Chapter IV: Part 4

_Soc._ What is the charge? Well, a very serious charge,
which shows a good deal of character in the young man, and
for which he is certainly not to be despised. He says he
knows how the youth are corrupted and who are their corruptors.
I fancy that he must be a wise man, and seeing
that I am the reverse of a wise man, he has found me out,
and is going to accuse me of corrupting his young friends.
And of this our mother the state is to be the judge. Of all
our political men he is the only one who seems to me to
begin in the right way, with the cultivation of virtue in youth;
like a good husbandman, he makes the young shoots his first 3
care, and clears away us who are the destroyers of them.
This is only the first step; he will afterwards attend to the
elder branches; and if he goes on as he has begun, he will be
a very great public benefactor.

_Euth._ I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that
the opposite will turn out to be the truth. My opinion is that
in attacking you he is simply aiming a blow at the foundation
of the state. But in what way does he say that you corrupt
the young?

[Sidenote: The nature of the charge against Socrates.]

_Soc._ He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which
at first hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or
maker of gods, and that I invent new gods and deny the
existence of old ones; this is the ground of his indictment.

_Euth._ I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you
about the familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes
to you. He thinks that you are a neologian, and he is going
to have you up before the court for this. He knows that
such a charge is readily received by the world, as I myself
know too well; for when I speak in the assembly about
divine things, and foretell the future to them, they laugh at
me and think me a madman. Yet every word that I say is
true. But they are jealous of us all; and we must be brave
and go at them.

_Soc._ Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of
much consequence. For a man may be thought wise; but
the Athenians, I suspect, do not much trouble themselves
about him until he begins to impart his wisdom to others;
and then for some reason or other, perhaps, as you say, from
jealousy, they are angry.

_Euth._ I am never likely to try their temper in this way.

_Soc._ I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour,
and seldom impart your wisdom. But I have a benevolent
habit of pouring out myself to everybody, and would even
pay for a listener, and I am afraid that the Athenians may
think me too talkative. Now if, as I was saying, they would
only laugh at me, as you say that they laugh at you, the time
might pass gaily enough in the court; but perhaps they may
be in earnest, and then what the end will be you soothsayers
only can predict.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro charges his father with murder._]

_Euth._ I dare say that the affair will end in nothing,
Socrates, and that you will win your cause; and I think
that I shall win my own.

_Soc._ And what is your suit, Euthyphro? are you the
pursuer or the defendant?

_Euth._ I am the pursuer.

_Soc._ Of whom?

_Euth._ You will think me mad when I tell you. 4

_Soc._ Why, has the fugitive wings?

_Euth._ Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life.

_Soc._ Who is he?

_Euth._ My father.

_Soc._ Your father! my good man?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ And of what is he accused?

_Euth._ Of murder, Socrates.

[Sidenote: The irony of Socrates.]

_Soc._ By the powers, Euthyphro! how little does the common
herd know of the nature of right and truth. A man
must be an extraordinary man, and have made great strides
in wisdom, before he could have seen his way to bring such
an action.

_Euth._ Indeed, Socrates, he must.

[Sidenote: _The murderer murdered._]

[Sidenote: Euthyphro is under a sacred obligation to prosecute a homicide, even if he be his own father.]

_Soc._ I suppose that the man whom your father murdered
was one of your relatives—clearly he was; for if he had been
a stranger you would never have thought of prosecuting him.

_Euth._ I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction
between one who is a relation and one who is not a relation;
for surely the pollution is the same in either case, if you
knowingly associate with the murderer when you ought to
clear yourself and him by proceeding against him. The real
question is whether the murdered man has been justly slain.
If justly, then your duty is to let the matter alone; but if
unjustly, then even if the murderer lives under the same roof
with you and eats at the same table, proceed against him.
Now the man who is dead was a poor dependant of mine who
worked for us as a field labourer on our farm in Naxos, and
one day in a fit of drunken passion he got into a quarrel with
one of our domestic servants and slew him. My father bound
him hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, and then sent
to Athens to ask of a diviner what he should do with him.
Meanwhile he never attended to him and took no care about
him, for he regarded him as a murderer; and thought that no
great harm would be done even if he did die. Now this was
just what happened. For such was the effect of cold and
hunger and chains upon him, that before the messenger
returned from the diviner, he was dead. And my father and
family are angry with me for taking the part of the murderer
and prosecuting my father. They say that he did not kill
him, and that if he did, the dead man was but a murderer,
and I ought not to take any notice, for that a son is impious
who prosecutes a father. Which shows, Socrates, how little
they know what the gods think about piety and impiety.

