Chapter XVII: The Submarine Peril, to Merchant Shipping; Recall to the Admiralty (1)

Events were to prove that my period of command of the Grand Fleet was drawing to a close, my transfer to the Admiralty occurring at the end of November, 1917.

But before coming to that development something must be said in continuation of the narrative of the work of the Grand Fleet.

During the month of September, 1916, there was not much movement by the Fleet as a whole. On the 4th, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron and 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, with eleven destroyers, left Rosyth, swept towards the Naze, then down to the southward of the Little Fisher Bank, and back to Rosyth. On the same day three divisions of destroyers from Scapa endeavoured without success to locate a submarine reported by the _Talisman_ to the eastward of the Pentland Skerries. On the 7th a further unsuccessful search for a submarine was carried out in the same locality.

On the 10th the 1st and 4th Light Cruiser Squadrons left Rosyth and Scapa respectively to exchange bases, carrying out a search of the North Sea _en route_, and on the 20th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth for a similar sweep to that carried out on the 4th.

On the 22nd numerous reports of submarines to the eastward made it necessary to move the patrol line of the 10th Cruiser Squadron temporarily farther west.

On September 20th the Battle Fleet, 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, _Campania_, and the destroyer flotillas left Scapa for a cruise between the Orkneys and Shetland Islands and the Norwegian coast. Three battleships, three cruisers, two light cruisers, and ten destroyers were absent, undergoing refit. Battle exercises were carried out during the cruise. A submarine was reported on the intended track of the fleet on return, and the base was, therefore, approached by another route, the available local patrol vessels being employed to keep the submarine submerged during the entry of the fleet to Scapa.

Submarines were again active during the latter part of the month in the vicinity of the cruising-ground of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, the position of the squadron being shifted for that reason.

On the 26th two light cruisers and four destroyers left Rosyth to search the waters to the southward of the German North Sea mine-field, returning on the 28th.

On the same date the yacht _Conqueror II._, the patrol trawler _Sarah Alice_, and two British steamers were torpedoed in the Fair Island Channel by enemy submarines. On receipt of the news at Scapa Flow, destroyers were detached from the Grand Fleet flotillas to operate against the submarines, and to strengthen the patrol in these waters.

Early on the 30th the _Lion_, with the 1st and 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, and accompanied by a destroyer escort, left Rosyth and swept in the direction of the Naze, then turned to the northward and proceeded to Scapa.

During September the cruiser patrols were continuously maintained to the northward of the Shetlands and on the Archangel routes, each patrol consisting of a cruiser and an armed boarding steamer. The submarine patrol, consisting of three submarines, was maintained off the Horn Reef. The enemy had presumably found the patrols inconvenient, and German destroyers on several occasions during the month cruised at night in the area patrolled with a view to interrupting our submarines when recharging their batteries. This was met by a frequent change of position at night. Submarine G 12, when returning from patrol on the 29th, sighted an enemy submarine on the surface, and, being unable to get into position to attack by torpedo, engaged her by gunfire, but did not score any hits before the enemy submarine submerged.

The formation of a new Grand Fleet Submarine Flotilla (the 10th Submarine Flotilla) was begun during the month, the base being the River Tees, and the parent ship the _Lucia_, with two attendant destroyers. The formation of the 15th Destroyer Flotilla was also commenced, this being the last of the Grand Fleet Flotillas to be formed to complete the total number of Grand Fleet destroyers to 100.

On the 21st the new battle cruiser _Repulse_, heavily armed and of high speed, but with inadequate protection for a battle cruiser, joined the Fleet at Scapa to work up gunnery and torpedo practices. The armour protection of this ship was about equal to that of the _Australia_ and _New Zealand_, and she was greatly inferior in this respect to the _Lion_, and later battle cruisers. As already stated, experience during the War had demonstrated very clearly that our battle cruisers were at a marked disadvantage in engaging German vessels of the same class, unless they were provided with better protection than that given to the _Australia_ and earlier vessels. Proposals were, therefore, forwarded to the Admiralty for adding very considerably to the deck protection of both the _Repulse_ and her sister ship, the _Renown_. These proposals were approved and the work carried out at the Fleet bases. Although the ships were much improved by the alteration, they were still far inferior in protection to the German battle cruisers.

On the 23rd a new floating-dock, which had been built on the Tyne, for light cruisers and destroyers, arrived at Invergordon, and was a very useful addition to that most valuable refitting base.

The average weekly results from the 10th Cruiser Squadron during September were:

No. of ships intercepted, 135; No. sent in, 45; No. on patrol, 15; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 9; No. on special service, 0.

The favourable weather and short nights, combined with the large number of vessels maintained on patrol were responsible for the increase in the number of ships intercepted.

The weather as a whole was good during the month. Fog or mist was prevalent on the 3rd, 8th, 23rd, 24th and 27th, and a gale occurred on the 18th. Otherwise the conditions were favourable.

