Chapter V: Part 5

Text size

Beyond that they are of 25,750 tons, and were designed for 31,000 horse-power, no details of these ships have been furnished. Two were estimated to be completed by the end of 1915--the others in 1916.

The rest of the programme consisted of eight more lightly armoured cruisers, a reduced number of destroyers and an increased number of submarines.

In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and _Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The participation of any of these in the war is very improbable.

The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines.

When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty. Details of these are as follows:--

There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed _Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two 6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about 11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast shortly after the outbreak of war.

In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_.

A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats.

The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one.

Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter.

* * * * *

At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have reached its apotheosis.

For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to “super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as any that the “fifties” saw.

As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and “not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being screened with very numerous smaller craft.

When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly danger.

On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?

There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.

_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid down in 1901.

The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_ (Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore), _Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss type turbines were installed.

For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_ class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight 6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class. These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_ (London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_ (Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines.

The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_, _Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and _Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12.

In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine.

Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German Navy.

The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of experience.

In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_, _Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and _Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:--

====================+========================+======================
| _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._
--------------------+------------------------+----------------------
Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800
Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in.
| 6--4in. | 10--4in.
| 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes
Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._
H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000
Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25
====================+========================+======================

Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving in weight.

Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely novel vista.

In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_, _Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_, but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness.

The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:--

which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons.

In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no details whatever have been published concerning them.

_DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of sea-going and coast-defence ironclads.

Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about £280,500.

It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the 40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years before anything else of the same size was built.

The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five 12-pounders.

The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about 260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel instead of coal.

In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to.

The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class. These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only.

On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were completed in June, 1911.

Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was obtained with all.

For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.

In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.

Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_.

The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.

It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it should be an immense asset if properly handled.

_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._

The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:--

=======+========+========+==========+=========================
Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration
in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C.
| cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------
| | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds.
-------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------
| | | | in. | in.
13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26
12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24
12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22
9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13
9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼
=======+========+========+==========+============+============

It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original _Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and the better capacity of its shell.

Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts era.

========+========+========+==========+======================+================
Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding
in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C.
| cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship
| | | +-----------+----------+ carrying
| | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.|
--------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+----------------
13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9
13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12
========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================

From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.

Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37] and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to judge are extremely careful about prophecying.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.

_TORPEDO PROGRESS._

The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, despite all the protests against “mastodons.”

With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time, partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship _Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the torpedo, startling things are toward.[38]

The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.

_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._

==========+============+===========+===============================================
Financial | Amount. | Personnel.| Ships provided.
Year. | | +-----------+-----------------------------------
| | |Battleships|Battle-cruisers|Armoured |Prot.
| | | | |cruisers.|cruisers.
----------+------------+-----------+-----------+---------------+---------+---------
1902–03 | 31,003,977 | 122,500 | 2 | | 2 |
1903–04 | 35,709,477 | 127,100 | 3 | | 4 |
1904–05 | 36,859,681 | 131,100 | 2 | | 3 |
1905–06 | 33,389,500 | 129,000 | 1 | 3 | |
1906–07 | 31,472,087 | 129,000 | 3 | | |
1907–08 | 31,419,500 | 128,000 | 3 | | |
1908–09 | 32,319,500 | 128,000 | 1 | 1 | | 5
1909–10 | 35,142,700 | 138,000 | 6 | 2 | | 3
1910–11 | 40,603,700 | 131,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1911–12 | 44,392,500 | 134,000 | 4 | 1 | | 3
1912–13 | 44,085,400 | 136,000 | 3 | 1 | |
==========+============+===========+===========+===============+=========+=========

Later in 1912 the sum of £1,000,000 was handed to the Navy out of the Budget surplus. This sum, the “supplementary estimate,” was allotted in order to set off a corresponding German increase.

The decrease of 1905–1908 is probably directly responsible for the increase 1910–1912; owing to the fact that the British decrease was met by a corresponding rise in German expenditure. It was the fashion before the war to deplore the sums spent on naval armaments, while little or nothing was said about the military estimates.

For 1912–13 the Naval Estimates were £45,075,400.

