Chapter V

[78] _The Atlantic Monthly_, November 1920.

[79] _Realities of War_, pp. 426-7, 441.

[80] Is it necessary to say that the present writer does not accept it?

[81] The argument is not invalidated in the least by sporadic instances of liberal activity here--an isolated article or two. For iteration is the essence of propaganda as an opinion forming factor.

[82] In an article in the _North American Review_, just before America's entrance into the War, I attempted to indicate the danger by making one character in an imaginary symposium say: 'One talks of "Wilson's programme," "Wilson's policy." There will be only one programme and one policy possible as soon as the first American soldier sets foot on European soil: Victory. Bottomley and Maxse will be milk and water to what we shall see America producing. We shall have a settlement so monstrous that Germany will offer any price to Russia and Japan for their future help.... America's part in the War will absorb about all the attention and interest that busy people can give to public affairs. They will forget about these international arrangements concerning the sea, the League of Peace--the things for which the country entered the War. In fact if Wilson so much as tries to remind them of the objects of the War he will be accused of pro-Germanism, and you will have their ginger Press demanding that the "old gang" be "combed out."'

[83] 'If we take the extremist possibility, and suppose a revolution in Germany or in South Germany, and the replacement of the Hohenzollerns in all or part of Germany by a Republic, then I am convinced that for republican Germany there would be not simply forgiveness, but a warm welcome back to the comity of nations. The French, British, Belgians, and Italians, and every civilised force in Russia would tumble over one another in their eager greeting of this return to sanity.' (_What is coming?_ p. 198).

[84] See the memoranda published in _The Secrets of Crewe House_.

[85] Mr Keynes is not alone in declaring that the Treaty makes of our armistice engagements a 'scrap of paper.' _The Round Table_, in an article which aims at justifying the Treaty as a whole, says: 'Opinions may differ as to the actual letter of the engagements which we made at the Armistice, but the spirit of them is undoubtedly strained in some of the detailed provisions of the peace. There is some honest ground for the feeling manifested in Germany that the terms on which she laid down her arms have not been observed in all respects.'

A very unwilling witness to our obligations is Mr Leo Maxse, who writes (_National Review_, February, 1921):--

'Thanks to the American revelations we are in a better position to appreciate the trickery and treachery of the pre-Armistice negotiations, as well as the hideous imposture of the Paris Peace Conference, which, we now learn for the first time, was governed by the self-denying ordinance of the previous November, when, unbeknown to the countries betrayed, the Fourteen Points had been inextricably woven into the Armistice. Thus was John Bull effectively 'dished' of every farthing of his war costs.'

As a fact, of course, the self-denying ordinance was not 'unbeknown to the countries betrayed.' The Fourteen Points commitment was quite open; the European Allies could have repudiated them, as, on one point, Britain did.

[86] A quite considerable school, who presumably intend to be taken seriously, would have us believe that the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the English Trade Union Movement are all the work of a small secret Jewish Club or Junta--their work, that is, in the sense that but for them the Revolutions or Revolutionary movements would not have taken place. These arguments are usually brought by 'intense nationalists' who also believe that sentiments like nationalism are so deeply rooted that mere ideas or theories can never alter them.

[87] An American playwright has indicated amusingly with what ingenuity we can create a 'collectivity.' One of the characters in the play applies for a chauffeur's job. A few questions reveal the fact that he does not know anything about it. 'Why does he want to be a chauffeur?' 'Well, I'll tell you, boss. Last year I got knocked down by an automobile and badly hurt. And I made up my mind that when I came out of the hospital I'd get a bit of my own back. Get even by knocking over a few guys, see?' A policy of 'reprisals,' in fact.

[88] December 26th, 1917.

[89] A thing which happens about once a week in the United States.

[90] October 16th, 1917.

[91] The amazing rapidity with which we can change sides and causes, and the enemy become the Ally, and the Ally the enemy, in the course of a few weeks, approaches the burlesque.

