Chapter II: Appendix: , No. Ii.--Containing Letters by Several (1)

EMINENT PERSONS, ILLUSTRATIVE OF DR. FRANKLIN'S
MANNERS AND CHARACTER.

Letter from the late Dr. Price to a gentleman in America 543

Letter from Mr. Thomas Jefferson to the late Dr. William Smith, of
Philadelphia 545

Letter from the late Dr. Joseph Priestly 547

_ERRATA._

_Page._ _Line._
24 8 from the bottom: for DAY, read LAY.
39 6, for iuppose, read suppose.
60 5 from the bottom: for Cruger, read Stuber.
449 7 from the bottom: for PLEIADS, read PLEIADES.

PAPERS

ON

AMERICAN SUBJECTS

BEFORE THE

_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.

[_The papers under the present head, of American Politics before the Troubles, in the volume of Dr. Franklin's works, printed for Johnson in 1799, from which they are nearly all taken, were divided into two parts, as if distinct from each other, viz. Papers on American Subjects before the Troubles; and Papers on Subjects of Provincial Politics. As we can see no grounds for this distinction, we have brought them together, and have placed them in the order of their dates, conceiving such to be the natural order of papers furnishing materials for history._]

PAPERS

ON

AMERICAN SUBJECTS,

BEFORE THE

_REVOLUTIONARY TROUBLES_.

ALBANY PAPERS.

_Containing_, I. _Reasons and Motives on which the_ PLAN _of_
UNION _for the_ COLONIES _was formed_;--II. _Reasons against
partial Unions_;--III. _And the Plan of Union drawn by B. F. and
unanimously agreed to by the Commissioners from New Hampshire,
Massachusett's Bay, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, and
Pensylvania[1], met in Congress at Albany, in July 1754, to
consider of the best Means of defending the King's Dominions in
America, &c. a War being then apprehended; with the Reasons or
Motives for each Article of the Plan._

B. F. was one of the four commissioners from Pensylvania[2].

I. _Reasons and Motives on which the Plan of Union was formed._

The commissioners from a number of the northern colonies being met at Albany, and considering the difficulties that have always attended the most necessary general measures for the common defence, or for the annoyance of the enemy, when they were to be carried through the several particular assemblies of all the colonies; some assemblies being before at variance with their governors or councils, and the several branches of the government not on terms of doing business with each other; others taking the opportunity, when their concurrence is wanted, to push for favourite laws, powers, or points, that they think could not at other times be obtained, and so creating disputes and quarrels; one assembly waiting to see what another will do, being afraid of doing more than its share, or desirous of doing less; or refusing to do any thing, because its country is not at present so much exposed as others, or because another will reap more immediate advantage; from one or other of which causes, the assemblies of six (out of seven) colonies applied to, had granted no assistance to Virginia, when lately invaded by the French, though purposely convened, and the importance of the occasion earnestly urged upon them; considering moreover, that one principal encouragement to the French, in invading and insulting the British American dominions, was their knowledge of our disunited state, and of our weakness arising from such want of union; and that from hence different colonies were, at different times, extremely harassed, and put to great expence both of blood and treasure, who would have remained in peace, if the enemy had had cause to fear the drawing on themselves the resentment and power of the whole; the said commissioners, considering also the present incroachments of the French, and the mischievous consequences that may be expected from them, if not opposed with our force, came to an unanimous resolution,--_That an union of the colonies is absolutely necessary for their preservation_.

The manner of forming and establishing this union was the next point. When it was considered, that the colonies were seldom all in equal danger at the same time, or equally near the danger, or equally sensible of it; that some of them had particular interests to manage, with which an union might interfere; and that they were extremely jealous of each other; it was thought impracticable to obtain a joint agreement of all the colonies to an union, in which the expence and burthen of defending any of them should be divided among them all; and if ever acts of assembly in all the colonies could be obtained for that purpose, yet as any colony, on the least dissatisfaction, might repeal its own act and thereby withdraw itself from the union, it would not be a stable one, or such as could be depended on: for if only one colony should, on any disgust withdraw itself, others might think it unjust and unequal that they, by continuing in the union, should be at the expence of defending a colony, which refused to bear its proportionable part, and would therefore one after another, withdraw, till the whole crumbled into its original parts. Therefore the commissioners came to another previous resolution, viz. _That it was necessary the union should be established by act of parliament_.

They then proceeded to sketch out a _plan of union_, which they did in a plain and concise manner, just sufficient to show their sentiments of the kind of union that would best suit the circumstances of the colonies, be most agreeable to the people, and most effectually promote his majesty's service and the general interest of the British empire. This was respectfully sent to the assemblies of the several colonies for their consideration, and to receive such alterations and improvements as they should think fit and necessary; after which it was proposed to be transmitted to England to be perfected, and the establishment of it there humbly solicited.

This was as much as the commissioners could do[3].

* * * * *

II. _Reasons against partial Unions._

It was proposed by some of the commissioners, to form the colonies into two or three distinct unions; but for these reasons that proposal was dropped even by those that made it: [viz.]