_Soc._ Good heavens, Euthyphro! and is your knowledge of
religion and of things pious and impious so very exact, that,
supposing the circumstances to be as you state them, you are
not afraid lest you too may be doing an impious thing in
bringing an action against your father?

_Euth._ The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes
him, Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all 5
such matters. What should I be good for without it?

[Sidenote: Socrates, who is accused of false theology, thinks that he cannot do better than become the disciple of so great a theologian as Euthyphro.]

_Soc._ Rare friend! I think that I cannot do better than be
your disciple. Then before the trial with Meletus comes on
I shall challenge him, and say that I have always had a
great interest in religious questions, and now, as he charges
me with rash imaginations and innovations in religion, I have
become your disciple. You, Meletus, as I shall say to him,
acknowledge Euthyphro to be a great theologian, and sound
in his opinions; and if you approve of him you ought to
approve of me, and not have me into court; but if you disapprove,
you should begin by indicting him who is my teacher,
and who will be the ruin, not of the young, but of the old;
that is to say, of myself whom he instructs, and of his old
father whom he admonishes and chastises. And if Meletus
refuses to listen to me, but will go on, and will not shift the
indictment from me to you, I cannot do better than repeat
this challenge in the court.

_Euth._ Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict
me I am mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court
shall have a great deal more to say to him than to me.

[Sidenote: _Socrates becomes the disciple of Euthyphro._]

[Sidenote: He asks, ‘What is piety?’]

_Soc._ And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of
becoming your disciple. For I observe that no one appears
to notice you—not even this Meletus; but his sharp eyes
have found me out at once, and he has indicted me for
impiety. And therefore, I adjure you to tell me the nature
of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well,
and of murder, and of other offences against the gods.
What are they? Is not piety in every action always the
same? and impiety, again—is it not always the opposite
of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety,
one notion which includes whatever is impious?

[Sidenote: Piety is doing as I am doing;—like Zeus, I am proceeding against my father.]

_Euth._ To be sure, Socrates.

_Soc._ And what is piety, and what is impiety?

_Euth._ Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting
any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any
similar crime—whether he be your father or mother, or
whoever he may be—that makes no difference; and not to
prosecute them is impiety. And please to consider, Socrates,
what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my
words, a proof which I have already given to others:—of
the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may
be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard
Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods?—and 6
yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because
he wickedly devoured his sons, and that he too had punished
his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless
manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they
are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way
of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am
concerned.

[Sidenote: Does Euthyphro believe these amazing stories about the gods?]

_Soc._ May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am
charged with impiety—that I cannot away with these stories
about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think
me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about
them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to
your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing
as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for
the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are
true.

[Sidenote: _What is piety?_]

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of
which the world is in ignorance.

_Soc._ And do you really believe that the gods fought with
one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like,
as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the
works of great artists? The temples are full of them;
and notably the robe of Athene, which is carried up to
the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered
with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?

[Sidenote: Yes, and things more amazing still.]

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you,
if you would like to hear them, many other things about the
gods which would quite amaze you.

_Soc._ I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other
time when I have leisure. But just at present I would rather
hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as
yet given, my friend, to the question, What is ‘piety’?
When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging
your father with murder.

_Euth._ And what I said was true, Socrates.

_Soc._ No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there
are many other pious acts?

_Euth._ There are.

_Soc._ Remember that I did not ask you to give me two
or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea
which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not
recollect that there was one idea which made the impious
impious, and the pious pious?

_Euth._ I remember.

_Soc._ Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then
I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which
I may measure actions, whether yours or those of any one
else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an
action is pious, such another impious.

