Chapter IX (2)

Newmarket, October 27th, 1840 {p.343}

At Downham laid up with the gout, and now here. Heard of Thiers' resignation on Sunday, and nothing since; but Lady Palmerston writes me word Guizot went to take leave of them in high spirits, and that there was no doubt he would accept the Foreign Office. Thiers had promised not to oppose the new Government.[10]

[10] [I breakfasted with M. Guizot at Hertford House on the
24th October, having arrived in London on the 21st from
Paris, where I had spent the preceding fortnight, and
had learned from Thiers, and other friends there, the
French side of these curious transactions. A courier
arrived in London on the morning of the 24th, bringing
a letter from the King to M. Guizot, which he showed
me. It was written in his own bold hand, and contained
the words, 'Je compte sur vous, mon cher Ministre, pour
m'aider dans ma lutte tenace contre l'anarchie!'
Whilst I was in Paris, where the greatest irritation
and alarm prevailed, my old friend and master, Count
Rossi, retained his composure, and said to me, tapping
a sheet of paper as he spoke, 'When it comes to the
Draft of the Speech from the Throne to be delivered to
the Chambers, this will break up. The King will not
consent to adopt Thiers' warlike language.' This is
exactly what occurred some ten days later. Rossi had a
deeper insight into political causes and events than
any other man whom I have known.--H.R.]

[Page Head: M. GUIZOT SUCCEEDS M. THIERS.]

Guizot left London pretty well determined to take the Government; and after some little discussion everything was settled, and the new Cabinet proclaimed. The Press instantly fell upon him with the greatest bitterness, and the first impression was that he had no chance of standing, but the last accounts held out a better prospect. I have had no communication with him but a short note he wrote me on his departure, expressing his regret not to have seen me, and begging I would communicate with Bourqueney, and let him call upon and converse with me. I wrote to him yesterday a long letter, in which I told him how matters stood here, and expressed my desire to know what we could do that would be of use to him. In the meantime there has been a fresh course of wrangling, and a fresh set of remonstrances on the part of the peace advocates here, and lively altercations, both by letter and _vivâ voce_, between Lord John and Melbourne, and Lord John and Palmerston. Clarendon, in a visit of six days at Windsor, worked away at the impenetrable Viscount, and Lord Lansdowne battered him with a stringent letter, pressing for the adoption of some immediate measure of a pacific tendency; and in a conversation which Clarendon had with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, he found him well inclined to the same policy, so that there is an important section of the Cabinet disposed to take an active part in this direction. But Palmerston at the same time wrote to Melbourne in a tone of the greatest contempt for all that was saying and doing in France, and, of course, elated by the recent successes in Syria, which, with his usual luck, have happened at this critical moment, and certainly do appear to be decisive.[11]

[11] [Lord Palmerston's object in all these critical
discussions with his colleagues had simply been to gain
time for the operations in Syria against the Pasha to
take effect, for he had never ceased to maintain that
they would be completely successful, and in this,
whether by superior information, by clearer judgment,
or by extreme good fortune, he proved to be in the
right, which ensured his ultimate triumph. But if there
had been the slightest failure, or check, or delay in
any part of the operations, it must have proved fatal
to the Government.]

[Page Head: LORD JOHN THREATENS TO RESIGN.]