At the head of the Polish armies is Marshal Pilsudski, who fought under Austro-German command, against Russia. His ally is the Ukrainian adventurer, General Petlura, who first made a separate peace at Brest-Litovsk, and contracted there to let the German armies into the Ukraine, and to deliver up to them its stores of grain. These in May 1920 were the friends of the Allies. The Polish Finance Minister at the time we were aiding Poland was Baron Bilinski, a gentleman who filled the same post in the Austrian Cabinet which let loose the world war, insisted hotly on the ultimatum to Serbia, helped to ruin the finances of the Hapsburg dominions by war, and then after the collapse repeated the same operation in Poland. On the other side the command has passed, it is said, to the dashing General Brusiloff, who again and again saved the Eastern front from Austrian and German offensives. He is now the 'enemy' and his opponents our 'Allies.' They are fighting to tear the Ukraine, which means all South Russia, away from the Russian State. The preceding year we spent millions to achieve the opposite result. The French sent their troops to Odessa, and we gave our tanks to Denikin, in order to enable him to recover this region for Imperial Russia.

[92] The Russian case is less evident. But only the moral inertia following on a long war could have made our Russian record possible.

[93] He complained that I had 'publicly reproved him' for supporting severity in warfare. He was mistaken. As he really did believe in the effectiveness of terrorism, he did a very real service by standing publicly for his conviction.

[94] Here is what the _Times_ of December 10th, 1870, has to say about France and Germany respectively, and on the Alsace-Lorraine question:--

'We must say with all frankness that France has never shown herself so senseless, so pitiful, so worthy of contempt and reprobation, as at the present moment, when she obstinately declines to look facts in the face, and refuses to accept the misfortune her own conduct has brought upon her. A France broken up in utter anarchy, Ministers who have no recognised chief, who rise from the dust in their air balloons, and who carry with them for ballast shameful and manifest lies and proclamations of victories that exist only in their imagination, a Government which is sustained by lies and imposture, and chooses rather to continue and increase the waste of lives than to resign its own dictatorship and its wonderful Utopia of a republic; that is the spectacle which France presents to-day. It is hard to say whether any nation ever before burdened itself with such a load of shame. The quantity of lies which France officially and unofficially has been manufacturing for us in the full knowledge that they are lies, is something frightful and absolutely unprecedented. Perhaps it is not much after all in comparison with the immeasurable heaps of delusions and unconscious lies which have so long been in circulation among the French. Their men of genius who are recognised as such in all departments of literature are apparently of opinion that France outshines other nations in a superhuman wisdom, that she is the new Zion of the whole world, and that the literary productions of the French, for the last fifty years, however insipid, unhealthy, and often indeed devilish, contain a real gospel, rich in blessing for all the children of men.

We believe that Bismarck will take as much of Alsace-Lorraine, too, as he chooses, and that it will be the better for him, the better for us, the better for all the world but France, and the better in the long run for France herself. Through large and quiet measures, Count von Bismarck is aiming with eminent ability at a single object; the well-being of Germany and of the world, of the large-hearted, peace-loving, enlightened, and honest people of Germany growing into one nation; and if Germany becomes mistress of the Continent in place of France, which is light-hearted, ambitious, quarrelsome, and over-excitable, it will be the most momentous event of the present day, and all the world must hope that it will soon come about.'

[95] We realise without difficulty that no society could be formed by individuals each of whom had been taught to base his conduct on adages such as these: 'Myself alone'; 'myself before anybody else'; 'my ego is sacred'; 'myself over all'; 'myself right or wrong.' Yet those are the slogans of Patriotism the world over and are regarded as noble and inspiring, shouted with a moral and approving thrill.

[96] However mischievous some of the manifestations of Nationalism may prove, the worst possible method of dealing with it is by the forcible repression of any of its claims which can be granted with due regard to the general interest. To give Nationalism full play, as far as possible, is the best means of attenuating its worst features and preventing its worst developments. This, after all, is the line of conduct which we adopt to certain religious beliefs which we may regard as dangerous superstitions. Although the belief may have dangers, the social dangers involved in forcible repression would be greater still.

[97] _The Great Illusion_, p. 326

[98] 'The Pacifists lie when they tell us that the danger of war is over.' General Leonard Wood.

[99] _The Science of Power_, p. 14.

[100] Ibid, p. 144.

[101] See quotations, Part I, Chapters I and III.

[102] The validity of this assumption still holds even though we take the view that the defence of war as an inevitable struggle for bread is merely a rationalisation (using that word in the technical sense of the psychologists) of impulse or instinct, merely, that is, an attempt to find a 'reason' for conduct the real explanation of which is the subconscious promptings of pugnacities or hostilities, the craving of our nature for certain kinds of action. If we could not justify our behaviour in terms of self-preservation, it would stand so plainly condemned ethically and socially that discipline of instinct--as in the case of sex instinct--would obviously be called for and enforced. In either case, the road to better behaviour is by a clearer revelation of the social mischief of the predominant policy.