_Euth._ I will tell you, if you like.

[Sidenote: A more correct definition:—Piety is that which is dear to the gods.]

_Soc._ I should very much like.

_Euth._ Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and
impiety is that which is not dear to them.

_Soc._ Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the 7
sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say
is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt
that you will prove the truth of your words.

[Sidenote: _The quarrels of the gods._]

_Euth._ Of course.

_Soc._ Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying.
That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and
that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious,
these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was
not that said?

_Euth._ It was.

_Soc._ And well said?

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.

_Soc._ And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to
have enmities and hatreds and differences?

_Euth._ Yes, that was also said.

[Sidenote: Differences about numbers and figures create no ill-will because they can be settled by a sum or by a weighing machine, but enmities about the just and unjust are the occasions of quarrels, both among gods and men.]

_Soc._ And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger?
Suppose, for example, that you and I, my good friend, differ
about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies
and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at
once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we
not quickly end the difference by measuring?

_Euth._ Very true.

_Soc._ And we end a controversy about heavy and light by
resorting to a weighing machine?

_Euth._ To be sure.

_Soc._ But what differences are there which cannot be thus
decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us
at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does
not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest
that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are
the just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable.
Are not these the points about which men
differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily
to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel,
when we do quarrel[13]?

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about
which we quarrel is such as you describe.

[Sidenote: _Would all the gods approve of Euthyphro’s conduct?_]

_Soc._ And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when
they occur, are of a like nature?

_Euth._ Certainly they are.

_Soc._ They have differences of opinion, as you say, about
good and evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable:
there would have been no quarrels among them, if there had
been no such differences—would there now?

_Euth._ You are quite right.

[Sidenote: Men and gods alike love the things which they deem noble and just, but they are not agreed what these are.]

_Soc._ Does not every man love that which he deems noble
and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?

_Euth._ Very true.

_Soc._ But, as you say, people regard the same things, some
as just and others as unjust,—about these they dispute; and
so there arise wars and fightings among them. 8

_Euth._ Very true.

_Soc._ Then the same things are hated by the gods
and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to
them?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will
be pious and also impious?

_Euth._ So I should suppose.

_Soc._ Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you
have not answered the question which I asked. For I
certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious
and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved
by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro,
in thus chastising your father you may very likely
be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to
Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but
unacceptable to Herè, and there may be other gods who
have similar differences of opinion.

_Euth._ But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be
agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there
would be no difference of opinion about that.

_Soc._ Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever
hear any one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer
ought to be let off?

[Sidenote: _Or condemn his father’s?_]

_Euth._ I should rather say that these are the questions
which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law:
they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which
they will not do or say in their own defence.

_Soc._ But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say
that they ought not to be punished?

_Euth._ No; they do not.

_Soc._ Then there are some things which they do not venture
to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty
are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not
be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer
is, and what he did and when?

_Euth._ True.

[Sidenote: Neither God nor man will say that the doer of evil is not to be punished, but they are doubtful about particular acts. What proof is there that all the gods approve of the prosecution of your father?]

_Soc._ And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert
they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say
while others deny that injustice is done among them. For
surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the
doer of injustice is not to be punished?

_Euth._ That is true, Socrates, in the main.

_Soc._ But they join issue about the particulars—gods and
men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some
act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed
to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?

_Euth._ Quite true.

_Soc._ Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for 9
my better instruction and information, what proof have you
that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of
murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man,
and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him
can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to
do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one
a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of
murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely
agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and
I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.

_Euth._ It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter
very clear indeed to you.

_Soc._ I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick
of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to
prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.

[Sidenote: _The priority of the act to the state._]

_Euth._ Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.

[Sidenote: Let us say then that what all the gods approve is pious and holy.]

_Soc._ But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are
a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind
while you were speaking; I said to myself: ‘Well, and what
if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the
death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of
the nature of piety and impiety? for granting that this action
may be hateful to the gods, still piety and impiety are not
adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is
hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and
dear to them.’ And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you
to prove this; I will suppose, if you like, that all the gods
condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend
the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is
impious, and what they love pious or holy; and what some of
them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be
our definition of piety and impiety?

