Chapter XIII

_The Dutch must maintain their right of trade with the East Indies by peace, by treaty, or by war_

Wherefore since both law and equity demand that trade with the East Indies be as free to us as to any one else, it follows that we are to maintain at all hazards that freedom which is ours by nature, either by coming to a peace agreement with the Spaniards, or by concluding a treaty, or by continuing the war. So far as peace is concerned, it is well known that there are two kinds of peace, one made on terms of equality, the other on unequal terms. The Greeks[178] call the former kind a compact between equals, the latter an enjoined truce; the former is meant for high souled men, the latter for servile spirits. Demosthenes in his speech on the liberty of the Rhodians[179] says that it was necessary for those who wished to be free to keep away from treaties which were imposed upon them, because such treaties were almost the same as slavery. Such conditions are all those by which one party is lessened in its own right, according to the definition of Isocrates.[180] For if, as Cicero says,[181] wars must be undertaken in order that people may live in peace unharmed, it follows that peace ought to mean not an agreement which entails slavery, but an undisturbed liberty, especially as peace and justice according to

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complurium[182a] iudicio pax et iustitia nominibus magis quam re differant, sitque pax non qualiscumque, sed ordinata concordia.

* [Philippica XII, 14: cum iis facta pax non erit pax, sed pactio servitutis.]

Indutiae autem si fiunt satis apparet ex ipsa indutiarum natura non debere medio earum tempore condicionem cuiusquam deteriorem fieri, cum ferme interdicti uti possidetis instar obtineant.

Quod si in bellum trudimur hostium iniquitate, debet nobis causae aequitas spem ac fiduciam boni eventus addere. Nam[183a] ὑπὲρ ὧν ἄν ἐλαττῶνται μεχρὶ δυνατοῦ πάντες πολεμοῦσι, περὶ δὲ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν οὐχ οὕτως, ‘pro his in quibus iniuria afficiuntur omnes quantum omnino possunt depugnant: at propter alieni cupiditatem non item’; quod et Alexander Imperator ita expressit: τὸ μὲν ἄρχειν ἀδίκων ἒργων οὐκ ἀγνώμονα ἔχει τὴν πρόκλησιν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὀχλοῦντας ἀποσείεσθαι ἔκ τε τῆς ἀγαθῆς συνειδήσεως ἔχει τὸ θαῤῥαλέον, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν ἀλλ’ ἀμύνασθαι ὑπάρχει τὸ εὔελπι, ‘eius a quo coepit iniuria, provocatio maxime invidiosa est; at cum depelluntur aggressores, sicut bona conscientia fiduciam secum fert, ita quia de vindicanda non de inferenda iniuria laboratur, spes etiam adsunt optimae’.

Si ita necesse est, perge gens mari invictissima, nec tuam tantum, sed humani generis libertatem audacter propugna.

_Nec te, quod classis centenis remigat alis,
Terreat: INVITO labitur illa MARI:
Quodve vehunt prorae Centaurica saxa minantes,
Tigna cava et pictos experiere metus.
Frangit et attollit vires in milite causa;
Quae nisi iusta subest, excutit arma pudor._[184a]

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the opinion of many philosophers and theologians[182] differ more in name than in fact, and as peace is a harmonious agreement based not on individual whim, but on well ordered regulations.

If however a truce is arranged for, it is quite clear from the very nature of a truce, that during its continuance no one’s condition ought to change for the worse, inasmuch as both parties stand on the equivalent of a _uti possidetis_.

But if we are driven into war by the injustice of our enemies, the justice of our cause ought to bring hope and confidence in a happy outcome. “For,” as Demosthenes has said, “every one fights his hardest to recover what he has lost; but when men endeavor to gain at the expense of others it is not so.”[183] The Emperor Alexander has expressed his idea in this way: ‘Those who begin unjust deeds, must bear the greatest blame; but those who repel aggressors are twice armed, both with courage because of their just cause, and with the highest hope because they are not doing a wrong, but are warding off a wrong’.

