Chapter XI: The Reed Era 264 (8)

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Guns--Ten 12-ton M.L.R., five 6½-ton M.L.R. (changed in 1890 to ten
8-in. 14-ton B.L.R., four 6-in., six 4-in. ditto.)

Armour (iron)--Belt 6in., Battery 6in., Bulkhead 5in., Conning
tower 8in.

Speed--14.17 knots.

Coal--650 tons.

Launched--1865; completed, 1866.

Cost--Hull and machinery--£322,701.

The 12-ton guns were on the main deck, the 6½-ton on the upper deck, two of them being in an armoured bow battery. The _Bellerophon_, completed in 1866, was ship rigged, and carried the then novel feature of an armoured conning tower, abaft the mainmast.[96] She proved extremely handy, her turning circle being 559yds. as against 939yds. for the _Minotaur_ and 1,050yds. for the _Warrior_. A balanced rudder, introduced in her for the first time, helped this result to some extent; but the well thought-out design of this, the first real “battleship,” was the main cause.

The _Bellerophon_ was followed by a series of “improved _Bellerophons_,” which will be dealt with later. First, however, it is necessary to revert to the coming of the turret-ship.

So long ago as the Crimean War Captain Cowper-Coles had introduced the _Lady Nancy_, “gun-raft,” previously mentioned in connection with that war. In the year 1860 his plans had matured sufficiently for him to make public the designs of a proposed turret ship, with no less than nine turrets in the centre line, each carrying two guns which were to recoil up a slope and return automatically to position.

There has been much discussion in the past as to whether Coles or Ericsson, the designer of the _Monitor_, first hit upon the turret-ship idea. As a matter of fact neither of them invented it, as the idea was first propounded in the 16th century, and “pivot guns” had long existed. In so far as adapting the idea to modern uses is concerned, Ericsson was first in the field, but his turret revolved on a spindle. The merit of the Cowper-Coles design was that he evolved the idea of mounting the turret on a series of rollers, thus making it of real practical utility.

Coles’ ideal turret ship was not received officially with any great show of enthusiasm; as a matter of fact it was an impracticable sort of ship. The famous fight between the _Monitor_ and the _Merrimac_, early in 1862, in the American Civil War, was, however, followed by a perfect “turret craze.” Turret ships were popularly acclaimed as essential to the preservation of British naval power. The idea of a sea-going ship without sail power was unthinkable; but the turret ships for coast defence purposes were demanded with such insistence that in 1862 Captain Coles, now more or less a popular hero, was put to supervise the reconstruction of the old steam wooden line-of-battleship _Royal Sovereign_ into a turret ironclad.

This ship was originally a three-decker. Coles cut her down to the lower deck, leaving a freeboard of ten feet. The sides were covered with 4½-inch iron armour. Four turrets were mounted on Coles’ roller system, the forward turret carrying two and the other three one 12½-ton guns. These turrets were generally five inches thick, but at the portholes were increased up to ten inches. They were rotated by hand power. There was one funnel, in front of which a thinly armoured conning tower was placed. Three pole masts were fitted. This ship was completed in 1864, and was fairly successful on trials. The cost of conversion was very heavy, and being wooden-hulled her weight-carrying ratio was small, 1837 tons to 3,243 tons, weight of hull.

Coles was at no time satisfied with this old three-decker an a proper test of his ideas, and his agitation was so far successful that the _Prince Albert_ was presently built to his design. She was an iron turret-ship, generally resembling the _Royal Sovereign_, though carrying only one gun in each turret.

Particulars of her are:--

Displacement--3,880 tons.
Length--240ft. p.p.
Beam--48ft. 1in.
H.P.--2,130.
Mean Draught--20ft. 4ins.
Speed--11.65 knots.
Coal--230 tons.
Guns--Four 9-in. 12-ton M.L.R.

To the same era belong three armoured gunboats--_Viper_, _Vixen_, and _Waterwitch_--of about 1,230 tons each, armed with a couple of 6½-ton M.L.R. guns, armour 4½ins. The _Waterwitch_, which was slightly the heavier, was fitted with a species of turbine, sucking water in ahead and ejecting it astern (a very old idea revived). This was moderately successful, as the trial speeds of the three were:--

_Viper_--8.89 knots.
_Vixen_--9.59 knots.
_Waterwitch_--9.24 knots.

In the _Vixen_ twin screws were for the first time tried.

The _Prince Albert_ was completed in 1866, the same year as the _Bellerophon_. Long before she was completed, Coles was agitating for the application of his principles to a sea-going masted ship.

Sir E. J. Reed has left it on record that his attitude in the matter was that of an interested observer. He was at no time blind to the advantages that the turret system conferred; but, unlike the Coles’ party, he was equally observant of its disadvantages. At a very early date he threw cold water on the masted turret-ship idea, and insisted that for a sea-going turret-ship to become practicable she must be mastless. He further pointed out that for a given weight eight guns could be mounted broadside fashion for four carried in turrets.

He developed his own ideas in the _Hercules_, laid down in 1866. The _Hercules_, except that recessed ports were introduced to supply something like end-on fire to the battery, was an amplified _Bellerophon_. Particulars of the _Hercules_ (which was always a very successful ship) are:--

Displacement--8,680 tons.
Length--325ft.
Beam--59ft. ½in.
Mean Draught--26ft. 6ins.
H.P.--6,750.
Guns--Eight 18-ton M.L.R., two 12½-ton M.L.R., four 6½-ton M.L.R.
Armour (iron)--9in. 6in. Belt and Battery.
Speed--14.00 kts. (14.69 on the measured mile trials).
Coal--610 tons.
Cost--Hull and machinery, £361,134.

The _Hercules_ was completed in 1868, contemporaneously with the completion of the _Agincourt_ and _Northumberland_, which were very slowly finished.

At and about the same time the _Penelope_ was built. She was designed for light draught and river service, her maximum draught being kept down to 17½ft. She carried eight 9-ton guns and had a 6-inch belt. Sir E. J. Reed being absent from office, his chief assistant, afterwards Sir N. Barnaby, was mainly responsible for this ship. She was given twin screws.