1. In all cases where the strength of the whole was necessary to be used against the enemy, there would be the same difficulty in degree, to bring the several unions to unite together, as now the several colonies; and consequently the same delays on our part and advantage to the enemy.

2. Each union would separately be weaker than when joined by the whole, obliged to exert more force, be oppressed by the expence, and the enemy less deterred from attacking it.

3. Where particular colonies have _selfish views_, as New York with regard to Indian trade and lands; or are less exposed, being covered by others, as New Jersey, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Maryland; or have particular whims and prejudices against warlike measures in general, as Pensylvania, where the Quakers predominate; such colonies would have more weight in a partial union, and be better able to oppose and obstruct the measures necessary for the general good, than where they are swallowed up in the general union.

4. The Indian trade would be better regulated by the union of the whole than by partial unions. And as Canada is chiefly supported by that trade, if it could be drawn into the hands of the English (as it might be if the Indians were supplied on moderate terms, and by honest traders appointed by and acting for the public) that alone would contribute greatly to the weakening of our enemies.

5. The establishing of new colonies westward on the Ohio and the lakes (a matter of considerable importance to the increase of British trade and power, to the breaking that of the French, and to the protection and security of our present colonies,) would best be carried on by a joint union.

6. It was also thought, that by the frequent meetings-together of commissioners or representatives from all the colonies, the circumstances of the whole would be better known, and the good of the whole better provided for; and that the colonies would by this connection learn to consider themselves, not as so many independent states, but as members of the same body; and thence be more ready to afford assistance and support to each other, and to make diversions in favour even of the most distant, and to join cordially in any expedition for the benefit of all against the common enemy.

These were the principal reasons and motives for forming the plan of union as it stands. To which may be added this, that as the union of the *******

The remainder of this article is lost.

III. _Plan of a proposed Union of the several Colonies of Massachusett's Bay, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pensylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, for their mutual Defence and Security, and for extending the British Settlements in North America, with the Reasons and Motives for each Article of the Plan [as far as could be remembered.]_

It is proposed--That humble application be made for an act of parliament of Great Britain, by virtue of which one general government may be formed in America, including all the said colonies, within and under which government each colony may retain its present constitution, except in the particulars wherein a change may be directed by the said act, as hereafter follows[4].

PRESIDENT GENERAL, AND GRAND COUNCIL.

_That the said general government be administered by a president general, to be appointed and supported by the crown; and a grand council, to be chosen by the representatives of the people of the several colonies met in their respective assemblies._

It was thought that it would be best the president general should be supported as well as appointed by the crown; that so all disputes between him and the grand council concerning his salary might be prevented; as such disputes have been frequently of mischievous consequence in particular colonies, especially in time of public danger. The quit-rents of crown-lands in America might in a short time be sufficient for this purpose.--The choice of members for the grand council is placed in the house of representatives of each government, in order to give the people a share in this new general government, as the crown has its share by the appointment of the president-general.

But it being proposed by the gentlemen of the council of New York, and some other counsellors among the Commissioners, to alter the plan in this particular, and to give the governors and council of the several provinces a share in the choice of the grand council, or at least a power of approving and confirming or of disallowing the choice made by the house of representatives, it was said:

"That the government or constitution proposed to be formed by the plan, consists of two branches; a president general appointed by the crown, and a council chosen by the people, or by the people's representatives, which is the same thing.

"That by a subsequent article, the council chosen by the people can effect nothing without the consent of the president general appointed by the crown; the crown possesses therefore full one half of the power of this constitution.

"That in the British constitution, the crown is supposed to possess but one third, the lords having their share.

"That this constitution seemed rather more favorable for the crown.

"That it is essential, to English liberty, [that] the subject should not be taxed but by his own consent, or the consent of his elected representatives.

"That taxes to be laid and levied by this proposed constitution will be proposed and agreed to by the representatives of the people, if the plan in this particular be preserved:

"But if the proposed alteration should take place, it seemed as if matters may be so managed, as that the crown shall finally have the appointment not only of the president general, but of a majority of the grand council; for seven out of eleven governors and councils are appointed by the crown:

"And so the people in all the colonies would in effect be taxed by their governors.

"It was therefore apprehended, that such alterations of the plan would give great dissatisfaction, and that the colonies could not be easy under such a power in governors, and such an infringement of what they take to be English liberty.

"Besides, the giving a share in the choice of the grand council would not be equal with respect to all the colonies, as their constitutions differ. In some, both governor and council are appointed by the crown. In others, they are both appointed by the proprietors. In some, the people have a share in the choice of the council; in others, both government and council are wholly chosen by the people. But the house of representatives is every where chosen by the people; and therefore, placing the right of choosing the grand council in the representatives is equal with respect to all.

"That the grand council is intended to represent all the several houses of representatives of the colonies, as a house of representatives doth the several towns or counties of a colony. Could all the people of a colony be consulted and unite in public measures, a house of representatives would be needless: and could all the assemblies conveniently consult and unite in general measures, the grand council would be unnecessary.