Therefore, if it be necessary, arise, O nation unconquered on the sea, and fight boldly, not only for your own liberty, but for that of the human race. “Nor let it fright thee that their fleet is winged, each ship, with an hundred oars. The sea whereon it sails will have none of it. And though the prows bear figures threatening to cast rocks such as Centaurs throw, thou shalt find them but hollow planks and painted terrors. ’Tis his cause that makes or mars a soldier’s strength. If the cause be not just, shame strikes the weapon from his hands.”[184]

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Si iusta multi, et ipse Augustinus,[185a] arma crediderunt eo nomine suscipi, quod per terras alienas iter innoxium negaretur, quanto illa erunt iustiora, quibus maris, quod naturae lege commune est, usus communis et innoxius postulatur? Si iuste oppugnatae sunt gentes quae in suo solo commercia aliis interdicebant, quid illae quae populos ad se nihil pertinentes per vim distinent, ac mutuos earum commeatus intercludunt? Si res ista in iudicio agitaretur, dubitari non potest quae a viro bono expectari deberet sententia, ait Praetor:[186a] ‘Quo minus illi in flumine publico navem agere, ratem agere, quove minus per ripam exonerare liceat, vim fieri veto’. De mari et litore in eandem formam dandum interdictum docent interpretes, exemplo Labeonis, qui cum interdiceret Praetor:[187a] ‘Ne quid in flumine publico ripave eius facias, quo statio iterve navigio deterius sit, fiat’; simile dixit interdictum competere in mari:[188a] ‘Ne quid in mari inve litore facias, quo portus, statio, iterve navigio deterius sit, fiat’.

Immo et post prohibitionem, si quis scilicet in mari navigare prohibitus sit, aut non permissus rem suam vendere, aut re sua uti, iniuriarum eo nomine competere actionem Vlpianus respondit.[189a] Theologi insuper et qui tractant casus, quos vocant, conscientiarum, concordes tradunt,

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If many writers, Augustine himself[185] among them, believed it was right to take up arms because innocent passage was refused across foreign territory, how much more justly will arms be taken up against those from whom the demand is made of the common and innocent use of the sea, which by the law of nature is common to all? If those nations which interdicted others from trade on their own soil are justly attacked, what of those nations which separate by force and interrupt the mutual intercourse of peoples over whom they have no rights at all? If this case should be taken into court, there can be no doubt what opinion ought to be anticipated from a just judge. The praetor’s law says:[186] ‘I forbid force to be used in preventing any one from sailing a ship or a boat on a public river, or from unloading his cargo on the bank’. The commentators say that the injunction must be applied in the same manner to the sea and to the seashore. Labeo, for example, in commenting on the praetor’s edict,[187] ‘Let nothing be done in a public river or on its bank, by which a landing or a channel for shipping be obstructed’, said there was a similar interdict which applied to the sea, namely,[188] ‘Let nothing be done on the sea or on the seashore by which a harbor, a landing, or a channel for shipping be obstructed’.

Nay more, after such a prohibition, if, namely, a man be prevented from navigating the sea, or not allowed to sell or to make use of his own wares and products, Ulpian says that he can bring an action for damages on that ground.[189] Also the theologians and the casuists agree that he who prevents another from buying or selling, or who puts his

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eum qui alterum vendere aut emere impediat, utilitatemve propriam publicae ac communi praeponat, aut ullo modo alterum in eo quod est iuris communis impediat, ad restitutionem teneri omnis damni viri boni arbitrio.

Secundum haec igitur vir bonus iudicans, Batavis libertatem commerciorum adiudicaret, Lusitanos et ceteros, qui eam libertatem impediunt, vetaret vim facere, et damna restituere iuberet. Quod autem in iudicio obtineretur, id ubi iudicium haberi non potest, iusto bello vindicatur. Augustinus:[190a] ‘Iniquitas partis adversae iusta ingerit bella’. Et Cicero:[191a] ‘Cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per disceptationem, alterum per vim, confugiendum ad posterius, si uti non licet priore’. Et Rex Theodoricus: ‘Veniendum tunc ad arma, cum locum apud adversarium iustitia non potest reperire’. Et quod proprius est nostro argumento,[192a] Pomponius eum qui rem omnibus communem cum incommodo ceterorum usurpet, MANV PROHIBENDVM respondit. Theologi quoque tradunt, sicuti pro rerum cuiusque defensione bellum recte suscipitur, ita non minus recte suscipi, pro usu earum rerum quae naturali iure debent esse communes. Quare ei qui itinera praecludat, evectionemque mercium impediat, etiam non expectata ulla publica auctoritate, _via facti_, ut loquuntur, posse occurri.