_Euth._ Why not, Socrates?

_Soc._ Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned,
Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this
admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me
as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.

_Euth._ Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is
pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious.

_Soc._ Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro,
or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority
and that of others? What do you say?

_Euth._ We should enquire; and I believe that the statement
will stand the test of enquiry.

[Sidenote: But does the state follow the act, or the act the state?]

_Soc._ We shall know better, my good friend, in a little
while. The point which I should first wish to understand is
whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it 10
is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.

_Euth._ I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.

_Soc._ I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carrying and
we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing
and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a
difference, and you know also in what the difference lies?

_Euth._ I think that I understand.

[Sidenote: _The priority of the act to the state._]

_Soc._ And is not that which is beloved distinct from that
which loves?

_Euth._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this
state of carrying because it is carried, or for some other
reason?

_Euth._ No; that is the reason.

_Soc._ And the same is true of what is led and of what is
seen?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because
it is in the state of being led, or carried because it is in the
state of being carried, but the converse of this. And now I
think, Euthyphro, that my meaning will be intelligible; and
my meaning is, that any state of action or passion implies
previous action or passion. It does not become because it is
becoming, but it is in a state of becoming because it becomes;
neither does it suffer because it is in a state of suffering, but
it is in a state of suffering because it suffers. Do you not
agree?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ Is not that which is loved in some state either of
becoming or suffering?

_Euth._ Yes.

[Sidenote: The latter is the truer account, and therefore we can only say that what is loved by all the gods is in a state to be loved by them; but holiness has a wider meaning than this.]

_Soc._ And the same holds as in the previous instances; the
state of being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the
act the state.

_Euth._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not
piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?

_Euth._ No, that is the reason.

_Soc._ It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is
loved?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them,
and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of
them?

[Sidenote: _The essence and the attribute._]

_Euth._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is
not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you
affirm; but they are two different things.

_Euth._ How do you mean, Socrates?

_Soc._ I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged
by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy
because it is loved.

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them
because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is
dear to them.

_Euth._ True.

[Sidenote: What is the essential meaning of holiness or piety?]

_Soc._ But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the
same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it
is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been 11
loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God
is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy
would have been holy because loved by him. But now you
see that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite
different from one another. For one (θεοφιλὲς) is of a kind to
be loved because it is loved, and the other (ὅσιον) is loved
because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus you appear to me,
Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness,
to offer an attribute only, and not the essence—the attribute
of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to
explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you
please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell
me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear
to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will
not quarrel); and what is impiety?

_Euth._ I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what
I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever
ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away
from us.

[Sidenote: _Socrates ‘a greater than Daedalus.’_]

_Soc._ Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my
ancestor Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of
them, you might say that my arguments walk away and will
not remain fixed where they are placed because I am a
descendant of his. But now, since these notions are your
own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as
you yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.

_Euth._ Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the
Daedalus who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly,
but you make them move or go round, for they would never
have stirred, as far as I am concerned.

_Soc._ Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas
he only made his own inventions to move, I move those of
other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would
rather not. For I would give the wisdom of Daedalus, and
the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain them and keep
them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are
lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might
instruct me in the nature of piety; and I hope that you will
not grudge your labour. Tell me, then,—Is not that which is
pious necessarily just?

_Euth._ Yes.

[Sidenote: All which is pious is just:—is therefore all which is just pious?]

_Soc._ And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, 12
pious?

_Euth._ I do not understand you, Socrates.

_Soc._ And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am,
as you are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend,
the abundance of your wisdom makes you lazy. Please to
exert yourself, for there is no real difficulty in understanding
me. What I mean I may explain by an illustration of what
I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings—

‘Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things,
You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.’

Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what
respect?

_Euth._ By all means.

[Sidenote: We may say, e. g., that wherever there is reverence there will be fear, but not that wherever there is fear there will be reverence.]

_Soc._ I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and
disease, and the like evils, but I do not perceive that they
reverence the objects of their fear.

_Euth._ Very true.