"That a house of commons or the house of representatives, and the grand council, are thus alike in their nature and intention. And as it would seem improper that the king or house of lords should have a power of disallowing or appointing members of the house of commons;--so likewise, that a governor and council appointed by the crown should have a power of disallowing or appointing members of the grand council (who, in this constitution, are to be the representatives of the people.)

"If the governors and councils therefore were to have a share in the choice of any that are to conduct this general government, it should seem more proper that they chose the president-general. But this being an office of great trust and importance to the nation, it was thought better to be filled by the immediate appointment of the crown.

"The power proposed to be given by the plan to the grand council is only a concentration of the powers of the several assemblies in certain points for the general welfare; as the power of the president general, is of the powers of the several governors in the same points.

"And as the choice therefore of the grand council by the representatives of the people, neither gives the people any new powers, nor diminishes the power of the crown, it was thought and hoped the crown would not disapprove of it."

Upon the whole, the commissioners were of opinion, that the choice was most properly placed in the representatives of the people.

ELECTION OF MEMBERS.

_That within [___] months after the passing such act, the house of representatives, that happen to be sitting within that time, or that shall be especially for that purpose convened, may and shall choose members for the grand council, in the following proportion, that is to say,_

Massachussett's Bay 7
New Hampshire 2
Connecticut 5
Rhode Island 2
New York 4
New Jerseys 3
Pennsylvania 6
Maryland 4
Virginia 7
North Carolina 4
South Carolina 4
----
48

It was thought, that if the least colony was allowed two, and the others in proportion, the number would be very great and the expence heavy; and that less than two would not be convenient, as a single person, being by any accident prevented appearing at the meeting, the colony he ought to appear for would not be represented. That as the choice was not immediately popular, they would be generally men of good abilities for business, and men of reputation for integrity; and that forty-eight such men might be a number sufficient. But, though it was thought reasonable, that each colony should have a share in the representative body in some degree, according to the proportion it contributed to the general treasury: yet the proportion of wealth or power of the colonies is not to be judged by the proportion here fixed; because it was at first agreed, that the greatest colony should not have more than seven members, nor the least less than two: and the settling these proportions between these two extremes was not nicely attended to, as it would find itself, after the first election from the sums brought into the treasury, as by a subsequent article.

PLACE OF FIRST MEETING.

--_who shall meet for the first time at the city of Philadelphia Pensylvania, being called by the president-general as soon as conveniently may be after his appointment._

Philadelphia was named as being the nearer the centre of the colonies, where the commissioners would be well and cheaply accommodated. The high-roads, through the whole extent, are for the most part very good, in which forty or fifty miles a day may very well be and frequently are travelled. Great part of the way may likewise he gone by water. In summer time, the passages are frequently performed in a week from Charles Town to Philadelphia and New York; and from Rhode Island to New York through the Sound, in two or three days; and from New York to Philadelphia, by water and land, in two days, by stage boats and wheel-carriages that set out every other day. The journey from Charles Town to Philadelphia may likewise be facilitated by boats running up Chesapeak Bay three hundred miles. But if the whole journey be performed on horseback, the most distant members (viz. the two from New Hampshire and from South Carolina) may probably render themselves at Philadelphia in fifteen or twenty days; the majority may be there in much less time.

NEW ELECTION.

_That there shall be a new election of the members of the grand council every three years; and on the death or resignation of any member, his place shall be supplied by a new choice at the next silting of the assembly of the colony he represented._

Some colonies have annual assemblies, some continue during a governor's pleasure; three years was thought a reasonable medium, as affording a new member time to improve himself in the business, and to act after such improvement; and yet giving opportunities, frequent enough, to change him, if he has misbehaved.

PROPORTION OF MEMBERS AFTER THE FIRST THREE YEARS.

_That after the first three years, when the proportion of money arising out of each colony to the general treasury can be known, the number of members to be chosen for each colony shall from time to time, in all ensuing elections, be regulated by that proportion (yet so as that the number to be chosen by any one province be not more than seven, nor less than two.)_

By a subsequent article it is proposed, that the general council shall lay and levy such general duties, as to them may appear most equal and least burthensome, &c. Suppose, for instance, they lay a small duty or excise on some commodity imported into or made in the colonies, and pretty generally and equally used in all of them; as rum perhaps, or wine; the yearly produce of this duty or excise, if fairly collected, would be in some colonies greater, in others less, as the colonies are greater or smaller. When the collector's accounts are brought in, the proportions will appear; and from them it is proposed to regulate the proportion of representatives to be chosen at the next general election, within the limits however of seven and two. These numbers may therefore vary in course of years, as the colonies may in the growth and increase of people. And thus the quota of tax from each colony would naturally vary with its circumstances; thereby preventing all disputes and dissatisfactions about the just proportions due from each; which might otherwise produce pernicious consequences, and destroy the harmony and good agreement that ought to subsist between the several parts of the union.

MEETINGS OF THE GRAND COUNCIL, AND CALL.

