Chapter VIII: The Intervention of the Kaiser (1)

The Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace of Europe. One fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute. When peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight progress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of Austria on July 31 to discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian question, the Kaiser--like Brennus with his _vae victis_--threw his sword into the trembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace of the world.

Was it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the Rubicon, at whose fateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign without destroying that peace?

Our information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer at this time. Not only are the premises in dispute, but the inferences from admitted premises are too conflicting.

At the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered the Kaiser was in Berlin, and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in all that it portended. It was officially announced that he planned to attend the funeral in Vienna, but later the world was advised that he had suffered a "chill," which would prevent such attendance. Perhaps it was a diplomatic chill. He then left for Norway, where he remained in the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of July 26th, when he suddenly returned to his Capitol.

Evidently his return was unexpected, for we learn from a telegram from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that,

the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the German]
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the
Foreign Office _regrets this step which was taken on His
Majesty's own initiative_. They fear that His Majesty's
sudden return may cause speculation and excitement.

As the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian reply and its severance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already thrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is difficult to understand why the German Foreign Office should have felt that the very natural return of the Kaiser to his Capitol at one of the greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world should be regarded as giving rise to "speculation and excitement," especially as the President of the French Republic was hastening back to Paris.

The Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of the Kaiser's return suggests the possibility that the German Foreign Office, which had already made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis, did not wish the Kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert, as in the Moroccan crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace.

It felt that it had the matter well in hand, but never before did a foreign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results. From beginning to end every anticipation that the German Chancellor had was falsified by events. This discreditable and blundering chapter of German diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious Bismarck turn in his grave.

As appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, it was the confident belief of the German diplomats that "Russia will keep quiet during the chastisement of Servia," and that "France too was not at all in a position for facing the war."[58]

[Footnote 58: English _White Paper_, No. 32.]

When the full history of this imbroglio is written, it will probably be found that the extensive labor troubles in St. Petersburg, the military unpreparedness of Russia and France, and the political schism in England, then verging to civil war, had deeply impressed both Vienna and Berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon Europe with reference to Servia without any serious risk of a European war.

While for these reasons Germany and Austria may not have regarded such a war or the intervention of England therein as probable, yet the dual alliance recognized from the outset such a possibility. The uncertainty as to the Kaiser's attitude with respect to such a war may therefore explain the "regret," with which the German Foreign Office witnessed his sudden and uninvited return.

On his return the diplomatic negotiations, which had commenced with an _allegro con brio_, for a time changed under the baton of the Imperial Conductor into a more peaceful _andante_, until the Kaiser made one of his characteristically sudden changes of purpose and precipitated the war by an arrogant ultimatum to Russia, which that country could not possibly accept without a fatal sacrifice of its self-respect and prestige as a nation.

If it be true--and the future may demonstrate it--that this war was planned by Germany at least as far back as the Moroccan crisis, then the Kaiser's responsibility for the commencement of the quarrel cannot be doubted. It is inconceivable that the German Foreign Office could pursue for three years the policy of precipitating a European war without the knowledge and consent of the "Over War Lord."

When full data are accessible as to the importations by Germany in advance of the war, as to its withdrawal of foreign credits and placing of foreign loans, its sales of stocks by influential investors, and its importations on the eve of the war of horses and foodstuffs, a strong circumstantial case may be developed of a deliberate purpose to retrieve the Moroccan fiasco by an audacious _coup_ which would determine the mastery of Europe. The levy in 1913 of an extraordinary tax upon capital, which virtually confiscated the earnings of the German people for military purposes, adds much support to this contention. According to Giolitti, the former Italian Premier, Austria sounded Italy in August, 1913, as to its willingness to participate in a war against Servia.[59]

[Footnote 59: Giolitti Speech, Italian Chamber, Dec. 5, 1914.]

The inferences to be drawn from the Kaiser's personality are somewhat conflicting. Like all self-centered and highly neurotic personalities, his nature is essentially a dual one. This does not mean that he is in any sense a hypocrite, for one of the engaging features of his attractive personality has been the candor and sincerity which have marked nearly all his public acts. He has shown himself to be a man of opposite moods, and conflicting purposes, having almost as many public poses as he has costumes, and a strong desire to play as many varied _roles_ as possible on the stage of the world. Like Bottom in the _Midsummer Night's Dream_, he would play all parts from the "roaring lion" to the shrinking Thisbe.