But just before the news came of the surrender of the Emir Beschir, Lord John had taken up the question in a much more serious and decisive tone than he ever did before; and in correspondence with Melbourne, and _vivâ voce_ with Palmerston, had announced his determination to quit the Government altogether. The occasion for this vigorous outbreak was the arrival of a box of Foreign Office papers, in which, besides some long rigmaroles of Metternich's, there was a proposal (transmitted by Beauvale) for a congress for the settlement of all disputes, together with the draft of a short answer which Palmerston had written and sent, declining the offer. This Lord John considered to pass all endurance, no matter whether the congress was advisable or not; but that such an important suggestion should be received and rejected without any communication of it to the other members of the Government, especially to him who was their leader in the House of Commons, was so outrageous that he was resolved not to pass it over, and he accordingly wrote his opinion upon it to Melbourne in the strongest terms, recommending him to transfer the lead of the House of Commons to Palmerston, and to dispose of his office as he pleased, as he would no longer go on; and he said that though there must be a Cabinet in a few days to settle about Parliament, he should not attend any more of them. To this Melbourne wrote a curious answer, because it was indicative of no approbation of, or confidence in, his brother-in-law and colleague. He said he thought Lord John had taken this up too strongly (he thinks everything is too strong), but that he had sent his letter to Palmerston, who would, no doubt, see him or write to him on the subject. He then went on to say that he presumed Lord John had well considered his determination, which would be, _ipso facto_, the dissolution of the Government, as he would not consent to carry it on with Palmerston as leader of the House of Commons; that the retirement of Lord John, and the substitution of Palmerston in such a post, would be such an announcement to all Europe of the intentions of the British Government to persevere in the extreme line of his policy, that he could not for a moment contemplate such a thing. Therefore, if Lord John persisted, the Government was at an end. Shortly after, Palmerston called on Lord John. He admitted that he had done wrong--that he ought to have consulted him, and have made him privy to his answer, but that he had attached so little importance to the proposal, and had considered it so totally out of the question, that he had replied offhand.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON DEFENDS LORD PONSONBY.]

They then went into the question itself, when Palmerston took that advantageous ground which he has always held and asked him how he reconciled his present opinions with his strenuous support of the Treaty itself, and complained again of his acting as he had done, while success was attending the coalition. They seem to have parted much as they met, with mutual dissatisfaction, but without any quarrel. Lord John, however, resolved upon action, and ultimately determined to propose the recall of Ponsonby as the _sine quâ non_ of his continuance in office. The violence of these disputes, and the peril in which the existence of the Government seemed to be placed, brought Melbourne up to town, and Lord John came to meet him, and imparted to him his intentions. Just in the nick of time, however, arrived the news of the Emir's flight, which seemed to be almost conclusive of the Syrian question. On this, Palmerston took courage, and, no longer insisting upon supporting Ponsonby _à tort et à travers_, entreated that a damp might not be cast upon the enterprise just as the final success was at hand; and employed the argument _ad misericordiam_ with regard to Ponsonby by saying, that he would be entitled to a pension if he was left there till December, and it would be hard to recall him before that term was accomplished. Lord John (never sufficiently firm of purpose) at last agreed to wait for the receipt of the official accounts of recent events in Syria which was expected in a few days, and to defer his demand for Ponsonby's recall till then, and Palmerston seems to have satisfied him that he is not at all desirous of quarrelling with France. Indeed, Palmerston himself threw out, that it might be expedient to find a provision for the family of the Pasha, and render the grant of some appointments to his sons instrumental to the settlement of the question. There was a strange article, too, in the 'Morning Chronicle' the other day, which talked of the probability of Ibrahim's being driven out of Northern Syria, and his entrenching himself within the Pashalik of Acre, which would then prevent the accomplishment of the Treaty of July. All this looks as if Palmerston was beginning to think he was driving matters too far, and that it was necessary to lower his tone and modify his policy, unless he was prepared to retire from office. At all events, Lord John was pacified for the moment by this indication of more moderate intentions, and began to hope better things for the future. To-morrow the Cabinet is to meet again.

While all these wranglings are going on here, and nothing is done, but a great deal contemplated, Bourqueney presses for _something_ on our part and keeps repeating that every minute is precious. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia is highly satisfied with the state of things as it is, and he intimated to Bloomfield that he should be extremely indisposed to consent to any scheme for a fresh arrangement in which France should participate, while our vague notion is, that the coalition should fall to the ground as soon as its object is attained, and that we should bring in France as a party to some final settlement of the East, and dotation of the sons of Mehemet Ali. In the meantime the Chambers met yesterday, and all depends upon their proceedings.