_Soc._ But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has
a feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any
action, fears and is afraid of an ill reputation.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro in the hands of Socrates._]

_Euth._ No doubt.

_Soc._ Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear
there is also reverence; and we should say, where there is
reverence there is also fear. But there is not always reverence
where there is fear; for fear is a more extended notion,
and reverence is a part of fear, just as the odd is a part of
number, and number is a more extended notion than the odd.
I suppose that you follow me now?

_Euth._ Quite well.

_Soc._ That was the sort of question which I meant to raise
when I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the
pious always the just; and whether there may not be justice
where there is not piety; for justice is the more extended
notion of which piety is only a part. Do you dissent?

_Euth._ No, I think that you are quite right.

_Soc._ Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we
should enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry
in the previous cases; for instance, if you had asked me what
is an even number, and what part of number the even is, I
should have had no difficulty in replying, a number which
represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not
agree?

_Euth._ Yes, I quite agree.

[Sidenote: Piety or holiness is that part of justice which attends upon the gods.]

_Soc._ In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of
justice is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus
not to do me injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now
adequately instructed by you in the nature of piety or holiness,
and their opposites.

_Euth._ Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that
part of justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other
part of justice which attends to men.

_Soc._ That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little 13
point about which I should like to have further information,
What is the meaning of ‘attention’? For attention can
hardly be used in the same sense when applied to the gods as
when applied to other things. For instance, horses are said
to require attention, and not every person is able to attend
to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it
not so?

_Euth._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: _What is the meaning of attention?_]

_Soc._ I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the
art of attending to horses?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only
the huntsman?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman
is the art of attending to dogs?

_Euth._ Yes.

_Soc._ As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to
oxen?

_Euth._ Very true.

_Soc._ In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending
to the gods?—that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?

_Euth._ Yes.

[Sidenote: Attention to others is designed to benefit and improve them. But how are the gods benefited or improved by the holy acts of men?]

_Soc._ And is not attention always designed for the good or
benefit of that to which the attention is given? As in the
case of horses, you may observe that when attended to by the
horseman’s art they are benefited and improved, are they not?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman’s art, and
the oxen by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are
tended or attended for their good and not for their hurt?

_Euth._ Certainly, not for their hurt.

_Soc._ But for their good?

_Euth._ Of course.

_Soc._ And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to
be the art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them?
Would you say that when you do a holy act you make any of
the gods better?

_Euth._ No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.

_Soc._ And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I
asked you the question about the nature of the attention,
because I thought that you did not.

_Euth._ You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of
attention which I mean.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro grows impatient of the argument._]

[Sidenote: The attention to the gods called piety is such as servants show their masters.]

_Soc._ Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the
gods which is called piety?

_Euth._ It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their
masters.

_Soc._ I understand—a sort of ministration to the gods.

_Euth._ Exactly.

_Soc._ Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service,
having in view the attainment of some object—would you
not say of health?

_Euth._ I should.

_Soc._ Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder
with a view to the attainment of some result?

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.

_Soc._ As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder
with a view to the building of a house?

_Euth._ Yes.

[Sidenote: But in what way do men help the work of God?]

_Soc._ And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which
ministers to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish?
For you must surely know if, as you say, you are of
all men living the one who is best instructed in religion.

_Euth._ And I speak the truth, Socrates.

_Soc._ Tell me then, oh tell me—what is that fair work which
the gods do by the help of our ministrations?

_Euth._ Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.

_Soc._ Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But 14
the chief of them is easily told. Would you not say that
victory in war is the chief of them?

_Euth._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman,
if I am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of
food from the earth?

_Euth._ Exactly.

_Soc._ And of the many and fair things done by the gods,
which is the chief or principal one?

_Euth._ I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all
these things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply
say that piety or holiness is learning how to please the
gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices. Such
piety is the salvation of families and states, just as the
impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and
destruction.

[Sidenote: _Piety a science of asking and giving._]

_Soc._ I think that you could have answered in much fewer
words the chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you
had chosen. But I see plainly that you are not disposed to
instruct me—clearly not: else why, when we reached the
point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered me I
should have truly learned of you by this time the nature
of piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily
dependent on the answerer, whither he leads I must follow;
and can only ask again, what is the pious, and what is piety?
Do you mean that they are a sort of science of praying and
sacrificing?