_That the grand council shall meet once in every year, and oftener if occasion require, at such time and place as they shall adjourn to at the last preceding meeting, or as they shall be called to meet at by the president general on any emergency; he having first obtained in writing the consent of seven of the members to such call, and sent due and timely notice to the whole._

It was thought, in establishing and governing new colonies or settlements, regulating Indian trade, Indian treaties, &c. there would be every year sufficient business arise to require at least one meeting, and at such meeting many things might be suggested for the benefit of all the colonies. This annual meeting may either be at a time or place certain, to be fixed by the president general and grand council at their first meeting; or left at liberty, to be at such time and place as they shall adjourn to, or be called to meet at by the president general.

In time of war it seems convenient, that the meeting should be in that colony, which is nearest the seat of action.

The power of calling them on any emergency seemed necessary to be vested in the president general; but that such power might not be wantonly used to harass the members, and oblige them to make frequent long journies to little purpose, the consent of seven at least to such call was supposed a convenient guard.

CONTINUANCE.

_That the grand council have power to choose their speaker; and shall neither be dissolved, prorogued, nor continued sitting longer than six weeks at one time, without their own consent or the special command of the crown._

The speaker should be presented for approbation; it being convenient, to prevent misunderstandings and disgusts, that the mouth of the council should be a person agreeable, if possible, both to the council and president general.

Governors have sometimes wantonly exercised the power of proroguing or continuing the sessions of assemblies, merely to harass the members and compel a compliance; and sometimes dissolve them on slight disgusts. This it was feared might be done by the president general, if not provided against: and the inconvenience and hardship would be greater in the general government than in particular colonies, in proportion to the distance the members must be from home, during sittings, and the long journies some of them must necessarily take.

MEMBERS' ALLOWANCE.

_That the members of the grand council shall be allowed for their service ten shillings sterling per diem, during their session and journey to and from the place of meeting; twenty miles to be reckoned a day's journey._

It was thought proper to allow _some_ wages, lest the expence might deter some suitable persons from the service;--and not to allow _too great_ wages, lest unsuitable persons should be tempted to cabal for the employment, for the sake of gain. Twenty miles was set down as a day's journey, to allow for accidental hinderances on the road, and the greater expences of travelling than residing at the place of meeting.

ASSENT OF PRESIDENT GENERAL AND HIS DUTY.

_That the assent of the president general be requisite to all acts of the grand council; and that it be his office and duty to cause them to be carried into execution._

The assent of the president general, to all acts of the grand council was made necessary, in order to give the crown its due share of influence in this government, and connect it with that of Great Britain. The president general, besides one half of the legislative power, hath in his hands the whole executive power.

POWER OF PRESIDENT GENERAL AND GRAND COUNCIL. TREATIES OF PEACE AND WAR.

_That the president general, with the advice of the grand council, hold or direct all Indian treaties in which the general interest of the colonies may be concerned; and make peace or declare war with Indian nations._

The power of making peace or war with Indian nations is at present supposed to be in every colony, and is expressly granted to some by charter, so that no new power is hereby intended to be granted to the colonies. But as, in consequence of this power, one colony might make peace with a nation that another was justly engaged in war with; or make war on slight occasions without the concurrence or approbation of neighbouring colonies, greatly endangered by it; or make particular treaties of neutrality in case of a general war, to their own private advantage in trade, by supplying the common enemy; of all which there have been instances--it was thought better, to have all treaties of a general nature under a general direction; that so the good of the whole may be consulted and provided for.

INDIAN TRADE.

_That they make such laws as they judge necessary for regulating all Indian trade._

Many quarrels and wars have arisen between the colonies and Indian nations, through the bad conduct of traders, who cheat the Indians after making them drunk, &c. to the great expence of the colonies both in blood and treasure. Particular colonies are so interested in the trade as not to be willing to admit such a regulation as might be best for the whole; and therefore it was thought best under a general direction.

INDIAN PURCHASES.

_That they make all purchases, from Indians for the crown, of lands not now within the bounds of particular colonies, or that shall not be within their bounds when some of them are reduced to more convenient dimensions._

Purchases from the Indians, made by private persons, have been attended with many inconveniences. They have frequently interfered, and occasioned uncertainty of titles, many disputes and expensive law-suits, and hindered the settlement of the land so disputed. Then the Indians have been cheated by such private purchases, and discontent and wars have been the consequence. These would be prevented by public fair purchases.

Several of the colony charters in America extend their bounds to the South Sea, which may be perhaps three or four thousand miles in length to one or two hundred miles in breadth. It is supposed they must in time be reduced to dimensions more convenient for the common purposes of government[5].

Very little of the land in those grants is yet purchased of the Indians.

It is much cheaper to purchase of them, than to take and maintain the possession by force: for they are generally very reasonable in their demands for land[6]; and the expence of guarding a large frontier against their incursions is vastly great; because all must be guarded, and always guarded, as we know not where or when _to expect them_[7].

NEW SETTLEMENTS.