The ruler who sent a sympathetic message to Kruger as an insult to England is he who shortly thereafter gratuitously submitted to Queen Victoria military plans for the subjugation of the Boers.

The ruler, who sent the _Panther_ to Agadir, later restrained his country from declaring war against England, when Lloyd George threw down the gauntlet in his Mansion House speech in the Moroccan crisis.

As preacher, the Kaiser exalted within sight of the Mount of Olives the precepts of Christian humility, and yet advised his soldiers, on their departure to China, to "take no prisoners and give no quarter." The most affable and democratic monarch on occasion will in another mood assume the outworn toggery of mediaeval absolutism. A democratic business monarch, and as such the advance agent of German prosperity, he yet shocks the common sense and awakens the ridicule of the world by posing as a combination of Caesar and Mahomet.

The avowed champion of Christianity, who has preached with the fervor of Peter the Hermit against the Yellow Race, he has nevertheless, since this war began, instigated the Sultan of Turkey to proclaim in the Moslem world a "holy war" against his Christian enemies.

Pacific and bellicose by turns the monarch, who throughout his whole reign has hitherto kept the peace of the world, has yet on slight pretext given utterance to the most warlike and incendiary statements.

How is it possible to draw any inference from such a personality, of whom it could be said, as Sydney Smith once said of Lord John Russell, that

there is nothing he would not undertake. I believe he would
perform an operation for stone, build St. Peter's, assume
(with or without ten minutes' notice) the command of the
Channel Fleet, and no one would discover from his manner
that the patient had died, that St. Peter's had tumbled
down, and that the Channel Fleet had been knocked to atoms.

We should therefore dismiss all inferences suggested by his complex personality and should judge him by what he did from the time that he suddenly arrived in Berlin on July 26th, until the issuance by his direct order of the fatal ultimatum to Russia.

Before proceeding to analyze the very interesting and dramatic correspondence, which passed between the rulers of Germany, England, and Russia--doubly interesting because of the family relationship and the unusual personal and cousinly intimacy of these dispatches--it is well to inquire what the Kaiser could have done that would have immediately avoided the crisis and saved the situation. So far as the published record goes, he did not send a single telegram in the interests of peace to his illustrious ally, the Emperor Francis Joseph.

Let us suppose that he had sent the following:

I have just returned to Berlin and find Europe on the verge
of war. I sympathize entirely with you and your country in
its demands upon Servia. I agree with you that the Servian
reply is not satisfactory. In accordance with the
obligations of our alliance, I shall in any event support
with the full power of the German sword the cause of
Austria. Servia has by its reply admitted its responsibility
for the murder of the Archduke and has unreservedly accepted
certain of your demands, and as to others has agreed to
submit them either to The Hague Tribunal for arbitration, or
to a concert of Powers. You will decide whether Austria is
satisfied to accept either of these suggestions, but as
England, France, and Russia have asked that time be granted
to consider a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the
difficulty, and as the questions reserved by Servia can be
used as the basis for further discussion without prejudice
to the rights of Austria, and as it is to the interest of
every country and the entire world that its peace should not
be broken unnecessarily, I shall be gratified if you can
agree that a reasonable time shall be granted as a matter of
courtesy to Russia, England, and France, in order that it
may be determined upon due consideration whether it is not
possible to preserve peace without sacrificing in any
respect the legitimate demands of Austria, which have my
full sympathy and support.

WILHELM.

Would the Austrian Emperor, himself a noble-minded and peace-loving monarch, have refused this reasonable request? A little time, a little patience and some forbearance for the rights of other States and the youth of Europe need not have perished. Again, "the pity of it."

In its place the following correspondence took place between the Kaiser on the one hand and the Czar and King George on the other. It is so dramatic that it justifies quotation _in extenso_.