[103] Rear-Admiral A. T. Mahan: _Force in International Relations_.

[104] _The Interest of America in International Conditions_, by Rear-Admiral A. T. Mahan, pp. 47-87.

[105] _Government and the War_, p. 62.

[106] _State Morality and a League of Nations_, pp 83-85.

[107] _North American Review_, March 1912.

[108] Admiral Mahan himself makes precisely this appeal:--

'That extension of national authority over alien communities, which is the dominant note in the world politics of to-day, dignifies and enlarges each State and each citizen that enters its fold.... Sentiment, imagination, aspiration, the satisfaction of the rational and moral faculties in some object better than bread alone, all must find a part in a worthy motive. Like individuals, nations and empires have souls as well as bodies. Great and beneficent achievement ministers to worthier contentment than the filling of the pocket.'

[109] It is not necessary to enter exhaustively into the difficult problem of 'natural right.' It suffices for the purpose of this argument that the claim of others to life will certainly be made and that we can only refuse it at a cost which diminishes our own chances of survival.

[110] See Mr Churchill's declaration, quoted Part I Chapter V.

[111] Mr J. L. Garvin, who was among those who bitterly criticised this thesis on account of its 'sordidness,' now writes: 'Armageddon might become almost as frequent as General Elections if belligerency were not restrained by sheer dread of the consequences in an age of economic interdependence when even victory has ceased to pay.'

(Quoted in _Westminster Gazette_, Jan. 24, 1921.)

[112] The introductory synopsis reads:--

What are the fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry of armaments in Europe, notably the Anglo-German? Each nation pleads the need for defence; but this implies that some one is likely to attack, and has therefore a presumed interest in so doing. What are the motives which each State thus fears its neighbours may obey?

They are based on the universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the best conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others (German naval competition is assumed to be the expression of the growing need of an expanding population for a larger place in the world, a need which will find a realisation in the conquest of English Colonies or trade, unless these were defended); it is assumed, therefore, that a nation's relative prosperity is broadly determined by its political power; that nations being competing units, advantage, in the last resort, goes to the possessor of preponderant military force, the weaker going to the wall, as in the other forms of the struggle for life.

The author challenges this whole doctrine.

[113] See chapters _The Psychological Case for Peace_, _Unchanging Human Nature_, and _Is the Political Reformation Possible?_

'Not the facts, but men's opinions about the facts, is what matters. Men's conduct is determined, not necessarily by the right conclusion from facts, but the conclusion they believe to be right.'

In another pre-war book of the present writer (_The Foundations of International Polity_) the same view is developed, particularly in the passage which has been reproduced in Chapter VI of this book, 'The Alternative Risks of Status and Contract.'

[114] The cessation of religious war indicates the greatest outstanding fact in the history of civilised mankind during the last thousand years, which is this: that all civilised Governments have abandoned their claim to dictate the belief of their subjects. For very long that was a right tenaciously held, and it was held on grounds for which there is an immense deal to be said. It was held that as belief is an integral part of conduct, that as conduct springs from belief, and the purpose of the State is to ensure such conduct as will enable us to go about our business in safety, it was obviously the duty of the State to protect those beliefs, the abandonment of which seemed to undermine the foundations of conduct. I do not believe that this case has ever been completely answered.... Men of profound thought and profound learning to-day defend it, and personally I have found it very difficult to make a clear and simple case for the defence of the principle on which every civilised Government in the world is to-day founded. How do you account for this--that a principle which I do not believe one man in a million could defend from all objections has become the dominating rule of civilised government throughout the world?

'Well, that once universal policy has been abandoned, not because every argument, or even perhaps most of the arguments, which led to it, have been answered, but because the fundamental one has. The conception on which it rested has been shown to be, not in every detail, but in the essentials at least, an illusion, a _mis_conception.

'The world of religious wars and of the Inquisition was a world which had a quite definite conception of the relation of authority to religious belief and to truth--as that authority was the source of truth; that truth could be, and should be, protected by force; that Catholics who did not resent an insult offered to their faith (like the failure of a Huguenot to salute a passing religious procession) were renegade.

'Now, what broke down this conception was a growing realisation that authority, force, was irrelevant to the issues of truth (a party of heretics triumphed by virtue of some physical accident, as that they occupied a mountain region); that it was ineffective, and that the essence of truth was something outside the scope of physical conflict. As the realisation of this grew, the conflicts declined.'--_Foundations of International Polity_, p. 214.