In the early part of October, the activities of the enemy’s submarines in the White Sea, which had been considerable during the month of September, became more pronounced. Between October 1st and 5th three Norwegian steamers were sunk in the vicinity of Sletness, and a British vessel and Russian steamer fell victims to U 43, in Lat. 70.14 N., Long. 35.3 E. Some submarines were attacked by Russian destroyers in Lat. 69.45 N., Long. 33.6 E., and it was reported that the attack was successful. The _Fearless_, now a submarine parent ship, and three submarines started for the White Sea on October 13th from Scapa to operate from Alexandrovsk against the hostile submarines. They arrived on the 20th and began operations at once. During their stay in the White Sea, they did not succeed in sinking any enemy submarines, but there was a marked decrease in enemy operations, possibly due to the cramping effect of the presence of our vessels in those waters. The _Fearless_, with her submarines, left Alexandrovsk on the return passage on November 15th, in order to be clear of these waters before the ice began to form.

On October 2nd the 1st Battle Squadron, some ships of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and the 12th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa for a cruise to the eastward, returning on the 4th.

On the 7th the Battle Cruiser Fleet left Scapa and swept towards the Naze, thence proceeding to a position to the south-westward of the Little Fisher Bank, in which our submarines engaged in the Horn Reef patrol had reported the presence of trawlers, which had been acting suspiciously. Twelve trawlers flying neutral colours were found there by the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron; three were selected and sent in for examination, but were found to be in order.

On the same day, the 7th, two light cruisers left Scapa to meet at sea the airships stationed at Longside, near Peterhead, with a view to gaining experience in airships and light cruisers working together. The programme arranged could not be completed owing to bad weather, but was carried out on a subsequent occasion, and some useful hints were gained. This work was undertaken as a preliminary to the airships being detailed to accompany the Fleet to sea when on passage south, as the number of these craft completing in the near future justified such a procedure; although we still lacked airships of the Zeppelin type, it was felt that those of the smaller class might be able to carry out useful reconnaissance work ahead of the Fleet if moving south on the western side of the North Sea. We had already had considerable experience of the value of Zeppelins to the German High Sea Fleet in this respect. That experience had fully confirmed the views put forward in 1913 on this subject at a period when, as Second Sea Lord, the Naval Air Service came under my supervision. These views were expressed on an occasion when the building of a fleet of Zeppelins was being urged on behalf of the Navy. It was then pointed out with emphasis how great would be the value of such vessels for reconnaissance duty in connection with Fleet movements. At this time the usual conflict was proceeding as to the relative values of Zeppelin and heavier-than-air craft, but the views expressed were that whatever future there might be for the latter as development proceeded, there was no likelihood of their having the radius of action necessary for scouting work in a fleet for some years, whereas the Zeppelin already possessed it. My apology for making mention of this fact is that it controverts the assertion so constantly made that the senior officers in the Navy were not alive to the value of air-craft before the War.

On October 8th, the 2nd Battle Squadron, some cruisers of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers of the 15th and 11th Flotillas, left Scapa to cruise to the eastward, returning on the 10th.

On the 15th, two light cruisers and four destroyers left for a sweep, but were recalled on the 16th owing to bad weather.

On the 17th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth for a position to the westward of Ekersund, and thence swept down to the Little Fisher Bank and back to Rosyth, without sighting anything of interest.

On the 19th two cruisers, two light cruisers and eight destroyers left the northern bases to spread on a line between Lat. 59.30 N., Long. 1 E., and Lat. 60 N., Long. 4.20 E., and sweep down, in wide zigzags, on a course approximately parallel to the Norwegian coast in order to search for possible enemy raiders; the operation was repeated during daylight hours on two successive days; no enemy vessels were sighted.

On the 22nd the 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons and the 14th and 15th Flotillas left Scapa for a watching and exercise cruise to the eastward, returning on the 24th.

During each of the Battle Squadron cruises carried out during the month of October, the Flag officers were directed to carry out battle exercises based on the tactics employed by the enemy during the Jutland action, with a view to gaining experience in methods designed to meet these tactics; reports on the subject were requested from all Flag officers.

On October 24th a division of destroyers, together with sea-planes, was sent to the Fair Island Channel to operate against enemy submarines reported to be using this passage. No enemy vessels were sighted during the patrol.

On the 26th a submarine was sent into the Skagerrak to operate against an enemy decoy vessel reported in those waters. On the same day the _Kildonan Castle_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, was fired at by a submarine and missed by two torpedoes in Lat. 63.17 N., Long. 18.30 W. The 10th Cruiser Squadron patrol line was consequently moved temporarily to the westward, and trawlers were despatched to the neighbourhood.

On the 28th two light cruisers and four destroyers sailed from Rosyth to carry out a reconnaissance of the waters south of the German North Sea mine-field. They returned on the 30th, not having sighted any enemy vessels.

On October 31st the Battle Cruiser Fleet and 13th Flotilla left Rosyth for an observation and exercise cruise in the central and northern positions of the North Sea, and returned without incident on November 3rd.

During the month the Northern patrol north of the Shetlands by one cruiser and one armed boarding-steamer was continued, as were the patrol on the Archangel route, and the submarine patrol off the Horn Reef.

The weekly average for the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--

No. of ships intercepted, 74; No. sent in, 25; No. on patrol, 12; No. absent at ports or _en route_ to or from patrol, 12; No. on special service, 0.

Bad weather during the month interfered with the operations of the squadron; gales were experienced on the 10th, 12th, 14th and 25th. There was little fog or mist.

