Chapter II: Part 2

“There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.” _Prov._ xvi. 25.

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Thus we see there is a class of theologians, who, in hot pursuit of abolitionism, seem ready to sacrifice their Bible and its religion to the establishment of such principles as they deem wholly contradictory to, and incompatible with, the existence of slavery; and it is hence that they attempt to teach that man possesses an intuitive sense of its wrong. But shall we not be forced, with regret, to acknowledge, that there are quacks in divinity as well as in physic?

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LESSON IV.

We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, (p. 242,) “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.“ Again: “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do.”

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Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:

“How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?

“_Answer._ The greater part of it, when it is once duly proposed to them, they may perceive to be so by the light of their own reason and conscience.”

Now it is evident that the bishop’s answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.

But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.

We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does the reverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature—of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?

We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment—much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

We discover, in some men of the highest order of intellects, the power of arriving, as it were instantaneously, at a conclusion, giving it the appearance of being intuitive, rather than the result of what would be, when analyzed, a long chain of reasoning. Thus, the instant and happy thought often springing to the mind when in some sudden or unforeseen difficulty. The nice and instant perception, often displayed by medical men, of the condition of the patient, is an example; and hence the astonishing accuracy of judgment, sometimes noticed in the military commander, from a mere glance of the eye.

In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplified by mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another.

But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument:

“We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.”

“Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.”

“We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.”

The syllogism is defective because the idea of right or wrong is not simple nor ultimate, but complex, and ever subject to change from the influence of any new light presented to the mind. Nor is it true that we possess a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with each distinct quality; for, if so, the mind would be merely a very large bundle of faculties; and we should neither possess nor stand in need of any reasoning powers whatever, because the naked truth about every thing would always stand revealed before us by these faculties; which, we think, is not the fact.

In syllogistic argument, the first principles must be something that cannot be otherwise—unalterable—an eternal truth; “because these qualities cannot belong to the conclusion unless they belong to the premises, which are its causes.”

The syllogism will then stand thus:

It is not true our notion, or idea, of the moral quality of an action “is simple and ultimate, and distinct from any other idea or notion:”

It is not true that we have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities:

Therefore, it is not true, nor self-evident, that we perceive the moral qualities of an action, or that we have the idea or notion of it, by the aid of a single distinct and separate faculty.

The “notion” advanced by Dr. Wayland, on this subject, appears to us so strange, that it would be difficult to conceive it to have been issued or promulgated by a schoolman, did we not know how often men, led by passion, some by prejudice, argue from false premises to which they take no heed, or, from a want of information, honestly mistake for truths.

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LESSON V.

P. 206. “It” (slavery) “supposes that the Creator intended one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as many other human beings as, by purchase, he can bring within his physical power, and that one human being may thus acquire a right to sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human beings, for the purpose of promoting his own.”

This proposition is almost a total error. Slavery supposes the Creator intended that the interest of the master in the slave who, by becoming his slave, becomes his property, should secure to the slave that protection and government which the slave is too degenerate to supply to himself; and that such protection and government are necessary to the happiness and well-being of the slave, without which he either remains stationary or degenerates in his moral, mental, and physical condition.

P. 207. “It” (slavery) “renders the eternal happiness of the one party subservient to the temporal happiness of the other.”

This is equally untrue. Slavery subjects one party to the command of another who is expected to feel it a duty to so “command his household” that “they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment.”

This is the voice of God on the subject, as heretofore quoted. The learned Dr. Wayland is evidently wholly unacquainted with the spirit and intention, and, we may add, origin of the institution of slavery; yet he has, doubtless, been studying some of its abuses.

But suppose a man to study nothing of Christianity but its abuses, and from these alone undertake to describe what he conceives to be its results, its character, and suppositions; he doubtless would make what Dr. Wayland would very justly call a distorted representation; and perhaps, he might safely use a harsher phrase. But would such a representation be productive of any good in the world? It might do much mischief by spreading, broadcast, its errors and misrepresentations; a most delicious food for the morbid appetite of the ignorant and fanatic infidel! Yes, infidelity has its fanatics as well as abolitionism!

