Chapter IX: Appendix: 263 (8)

Aet. _Plac._ v. 7; 419. Empedokles: Male or female are born according to warmth and coldness; whence he records that the first males were born to the east and south from the earth, and the females to the north. v. 8; 420. Empedokles: Monstrosities are due to too much or too little seed (_semen_), or to disturbance of motion, or to division into several parts, or to a bending aside. v. 10; 421. Empedokles: Twins and triplets are due to excess of seed and division of it. v. 11; 422. Empedokles: Likenesses (of children to parents) are due to power of the fruitful seed, and differences occur when the warmth in the seed is dissipated.[85] v. 12; 423. Empedokles: Offspring are formed according to the fancy of the woman at the time of conception; for oftentimes women fall in love with images and statues, and bring forth offspring like these. v. 14; 425. Empedokles: (Mules are not fertile) because the womb is small and low and narrow, and attached to the belly in a reverse manner, so that the seed does not go into it straight, nor would it receive the seed even if it should reach it. v. 15; 425. Empedokles: The embryo is [not] alive, but exists without breathing in the belly; and the first breath of the animal takes place at birth, when the moisture in infants gives way, and when the airy matter from without comes to the void, to enter into the openings of the lungs. v. 19; 430. Empedokles: The first generations of animals and plants were never complete, but were yoked with incongruous parts; and the second were forms of parts that belong together; and the third, of parts grown into one whole; and the fourth were no longer from like parts, as for instance from earth and water, but from elements already permeating each other; for some the food being condensed, for others the fairness of the females causing an excitement of the motion of the seed. And the classes of all the animals were separated on account of such mixings; those more adapted to the water rushed into this, others sailed up into the air as many as had the more of fiery matter, and the heavier remained on the earth, and equal portions in the mixture spoke in the breasts of all. v. 22; 434. Empedokles: Flesh is the product of equal parts of the four elements mixed together, and sinews of double portions of fire and earth mixed together, and the claws of animals are the product of sinews chilled by contact with the air, and bones of two equal parts of water and of earth and four parts of fire mingled together. And sweat and tears come from blood as it wastes away, and flows out because it has become rarefied. v. 24; 435. Empedokles: Sleep is a moderate cooling of the warmth in the blood, death a complete cooling. v. 25; 437. Empedokles: Death is a separation of the fiery matter out of the mixture of which the man is composed; so that from this standpoint death of the body and of the soul happens together; and sleep is a separating of the fiery matter. v. 26; 438. Empedokles: Trees first of living beings sprang from the earth, before the sun was unfolded in the heavens and before day and night were separated; and by reason of the symmetry of their mixture they contain the principle of male and female; and they grow, being raised by the warmth that is in the earth, so that they are parts of the earth, just as the fœtus in the belly is part of the womb; and the fruits are secretions of the water and fire in the plants; and those which lack (sufficient) moisture shed their leaves in summer when it is evaporated, but those which have more moisture keep their leaves, as in the case of the laurel and the olive and the date-palm; and differences in their juices are (due to) variations in the number of their component parts, and the differences in plants arise because they derive their homoeomeries from (the earth which) nourishes them, as in the case of grape-vines; for it is not the kind of vine which makes wine good, but the kind of soil which nurtures it. v. 26; 440. Empedokles: Animals are nurtured by the substance of what is akin to them [moisture], and they grow with the presence of warmth, and grow smaller and die when either of these is absent; and men of the present time, as compared with the first living beings, have been reduced to the size of infants (?). v. 28; 440. Empedokles: Desires arise in animals from a lack of the elements that would render each one complete, and pleasures....

Theophr. _Phys. opin._ 3; _Dox._ 478. Empedokles of Agrigentum makes the material elements four: fire and air and water and earth, all of them eternal, and changing in amount and smallness by composition and separation; and the absolute first principles by which these four are set in motion, are Love and Strife; for the elements must continue to be moved in turn, at one time being brought together by Love and at another separated by Strife; so that in his view there are six first principles; for sometimes he gives the active power to Love and Strife, when he says (vv. 67-68): ‘Now being all united by Love into one, now each borne apart by hatred engendered of Strife;’ and again he ranks these as elements along with the four when he says (vv. 77-80): ‘And at another time it separated so that there were many out of the one; fire and water and earth and boundless height of air, and baneful Strife apart from these, balancing each of them, and Love among them, their equal in length and breadth.’

Fr. 23; _Dox._ 495. Some say that the sea is as it were a sort of sweat from the earth; for when the earth is warmed by the sun it gives forth moisture; accordingly it is salt, for sweat is salt. Such was the opinion of Empedokles.