For 1912–14 they increased to £48,809,300, and for 1914–15 they stood at £51,550,000.

On the face of things, this ever-increasing naval outlay looked likely to lead to ultimate financial ruin. This, however, is really a somewhat superficial view, and mostly nothing but a modern equivalent to that “Insular Spirit” which has been referred to in previous pages.

Compared to the national interests at stake, the increase regarded as an insurance is more apparent than real. It is, if anything, a smaller percentage on national existence; also over a period of a hundred years it is far less than the corresponding increase in the Civil Service Vote, which lacks any claims to be considered an “insurance.” The entire amount spent in shipbuilding is expended in the country, and about 70 per cent. of it goes in direct payment to “Labour”: which is probably a larger percentage than would be achieved were the same sum spent in any other way whatever.

The “ruinous competition in naval armaments” so prated on by certain publicists was really little better than an idle phrase so far as the British nation is concerned; and there was never any real reason to regard future increases with apprehension.

Now that the nation is at war this fact is being recognised. We must continue to recognise it. In trenches over the water we may attack. But on the British Navy depends our defence of home interests.

SUBMARINES.

The submarine as anything of the nature of a practical arm made its first appearance as a “submarine torpedo boat,” useful merely for harbour defence. As such it was eagerly embraced by the French Navy, and had a considerable vogue therein, besides being a commonplace in the United States long before the British Admiralty accepted it as serious in a way.

As a matter of fact, till the invention of the periscope enabled it to see where it was going when submerged, the submarine was little if anything but a paper menace. The periscope altered all this.

The first submarines for the British Navy figured in the 1901–2 Estimates. Five copies of the American _Holland_ were laid down at Barrow, the first being launched in October, 1901. These boats were of 120 tons submerged displacement, and used merely as instructional or experimental craft almost as soon as completed.

They were followed immediately by the “A” class, totalling thirteen boats in all. Displacement submerged, 207 tons. Those numbered from five to thirteen were given sixteen cylinder surface motors of 550 horse-power in place of the 450 horse-power twelve cylinder ones of the earlier boats. In 1904 A1 was lost with all hands under tragic circumstances off Spithead, being run down by a merchant steamer. This disaster led to the installation of double periscopes in later types. A3 was lost off Spithead in 1912, being run down by the _Hazard_, very near where A1 was lost.

The B class which followed numbered eleven boats, of which B1 was originally known as A14. The remaining B class belong to the 1904–05 Estimates. The submerged displacement in these rises to 313 tons, and the surface speed to thirteen knots, instead of eleven and a half, though, owing to improved lines, the horse-power was little increased.

New boats, completed in 1906 and later, though generally identical with the B class, were known as the C class, and totalled thirty-eight altogether. One, C11, was lost at sea from a collision.

In 1907 the earliest boat of a new type (D Class) was put in hand. Displacing 600 tons submerged, she practically doubled her predecessors. Her surface speed rose to sixteen knots with 1,200 horse-power. Three instead of two torpedo tubes were fitted, also wireless telegraphy was experimentally adopted in her. She herself was never any great success, but the rest of the type were far more successful.

By the end of 1911 eight boats of the D class had been launched. It was originally intended to build a total of nineteen of this class, but meanwhile an improved boat of the E type was evolved. The E class are 177ft. long, with a submerged displacement of 800 tons or thereabouts, and four 21-inch tubes. They are fitted with wireless. Their special feature, however, is the fitting of guns, as a regular and integral part of the design.

The first submarine to mount a gun was D4, in which a special 12-pounder was experimentally mounted, so that it could be housed when the boat was submerged; for later boats two guns were decided on.

The E class were followed by an F class--and a variety of other boats, most of which have been completed since the war began and concerning which it is obviously undesirable to say anything whatever.

Guns for submarines were expected to appear sooner than they actually did. At an early stage it was foreseen that, once radii developed, submarines were likely enough to find themselves in contact with hostile submarines and to need something to attack them with. The original idea of the submarine as “the weapon of the weaker Power” soon went the same way as did a similar idea about torpedo boats at their first inception.