_That they make new settlements on such purchases, by granting lands in the king's name, reserving a quit-rent to the crown for the use of the general treasury._

It is supposed better that there should be one purchaser than many; and that the crown should be that purchaser, or the union in the name of the crown. By this means the bargains may be more easily made, the price not inhanced by numerous bidders, future disputes about private Indian purchases, and monopolies of vast tracts to particular persons (which are prejudicial to the settlement and peopling of country) prevented; and the land being again granted in small tracts to the settlers, the quit-rents reserved may in time become a fund for support of government, for defence of the country, ease of taxes, &c.

Strong forts on the lakes, the Ohio, &c. may, at the same time they secure our present frontiers, serve to defend new colonies settled under their protection; and such colonies would also mutually defend and support such forts, and better secure the friendship of the far Indians.

A particular colony has scarce strength enough to extend itself by new settlements, at so great a distance from the old: but the joint force of the union might suddenly establish a new colony or two in those parts, or extend an old colony to particular passes, greatly to the security of our present frontiers, increase of trade and people, breaking off the French communication between Canada and Louisiana, and speedy settlement of the intermediate lands.

The power of settling new colonies is therefore thought a valuable part of the plan, and what cannot so well be executed by two unions as by one.

LAWS TO GOVERN THEM.

_That they make laws for regulating and governing such new settlements, till the crown shall think fit to form them into particular governments._

The making of laws suitable for the new colonies, it was thought, would be properly vested in the president general and grand council; under whose protection they will at first necessarily be, and who would be well acquainted with their circumstances, as having settled them. When they are become sufficiently populous, they may by the crown be formed into complete and distinct governments.

The appointment of a sub-president by the crown, to take place in case of the death or absence of the president general, would perhaps be an improvement of the plan; and if all the governors of particular provinces were to be formed into a standing council of state, for the advice and assistance of the president general, it might be another considerable improvement.

RAISE SOLDIERS AND EQUIP VESSELS, &C.

_That they raise and pay soldiers and build forts for the defence of any of the colonies, and equip vessels of force to guard the coasts and protect the trade on the ocean, lakes[8], or great rivers; but they shall not impress men in any colony, without the consent of the legislature._

It was thought, that quotas of men, to be raised and paid by the several colonies, and joined for any public service, could not always be got together with the necessary expedition. For instance, suppose one thousand men should be wanted in New Hampshire on any emergency; to fetch them by fifties and hundreds out of every colony, as far as South Carolina, would be inconvenient, the transportation chargeable and the occasion perhaps passed before they could be assembled; and therefore, that it would be best to raise them (by offering bounty-money and pay) near the place where they would be wanted, to be discharged again when the service should be over.

Particular colonies are at present backward to build forts at their own expence, which they say will be equally useful to their neighbouring colonies; who refuse to join, on a presumption that such forts _will_ be built and kept up, though they contribute nothing. This unjust conduct weakens the whole; but the forts being for the good of the whole, it was thought best they should be built and maintained by the whole, out of the common treasury.

In the time of war, small vessels of force are sometimes necessary in the colonies to scour the coast of small privateers. These being provided by the union will be an advantage in turn to the colonies which are situated on the sea, and whose frontiers on the land-side, being covered by other colonies, reap but little immediate benefit from the advanced forts.

POWER TO MAKE LAWS, LAY DUTIES, &C.

_That for these purposes they have power to make laws, and lay and levy such general duties, imports, or taxes, as to them shall appear most equal and just (considering the ability and other circumstances of the inhabitants in the several colonies,) and such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people; rather discouraging luxury, than loading industry with unnecessary burthens._

The laws which the president general and grand council are impowered to make _are such only_ as shall be necessary for the government of the settlements; the raising, regulating, and paying soldiers for the general service; the regulating of Indian trade; and laying and collecting the general duties and taxes. (They should also have a power to restrain the exportation of provisions to the enemy from any of the colonies, on particular occasions, in time of war.) But is it not intended that they may interfere with the constitution and government of the particular colonies; who are to be left to their own laws, and to lay, levy, and apply their own taxes as before.

GENERAL TREASURER AND PARTICULAR TREASURER.

_That they may appoint a general treasurer and particular treasurer in each government when necessary; and from time to time may order the sums in the treasuries of each government into the general treasury; or draw on them for special payments, as they find most convenient._

The treasurers here meant are only for the general funds, and not for the particular funds of each colony, which remain in the hands of their own treasurers at their own disposal.

MONEY HOW TO ISSUE.

_Yet no money to issue but by joint orders of the president general and grand council; except where sums have been appropriated to particular purposes, and the president general is previously impowered by an act to draw for such sums._

To prevent misapplication of the money, or even application that might be dissatisfactory to the crown or the people, it was thought necessary, to join the president general and grand council in all issues of money.

ACCOUNTS.

_That the general accounts shall be yearly settled and reported to the several assemblies._

By communicating the accounts yearly to each assembly, they will be satisfied of the prudent and honest conduct of their representatives in the grand council.

QUORUM.