Captain Coles meanwhile continued to demand turret-ships, and in 1865 submitted a design for a sea-going turret-ship, which was referred to a Committee of Naval Officers. They declined to approve the design, but expressed much interest in the principle involved, and recommended that an Admiralty design on similar principles should be worked out, and a ship built to it. This eventuated in the _Monarch_, which in substance was an ordinary ironclad of less freeboard than usual (14ft.) with two turrets on the upper deck, carrying each a pair of the heaviest guns then in existence (25 tons).

BELLEROPHON.
HERCULES.
AUDACIOUS.
SULTAN.
ALEXANDRA.

BROADSIDE AND CENTRAL BATTERY SHIPS OF THE REED ERA.]

It is difficult to ascertain what part (if any) Sir E. J. Reed had in the design of the _Monarch_. At a later date in the work already referred to (1869) he criticised her severely enough.[97]

“I have already intimated that the enlarged adoption of the turret
system has usually been associated in my mind with those classes
of vessels in which masts and sails are not required. It is well
known that others have taken a wider view of its applicability,
and have contended that it is, and has all along been, perfectly
well adapted for rigged vessels. I have never considered it wholly
inapplicable to such vessels: on the contrary, I have myself
projected designs of sea-going and rigged turret-ships, which I
believe to be safe, commodious, and susceptible of perfect handling
under canvas. But most assuredly the building of such vessels
was urged by many persons long before satisfactory methods of
designing them had been devised; and my clear and strong conviction
at the moment of writing these lines (March 31, 1869) is that no
satisfactorily designed turret-ship with rigging has yet been
built, or even laid down.

“The most cursory consideration of the subject will, I think,
result in the feeling that the middle of the upper deck of a
full-rigged ship is not a very eligible position for fighting
large guns. Anyone who has stood upon the deck of a frigate,
amid the maze of ropes of all kinds and sizes that surrounds
him, must feel that to bring even guns of moderate size away
from the port holes, to place them in the midst of these ropes,
and discharge them there, is utterly out of the question; and
the impracticability of that mode of proceeding must increase in
proportion as the size and power of the guns are increased. But
as a central position, or a nearly central position, is requisite
for the turret, this difficulty has had to be met by many devices,
some of them tending to reduce the number of the ropes, and others
to get them stopped short above the guns. In the former category
come tripod masts; in the latter, flying-decks over the turrets;
the former have proved successful in getting rid of shrouds, but
they interfere seriously with the fire of the turret guns, and are
exposed to the danger of being shot away by them in the smoke of
action; the latter are under trial, but however successful they
may prove in some respects, they will be very inferior in point of
comfort and convenience to the upper decks of broadside frigates.
In the case of the _Monarch_, which has a lofty upper deck, neither
a tripod system nor a flying deck for working the ropes upon has
been adopted. A light flying deck to receive a portion of the
boats, and to afford a passage for the officers above the turrets,
has been fitted; but the ropes will be worked upon the upper deck
over which the turrets have to fire, and consequently a thousand
contrivances have had to be made for keeping both the standing
and running rigging tolerably clear of the guns. It seems to me
out of the question to suppose that such an arrangement can ever
become general in the British Navy, especially when one contrasts
the _Monarch_ with the _Hercules_ as a rigged man-of-war. Nor is
the matter at all improved, in my opinion, in the case of the
_Captain_ and other rigged turret-ships in which the ropes have to
be worked upon bridges or flying-decks poised in the air above the
turrets. Such bridges or decks, even if they withstand for long the
repeated fire of the ship’s own guns, must of necessity be mounted
upon a few supports only; and I am apprehensive that in action an
enemy’s fire would bring down parts, at least, of these cumbrous
structures, with their bitts, blocks, ropes, and the thousand and
one other fittings with which a rigged ship’s deck is encumbered,
with what result I need not predict.

“It is well known that both in the _Captain_ and in the _Monarch_
the turrets have been deprived of their primary and supreme
advantage, that of providing an all-round fire for the guns, and
more especially a head fire. This deprivation is consequent upon
the adoption of forecastles, which are intended to keep the ships
dry in steaming against a head sea, and to enable the head-sails
to be worked. When it first became known that the _Monarch_
was designed with a forecastle (by order of the then Board of
Admiralty) there were not wanting persons who considered the plan
extremely objectionable, and who took it for granted that as a
turret-ship the new vessel would be fatally defective. The design
of the _Captain_ shortly afterwards, under the direction of Captain
Coles, with a similar but much larger forecastle, was an admission,
however, that the Board of Admiralty did not stand alone in the
belief that this feature was a necessity, however objectionable.
Both these ships, therefore, are without a right-ahead fire
from the turrets, the _Monarch_ having this deficiency partly
compensated by two forecastle (6½-ton) guns protected with armour,
while the _Captain_ has no protected head-fire at all, but merely
one gun (6½-ton) standing exposed on the top of the forecastle.”

Time has shown that he was quite correct in his views; but in 1866 and the years that followed he was regarded as unduly conservative and non-progressive.

ROYAL SOVEREIGN.
TYPICAL U.S. MONITOR.
SCORPION.
CAPTAIN.
MONARCH.
REED IDEAL OF A MASTED TURRET SHIP.

TURRET-SHIPS OF THE REED ERA.]

Captain Coles objected to the _Monarch_ altogether. He insisted with vehemence that she did not in the least express his ideas. She had a high forecastle, also a poop; these features depriving her of end-on fire, except in so far as a couple of 6½-ton guns in an armoured forecastle supplied the deficiency. The Admiralty replied that a forecastle was essential for sea-worthiness; but Coles was so insistent that eventually he was allowed to design a sea-going turret-ship on his own ideas, in conjunction with Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, who had already had considerable experience in producing masted turret-ships.[98] Coles was given a free hand. As a naval officer his form of turret displays the practical mind; as a ship designer he was simply the raw amateur. The _Captain_, which he produced, accentuated every fault of the _Monarch_, except in the purely technical matter of rigging being in the way of the guns. Coles got over this by fitting tripod masts (which Laird’s had evolved before him[99]); but for the light flying bridges of the _Monarch_ he substituted a very considerable superstructure erection. For the _Monarch’s_ armoured two-gun forecastle, which he had so violently condemned, he substituted a much larger unarmoured, one-gun structure. Owing to an error in design, his intended 8-ft. freeboard was actually only 6ft., and his ideal ship resulted in nothing but a _Monarch_ of less gun power, and of 8ft. less freeboard. Her fate is dealt with later. Details of the two ships are:--

It has been said that Captain Coles was tied down by Admiralty ideas that a sea-going ship must have auxiliary sail power. All the evidence is, however, to the effect that not only did he recognise this limitation from the first, but that he concurred with it and believed his design to fill the conditions best. It failed to do so, the _Monarch_ under all conditions doing far better than the _Captain_ on trial (except occasionally under sail).