November 7th, 1840 {p.347}

Lord Palmerston has written a long and able letter, setting forth all the reasons why no special mission should be sent to Constantinople, and why Ponsonby should not be recalled; a skilful defence of Ponsonby showing how right he had been about Syria; what unprecedented influence he had obtained, having got both the Turkish fleet and army placed under the command of Englishmen, and how he had infused such spirit into the Turkish councils that they had made exertions of which nobody thought they were capable, and manifested a vigour it was not imagined they possessed. This letter must have been a very good one, for it entirely brought over Lord John to his opinion, and even convinced Clarendon himself; and the former had already written to Palmerston to say that he gave up his demand for Ponsonby's recall. There is, however, still too much reason to believe, that Palmerston is bent upon quarrelling with France,[12] and that he is now fighting to gain time in hopes of some commotion in Egypt itself, which might lead to the complete ruin of the Pasha.

[12] [This was the real charge against Lord Palmerston and
his policy, and it is impossible to doubt that he was
actuated in the whole of this affair, not so much by a
desire to support the Sultan and to ruin the Pasha of
Egypt, as by the passionate wish to humble France, and
to revenge himself on King Louis Philippe and his
Ministers for their previous conduct in the affairs of
Spain. At this very moment, far from wishing to
strengthen M. Guizot in his efforts to maintain peace,
Lord Palmerston addressed to him a most offensive
despatch, and published it, with a view to weaken and
injure the French Ministry.--H.R.]

[Page Head: M. GUIZOT'S LETTER.]

This evening Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter which he had received the day before from Guizot, which I shall copy here.

M. Guizot's Letter to Baron Bourqueney.

Mon Cher Baron,--Le discours de la Couronne est
définitivement arrêté. Je crois que vous le trouverez
conforme à la vérité des choses et aux convenances de la
situation. Vous recevrez une circulaire que j'adresse à
tous mes agents. J'y ai essayé de marquer avec précision
l'attitude que le Cabinet veut prendre et qu'il gardera.
Mais ce ne sont là que des paroles: il faut des
résultats. On les attend du Cabinet. Il s'est formé pour
maintenir la paix, et pour trouver aux embarras de la
question d'Orient quelque issue; pour vivre il faut qu'il
satisfasse aux causes qui l'ont fait naître. La
difficulté est extrême. L'exaltation du pays n'a pas
diminué, la formation du Cabinet donne aux amis de la
paix plus de confiance, mais elle redouble l'ardeur des
hommes qui poussent, ou qui se laissent pousser, à la
guerre; les malveillants et les rivaux exploiteront,
fomenteront les préjugés nationaux, les passions
nationales. La lutte sera très-vive et le péril toujours
imminent. Je dirai la vérité. Je m'applique à éclaircir
les esprits et à contenir les passions: je ne puis que
cela. Ce n'est pas assez; pour que le succès vienne à la
raison, il faut qu'on m'aide. Deux sentiments sont ici en
présence, le désir de la paix et l'honneur national. Je
l'ai souvent dit à Londres, je le répète de Paris. Le
sentiment de la France--je dis de la France, et non pas
des brouillons et des factions--est qu'elle a été traitée
légèrement, qu'on a sacrifié légèrement, sans motif
suffisant, pour un intérêt secondaire son alliance, son
amitié, son concours. Là est le grand mal qu'a fait la
Convention du 15 Juillet, là est le grand obstacle à la
politique et à la paix. Pour guérir ce mal, pour lever
cet obstacle, il faut prouver à la France qu'elle se
trompe, il faut lui prouver qu'on attache à son alliance,
à son amitié, à son concours, beaucoup de prix, assez de
prix pour lui faire quelque sacrifice. Ce n'est pas
l'etendue, c'est le fait même du sacrifice qui importe,
qu'indépendamment de la Convention du 15 Juillet quelque
chose soit donné, évidemment donné, au désir de rentrer
en bonne intelligence avec la France, et de la voir
rentier dans l'affaire, la paix pourra être maintenue et
l'harmonie générale rétablie en Europe. Si on vous dit
cela se peut, je suis prêt à faire les démarches
nécessaires pour atteindre à ce but, et à en accepter la
responsabilité, mais je ne veux pas me mettre en
mouvement sans savoir si le but est possible à atteindre.
Si on vous dit que cela ne se peut pas, qu'on entend s'en
tenir rigoureusement aux premières stipulations du
traité, et ne rien accorder, ne rien faire qui soit pour
la France une preuve qu'on désire se rapprocher d'elle,
pour le Cabinet une force dans la lutte qu'il a à
soutenir, la situation restera violente et précaire, le
Cabinet se tiendra immobile, dans l'isolement et
l'attente. Je ne réponds pas de l'avenir. Dites cela à
Lord Palmerston, c'est de lui que l'issue dépend. Il vous
parlera de l'état de la Syrie, de l'insurrection du
Liban, des progrès que font les Alliés. Répondez
simplement que c'est là pour la France une raison de se
montrer plus facile à satisfaire, mais que ce n'est pas
pour l'Angleterre une raison de ne rien faire en
considération de la France. Je n'ai encore rien dit, rien
écrit nulle part. J'attends ce qu'on vous dira à
Londres....