Theophr. _de sens._ 7; _Dox._ 500. Empedokles speaks in like manner concerning all the senses, and says that we perceive by a fitting into the pores of each sense. So they are not able to discern one another’s objects, for the pores of some are too wide and of others too narrow for the object of sensation, so that some things go right through untouched, and others are unable to enter completely. And he attempts to describe what vision is; and he says that what is in the eye is fire and water, and what surrounds it is earth and air, through which light being fine enters, as the light in lanterns. Pores of fire and water are set alternately, and the fire-pores recognise white objects, the water-pores black objects; for the colours harmonise with the pores. And the colours move into vision by means of effluences. And they are not composed alike ... and some of opposite elements; for some the fire is within and for others it is on the outside, so some animals see better in the daytime and others at night; those that have less fire see better by day, for the light inside them is balanced by the light outside them; and those that have less water see better at night, for what is lacking is made up for them. And in the opposite case the contrary is true; for those that have the more fire are dim-sighted, since the fire increasing plasters up and covers the pores of water in the daytime; and for those that have water in excess, the same thing happens at night; for the fire is covered up by the water.... Until in the case of some the water is separated by the outside light, and in the case of others the fire by the air; for the cure of each is its opposite. That which is composed of both in equal parts is the best tempered and most excellent vision. This, approximately, is what he says concerning vision. And hearing is the result of noises coming from outside. For when (the air) is set in motion by a sound, there is an echo within; for the hearing is as it were a bell echoing within, and the ear he calls an ‘offshoot of flesh’ (v. 315): and the air when it is set in motion strikes on something hard and makes an echo.[86] And smell is connected with breathing, so those have the keenest smell whose breath moves most quickly; and the strongest odour arises as an effluence from fine and light bodies. But he makes no careful discrimination with reference to taste and touch separately, either how or by what means they take place, except the general statement that sensation takes place by a fitting into the pores; and pleasure is due to likenesses in the elements and in their mixture, and pain to the opposite. And he speaks similarly concerning thought and ignorance: Thinking is by what is like, and not perceiving is by what is unlike, since thought is the same thing as, or something like, sensation. For recounting how we recognise each thing by each, he said at length (vv. 336-337): Now out of these (elements) all things are fitted together and their form is fixed, and by these men think and feel pleasure and pain. So it is by blood especially that we think; for in this especially are mingled <all> the elements of things. And those in whom equal and like parts have been mixed, not too far apart, nor yet small parts, nor exceeding great, these have the most intelligence and the most accurate senses; and those who approximate to this come next; and those who have the opposite qualities are the most lacking in intelligence. And those in whom the elements are scattered and rarefied, are torpid and easily fatigued; and those in whom the elements are small and thrown close together, move so rapidly and meet with so many things that they accomplish but little by reason of the swiftness of the motion of the blood. And those in whom there is a well-tempered mixture in some one part, are wise at this point; so some are good orators, others good artisans, according as the mixture is in the hands or in the tongue; and the same is true of the other powers.

Theophr. _de sens._ 59; _Dox._ 516. And Empedokles says of colours that white is due to fire, and black to water.

Cic. _De nat. deor._ xii.; _Dox._ 535. Empedokles, along with many other mistakes, makes his worst error in his conception of the gods. For the four beings of which he holds that all things consist, he considers divine; but it is clear that these are born and die and are devoid of all sense.

Hipp. _Phil._ 3; _Dox._ 558. And Empedokles, who lived later, said much concerning the nature of the divinities, how they live in great numbers beneath the earth and manage things there. He said that Love and Strife were the first principle of the all, and that the intelligent fire of the monad is god, and that all things are formed from fire and are resolved into fire; and the Stoics agree closely with his teaching, in that they expect a general conflagration. And he believed most fully in transmigration, for he said: ‘For in truth I was born a boy and a maiden, and a plant and a bird, and a fish whose course lies in the sea.’ He said that all souls went at death into all sorts of animals.

Hipp. _Phil._ 4; _Dox._ 559. See Herakleitos, p. 64.

Plut. _Strom._ 10; _Dox._ 582. Empedokles of Agrigentum: The elements are four—fire, water, aether, earth. And the cause of these is Love and Strife. From the first mixture of the elements he says that the air was separated and poured around in a circle; and after the air the fire ran off, and not having any other place to go to, it ran up from under the ice that was around the air. And there are two hemispheres moving in a circle around the earth, the one of pure fire, the other of air and a little fire mixed, which he thinks is night. And motion began as a result of the weight of the fire when it was collected. And the sun is not fire in its nature, but a reflection of fire, like that which takes place in water. And he says the moon consists of air that has been shut up by fire, for this becomes solid like hail; and its light it gets from the sun. The ruling part is not in the head or in the breast, but in the blood; wherefore in whatever part of the body the more of this is spread, in that part men excel.

Epiph. _adv. Haer._ iii. 19; _Dox._ 591. Empedokles of Agrigentum, son of Meton, regarded fire and earth and water and air as the four first elements, and he said that enmity is the first of the elements. For, he says, they were separated at first, but now they are united into one, becoming loved by each other. So in his view the first principles and powers are two, Enmity and Love, of which the one tends to bring things together and the other to separate them.

XI.

_ANAXAGORAS._

Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, son of Hegesiboulos, was born in the seventieth Olympiad (500-497) and died in the first year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad (428), according to the chronicles of Apollodoros. It is said that he neglected his possessions in his pursuit of philosophy; he began to teach philosophy in the archonship of Kallias at Athens (480). The fall of a meteoric stone at Aegos Potamoi (467 or 469) influenced profoundly his views of the heavenly bodies. Perikles brought him to Athens, and tradition says he remained there thirty years. His exile (434-432) was brought about by the enemies of Perikles, and he died at Lampsakos. He wrote but one book, according to Diogenes, and the same authority says this was written in a pleasing and lofty style.

Literature:—Schaubach, _Anax. Claz. Frag._ Lips. 1827; W.
Schorn, _Anax. Claz. et Diog. Apoll. Frag._ Bonn 1829;
Panzerbieter, _De frag. Anax. ord._ Meining. 1836; Fr. Breier,
_Die Philosophie des Anax. nach Arist._ Berl. 1840. Cf. Diels,
_Hermes_ xiii. 4.

FRAGMENTS OF ANAXAGORAS.

1. ὁμοῦ χρήματα πάντα ἦν ἄπειρα καὶ πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ σμικρὸν ἄπειρον ἦν. καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον ἦν ὑπὸ σμικρότητος· πάντα γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ κατεῖχεν ἀμφότερα ἄπειρα ἔοντα· ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι καὶ πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει.

2. καὶ γὰρ ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθὴρ ἀποκρίνονται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιέχοντος. καὶ τό γε περιέχον ἄπειρόν ἐστι τὸ πλῆθος.

4. πρὶν δὲ ἀποκριθῆναι ... πάντων ὁμοῦ ἐόντων οὐδὲ χροιὴ ἔνδηλος ἦν οὐδεμία· ἀπεκώλυε γὰρ ἡ σύμμιξις πάντων χρημάτων τοῦ τε διεροῦ καὶ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ λαμπροῦ καὶ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ καὶ γῆς πολλῆς ἐνεούσης καὶ σπερμάτων ἀπείρων πλήθους οὐδὲν ἐοικότων ἀλλήλοις. οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔοικε τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ.

3. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων, χρὴ δοκεῖν ἐνεῖναι πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς συγκρινομένοις καὶ σπέρματα πάντων χρημάτων καὶ ἰδέας παντοίας ἔχοντα καὶ χροιὰς καὶ ἡδονάς.

10. καὶ ἀνθρώπους τε συμπαγῆναι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα ὅσα ψυχὴν ἔχει. καὶ τοῖς γε ἀνθρώποισιν εἶναι καὶ πόλεις συνῳκημένας καὶ ἔργα κατεσκευασμένα, ὥσπερ παρ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ ἠέλιόν τε αὐτοῖσιν εἶναι καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ὥσπερ παρ’ ἡμῖν, καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖσι φύειν πολλά τε καὶ παντοῖα, ὧν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ ὀνήιστα συνενεγκάμενοι εἰς τὴν οἴκησιν χρῶνται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν μοι λέλεκται περὶ τῆς ἀποκρίσιος, ὅτι οὐκ ἂν παρ’ ἡμῖν μόνον ἀποκριθείη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλῃ.

11. οὕτω τούτων περιχωρούντων τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένων ὑπὸ βίης τε καὶ ταχυτῆτος. βίην δὲ ἡ ταχυτὴς ποιεῖ. ἡ δὲ ταχυτὴς αὐτῶν οὐδενὶ ἔοικε χρήματι τὴν ταχυτῆτα τῶν νῦν ἐόντων χρημάτων ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ πάντως πολλαπλασίως ταχύ ἐστι.

14. τούτων δὲ οὕτω διακεκριμένων γινώσκειν χρὴ, ὅτι πάντα οὐδὲν ἐλάσσω ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πλείω. οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστὸν πάντων πλείω εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἴσα ἀεί.

5. ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν πλὴν νοῦ, ἔστιν οἷσι δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἔνι.

6. τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει, νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐστιν. εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλά τεῳ ἐμέμικτο ἄλλῳ, μετεῖχεν ἂν ἁπάντων χρημάτων, εἰ ἐμέμικτό τεῳ. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν μοι λέλεκται, καὶ ἂν ἐκώλυεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμιγμένα, ὥστε μηδενὸς χρήματος κρατεῖν ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ μόνον ἔοντα ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ. ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον, καὶ ὅσα γε ψυχὴν ἔχει καὶ μείζω καὶ ἐλάσσω, πάντων νοῦς κρατεῖ. καὶ τῆς περιχωρήσιος τῆς συμπάσης νοῦς ἐκράτησεν, ὥστε περιχωρῆσαι τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἤρξατο περιχωρεῖν, ἐπεὶ δὲ πλεῖον περιχωρεῖ, καὶ περιχωρήσει ἐπὶ πλέον. καὶ τὰ συμμισγόμενά τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, πάντα ἔγνω νοῦς. καὶ ὁποῖα ἔμελλεν ἔσεσθαι καὶ ὁποῖα ἦν, καὶ ὅσα νῦν ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖα ἔσται, πάντα διεκόσμησε νοῦς, καὶ τὴν περιχώρησιν ταύτην ἣν νῦν περιχωρέει τά τε ἄστρα καὶ ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ἡ σελήνη καὶ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ὁ αἰθὴρ οἱ ἀποκρινόμενοι. ἡ δὲ περιχώρησις αὕτη ἐποίησεν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. καὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἀπό τε τοῦ ἀραιοῦ τὸ πυκνὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ζοφεροῦ τὸ λαμπρὸν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ διεροῦ τὸ ξηρόν. μοῖραι δὲ πολλαὶ πολλῶν εἰσι. παντάπασι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνεται οὐδὲ διακρίνεται ἕτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου πλὴν νοῦ. νοῦς δὲ πᾶς ὅμοιός ἐστι καὶ ὁ μείζων καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων. ἕτερον δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὅμοιον οὐδένι, ἀλλ’ ὅτῳ πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότητα ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.

7. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη. κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει διακρίνεσθαι.

8. τὸ μὲν πυκνὸν καὶ διερὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ζοφερὸν ἐνθάδε συνεχώρησεν ἔνθα νῦν <ἡ γῆ>· τὸ δὲ ἀραιὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν <καὶ τὸ λαμπρὸν> ἐξεχώρησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ αἰθέρος.

9. ἀπὸ τουτέων ἀποκρινομένων συμπήγνυται γῆ· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν νεφελῶν ὕδωρ ἀποκρίνεται, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος γῆ, ἐκ δὲ τῆς γῆς λίθοι συμπήγνυνται ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ, οὗτοι δὲ ἐκχωρέουσι μᾶλλον τοῦ ὕδατος.

12. ὁ δὲ νοῦς, ὡς ἀεί ποτε, κάρτα καὶ νῦν ἐστιν, ἵνα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ἐν τῷ πολλῷ περιέχοντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκριθεῖσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀποκρινομένοις.

13. οὐ κεχώρισται ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ κόσμῳ οὐδὲ ἀποκέκοπται πελέκει οὔτε τὸ θερμὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ οὔτε τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ.

15. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ σμικροῦ ἐστι τό γε ἐλάχιστον, ἀλλ’ ἔλασσον ἀεί. τὸ γὰρ ἐὸν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ οὐκ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ μεγάλου ἀεί ἐστι μεῖζον. καὶ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ σμικρῷ πλῆθος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸ δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστι καὶ μέγα καὶ σμικρόν.

