Chapter X (1)

1. All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are either
covenant, counsel, or command. 2. The difference between a law
and a covenant. 3. The command of him whose command is law in
one thing, is law in every thing. 4. The difference between law
and counsel. 5. The difference between _jus_ and _lex_. 6. The
division of laws, &c. 7. That the divine moral law, and the law
of nature, is the same. 8. That the civil laws are the common
measure of right and wrong, &c. 9. Martial law is civil law. 10.
Written laws, &c. Unwritten, &c. Customs and opinions, &c.

[Sidenote: All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are
either covenant, counsel, or command.]

1. Thus far concerning the Nature of Man, and the constitution and properties of a Body Politic. There remaineth only for the last chapter, to speak of the nature and sorts of law. And first it is manifest, that all laws are declarations of the mind, concerning some action future to be done, or omitted. And all declarations and expressions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions, are either _promissive_, as _I will do, or not do_; or _provisive_, as for example, _If this be done or not done, this will follow_; or _imperative_, as _Do this, or do it not_. In the first sort of these expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second, consisteth counsel; in the third, command.

[Sidenote: The difference between a law and a covenant.]

2. It is evident when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another, should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is a declaration of a man’s own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ: and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a law, standeth thus: in simple covenant, the action to be done, or not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the promise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not to do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not done, followeth after.

[Sidenote: The command of him whose command is law in one thing, is
law in every thing.]

3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a _paradox, That the command of him, whose command is a law in one thing, is a law in every thing_. For seeing a man is obliged to obedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in general, that is to say, in every thing.

[Sidenote: The difference between law and counsel.]

4. That the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled, and that he who alloweth another to give him counsel, doth not thereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough. And yet men usually call counselling, by the name of governing; not that they are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy many times those men that are called to counsel, and are therefore angry with them that they are counselled. But if to counsellors there should be given a right to have their counsel followed, then are they no more counsellors, but masters of them whom they counsel; and their counsels no more counsels, but laws. For the difference between a law and a counsel being no more but this, that in counsel the expression is, _Do, because it is best_; in a law, _Do, because I have a right to compel you_; or _Do, because I say, do_; when counsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to, because the reason thereof itself is no more counsel, but a law.

[Sidenote: The difference between _jus_ & _lex_.]

5. The names _lex_ and _jus_, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded, and yet scarce are there any two words of more contrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth us, and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge one another’s liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different than restraint and liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a man doth, that liveth in a commonwealth _jure_, he doth it _jure civili_, _jure naturæ_, and _jure divino_. For whatsoever is against any of these laws, cannot be said to be _jure_. For the civil law cannot make that to be done _jure_, which is against the law _divine_, or of _nature_. And therefore whatsoever any subject doth, if it be not contrary to the civil law, and whatsoever a sovereign doth, if it be not against the law of nature, he doth it _jure divino_, by _divine right_. But to say, _lege divinâ_, by _divine law_, is another thing. For the laws of God and nature allowing greater liberty than is allowed by the law civil; for subordinate laws do still bind more than superior laws, the essence of law being not to loose, but to bind, a man may be commanded that by a law civil, which is not commanded by the law of nature, nor by the law divine. So that of things done _lege_, that is to say, by command of the law, there is some place for a distinction between _lege divinâ_, and _lege civili_. As when a man giveth an alms, or helpeth him that is in need, he doth it not _lege civili_, but _lege divinâ_, by the divine law, the precept whereof is _charity_. But for things that are done _jure_, nothing can be said to be done _jure divino_, that is not also _jure civili_, unless it be done by them that having sovereign power, are not subject to the civil law.

[Sidenote: The division of laws, &c.]

