-SEVEN.

His Britannic majesty was resolved that the king of Prussia should have no cause to complain of his indifference, whatever reasons he had to exclaim against the convention of Closter-Seven, which he did not scruple to condemn as a very scandalous capitulation, as much as he disapproved of the conduct, in consequence of which near forty thousand men were so shamefully disarmed, and lost to his cause. Those stipulations also met with a very unfavourable reception in England, where the motions of the allied army, in their retreat before the enemy, were very freely censured, and some great names exposed to the ridicule and contempt of the public. This event, so singular in itself, and so important in its consequences, attracted the attention of the privy-council, where it is said to have been canvassed with great warmth and animosity of altercation. The general complained that he was restricted by peremptory orders from the regency of Hanover; and they were reported to have used recriminations in their defence. In all probability, every circumstance of the dispute was not explained to the satisfaction of all parties, inasmuch as that great commander quitted the harvest of military glory, and, like another Cincinnatus, retired to his plough. The convention of Closter-Seven was equally disagreeable to the courts of London and Versailles. The former saw the electorate of Hanover left, by this capitulation, at the mercy of the enemy, who had taken possession of the whole country, seized the revenues, exacted contributions, and changed the whole form of government, in the name of his most christian majesty; whilst the French army, which had been employed in opposing the Hanoverian, was now at liberty to throw their additional force into the scale against the king of Prussia, who, at that period, seemed to totter on the verge of destruction. On the other hand, the French ministry thought their general had granted too favourable terms to a body of forces, whom he had cooped up in such a manner that, in a little time, they must have surrendered at discretion. They, therefore, determined either to provoke the Hanoverians by ill usage to an infraction of the treaty, or, should that be found impracticable, renounce it as an imperfect convention, established without proper authority. Both expedients were used without reserve. They were no sooner informed of the capitulation, than they refused to acknowledge its validity, except on condition that the Hanoverian troops should formally engage to desist from all service against France and her allies during the present war, and be disarmed on their return to their own country. At the same time her general, who commanded in the electorate, exhausted the country by levying exorbitant contributions, and connived at such outrages as degraded his own dignity, and reflected disgrace on the character of his nation. The court of London, to make a merit of necessity, affected to consider the conventional act as a provisional armistice, to pave the way for a negotiation that might terminate in a general peace, and proposals were offered for that purpose; but the French ministry kept aloof, and seemed resolved that the electorate of Hanover should be annexed to their king’s dominions. At least, they were bent upon keeping it as a precious depositum, which, in the plan of a general pacification, they imagined, would counterbalance any advantage that Great Britain might obtain in other parts of the world. Had they been allowed to keep this deposit, the kingdom of Great Britain would have saved about twenty millions of money, together with the lives of her best soldiers; and Westphalia would have continued to enjoy all the blessings of security and peace. But the king of England’s tenderness for Hanover was one of the chief sources of the misfortunes which befel the electorate. He could not bear the thoughts of seeing it, even for a season, in the hands of the enemy; and his own sentiments in this particular were reinforced by the pressing remonstrances of the Prussian monarch, whom, at this juncture, he thought it dangerous to disoblige. Actuated by these motives, he was pleased to see the articles of the convention so palpably contravened, because the violation unbound his hands, and enabled him, consistently with good faith, to take effectual steps for the assistance of his ally, and the recovery of his own dominions. He, therefore, in quality of elector of Brunswick-Lunen-burgh, published a declaration, observing, “That his royal highness the duke of Cumberland had, on his part, honestly fulfilled all the conditions of the convention; but the duke de Richelieu demanded that the troops should enter into an engagement specified above, and lay down their arms; although it was expressly stipulated in the convention, that they should not be regarded as prisoners of war, under which quality alone they could be disarmed: that the French court pretended to treat the convention as a military regulation only; and, indeed, it was originally nothing more; but as they had expressly disowned its validity, and a negotiation had been actually begun for disarming the auxiliaries, upon certain conditions, though the French general would never answer categorically, but waited always for fresh instructions from Versailles, the nature of that act was totally changed, and