16. καὶ ὅτε δὲ ἴσαι μοῖραί εἰσι τοῦ τε μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλῆθος, καὶ οὕτως ἂν εἴη ἐν παντὶ πάντα. οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἔστιν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πάντα παντὸς μοῖραν μετέχει. ὅτε τοὐλάχιστον μὴ ἔστιν εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο χωρισθῆναι, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ γενέσθαι· ἀλλ’ ὅπωσπερ ἀρχὴν εἶναι καὶ νῦν, πάντα ὁμοῦ. ἐν πᾶσι δὲ πολλὰ ἔνεστι, καὶ τῶν ἀποκρινομένων ἴσα πλῆθος ἐν τοῖς μείζοσί τε καὶ ἐλάσσοσι.

17. τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες· οὐδὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεται οὐδὲ ἀπόλλυται, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ἐόντων χρημάτων συμμίσγεταί τε καὶ διακρίνεται. καὶ οὕτως ἂν ὀρθῶς καλοῖεν τό τε γίνεσθαι συμμίσγεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἀπόλλυσθαι διακρίνεσθαι.

(18.) πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ μὴ τριχὸς γίνοιτο θρὶξ καὶ σὰρξ ἐκ μὴ σαρκός;

_Sources and Critical Notes._

1. Simpl. _Phys._ 33 v 155, 26. (First clause 8 r 34, 20, and 37 r 172, 2.)

34, 20 and 172, 2 πάντα χρήματα. 155, 28. a_D_ εὔδηλον, Text
from _DE_.

2. Simpl. _Phys._ 33 v 155, 31.

155, 31. a_D_ ὁ ἀήρ τε καὶ ὁ αἰθὴρ, Text follows _EF_.

4. Simpl. _Phys._ 33 v 156, 4. (8 r 34, 21 substitutes for the last line a paraphrase of Fr. 3.)

34, 21 inserts ταῦτα after ἀποκριθῆναι. 34, 24 καὶ τῆς, Text
from 156, 7.

3. Simpl. _Phys._ 8 r 34, 29. 33 v 156, 2. 33 v 157, 9. (Cf. p. 34, 25 at end of Fr. 4.)

10. Simpl. _Phys._ 8 r 35, 3. 33 v 157, 9 (continuing Fr. 3). Simpl. _de coelo._

157, 12. συνημμένας, Text from 35, 4. 157, 13. ἥλιον ... αὐτοῖς
ἐνεῖναι. 35, 7. _E_ τὰσωνήιστα, a_F_ τὰ ὀνιστὰ, Text from 157,
15. 35, 8. (ταῦτα ... ἄλλῃ) is omitted at 157, 16.

11. Simpl. _Phys._ 8 r 35, 14.

35, 16. _DE_ χρήματα. 17. _DE_ νοῦν.

14. Simpl. _Phys._ 33 v 156, 10.

_DE_ τὰ πάντα, Text from a_F_.

5. Simpl. _Phys._ 35 r 164, 23.

6. Simpl. _Phys._ 35 v 164, 24 τὰ μὲν ... μέμικται οὐδενί, and 33 r 156, 13, beginning νοῦς δέ ἐστιν. _Phys._ 156, 13 cf. 67 v 301, 5, and 38 v 176, 32 (37 r 174, 16). _Phys._ 156, 19 cf. 38 v 176, 34. _Phys._ 156, 24 cf. 35 v 165, 31 and 37 r 174, 7. _Phys._ 157, 2 cf. 37 r 175, 11 and 38 v 176, 24. _Phys._ 157, 3 cf. 35 v 165, 14. _Phys._ 157, 4 cf. 35 v 165, 3.

156, 15. 176, 34 ἐπ’ ἐωυτοῦ: _D_ ἀλλὰ τέω, _E_ ἀλλὰ τέως,
_F_ ἀλλ’, Text from a. 156, 16. _DEF_ μετεῖχε μὲν, Text from
a. 156, 17. Refers to Fr. 5. a_EF_ ἀνεκώλυεν, Text from _D_.
156, 20. ἴσχει. 177, 1 ἔχει. 156, 21. a_DF_ omit καὶ before
ὅσα, Text from _E_ and 177, 2. 177, 2 τὰ μείζω καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσω.
156, 22. _ED_¹ περιχωρήσεως, Text from a_D_²_F_. 177, 3 omits
ὥστε—ἐπὶ πλέον. 156, 23. _E_ omits τοῦ before σμικροῦ. a_F_
περιχωρῆσαι, Text from _DE_. 156, 26. 165, 33 καὶ ὁπόσα νῦν
ἐστι καὶ ἔσται, 177, 5. ἅσσα νῦν μὴ ἔστι. 157, 3. 165, 15.
After ὅμοιον οὐδενὶ the words ἑτέρῳ ἀπείρων ὄντων should
probably be ascribed to Simpl. 157, 4. _DE_ ἀλλ’ ὅτω, _F_ ἄλλω
τῶ: _F_ τὰ πλεῖστα (also 165, 3), Text from a_DE_.

7. Simpl. _Phys._ 66 r; 300, 31. 33. _DE_ καὶ, a_F_ omit.

8. Simpl. _Phys._ 38 r; 179, 3. Cf. _Dox._ 562, 3.

4. 179, 4 Diels would supply τὸ before διερὸν and ψυχρὸν. 5.
From _Dox._ 562 add ἡ γῆ ... τὸ λαμπρὸν.

9. Simpl. _Phys._ 38 r 179, 8. In part 33 r 155, 21. Cf. 106 v 460, 13-14. 155, 22. λίθοι συμπήγνυνται.

12. Simpl. _Phys._ 33 r 157, 7. Simpl. ὅσα ἐστί τε, corr. Diels: πολλὰ περιέχοντι, corr. Diels; cf. p. 155, 31: προσκριθεῖσι ... ἀποκρινομένοις, corr. Diels; cf. 156, 28.