6. The differences of laws, are according to the differences, either of the authors and lawmakers, or of the promulgation, or of those that are subject to them. From the difference of the authors, or lawmakers, cometh the division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and _civil_. From the difference of promulgation, proceedeth the division of laws into _written_ and _unwritten_. And from the difference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth, it proceedeth, that some laws are called simply laws, and some penal. As for example, _thou shalt not steal_, is simply a law; but this, _he that stealeth an ox, shall restore four-fold_, is a penal, or as others call it, a judicial law. Now in those laws, which are simply laws, the commandment is addressed to every man; but in penal laws the commandment is addressed to the magistrate, who is only guilty of the breach of it, when the penalties ordained, are not inflicted; to the rest appertained nothing, but to take notice of their danger.

[Sidenote: That the divine moral law, and the law of nature, is the
same.]

7. As for the first division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and _civil_, the first two branches are one and the same law. For the law of nature, which is also the moral law, is the law of the author of nature, God Almighty; and the law of God taught by our Saviour Christ, is the moral law. For the sum of God’s law is, _Thou shalt love God above all, and thy neighbour as thyself_; and the same is the sum of the law of nature, as hath been showed, Part I. chap. V. And although the doctrine of our Saviour be of three parts, _moral_, _theological_, and _ecclesiastical_; the former part only, which is the moral, is of the nature of a law universal; the latter part is a branch of the law civil; and the theological, which containeth those articles concerning the divinity and kingdom of our Saviour, without which there is no salvation, is not delivered in the nature of laws, but of counsel and direction, how to avoid the punishment, which by the violation of the moral law, men are subject to. For it is not infidelity that condemneth, though it be faith that saveth, but the breach of the law and commandments of God, written first in man’s heart, and afterwards in tables, and delivered to the Jews by the hands of Moses.

[Sidenote: That the civil laws are the common measure of right and
wrong, &c.]

8. In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all things, that might fall in controversy. As for example; of what is to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what _meum_ and _tuum_, what a pound, what a quart, &c. For in these things private judgments may differ, and beget controversy. This common measure, some say, is _right reason_: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing to be found or known _in rerum naturâ_. But commonly they that call for _right reason_ to decide any controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing _right reason_ is not existent, the reason of some man or men must supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that have the sovereign power, as hath been already proved; and consequently the civil laws are to all subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the use and definition of all names not agreed upon, and tending to controversy, shall be established. As for example, when upon occasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be decided by Aristotle, or the philosophers, whether the same be a man, or no, but by the laws; the civil law containing in it the ecclesiastical, as a part thereof, proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical government, given by our Saviour to all Christian sovereigns, as his immediate vicars, as hath been said Part II. chap. VII. sect. 10.

[Sidenote: Martial law is civil law.]

9. But seeing it hath been said, that all laws are either natural or civil, it may be demanded, to which of these shall be referred that law, which is called martial law, and by the Romans, _disciplina militaris_? And it may seem to be the same with the law of nature; because the laws by which a multitude of soldiers are governed in an army are not constant, but continually changing with the occasion; and that is still a law, which is reason for the present, and reason is the law of nature. It is nevertheless true, that martial law is civil law, because an army is a body politic, the whole power whereof is in the General, and the laws thereof made by him; and though they still follow and change as reason requireth, yet it is not, as the reason of every private man, but as the reason of the General requireth.

[Sidenote: Written laws, Unwritten, &c. Customs, and Opinions, &c.]