On the night of July 28th, the Kaiser sent the following dispatch to the Czar:

I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression
which is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against
Servia. The unscrupulous agitation which has been going on
for years in Servia has led to the revolting crime of which
Archduke Franz Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit
which made the Servians murder their own King and his
consort still dominates that country. Doubtless You will
agree with me that both of us, You as well as I, and all
other sovereigns, have a common interest to insist that all
those who are responsible for this horrible murder shall
suffer their deserved punishment.

On the other hand I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by You and Your Government to stem the tide of
public opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has
joined us both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use
my entire influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a
frank and satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope
confidently that You will support me in my efforts to
overcome all difficulties which may yet arise.[60]

[Footnote 60: German _White Paper_, No. 20. The Capitals to the pronouns follow the original correspondence.]

This telegram rings true, and fairly suggests a pacific attitude on the part of the Kaiser when he first took the helm on his return from Norway. Its weakness lies in the fact that the record, as presented by the German Government, does not disclose any communication which he sent to his Austrian ally in the interests of peace. We have the frequent assurances of the Kaiser to the Czar that he was exerting all his influence to induce his ally to come to a satisfactory understanding with Russia, _but neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace_.

The Czar did not fail to appreciate this, and his reply to the Kaiser rings quite as true and suggests the crux of the whole problem. It reads:

I am glad that You are back in Germany. In this serious
moment I ask You earnestly to help me. An ignominious war
has been declared against a weak country, and in Russia the
indignation, which I fully share, is tremendous. I fear that
very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised
upon me and that I shall be forced to take measures which
will lead to war. To prevent such a calamity as a European
war would be, I urge You in the name of our old friendship
to do all in Your power _to restrain Your ally from going
too far_.[61]

[Footnote 61: German _White Paper_, No. 21.]

Who can deny the force of the sentence thus italicized? It was Austria which was the provocative factor. It was then bombarding Belgrade and endeavoring to cross the Danube into Servia. It had declared war, and brusquely refused even to discuss the question with Russia. It was mobilizing its army, and making every effort to make a speedy subjugation of Servia. If peace was to be preserved, the pressure must begin with Austria. If any question remained for peace parleys, the _status quo_ must be preserved. Russia could not permit Austria to destroy Servia first and then discuss its justice.

Thereupon the Kaiser telegraphed the Czar as follows:

I have received Your telegram and I share Your desire for
the conservation of peace. However I cannot--as I told You
in my first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary
as an "ignominious war." Austria-Hungary knows from
experience that the promises of Servia as long as they are
merely on paper are entirely unreliable.

According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to
be considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that
the promises of Servia are effectively translated into
deeds. In this opinion I am strengthened by the explanation
of the Austrian Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no
territorial gain at the expense of Servia. I am therefore
of opinion that it is perfectly possible for Russia to
remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without drawing
Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen. I
believe that a direct understanding is possible and
desirable between Your Government and Vienna, an
understanding which--as I have already telegraphed You--my
Government endeavors to aid with all possible effort.
Naturally military measures by Russia, which might be
construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary, would accelerate a
calamity which both of us desire to avoid and would
undermine my position as mediator which--upon Your appeal to
my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted.[62]

[Footnote 62: German _White Paper_, No. 22. See note, _post._, p. 189.]

The Kaiser's fatal error lies in the concluding paragraph of this telegram, in claiming that Russia should not take any military measures pending the Kaiser's mediation, _although Austria should be left free not merely to make such preparations against Russia, but to pursue its aggressive war then already commenced against Servia_. If the belligerents were expected to desist from military preparations, should not the obligation be reciprocal?

Later that night the Kaiser again telegraphed the Czar:

My Ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of
Your Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
mobilization; I have told You the same in my last telegram.
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Servia, and only
a part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case
according to Your advice and that of Your Government,
mobilizes against Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator,
with which You have entrusted me in such friendly manner
and which I have accepted upon Your express desire, is
threatened if not made impossible. The entire weight of
decision now rests upon Your shoulders. You have to bear the
responsibility for war or peace.[63]

[Footnote 63: German _White Paper_, No. 23.]

To which the Czar replied as follows:

I thank You from my heart for Your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser)
with instructions. The military measures now taking form
were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of
defense against the preparations of Austria. I hope with all
my heart that these measures will not influence in any
manner Your position as mediator which I appraise very
highly. _We need Your strong pressure upon Austria so that
an understanding can be arrived at with us._[64]

[Footnote 64: German _White Paper_, No. 23 A.]