13. Simpl. _Phys._ 37 r 175, 12 beginning with οὐδέ. To πελέκει, 38 v 176, 29.

15. Simpl. _Phys._ 35 v 164, 17. Cf. 35 r 166, 15.

164, 17. MS. τὸ μή, Zeller, _Phil. Gr._ i.⁴, 884 n. 3 τομῇ.
After εἶναι Schorn inserts οὔτε τὸ μέγιστον, comparing previous
line and 166, 16.

16. Simpl. _Phys._ 35 v 164, 24.

17. Simpl. _Phys._ 34 v 163, 20.

18. Schol. in Gregor. Naz. Migne 36, 911. (Cf. _Hermes_ xiii. 4, Diels.)

TRANSLATION.

1. All things were together, infinite both in number and in smallness; for the small also was infinite. And when they were all together, nothing was clear and distinct because of their smallness; for air and aether comprehended all things, both being infinite; for these are present in everything, and are greatest both as to number and as to greatness.

2. For air and aether are separated from the surrounding mass; and the surrounding (mass) is infinite in quantity.

4. But before these were separated, when all things were together, not even was any colour clear and distinct; for the mixture of all things prevented it, the mixture of moist and dry, of the warm and the cold, and of the bright and the dark (since much earth was present), and of germs infinite in number, in no way like each other; for none of the other things at all resembles the one the other.

3. And since these things are so, it is necessary to think that in all the objects that are compound there existed many things of all sorts, and germs of all objects, having all sorts of forms and colours and tastes.

10. And men were constituted, and the other animals, as many as have life. And the men have inhabited cities and works constructed as among us, and they have sun and moon and other things as among us; and the earth brings forth for them many things of all sorts, of which they carry the most serviceable into the house and use them. These things then I have said concerning the separation, that not only among us would the separation take place, but elsewhere too.

11. So these things rotate and are separated by force and swiftness. And the swiftness produces force; and their swiftness is in no way like the swiftness of the things now existing among men, but it is certainly many times as swift.

14. When they are thus distinguished, it is necessary to recognise that they all become no fewer and no more. For it is impossible that more than all should exist, but all are always equal.

5. In all things there is a portion of everything except mind; and there are things in which there is mind also.

6. Other things include a portion of everything, but mind is infinite and self-powerful and mixed with nothing, but it exists alone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would include parts of all things, if it were mixed with anything; for a portion of everything exists in everything, as has been said by me before, and things mingled with it would prevent it from having power over anything in the same way that it does now that it is alone by itself. For it is the most rarefied of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge in regard to everything and the greatest power; over all that has life, both greater and less, mind rules. And mind ruled the rotation of the whole, so that it set it in rotation in the beginning. First it began the rotation from a small beginning, then more and more was included in the motion, and yet more will be included. Both the mixed and the separated and distinct, all things mind recognised. And whatever things were to be, and whatever things were, as many as are now, and whatever things shall be, all these mind arranged in order; and it arranged that rotation, according to which now rotate stars and sun and moon and air and aether, now that they are separated. Rotation itself caused the separation, and the dense is separated from the rare, the warm from the cold, the bright from the dark, the dry from the moist. And there are many portions of many things. Nothing is absolutely separated nor distinct, one thing from another, except mind. All mind is of like character, both the greater and the smaller. But nothing different is like anything else, but in whatever object there are the most, each single object is and was most distinctly these things.[87]

7. And when mind began to set things in motion, there was separation from everything that was in motion, and however much mind set in motion, all this was made distinct. The rotation of the things that were moved and made distinct caused them to be yet more distinct.

8. The dense, the moist, the cold, the dark, collected there where now is the earth; the rare, the warm, the dry, the bright, departed toward the farther part of the aether.

9. Earth is condensed out of these things that are separated. For water is separated from the clouds, and earth from the water; and from the earth stones are condensed by cold; and these are separated farther from water.[88]

12. But mind, as it always has been, especially now also is where all other things are, in the surrounding mass, and in the things that were separated, and in the things that are being separated.

13. Things in the one universe are not divided from each other, nor yet are they cut off with an axe, neither hot from cold, nor cold from hot.

15. For neither is there a least of what is small, but there is always a less. For being is not non-being. But there is always a greater than what is great. And it is equal to the small in number; but with reference to itself each thing is both small and great.

16. And since the portions of the great and the small are equal in number, thus also all things would be in everything. Nor yet is it possible for them to exist apart, but all things include a portion of everything. Since it is not possible for the least to exist, nothing could be separated, nor yet could it come into being of itself, but as they were in the beginning so they are now, all things together. And there are many things in all things, and of those that are separated there are things equal in number in the greater and the lesser.

17. The Greeks do not rightly use the terms ‘coming into being’ and ‘perishing.’ For nothing comes into being nor yet does anything perish, but there is mixture and separation of things that are. So they would do right in calling the coming into being ‘mixture,’ and the perishing ‘separation.’

(18.) For how could hair come from what is not hair? Or flesh from what is not flesh?

PASSAGES FROM PLATO REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

_Apol._ 26 D. He asserts that I say the sun is a stone and the moon is earth. Do you think of accusing Anaxagoras, Meletos, and have you so low an opinion of these men and think them so unskilled in letters as not to know that the books of Anaxagoras of Klazomenae are full of these doctrines? And forsooth the young men are learning these matters from me, which sometimes they can buy from the orchestra for a drachma at the most, and laugh at Sokrates if he pretends that they are his—particularly seeing they are so strange.

_Phaedo_ 72 C. And if all things were composite and were not separated, speedily the statement of Anaxagoras would become true, ‘All things were together.’

97 C. I heard a man reading from a book of one Anaxagoras (he said), to the effect that it is mind which arranges all things and is the cause of all things.

98 B. Reading the book, I see that the man does not make any use of mind, nor does he assign any causes for the arrangement of things, but he treats air and aether and water as causes, and many other strange things.