10. When he or they in whom is the sovereign power of a commonwealth, are to ordain laws for the government and good order of the people, it is not possible they should comprehend all cases of controversy that may fall out, or perhaps any considerable diversity of them: but as time shall instruct them by the rising of new occasions, so are also laws from time to time to be ordained: and in such cases where no special law is made, the law of nature keepeth its place, and the magistrates ought to give sentence according thereunto, that is to say, according to natural reason. The constitutions therefore of the sovereign power, by which the liberty of nature is abridged, are written, because there is no other way to take notice of them; whereas the laws of nature are supposed to be written in men’s hearts. Written laws therefore are the constitutions of a commonwealth expressed; and unwritten, are the laws of natural reason. Custom of itself maketh no laws. Nevertheless when a sentence hath been once given, by them that judge by their natural reason, whether the same be right or wrong, it may attain to the vigour of a law; not because the like sentence hath of custom been given in the like case, but because the sovereign power is supposed tacitly to have approved such sentence for right, and thereby it cometh to be a law, and numbered amongst the written laws of the commonwealth. For if custom were sufficient to introduce a law, then it would be in the power of every one that is deputed to hear a cause, to make his errors laws. In the like manner, those laws that go under the title of _responsa prudentum_, that is to say, the opinions of lawyers, are not therefore laws, because _responsa prudentum_, but because they are admitted by the sovereign. And from this may be collected, that when there is a case of private contract between the sovereign and the subject, a precedent against reason shall not prejudice the cause of the sovereign; no precedent being made a law, but upon supposition that the same was reasonable from the beginning.

And thus much concerning the elements and general grounds of laws natural and politic. As for the law of nations, it is the same with the law of nature. For that which is the law of nature between man and man, before the constitution of commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

OF
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY:

A TREATISE,

WHEREIN ALL CONTROVERSY CONCERNING

PREDESTINATION, ELECTION, FREE-WILL, GRACE,
MERITS, REPROBATION, &c.

IS FULLY DECIDED AND CLEARED.

IN ANSWER TO A TREATISE
WRITTEN BY THE BISHOP OF LONDONDERRY,
ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

TO THE
SOBER AND DISCREET READER.

It made St. Chrysostom tremble whenever he reflected on the proportion, which those that went the _narrow_ way, bore to those which marched in the _broad_, how _many_ were the called, and how _few_ the chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a capacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This consideration certainly would make a man look upon the Holy Scriptures, among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of heaven, being all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor _man_ in so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery. But when a man cometh to look into those transcendant writings, he finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of several countries; that though they are all but necessary, yet were they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly, that their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to persuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither _see_, _hear_, nor _conceive_, before all the present enjoyments this world can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those who endeavour to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man, not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of those, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, and to make them fit meat for the people; how that instead of renouncing the world, they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions, leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people, to carry on designs and intrigues of state, and study the enjoyments of this world more than any other people: he will find some grounds to conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the world. The complaint is as true as sad; instead of acquainting the credulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited; they involve their consciences in the briars of a thousand needless scruples, they spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and accents, and raise endless controversies about things, (were men free from passion and prejudice), in themselves clear enough: and when they have canvassed their questions, till they are weary themselves, and have wearied hearers and readers, and all they have to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own apprehensions; so that after all their pains, bandings, and implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.

The controversies betwixt _Rome_ and the _Reformation_ are long since beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood; so that if we speak of _Protestant_ and _Catholic_, they are in a manner content to sit down with their present acquests: for as to conviction, he certainly is a rare _proselyte_, at whose conversion, _interest_, _humour_, _discontent_, _inclination_, are not admitted to the debate.

But to come yet nearer our purpose, let us consider our own fractions of fractions of _religion_ here in England, where if that saying, that _it is better to live where nothing is lawful, than where all things_, be as true in _religion_ as _policy_, posterity may haply feel the sad consequence of it. What, I pray, is the effect of so many _sermons_, _teachings_, _preachings_, _exercises_, and _exercising of gifts_, _meetings_, _disputations_, _conferences_, _conventicles_, _printed books_, written with so much distraction and presumption upon God Almighty, and abuse of his Holy Word? Marry this: it is the seminary of many vexatious, endless, and fruitless controversies, the consequence whereof are jealousies, heart-burnings, exasperation of parties, the introduction of factions and national quarrels into matters of religion, and consequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides, they are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of _citizens_, who contract diseases for want of motion; they supply the building of pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the people from matters of state, and consequently from rebellion.