_That a quorum of the grand council, impowered to act with the president general, do consist of twenty-five members; among whom there shall be one or more from a majority of the colonies._

The quorum seems large, but it was thought it would not be satisfactory to the colonies in general, to have matters of importance to the whole transacted by a smaller number, or even by this number of twenty-five, unless there were among them one at least from a majority of the colonies; because otherwise, the whole quorum being made up of members from three or four colonies at one end of the union, something might be done that would not be equal with respect to the rest, and thence dissatisfactions and discords might rise to the prejudice of the whole.

LAWS TO BE TRANSMITTED.

_That the laws made by them for the purposes aforesaid shall not be repugnant, but, as near as may be, agreeable to the laws of England, and shall be transmitted to the king in council for approbation as soon as may be after their passing; and if not disapproved within three years after presentation, to remain in force._

This was thought necessary for the satisfaction of the crown, to preserve the connection of the parts of the British empire with the whole, of the members with the head, and to induce greater care and circumspection in making of the laws, that they be good in themselves and for the general benefit.

DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT GENERAL.

_That in case of the death of the president general, the speaker of the grand council for the time being shall succeed, and be vested with the same powers and authorities, to continue till the king's pleasure be known._

It might be better, perhaps, as was said before, if the crown appointed a vice president, to take place on the death or absence of the president general; for so we should be more sure of a suitable person at the head of the colonies. On the death or absence of both, the speaker to take place (or rather the eldest king's-governor) till his majesty's pleasure be known.

OFFICERS HOW APPOINTED.

_That all military commission officers, whether for land or sea-service, to act under this general constitution, shall be nominated by the president general; but the approbation of the grand council is to be obtained, before they receive their commissions. And all civil officers are to be nominated by the grand council, and to receive the president general's approbation before they officiate._

It was thought it might be very prejudicial to the service, to have officers appointed unknown to the people, or unacceptable, the generality of Americans serving willingly under officers they know: and not caring to engage in the service under strangers, or such as are often appointed by governors through favour or interest. The service here meant, is not the stated settled service in standing troops; but any sudden and short service, either for defence of our own colonies, or invading the enemies country; (such as, the expedition to Cape Breton in the last war; in which many substantial farmers and tradesmen engaged as common soldiers under officers of their own country, for whom they had an esteem and affection; who would not have engaged in a standing army, or under officers from England.)--It was therefore thought best, to give the council the power of approving the officers, which the people will look upon as a great security of their being good men. And without some such provision as this, it was thought the expence of engaging men in the service on any emergency would be much greater, and the number who could be induced to engage much less; and that therefore it would be most for the king's service and general benefit of the nation, that the prerogative should relax a little in this particular throughout all the colonies in America; as it had already done much more in the charters of some particular colonies, viz. Connecticut and Rhode Island.

The civil officers will be chiefly treasurers and collectors of taxes; and the suitable persons are most likely to be known by the council.

VACANCIES HOW SUPPLIED.

_But in case of vacancy by death, or removal of any officer civil or military under this constitution, the governor of the province in which such vacancy happens may appoint, till the pleasure of the president general and grand council can be known._

The vacancies were thought best supplied by the governors in each province, till a new appointment can be regularly made; otherwise the service might suffer before the meeting of the president general and grand council.

EACH COLONY MAY DEFEND ITSELF ON EMERGENCY, &C.

_That the particular military as well as civil establishments in each colony remain in their present state, the general constitution notwithstanding; and that on sudden emergencies any colony may defend itself, and lay the accounts of expence thence arising before the president general and general council, who may allow and order payment of the same, as far as they judge such accounts just and reasonable._

Otherwise the union of the whole would weaken the parts, contrary to the design of the union. The accounts are to be judged of by the president general and grand council, and allowed if found reasonable: this was thought necessary to encourage colonies to defend themselves, as the expence would be light when borne by the whole; and also to check imprudent and lavish expence in such defences.[9]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The reader must be informed here, that this plan was intended for all the colonies; but, commissioners from some of them not attending (from causes which I cannot specify) their consent to it was not, in this respect, universally expressed. Governor Pownall, however, says, "That he had an opportunity of conversing with, and knowing the sentiments of the commissioners appointed by their respective provinces, to attend this congress, to which they were called by the crown; of learning from their experience and judgment, the actual state of the American business and interest; and of hearing amongst them, the grounds and reasons of that American union, which they then had under deliberation, and transmitted the plan of to England;" and he adds, in another place, "that the sentiments of our colonies were collected in an authentic manner on this subject in the plan proposed by Dr. Franklin, and unanimously agreed to in congress." See Governor Pownall's Administration of the British Colonies. Vol. I. p. 13. Edit. 4, 1774, and Vol. II. p. 86. B. V.

[2] "Mr. [since Governor] Hutchinson was one of the commissioners for Massachusetts Bay." Governor Pownall as above, Vol. II. p. 144. "Thomas Pownall, Esq.; brother to John Pownall, Esq.; one of the secretaries to the board of trade, and afterwards Governor of the Massachusetts, was upon the spot." History of the British Empire in North America, p. 25. B. V.