Later the Czar again telegraphed the Kaiser:

I thank You cordially for Your mediation which permits the
hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is
technically impossible to discontinue our military
preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian
mobilization. It is far from us to want war. _As long as the
negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops
will undertake no provocative action. I give You my solemn
word thereon._ I confide with all my faith in the grace of
God, and I hope for the success of Your mediation in Vienna
for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe.

What more could the Kaiser reasonably ask? Here was an assurance from the ruler of a great nation, and his royal cousin, that on his "solemn word" no provocative action would be taken by Russia "as long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue" and this notwithstanding the fact that Austria had flouted and ignored Russia, had declared war against Servia and was then endeavoring to subjugate it quickly by bombarding its capital and invading its territory with superior forces.

It is true that the Czar did not order demobilization, and apart from his unquestioned right to prepare for eventualities in the event of the failure of the peace parleys, the Kaiser himself recognized in a later telegram that in the case of Germany when mobilization had once been started it could not be immediately arrested.

Simultaneously King George had telegraphed the Kaiser through Prince Henry as follows:

Thanks for Your telegram; so pleased to hear of William's
efforts to concert with Nicky to maintain peace. Indeed I am
earnestly desirous that such an irreparable disaster as a
European war should be averted. My Government is doing its
utmost suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further
military preparations if Austria will consent to be
satisfied with occupation of Belgrade and neighboring
Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement
of her demands; other countries meanwhile suspending their
war preparations. Trust William will use his great influence
to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that
Germany and England are working together to prevent what
would be an international catastrophe. Pray assure William I
am doing and shall continue to do all that lies in my power
to preserve peace of Europe.[65]

[Footnote 65: Second German _White Paper_.]

The fairness of this proposal can hardly be disputed. It conceded to Austria the right to occupy the capital of Servia and hold it as a hostage for a satisfactory adjustment of her demands and even to continue her military preparations, while all other nations, including Russia, were to suspend their military preparations. As the Kaiser precipitated the war because Russia would not cease its preparations for eventualities, King George's proposal, upon which neither the Kaiser nor his government ever acted, fully met his demands.

To this the Kaiser replied on July 31st:

Many thanks for kind telegram. Your proposals coincide with
My ideas and with the statements I got this night from
Vienna which I have had forwarded to London. I just received
news from Chancellor that official notification has just
reached him that this night Nicky has ordered the
mobilization of his whole army and fleet. He has not even
awaited the results of the mediation I am working at, and
left Me without any news. I am off for Berlin to take
measures for ensuring safety of My eastern frontiers where
strong Russian troops are already posted.[66]

[Footnote 66: Second German _White Paper_.]

On its face this reply seems not unreasonable, but it must not be forgotten that Austria continued not only to bombard Belgrade but to mobilize its armies against Russia as well as Servia. Russia agreed to stop all military preparations, if Austria would consent to discuss the Servian question with a view to peace. Austria until the eleventh hour--when it was too late--refused even to discuss the Servian question and never offered either to demobilize or to cease its attack upon Servia. Germany upheld her in this unwarrantable course.

While in principle the Kaiser agreed with the King as to the method of adjustment, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Kaiser ever made any suggestion to his ally that it should stop its operations against Servia after capturing Belgrade, and await the adjustment of the questions through diplomatic channels.

Thereupon King George sent a brief telegram, stating that he had sent an urgent telegram to the Czar urging this course. Later on July 31st the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Czar:

Upon Your appeal to my friendship and Your request for my
aid I have engaged in mediation between Your Government and
the Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was
taking place, Your troops were being mobilized against my
ally, Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already
communicated to You, my mediation has become almost
illusory. In spite of this, I have continued it, and now I
receive reliable news that serious preparations for war are
going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility for the
security of my country forces me to measures of defense. I
have gone to the extreme limit of the possible in my efforts
for the preservation of the peace of the world. It is not I
who bear the responsibility for the misfortune which now
threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in Your hand
to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia
which might well have awaited the success of my mediation.
The friendship for You and Your country, bequeathed to me
by my grandfather on his death-bed, has always been sacred
to me, and I have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in
serious affliction, especially during its last war. _The
peace of Europe can still be preserved by You if Russia
decides to discontinue those military preparations which
menace Germany and Austria-Hungary._