On November 1st I left the _Iron Duke_ at Cromarty and proceeded to the Admiralty at the request of the First Lord, Mr. Balfour. The visit was the result of letters I had written on the subject of the ever-growing danger of the submarine to our sea communications, and the necessity for the adoption of most energetic measures to deal with this danger. It had been for some time my opinion that unless the Navy could devise effective means, first, to destroy the submarines, and, secondly, to protect our communications more successfully until the submarines could be destroyed, there was undoubted risk of our being forced into making an unsatisfactory peace. From information furnished to me it was evident that the Germans were making special efforts to increase the number of their submarines very largely, and there did not seem to be much prospect, with the methods we were at the time employing, of destroying submarines at a rate at all approaching that of their construction.

So far as I was aware there was an insufficient reserve of food in the country to provide against the consequences of successful action by enemy submarines; and the construction of merchant-ships on an adequate scale to replace those lost had not been taken in hand, this being obviously an essential measure. I had written semi-officially for eighteen months before on the matter.[T] It seemed to me questionable whether our organisation at the Admiralty included a sufficiently numerous and important staff, having as its sole business the work of dealing, rapidly and effectively, with the problem which was assuming such very serious proportions. It did not appear that new proposals and inventions for dealing with the submarine campaign were being pushed forward with the necessary rapidity, possibly because of the absence of such an organisation, of difficulties connected with labour and _matériel_; and generally it seemed doubtful whether the dangers confronting us would be successfully combated.

[T] The Admiralty had no responsibility either for food
supplies or, at that time, for merchant-ship building.

I knew that the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, was alive to the danger, and that it caused him much anxiety. We had corresponded very freely on all subjects during his tenure of office at the Admiralty, and I was aware of his views on matters connected with the War, on which we had always been in complete agreement. His direction and assistance in connection with matters concerning the development and employment of the Grand Fleet had been most helpful to me, and invaluable to the nation, and my hope was that in putting forward my views as to the new and serious danger confronting us, and the possible methods of dealing with it, I should be rendering him assistance in combating the menace. One of my suggestions was the formation of a committee, or department, at the Admiralty under a senior officer, and composed of some of the clever and younger officers who had shown marked ability in studying new ideas. Their sole object would be the development of arrangements for dealing with the submarine warfare against merchant shipping, and the production of the necessary material. I pointed out that our existing methods were not meeting with the success attained at an earlier period, and gave the reasons which, in my opinion, were responsible for this result.

I had also formed and expressed the opinion that the High Sea Fleet would not be risked again in a Fleet action, at any rate, until the submarine campaign against merchant shipping had been fully tried and had failed. So strongly did I hold this view that I suggested to the Admiralty the desirability of reducing the number of destroyers in the Grand Fleet by one flotilla for work against the enemy’s submarines in waters where such action had some chance of success. I pointed out, once again, that offensive action against submarines in the northern part of the North Sea (the only waters in which Grand Fleet destroyers could be used, and yet be available for work with the Fleet in an emergency) was not likely to give satisfactory results, as the submarines could, in the wide expanse of water open to them, always dive and escape. The areas in which destroyers _could_ act more effectively against submarines were comparatively narrow and deep waters; in restricted localities, such as some parts of the English Channel, where the depth did not allow of their resting on the bottom, if hunted. My contention was that it was probably wise to reduce the number of Grand Fleet destroyer flotillas in order to strengthen the force required to deal with the submarine danger, even if this reduction necessitated sending the Grand Fleet to sea short of one battle squadron, should it have to deal with a grave emergency, such as attempted invasion. The alternative, which I felt _we could not face_, was to run the graver risk of serious disaster from successful submarine warfare on merchant shipping.

It was my firm belief that the High Sea Fleet would _not_ risk a fleet action for some time, and even if this Fleet undertook an operation having as its objective some military advantage, I considered that with the 1st, 2nd and 5th Battle Squadrons (all the ships of which had been fitted with additional deck protection) it could be engaged with every prospect of success, provided always that it was well screened from submarine attack and carefully handled. The only direction, apart from an attack on our sea communications, in which the High Sea Fleet could inflict any material damage on us and which the Grand Fleet could expect to be in a position to prevent, lay in attempted invasion. The bombardment of coast towns was an operation which the Grand Fleet could not prevent, unless by some fortunate chance it happened to be at sea and in the right position at the right moment.

The objection which might be raised to this policy, which was otherwise to my mind correct, was the effect on the public mind of the High Sea Fleet being at sea without being brought to action, even if it could achieve no military success by its presence at sea. I recognised very fully the force of this objection, and the responsibility involved in disregarding it. On the other hand, the submarine danger to our shipping was most pressing and should, I felt strongly, be dealt with at all costs, and without delay, since the existence of the armies as well as that of the civil population depended on merchant shipping.

I returned to the Fleet from my visit to the Admiralty on November 5th.

On the 2nd the 2nd Battle Squadron with the 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and 11th Destroyer Flotilla, left Scapa to cruise eastward of the Shetland Islands, returning on November 4th.