Sir E. J. Reed’s objections to the _Captain_ design have already been mentioned. He was not the only critic, since Laird’s, of Birkenhead, who built the ship, were so suspicious of the design that they requested the Admiralty to submit her to severe tests for stability.

The ship, however, came through these tests very well, and the public were more convinced than ever that she was the finest warship ever built. One or two naval officers who had criticised her also modified their opinions after she had done a couple of very successful cruises across the Bay of Biscay. Her crew had the utmost confidence in her. She was commanded by Captain Burgoyne, and Captain Coles was also on board her when she made her third cruise in September, 1871.

On the 6th September she was off Cape Finisterre in company with the Channel Fleet, consisting of the _Lord Warden_, _Minotaur_, _Agincourt_, _Northumberland_, _Monarch_, _Hercules_, _Bellerophon_, and the unarmoured ships _Inconstant_ and _Bristol_. Admiral Milne came on board her from the _Lord Warden_, and drew attention to the fact that she was rolling a great deal,[102] but nobody on board the _Captain_ agreed with him that this was dangerous. During the night a heavy gale suddenly arose, and in the morning the _Captain_ was missing. Eighteen survivors reached the land with the story of what had happened.

From this it appears that about midnight the ship was under her topsails, double reefed. She had steam up, but was not using her screw. The ship gave a heavy lurch, righted herself, and the captain gave the order, “Let go the topsail halyards,” and immediately afterwards, “Let go fore and main topsail sheets.” The ship, however, continued to heel, and “18 degrees” was called out. This increased until 28 degrees was arrived at. With the ship lying over on her side some of the crew succeeded in walking over her bottom, and these were practically the only survivors. Immediately afterwards the ship went down stern first. There were at this time some five and twenty survivors, including Captain Burgoyne and Mr. May, the gunner. Some of these were in the launch, others clinging to the pinnace, which was floating bottom upwards. Captain Burgoyne was amongst those who were clinging to the pinnace, and that was the last seen of him. A few of the men in the pinnace succeeded in jumping into the launch and so escaped. The rest were never seen again.

The subsequent court-martial placed it on record that “the _Captain_ was built in deference to public opinion and in opposition to the views and opinions of the Controller of the Navy and his Department.” The instability of the ship and the incompetence of Captain Coles to design her were emphasised.

After the loss of the _Captain_ considerable panic on the subject of turret-ships arose. The _Monarch_ was submitted to a number of tests which, however, generally proved satisfactory, and there was never anything to be said against her except that the forecastle and the poop necessitated by her being a rigged ship, negatived one of the principal advantages of the turret system.

To the loss of the _Captain_ is to be traced some of the extraordinary opposition which the _Devastation_ idea subsequently encountered.

The various writings of Sir E. J. Reed make it abundantly clear that just as in the _Bellerophon_ he had realised that an ironclad battleship must be something more than an old-type vessel with some armour on her, so he realised from the first that the ordinary sea-going warship with turrets on deck, instead of guns in the battery, was no true solution of the turret problem. There is ample evidence that he studied the monitors of the American Civil War with a balanced intelligence far ahead of his day, taking into consideration every _pro_ and _con_ with absolute impartiality, and applying the knowledge thus gained to the different conditions required for the British Fleet. It is no exaggeration to say that he was the only man who really kept his head while the turret-ship controversy reigned; the one man who thought while others argued.

He swiftly recognised the tremendous limitations of the American low-freeboard monitors, and at an early date evolved his own idea of the “breastwork monitor,” which began with the Australian _Cerberus_, and ended with the predecessor of the present _Dreadnought_. The ships of this type varied considerably from each other in detail; but the general principle of all was identical. All, whether coast-defence or sea-going, were “mastless”; all, while of low freeboard fore and aft, carried their turrets fairly high up on a heavily armed redoubt amidships. Side by side with them he developed the central battery ironclads of this particular era. He ceased to be Chief Constructor before either type reached its apotheosis; but all may be deemed lineal descendants of his original creations.

First, however, it is desirable to revert to the Reed broadside and central battery-ships.

The _Audacious_ class, which followed closely upon the _Hercules_, and were contemporary in the matter of design, were avowedly “second-class ships,” intended for service in distant seas. The ships of this class, of which the first was completed in 1869 and the last in 1873, were the _Audacious_, _Invincible_, _Iron Duke_, _Vanguard_, _Swiftsure_, and _Triumph_. As the sketch plan illustrations indicate, the main deck battery in them was more centralised than in the _Hercules_, while instead of the bow battery they carried on their upper decks four 6½-ton guns capable of firing directly ahead or astern.

Excluding the converted ships, the _Audacious_ was the eleventh British ironclad to be designed in point of date of laying down, but in the matter of design she followed directly on the eighth ship--_Hercules_.

Her weights, as compared with the _Bellerophon_, were:--

In some of these ships the principle of wood-copper sheathing was re-introduced; the iron ships having been found to foul their hulls more quickly than wooden hulled ships. The _Swiftsure_ and _Triumph_ (the two latest) were the ones so treated. Sir E. J. Reed was not responsible for the experiment, which was entirely an Admiralty one. It proved successful enough, the loss of speed being trifling.

Details of the _Audacious_ class:--[103]

Displacement--6,010.
Length--280ft.
Beam--54ft.
H.P.--4,830.
Mean Draught--23ft. 8ins.
Guns--Ten 12-ton M.L.R.
Coal--500 tons.
Belt Armour--8ins. to 6ins.