In torpedo-boats it was at once self-evident that, whatever the value of the torpedo boat, the stronger Power was able to build far more than the weaker, and to annihilate accordingly.

For a time the submarine seemed to defy this law. It was fatuously hoped that “submarines cannot injure hostile submarines”; and that the “torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat” would not have as sequel “the submarine is the answer to the submarine.”

_Photo_] [_Stephen Crabb. Southsea._

SUBMARINE E 2.]

It may well be in the womb of the future that submarines to-morrow, or perhaps to-day, may be what the ironclad was yesterday or the day before. The submarine battleship may appear and render obsolete the “Dreadnought” of to-day! But nothing can alter the cardinal fact that, given equal efficiency, the Power with most such craft must win, and that, given an inferior efficiency, defeat may be looked for as the natural corollary on lines entirely unconnected with whether the “capital ship” is of a type that floats only or one that can be submerged at will.

Tactics may alter, the means may alter, and the most obvious instruments of naval strategy may do the same. But nothing whatever can affect the bedrock truth that, given equal efficiency, “numbers only can annihilate.” Given the “equal efficiency” nothing else really matters!

If the creators of weapons keep themselves to date, if those who supply them see to it that the supply is sufficient, if those who work the weapons are efficient, the part of those in chief control resolves itself into little save achieving victory with the minimum of loss. The day may yet arrive when someone discovers that a good deal of what has been written about the genius of various famous admirals of the past is verbiage rather than fact, that they were a part of one great whole, rather than the sole controlling organisation--at any rate, once battle was engaged.

In the future, if the submarine “Dreadnought” becomes an actuality, this is probably likely to be so to a greater extent than anything which obtained in the past. So far as we can to-day conceive of such future fights, much of the battle, at any rate, will entail more or less blind work under the surface, individual enemies engaging one another, the leader compelled to rely more and more upon the efficiency of his individual units and less and less upon his own tactical combinations.

Of course things may turn out otherwise. Inventions yet undreamed of may come to the fore, and the nether waters present no greater obstacle to regular operations than the surface does to-day. Plunging may offer no salvation to a beaten enemy. We can only make idle speculations now.

Yet, however things may shape, success or failure, victory or defeat must assuredly depend in a great measure on the makers of the weapons and the efficiency of those who work them--the tools, on the reliability of which every admiral must trust for victory.

When this war started there were roughly thirty German submarines to something like seventy British. At the moment of writing (June, 1915) at least twenty of those German submarines have gone below. How and why cannot be published: but they have gone under in one way or another. Means of defeating submarines are being developed.

Where big ships are concerned the principle means in use are high speed and a zig-zag course, the combination making it difficult for the relatively slow submarine to arrive at the correct striking point.

In this connection it has to be remembered that the vision of a submarine is limited; and so that though the range of modern torpedoes is something like five miles, the actual effective range of a submarine’s torpedoes is nearer a mile or less.

So much is this the case that German submarines are fitted with a torpedo which has a range of only a thousand yards or thereabouts, the reduced range being compensated for by a greatly increased charge. This charge, 420 lbs. of very high explosive instead of the usual charge of 300 lbs. or less, accounts for the devastating effects of German torpedoes fired from submarines.

It is merely a phase in submarine warfare. At present a submarine dare not fire too near its victim lest it be involved in the common destruction. That, however, is likely enough to be guarded against in future construction, and the prospects of the early future is one of more importance for submarines rather than less. They are bound to become larger and larger, their radius increasing with the size. Coincidently with this we may expect to see the birth of small submarines designed to attack big ones: some new variant of the swordfish and the whale.

VI.

NAVAL AVIATION.

The aeroplane idea is so old that we find it in Greek mythology, and it is consequently of unknown antiquity. Hundreds of years before Christ there were hoary old legends of Dædalus and Icarus, who made wings for themselves and flew. Icarus flew too high, the sun melted his wings, with the result that there happened to him what happens about once a week to aviators to-day, he fell and died. Contemporary with these legends, are legends of floating rocks which spurted out fire--stories which sounded inestimably silly till steamships came along. We may imagine prophets able to look ahead[39] and to invest their day with visions of the future. Equally we can discard prophets and imagine a civilisation long since dead which knew all about flying and steamers, and survives in legends only.