They find work for _printers_, &c. if the parties interested are troubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to be scratched out of somewhat by way of contribution to the impression. Hence is the _stationer’s_ shop furnished, and thence the _minister’s_ study in the country, who having found out the humour of his auditory, consults with his stationer, on what books his money is best bestowed; who very gravely, it may be, will commend _Cole upon the Philippians_ before the excellent, but borrowed, _Caryl upon Job_. But as to any matter of conviction, we see every one _acquiesces_ in his own sentiments, every one hears the teacher who is most to his humour; and when he hath been at church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home and censures him as he pleases.

To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those vast and involuble volumes concerning _predestination_, _free-will_, _free-grace_, _election_, _reprobation_, &c., which fill not only our libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance, whereof the least thing we are to expect is _conviction_; every side endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in their hands as long as they can? What stir is there between the Molinists and Jansenists about _grace_ and _merits_; and yet both pretend St. Augustin!

Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end but to vindicate that reputation of learning they have obtained in the world, endeavour to make good their tenets, though the other were the truer opinion? Is truth then retired to that inaccessible rock that admits no approaches? Or are we all turned Ixions, and instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain ourselves with the _clouds_ of our own persuasions; of which unnatural coition, what other issue can there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions I shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great author, who answering the charge of _impiety_ laid upon the holding of necessity, says thus; _If we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is as men, whom either the study of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c._

Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he in so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous works of the _priests and ministers_, and that in points of soul-concernment and Christian interest, as _predestination_, _free-will_, _grace_, _merits_, _election_, _reprobation_, _necessity_, and _liberty_ of actions, and others, the main hinges of human _salvation_; and to do this, being a person, whom not only the averseness of his nature to engage himself in matters of controversy of this kind, but his severer study of the _mathematics_, might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; we may not stick to infer, that the _black-coats_, generally taken, are a sort of ignorant _tinkers_, who in matters of their own profession, such as is the _mending_ and _soldering_ of men’s _consciences_, have made more _holes_ than they found; nay, what makes them more impardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuity to acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been tampering about. I know this author is little beholden to the _ministers_, and they make a great part of the nation; and besides them, I know there are many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible spirits: yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may seem to some; that this book, how little and contemptible soever it may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it treats of, than all the volumes, nay libraries, which the _priests_, _jesuits_, and _ministers_ have, to our great charge, distraction, and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall undertake for any rational man, that all the controversial labours concerning religion in the world, all the polemical treatises of the most ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples, or dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever ache with turning them over; but he shall be so resolved in mind, as never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever become any of those enthusiastical _spiritati_, who, as the most learned Mr. White says, _expound Scripture without sense or reason_, and are not to be disputed with but with the same success as men write on sand, and trouble their neighbours with their dreams, revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No! here is solid conviction, at least so far as the metaphysical mysteries of our religion will admit. If God be _omnipotent_, he is _irresistible_; if so, _just_ in all his actions, though we, who have as much capacity to measure the justice of God’s actions as a man born blind to judge of colours, haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble his head, whether he be predestinated or no? Let him live justly and honestly according to the _religion_ of his _country_, and refer himself to God for the rest, since he is the potter, and may do what he please with the vessel. But I leave the reader to find his satisfaction in the treatise itself, since it may be I derogate from it by saying so much before it. This book, I doubt not, will find no worse entertainment than the _Leviathan_, both in regard of its bulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the _ministers_ and _Catholic_ party as that did. And yet here we must complain of want of sufficiency or ingenuity to acknowledge the truths or confute the errors of that book; which till it is done, we shall not count the author an heretic. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and slander cast on him in _sermons_ and private meetings, none hath put anything in print against him, but Mr. Rosse; one who may be said to have had so much learning, as to have been perpetually barking at the works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond seas I know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the _Catholics_; who building their _church_ on other foundations than those of the _Scriptures_, and pretending _infallibility_, _certitude_, and _unity_ in _religion_, cannot but be discontented that these prerogatives of religion are taken away, not only from _tradition_, that is to say, from the _church_, but also from the _Scriptures_, and are invested in the _supreme power_ of the nation, be it of what persuasion it will.

Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that thou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou must accordingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou hast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many thousand sermons and exercises; and more than the _catechisms_ and _confessions_ of a thousand _assemblies_ could furnish thee with: thou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the _cornered_ caps of _priests_ and _jesuits_, and all the _black and white_ caps of the _canting tribe_; to be short, thou art now acquainted with that man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou hast ever yet been acquainted with, what _profession_, _persuasion_, _opinion_, or _church_ soever thou art of; of whom and his works make the best use thou canst. Farewell.

pm hrdbl

TO THE
LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.

-------

RIGHT HONOURABLE,

I had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop’s objections to my book DE CIVE in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and afterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which, because I had never uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less. But seeing it was your Lordship’s and my Lord Bishop’s desire that I should begin with the _latter_, I was contented so to do, and here I present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment.

And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument neither from _Scripture_ nor from _reason_, that I have not often heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.

The _preface_ is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, _If I be free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause_: I deny that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one to say, _I was free_ to write it, and, _It was not necessary_ I should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is _free_ to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear, if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_ to do it, the action is necessarily to follow: and if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_ to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a _free agent_, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to his _will_; but, whether the _will_ to write, and the _will_ to forbear, come upon him according to his _will_, or according to anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this _liberty_, that I _can_ do if I _will_; but to say, I can _will_ if I _will_, I take to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause upon his _preface_.

In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of _liberty_, and says he meaneth not _liberty_ from sin, nor from _servitude_, nor from _violence_; but, from _necessity_, _necessitation_, _inevitability_, and _determination to one_.

It had been better to _define_ liberty, than thus to _distinguish_. For I understand never the more what he means by _liberty_; and though he say he means _liberty_ from _necessitation_, yet I understand not how such a _liberty_ can be, and it is a taking of the question without proof. For what is else the question between us, but whether _such_ a liberty be possible or not?

There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of _exercise only_, which he calls a _liberty of contradiction_, namely of doing not good, or evil _simply_, but of doing this or that good, or this or that evil _respectively_, and a _liberty of specification and exercise also_, which he calls a liberty of _contrariety_, namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not do this or that good or evil.

And with these _distinctions_ his Lordship says he _clears the coast_, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and the question, not only with the jargon of _exercise only_, _specification also_, _contradiction_, _contrariety_, but also with pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that the _liberty_ of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?

The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into _two_ squadrons, _one_ of places _of Scriptures_, the _other_ of _reasons_, which allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his _forces_ do look and _march_ another way, and some of them _fight_ amongst themselves.

And the first place of _Scripture_, taken from Numb. xxx. 13, is one of those that look another way; the words are, _If a wife make a vow, it is left to her husband’s choice either to establish it or make it void_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a _free_ and _voluntary agent_, but not that his _choice_ therein is not _necessitated_ or not _determined_ to what he shall choose, by precedent _necessary_ causes.

For if there come into the husband’s mind greater good by establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the husband’s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow: and yet in this following of one’s _hopes_ and _fears_, consisteth the nature of _election_. So that a man may both choose this, and cannot but choose this, and consequently _choosing_ and _necessity_ are joined together.

The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2 Sam. xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is _election_ in _man_, but not proved that such _election_ was not _necessitated_ by the _hopes_, and _fears_, and considerations of _good_ and _bad_ to follow, which depend not on the _will_, nor are subject to _election_. And therefore one answer serves all such places, if there were a thousand.

But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have done, that _necessity_ and _election_ might stand together, and instance in the actions of _children_, _fools_, or _brute beasts_, whose _fancies_, I might say, are _necessitated_ and _determined_ to _one_; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent that instance, and therefore says that the actions of _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, are indeed _determined_, but that they proceed not from _election_, nor from _free_, but from _spontaneous agents_. As for example, that the _bee_, when it maketh honey, does it _spontaneously_; and when the _spider_ makes his web, he does it _spontaneously_, but not by _election_.