===========+===========+===========+============+==========+===========+=========
|_Audacious_|_Iron Duke_|_Invincible_|_Vanguard_|_Swiftsure_|_Triumph_
-----------+-----------+-----------+------------+----------+-----------+---------
Speed | 13.2 | 13.64 | 14.09 | 13.64 | 13.75 | 13.75
Builder of | | | | | |
Ship | Glasgow | Pembroke | Glasgow | | Jarrow | Jarrow
Builder of | | | | | |
Machin’y | Ravenhill | Ravenhill | Napier | | Maudslay | Maudslay
Launched | 1869 | 1870 | 1869 | 1869 | 1870 | 1870
Completed | 1869 | 1871 | 1870 | 1871 | 1872 | 1873
Cost--Hull | | | | | |
& Machin’y| £246,482 | £196,479 | £239,441 | | £257,081 | £258,322
===========+===========+===========+============+==========+===========+=========

The sheathing increased the displacement of the two latest ships by about 900 tons in the _Swiftsure_, and some 600 tons in the _Triumph_. These two were single-screw ships only, whereas all the others were twin-screw.

In September, 1875, the _Vanguard_ was rammed and sunk by the _Iron Duke_.

The finding of the Court Martial was as follows:--

“The court having heard the evidence which had been adduced in this
inquiry and trial, is of opinion that the loss of Her Majesty’s
ship _Vanguard_ was occasioned by Her Majesty’s ship _Iron Duke_
coming into collision with her off the Kisbank, the Irish Channel,
at about 12-50 on the 1st September, from the effects of which
she foundered; that such collision was caused--First, by the high
rate of speed at which the squadron, of which these vessels formed
a part, was proceeding whilst in a fog; secondly, by Captain
Dawkins, when leader of his division, leaving the deck of the ship
before the evolution which was being performed was completed, as
there were indications of foggy weather at the time; thirdly, by
the unnecessary reduction of speed of H.M.S. _Vanguard_ without
a signal from the vice-admiral in command of the squadron, and
without H.M.S. _Vanguard_ making the proper signals to the _Iron
Duke_; fourthly, by the increase of speed of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_
during a dense fog, the speed being already high; fifthly, by
H.M.S. _Iron Duke_ improperly shearing out of the line; sixthly,
for want of any fog signals on the part of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_.

“The court is further of opinion that the cause of the loss of
H.M.S. _Vanguard_ by foundering was a breach being made in her
side by the prow of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_ in the neighbourhood of
the most important transverse bulkhead--namely, that between the
engine and boiler rooms, causing a great rush of water into the
engine-room, shaft-alley, and stoke-hole, extinguishing the fires
in a few minutes, the water eventually finding its way into the
provision room flat, and provision rooms through imperfectly
fastened watertight doors, and owing to leakage of 99 bulkhead.
The court is of opinion that the foundering of H.M.S. _Vanguard_
might have been delayed, if not averted, by Captain Dawkins giving
instructions for immediate action being taken to get all available
pumps worked, instead of employing his crew in hoisting out boats,
and if Captain Dawkins, Commander Tandy, Navigating-Lieutenant
Thomas, and Mr. David Tiddy, carpenter, had shown more resource
and energy in endeavouring to stop the breach from the outside by
means at their command, such as hammocks and sails--and the court
is of opinion that Captain Dawkins should have ordered Captain
Hickley, of H.M.S. _Iron Duke_, to tow H.M.S. _Vanguard_ into
shallow water. The court is of opinion that blame is imputable to
Captain Dawkins for exhibiting want of judgment and for neglect of
duty in handling his ship, and that he showed a want of resource,
promptitude, and decision in the means be adopted for saving
H.M.S. _Vanguard_ after the collision. The court is further of
opinion that blame is imputable to Navigating-Lieutenant Thomas for
neglect of duty in not pointing out to his captain that there was
shallower water within a short distance, and in not having offered
any suggestion as to the stopping of the leak on the outside. The
court is further of opinion that Commander Tandy showed great
want of energy as second in command under the circumstances. The
court is further of opinion that Mr. Brown, the chief engineer,
showed want of promptitude in not applying the means at his command
to relieve the ship of water. The court is further of opinion
that blame is imputable to Mr. David Tiddy, of H.M.S. _Vanguard_,
for not offering any suggestions to his captain as to the most
efficient mode of stopping the leak, and for not taking immediate
steps for sounding the compartments and reporting from time to
time the progress of the water. The court adjudges Captain Richard
Dawkins to be severely reprimanded and dismissed from H.M.S.
_Vanguard_ and he is hereby severely reprimanded and so sentenced
accordingly. The court adjudges Commander Lashwood Goldie Tandy
and Navigating-Lieutenant James Cambridge Thomas to be severely
reprimanded, and they hereby are severely reprimanded accordingly.
The court imputes no blame to the other officers and ship’s company
of H.M.S. _Vanguard_ in reference to the loss of the ship, and they
are hereby acquitted accordingly.”

HOTSPUR
FRENCH RAM TAUREAU (1865)
GLATTON
RUPERT

RAMS OF THE REED ERA.]

This disaster drew attention to the ram, the more so when it became known that the _Iron Duke_ was uninjured. Ram tactics had, of course, been heard of before, and had been discussed at great length by Sir Edward Reed in 1868. At that date, although one or two special ram-ships had been built, Sir E. J. Reed had expressed a certain amount of scepticism as to whether the ram could be successfully used in connection with a ship in motion, and pointed out that in the historical instance of the _Re d’Italia_ at the battle of Lissa, the ship was stationary. He further had written:--[104]

“Even if the side were thus broken through, any one of our
iron-built ships would most probably remain afloat, although her
efficiency would be considerably impaired, the water which would
enter being confined to the watertight compartment of the hold,
enclosed by bulkheads crossing the ship at a moderate distance
before and abaft the part broken through. In fact, under these
circumstances the ship struck would be in exactly the same
condition as an ordinary iron ship which by any accident has
had the bottom plating broken, and one of the hold-compartments
filled with water, so that we have good reason to believe that
her safety need not be despaired of, unless, by the blow being
delivered at, or very near, a bulkhead, more than one compartment
should be injured and filled. All iron ships can thus be protected
to some extent against being sunk by a single blow of a ram, and
our own vessels have the further and important protection of the
watertight wings just described; but wood ships are not similarly
safe. One hole in the side of the _Re d’Italia_ sufficed to sink
her; but this would scarcely have been possible in an iron ship
with properly arranged watertight compartments. The French, in
their latest ironclads, have become alive to this danger, and have
fitted transverse iron bulkheads in the holds of wood-built ships
in order to add to their safety. No doubt this is an improvement,
but our experience with wood ships leads us to have grave doubts
whether these bulkheads can be made efficient watertight divisions
in the hold, on account of the working that is sure to take place
in a wood hull. This fact adds another to the arguments previously
advanced in favour of iron hulls for armoured ships; for it appears
that an iron-built ship, constructed on the system of our recent
ironclads, is comparatively safe against destruction by a ram,
unless she is repeatedly attacked when in a disabled state, while
a wood-built ship may, and most likely will, be totally lost in
consequence of one well-delivered heavy blow.”