what was at first an agreement between general and general, was now become a matter of state between the two courts of London and Versailles: that, however hard the conditions of the convention appeared to be for the troops of Hanover, his Britannic majesty would have acquiesced in them, had not the French glaringly discovered their design of totally ruining his army and his dominions; and, by the most outrageous conduct, freed his Britannic majesty from every obligation under which he had been laid by the contention: that, in the midst of the armistice, the most open hostilities had been committed; the castle of Schartzfels had been forcibly seized and pillaged, and the garrison made prisoners of war; the prisoners made by the French before the convention had not been restored, according to an express article stipulated between the generals, though it had been fulfilled on the part of the electorate, by the immediate release of the French prisoners; the bailies of those districts, from which the French troops were excluded by mutual agreement, had been summoned, on pain of military execution, to appear before the French commissary, and compelled to deliver into his hands the public revenue: the French had appropriated to themselves part of those magazines, which, by express agreement, were destined for the use of the electoral troops; and they had seized the houses, revenue, and corn, belonging to the king of England in the city of Bremen, in violation of their engagement to consider that city as a place absolutely free and neutral. Pie took notice, that they had proceeded to menaces unheard of among civilized people, of burning, sacking, and destroying every thing that fell in their way, should the least hesitation be made in executing the convention according to their interpretation.”--Such were the professed considerations that determined his Britannic majesty to renounce the agreement which they had violated, and have recourse to arms for the relief of his subjects and allies. It was in consequence of this determination that he conferred the command of his electoral army on prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, brother to the duke of that name, who had distinguished himself in the Prussian army by his great military talents, and was, by blood and inclination, as well as interest, supposed warmly attached to his Britannic majesty. The truth is, the king of Prussia recommended him to this command, because he knew he could depend upon his concurring with all his measures, in conducting the operations of the British army. The duke de Richelieu was no sooner informed of these particulars, than he sent a letter to prince Ferdinand, specifying, “That although for some days he had perceived the Hanoverian troops in motion, in order to form themselves into a body, he could not imagine the object of these movements was to infringe the convention of neutrality which had been established between the duke of Cumberland and himself, as French general; that he was blinded so far by his confidence in the good faith of the elector of Hanover, who had signed that convention, as to believe the troops were assembled for no other purpose than to be distributed into winter-quarters, which had been assigned them by the agreement; but his eyes were at last opened by repeated advices which he had received from all quarters, importing, that the Hanoverians intended to infringe those articles which ought to be sacred and inviolable; he affirmed, the king his master was still willing to give fresh proofs of his moderation, and his desire to spare the effusion of human blood: with that view he declared to his serene highness, in the name of his most christian majesty, that he persisted in his resolution of fulfilling exactly all the points of the convention, provided that they should be equally observed by the Hanoverian army; but he could not help apprising his serene highness, that if this army should take any equivocal step, and, still more, should it commit any act of hostility, he would then push matters to the last extremity, looking upon himself as authorized so to do by the rules of war: that he would set fire to all palaces, houses, and gardens; sack all the towns and villages, without sparing the most inconsiderable cottage, and subject the country to all the horrors of war and devastation. He conjured his serene highness to reflect on these particulars, and begged he would not lay him under the necessity of taking steps so contrary to his own personal character, as well as to the natural humanity of the French nation.” To this letter, which was seconded by the count de Lynar, the Danish ambassador, who had mediated the convention, prince Ferdinand returned a very laconic answer, intimating, that he would give the duke de Richelieu his answer in person at the head of his army. At this particular juncture, the French general was disposed to abide by the original articles of the convention, rather than draw upon himself the hostilities of an army which he knew to be brave, resolute, and well appointed, and which he saw at present animated with an eager desire of wiping out the disgrace they had sustained by the capitulation, as well as of relieving their country from the grievous oppression wider which it groaned.

PROGRESS OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY.