Chapter IX: Japan’s Foreign Policy and Her Military Power

The military forces of Japan—The part they may play in the Far
East—Japanese army and navy—Excellent qualities and sound
instruction of the troops—Remarkable power of organization
displayed during the war with China—Importance of a Japanese
alliance for the Powers interested in China—The feeling of Japan
towards foreign countries—Her conservative policy in China since
the war—Her policy hostile to Russia and favourable to England—The
Korean Question—Motives which might lessen her feeling of
hostility towards Russia—Japan the champion of the integrity of
the Celestial Empire.

The Japanese Parliament having voted the necessary funds for carrying out the programme of military, naval and economic expansion which was formulated by the Government after the Chino-Japanese War, the Empire will have, as we have already seen, without mentioning new railways and other public works, an army of 150,000 men on a peace footing, instead of from 70,000 to 75,000, and will be able to send into the field 500,000 men instead of from 270,000 to 280,000 men. Her fleet will be increased to 67 men-of-war, of 258,000 tons, 11 torpedo-boat destroyers, and 115 torpedo-boats, instead of the 33 vessels of 63,000 tonnage and 26 torpedo-boats she had before the war with China.

It is not expected that the completion of this programme of defence will take place before 1905 as regards the navy, and 1903 with respect to the army. As the matter stands, however, more than half the work is finished. Of the £21,300,000 voted to defray the expenses of the augmentation of the navy, which includes arsenals, docks, etc., it was stipulated that £13,300,000 was to be disbursed before April 1st, 1899, and £3,400,000 more between that date and April 1st, 1900. The lengthy opposition made by the Parliament with regard to the raising of taxes and foreign loans possibly may have retarded the works a little, especially those which have been executed in Japan; but the foreign orders have been fulfilled, and the Mikado’s navy is now in possession of nearly all the new vessels contracted for. The completion of at least three out of the five arsenals is also far advanced. The same may be said of the army. Of the £7,900,000 demanded for its increase, £4,200,000 was spent before April, 1896, and £1,000,000 between that date and April, 1900. It may be well to remind my readers that when everything is completed the army will consist of twelve divisions instead of six, exclusive of the Imperial Guard. Three of these new divisions were completed when I was in Japan in 1898.

What constitutes the great importance of the Japanese factor in the Far East, and consequently throughout the world—the question of the Far East dominating all others—is that her military and maritime forces are on the spot. The Japanese navy would be respectable under any circumstances, for it is equal to that of either Italy or Germany; but it should be remembered that the Western nations cannot leave their coasts and their colonies unprotected, and consequently can only send a secondary portion of their maritime force, otherwise scattered throughout the world, into Chinese waters. It follows therefore that no other European Power, excepting perhaps England, could bring into these waters in case of war a fleet in any way comparable with that of the Mikado.[20]

What has been said of the naval power may be repeated with still greater emphasis of the military. It is needless to recall the difficulties to be overcome in transporting, notwithstanding the immense size of vessels now in use, even a single army corps to the Far East, the long and minute preparations necessary for such an enterprise, or the perils that are likely to be encountered, unless the sending Power is absolute mistress of the sea. Japan, thanks to her railways and Inland Sea, can now in a few days concentrate her whole army where no hostile vessel dare pursue it, in the island of Kiu-Siu, 125 miles from the coast of Korea, barely 500 miles from the mouth of the Yang-tsze-Kiang, a distance equalling that between Marseilles and Algiers, and 625 miles from the Bay of Pe-chi-li, and 940 miles from the entrance to the Pei-ho, the river which flows to Peking. It could, therefore, in a few days after the declaration of war land in China and especially in Korea such a force as no European Power, excepting Russia, once the Trans-Siberian line is finished, could introduce in so short a time.[21] Since her fleet can easily protect her own territory, she need keep only a part of her reserves at home.

We have already seen that in the struggle with China, Japan, with her naval and military forces, easily overcame that rather contemptible enemy. It was evident that in this campaign the Japanese displayed remarkable organizing ability, and that the whole working of the delicate machinery of transports, ambulances, commissariat, etc., was admirably managed. This is a great point in their favour, especially when we remember that a similar compliment could not be paid to many a European expedition sent out against enemies less redoubtable than the Chinese. Even the English, after observing the manœuvres of the Japanese squadron during the Chino-Japanese War, did not hesitate to praise their excellence; and the military attaches who followed the Korean and Manchurian campaign expressed themselves equally impressed by the Japanese army.