On the 3rd the _Botha_, with four destroyers of the 14th Flotilla, left Scapa for a sweep northward along the Norwegian coast from a position near Udsire Lighthouse on the probable track of enemy submarines returning to their bases. On the same day the _Faulknor_ and six destroyers of the 12th Flotilla from Cromarty carried out a similar sweep to the northward, starting from the vicinity of the Little Fisher Bank. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla from Rosyth supported both forces.

At 1.20 P.M., on November 5th, submarine J 1 on patrol off the Horn Reef, sighted four enemy battleships of the “Kaiser” class in Lat. 56.6 N., Long. 6.53 E. A considerable sea was running, making it difficult to prevent J 1 from breaking surface. The battleships had a strong destroyer screen, and the conditions for attack were very difficult. But Commander Lawrence succeeded, in spite of these difficulties, in firing his four bow torpedoes at a range of 4,000 yards. Two of them took effect on two of the battleships. The battleships turned to the southward, and the destroyers hunted J 1 for a considerable period, but unsuccessfully. It was learned subsequently that the two damaged ships managed to reach port, but this fact does not detract from the great credit attaching to the submarine for her very successful attack under exceedingly difficult conditions. The incident showed, as in previous cases, the efficiency of the German system of underwater protection in their capital ships.

On the 9th submarine G 9 left to operate against enemy submarines on their expected tracks.

From the 16th to the 18th very heavy weather was experienced in northern waters; several merchant ships were disabled and assistance was rendered to them by the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, and by tugs from Scapa. One Admiralty collier foundered at sea on the 17th.

On the 18th the _Otway_, of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, intercepted the Norwegian steamship _Older_, which was found to be in charge of a prize crew from a German submarine. She had on board, in addition, survivors of an Italian steamship and a British trawler, sunk by the submarine. The _Otway_ recaptured her, but was not in time to prevent the Germans from exploding several bombs in an attempt to sink her. The attempt did not, however, succeed, and the ship was brought into Stornoway.

During the period up to November 19th, the weekly average of work of the 10th Cruiser Squadron showed the following figures:--

No. of ships intercepted, 29; No. sent in, 10; No. on patrol, 13; No. absent, 11; No. on special service, 0.

The weather throughout the period to the 19th November was very bad, and the figures showed a corresponding reduction in the number of ships intercepted.

Gales were experienced on the 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th, 16th, 17th and 18th.

On the 24th, the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Battle Squadrons, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, and destroyers proceeded to sea for a cruise in northern waters, during which battle exercises were carried out.

Shortly before the _Iron Duke_ slipped from her buoy, and whilst the remainder of the Battle Fleet was on its way out of harbour, I received a telegram from the First Lord, Mr. Balfour, offering me the post of First Sea Lord, and expressing a hope that I would accept it. I consulted my chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Madden, and he stated his opinion that I ought to accept the post in order to be in a position to put into practice the views I held as to the steps required to deal with the submarine menace to shipping. It was naturally a great blow to leave the Fleet, with which I had been associated since the outbreak of the War, for a position which I knew was the most difficult that a sailor could be called upon to fill in war time.

I replied to Mr. Balfour, saying that I was ready to do whatever was considered best for the Service, and in accordance with the wish expressed in his telegram, agreed to meet him at Rosyth.

I then followed the Fleet to sea in the _Iron Duke_, and having completed the exercises on the 26th, I turned over the Command of the Fleet to Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (second in command), with directions that the ships should return to the Fleet bases, and I proceeded in the _Iron Duke_ to Rosyth, arriving there on the morning of the 27th.

I met and conferred with Mr. Balfour during the 27th, on the question of taking up the work at the Admiralty, and accepted the appointment. He intimated to me that in that event, it had been decided that Sir David Beatty should succeed to the Command of the Grand Fleet, and informed me also of the other changes in Flag appointments that would be effected. I made suggestions on some of these matters.

Mr. Balfour then returned to London, and I started my preparations for the change of duties and the transfer of command. I was under no delusion as to the difficulty of the task before me. The attacks already made upon the Admiralty in connection with the shipping losses due to submarine warfare, and on the subject of night raids on our coast, which it was impossible to prevent, with the means existing, fully prepared me for what was to come.

I knew then that no fresh measures, involving the production of fresh material, could become effective for a period of at least six to twelve months. Indeed, I was so certain of the course that events would take, that in bidding farewell to the officers and men of the _Iron Duke_ (a very difficult task in view of the intense regret that I felt at leaving them), I said that they must expect to see me the object of the same attacks as those to which my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry Jackson, had been exposed. I was not wrong in this surmise. I left the _Iron Duke_ with a very sad heart on November 28th, 1916, and cannot close this record of the work of the Grand Fleet during my twenty-eight months’ service as Commander-in-Chief better than by quoting my farewell memorandum to the Fleet which I loved so well.

“In bidding farewell to the Flag officers, Captains, officers and men of the Fleet which it has been my privilege to command since the commencement of the War, I desire to express my warmest thanks to all ranks for their loyal support during a period which I know must have tried their patience to the breaking-point.

“The disappointment which has so constantly attended the southern movements of the Fleet might well have resulted in a tendency to staleness and a feeling that the strenuous efforts made to maintain the highest state of efficiency were unavailing if the opportunities for testing the result were so seldom provided by our enemy.