Though I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_ do; yet that your Lordship may understand what can be meant by _spontaneous_, and how it differeth from _voluntary_, I will answer that _distinction_, and show that it _fighteth_ against its fellow arguments.

Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all _voluntary_ actions, where the thing that induceth the _will_ is not _fear_, are called also _spontaneous_, and said to be done by a man’s _own_ accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own accord, which in Latin is _sponte_, and therefore the action is _spontaneous_; though to give one’s money willingly to a thief to avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the motive is _fear_, be not called _spontaneous_. But every _spontaneous_ action is not therefore _voluntary_, for _voluntary_ presupposes some precedent _deliberation_, that is to say, some _consideration_, and _meditation_, of what is likely to _follow_, both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of; whereas many actions are done of our _own_ accord, and are therefore _spontaneous_, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never _consulted_ nor _deliberated_ in ourselves. As when making no question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are about is good, we _eat_ and _walk_, or in anger _strike_ or _revile_, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor elective actions, and with _such_ kind of actions, he says _necessitation_ may stand, but not with such as are _voluntary_, and proceed upon _election_ and _deliberation_. Now if I make it appear to your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from _spontaneity_, and which he ascribes to _children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, proceed from _election_ and _deliberation_, and that actions _inconsiderate_, _rash_, and _spontaneous_, are ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more thought as _wise_, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord Bishop’s argument concludeth, that _necessity_ and _election_ may stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all the rest of his arguments to prove.

And first your Lordship’s own experience furnishes you with proof enough, that _horses_, _dogs_, and other brute _beasts_, do _demur_ oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the spur. And what else doth a man that _deliberateth_, but one while _proceed_ toward action, another while _retire_ from it, as the _hope_ of greater _good_ draws him, or the _fear_ of greater evil _drives_ him away.

A _child_ may be so young as to do what it does without all _deliberation_, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod: for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be _deliberated_ on the second time.

_Fools_ and _madmen_ manifestly _deliberate_ no less than the _wisest_ men, though they make not so good a _choice_, the images of things being by disease altered.

For _bees_ and _spiders_, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not only _election_, but _art_, _prudence_, and _policy_, in them, very near equal to that of mankind. Of _bees_, Aristotle says, _their life is civil_.

Again, his Lordship is deceived, if he think any _spontaneous_ action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action _voluntary_ and _elective_: for even the setting of a man’s foot, in the posture for _walking_, and the action of ordinary _eating_, was once _deliberated_ of how and when it should be done, and though afterward it became _easy_ and _habitual_, so as to be done without _forethought_; yet that does not hinder but that the act is _voluntary_, and proceedeth from _election_. So also are the _rashest_ actions of _choleric_ persons _voluntary_ and upon _deliberation_: for who is there but very young children, that hath not _considered_ when and how far he _ought_, or safely _may_ strike or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such actions are _necessitated_, and the _fancy_ of those that do them _determined_ to the action they do, it follows out of his Lordship’s own doctrine, that the liberty of _election_ does not take away the _necessity_ of _electing_ this or that _individual_ thing. And thus one of his arguments fights against another.

The second argument from Scripture, consisteth in histories of men that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done another; the places are two: one is 1 Kings iii. 10, where the history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would, have asked _riches_, or _revenge_, did nevertheless ask _wisdom_ at God’s hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v. 4: _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_

To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former places, that they prove there is _election_, but do not disprove the _necessity_, which I maintain, of what they so elect.

The fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one answer) is to this effect; _If the decrees of God, or his foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi._

_That_ which I say _necessitateth and determinateth every action_, that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, _is the sum of all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now were wanting, the effect could not be produced_. This _concourse_ of _causes_, whereof every one is _determined_ to be such as it is by a like concourse of _former_ causes, may well be called (in respect they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things, God Almighty) the _decree_ of God.

But that the _foreknowledge_ of God should be a cause of any thing, cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they on it.