_Lysis_ 214 B. The writings of the wisest men say ... that it is necessary for the like always to be loved by the unlike.

_Hipp. Mai._ 283 A. They say you had an experience opposite to that of Anaxagoras; for though he inherited much property he lost it all by his carelessness; so he practised a senseless wisdom.

_Kratyl._ 400 A. And do you not believe Anaxagoras that the nature of all other things is mind, and that it is soul which arranges and controls them? (cf. _Phaedo_ 72 C).

409 A. It looks as though the opinion Anaxagoras recently expressed was a more ancient matter, that the moon has its light from the sun.

413 C. Anaxagoras is right in saying that this is mind, for he says that mind exercising absolute power and mingled with nothing disposes all things, running through all.

_Rival._ 132 A. But the youths seemed to be quarrelling about Anaxagoras or Oenopedos, for they were evidently drawing circles and imitating certain inclinations by the slope of their hands with great earnestness.

_Phil._ 28 C. All the wise men agree that mind is king of heaven and earth for us.

30 D. Some long ago declared that always mind rules the all.

_Legg._ 967 B. And some had the daring to conjecture this very thing, saying that it is mind which disposes all things in the heavens. And the same men again, being in error as to the nature of soul, in that it is older than bodies, while they regarded it as younger, to put it in a word, turned all things upside down, and themselves most of all. For indeed all things before their eyes—the things moving in the heavens—appeared to them to be full of stones and earth and many other soulless bodies, which dispose the causes of all the universe.

_Phaedr._ 270 A. All the arts that are great require subtlety and the higher kind of philosophy of nature; so such loftiness and complete effectiveness seem to come from this source. This Perikles acquired in addition to being a man of genius; for as the result, I think, of his acquaintance with such a man as Anaxagoras he became imbued with high philosophy, and arrived at the nature of intelligence [νοῦς] and its opposite, concerning which Anaxagoras often discoursed, so that he brought to the art of speaking what was advantageous to him.

PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

_Phys._ i. 4; 187 a 20. And others say that the opposites existing in the one are separated out of it, as Anaximandros says, and as many as say that things are one and many, as Empedokles and Anaxagoras; for these separate other things out of the mixture.... And Anaxagoras seems to have thought (the elements) infinite because he assumed the common opinion of the physicists to be true, that nothing arises out of non-being; for this is why they say, as they do, that all things were together, and he established the fact that such ‘arising’ was change of form.

_Phys._ i. 4; 187 a 36. They thought that (what arose) arose necessarily out of things that are and their attributes, and, because the masses were so small, out of what we cannot perceive. Wherefore they say that everything was mixed in everything because they saw everything arising out of everything; and different things appeared and were called different from each other according to what is present in greater number in the mixture of the infinites; for the whole is not purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but the nature of the thing seems to be that of which it has the most.

_Phys._ iii. 4; 203 a 19. And as many as make the elements infinite, as Anaxagoras and Demokritos, the former out of homoeomeries....

_Phys._ iii. 5; 205 b 1. Anaxagoras speaks strangely about the permanence of the infinite; for he says that the infinite itself establishes itself—that is, it is in itself; for nothing else surrounds it, so that wherever anything may be, it is there in virtue of its origin.

_Phys._ iv. 6; 213 a 22. Some who try to show that the void does not exist, do not prove this of what men are wont to call a void, but they make the mistake Anaxagoras did and those who attempted to prove it after this manner. For they show that air is something, blowing skins up tight, and showing how strong air is, and shutting it up in clepsydrae.

_Phys._ viii. 1; 250 b 24. For Anaxagoras says that when all things were together and had been at rest for an infinite time, mind introduced motion and caused separation.[89]

_Phys._ viii. 5; 256 b 24. So Anaxagoras is right in saying that mind is not affected by other things and is unmixed, since he makes it the first principle of motion. For thus only, being unmoved, it might move, and being unmixed, it might rule.[90]

_De caelo_ i. 3; 270 b 24. Anaxagoras does not use this word [αἰθήρ] rightly, for he uses the word aether instead of fire.

_De caelo_ iii. 2; 301 a 12. Anaxagoras starts to construct the universe out of non-moving bodies.

_De caelo_ iii. 3; 302 a 31. Anaxagoras says the opposite to Empedokles, for he calls the homoeomeries elements (I mean such as flesh and bone and each of those things), and air and fire he calls mixtures of these and of all the other ‘seeds;’ for each of these things is made of the invisible homoeomeries all heaped together. Wherefore all things arise out of these things; for he calls fire and aether the same. And since there is a peculiar motion of every material body, and some motions are simple and some complex, and the complex motions are those of complex bodies and the simple motions of simple bodies, it is evident that there will be simple bodies. For there are also simple motions. So it is evident what elements are, and why they are.

_De caelo_ iv. 2; 309 a 20. Some of those who deny that there is a void say nothing definite concerning lightness and weight, for instance Anaxagoras and Empedokles.

_Gen. corr._ i. 1; 314 a 11. Others assert that matter is more than one, as Empedokles and Leukippos and Anaxagoras, but there is a difference between these. And Anaxagoras even ignores his own word, for he says that he has shown genesis and destruction to be the same as change, but like the others, he says there are many elements.... Anaxagoras et al. say there are an infinite number of elements. For he regards the homoeomeries as elements, such as bone and flesh and marrow, and other things of which the part (μέρος) has the same name as the whole.

_De anima_ i. 2; 404 a 25. In like manner Anaxagoras says that soul is the moving power, and if any one else has said that mind moved the all, no one said it absolutely as did Demokritos.

_De anima_ i. 2; 404 b 1. Anaxagoras speaks less clearly about these things; for many times he rightly and truly says that mind is the cause, while at other times he says it is soul; for (he says) it is in all animals, both great and small, both honoured and dishonoured. But it is not apparent that what is intelligently called mind is present in all animals alike, nor even in all men.