“But this is far from being the case. I am proud to be able to say, with absolute confidence, that the spirit of keenness and enthusiasm has constantly grown, and I am convinced that the Fleet gains in efficiency from day to day. We have benefited by experience, and we have turned that experience to good account.

“Whilst leaving the Fleet with feelings of the deepest regret, I do so with the knowledge that officers and men are imbued with that spirit which has carried their forefathers to victory throughout all ages, whenever and wherever they have met the enemies of their country, and whilst giving our present foe full credit for high efficiency, I am perfectly confident that in the Grand Fleet they will meet more than their match, ship for ship in all classes, and that the result will never be for one moment in doubt.

“May your arduous work be crowned with a glorious victory resulting in a just and lasting peace!

“J. R. JELLICOE,
“Admiral.”

Appendix I

BATTLE OF JUTLAND DESPATCH

_Iron Duke,
18th June, 1916._

No. 1395 H.F. 0022.
The Secretary
of the ADMIRALTY,

SIR,--

Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that
the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31 May, 1916, to
the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.

2. The available ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the
general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left
its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions
issued by me.

3. The ships under my command taking part in the sweep were as
follows:

(_a_) Those in company with me:

_Iron Duke_--Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B. (flying my Flag).

_Marlborough_--Captain George P. Ross (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Captain E.
Percy F. G. Grant, Chief of the Staff).

_Colossus_--Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.).

_Hercules_--Captain Lewis Clinton-Baker.

_Neptune_--Captain Vivian H. G. Bernard.

_Collingwood_--Captain James C. Ley.

_Revenge_--Captain Edward B. Kiddle.

_Agincourt_--Captain Henry M. Doughty.

_St. Vincent_--Captain William W. Fisher, M.V.O.

_Bellona_--Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton.

_King George V._--Captain Frederick L. Field (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B.).

_Orion_--Captain Oliver Backhouse, C.B. (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B.).

_Centurion_--Captain Michael Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.

_Conqueror_--Captain Hugh H. D. Tothill.

_Erin_--Captain The Hon. Victor A. Stanley, M.V.O., A.D.C.

_Thunderer_--Captain James A. Fergusson.

_Monarch_--Captain George H. Borrett.

_Ajax_--Captain George H. Baird.

_Boadicea_--Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.

_Benbow_--Captain Henry Wise Parker (flying the Flag of Vice-Admiral
Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.).

_Superb_--Captain Edmond Hyde Parker (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Alexander L. Duff, C.B.).

_Canada_--Captain William C. M. Nicholson.

_Bellerophon_--Captain Edward F. Bruen.

_Temeraire_--Captain Edwin V. Underhill.

_Vanguard_--Captain James D. Dick.

_Royal Oak_--Captain Crawford Maclachlan.

_Blanche_--Captain John M. Casement.

_Minotaur_--Captain Arthur C. S. H. D’Aeth (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O.).

_Hampshire_--Captain Herbert J. Savill.

_Cochrane_--Captain Eustace La T. Leatham.

_Shannon_--Captain John S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.

_Defence_--Captain Stanley V. Ellis (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O.).

_Duke of Edinburgh_--Captain Henry Blackett.

_Black Prince_--Captain Thomas P. Bonham.

_Warrior_--Captain Vincent B. Molteno.

_Invincible_--Captain Arthur L. Cay (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
The Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.).

_Indomitable_--Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

_Inflexible_--Captain Edward H. F. Heaton-Ellis, M.V.O.

_Calliope_--Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier.

_Caroline_--Captain H. Ralph Crooke.

_Comus_--Captain Alan G. Hotham.

_Constance_--Captain Cyril S. Townsend.

_Royalist_--Captain The Hon. Herbert Meade, D.S.O.

_Canterbury_--Captain Percy M. R. Royds.

_Chester_--Captain Robert N. Lawson.

_Active_--Captain Percy Withers.

_Castor_--Commodore (F.) James R. P. Hawkesley, M.V.O.

_Tipperary_--Captain (D.) Charles J. Wintour.

_Broke_--Commander Walter L. Allen.

_Shark_--Commander Loftus W. Jones.

_Acasta_--Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron.

_Spitfire_--Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny.

_Sparrowhawk_--Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins.

_Achates_--Commander Reginald B. C. Hutchinson, D.S.C.

_Ambuscade_--Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles.

_Ardent_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden.

_Fortune_--Lieutenant-Commander Frank G. Terry.

_Porpoise_--Commander Hugh D. Colville.

_Unity_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur M. Lecky.

_Garland_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff.

_Christopher_--Lieutenant-Commander Fairfax M. Kerr.

_Contest_--Lieutenant-Commander Ernald G. H. Master.

_Owl_--Commander Robert G. Hamond.

_Hardy_--Commander Richard A. A. Plowden.

_Midge_--Lieutenant-Commander James R. C. Cavendish.

_Ophelia_--Commander Lewis G. E. Crabbe.

_Kempenfelt_--Commander Harold E. Sulivan.

_Ossory_--Commander Harold V. Dundas.

_Martial_--Lieutenant-Commander Julian Harrison.

_Magic_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Wynter.

_Minion_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry C. Rawlings.

_Mystic_--Commander Claude F. Allsup.