Nothing can be better, more serious, or better calculated to produce an effect, if anything can, upon our impenetrable Cabinet. Bourqueney showed it in the first instance to Melbourne, who told him to show it to Palmerston; but he said he had scruples in doing that lest Palmerston should make him an answer calculated to exclude all hope of accommodation; but Melbourne hinted that he would take care of this, and accordingly he took it to Palmerston this morning. He read it, said it was very moderate, and praised the tone and language. But when Bourqueney began to ask what he had to say to the _fond_, he only talked of the practical difficulties, and ended without saying anything the least promising or satisfactory, though nothing decidedly the reverse. Bourqueney had previously been with Billow, who is just come back, and who desires no better on the part of his Government than to join in any conciliatory measure we may adopt; and Esterhazy, who is expected every hour, will, he doubts not, be equally well disposed. But although such is the disposition both of Austria and Prussia, though the Queen is earnestly desirous of seeing tranquillity and security restored, and almost all, if not quite all, the Cabinet, are in favour of an accommodation with France, and France herself is prepared to accept the slightest advance offered in a conciliatory spirit, the personal determination of Palmerston will probably predominate over all these opinions and inclinations. He will put down or adjourn every proposal that is made, and if any should be adopted in spite of him, he will take care to mar it in the execution, to remove no difficulties, and create them where they don't already exist. The most extraordinary part of the whole affair is, that a set of men should consent to go on with another in whom they have not only no confidence, but whom they believe to be politically dishonest and treacherous, and that they should keep gravely discussing the adoption of measures with a full conviction that he will not fairly carry them out. It is like Jonathan Wild and his companions playing together in Newgate. I understand the last decision of the Cabinet is that Guizot is to be invited to say what would suit his case. There would be a difficulty in specifying what concessions we should make, either for Mehemet Ali or his sons, because events are proceeding rapidly in Syria, and we _might be_ offering what we have already restored to the Sultan, and what the Porte has assisted to recover for itself. It is settled that all this shall be fairly stated to Guizot, with an assurance that we are desirous of assisting him, together with our willingness to concert with him the means. This may do, if honestly and truly carried out.

Friday, November 13th, 1840 {p.349}

[Page Head: TERMS OF CONCILIATION.]