_De anima_ i. 2; 405 a 13. Anaxagoras seems to say that soul and mind are different, as we said before, but he treats both as one in nature, except that he regards mind especially as the first principle of all things; for he says that this alone of all things is simple and unmixed and pure. And he assigns both to the same first principle, both knowledge and motion, saying that mind moves the all.[91]

_De anima_ i. 19; 405 b 19. Anaxagoras alone says that mind does not suffer change, and has nothing in common with any of the other things.

_De anima_ iii. 4; 429 a 18. It is necessary then that it be unmixed since it knows [νοεῖ] all things, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may rule, that is, that it may know [γνωρίζῃ].

_De part. anim._ iv. 10; 687 a 7. Anaxagoras says that man is the most intelligent of animals because he has hands.

_De plant._ i.; 815 a 16. Anaxagoras said that plants are animals and feel pleasure and pain, inferring this because they shed their leaves and let them grow again.

_De plant._ i.; 816 b 26. Anaxagoras said that plants have these (motion and sensation) and breathing.

_De plant._ i.; 817 a 26. Anaxagoras said that their moisture is from the earth, and on this account he said to Lechineos that the earth is mother of plants, and the sun father.

_De X. Z. G._ ii.; 976 b 20. Anaxagoras busying himself on this point, was satisfied with saying that the void does not exist, nevertheless he says beings move, though there is no void.

_Meta._ i. 3; 984 a 11. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae, who preceded him (Empedokles) in point of age and followed him in his works, says that the first principles are infinite in number; for nearly all things being made up of like parts (homoeomeries), as for instance fire and water, he says arise and perish only by composition and separation, and there is no other arising and perishing, but they abide eternal.

_Meta._ i. 3; 984 b 8. Besides these and similar causes, inasmuch as they are not such as to generate the nature of things, they (again compelled, as we said, by the truth itself) sought the first principle which lay nearest. For perhaps neither fire nor earth nor any other such thing should fittingly be or be thought a cause why some things exist and others arise; nor is it well to assign any such matter to its voluntary motion or to chance. Moreover one who said that as mind exists in animals, so it exists in nature as the cause of the universe and of all order, appeared as a sober man in contrast with those before who spoke rashly.

_Meta._ i. 4; 985 a 18. Anaxagoras uses mind as a device by which to construct the universe, and when he is at a loss for the cause why anything necessarily is, then he drags this in, but in other cases he assigns any other cause rather than mind for what comes into being.

_Meta._ i. 8; 989 a 30. And if any one were to assume that Anaxagoras said the elements were two, he certainly would assume it according to a principle which that one did not describe distinctly; nevertheless he would follow along a necessary path those who guided him. For though it is strange particularly that he said all things had been mixed together at first, and that they must first have existed unmixed because they came together, and because chance had not in its nature to be mingled with chance; and in addition to this it is strange that he should separate qualities and accidental characteristics from essences (for there is mixture and separation of these), nevertheless if any one should follow him and try to put together what he wanted to say, perhaps he would seem to speak in a very novel manner. For when nothing was separated, clearly it was not possible to say anything true of that essence, I mean to say that anything was white or black or grey or any other colour, but everything was necessarily colourless; for it might have any of these colours. In like manner it is tasteless, nor according to the same line of argument could it have any other of the like qualities; for it could not have any quality, or quantity, or anything. For then one of what are sometimes called forms would exist for it, and this is impossible when all things are mixed together; for it would have been already separated, and he says that all things are mixed together except mind, and this alone is unmixed and pure. It results from these views that he says the first principles are unity (for this is simple and unmixed), and what is different from unity, such as we suppose the undefined to be before it was defined and partook of any form. So he does not speak rightly or clearly, still he means something like those who spoke later and with greater clearness.

_Meta._ iii. 5; 1009 b 25. And he called to mind the saying of Anaxagoras that just such things as men assume will be real for them.

_Meta._ iii. 7; 1012 a 26. The thought of Anaxagoras ... that some things exist between contradictory propositions, so that all things are false; for when they are mixed together, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that there is nothing true to be said.[92]

_Meta._ x. 6; 1063 b 25. According to the position of Herakleitos, or of Anaxagoras, it is not possible to speak the truth.

_Ethic._ vi. 5; 1141 b 3. Wherefore they say that Thales and Anaxagoras and such wise men are lacking in intelligence, when they see them ignorant in things that are for their own advantage, and they say they know things extraordinary and wonderful and dreadful and divine, but these are of no use, because they do not seek human good.

_Ethic._ x. 9; 1179 a 13. And Anaxagoras did not seem to regard the rich man nor yet the powerful man as the happy one when he said he would not be surprised if any one appeared strange to the many; for these judge by what is outside, for that is all they can see.

PASSAGES IN THE DOXOGRAPHISTS REFERRING TO ANAXAGORAS.

Aet. _Plac._ i. 3; _Dox._ 279. Anaxagoras of Klazomenae declared that homoeomeries are the first principles of things. For he thought it most difficult to understand how anything should arise out of not-being, or perish into not-being. Certainly we take simple food of one kind, such as the bread of Demeter, and we drink water; and from this nourishment there are nurtured hair, veins, arteries, sinews, bones, and the other parts. Since these arise we must acknowledge that in the nourishment that is taken are present all realities, and from them everything will grow. And in that nourishment there are parts productive of blood and of sinews and bones and the rest; these are the parts that may be discovered by contemplation. For it is not necessary to perceive everything by sense, how that bread and water give rise to these things, but the parts may be discovered in them by contemplation. From the fact that parts exist in the nourishment like the things that are generated, he called them homoeomeries, and declared that they are the first principles of things; and he called the homoeomeries matter, but the active cause that arranges all things is mind. And he began thus: All things were together and mind arranged and disposed them. So we must assert that he associated an artificer with matter. i. 7; 299. Anaxagoras says that bodies are established according to first principles, and the mind of God arranged them and caused the generations of all things. i. 7; 302. The mind that made the universe is God. i. 14; 312. Anaxagoras: The homoeomeries are of many shapes. i. 17; 315. Anaxagoras and Demokritos: The elements are mixed by juxtaposition. i. 24; 320. (See p. 241. i. 29; 326.) Anaxagoras and the Stoics: Cause is not evident to human reason; for some things happen by necessity, and others by fate, and others by purpose, and others by chance, and others of their own accord. i. 30; 326. Anaxagoras: Origination is at the same time composition and separation, that is, genesis and destruction.