_Mons_--Lieutenant-Commander Robert Makin.

_Mandate_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Mc. C. W. Lawrie.

_Michael_--Lieutenant-Commander Claude L. Bate.

_Marne_--Lieutenant-Commander George B. Hartford.

_Milbrook_--Lieutenant Charles G. Naylor.

_Manners_--Lieutenant-Commander Gerald C. Harrison.

_Moon_--Commander (Acting) William D. Irvin.

_Mounsey_--Lieutenant-Commander Ralph V. Eyre.

_Morning Star_--Lieutenant-Commander Hugh U. Fletcher.

_Faulknor_--Captain (D) Anselan J. B. Stirling.

_Marksman_--Commander Norton A. Sulivan.

_Obedient_--Commander George W. Mc. C. Campbell.

_Mindful_--Lieutenant-Commander John J. C. Ridley.

_Marvel_--Lieutenant-Commander Reginald W. Grubb.

_Onslaught_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.

_Mænad_--Commander John P. Champion.

_Narwhal_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry V. Hudson.

_Nessus_--Lieutenant-Commander Eric Q. Carter.

_Noble_--Lieutenant-Commander Henry P. Boxer.

_Opal_--Commander Charles G. C. Sumner.

_Nonsuch_--Lieutenant-Commander Herbert I. N. Lyon.

_Menace_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles A. Poignand.

_Munster_--Lieutenant-Commander Spencer F. Russell.

_Mary Rose_--Lieutenant-Commander Edwin A. Homan.

_Mischief_--Lieutenant-Commander The Hon. Cyril A. Ward, M.V.O.

_Oak_--Lieutenant-Commander Douglas Faviell, M.V.O.

_Abdiel_--Commander Berwick Curtis.

(_b_) Those in company with Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty:

_Lion_--Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O. (flying the Flag of
Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O.); Captain
Rudolf W. Bentinck, Chief of the Staff.

_Princess Royal_--Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O. (flying the
Flag of Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, C.B.).

_Tiger_--Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.

_Queen Mary_--Captain Cecil I. Prowse.

_New Zealand_--Captain John F. E. Green (flying the Flag of
Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.).

_Indefatigable_--Captain Charles F. Sowerby.

_Southampton_--Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D.C.

_Nottingham_--Captain Charles B. Miller.

_Birmingham_--Captain Arthur A. M. Duff.

_Dublin_--Captain Albert C. Scott.

_Galatea_--Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.

_Inconstant_--Captain Bertram S. Thesiger, C.M.G.

_Phaeton_--Captain John E. Cameron, M.V.O.

_Cordelia_--Captain Tufton P. H. Beamish.

_Falmouth_--Captain John D. Edwards (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Trevylyan D. W. Napier, M.V.O.).

_Birkenhead_--Captain Edward Reeves.

_Gloucester_--Captain William F. Blunt, D.S.O.

_Yarmouth_--Captain Thomas D. Pratt.

“_Barham_”--Captain Arthur W. Craig (flying the Flag of Rear-Admiral
Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.).

_Warspite_--Captain Edward M. Phillpotts.

_Valiant_--Captain Maurice Woollcombe.

_Malaya_--Captain The Hon. Algernon D. E. H. Boyle, C.B., M.V.O.

_Champion_--Captain (D.) James U. Farie.

_Nestor_--Commander The Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham.

_Nomad_--Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield.

_Narborough_--Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett.

_Obdurate_--Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams.

_Petard_--Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson.

_Pelican_--Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie.

_Nerissa_--Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge.

_Onslow_--Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey.

_Moresby_--Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison.

_Nicator_--Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta.

_Fearless_--Captain (D.) Charles D. Roper.

_Acheron_--Commander Charles G. Ramsey.

_Ariel_--Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Tippet.

_Attack_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles H. N. James.

_Hydra_--Lieutenant Francis G. Glossop.

_Badger_--Commander G. A. Fremantle.

_Goshawk_--Commander Dashwood F. Moir.

_Defender_--Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer.

_Lizard_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward Brooke.

_Lapwing_--Lieutenant-Commander Alexander H. Gye.

_Lydiard_--Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith.

_Liberty_--Lieutenant-Commander Philip W. S. King.

_Landrail_--Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart.

_Laurel_--Lieutenant Henry D. C. Stanistreet.

_Moorsom_--Commander John C. Hodgson.

_Morris_--Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham.

_Turbulent_--Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart.

_Termagent_--Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake.

_Engadine_--Lieutenant-Commander Charles G. Robinson.

4. In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas,
supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my
directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which
was accompanied by the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd
Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light Cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th, and 12th
Flotillas.

5. The junction of the Battle Fleet with the scouting force after
the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly
course steered by the latter during the first hour of their action
with the enemy battle cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable,
as had our battle cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward
the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle Cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Sir David Beatty, and
admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron
under Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, fought an action under, at times,
disadvantageous conditions, in a manner that was in keeping with
the best traditions of the service. Our vessels had a considerable
advantage in gun-power and in numbers prior to the arrival of the
German Battle Fleet, but the great disparity between British and
German battle cruisers in the matter of protection must not be
forgotten. The German vessels are in this respect equal to powerful
battleships, whereas our battle cruisers, particularly those of the
2nd and 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, are very lightly protected.
The main difficulty with which our ships had to contend was the bad
light. All reports mention the difficulty experienced in seeing the
enemy vessels to the eastward, whilst remarking on the clearness of
the western horizon. A photograph taken from _Malaya_ during the
action indicates this fact very clearly.