This is in strange contrast to the fate of the _Vanguard_, but the finding of the court-martial indicates that the precautions taken were hardly such as were contemplated by the ship’s designer! Furthermore, she appears to have been struck immediately on one of the watertight bulkheads, and so, instead of being left with seven of her eight compartments unfilled, she had only six unfilled. The shock, also, was such that most of the other bulkheads started leaking; and in addition to this the double bottom is said to have been filled with bricks and cement,[105] and so less operative than it might otherwise have been, since any shock on the outer bottom would thus be immediately communicated to the inner one.

The actual successor of the _Hercules_, in the matter of first-class ships, was the _Sultan_. She differed from the _Hercules_ merely in a somewhat increased draught and displacement, and increased provision for end-on bow fire--four 12½-ton guns able to fire ahead being substituted for the one smaller gun in the _Hercules_.

This end-on fire was given because ram-tactics were then coming greatly into favour. Particulars of the _Sultan_,[106] which was the last of the central battery ironclads to be designed and built by Sir E. J. Reed, are as follows:--

Displacement--9,290 tons.
Length--325ft.
Beam--59ft. ½-in.
H.P.--7,720.
Mean Draught--26ft. 5ins.
Guns--Eight 18-ton M.L.R., four 12½-ton M.L.R.
Coal--810 tons.
Armour (iron)--9ins., 8ins., and 6ins.
Speed--14.13 knots (single screw).
Builder of Ship--Chatham.
Builder of Machinery--Penn.
Cost--Hull and machinery, £357,415.
Launched--1870; completed for sea in 1871.

CERBERUS.
DEVASTATION.
FURY.
DREADNOUGHT.

BREASTWORK MONITORS.]

Sir E. J. Reed’s “breastwork monitors” have already been referred to. They were received with little enthusiasm by the Admiralty, and the first of them were merely Colonial coast defence vessels. These were:--

============+==========+======+=======+=======+==========
Name. |Displ’m’t.|Speed.|Armour.|Turret |Completed.
| Tons. |Knots.|Inches.|Armour.|
------------+----------+------+-------+-------+----------
_Cerberus_ | 3480 | 9.75 | 8 | 10 | 1870
_Abyssinia_ | 2900 | 9.59 | 7 | 10 | 1870
_Magdala_ | 3340 |10.67 | 8 | 10 | 1870
============+==========+======+=======+=======+==========

In general design all were identical, a redoubt amidships carrying two centre line turrets and a small oval superstructure between. Twin screws were employed.

The belief in the ram already alluded to had by now attained such proportions that a ship specially designed for ramming was called for, and the _Hotspur_ was the result. Nothing written by Sir E. J. Reed (and he wrote a great deal) indicates that he was in sympathy with her design, though nominally responsible. The _Hotspur_ was not even a turret-ship. She carried a fixed armoured structure of considerable size,[107] inside of which a single 25-ton gun revolved, firing through the most convenient of several ports. She was fitted with two masts with fore and aft sails. Particulars of her were:--

Displacement--4,010 tons.
Length--235ft.
Beam--50ft.
H.P.--3,060.
Mean Draught--21ft. 10ins.
Guns--One 25-ton M.L.R., two 6½-ton.
Belt Armour--11in. to 8in.; complete belt.
Turret Armour--10in.
Coal--300 tons.
Speed--12.8 knots (twin-screw).
Builder--Napier, Glasgow.
Launched--1870; completed, 1871.
Cost--Hull and machinery, £171,528.

She was built solely and simply as an “answer” to a series of “rams” projected for the French Navy, apparently more with an Admiralty idea of not being caught napping “in case,” than from any belief in her efficacy.

Sir E. J. Reed’s ideas in the matter of turret-ships now found expression in four ships of the _Cerberus_ type enlarged. These were the _Cyclops_, _Gorgon_, _Hecate_, and _Hydra_. Like their prototype, they were of the breastwork type, and differed only in having an inch more belt armour and a displacement of 3,560 tons. Differing from them, and perhaps more on Reed lines, was the _Glatton_. Her special feature was the introduction of water to reduce her freeboard in action. She had a single turret only, but her belt was 12ins. thick, and she represented the, then, “last word” in coast defence ships, so far as the British Navy was concerned. Details of her are as follows:--

Displacement--4,910 tons.
Length--245ft.
Beam--54ft.
H.P.--2,870.
Mean Draught--19ft. 5ins.
Guns--Two 25-ton M.L.R.
Armour (iron)--12-10in. Belt Turret, 14in.
Coal--540 tons.
Speed--12.11 knots (twin screw).
Builder of Ship--Chatham Dockyard.
Builder of Machinery--Laird.
Floated out of Dock--1871; completed, 1871.
Cost--Hull and Machinery, £219,529.

The last ship of this group was the ram _Rupert_, of 5,440 tons, laid down at Chatham, in 1870. She was, in substance, merely an enlarged _Hotspur_, carrying two 18-ton guns in a single revolving turret forward and two 64-pounders behind the bulwarks aft. Her armour was slightly inferior to the _Glatton’s_: her speed considerably higher--14 knots being aimed at, though it was never reached. She was one of the very few ships which had their engines built in a Royal Dockyard, hers being constructed at Portsmouth Yard.

About the year 1890, when re-construction was very much to the fore, the _Rupert_ was re-constructed. She was given a couple of 10in. breech-loaders instead of her old 10in. M.L., a military-top, and a few other improvements. The net result of this re-construction was that when, after it, she first proceeded to coal she began to submerge herself almost at once. Her torpedo tubes were awash before she had received her normal quota of coal, and she was, generally, the most futile example of re-construction ever experienced.