_Photo_] [“_Topical._”

BRITISH NAVY SEAPLANE.]

The latter alternative is really the more reasonable of the two. While imagination can do a very great deal and exaggerate to any extent, it must have a base to work on. It is easier to believe in some long gone and extinct civilisation which destroyed itself in the air, than to believe that pure imagination accounts for the flying stories of long ago. Africa is full of traces of vast cities older than any history, telling of past civilisations of which nothing is or ever will be known. Also there is practically no known age in which anything but the motive power stood between aeroplane theories and their realisation.

In support of the theory that men flew before to-day there is the following:--Somewhere about the year 1100, that is to say, back in the reign of King Stephen, a French historian relates the appearance of “as it were, a ship, in the air over London.” It anchored, and the citizens of London got hold of the anchor. The airship sent a man down to free it, and the citizens of London caught him and drowned him in the river. The rest of the aviators then cut the rope and sailed away.

This incident is mentioned so baldly and casually and so much mixed up with ordinary petty chat of the era (chat which proves to have been quite true), that it takes far more faith to accept it as “pure lies” than to accept it as fact more or less.

These legends cannot be disregarded lightly. They one and all give priority to the aeroplane--the “heavier than air” vehicle. Once in a way the “lighter than air” idea got a casual look in; but it was not till the end of the eighteenth century that it got into the regions of practical politics with the French Montgolfiers. But there were people who invented elementary aeroplanes long before Montgolfier.

From the end of the eighteenth century until to-day the Montgolfier idea of “lighter than air” has got little further. The shape has altered; instead of hot air, hydrogen gas is now employed; and by means of motors the balloon no longer drifts before the wind. But progress is terribly slow. That it is so, is a very important thing to recognise, as slow development is by no means a reason for ignoring an invention. Sometimes it is quite the opposite.

It will probably be a good many years before it is definitely settled whether the “heavier than air” or “lighter than air” principle is the better for Naval purposes, though there are not wanting enthusiasts who decry the “lighter than air” machines altogether.

This is probably a grave mistake, brought about by the fact that practical balloons existed long before practical aeroplanes, and dirigibles made flights before ever aeroplanes rose off the earth. Yet the dirigible is in a far more elementary stage than the aeroplane is. Not only is the aeroplane a much older idea in the theoretical direction, but, being very much smaller, it on that account has very possibly developed more quickly.

The world has been building ships for thousands of years, yet it has only recently developed _Tigers_ and _Olympics_, and both are still developing and likely to do so for some time to come. Row-boats, however, arrived at perfection a good thousand years ago. That is to say, there has been no alteration or improvement in them at all commensurate with the alterations that have taken place in big ships during the same period.

_Photo_] [_Sport & General._

HOISTING A NAVAL SEAPLANE ON BOARD THE _HIBERNIA_.]

Something of the same sort is quite possible with aeroplanes. It is already comparatively easy to forecast their eventual form without much danger of being proved a false prophet later on. We may safely say that they will become capable of much higher speeds than at present; also (which is perhaps more important) _slower_ speeds; and that all existing troubles with stability will eventually be overcome. But experiments made with birds indicate that the run which an aeroplane has to take before it can rise occurs in much the same proportion with birds; and so there are few, if any, practical men who now expect to see future aeroplanes capable of rising vertically from the ground, or hovering in the air except under such conditions as any bird can hover without inconvenience.

The possibilities of the dirigible, on the other hand, no man can foresee. The gasbag that can be brought to the ground by a single bullet hole in it, is a very different thing from the possibility of airships of the future, which may be a mile or two long, divided into innumerable compartments, filled with non-explosive gas such as is sure to be discovered sooner or later. Two miles seems an extraordinary length to-day, but a ship ten miles long would only be something like the ratio of the early dirigible to the future ones compared to the ratio Dreadnoughts bear to the first ships built by men.