During the period that the Fifth Battle Squadron was engaged with
the enemy leading battleships as well as battle cruisers, all the
advantages of light and numbers were on the side of the enemy, and
the punishment inflicted by our ships is testimony to the fighting
qualities of the personnel.

6. The following extracts from the report of Vice-Admiral Sir David
Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon
the scene:

“At 2.20 P.M. reports were received from _Galatea_ indicating
the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was
immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to
place my force between the enemy and his base.

“At 2.35 P.M. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the
eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward
and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the
Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly
altered the eastward and north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at
3.31 P.M. They appeared to be five battle cruisers.

“After the first report of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser
Squadrons changed their direction and without waiting for orders
spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the
battle cruiser squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we
had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light
cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser
Squadron had come in at high speed and was able to take station
ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned E.S.E., the
course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the
work of the light cruiser squadrons was excellent and of great
value.

“From a report from _Galatea_ at 2.25 P.M. it was evident that
the enemy force was considerable and not merely an isolated unit
of light cruisers, so at 2.45 P.M. I ordered _Engadine_ to send
up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out
very quickly, and by 3.8 P.M. a seaplane, with Flight-Lieutenant
F. J. Rutland, R.N., as Pilot, and Asst.-Paymaster G. S. Trewin,
R.N., as Observer, was well under way; her first reports of the
enemy were received in _Engadine_ about 3.30 P.M. Owing to clouds
it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four
enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900
feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire
on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered
with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight-Lieutenant
Rutland and Assistant-Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated
on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such
circumstances are of distinct value.

“At 3.30 P.M. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed Line of
Battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th
Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly
converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards,
and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The
5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now
bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was
good, the sun behind us, and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy
and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically
good.

“At 3.48 P.M. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both
forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered
to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E.,
the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500
yards.

“Shortly after 4 P.M. _Indefatigable_, after a violent explosion,
fell out of the line, turned over and sank.

“At 4.8 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened
fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy’s fire now seemed to
slacken. It would appear that at this time we passed through
a screen of enemy submarines. The destroyer _Landrail_ of 9th
Flotilla, who was on our port beam trying to take station ahead,
sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though
causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of
_Lydiard_ and _Landrail_ undoubtedly preserved the battle cruisers
from closer submarine attack. _Nottingham_ also reported a
submarine on the starboard beam.

“Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, _Nestor_, _Nomad_,
_Nicator_, _Narborough_, _Pelican_, _Petard_, _Obdurate_,
_Nerissa_, with _Moorsom_ and _Morris_ of 10th Flotilla,
_Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ of the 9th Flotilla, having been
ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity
offered, moved out at 4.15 P.M. simultaneously with a similar
movement on the part of the enemy. The attack was carried out
in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before
arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they
intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15
destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with
the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle
cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their
torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in
this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle cruisers was
rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having
dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore
unfavourable for torpedo attack.

“_Nestor_, _Nomad_ and _Nicator_, gallantly led by Commander
the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of _Nestor_, pressed home their
attack on the battle cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them
at a range of 6,000 and 5,000 yards, being subjected to a heavy
fire from the enemy’s secondary armament. _Nomad_ was badly hit
and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently
_Nestor_ and _Nicator_ altered course to the S.E., and in a short
time the opposing battle cruisers having turned 16 points, found
themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships.
Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and
their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo
at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards.
Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, _Nestor_ was badly hit
and swung to starboard, _Nicator_ altering course inside her to
avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last
torpedo. _Nicator_ made good her escape and subsequently rejoined
the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. _Nestor_ remained stopped, but was
afloat when last seen. _Moorsom_ also carried out an attack on the
enemy’s battle fleet.

“_Petard_, _Nerissa_, _Turbulent_ and _Termagent_ also pressed home
their attack on the enemy battle cruisers, firing torpedoes after
the engagement with enemy destroyers. _Petard_ reports that all
her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy’s line, while _Nerissa_
states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These
destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His
Majesty’s Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions.

“From 4.15 to 4.43 P.M. the conflict between the opposing battle
cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th
Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy’s rear ships, unfortunately
at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and
rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18
P.M. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to
the north-eastward had become considerably reduced and the outline
of the ships very indistinct.

“At 4.26 P.M. there was a violent explosion in _Queen Mary_; she
was enveloped in clouds of grey smoke and disappeared. Eighteen of
her officers and men were subsequently picked up by _Laurel_.