Quae cum ita sint, minime verendum est, ne aut Deus

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private interests before the public and common interests, or who in any way hinders another in the use of something which is his by common right, is held in damages to complete restitution in an amount fixed by an honorable arbitrator.

Following these principles a good judge would award to the Dutch the freedom of trade, and would forbid the Portuguese and others from using force to hinder that freedom, and would order the payment of just damages. But when a judgment which would be rendered in a court cannot be obtained, it should with justice be demanded in a war. Augustine[190] acknowledges this when he says: ‘The injustice of an adversary brings a just war’. Cicero also says:[191] “There are two ways of settling a dispute; first, by discussion; second, by physical force; we must resort to force only in case we may not avail ourselves of discussion.” And King Theodoric says: ‘Recourse must then be had to arms when justice can find no lodgment in an adversary’s heart’. Pomponius, however, has handed down a decision which has more bearing on our argument[192] than any of the citations already made. He declared that the man who seized a thing common to all to the prejudice of every one else must be forcibly prevented from so doing. The theologians also say that just as war is righteously undertaken in defense of individual property, so no less righteously is it undertaken in behalf of the use of those things which by natural law ought to be common property. Therefore he who closes up roads and hinders the export of merchandise ought to be prevented from so doing _via facti_, even without waiting for any public authority.

Since these things are so, there need not be the slightest

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eorum conatus secundet, qui ab ipso institutum ius naturae certissimum violant, aut homines ipsi eos inultos patiantur, qui solo quaestus sui respectu communem humani generis utilitatem oppugnant.

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fear that God will prosper the efforts of those who violate that most stable law of nature which He himself has instituted, or that even men will allow those to go unpunished who for the sake alone of private gain oppose a common benefit of the human race.

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CVM SVB HOC TEMPVS PLVRIMAE REGIS HISPANIARVM LITTERAE IN MANVS
NOSTRAS VENISSENT, QVIBVS IPSIVS ET LVSITANORVM INSTITVTVM
MANIFESTE DETEGITVR, OPERAE PRETIVM VISVM EST EX IIS, QUAE
PLERAEQVE EODEM ERANT ARGVMENTO, BINAS IN LATINVM SERMONEM
TRANSLATAS EXHIBERE.

Domine Martine Alphonse de Castro, Prorex amice, ego Rex multam tibi salutem mitto:

Cum hisce litteris perveniet ad te exemplum typis impressum Edicti quod faciendum curavi, quo, ob rationes quas expressas videbis, aliasque meis rebus conducentes prohibeo commercium omne externorum in ipsis partibus Indiae aliisque regionibus transmarinis. Quandoquidem res haec est momenti atque usus maximi, et quae effici summa cum industria debeat, impero tibi, ut simulatque litteras has et edictum acceperis, publicationem eius omni diligentia procures in omnibus locis ac partibus istius imperi, idque ipsum quod edicto continetur exsequaris sine ullius personae exceptione, cuiuscumque qualitatis, aetatis, condicionisve sit, citra omnem moram atque excusationem, procedasque ad impletionem mandati via merae exsecutionis, nullo admisso impedimento, appellatione, aut gravamine in contrarium, cuiuscumque materiae generis aut qualitatis. Iubeo itaque hoc ipsum impleri per eos ministros ad quos exsecutio pertinet, iisque significari, non modo eos qui contra fecerint malam operam mihi navaturos, sed eosdem me puniturum privatione officiorum in quibus mihi serviunt.

Quia autem relatum est mihi commorari in istis partibus

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