[115] An attempt is made, in _The Great Illusion_, to sketch the process which lies behind the progressive substitution of bargain for coercion (The Economic Interpretation of the History of Development 'From Status to Contract') on pages 187-192, and further developed in a chapter 'the Diminishing Factor of Physical Force' (p. 257).

[116] 'When we learn that London, instead of using its police for the running in of burglars and "drunks," is using them to lead an attack on Birmingham for the purpose of capturing that city as part of a policy of "municipal expansion," or "Civic Imperialism," or "Pan-Londonism," or what not; or is using its force to repel an attack by the Birmingham police acting as the result of a similar policy on the part of the Birmingham patriots--when that happens you can safely approximate a police force to a European army. But until it does, it is quite evident that the two--the army and the police force--have in reality diametrically opposed roles. The police exist as an instrument of social co-operation; the armies as the natural outcome of the quaint illusion that though one city could never enrich itself by "capturing" or "subjugating" another, in some wonderful (and unexplained) way one country can enrich itself by capturing or subjugating another....

'France has benefited by the conquest of Algeria, England by that of India, because in each case the arms were employed not, properly speaking, for conquest, but for police purposes, for the establishment and maintenance of order; and, so far as they filled that role, their role was a useful one....

'Germany has no need to maintain order in England, nor England in Germany, and the latent struggle, therefore, between these two countries is futile....

'It is one of the humours of the whole Anglo-German conflict that so much has the British public been concerned with the myths and bogeys of the matter, that it seems calmly to have ignored the realities. While even the wildest Pan-German does not cast his eyes in the direction of Canada, he does cast them in the direction of Asia Minor; and the political activities of Germany may centre on that area for precisely the reasons which result from the distinction between policing and conquest which I have drawn. German industry is coming to have a dominating situation in the Near East, and as those interests--her markets and investments--increase, the necessity for better order in, and the better organisation of, such territories, increases in corresponding degree. Germany may need to police Asia Minor.' (_The Great Illusion_, pp. 131-2-3.)

[117] 'If a great country benefits every time it annexes a province, and her people are the richer for the widened territory, the small nations ought to be immeasurably poorer than the great; instead of which, by every test which you like to apply--public credit, amounts in savings banks, standard of living, social progress, general well-being--citizens of small States are, other things being equal, as well off as, or better off than, the citizens of great. The citizens of countries like Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, are, by every possible test, just as well off as the citizens of countries like Germany, Austria, or Russia. These are the facts which are so much more potent than any theory. If it were true that a country benefited by the acquisition of territory, and widened territory meant general well-being, why do the facts so eternally deny it? There is something wrong with the theory.' (_The Great Illusion_, p. 44).

[118] See Chapters of _The Great Illusion_, _The State as a Person_, and _A False Analogy and its Consequences_.

[119] In the synopsis of the book the point is put thus: 'If credit and commercial contract are tampered with an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its collapse involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile.'

[120] 'We need markets. What is a market? "A place where things are sold." That is only half the truth. It is a place where things are bought and sold, and one operation is impossible without the other, and the notion that one nation can sell for ever and never buy is simply the theory of perpetual motion applied to economics; and international trade can no more be based upon perpetual motion than can engineering. As between economically highly-organised nations a customer must also be a competitor, a fact which bayonets cannot alter. To the extent to which they destroy him as a competitor, they destroy him, speaking generally and largely, as a customer.... This is the paradox, the futility of conquest--the great illusion which the history of our own empire so well illustrates. We "own" our empire by allowing its component parts to develop themselves in their own way, and in view of their own ends, and all the empires which have pursued any other policy have only ended by impoverishing their own populations and falling to pieces.' (p. 75).

[121] See Part I, Chapter II.

[122] _Government and the War_, pp. 52-59.

[123] _The Political Theory of Mr Norman Angell_, by Professor A. D. Lindsay, _The Political Quarterly_, December 1914.

[124] In order that the reader may grasp more clearly Mr Lindsay's point, here are some longer passages in which he elaborates it:--

'If all nations really recognised the truth of Mr Angell's arguments, that they all had common interests which war destroyed, and that therefore war was an evil for victors as well as for vanquished, the European situation would be less dangerous, but were every one in the world as wisely concerned with their own interests as Mr Angell would have men to be, if they were nevertheless bound by no political ties, the situation would be infinitely more dangerous than it is. For unchecked competition, as Hobbes showed long ago, leads straight to war however rational men are. The only escape from its dangers is by submitting it to some political control. And for that reason the growth of economic relations at the expense of political, which Mr Angell heralds with such enthusiasm, is the greatest peril of modern times.