The failure was such that thereafter no further attempt to modernise old ships was ever made; instead, a policy of “scrapping” all such was introduced. This is probably the best service that the _Rupert_ ever rendered to the Navy. She demonstrated for all time that--so far as the British Navy was concerned--modernising was a hopeless task. It took France and Germany many years to learn a similar lesson. To-day, it is generally recognised that, as a ship is completed, she represents the best that can be got out of her; and that any attempt to improve her in any one direction merely spells reduced efficiency in some other. Hence the apparently early scrapping of many ships of later date and the present day proverb, “Re-construction never pays.”

The whole of the series, however, can only be regarded as improvements on the old _Prince Albert_ idea. Sir E. J. Reed’s real answer to the _Captain_ was the _Devastation_, designed in 1868, but not completed till 1873; at which date he had left the Admiralty. The _Devastation_ and the _Thunderer_ (completed four years later than her sister) cost Sir E. J. Reed his position. In them he introduced all his ideas as to what the sea-going turret-ship should be. He carried the Admiralty with him; but before ever the _Devastation_ was set afloat, it was “proved” to the satisfaction of the general public that she was an “egregious failure.” The date of her design is about 1868, though, as mentioned above, she was not completed till 1873. The _Dreadnought_ of more or less these times was nothing in the way of novelty compared to the _Devastation_ of the later sixties.

Details of the _Devastation_ (laid down Nov., 1869), were:--

Displacement--9,330 tons.
Length--385ft.
Beam--62ft. 3ins.
Mean Draught--25ft. 6ins.
H. P.--6,650.
Guns--Four 35-ton M.L.R.[108]
Belt Armour--12in. and 10in. (iron).
Turret Armour--14in. (iron).
Coal--1,800 tons.
Speed--13.84 knots (twin-screw).
Where Built--Portsmouth Dockyard.
Builder of Machinery--Humphrys.
Launched--1871; completed, 1873.
Cost--Hull and Machinery, £353,848.

On her trials the _Devastation_ proved completely successful. An interesting and little known item in connection with her is that as designed she was to carry two signal masts,[109] one forward of the turrets, one aft. For these, on completion, a single mast on the superstructure was substituted.

How the _Devastation_, even after successful completion, was received by the public can be gleaned from the following extracts from the contemporary press:--[110]

“It is a weakness with the officers and men of any of Her Majesty’s
ships to ‘crack up’ the vessels to which they belong, and it is
rarely that a bluejacket growls openly against his ship. The warm
confidence expressed in the ill-fated _Captain_ by her unfortunate
crew is well remembered, and is sufficient to prove that even the
first of this necessarily uncomfortable class of monitors was not
met by the seamen of the Fleet in any complaining spirit, but
that they submitted to the discomforts imposed upon them with
characteristic cheerfulness. When, therefore, an unmistakable
feeling of dissatisfaction prevails throughout a ship, and no
hesitation is shown in expressing it, we may be certain that there
is some valid reason for so unusual an occurrence. We hesitated to
give currency to reports which reached us during the cruise of the
_Devastation_ around the coast with the Channel Squadron, as we had
good reason to believe that it was the intention of the Admiralty
to pay her off, and berth her in Portsmouth harbour as a tender
to the _Excellent_, the advantage of so doing being that a very
large number of men passing through the School of Gunnery would
thus be enabled to become acquainted with the latest improvements
in the turret system.... But since the arrival at the Admiralty
of Rear-Admiral Hornby, late in command of the Channel Squadron,
who certainly should be able to form a correct estimate of the
_Devastation’s_ fitness in every respect for sea service, it has
been determined that she shall be ordered to Gibraltar, there
probably to remain during the coming winter as a kind of ‘guardo.’
A cruise across the bay in the month of November is not looked
forward to by the present crew, who have had a little experience
both of being stifled by being battened down and of being nearly
blown out of their hammocks when efforts at ventilation are made
by opening every hatch. Her qualities as a sea-boat have been
fairly tested, and the present notion of filling her up with stores
for six months’ further service, and then stowing her away at
Gibraltar, leads to the conclusion that on this point at least the
value of the counsel of the First Lord’s new Naval adviser is not
altogether apparent.

“... It is needless to comment on the facts. They speak for
themselves. The condensers will be repaired, no doubt, and
strengthened and modified; but no engineer can guarantee that they
will not fail again, or, if they turn out a permanent job, that the
cylinders will not split, or some other of the mishaps to which
marine engines in the Navy are subject may not happen. If the
failure takes place in the day of battle it will constitute little
short of a national calamity. Even as it is, it must be looked on
as a most fortunate circumstance that the sea was perfectly smooth
and the vessel near a port. Had the breakdown occurred during
the six hours’ run of the ship--which was to have been made on
Wednesday--and in a stiff breeze blowing on a lee shore, the ship
might have been lost before an effort could have been made to save
her. Very important improvements in marine engines of large size
must be made before we can reconcile ourselves to the adoption of
mastless sea-going monitors.”

With such labour and travail was the modern British battleship born! Public opinion decidedly modified naval construction--leading, as it did, to a considerable delay with the _Thunderer_,[111] the re-designing of the _Fury_, and the building of some old-type ships which else had probably never been constructed.

As already mentioned, Sir E. J. Reed left the Admiralty before the _Devastation_ was completed. None the less the ships which immediately followed were in all essential particulars “Reed Ships,” and so are included in this chapter.

The _Devastation_, owing to the Committee on Designs, received certain minor modifications before completion. These mainly concerned the hatches. Her sister ship, the _Thunderer_, built at Pembroke and engined by Humphrys, was held back, pending the _Devastation’s_ trials, and not completed till 1877.

Save that in one turret she carried a couple of 38 ton (12.5-inch) instead of 35 ton (12-inch) guns, she was a replica of the _Devastation_.

A third ship of the same type, named the _Fury_, was in hand, but criticisms of the _Devastation_ caused her to be re-designed, and she was eventually completed as the _Dreadnought_. In her the very low freeboard forward and aft of the _Devastation_ type was done away with and freeboard maintained at a uniform medium height.