The courage of the Japanese cannot be questioned. They have proved it in their long and bloody feudal wars, and, again, only twenty years ago, during the insurrection in Satsuma. Their patriotism is equally sincere, for they are the only Orientals among whom this sentiment exists, and with them it easily rises to fanaticism. The endurance of their troops is extraordinary. The subjects of the Mikado are unquestionably the best pedestrians in the world; and it needs no strain on the imagination to realize what must be the excellence of the infantry of a country whose peasantry use no cattle to draw their waggons, and who pass their winter months in making pilgrimages to distant sanctuaries in their own and in neighbouring provinces.

In Japan two men think nothing of dragging a jinrikisha sixty miles in twelve hours, taking only two for rest, and recommencing their journey the next day quite fresh. A Japanese battalion has been known to march twenty-five to thirty miles in a day, knapsack on back, without leaving any stragglers behind. The instruction of the soldiers—cavalry, perhaps, excepted—is excellent, and they learn very quickly. I have watched the manœuvres of some recruits who had only been six weeks in the regiment, and, although they had never in their lives been in European dress before, they wore their uniforms much more easily than many of our young soldiers. The Japanese are, moreover, excellent shots.

The raw material of the Japanese army is, therefore, exceedingly good. It is provided with first-class guns and cannon, and as the navy is composed of vessels built by the best builders in Europe and America, according to the latest models, it goes without saying that the artillery is worthy of the vessels which convey it. The staff may possibly not attain the same high standard as the rank and file, but this is difficult to pronounce upon, the data not being sufficient to assist us in forming a correct opinion. It seems, however, that it has been accused of lacking decision, and also of being too much under the influence of academic and technical theories, not paying sufficient attention to the exigencies of modern warfare.

Be this as it may, it is very probable that in the case of Japan going to war as the ally of a European Power, these defects would be much modified if they listened to the advice of their friends. In addition to the above, we must not forget to add that Japan is the only country of the Far East which works important coal-mines, and that two of the principal of these are situated in the island of Kiu-Siu, quite close to that part of the coast nearest Korea and China, and that she is, moreover, at the present day mistress of the Pescadors, a strategical point which Courbet valued very highly, situated in the middle of the China Sea. It will thus be easy to estimate of what value the co-operation of this nation would be to those Powers who are interested in the Middle Kingdom.

It is, therefore, necessary to know something of the feeling entertained by Japan towards the Sick Man of Peking, as well as towards the various doctors assembled round his bed, thinking less of the patient’s recovery than of the eventual division of his legacy. So far as China is concerned, Japan is undoubtedly favourably disposed towards her, and since the war she has had no warmer, and, it may be added, no sincerer friend than her late enemy. If Japan had been allowed a free hand, she would undoubtedly have reorganized China to her own profit, but possibly Europe, in preventing this, displayed considerable acumen, for her so doing might in the long-run have proved dangerous. Next to being able to reform China herself, Japan would like her to undertake her own reformation, and place herself in a position to maintain her autonomy, so as not to fall a prey to the European Powers.

The Ministers of the Mikado are very naturally somewhat alarmed at the thought that their country may soon be the only one in the whole world inhabited by a non-European race that maintains its independence, and they cannot forbear asking themselves how long this independence may be allowed to last, all the more so since Japan is in immediate contact with, numerically speaking, the most powerful State in the world, the colossal Russian Empire, which borders upon China. Might not Japan under these circumstances be constantly menaced by so formidable a neighbour? Doubtless she would be able to resist an invasion, but at a terrific sacrifice—for to conquer Japan it would be necessary to exterminate many millions of Japanese. In any case Japan’s foreign influence would be at an end, especially in Korea, which she has several times conquered, and upon which she still cherishes pretensions that date over 2,000 years. Even from the purely economic side she would suffer greatly; for her principal commercial outlet, China, might be closed to her for good.