The day before yesterday Bourqueney called on me, and brought me a letter from Guizot in reply to the one I had written him. He then proceeded to tell me all that had occurred since I had before seen him, and to this effect: On Saturday the Cabinet had resolved upon an invitation to Guizot to announce his wishes and ideas, and proposed a frank explanation _de part et d'autre_ on the whole question. On Sunday, Palmerston communicated this to Bourqueney, and very faithfully. On Sunday or Monday arrived a despatch from Metternich, first of all confirming Neumann as sole Minister to the Conference, and secondly announcing that any concession in Syria was _now_ quite out of the question. This he told Bourqueney, and conveyed to Palmerston, to whom it was a great accession of force, and by this the disposition of Austria, and with it that of Bülow, became entirely changed, and very unfavourable to any transaction. On Monday morning Bourqueney received a letter from Guizot saying that he had had a conference with Lord Granville, to whom he had suggested various alternatives for a settlement on the basis of a concession, which Granville was by the same post to transmit to Palmerston, and he at the same time told Bourqueney what they were: Egypt hereditary, St. Jean d'Acre for life, and either Tripoli or Candia for one of his sons; or the hereditary Pashalik of Acre instead. On Monday night Bourqueney met Palmerston at dinner at the Mansion House, when he said to him, 'You have heard from Lord Granville, and he has transmitted to you M. Guizot's proposals (or suggestions).' 'No,' said Palmerston, 'I have heard from Lord Granville, but he sent me nothing specific on the part of Guizot. But come to Lady Palmerston's to-night from hence, and we will talk it over.' He went there, and Palmerston read to him a long despatch from Granville, but which, to his surprise, did not contain any of the specific propositions which Guizot had notified to him, and, conceiving that Granville must have certain good reasons for this reticence, he resolved to say nothing of them either, and confined himself to mere general inquiries as to what could be done, to which he obtained no satisfactory reply, not a hope being held out of any concession. In this condition of affairs he came to me to tell me what passed and consult me as to the future. I told him that though there was the same desire for a reconciliation with France, and the same anxiety to assist M. Guizot on the part of my friends, when they came to consider what was possible and would be safe and justifiable, they were unable to find any expedient to meet the immense practical difficulties of the case; that events had proceeded with such celerity, and placed the question in so different a position, that concessions formerly contemplated as reasonable and possible were now out of the question. They all felt that they could offer nothing in Syria; that it was possible the Sultan might be actually in possession of any town or territory at the moment they were offering it, and that now justice to the people, honour and fidelity to our allies, especially to the Sultan himself, forbade us to make any concession whatever in that quarter. Bourqueney did not deny the force of this, but he said Guizot was sanguine as to the acceptance of some such terms as he had suggested, and it was of the last importance he should be undeceived, and made acquainted with the real truth, and know what he had to rely on. He said he would write, but he entreated me to write to him too, and to tell him the substance of what I had imparted to him. Accordingly I did write to Guizot at great length, setting forth in terms as strong as I could, and without any disguise, the difficulties of the case, and the utter unreasonableness of the French public in requiring, as a salve to their vanity, terms which we could neither in good policy or good faith concede. We both agreed that under existing circumstances it was not desirable that Guizot should make any proposal to our Government, and so we both of us told him. Such was the result of a conversation which when reported to Guizot will be a bitter disappointment to him; but I concur with the rest, that we could not now make any of the concessions he was disposed to ask. Bourqueney suggested that if the chances of war should be hereafter favourable to the Pasha, if the Allies should make no impression upon Acre or the south-west part of Syria, then possibly some transaction on such a basis might be possible. This, however, it was useless to discuss. Yesterday I saw Dedel, who has lately been at Walmer, and he told me the Duke of Wellington's opinion exactly coincided with ours, coincided both as to the impossibility of our making any concession in Syria, and to its perfect inutility if we did. We might degrade ourselves, weaken our own cause, but we should neither strengthen Guizot nor satisfy the cravings of French vanity and insolence, still less silence that revolutionary spirit which, not strong enough in itself, seeks to become formidable by stimulating the passions and allying itself with all the vanity, pride, and restlessness, besides desire for plunder, which are largely scattered throughout the country.