In this fair-spoken message we unhappily find no suggestion that Austria would stop its mobilization, or its military operations against Servia. The untenable position of the Kaiser, to which he adhered with fatal consistency to the end, was that Austria should be given the full right to mobilize against Russia as well as Servia, and that his ally should even be permitted to press its aggressive operations against Servia by taking possession of its capital and holding it as a ransom. In the meantime Russia should not make any military preparations, either to move effectually against Austria in the event of the failure of negotiations, or even to defend itself.

The Kaiser's suggestion did not even carry with it the implication that Germany would stop the military preparations that it was then carrying on in feverish haste, so that the contention of the Kaiser, however plausibly it was veiled in his telegram, was that _Germany and Austria_ _should have full freedom to prepare for war against Russia, while Russia was to tie its hands and await the outcome of further parleys, with Austrian cannon bombarding Belgrade_.

In this correspondence the Kaiser displayed his recognized ability as a writer and speaker, for in this rapid-fire exchange of telegrams the Kaiser was easily the better controversialist.

He assumed the role of a disinterested party, who, at the request of a litigant, agrees to become an impartial mediator. He was neither. The Czar had not asked him to be a mediator, although in the later telegrams the Russian monarch accepted that term. The Czar in his first telegram had asked the Kaiser as a party to the quarrel "to restrain your ally from going too far." The Kaiser, having adroitly accepted a very different role, promptly shifts the responsibility upon the Czar of embarrassing the so-called "mediation." This enabled him to assume the attitude of "injured innocence" and very skillfully he played that part.

This at least is clear that in this correspondence the Kaiser was either guilty of insincerity or he betrayed a fatal incapacity to grasp the essentials of the quarrel. I prefer the latter construction of his conduct. Against the bellicose efforts of his Foreign Office and his General Staff, I believe that for dynastic reasons he strove for a time to adjust the difficulty, but his egomania and his life-long habit of personal absolutism blinded him to the fact that he was taking an untenable, indeed an impossible, position, in contending that Russia should effectually tie its hands while Germany and Austria should be left free to prepare for eventualities. Had there been a breathing spell and the Kaiser had had more time for reflection, possibly the unreasonableness of his contention would have suggested itself, but he found on his sudden return from Norway that his country, through the fatuous folly of its military party, was almost irrevocably committed to war. Probably he did not dare to reverse openly and formally its policy. His popularity had already suffered in the Moroccan crisis. This consideration and the histrionic side to his complex personality betrayed him into his untenable and fatal position.

The Kaiser has hitherto been regarded as a man of exceptional ability. Time and the issue of this war will tell. The verdict of history may be to the contrary. The world for a time may easily confuse restless energy and habitual meddling with real ability, but its final verdict will go far deeper. Since the Kaiser dropped his sagacious pilot, Germany's real position in the world has steadily weakened. Then it was the first power in Europe with its rivals disunited. The Kaiser has united his enemies with "hoops of steel," driven Russia and England into a close alliance, forced Italy out of the Triple Alliance, and as the only compensation for these disastrous results, he has gained the doubtful cooperation of moribund Turkey, of which he is likely to say before many months are over: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

In the meantime, Germany was not idle in its preparations for eventualities.

The Kaiser and his counsellors were already definitely planning for the war, and were taking steps to alienate England from her Allies and secure her neutrality. To insure this, the German Chancellor, having visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, sent for the British Ambassador, and made the following significant offer:

[67]I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His
Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

[Footnote 67: Sir E. Goschen.]

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European
conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to
Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his
continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to
make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He
said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the
main principle which governed British policy, that Great
Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. _That, however, was not the
object at which Germany aimed._ Provided that neutrality of
Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given
to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed
at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,
should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and
he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in
that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency
said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the
integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was
ready to give his Majesty's Government an assurance that she
would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France
what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in
Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would
be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were
aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he
trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that
understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a
general neutrality agreement between England and Germany,
though it was, of course, at the present moment too early to
discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in
the conflict which the present crisis might possibly
produce, would enable him to look forward to a realization
of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's inquiry how I thought his
request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it
probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind
yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion
that you would desire to retain full liberty.[68]

[Footnote 68: English _White Paper_, No. 85.]