These are the principal reasons which oblige the Japanese to remain the devoted friends of the Chinese Empire, and at the same time the adversaries of Russia, who, they believe, wishes to absorb China, and thereby dominate, if not the whole, at least the north, of the Asiatic Continent, and which compel them to throw in their lot with England. This latter Power does not aim at the political annexation of China; she only wishes to obtain additional facilities for her commerce and concessions for public works, and has therefore no intention whatever of surrounding the Celestial Empire by a formidable ring of Custom-houses. Undoubtedly Japan has had good reason to seek an alliance with England, and we need not be surprised at her distrust of Russia, which, having deprived her of the fruits of her continental conquests in 1895, three years later annexed them herself. As to England, her interest in obtaining the co-operation of Japan is so self-evident as only to need a passing allusion. Through her friendship with Japan she could obtain what she wants, not only in the Far East, but elsewhere, a large and well-organized army that, owing to an unquestionable supremacy on the sea, the result of the combination of two formidable fleets, could be easily and safely transported to the neighbouring continent.

May there not, however, be certain other reasons which might eventually induce not so much Great Britain to break off her Japanese alliance as Japan to sever her side of the compact and ultimately extend her hand to Russia? There is ground for the belief that such a proposition does exist, since there are Russophiles at Tokio and Japanophiles at St. Petersburg. Is it not, moreover, rather imprudent to oppose the progress the Tsar’s Empire is making on the continent? It is, after all, an irresistible force resulting from the very nature of things, and therefore it were perchance wiser to be rather with Russia than against her. Then, again, it should be remembered that Russia displayed her goodwill towards Japan by leaving her a free hand in Korea, not, however, until after she had seized Port Arthur. True, the situation created in Korea by the compact of April, 1898, was precarious; and possibly, when once her position in the Far East is consolidated by the completion of the Trans-Siberian line, the Tsar’s Government may rescind the concession which it has signed and occupy the peninsula. But even if we admit that this contingency is a possible one—and it is by no means absolutely certain that Russia does entertain any such project—Japan may still hope for compensation elsewhere in the centre or south of China round the province of Fu-kien, where she has already made her influence felt, as also at Borneo. Russia might also give certain tariff guarantees, and might it not be to her interest, less urgently, perhaps, than in the case of England, to secure the co-operation of Japan in case of conflict? And, finally, is Great Britain a very safe ally? May she not be simply using Japan for her own ends, thrusting her forward only perhaps to abandon her when she is committed? Will she lend assistance to a commercial rival?

These are arguments which are not without their influence at Tokio, where the difficulty of opposing a solid and durable barrier against the encroachments of Russia on the continent is fully appreciated, and where there certainly exists a feeling of distrust, not only of the English, but of all other Europeans. Political and military interference in continental affairs has never resulted otherwise than in weakening an insular power, and much as the subjects of the Mikado may desire Korea, it should not be forgotten that, however great Japan’s interests may be in that direction, she may easily renounce her pretensions on _terra firma_ if she were offered some material and tangible compensation elsewhere. It has been said that Japan had cast a longing eye on the Philippines, and certain signs led many to think that at one time she had played with the rebels in those islands much the same part enacted by the United States in Cuba; but now America has seized upon these islands, and has also annexed Hawaii, another spot coveted by Japan. Unfortunately, Japan has come too late into the world to possess colonies, and must therefore content herself with the solitary Formosa, which, however, is a possession by no means to be despised.

Still, even now, Japan does not lose all hope of eventually obtaining a footing upon the continent; but, providing that others do not handle China too roughly, she has no intention of interfering with her neighbour, certainly not to menace her integrity. She wishes only to consolidate her by augmenting at the same time her own influence, and would not intervene even if she thought the Celestial Empire were in danger. From the point of view of international politics, Japan is certainly a conservative element; but in the day of struggle, should it ever occur, she is destined to weigh very heavily in the scale, not only in the solution of the question of the Far East, but also in the problem which rises behind it—that of supremacy in the Pacific, which will one day be fought out, not between the Whale and the Elephant, but between the Elephants of the Old and the New Worlds—that is to say, between Russia and the United States. But whatever may be the events which will eventually transpire, Japan apparently does not wish to precipitate a struggle, provided only that the maintenance of the _status quo_ is not threatened by others.