“Obey them that have rule over you, and submit yourselves: for they watch for your souls as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy and not with grief: for that is unprofitable for you.” _Heb._ xiii. 17.

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P. 207. “If argument were necessary to show that such a system as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it might easily be drawn from the effects which it produces, both upon morals and national wealth.”

The author, in this instance, as he has in many others, designs to produce an effect on the mind of his reader from what he does not say, as well as from what he does say. We acknowledge this mode to be quite noncommittal, while, on the minds of some, it may be very skilfully used to produce an impression. But we confess ourselves ignorant of any logical rule by which it is entitled to produce any on us. The mode of speech used is intended to produce the impression that the proposition is someway self-evident, and therefore stands in no need of proof or argument. But how the proposition, that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God” is self-evident, and needs no proof nor argument, we have not the “moral sense” or “faculty” to discover. But as Dr. Wayland proposes, nevertheless, to prove its truth by its effects on morals and wealth, let us listen to the evidence.

_Idem._ “Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be satiated without resistance and without redress, it tends to cultivate in the master, pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness. By accustoming the slave to subject his moral principles to the will of another, it tends to abolish in him all moral distinctions; and thus fosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to the appetites of his master.”

This is his proof that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God,” as he has drawn it from its effect on morals;—in which we think him singularly unfortunate. He asks us to receive, as proof of the truth of the proposition, a combination of propositions all requiring proof of their truth, but of the truth of which he offers no proof.

This view of the state of the argument, we imagine, would be sufficient to condemn it in all well-schooled minds; but, nevertheless, we propose to show that which he offers as proof is not true; and even if true, is no proof of the truth of the proposition he endeavours to sustain.

In regard to the master, the effect complained of may or may not exist, as may be the fact whether the master is or is not capable of administering the charge and government of slaves wisely for himself and them. But these abuses, when found to exist, are no proof of the moral impropriety of the institution; for, if so, the abuses of a thing are proof that the thing itself is evil. There are many abuses of government: is government, therefore, at variance with the ordinances of God? The same of matrimony; and is it, therefore, to be set aside? Some men make an abusive use of their education, and, in consequence, would have been more valuable members of society in a state of comparative ignorance: are our universities, therefore, to be abolished? Money has been said to be “the root of all evil;” it, to some extent, is the representative of wealth and power; the possession of either of which may, in some individuals, sometimes apparently enable the possessor “to cultivate pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness.” The same may be said of power of any kind. But has not Dr. Wayland learned that there are cases where the effect would be and is entirely the reverse?—where power, wealth, or even the possession of slaves, produces in the possessor a greater degree of humility, placidity or mildness, sympathy or charity for others, and orderly conduct in himself? Does the reverend moral philosopher make so low an estimate of the value of civilization—of the influence of Christianity—as not to admit the capability of enjoying a blessing without abusing it?

If Dr. Wayland’s argument be founded on truth, it will be easy to show that any system of things must be at variance with the ordinances of God which permit the possession of either power or wealth: consequently, in such case, we must and should all go back to the savage state. We ask this learned standard author to read the history of Abraham and Isaac, and inform us whether slavery produced the effect on them which he supposes to be an entailment of the institution; for the effect must be proved to be an unchangeable, a universal and unavoidable consequence, before it can receive the character of evidence in the case to which he applies it.

But Dr. Wayland thinks that slavery “tends to abolish all moral distinctions in the slave”—“fosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to minister to the appetites of his master;” and, therefore, “is at variance with the ordinances of God.”

If the doctor had seen the native African and slave in the wild, frantic joy of his savage worship, tendered to his chief idol-god, the imbodiment of concupiscence; if he had seen all the power of the Christian master centered to effect the eradication of this heathen belief, and the habits it engendered; had he witnessed the anxiety of the master for the substitution of the precepts of Christianity; if he had seen the untiring efforts of the masters, sometimes for several generations, before this great object could be accomplished, and the absolute necessity of its accomplishment before the labour of the slave could ordinarily become to him an article of full and desirable profit,—he would probably never have written the paragraph we have quoted!