It is curious that Austria, hitherto so timid, should all of a sudden become so bold, for besides this notification to Neumann, Metternich has said that, though we have instructed Ponsonby to move the Sultan to restore Mehemet Ali to Egypt, he has not given the same instructions to Stürmer, and that he wants to see the progress of events and the conduct of the Pasha before he does so.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON'S IRRITATING LANGUAGE.]

Events have so befriended Palmerston that he is now in the right, and has got his colleagues with him; but where he is and always has been wrong is in his neglect of forms; the more _fortiter_ he is _in re_, the more _suaviter_ he ought to be _in modo_. But while defending his policy or attacking that of France, he has never said what he might have done to conciliate, to soften, and to destroy those impressions of intended affronts and secret designs which have produced such violent effects on the French public. On the contrary, he has constantly, in his State papers, and still more in his newspapers, said what is calculated to irritate and provoke them to the greatest degree; but Dedel says this has always been his fault, in all times and in all his diplomatic dealings, and this is the reason he is so detested by all the Corps Diplomatique, and has made such enemies all over Europe. Guizot will now be cast on his own resources, and must try whether the language of truth and reason will be listened to in France; whether he can, by plain statements of facts, and reasonable deductions therefrom, dissipate those senseless prejudices and extravagant delusions which have excited such a tempest in the public mind. It is clear enough to me that if he cannot, if vanity and resentment are too strong for sober reason and sound policy, no concessions we could make would save him from downfall, or save Europe from the consequences of this moral deluge.

November 15th, 1840 {p.353}

Two days ago, Lord John Russell called on me. We had some talk, but nothing very conclusive. He said the operations in Syria could not go on much longer, and we are threatened with the greatest of all evils, the hanging over of the question for another year. This he thought the worst thing of all. It is curious that he told me Stopford wrote word he must send his ships into port, and all the authorities, military and naval, say nothing can be done after the 20th. Palmerston keeps telling Bourqueney they can go on all the winter, and that the operations will not be suspended at all. I asked Lord John, if the campaign did close, leaving the Pasha in possession of all the south-west of Syria from Damascus to the Desert, and Acre unattacked, whether on such a status an agreement could not be concluded, terminating the contest by the concession of the original terms of the treaty. He said Melbourne would like that very well, but that there would be difficulties, and France would not come into the treaty on those terms. I told him I was pretty sure France would, though I did not tell him what had passed between Bourqueney and me. However, I sent for Bourqueney, and told him to propose nothing new, but to wait till the campaign was over, and in the meantime to prepare the way for some specific proposition which France might make in a spirit of amicable intervention to put an end to the contest.

December 4th, 1840 {p.354}

[Page Head: DEBATE IN THE FRENCH CHAMBER.]

In the course of the last three weeks, and since I last wrote, a mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of St. Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers.[13] Palmerston is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. He is justified by the success of his operations and by the revelations in the speeches of Thiers and Rémusat. So, at least, the world will consider it, which does not examine deeply and compare curiously in order to form its judgements; and it must be acknowledged that he has a fair right to plume himself on his success. His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot makes a sort of common cause with him in the Chamber, and Thiers makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and designs which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the Pasha is now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest is at an end. Guizot continued up to the eve of the discussion to press us to do or say something to assist him; but when he found we could or would do nothing, he took the only line that was left him, and the best after all, and threw himself on the sense and reason of the country. He told the truth, and justified himself by vindicating us. He has done very well, and shown himself a good debater; but the discussion has been disgracefully personal, and with all the talent displayed they have not an idea how a deliberating assembly ought to conduct its debates, and the disclosures and revelations of official secrecy and confidence have been monstrous. Thiers has all along been playing a false, shuffling, tricky part, and at last he got so entangled in the meshes of his own policy, and so confused by the consequences of his double dealing, that he evidently did not know what to do; and the King had no difficulty in getting him out of a Government that he could no longer conduct. He says now that he meant to make war by and by; but though these menaces and the reasons he gives afford Palmerston his best justification, and are appealed to triumphantly by him and his friends, my own conviction is that Thiers would gladly have closed the account by a transaction, and that _at last_ he would have come into the Treaty--if Palmerston would have let him in--upon terms much worse for the Pasha than those to which he would not have consented before July. Nothing that has occurred shakes my conviction that Palmerston was very wrong not to endeavour to bring France into the Treaty and to offer the _status quo_, though it is very possible France would have refused it. If the French Government were on the one hand resolved to agree to nothing, and under no circumstances to join in coercing the Pasha, Palmerston on the other was as obstinately determined to settle the business his own way, and not to make any proposal to France which she would or could accept. They both stood aloof, and both were immensely to blame. Palmerston has taken his success without any appearance of triumph or a desire to boast over those who doubted or opposed him; whatever may be said or thought of his policy, it is impossible not to do justice to the vigour of his execution. Mr. Pitt (Chatham) could not have manifested more decision and resource. He would not hear of delays and difficulties, sent out peremptory orders to attack Acre, and he provided in his instructions with great care and foresight for every contingency. There can be no doubt that it was the capture of Acre which decided the campaign; and the success is much more attributable to Palmerston than to our naval and military commanders, and probably solely to him.