_Euth._ Yes, I do.

_Soc._ And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is
asking of the gods?

_Euth._ Yes, Socrates.

_Soc._ Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and
giving?

_Euth._ You understand me capitally, Socrates.

_Soc._ Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary
of your science, and give my mind to it, and therefore
nothing which you say will be thrown away upon me. Please
then to tell me, what is the nature of this service to the
gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and give gifts
to them?

_Euth._ Yes, I do.

_Soc._ Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we
want?

_Euth._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: Men give to the gods, and the gods give to men; they do business with one another.]

_Soc._ And the right way of giving is to give to them in
return what they want of us. There would be no meaning
in an art which gives to any one that which he does not
want.

_Euth._ Very true, Socrates.

_Soc._ Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men
have of doing business with one another?

_Euth._ That is an expression which you may use, if you
like.

_Soc._ But I have no particular liking for anything but the
truth. I wish, however, that you would tell me what benefit
accrues to the gods from our gifts. There is no doubt about
what they give to us; for there is no good thing which they 15
do not give; but how we can give any good thing to them in
return is far from being equally clear. If they give everything
and we give nothing, that must be an affair of business
in which we have very greatly the advantage of them.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro is fairly puzzled._]

_Euth._ And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit
accrues to the gods from our gifts?

_Soc._ But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts
which are conferred by us upon the gods?

_Euth._ What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was
just now saying, what pleases them?

_Soc._ Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial
or dear to them?

_Euth._ I should say that nothing could be dearer.

_Soc._ Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is
dear to the gods?

_Euth._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: Again, the argument walks away.]

_Soc._ And when you say this, can you wonder at your
words not standing firm, but walking away? Will you accuse
me of being the Daedalus who makes them walk away, not
perceiving that there is another and far greater artist than
Daedalus who makes them go round in a circle, and he is
yourself; for the argument, as you will perceive, comes
round to the same point. Were we not saying that the holy
or pious was not the same with that which is loved of the
gods? Have you forgotten?

_Euth._ I quite remember.

_Soc._ And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods
is holy; and is not this the same as what is dear to them—do
you see?

_Euth._ True.

_Soc._ Then either we were wrong in our former assertion;
or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.

_Euth._ One of the two must be true.

[Sidenote: Nevertheless, Socrates is confident that Euthyphro knows the truth, but will not tell him.]

_Soc._ Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety?
That is an enquiry which I shall never be weary of pursuing
as far as in me lies; and I entreat you not to scorn me, but
to apply your mind to the utmost, and tell me the truth.
For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore I must
detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. If you had not
certainly known the nature of piety and impiety, I am confident
that you would never, on behalf of a serf, have charged
your aged father with murder. You would not have run
such a risk of doing wrong in the sight of the gods, and you
would have had too much respect for the opinions of men.
I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and
impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not
hide your knowledge.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro departs._]

[Sidenote: Euthyphro is in a hurry to depart, and finally leaves Socrates to his fate.]

_Euth._ Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and
must go now.

_Soc._ Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in
despair? I was hoping that you would instruct me in the
nature of piety and impiety; and then I might have cleared
myself of Meletus and his indictment. I would have told
him that I had been enlightened by Euthyphro, and had 16
given up rash innovations and speculations, in which I
indulged only through ignorance, and that now I am about
to lead a better life.

FOOTNOTES

[13] Cp. 1 Alcib. 111 foll.

APOLOGY.

INTRODUCTION.

[Sidenote: _Apology._]

[Sidenote: INTRODUCTION.]