Aet. _Plac._ ii. 1; 327. The universe is one. ii. 4; 331. The universe is perishable. ii. 8; 337. Diogenes and Anaxagoras: After the universe arose and the animals were brought forth out of the earth, it tipped somehow of its own accord towards its south part, perhaps intentionally, in order that some parts of the universe might be inhabited and others uninhabited according as they are cold, or hot, or temperate. ii. 13; 341. Anaxagoras: The surrounding aether is of a fiery nature, and catching up stones from the earth by the power of its rotation and setting them on fire it has made them into stars. ii. 16; 345. Anaxagoras et al.: All the stars move from east to west. ii. 21; 351. Anaxagoras: The sun is many times as large as the Peloponnesos. ii. 23; 352. Anaxagoras: The solstices are due to a repulsion of the air towards the south, for the sun compressed it and by condensation made it strong. ii. 25; 356. Anaxagoras and Demokritos: The moon is a fiery solid body having in itself plains and mountains and valleys. ii. 29; 360. Anaxagoras, as Theophrastos says, attributed eclipses to bodies below the moon which sometimes come in front of it.[93] ii. 30; 361. Anaxagoras says that the unevenness of the composition (the surface of the moon) is due to the mixture of earthy matter with cold, since the moon has some high places and some low hollows. And the dark stuff is mingled with the fiery, the result of which is the shadowy appearance; whence it is called a false-shining star.

Aet. _Plac._ iii. 1; 365. Anaxagoras: The shadow of the earth falls along this part of the heaven (the milky way), when the sun is beneath the earth and does not shed light on all things. iii. 2; 366. Anaxagoras and Demokritos: (Comets etc.) are due to the conjunction of two or more stars, and the combination of their rays. 367. The so-called shooting stars come darting down from the aether like sparks, and so they are immediately extinguished. iii. 3; 368. Anaxagoras: When the hot falls on the cold (that is, aether on air), it produces thunder by the noise it makes, and lightning by the colour on the black of the cloud, and the thunderbolt by the mass and amount of the light, and the typhoon by the more material fire, and the fiery whirlwind by the fire mixed with cloud. iii. 4; 371. Anaxagoras: Clouds and snow are formed in somewhat the same manner; and hail is formed when, already cooled by its descent earthwards, it is thrust forth from frozen clouds; and it is made round. iii. 5; 373. Anaxagoras: (The rainbow) is a reflection of the sun’s brightness from thick cloud, and it is always set opposite the star which gives rise to the reflection. And in a similar way he accounts for the so-called parhelia, which take place along the Pontos. iii. 15; 379. Anaxagoras: (Earthquakes take place) when the air falls on the thickness of the earth’s surface in a sheltered place, and it shakes the surrounding medium and makes it tremble, because it is unable to effect a separation. iii. 16; 381. Anaxagoras: When the moisture which was at first gathered in pools was burned all around by the revolution of the sun, and the fresh water was evaporated into saltness and bitterness, the rest (of the sea) remained.

Aet. _Plac._ iv. 1; 385. Anaxagoras: The Nile comes from the snow in Ethiopia which melts in summer and freezes in winter. iv. 3; 387. Anaxagoras et al.: The soul is of the nature of air. iv. 5; 392. The intelligence is gathered in the breast. The soul is imperishable. iv. 9; 396. Anaxagoras et al.: Sensations are deceptive. 397. Sensations arise part by part according to the symmetry of the pores, each particular object of sense corresponding to a particular sense (organ). iv. 19; 409. Anaxagoras: Sound arises when wind falls on solid air, and by the return of the blow which is dealt to the ear; so that what is called an echo takes place.

Aet. _Plac._ v. 7; 420. Anaxagoras, Parmenides: Males are conceived when seed from the right side enters the right side of the womb, or seed from the left side the left side of the womb; but if its course is changed females are born. v. 19; 430. As Anaxagoras and Euripides say: Nothing of what is born dies, but one thing separated from one part and added to another produces different forms. v. 20; 432. Anaxagoras: All animals have reason that shows itself in activity, but they do not have a sort of intelligence that receives impressions, which may be called the interpreter of intelligence. v. 25; 437. Anaxagoras: Sleep is due to a weariness of the body’s energy; for it is an experience of the body, not of the soul; and death is the separation of the soul from the body.

Theophr. _Phys. opin._ Fr. 4; _Dox._ 479. Theophrastos says that the teaching of Anaxagoras is much like that of Anaximandros; for Anaxagoras says that in the separation of the infinite, things that are akin come together, and whatever gold there is in the all becomes gold, and whatever earth becomes earth, and in like manner each of the other things, not as though they came into being, but as though they were existing before. And Anaxagoras postulated intelligence (νοῦν) as the cause of motion and of coming into being, and when this caused separation worlds were produced and other objects sprang forth. He might seem, he says, to make the material causes of things taking place thus infinite, but the cause of motion and of coming into being one. But if one were to assume that the mixture of all things were one nature undefined in form and in amount, which he seems to mean, it follows that he speaks of two first principles, the nature of the infinite and intelligence, so that he appears to treat all the material elements in much the same manner as Anaximandros.

_Phys. op._ Fr. 19; _Dox._ 493. See Aet. ii. 29; _Dox._ 360, translated above, p. 255.