[13] [The bombardment and capture of St. Jean d'Acre by the
allied fleet took place on the 3rd November, whilst
these diplomatic troubles were going on in London and
Paris. The French Chambers opened on the 6th November.]

Yesterday I saw the Baron Mounier, who is come over here, on a sort of mission, to talk about possible arrangements, from Guizot. He still pertinaciously urges our doing or saying something demonstrative of a disposition to be reconciled with France, and that, in the ultimate settlement of the Eastern Question, we wish to show her some deference. He wants (Syria being gone) that we should make out that it is from consideration for France that Egypt is left to the Pasha. I told him the only difficulty appeared to be that, as we had already announced we had no intention to strip him of Egypt, and had signified long ago that we had advised the Sultan to restore him to that Government, I did not see how we could now make any such declaration available, and that it would go for nothing. But he said he thought by a not difficult employment of diplomatic phraseology much might be done; and he suggested that there must be some definite settlement of the whole question, including stipulations and guarantees for the Syrian population (of the mountains, I presume), and to this France might be invited to accede. In short, nothing will satisfy her but having a finger in the pie upon any terms. What Guizot now wants is to renew the English alliance. So he said when he went away; but it may well be doubted whether the French are not too sulky with us and too deeply mortified not to make this an unpopular attempt just now. Mounier is the son of Mounier the Constitutionalist, entirely in Guizot's confidence, a talkative man not seemingly brilliant, but he is well versed in affairs, an active member of the Chamber of Peers, and considered indispensable there as a _rédacteur_ and transactor of Parliamentary business.

December 13th, 1840 {p.357}

For the last week at Norman Court, during which little or nothing has happened; but I heard one or two things before I left town. Guizot had made a direct application to Palmerston for his permission to attribute the leaving of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, to the influence of France, and to a desire to gratify her. This Palmerston (through Lord Granville) refused; but Guizot had not waited for the answer, and in his speech he said so, and it was not without its use. But while everything was on the point of being settled, Metternich (who is always in hot or cold fits of courage or cowardice) sends over a proposal that Egypt shall only be granted to Mehemet Ali for his own and his son's lives, and not hereditary. For what possible reason this absurd proposition was made, unless to create embarrassment and rekindle animosities, nobody can conceive; though probably the real solution is that Metternich is in his dotage, has no policy in his brain, and acts from foolish impulses. I have heard no more of it; and though Palmerston would not be at all averse to the proposal as a matter of inclination, I do not suspect him of the folly of listening to it, and, if he did, his colleagues would not.

December 29th, 1840 {p.357}

[Page Head: LORD MELBOURNE IN HIGH SPIRITS.]