'If men are to avoid the danger that, in competing with one another in the small but immediate matters where their interests diverge, they may overreach themselves and bring about their mutual ruin, two things are essential, one moral or emotional, the other practical. It is not enough that men should recognise that what they do affects other men, and vice versa. They must care for how their actions affect other men, not only for how they may react on themselves. They must, that is, love their neighbours. They must further agree with one another in caring for certain ways of action quite irrespective of how such ways of action affect their personal interests. They must, that is, be not only economic but moral men. Secondly, recognising that the range of their personal sympathies with other men is more restricted than their interdependence, and that in the excitement of competition all else is apt to be neglected, they must depute certain persons to stand out of the competitive struggle and look after just those vital common interests and greater issues which the contending parties are apt to neglect. These men will represent the common interests of all, their common ideals and their mutual sympathies; they will give to men's concern for these common ends a focus which will enable them to resist the pull of divergent interests and round their actions will gather the authority which these common ends inspire....

' ... Such propositions are of course elementary. It is, however, important to observe that economic relations are in this most distinguished from political relations, that men can enter into economic relations without having any real purpose in common. For the money which they gain by their co-operation may represent power to carry out the most diverse and conflicting purposes....

' ... Politics implies mutual confidence and respect and a certain measure of agreement in ideals. The consequence is that co-operation for economic is infinitely easier than for political purposes and spreads much more rapidly. Hence it easily overruns any political boundaries, and by doing so has produced the modern situation which Mr Angell has described.'

[125] I have in mind, of course, the writings of Cole, Laski, Figgis, and Webb. In _A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain_, Mr Webb writes:--

'Whilst metaphysical philosophers had been debating what was the nature of the State--by which they always meant the sovereign Political State--the sovereignty, and even the moral authority of the State itself, in the sense of the political government, were being silently and almost unwittingly undermined by the growth of new forms of Democracy.' (p. xv.)

In _Social Theory_, Mr Cole, speaking of the necessary co-ordination of the new forms of association, writes:--

'To entrust the State with the function of co-ordination would be to entrust it in many cases with the task of arbitrating between itself and some other functional association, say a church or a trade union.' There must be a co-ordinating body, but it 'must be not any single association, but a combination of associations, a federal body in which some or all of the various functional associations are linked together.' (pp. 101 and 134.) A reviewer summarises Mr Cole as saying: 'I do not want any single supreme authority. It is the sovereignty of the State that I object to, as fatal to liberty. For single sovereignty I substitute a federal union of functions, and I see the guarantee of personal freedom in the severalty which prevents any one of them from undue encroachments.'

[126] The British Treasury has issued statements showing that the French people at the end of last year were paying £2. 7s., and the British people £15. 3s. per head in direct taxation. The French tax is calculated at 3.5. per cent. on large incomes, whereas similar incomes in Great Britain would pay at least 25 per cent. This does not mean that the burden of taxes on the poor in France is small. Both the working and middle classes have been very hard hit by indirect taxes and by the rise in prices, which is greater in France than in England.

The point is that in France the taxation is mainly indirect, this falling most heavily upon the poor; while in England it is much more largely direct.

The French consumers are much more heavily taxed than the British, but the protective taxes of France bring in comparatively little revenue, while they raise the price of living and force the French Government and the French local authorities to spend larger and larger amounts on salaries and wages.

The Budget for the year 1920 is made the occasion for an illuminating review of France's financial position by the reporter of the Finance Commission, M. Paul Doumar.

The expenditure due to the War until the present date amounts roughly to 233,000 million francs (equivalent, at the normal rate of exchange, to £9,320,000,000) whereof the sum of 43,000 million francs has been met out of revenue, leaving a deficit of 190 billions.

This huge sum has been borrowed in various ways--26 billions from the Bank of France, 35 billions from abroad, 46 billions in Treasury notes, and 72 billions in regular loans. The total public debt on July 1 is put at 233,729 millions, reckoning foreign loans on the basis of exchange at par.

M. Doumer declares that so long as this debt weighs on the State, the financial situation must remain precarious and its credit mediocre.

[127] January, 1921.

[128] An authorised interview published by the daily papers of January 28th, 1921.