In what relation the Apology of Plato stands to the real defence of Socrates, there are no means of determining. It certainly agrees in tone and character with the description of Xenophon, who says in the Memorabilia (iv. 4, 4) that Socrates might have been acquitted ‘if in any moderate degree he would have conciliated the favour of the dicasts;’ and who informs us in another passage (iv. 8, 4), on the testimony of Hermogenes, the friend of Socrates, that he had no wish to live; and that the divine sign refused to allow him to prepare a defence, and also that Socrates himself declared this to be unnecessary, on the ground that all his life long he had been preparing against that hour. For the speech breathes throughout a spirit of defiance, ‘ut non supplex aut reus sed magister aut dominus videretur esse judicum’ (Cic. de Orat. i. 54); and the loose and desultory style is an imitation of the ‘accustomed manner’ in which Socrates spoke in ‘the agora and among the tables of the money-changers.’ The allusion in the Crito (45 B) may, perhaps, be adduced as a further evidence of the literal accuracy of some parts (37 C, D). But in the main it must be regarded as the ideal of Socrates, according to Plato’s conception of him, appearing in the greatest and most public scene of his life, and in the height of his triumph, when he is weakest, and yet his mastery over mankind is greatest, and his habitual irony acquires a new meaning and a sort of tragic pathos in the face of death. The facts of his life are summed up, and the features of his character are brought out as if by accident in the course of the defence. The conversational manner, the seeming want of arrangement, the ironical simplicity, are found to result in a perfect work of art, which is the portrait of Socrates.

[Sidenote: _The Platonic defence of Socrates._]

Yet some of the topics may have been actually used by Socrates; and the recollection of his very words may have rung in the ears of his disciple. The Apology of Plato may be compared generally with those speeches of Thucydides in which he has embodied his conception of the lofty character and policy of the great Pericles, and which at the same time furnish a commentary on the situation of affairs from the point of view of the historian. So in the Apology there is an ideal rather than a literal truth; much is said which was not said, and is only Plato’s view of the situation. Plato was not, like Xenophon, a chronicler of facts; he does not appear in any of his writings to have aimed at literal accuracy. He is not therefore to be supplemented from the Memorabilia and Symposium of Xenophon, who belongs to an entirely different class of writers. The Apology of Plato is not the report of what Socrates said, but an elaborate composition, quite as much so in fact as one of the Dialogues. And we may perhaps even indulge in the fancy that the actual defence of Socrates was as much greater than the Platonic defence as the master was greater than the disciple. But in any case, some of the words used by him must have been remembered, and some of the facts recorded must have actually occurred. It is significant that Plato is said to have been present at the defence (Apol. 38 B), as he is also said to have been absent at the last scene in the Phaedo (59 B). Is it fanciful to suppose that he meant to give the stamp of authenticity to the one and not to the other?—especially when we consider that these two passages are the only ones in which Plato makes mention of himself. The circumstance that Plato was to be one of his sureties for the payment of the fine which he proposed has the appearance of truth. More suspicious is the statement that Socrates received the first impulse to his favourite calling of cross-examining the world from the Oracle of Delphi; for he must already have been famous before Chaerephon went to consult the Oracle (Riddell, i. p. xvi), and the story is of a kind which is very likely to have been invented. On the whole we arrive at the conclusion that the Apology is true to the character of Socrates, but we cannot show that any single sentence in it was actually spoken by him. It breathes the spirit of Socrates, but has been cast anew in the mould of Plato.

[Sidenote: _Analysis 17-19._]

There is not much in the other Dialogues which can be compared with the Apology. The same recollection of his master may have been present to the mind of Plato when depicting the sufferings of the Just in the Republic (ii. 361 foll., vi. 500 A). The Crito may also be regarded as a sort of appendage to the Apology, in which Socrates, who has defied the judges, is nevertheless represented as scrupulously obedient to the laws. The idealization of the sufferer is carried still further in the Gorgias (476 foll.), in which the thesis is maintained, that ‘to suffer is better than to do evil;’ and the art of rhetoric is described as only useful for the purpose of self-accusation. The parallelisms which occur in the so-called Apology of Xenophon are not worth noticing, because the writing in which they are contained is manifestly spurious. The statements of the Memorabilia (i. 2; iv. 8) respecting the trial and death of Socrates agree generally with Plato; but they have lost the flavour of Socratic irony in the narrative of Xenophon.