The _Devastation_ and _Thunderer_ had their armour-plates amidships pierced with square portholes. These with some reason were attacked as likely to weaken the armour very considerably, and the _Dreadnought_ was built entirely wall-sided and so depended on artificial ventilation, known in the Navy in those days as “potted air,” even more than her predecessors.

Particulars of the _Dreadnought_:--

Displacement--10,820 tons.

Length--320ft.

Beam--63ft. 10in.

Draught--26ft. 9in.

Armament--Four 38-ton M.L.R., two 14in. torpedo tubes.

Armour (iron)--Belt 14-11in., Bulkheads 13in., Turrets 14in.

H.P.--8,210 = 12.40 knots.

In the original design of the _Fury_ provision was made for a conning tower with a heavily-armoured communication tube. She proved a very successful ship. No sisters were ordered, probably because the Admiralty wished to see how she did before committing themselves to the type. Ere she was finished a different fashion in warships had set in. The cost of the _Dreadnought_ was about £600,000.

The _Alexandra_ was designed long after Reed had left the Admiralty. That famous constructor had nothing whatever to do with her. None the less she was the apotheosis of his box-battery ironclad ideas and for that reason is included in his era. She was simply an “improved _Sultan_.”

Particulars of her:--

Displacement--9,490 tons.

Length (between perpendiculars)--325ft.

Beam--63⅔ft.

Draught--26½ft.

Armament--Four 25-ton M.L., ten 18-ton M.L., four above-water
torpedo dischargers (14in.)

Armour (iron)--12-6in. belt, flat deck on top of it. Bulkheads
8-5in. Battery 12-6in.

Horse-power--9,810 = 15 knots.

Coal--680 tons = 2,700 knots at 10 knots (nominal).

She was built at Chatham Dockyard; engined by Humphrys; completed for sea, 1877.

Four of the 18-ton guns were carried in an upper deck battery, and had end-on training. The other guns were carried in the main-deck battery, which was some 10ft. high. The 25-ton guns had a right-ahead training.

After completion she served as Mediterranean flagship, though at the bombardment of Alexandria the flag was transferred to the _Invincible_, which, being of lighter draught, was able to enter the inner harbour. At a later date (about 1890) she was “partially reconstructed.” For her original barque rig a three-masted military rig was substituted, and six 4-inch Q.F. were mounted on top of her upper deck battery. She has been described as the apotheosis of Reed broadside ideas, and a very apotheosis she was. No broadside or central battery ironclad of the British or any other Navy ever equalled her, and she dropped out of the first rank only because the big gun rendered broadside ships entirely obsolete.

_GUNS IN THE ERA._

The principal guns (all M.L.R.) in the Reed Era were as follows:--

======+=======+=========+==========+=========+=======+=========
Weight|Bore in| Length |Weight of | Muzzle |Muzzle | Penet’n
in |inches.| in |Projectile|Velocity.|Energy.| Iron at
tons. | |Calibres.| lbs. | f.s. | f.t. +----+----
| | | | | |yds.|yds.
| | | | | |2000|1000
------+-------+---------+----------+---------+-------+----+----
38 | 12.5 | 16 | 810 | 1575 | 13,930| 16 | 18
35 | 12 | 13½ | 707 | 1390 | 9470| 13 | 15
25 | 12 | 12 | 609 | 1288 | 7006| 11 | 12
25 | 11 | 12 | 544 | 1314 | 6560| 13 | 14
18 | 10 | 14½ | 406 | 1370 | 5360| 10 | 12
12½ | 9 | 14 | 253 | 1440 | 3695| 9 | 10
9 | 8 | 15 | 174 | 1384 | 2391| 7 | 8
6½ | 7 | 16 | 112 | 1325 | 1400| 6 | 7
======+=======+=========+==========+=========+=======+====+====

In the early part of the period Armstrong breech-loaders up to 120 pounders had been in use, but the elementary breech blocks were so unsatisfactory that the Navy quickly discarded them, and adhered to muzzle-loaders long after all other Powers had given them up.

The big muzzle loaders tabulated were of a very elementary type also. They were made by shrinking red hot wrought-iron collars over a steel tube; and it was never quite certain how far the interior would be affected. The projectiles never fitted accurately, with the result that there was considerable leakage of gas and very erratic firing. The rifling consisted of five or six grooves into which studs in the projectile fitted.

In 1872 some experiments were carried out, the _Hotspur_ firing at the _Glatton’s_ turret at a range of 200 yards. The first shot missed altogether, the other two struck the turret, but not at the point aimed at. The turret was not appreciably damaged, though theoretically it should have been completely penetrated. This eventually led to the invention of an improved gas check--reference to which will be found at the end of the Barnaby Era.

_UNARMOURED SHIPS OF THE ERA._

Contemporaneously with the _Hercules_ the _Inconstant_ was designed. She was inspired by the United States _Wampanoag_, a type of large, fast, unprotected, heavily-gunned frigate, to which the Americans had always been partial. The _Wampanoag_, as a matter of fact, never reached expectations, whereas the _Inconstant_ was a decided success so far as she went. She marked, so far as the British Navy was concerned, the first appearance of the theory that speed and gun power--in other words, “the offensive”--might be developed advantageously, at the cost of defensive arrangements, a theory which still survives in the “battle-cruisers” of to-day, though of course in a very modified form. None the less, the _Inconstant_ represents the germ idea of our present battle-cruisers, and is supremely important on that account.

Particulars of the _Inconstant_ were:--

Displacement--5,780 tons.

Length (between perpendiculars)--337⅓ ft.

Beam--50¼ft.

Draught (mean)--25½ft.

Guns--Ten 12½ ton M.L.R., six 6½ ton M.L.R.

H.P.--7,360 = 16 knots (trial 16.2).

Speed--Sixteen knots (trial 16.2).

Built at Pembroke Dockyard. Completed for sea 1868 at a cost of
£213,324. She had an iron hull, wood-sheathed and coppered. A
coal supply of 750 tons gave a nominal radius of 2780 miles. She
was ship-rigged and sailed well.

She was followed by a couple of variants on her, the _Raleigh_ and _Shah_, the former 5,200 tons and the latter 6,250 tons.