M. Briand, the French Premier, in explaining what he and Mr Lloyd George arranged at Paris to the Chamber and Senate on February 3rd, remarked:--

'We must not lose sight of the fact that in order to pay us Germany must every year create wealth abroad for herself by developing her exports and reducing her imports to strictly necessary things. She can only do that to the detriment of the commerce and industry of the Allies. That is a strange and regrettable consequence of facts. The placing of an annuity on her exports, payable in foreign values, will, however, correct as much as possible this paradoxical situation.'

[129] Version appearing in the _Times_ of January 28th, 1921.

[130] _The Manchester Guardian_, Jan 31st, 1921.

[131] Mr John Foster Dulles, who was a member of the American delegation at the Peace Conference, has, in an article in _The New Republic_ for March 30th, 1921, outlined the facts concerning the problem of payment more completely than I have yet seen it done. The facts he reveals constitute a complete and overwhelming vindication of the case as stated in the first edition of _The Great Illusion_.

[132] As the Lorraine ores are of a kind that demand much less than their own weight of coal for smelting, it is more economic to bring the coal to the ore than vice versa. It was for political and military reasons that the German State encouraged the placing of some of the great furnaces on the right instead of the left bank of the Rhine.

[133] It is worth while to recall here a passage from _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_, by Mr J. M. Keynes, quoted in Chapter I. of this book.

[134] There is one aspect of the possible success of France which is certainly worth consideration. France has now in her possession the greatest iron ore fields in Europe. Assume that she is so far successful in her policy of military coercion that she succeeds in securing vast quantities of coal and coke for nothing. French industry then secures a very marked advantage--and an artificial and 'uneconomic' one--over British industry, in the conversion of raw materials into finished products. The present export by France of coal which she gets for nothing to Dutch and other markets heretofore supplied by Britain might be followed by the 'dumping' of steel and iron products on terms which British industry could not meet. This, of course, is on the hypothesis of success in obtaining 'coal for nothing,' which the present writer regards as extremely unlikely for the reasons here given. But it should be noted that the failure of French effort in this matter will be from causes just as disastrous for British prosperity as French success would be.

[135] See Part I, Chapter I.

[136] _English Review_, January 1913.

Lord Roberts, in his 'Message to the Nation,' declared that Germany's refusal to accept the world's _status quo_ was 'as statesmanlike as it is unanswerable.' He said further:--

'How was this Empire of Britain founded? War founded this Empire--war and conquest! When we, therefore, masters by war of one-third of the habitable globe, when _we_ propose to Germany to disarm, to curtail her navy or diminish her army, Germany naturally refuses; and pointing, not without justice, to the road by which England, sword in hand, has climbed to her unmatched eminence, declares openly, or in the veiled language of diplomacy, that by the same path, if by no other, Germany is determined also to ascend! Who amongst us, knowing the past of this nation, and the past of all nations and cities that have ever added the lustre of their name to human annals, can accuse Germany or regard the utterance of one of her greatest a year and a half ago, (or of General Bernhardi three months ago) with any feelings except those of respect?' (pp. 8-9.)

[137] Lord Loreburn says: 'The whole train of causes which brought about the tragedy of August 1914 would have been dissolved by a Russian revolution.... We could have come to terms with Germany as regards Asia Minor: Nor could the Alsace-Lorraine difficulty have produced trouble. No one will pretend that France would have been aggressive when deprived of Russian support considering that she was devoted to peace even when she had that support. Had the Russian revolution come, war would not have come.' (_How the War Came_, p. 278.)

[138] Mr Walter Lippmann did tackle the problem in much the way I have in mind in _The Stakes of Diplomacy_. That book is critical of my own point of view. But if books like that had been directed at _The Great Illusion_, we might have made headway. As it is, of course, Mr Lippmann's book has been useful in suggesting most that is good in the mandate system of the League of Nations.

* * * * *

Typographical errors corrected by the etext transcriber:

wth Great Britain=> with Great Britain {pg xvii}

his colleages=> his colleagues {pg 38}

retore devastated districts=> restore devastated districts {pg 39}

aquiescence=> acquiescence {pg 45}

indispensible=> indispensable {pg 46}

the Lorrarine work=> the Lorraine work {pg 86}

rcently passed=> recently passed {pg 135}

Allied aerodomes on the Rhine=> Allied aerodromes on the Rhine {pg 163}

the sublest=> the subtlest {pg 239}

the enemy's propetry=> the enemy's property {pg 294}

a monoply=> a monopoly {pg 299}

goverments=> governments {pg 299}

econmic=> economic {pg 303}