The _influence of the stars_ is but a small part of the whole cause, consisting of the concourse of all agents.

Nor does the _concourse of all causes_ make one simple _chain_ or concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together, not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on one single chain, but on many together.

_Natural_ efficacy of _objects_ does _determine voluntary_ agents, and _necessitates_ the _will_, and consequently the _action_; but for _moral_ efficacy, I understand not what he means.

_The last dictate of the judgment_, concerning the good or bad, that may follow on any action, is not properly the _whole cause_, but the last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect _necessarily_, in such manner as the last feather may be said to break a horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before as there wanted but that one to do it.

Now for his _argument_, that _if the concourse of all the causes necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true liberty_: I deny the consequence; for I make not only the _effect_, but also the _election_, of that particular effect _necessary_, inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more necessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature, whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have _election_, that is _liberty_, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his _will_ or _power_ to _choose_ his _fancy_, or choose his _election_ and _will_.

This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.

The arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth, and they fall both into one, namely: _If there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and reprehension, and reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust; and that if God should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief among them of heaven and hell_.

To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix. 20, 21. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is laid down the very same objection in these words: _When they_, meaning Esau and Jacob, _were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto her_ (_viz._ Rebecca) _that the elder should serve the younger_, &c. _What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up that I might show my power in thee, and that my name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth._ Thus you see the case put by St. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord Bishop, and the same objection in these words following:

_Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will?_

To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God’s _will_, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but thus: _Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour, another to dishonour?_ According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer my Lord’s objection, and say, the _power_ of God alone without other helps is sufficient _justification_ of any action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly _just_ or _unjust_, is not that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be measured or called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I say, in him, though not always just in us.

For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified his afflicting of him, by telling him of his _power_: (Job xl. 9:) _Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?_ (Job xxviii. 4): _Where wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like. So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the power of God might be shown in him. _Beasts_ are subject to death and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God’s will they should be so. _Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly_, in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by distinguishing between _will_ and _permission_, as that God Almighty does indeed sometimes _permit_ sins, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not _will_ it, nor _necessitate_ it.

I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the _action_, whatsoever action it be, but not the _sinfulness_ or _irregularity_ of it, that is, the _discordance_ between the _action_ and the _law_. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference between the _will_ to have a thing done, and the _permission_ to do it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an _action_ and the _sin_ of that action; as for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when _one_ is _cause_ both of the _action_ and of the _law_, how _another_ can be cause of the _disagreement_ between them, no more than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another’s law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other _distinctions_ can make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the _will_ and _purpose_ of God, or that proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto my Lord’s opinion: for I now hold nothing in all this question betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture.

-------

TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.

Of the arguments from _reason_, the first is that which his Lordship saith is drawn from Zeno’s beating of his man, which is therefore called _argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument. The story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his Lordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than drawn from the story.

The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it. But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is fit to be preached, but, what is true.

The first inconvenience he says, is this; _That the laws, which prohibit any action, will be unjust_.

2. _That all consultations are vain._

3. _That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use, than to children, fools, and madmen._

4. _That, praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, are in vain._

5, 6. _That counsels, acts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors, medicines, are in vain._

To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the means, adds, as it were a reply to my answer foreseen, these words: _Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive to make us use the means?_ Wherein his Lordship says right, but my answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer,

First, that the _necessity_ of an _action_ doth not make the _laws_, that prohibit it, _unjust_. To let pass, that not the _necessity_, but the _will_ to break the _law_, maketh the action _unjust_, because the _law_ regardeth the _will_, and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no _law_ can possibly be _unjust_, inasmuch as every man maketh, by his consent, the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself. I say, what _necessary_ cause soever precede an _action_, yet if the action be _forbidden_, he that doth it _willingly_ may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by the strength of temptation is _necessitated_ to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from theft? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame and make their wills to justice?

To make the _law_, is therefore to make a _cause_ of _justice_, and to _necessitate_ justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to make such a law.