But since, in the honest, we may perhaps say the amiable, simplicity of his mind, he has composed this lesson for his pupil, which, like the early dew in imperceptible showers on the tender blade, becomes the daily nutriment of his juvenile mind and the habitual aliment of its maturity, we deem it necessary to make one further brief remark in proof of its entire inadequacy to the task assigned it in his argument, as a particular and special, and of its total untruthfulness as a general and comprehensive, maxim in morals.

Our experience is, that the crimes here named, when detected in the slave, are punished, and, if necessary, with severity, if for no other reason, because they render the slave less valuable to his master. The master wishes to find in his slave one on whom he can rely with certainty; in whom there is no dissonance of interest from his own, and whose honesty and obedience are past doubt. The qualities which are the exact opposite of the crimes imputed are, therefore, sedulously cultivated in the slave,—and truly, very often, with small success. But we are surprised at the doctrine which proclaims a system of government that ever punishes and looks with displeasure on “lying, deceit, hypocrisy, and dishonesty,” to be the very thing to foster and nourish those vices! When such is proved to be the fact, we shall regard it as a new discovery in morals.

As to the last clause of what he has adduced as proof of his proposition, we say that any one who is in the employ, or even the company, of another, either as a friend, wife, child, or hireling, as well as slave, may manifest a growing willingness to minister to the appetites of such person; and such inclination, or willingness, will operate to the benefit or injury of those so influenced, in proportion as such appetite is good or bad, or tends to good or evil: but this influence, whether tending to benefit or injury, is not an exclusive incident of slavery, and, therefore, cannot with any propriety, be quoted either for or against it: for, everywhere, “evil communications corrupt good manners.”

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LESSON VI.

Dr. Wayland informs us that slavery is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it diminishes the amount of national wealth. If the diminishing of national wealth be proof of the variance from the ordinances of God, then it will follow that whatever will increase such wealth must be in conformity to such ordinances,—a position which we think no one will attempt to maintain. But let us notice the evidence he adduces to prove that slavery diminishes national wealth. His first proof is, that slavery does not “impose on all the necessity of labour;” but that it “restricts the number of labourers—that is, of producers—by rendering labour disgraceful.”

Now this is surely a proposition which requires to be proved itself before it can be received as a proof of an antecedent proposition; and President Wayland seems to have perceived that, under the general term, “labourers,” it would be incapable of proof; and, therefore, he informs us that by labourers he means producers. The logicians will agree that there is a disjointedness in this proposition (very common in this author) to which exception might be taken; but we suppose Dr. Wayland means that slavery decreases the number of those whose labour is employed in the production of the articles or products of agriculture; for we do not presume he means that the labours of the law, physic, divinity, the mechanic arts, commerce, politics or war, are rendered disgraceful by slavery, but agriculture alone; and that, therefore, it is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it thus diminishes the amount of national wealth. If this is not his meaning, we confess ourselves unable to find any meaning in it.

We know of no surer method to test its truth or falsehood than for the Slave States to compare their number of agricultural producers with those of the Free States, having relation to the entire population. The result will be found wholly adverse to the reverend moralist’s position. In fact, so great is the disproportion between the numbers of agricultural labourers in the Slave States, compared to those in the Free, that the articles of their produce often fall down to prices ruinous to the agriculturist, which very seldom, or never, happens in the Free States. Let Dr. Wayland study the statistics touching this point, and he will find himself in error.

But the proposition of President Wayland includes this minor proposition: That the increase of agricultural products, to the greatest possible extent, increases national wealth. We are very far from discovering the truth of this; because the increase of a production, beyond utility and demand, can add nothing to the value of the production, since value depends upon utility and demand. If this position be true, which we think very few at this day will dispute, it is quite obvious that President Wayland, and even Adam Smith, (from whom we suppose the former has received this notion,) are quite mistaken when they predicate the amount of labour to be the sole measure, or, in fact, the amount of wealth; since that position must render the amount of labour and the amount of wealth terms of convertible significance, which, in fact, is seldom the case. Such, then, being the state of the argument, Dr. Wayland’s proposition is, in effect: That the production of the articles of agriculture, to an extent beyond any demand or value, is in conformity to the ordinances of God; and, therefore, their production, to any less extent, is at variance with those ordinances, because the first increases and the latter decreases national wealth. We shall leave these contradictions for the consideration of the professor of moral philosophy and his pupils.