[3] Dr. Davenant was so well convinced of the expediency of an union of the colonies, that he recites, at full length, a plan contrived, as he says, with good judgment for the purpose. Davenant, Vol. I. p. 40, 41, of Sir C. Whitworth's Edition. B. V.

[4] The reader may perceive, by the difference of the type, which is the text of the plan, and which the _reasons and motives_ mentioned in the title. They are thus consolidated for his convenience. The editor has taken one or two farther liberties in _transposing_ these Albany papers; but the sense remains as before. B. V.

[5] Mr. Baron M----, in page 200 of his account of the Proceedings at Quebec, for obtaining an Assembly, has the following hint: "The vast enlargement of the province of Quebec by adding to it a new territory that contains, according to Lord Hillsborough's estimation, of it, five hundred and eleven millions of acres (that is, more land than Spain, Italy, France, and Germany put together, and most of it good land) is a measure that would require an ample discussion."----That the reader may not suspect that these dimensions were convenient for uncommon purposes of government, I shall quote the motives assigned upon this occasion by the act regulating the government of Quebec. "By the arrangements made by the royal proclamation, a very large extent of [outlying] country, within which there were several colonies and settlements of the subjects of France, who claimed to remain therein under the faith of the said treaty, was left without any provision being made for the administration of civil government therein:" _i. e._ a few Indian traders were a pretext for this appropriation of a tract of country, which, according to the minister's estimate, was more than thirteen times larger than England and Wales united, nearly one hundred and twenty eight times larger than Jamaica, almost one-eighth part of Europe, and considerably more than one-thirty-eighth part of the whole habitable earth (comparing it with the several calculations in The Political Survey of Great Britain, by Dr. Campbell, and in that of Jamaica, by Mr. Long.) "Now _all_ the inhabitants of the province of Quebec," says this very act, "amounted at the conquest to above sixty-five thousand [only,] professing the religion of the church of Rome, and enjoying an established form of constitution and system of laws." B.V.

[6] "Dr. Franklin (says Mr. Kalm the Swede,) and several other gentlemen, frequently told me, that a powerful Indian, who possessed Rhode Island, had sold it to the English for a pair of spectacles: it is large enough for a prince's domain, and makes a peculiar government at present. This Indian knew how to set a true value upon a pair of spectacles: for undoubtedly if those glasses were not so plentiful, and only a few of them could be found, they would, on account of their great use, bear the same price with diamonds." See Kalm's Travels into North America, Vol. I. p. 386, 387. "At the time when the Swedes first arrived, they bought land at a very inconsiderable price. For a piece of baize, or a pot full of brandy, or the like, they could get a piece of ground, which at present would be worth more than 290_l._ sterling." Ib. Vol. II. p. 118.--The truth is, that the Indians considered their lands as mere _hunting-manors_, and not as farms. B. V.

[7] To guard against the incursions of the Indians, a plan was sent over to America (and, as I think, by authority) suggesting the expediency of clearing away the woods and bushes from a tract of land, a mile in breadth, and extending along the back of the colonies. Unfortunately, besides the large expence of this undertaking (which, if one acre cost 2_l._ sterling, and six hundred and forty acres make a square mile, is 128,000_l._ _first cost_ for every 100 miles) it was forgotten, that the Indians, like other people, knew the difference between day and night, and that a mile of advance and another of retreat were nothing to the celerity of such an enemy.--This plan, it is said, was the work of Dean Tucker; and possibly might contain many other particulars. The plans of Doctor Franklin and Governor Pownall appear much more feasible. B. V.

[8] "According to a plan which had been proposed by Governor Pownall, and approved of by congress."--Administration of the Colonies, Vol. II. p. 143. B. V.

[9] This plan of union, it will appear from the next page, was rejected; and another proposed to be substituted by the English minister, which had for its chief object, the taking power from the _people_ in the colonies in order to give it to the _crown_. B. V.

ALBANY PAPERS CONTINUED.

I. LETTER _to Governor Shirley, concerning the Imposition of direct
Taxes upon the Colonies, without their Consent_.[10]

_Tuesday Morning._

SIR,

I return you the loose Sheets of the plan, with thanks to your excellency for communicating them.

I apprehend, that excluding the people of the colonies from all share in the choice of the grand council will give extreme dissatisfaction; as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have no representation. It is very possible, that this general government might be as well and faithfully administered without the people, as with them; but where heavy burdens are to be laid upon them, it has been found useful, to make it as much as possible their own act; for they bear better, when they have, or think they have, some share in the direction; and when any public measures are generally grievous, or even distasteful, to the people, the wheels of government move more heavily.