On the water, bulk is limited by the depth and size of harbours, but in the vast regions of the air there are practically no limitations whatever, and there is virtually nothing to limit size, save the building of land docks on open plains into which airships could descend for purposes of repair and so forth. Consequently those who hastily assume from a few accidents that the “lighter than air” craft has no future are probably making a mistake; at any rate, so far as naval work is concerned. Certain definite uses are apparent even now to those who think and ignore commercial rivalries.

It has been wisely laid down that aeroplanes for naval purposes must be capable of rising from and descending on the water. The Curtiss was the first successful hydro-aeroplane, but since then floats have been fitted to various other types with equal success. It is doubtful whether naval aeroplanes will ever be carried on shipboard like boats, although this is by no means impossible. It will, however, be more convenient for a variety of reasons to use them like submarines with their own special depot ships.

The main naval use of aeroplanes at the outbreak of war was for scouting purposes. How near they would be able to approach a hostile fleet was a question not likely to be solved until the day of battle. The question of their being hit is secondary to the question of their being upset, owing to tremendous concussions of heavy gun fire. The idea of aeroplanes dropping bombs down the funnels of warships can be dismissed as the entirely fanciful dreams of people who know nothing whatever about aeroplanes or the mathematical problems involved. Judging by recent events, dropping bombs anywhere upon a moving ship is nearly or entirely impossible, except at ranges where the aviator would at once be brought down by rifle fire.

A far more likely and useful service would be the destruction of enemy aeroplanes. For this purpose a special gun, firing a species of chain shot, has already been suggested, and the naval aeroplane of the future was always certain to carry a gun of some kind. The off-chance of doing a certain amount of damage to a hostile ship by dropping a bomb upon it, is nothing compared to the importance of destroying the enemy’s aeroplanes. This last seems likely to be all-important as time goes on.

The duties of naval airships will be of a different nature. Already a point kept in view in their design is ability to “keep the air” for a considerable period, and with what are in these days “large airships” of the Zeppelin type (to which the ill-fated Naval Airship No. 1 _Mayfly_ belonged) there seems no reason why an airship should not be kept in the air for three or four days already.

The fuel problem is not very difficult, because a great deal can already be done without the use of the engines, or with only partial use of them. It is also more than probable that with a view to further economy some kind of sails, combined with sea-anchors, will be evolved, whereby the ship might become able to sail in the air nearly as well as the old three-deckers, or, at any rate, as well as the masted ironclads, sailed in the water. The difficulty of “keeping the air” is the inevitable leakage of gas, but as leakage nowadays is infinitesimally less than it once was, the assumption is that as the years go on it will eventually be reduced to almost a minus quantity. Gales will be met by “bulk” and efficient anchors, on the principle that the gale which swamps a fishing-boat or blows over a haystack has no effect on a Dreadnought or a cathedral.

Ability to keep the air will enable all Fleets to be accompanied by airships, which would detect mines and perhaps submarines, and with their ability to adapt their speeds at will, the presumption is that they would be able to destroy submarines by bombs.

A further and very important duty would be the detection of torpedo attacks at night. Experiments carried out in Austria some few years ago with a captive balloon proved conclusively that except in cases of thick fog any vessels in motion are easily detected at a distance of ten or twelve miles. It is not merely the tell-tale flames in the funnels which betray attacking vessels; their wakes are always clearly visible, and as a general rule the vessels themselves, no matter how dark the night.

Bomb-dropping from an airship must be a more serious matter than from aeroplanes, as so much more in the way of explosives could be carried. The chance of being hit, however, would probably be so much greater that it was (when war broke out) unlikely that any airships would be risked for such purposes. Nor is it very probable that naval airships will for some time to come attack each other, if they can possibly avoid it, the reason being that for a good many years they will be comparatively few in number, and the attack would have, in most cases, to be delivered in the presence of a fleet, which would make the attack, to say the least of it, very hazardous.