The Apology or Platonic defence of Socrates is divided into three parts: 1st. The defence properly so called; 2nd. The shorter address in mitigation of the penalty; 3rd. The last words of prophetic rebuke and exhortation.

* * * * *

The first part commences with an apology for his colloquial style;
he is, as he has always been, the enemy of rhetoric, and =Steph.= 17
knows of no rhetoric but truth; he will not falsify his character
by making a speech. Then he proceeds to divide his accusers into 18
two classes; first, there is the nameless accuser—public opinion.
All the world from their earliest years had heard that he was
a corrupter of youth, and had seen him caricatured in the Clouds
of Aristophanes. Secondly, there are the professed accusers, who
are but the mouth-piece of the others. The accusations of both
might be summed up in a formula. The first say, ‘Socrates is an
evil-doer and a curious person, searching into things under the
earth and above the heaven; and making the worse appear the
better cause, and teaching all this to others.’ The second,
‘Socrates is an evil-doer and corrupter of the youth, who does
not receive the gods whom the state receives, but introduces other
new divinities.’ These last words appear to have been the actual
indictment (cp. Xen. Mem. i. 1); and the previous formula, which
is a summary of public opinion, assumes the same legal style.

[Sidenote: _Analysis 19-23._]

The answer begins by clearing up a confusion. In the representations
of the Comic poets, and in the opinion of the multitude, 19
he had been identified with the teachers of physical science and
with the Sophists. But this was an error. For both of them
he professes a respect in the open court, which contrasts with his
manner of speaking about them in other places. (Cp. for Anaxagoras,
Phaedo 98 B, Laws xii. 967; for the Sophists, Meno 95 D,
Rep. vi. 492, Tim. 19 E, Theaet. 154 E, Soph. 265 foll., etc.) But
at the same time he shows that he is not one of them. Of natural
philosophy he knows nothing; not that he despises such pursuits,
but the fact is that he is ignorant of them, and never says a word
about them. Nor is he paid for giving instruction—that is another
mistaken notion:—he has nothing to teach. But he commends 20
Evenus for teaching virtue at such a ‘moderate’ rate as five
minae. Something of the ‘accustomed irony,’ which may perhaps
be expected to sleep in the ear of the multitude, is lurking
here.

[Sidenote: _Analysis 23-30._]

He then goes on to explain the reason why he is in such an evil
name. That had arisen out of a peculiar mission which he had
taken upon himself. The enthusiastic Chaerephon (probably in 21
anticipation of the answer which he received) had gone to
Delphi and asked the oracle if there was any man wiser than
Socrates; and the answer was, that there was no man wiser.
What could be the meaning of this—that he who knew nothing,
and knew that he knew nothing, should be declared by the oracle
to be the wisest of men? Reflecting upon the answer, he determined
to refute it by finding ‘a wiser;’ and first he went to the
politicians, and then to the poets, and then to the craftsmen, but 22
always with the same result—he found that they knew nothing, or
hardly anything more than himself; and that the little advantage
which in some cases they possessed was more than counter-balanced
by their conceit of knowledge. He knew nothing, and
knew that he knew nothing: they knew little or nothing, and
imagined that they knew all things. Thus he had passed his 23
life as a sort of missionary in detecting the pretended wisdom
of mankind; and this occupation had quite absorbed him and
taken him away both from public and private affairs. Young
men of the richer sort had made a pastime of the same pursuit,
‘which was not unamusing.’ And hence bitter enmities had
arisen; the professors of knowledge had revenged themselves
by calling him a villainous corrupter of youth, and by repeating
the commonplaces about atheism and materialism and sophistry,
which are the stock-accusations against all philosophers when 24
there is nothing else to be said of them.

The second accusation he meets by interrogating Meletus, who
is present and can be interrogated. ‘If he is the corrupter, who
is the improver of the citizens?’ (Cp. Meno 91 C.) ‘All men
everywhere.’ But how absurd, how contrary to analogy is this! 25
How inconceivable too, that he should make the citizens worse
when he has to live with them. This surely cannot be intentional;
and if unintentional, he ought to have been instructed by Meletus, 26
and not accused in the court.