“At 4.38 P.M. _Southampton_ reported the enemy’s Battle Fleet
ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 P.M. the enemy’s
Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in
succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course
to lead them towards the Grand Fleet. The enemy battle cruisers
altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued.
_Southampton_ with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron held on to the
southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the
enemy battle fleet and came under a very heavy but ineffective
fire. _Southampton’s_ reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle
Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the
enemy battle cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy
battle fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter
course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., in
_Barham_, this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

“At 4.57 P.M. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and
came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy battle fleet.
_Fearless_ with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla joined the battle
cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. _Champion_
with 13th Flotilla took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At
5 P.M. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been
following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard
bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

“The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being
silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the
enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up
clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had
turned their van at about 6 P.M. Between 5 and 6 P.M. the action
continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000
yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment,
and undoubtedly one of their battle cruisers quitted the line in
a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal
observation and was corroborated by _Princess Royal_ and _Tiger_.
Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5
P.M. _Onslow_ and _Moresby_, who had been detached to assist
_Engadine_ with the seaplane, rejoined the battle cruiser squadrons
and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of _Lion_. At 5.10
P.M. _Moresby_, being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy
ship, fired a torpedo at the 3rd in their line. Eight minutes later
she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the 6th
ship in the line. _Moresby_ then passed between the lines to clear
the range of smoke, and rejoined _Champion_. In corroboration of
this, _Fearless_ reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily
on fire at about 5.10 P.M., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of
smoke and steam similar to that which accompanied the blowing up of
_Queen Mary_ and _Indefatigable_.

“At 5.35 P.M. our course was N.N.E. and the estimated position
of the Grand Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the
north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He
was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment
at the head of his line, and probably acting on information
received from his light cruisers which had sighted and were engaged
with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron (vide _Indomitable’s_
report). Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 P.M. British
cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 P.M. the leading
battleships of the Grand Fleet bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon
altered course to east and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought
the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to the
Commander-in-Chief that the enemy battle cruisers bore south-east.
At this time only three of the enemy battle cruisers were visible,
closely followed by battleships of the ”König“ class.

“At about 6.5 P.M. _Onslow_, being on the engaged bow of _Lion_,
sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from
us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. _Onslow_ at
once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from
4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. _Onslow_ then
closed the enemy battle cruisers, and orders were given for all
torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by
a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired.
Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer
proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had
three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged and
torpedoed her. The enemy’s battle fleet was then sighted, and the
remaining torpedoes were fired at them; having started correctly,
they must have crossed the enemy’s track. Damage then caused
_Onslow_ to stop.

“At 7.15 P.M. _Defender_, whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots,
while on the disengaged side of the battle cruisers, by a shell
which damaged her foremost boiler, closed _Onslow_ and took her
in tow. Shell were falling all round them during this operation,
which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy
weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was
re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1. P.M. 1st June,
when _Onslow_ was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances
of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am
recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey of _Onslow_, and
Lieutenant-Commander Palmer of _Defender_, for special recognition.
_Onslow_ was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral
Commanding, 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, as follows:

“‘Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a
destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled
condition soon after 6 P.M. She apparently was able to struggle
ahead again, and made straight for the _Derfflinger_ to attack her.
The incident appeared so courageous that it seems desirable to
investigate it further.’”

PROCEEDINGS OF BATTLE FLEET

7. On receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted,
the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying Cruiser and
Destroyer Force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course
to close the Battle Cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that
elapsed before the arrival of the battle fleet on the scene the
steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested.
Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner
in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet
maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the
older vessels.

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Rear-Admiral the
Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, which was in advance of the battle fleet,
was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. The difference in
reckoning between _Lion_ and the _Iron Duke_, which was inevitable
under the circumstances existing, apparently caused the Third
Battle Cruiser Squadron to press rather too far to the eastward,
and it was not until 5.30 P.M. that this squadron observed flashes
of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to the south-westward.
Rear-Admiral Hood sent the _Chester_ (Captain Robert N. Lawson)
to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light
cruisers at about 5.45 P.M. The engagement lasted for about twenty
minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with
great skill against heavy odds, and although the ship suffered
considerably in casualties her fighting and steaming qualities were
unimpaired, and at about 6.5 P.M. she rejoined the Third Battle
Cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward,
and at 6.10 P.M. sighted our battle cruisers, the squadron taking
station ahead of the _Lion_ at 6.21 P.M. in accordance with the
orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle Cruiser Fleet. He
reports as follows:

“I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out
magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action
ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval
ancestors. At 6.25 P.M. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support
of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only
8,000 yards from the enemy’s leading ship. They were pouring a hot
fire into her, and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At
the same time I made a visual report to the Commander-in-Chief of
the bearing and distance of the enemy battle fleet. At 6.33 P.M.
_Invincible_ blew up.

“After the loss of _Invincible_, the squadron was led by
_Inflexible_ until 6.50 P.M. By this time the battle cruisers were
clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3
miles, and I ordered the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong
the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this
time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy
ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note
that after 6 P.M., although the visibility became reduced, it was
undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals
their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very
severely and establish a definite superiority over them. The damage
received by our ships during this period, excepting the destruction
of _Invincible_, was slight. From the reports of other ships and
my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered severely,
battle cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was
crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our
battle cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron were
also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas
shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely
said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

“From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third
Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our
starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 P.M. attacked with
the torpedo. _Falmouth_ and _Yarmouth_ both fired torpedoes at the
leading enemy battle cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo
hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light
Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with
gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that
the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired.
Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and
effective attack. _Indomitable_ reports that about this time one of
the _Derfflinger_ class fell out of the enemy’s line.”