Eventually, of course, aerial Dreadnoughts fighting each other are probable enough; but “the Trafalgar of the air” is unlikely to be witnessed within the lifetime of most or any of us now living. Nor is it likely that aerial Dreadnoughts will replace Dreadnoughts of the water, although as years go on they may cause profound modifications in design in order to allow of mounting guns for vertical fire.

We are in the presence of the introduction of a “new arm.” But between what a “new arm” can actually accomplish, and what enthusiastic inventors say it will do, there is always an enormous gap. Inventors, when they come to prophesying, are usually one of two things--asses, or prodigious asses! France--once the second Naval Power in Europe--became of little or no account because it took the submarine at the enthusiastic inventor’s face value, and neglected the present and immediate future.

The present stage of aerial progress in the British Navy is briefly to be summarised as follows:--

1. A big Zeppelin type naval airship was built in 1909–1911. It proved a total failure.

2. In 1911 four naval officers were appointed to learn aeroplane work. Subsequently a few others were appointed. Others, again, qualified privately. In 1912, the Royal Flying Corps was established--both naval and military aviators becoming “wings” of the same body--an excellent principle, but one necessarily experimental so far as practical work was concerned.

3. In practice it proved a failure; so the Naval Air Service was formed into a branch by itself. Four small army airships were handed over to it--craft too small to be of any value except for instructional purposes.

At the outbreak of war there were two effective dirigibles--one of French type of Astra-Torres design, the other a Parseval purchased in Germany. Neither of these ships is in any way comparable to the German Zeppelins in dimensions or endurance. A number of other dirigibles of varying sizes were on order, but it is inadvisable to publish any particulars on this subject. The designs for these were foreign, but the construction was British.

In the matter of aeroplanes a number of special naval stations were established and supplied with seaplanes and landplanes of various types, while strenuous efforts were made towards the training of a large number of efficient pilots. The building of an aeroplane is a matter of only a few weeks, whereas the training of a really efficient pilot is a matter of a year or thereabouts.

VII

AUXILIARY NAVIES.

No account of the British battle fleet would be complete without reference to the various auxiliary navies. Though none of them possesses any very serious fighting value, yet all possess potentialities for the future which can with difficulty be computed.

The auxiliary navies may be divided into two main sections--(1) those which are direct branches of the British Navy, and (2) those which belong to the semi-independent colonies.

Of the former, the principal is the Royal Indian Marine, which consists of a number of armed troopships. Of these the chief are the _Northbrook_, launched at Clydebank in 1907, 5,820 tons, 16 knot speed, and an armament of six 4-inch and six 3-pounders. The _Dufferin_, which was launched in 1904, is of 7,457 tons, has a speed of 19 knots, and an armament of eight 4-inch and eight 3-pounders. The _Hardinge_, launched 1900, is of 6,520 tons, 18 knots speed, and carries six 4.7-inch guns as well as six 3-pounders and 4 Maxims.

There are three older troopships, the _Minto_ (1893), the _Elphinstone_ (1887), and the _Dalhousie_ (1886). These are supplemented by ten small steamers and nine small mining vessels.

The germ of this fleet was created in the early seventies when the breastwork monitors _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ were sent out for the defence of Indian harbours. These were small predecessors of the _Devastation_, very similar to the home coast-defence monitors of the _Cyclops_ class, and carried four 18-ton muzzle-loading guns.

About the year 1888 some new torpedo boats (Nos. 100–106) were lent for the Indian Marine service. These, with their names and numbers, were as follows:--_Baluch_ (100), _Ghurka_ (101), _Kahren_ (102), _Pathan_ (103), _Maharatta_ (104), _Sikh_ (105), and _Rajput_ (106). The two earliest numbers were built by Thornycroft, and were of 92 tons; the others were built by White, of Cowes, and were of 95 tons displacement.

In the years 1890–91 two torpedo gunboats, _Plassy_ and _Assaye_, of the _Sharpshooter_ class, were launched at Elswick for the Indian Marine, in which they remained until withdrawn in the early years of the present century.

On a similar footing to the Royal Indian Marine are the flotillas, mostly consisting of river gunboats, maintained in North and South Nigeria and in Central Africa, and the gunboats on the Nile under the Egyptian Government.