While the German Foreign Office was thus endeavoring to keep England neutral, its army was on the move against France. This does not rest upon vague allegation, but upon the detailed specifications in a communication from the French Foreign Office, which the French Ambassador in London submitted to Sir Edward Grey on July 31st. Its significance is apparent when it is remembered that simultaneously the Kaiser was invoking the Czar to demobilize his armies, and cease military preparations.

The German army had its advance posts on our frontiers
yesterday (Friday). German patrols twice penetrated on to
our territory. Our advance posts are withdrawn to a distance
of 10 kilometers from the frontier. The local population is
protesting against being thus abandoned to the attack of the
enemy's army, but the Government wishes to make it clear to
public opinion and to the British Government that in no case
will France be the aggressor. The whole 16th Corps from
Metz, reinforced by a part of the 8th from Treves and
Cologne, is occupying the frontier at Metz on the Luxemburg
side. The 15th Army Corps from Strassburg has closed up on
the frontier. The inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine are
prevented by the threat of being shot from crossing the
frontier. Reservists have been called back to Germany by
tens of thousands. This is the last stage before
mobilization, whereas we have not called out a single
reservist.

As you see, Germany has done it. _I would add that all my
information goes to show that the German preparations began
on Saturday, the very day on which the Austrian note was
handed in._[69]

[Footnote 69: English _White Paper_, No. 105 "Austrian" obviously means "Servian."]

In reply to the suggestion of the German Chancellor as to the neutrality of England, Sir Edward Grey advised the English Ambassador on July 30th, as follows:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while
French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as
Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the
colonies.

From the material point of view such a proposal is
unacceptable, for France, without further territory in
Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose
her position as a great Power, and become subordinate to
German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a
disgrace from which the good name of this country would
never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away
whatever obligations or interest we have as regards the
neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain
either.

Having said so much, it is unnecessary to examine whether
the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany offered positive advantages
sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must
preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem
to us to require in any such unfavorable and regrettable
development of the present crisis as the Chancellor
contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and
add most earnestly that one way of maintaining good
relations between England and Germany is that they should
continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe;
if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of
Germany and England will, I believe, be _ipso facto_
improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's
Government will work in that way with all sincerity and
goodwill.

_And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be
preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own
endeavor will be to promote some arrangement, to which
Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that
no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her
or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
separately._

This letter will give Sir Edward Grey lasting glory in the history of civilization. Its chivalrous fairness to France needs no comment, but its most significant feature is the concluding portion, in which the English Foreign Minister suggested to Germany that if peace could be preserved, England stood ready to join with Germany in an alliance which would have insured all the great European nations against any aggressive war on the part of either of them.

It was, in fact, the "United States of Europe" in embryo. It was the one solution possible for these long-continued European wars--essentially civil wars--namely an alliance by the six great Powers,--a merger of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente,--whereby any aggressive act on the part of any one of them would be prevented by the others. What an infinite pity that the imprudent act of the Kaiser, and the mad folly of his advisers probably made a fair trial of this most hopeful plan for the unification of Europe an impossibility for another century!

In order that Germany should have no excuse whatever to declare war on account of Russia's preparations, the Russian Foreign Minister saw the German Ambassador in St. Petersburg on July 30th, _and then offered on behalf of Russia to stop all military preparations_, provided that Austria would simply recognize as an abstract principle that the Servian question had assumed the character of a question of European interest. As this proposal fully met the demands of the Kaiser with respect to the cessation by Russia of military preparations, the conversation as reported by the English Ambassador at St. Petersburg to Sir Edward Grey on July 30th deserves quotation _in extenso_:

French Ambassador and I visited Minister for Foreign Affairs
this morning. His Excellency said that German Ambassador had
told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were
willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be
respected by Austria. To this he had replied that this might
be so, but nevertheless Servia would become an Austrian
vassal, just as, in similar circumstances, Bokhara had
become a Russian vassal. There would be a revolution in
Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of
Russian Government, that Germany was making military and
naval preparations against Russia--more particularly in the
direction of the Gulf of Finland.