FOOTNOTE:

[10] These letters to Governor Shirley first appeared in the London Chronicle for Feb. 6-8, 1766, with an introduction signed _A Lover of Britain_. In the beginning of the year 1776, they were republished in Almon's Remembrancer, with an additional prefatory piece, under the signature of _A Mourner over our Calamities_.--I shall explain the subject of them in the words of one of these writers. "The Albany Plan of Union was sent to the government here for approbation: had it been approved and established by authority from hence, English America thought itself sufficiently able to cope with the French, without other assistance; several of the colonies having alone, in former wars, withstood the whole power of the enemy, unassisted not only by the mother-country, but by any of the neighbouring provinces.--The plan, however, was not approved here; but a _New one_ was formed instead of it; by which it was proposed, that 'the governors of all the colonies, attended by one or two members of their respective councils, should assemble, and concert measures for the defence of the whole, erect forts where they judged proper, and raise what troops they thought necessary, with power to draw on the treasury here for the sums that should be wanted, and the treasury to be reimbursed by a _tax laid on the colonies by act of parliament_.'--This _New plan_ being communicated by Governor Shirley to a gentleman of Philadelphia (Dr. Franklin) then in Boston (who hath very eminently distinguished himself, before and since that time, in the literary world, and whose judgment, penetration, and candor, as well as his readiness and ability to suggest, forward, or carry into execution, every scheme of public utility, hath most deservedly endeared him, not only to our fellow-subjects throughout the continent of North America, but to his numberless friends on this side the Atlantic) occasioned the following remarks from him, which perhaps may contribute in some degree to its being laid aside. As they very particularly show the then sentiments of the Americans on the subject of a parliamentary tax, before the French power in that country was subjected, and before the late restraints on their commerce; they satisfy me, and I hope they will convince your readers (contrary to what has been advanced by some of your correspondents) that those particulars have had no share in producing the present opposition to such a tax, nor in disturbances occasioned by it, which these papers indeed do almost prophetically foretel. For this purpose, having accidentally fallen into my hands, they are communicated to you by one who is, not _partially_, but in the _most enlarged sense_,

"A LOVER OF BRITAIN." B. V.

II. LETTER _to the same; concerning direct Taxes in the Colonies
imposed without Consent, indirect Taxes, and the Albany Plan of
Union_.

_Wednesday Morning._

SIR,

I mentioned it yesterday to your excellency as my opinion, that excluding the people of the colonies from all share in the choice of the grand council would probably give extreme dissatisfaction, as well as the taxing them by act of parliament, where they have no representation. In matters of general concern to the people, and especially where burdens are to be laid upon them; it is of use to consider, as well what they will be apt to think and say, as what they ought to think: I shall therefore, as your excellency requires it of me, briefly mention what of either kind occurs to me on this occasion.

First, they will say, and perhaps with justice, that the body of the people in the colonies are as loyal, and as firmly attached to the present constitution, and reigning family, as any subjects in the king's dominions.

That there is no reason to doubt the readiness and willingness of the representatives they may choose, to grant from time to time such supplies for the defence of the country, as shall be judged necessary, so far as their abilities will allow.

That the people in the colonies, who are to feel the immediate mischiefs of invasion and conquest by an enemy, in the loss of their estates, lives, and liberties, are likely to be better judges of the quantity of forces necessary to be raised and maintained, forts to be built and supported, and of their own abilities to bear the expence than the parliament of England, at so great a distance.

That governors often come to the colonies merely to make fortunes, with which they intend to return to Britain; are not always men of the best abilities or integrity; have many of them no estates here, nor any natural connections with us, that should make them heartily concerned for our welfare; and might possibly be fond of raising and keeping up more forces than necessary, from the profits accruing to themselves, and to make provision for their friends and dependents.

That the counsellors in most of the colonies, being appointed by the crown, on the recommendation of governors, are often persons of small estates, frequently dependent on the governors for offices, and therefore too much under influence.

That there is therefore great reason to be jealous of a power, in such governors and councils, to raise such sums as they shall judge necessary, by drafts on the lords of the treasury, to be afterwards laid on the colonies by act of parliament, and paid by the people here; since they might abuse it, by projecting useless expeditions, harassing the people, and taking them from their labour to execute such projects, merely to create offices and employments, and gratify their dependents, and divide profits.

That the parliament of England is at a great distance, subject to be misinformed and misled by such governors and councils, whose united interests might probably secure them against the effect of any complaint from hence.

That it is supposed an undoubted right of Englishmen, not to be taxed but by their own consent, given through their representatives:

That the colonies have no representatives in parliament.

That to propose taxing them by parliament, and refuse them the liberty of choosing a representative council, to meet in the colonies, and consider and judge of the necessity of any general tax, and the quantum, shows a suspicion of their loyalty to the crown, or of their regard for their country, or of their common sense and understanding; which they have not deserved.

That compelling the colonies to pay money without their consent, would be rather like raising contributions in an enemy's country, than taxing of Englishmen for their own public benefit.

That it would be treating them as a conquered people, and not as true British subjects.

That a tax laid by the representatives of the colonies might be easily lessened as the occasions should lessen; but, being once laid by parliament under the influence of the representations made by governors, would probably be kept up, and continued for the benefit of governors; to the grievous burthen and discontentment of the colonies, and prevention of their growth and increase.