The Colonial Navies are on a different standing. First place in their formation belongs to Australia. The monitor _Cerberus_, practically a sister of the _Abyssinia_ and _Magdala_ already mentioned, was launched at Jarrow in 1868 for Victoria. This vessel (which still exists as a drill ship) is of 3,480 tons, armed with four 18-ton muzzle-loaders, and protected with an 8-inch belt.

In 1884 Australia’s local defence was re-inforced with four gunboats as follows:--The _Protector_, of 920 tons, carrying one 8-inch and five 6-inch guns, for South Australia. She, as well as the others, was built at Elswick. For Western Australia a similar vessel of 530 tons, named the _Victoria_, was built, armed with one 18-ton muzzle-loader. The _Gayundah_ and _Paluma_, also of the same type, carrying one old 8-inch and one 6-inch, were built for Queensland. Their displacement is 360 tons each.

From that time onward the Australian Navy occasionally sent a few officers and men for training in the British Navy.

Towards the end of the eighties interest began to be taken in Australian naval defence, and five cruisers and two torpedo gunboats were ordered for local Australian service while borne on the Royal Navy List. Of these vessels the five cruisers were the _Katoomba_ (ex _Pandora_), _Mildura_ (ex _Pelorus_), _Ringarooma_ (ex _Psyche_), _Tauranga_ (ex _Phœnix_), and the _Wallaroo_ (ex _Persian_), all 2,575 vessels of the old _Pallas_ class, of which at the time of writing the _Philomel_ still exists. These ships had a designed speed of 16.5 knots, a protective deck, and an armament of eight 4.7-inch and some smaller guns.

The torpedo gunboat _Boomerang_ (ex _Whiting_) and _Karrakatta_ (ex _Wizard_) belonged to the _Sharpshooter_ class, and were lent under the same conditions as the cruisers.

In the course of time all of them wore out and were eventually recalled.

Coincident with this the Australians commenced to have a revived interest in Imperial defence, and in the year 1905–6 Australia and New Zealand contributed £240,000 to Imperial naval defence, and a project was put forward for the building of eight destroyers and four torpedo gunboats for Colonial Defence purposes.

A few years later this project took a more definite shape, and about the year 1910 the battle-cruiser _Australia_, a sister of the _Indefatigable_, was ordered. As part of the same programme, three protected cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ type, the _Melbourne_, _Sydney_, and _Brisbane_, were also ordered. Previously to this, three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type had been commenced, and in 1911 three more were ordered, thus forming a nucleus of a serious Australian Navy.[40]

New Zealand’s interest in the Imperial Navy may be said to have commenced about the year 1900. It eventuated in paying for the battleship _New Zealand_[41] of the _King Edward_ class, which was laid down in September, 1903. An old gunboat of the _Magpie_ class was purchased, re-christened the _Amokoura_, and used for training purposes, while to replace some old torpedo boats, which had been sent to New Zealand about the same time as similar boats went to Australia, three destroyers of the _Paramatta_ type were ordered. Finally, an offer from the New Zealand Premier to supplement the Dreadnought efficiency of the British Navy culminated in the battle-cruiser _New Zealand_, which was offered to be provided about the same time or a little before Australia offered a similar vessel.[42]

The Dominion of Canada has always maintained a certain number of small vessels for Customs duties or fishery protection, also for service on the Great Lakes. In 1909 the question of a Canadian Navy became insistent, and two old British cruisers--the _Niobe_ of the _Diadem_ class and the _Rainbow_ of the _Apollo_ class--were purchased as training ships for the Canadian Navy. A project was also brought forward for the creation of Canadian dockyards and building therein four second-class cruisers of the _Dartmouth_ class and six destroyers, though up to the time of writing none of these ships have materialised, and the Canadian Navy is still very much a project in the air.

Newfoundland has a naval reserve, trained over many years in the drill-ship, which is ex H.M.S. _Calypso_.

Previous Next

Comments

The British battle fleet, Vol. 2 (of 2)Chapter V: Part 5

0%37 min left in chapter