German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for
Foreign Affairs at 2 A.M., when former completely broke down
on seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof
to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to German
Government as a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up
and handed to German Ambassador a formula in French, of
which the following is a translation:

"_If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has
assumed character of question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages
to stop all military preparations._"

Later in the day, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, the Russian Foreign Minister still further modified in the interests of peace the proposition upon which Russia was willing to cease all military preparations.

If Austria consents to stay the march of her armies upon
Servian territory, and if, recognizing that the
Austro-Servian conflict has assumed the character of a
question of European interest, she admits that the great
Powers examine _the reparation which Servia could accord to
the Government of Austria-Hungary without injury to her
rights as a sovereign State_ and to her independence--Russia
undertakes to maintain her expectant attitude.

It will be noted that this formula implied that Servia owed some reparation to Austria, and it did not bind Austria to accept the judgment of the Powers as to the character of such reparation.

It simply conceded to the Powers the opportunity to "examine"--not the original controversy between Austria and Servia--but what reparation could be made without a compromise of sovereignty and independence. Austria did not bind itself to do anything except to stay the advance of her army into Servia, while Russia agreed to desist from further preparations or mobilization.

Could the offer have been more liberal? In face of this assurance, how can the Kaiser or Germany reasonably contend that it was the mobilization of the Russian army which precipitated the war.

In the meantime Sir Edward Grey was working tirelessly to suggest some peace formula, upon which the Powers could agree. His suggestions for a conference of the four leading Powers of Europe, other than Russia and Austria, had been negatived by Germany on the frivolous pretext that such a conference was "too formal a method," quite ignoring the fact that its very formality would have necessarily given a "cooling time" to the would-be belligerents. Thereupon Sir Edward Grey urged that,

_the German Government should suggest any method by which
the influence of the four Powers could be used together to
prevent war between Austria and Russia_. France agreed.
Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method
that Germany could suggest if mine was not acceptable_. In
fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any
method that Germany thought possible _if only Germany would
"press the button" in the interests of peace_.[70]

[Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the German Ambassador in London and urged that Germany should,

_propose some method_ by which the four Powers should be
able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed
out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of
mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military
operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise
a mediation would only drag on matters _and give Austria
time to crush Servia_. It was of course too late for all
military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a
short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in
Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But
even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into
existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the
occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from
Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending
an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The only reply that England received to this reiterated request that Germany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was set forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey:

I was informed last night that they (the German Foreign
Office) had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in
reply to an inquiry from the French Ambassador as to whether
the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action,
_the [German] Secretary of State said that he felt that time
would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that
he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would
satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned._

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the
button" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure
whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at
Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than
otherwise.[71]

[Footnote 71: See English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

The Court of Public Opinion unfortunately is not favored in the German _White Paper_ with the text of its communication on this subject to Vienna, nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which the German Chancellor "pressed the button."

What the world knows without documentary proof is that Austria continued its military preparations and operations and that Russia then ordered a general mobilization. The only assurance which Russia received from Austria as a result of the alleged "pressing of the button" is set forth in the following dispatch from the Russian Ambassador at Vienna to Sazonof, dated July 31st:

In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange
views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist
on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of
Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in
regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity
for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and
of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would constitute
a certain guarantee for the future_.

This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise pacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by giving it "a serious lesson"--what such a lesson is let Louvain, Liege, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.

Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that Germany had declared that day the "_Kriegsgefahr_" and that the German Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis" was at an end. The British Ambassador then asked the Chancellor,--

whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities
at Vienna to do something in the general interests to
reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue
discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night
he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and
that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the
Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]

[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]

Here again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in which the Chancellor "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the Austrian Foreign Minister's reply.

While these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian Ambassador in Vienna advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined not to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as Servia."[73]

[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]

Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her army.

Concurrently with these interviews, the English Ambassador in Vienna had a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and

called his attention to the fact that during the discussion
of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of
Ambassadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia,
and that a compromise between the views of Russia and
Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.
Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not
regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him
any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present
case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the
Russian Ambassador, whom I have informed of the above
conversation.[75]

[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]

[Footnote 75: English _White Paper_, No. 118.]

Notwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs, Sir Edward Grey, that unwearying friend of peace, still continued to make a last attempt to preserve peace by instructing the British Ambassador in Berlin to sound the German Foreign Office, as he would sound the Russian Foreign Office,

whether it would be possible for the four disinterested
Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see
that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on
Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian
sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your
Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her
willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the
four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian
demands from going the length of impairing Servian
sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course
suspend further military operations or preparations.

He further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to advise the German Foreign Office that he, Sir Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the German Ambassador in London,

_that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put
forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were
striving to preserve European peace_, and that Russia and
France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, _I would
support it at St. Petersburg and Paris_, and go the length
of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it,
_his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with
the consequences_; that, otherwise, I told the German
Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn
in.[76]

[Footnote 76: English _White Paper_, No. 111.]

What, then, was the position when the last fatal step was taken? The Czar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should be taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in progress, and the Russian Foreign Minister had agreed to cease all military preparations, provided that Austria would recognize that the question of Servia had become one of European interest, and that its sovereignty would be respected.

On July 31st, Austria _for the first time_ in the negotiations agreed to discuss with the Russian Government the merits of the Servian note. Until this eleventh hour Austria had consistently contended that her difficulty with Servia was her own question, in which Russia had no right to intervene, and which it would not under any circumstances even discuss with Russia. For this reason it had refused any time for discussion, abruptly declared war against Servia, commenced its military operations, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few questions left open in the Servian reply as a basis for further peace parleys.

As recently as July 30th, the Austrian Government had declined or refused any "direct exchange of views with the Russian Government."

But late on July 31st, a so-called "conversation" took place at Vienna between Count Berchtold and the Russian Ambassador, and as a result, the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg was instructed to "converse" with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This important concession of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, who expressed

the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of
the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by
expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that
the discussions should take place in London with the
participation of the Great Powers.

M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would assume
the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe
would be thankful to them. It would be very important that
Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her
military action on Servian territory.[77]

[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]

_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place some time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St. Petersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that while Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the substance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession of its chief value.[78]

[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]

The cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at present writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria publishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.

Two theories are equally plausible:

Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to champion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified reversal of its bellicose attitude may have induced the war party at Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that event, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more iniquitous.[79]

[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]

The supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised from Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve the peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war inevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world would be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the attitude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more plausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the conflict.

_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that Austria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that a ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds, either on his own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military camarilla, directed the issuance of the ultimatum to Russia and thus blasted the last hope of peace.

On midnight of July 31st, the German Chancellor sent the following telegram to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and
although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no
measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire
army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also.
By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the
safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that danger of war
threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization.
Mobilization, however, must follow _unless Russia ceases
within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and
Austria-Hungary_ and gives us definite assurance thereof.
Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour
of its communication to him.

At midnight the fateful message was delivered. As Sazonof reports the interview:

At midnight the Ambassador of Germany declared to me, by
order of his Government, that if within twelve hours,
that is at midday of Saturday, we did not commence
demobilization, _not only in regard to Germany but also in
regard to Austria_, the German Government would be forced to
give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was
war the Ambassador replied in the negative, but added that
we were very near it.

It will be noted by the italicized portion that Germany did not restrict its demand that Russia cease its preparations against Germany, but it should also desist from any preparations to defend itself or assert its rights against Austria, although Austria had made no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its general mobilization order.

The twelve hours elapsed and Russia, standing upon its dignity as a sovereign nation of equal standing with Germany, declined to answer this unreasonable and most arrogant demand, which under the circumstances was equivalent to a declaration of war.

Simultaneously a like telegram was sent to the Ambassador at Paris, requiring the French Government to state in eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-German war.

The reasons given for this double ultimatum are as disingenuous as the whole course of German diplomacy in this matter. The statement that Germany had pursued any mediatory negotiations was as untrue as its statement that it had taken no measures for mobilization. Equally disingenuous was the statement with respect to the _Kriegsgefahr_ (state of martial law), for when that was declared on July 31st, the railroad, telegraph, and other similar public utilities were immediately taken over by Germany and the movement of troops to the frontier began.