The _Shah_ was originally named the _Blonde_, but rechristened out of compliment to the Shah of Persia, who was visiting England at the time of her launch.

At a later stage in her career (1877) the _Shah_, then flagship on the S.W. Coast of America, fought a much-criticised action with the Peruvian turret-ship _Huascar_, a Laird-built monitor, carrying a couple of 12½ ton guns, launched in 1865, and generally of the same type (though smaller) as the British _Hotspur_ and _Rupert_.

The _Huascar_ had been seized by the Revolutionists and practically turned into a pirate ship. In attacking her the British Admiral de Horsey gave hostages to fortune, seeing that it was an axiom of those days that an unarmoured ship was helpless against an ironclad monitor. He had, however, no alternative.

As things turned out, the _Huascar_ never succeeded in hitting either the _Shah_, or the _Amethyst_ which accompanied her, while the British flagship, having a speed advantage, the efforts of the _Huascar_ to ram her were futile. The _Huascar_ was hit about thirty times, and one man was killed on board her, but the damage done to the turret-ship was practically nil. The engagement is of further special interest as for the first time a torpedo was used from a big ship in action. The range, however, was too great and no hit was secured.

During the night following the action an attempt was made to torpedo the _Huascar_ from the _Shah’s_ steam pinnace, but the enemy could not be found. Yet it is probable that the knowledge of the _Shah’s_ torpedoes was the reason why Pierola surrendered the _Huascar_ next morning to the Peruvian fleet.

It must have been abundantly clear to him that he had next to nothing to fear from the British gun-fire, while a single water-line hit from him would probably have put the _Shah_ entirely at his mercy, save in so far as her torpedoes might make attempts to ram fatal to him.

END OF VOL. I.

A SHORT GLOSSARY OF COMMON NAVAL TERMS.

=ABAFT.=--Behind or towards the stern of the vessel. Thus one would say that the aftermost turret guns in any ship are “abaft” the mainmast.

=ABEAM.=--On the side of a vessel amidships. To say an object is abeam (or on the beam) means that its bearing by compass is at right angles to the vessel’s course.

=ADMIRALTY, BOARD OF.=--That department of State which is responsible for the proper constitution, maintenance, disposition, and direction of the Fleet in its material and personal elements, executing the duties formerly charged upon the Lord High Admiral; it is presided over by the First Lord (a Cabinet Minister) and consists of Naval Officers--the Sea Lords--and Civil Officials.

=AHEAD.=--In advance--an object is said to be ahead of the ship when its compass bearing is nearly the same as the vessel’s course.

=AHEAD FIRE.=--The discharge of guns along the line of the keel directly ahead of the vessel.

=AMIDSHIPS.=--Generally speaking, in the middle portion of a vessel. The point of intersection of two lines--one drawn from stem to stern, the other across the beam (or widest part)--is the actual “midships.”

=ANCHOR.=--A ship carries several distinct kinds of anchor: the bowers, which are always used for anchoring or mooring the ship; the sheet anchor, as an auxiliary to the bowers; the stream and kedge anchors, which can be used for special purposes.

=ANTI-TORPEDO ARMAMENT.=--Those guns in a ship which are specially mounted for repelling attack by torpedo craft.

=ARC OF FIRE.=--That sector of a circle through which a gun can be moved or trained for effective practice.

=ARMAMENT.=--The weapons of offence with which a ship is armed, including guns and torpedo tubes.

=ARMOUR.=--Any effective covering which protects a ship. The following specify a few main features of armour protection:--

1. =Armour Belt.=--The vertical belt of armour which forms
the citadel or fortress of a ship, and may extend right
forward to the bows and right aft the stern.

2. =Side Armour.=--Vertical armour placed on the exterior of
a ship, being both the belt and additional thereto.

3. =Armoured Deck.=--A curved steel deck protecting the
engine room and other vital portions of a ship inside the
citadel. A ship may have as many as three armoured decks.

4. =Armour Backing.=--A thick layer of teak which acts as a
cushion behind the armour and to which it is secured.

5. =Bulkhead Armour.=--Vertical armour in the interior of
the ship, placed across it from side to side.

=ASTERN.=--The opposite to ahead.

=ASTERN FIRE.=--The discharge of guns along the line of the keel directly astern of a vessel.

=ATHWARTSHIPS.=--At right angles to the keel.

=AUXILIARY.=--A ship--not necessarily a fighting ship--which forms a component part of a Fleet. These include Repair vessels, Hospital ships, Depôt, Submarine and Destroyer Mother-ships, Colliers, etc.

=AUXILIARY ENGINES.=--The machinery employed for boat-hoisting, pumping, electric lighting, refrigerating, ventilating, and other purposes on board ships.

=BACKSTAYS.=--Ropes stretched from a mast or topmast head to the sides of a vessel--some way abaft the mast--to give support to the mast and prevent it going forward.

=BALLAST.=--Weighty material placed in the bottom of a ship to give her “stiffness”; that is, to increase her tendency to return to the upright position when inclined or heeled over by the force of the wind or other cause.

=BALLISTICS.=--That branch of science particularly devoted to the theory of gunnery.

=BARBETTE.=--The steel platform or mounting on which a power-worked gun rests and within which it revolves.

=BARGE.=--A general term given to flat-bottomed boats. The _Admiral’s_ (or _Captain’s_) Barge is usually a special steamboat belonging to a warship reserved for the use of the Admiral or Captain.

=BATTEN.=--Long strips of wood used for various purposes.

=To batten down.=--To cover up and fix down, usually spoken
of hatches when they are covered over in rough weather.

=BATTERY.=--That portion of a ship’s armament inside the citadel. The entire armament is frequently spoken of as a “battery.”

=BATTLE CRUISER.=--A vessel combining the speed and other essential qualities of a cruiser with an armament and protection sufficient to enable her to take her place in the fighting-line beside the battleships.

=BATTLE PRACTICE.=--An annual practice carried out in the Navy, to test the battle or fighting efficiency of the component parts of a ship’s armament.

=BATTLESHIP.=--A ship specially designed to take and give the hard knocks of a Fleet action.

=BEAK.=--The extreme fore part of a vessel.

=BEAM.=--The widest measurement across a ship.

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