Went on Thursday last to the Grange, and returned yesterday. Just before I went, the Duke of Bedford called on me; he was just come from Woburn, where he had had a great party--Melbourne, like a boy escaped from school, in roaring spirits. They anticipate an easy session, and all Melbourne's alarm and despondency are quickly succeeded by joy at having got out of a scrape, and confidence that all difficulties are surmounted and all opposition will be silenced. But it now comes out that of all who were opposed to Palmerston's policy, not one--not even Lord Holland--was _in his heart_ so averse to, and so afraid of it, as Melbourne himself; and, nevertheless, he would say nothing and do nothing to impede or alter it. Palmerston is now doing his best to flatter Lord John out of any remains of sourness or soreness that their recent disputes may have left in his mind; and (passing over all that subsequently occurred) he writes to him to invite him to Broadlands, and says that while their recent successes have far exceeded the most sanguine expectations, he never shall forget how much of them is owing to the powerful support which he (Lord John) gave to him (Palmerston) in the _Treaty_. There is, it must be owned, astuteness in this; for Lord John's original support of the Treaty, and Palmerston's success in the operations, bind them indissolubly together, and it is very wise to put this prominently forward and cancel the recollection of all the rest.

[Page Head: TORY OPINION OF LORD PALMERSTON'S POLICY.]

But while public opinion appears to be universally pronounced in Palmerston's favour, and the concurrent applause of all the Tory papers indicates the satisfaction of that party, some circumstances lead me to believe that their approbation of the Treaty of July, and of all Palmerston's proceedings under it, is by no means so certain as the Government believe. At the Grange I found Lord Ashburton loud in his condemnation of the whole thing, talking exactly as we have all been talking and writing for many weeks past; and what surprised me much more was, that, in a conversation which I had with Granville Somerset yesterday, he expressed precisely the same opinions; and when I expressed my surprise at his language, and said that I had fancied all the Tories were enraptured with Palmerston, he replied that he had no reason to believe any such thing; that he had not met (among the many with whom he had conversed) with any such general and unqualified approbation; and he believed both the Duke and Peel had carefully abstained from pronouncing any opinion whatever on the subject, leaving themselves entire liberty to deal with the whole question as they might think fit. The notion is, that the Tories are charmed with a transaction which separates us from France, but Lord Ashburton and Granville Somerset--a bigoted Tory, if ever there was one--inveighed against the Treaty precisely because it had produced that consequence. It is the approbation expressed by Aberdeen, both before and since our successes, which has led to the general belief that the Tories are with the Government on this matter, for Aberdeen is regarded as their mouthpiece upon all questions of foreign policy. I had another conversation with Mounier just before he went. He had been to Strathfieldsaye, and was delighted with his reception by the Duke, and with the tone and tenor of his talk, anxious for a reconciliation with France, and entering into the whole history of our mutual relations from the Restoration to the present day, as he said, with the greatest clearness, precision, and solidity. He admitted that Guizot's was a very difficult situation, and the restoration of amicable feelings between the two countries very difficult also, but a thing earnestly to be desired.

December 31st, 1840 {p.359}

The end of the year is a point from which, as from a sort of eminence, one looks back over the past, happy if the prospect is not gloomy, and if the retrospect carries with it no feelings of regret and self-reproach. The past year has been full (as what year is not?) of events, of which that which has made the deepest impression on society is the death of Lord Holland. I doubt, from all I see, whether anybody (except his own family, including Allen) had really a very warm affection for Lord Holland, and the reason probably is that he had none for anybody. He was a man with an inexhaustible good humour, and an ever-flowing nature, but not of strong feelings; and there are men whose society is always enjoyed but who never inspire deep and strong attachment. I remember to have heard good observers say that Lady Holland had more feeling than Lord Holland--would regret with livelier grief the loss of a friend than this equable philosopher was capable of feeling. The truth is social qualities--merely social and intellectual--are not those which inspire affection. A man may be steeped in faults and vices, nay, in odious qualities, and yet be the object of passionate attachment, if he is only what the Italians term '_simpatico_.'