The second witness Dr. Wayland introduces to prove the truth of his proposition, that slavery lessens the amount of national wealth, is that slavery takes from the labourer the natural stimulus to labour,—the desire of individual benefit,—and substitutes the fear of punishment: And for the third and last, that slavery removes from both parties the disposition and motive to frugality; by which means national wealth is diminished.

If national wealth be the desideratum, in order not to be at variance with the ordinances of God, it matters not whether the contributors to it did so contribute through the selfish view of personal aggrandizement and a desire of elevation above their fellows, or whether they did so to relieve themselves from some stigma or personal infliction that a refusal might be expected to fasten upon them. The motive in both cases is the same—a desire to benefit themselves. Thus Dr. Wayland, therefore, makes a distinction where, in reality, there is no difference.

But again, if the amount of labour be the criterion of the amount of national wealth, as he seems to suppose, it can make no difference, in a national point of view, whether A and B squander the result of their labours into the possession of C and D, or retain it themselves because the change of possession in no way destroys the thing possessed. It might be gathered, from this part of Dr. Wayland’s argument, that the greatest misers would be the most efficient builders of national wealth, and, therefore, most in accordance with the ordinances of God.

We are somewhat at loss to perceive the precise idea the author affixes to the term “national wealth.” Whether this be his or our fault, we leave for others to decide.

Has it ever occurred to the reverend author to estimate the wealth of a nation by the moral, physical, and individual welfare of the population?

But we cannot attempt, or undertake, to expose, nor explain, all the false reasoning, distorted views, and prejudiced conclusions found heaped up, in heterogeneous confusion, by the abolition writers. The dissection of mental putridity is as unwelcome a task as that of the animal carcass in a state of decomposition.

If we cast our eyes over the surface of human life, we notice that wealth and power usually travel hand in hand but that wealth is distributed unequally, varied from the lofty possessions of royal power down to the most scanty pittance of poverty and want;—yet leaving a vast majority in possession of nothing save life, and their right to the use of the elements of nature. It is with these lower classes we have the most to do. The wants of these, most generally, are physical: indeed, we sometimes find them only on a level with the brute. Thus, the African mountaineer is prone and content to feed on the decaying remains of what he may find, and wanders, like the hyena, upon the trail of what he hopes to find his prey; while the savage islanders of the distant seas are satisfied with what the ocean heaves on shore. We notice that these wants are increased by climate; hence, the native of the extreme north, content with his flitch of blubber, yet robs the bear of his hide for a blanket. These wants we also find enlarged by the least contact with civilization. Hence we see the African, on the western coast of his continent, garnished out with the gewgaws of Europe, and the Indian of our own clime with the trinkets of trade. And thus we may notice that, as civilization and capital increase in any country, new objects of desire, new individual wants increase in proportion. Hence, the farm-house now exhibits its carpet, whereas Queen Elizabeth was content with straw!

All these wants require some action, on the part of those who desire their gratification, to continue their supply, or it must cease; because, as a general rule, the product of individual labour must bound the supply of individual wants, in all cases where the individual possesses no capital which yields an additional revenue.

But a large portion of those in savage life produce nothing; so, also, a portion from civilized society seem ever disposed to break through the rules of civilization, to retrograde as to morals, and subsist by trick or some dishonesty. They produce nothing, and are, therefore, a total drawback on the welfare of others. We find, also, another portion, the product of whose labour is inadequate to the supply of their individual wants, and who are without capital to supply the deficiency. Such must die, or resort to charity; or retrograde, and live by their wits. Good men, in all ages, have striven to obviate these evils. The Levitical law did so by permitting the unfortunate man to sell himself, as a slave, for six years, or for life, as he might choose, under the state of the case; or, in case he did not so choose to sell himself, but became indebted beyond his means, the law forced his sale, and also that of his whole family. Although, to some, this law may look harsh, yet its spirit, intention, and effect were in favour of the general good, of morals, and of life. Yet it was slavery; and we take liberty here to say, although some may not be prepared to receive it, that such ever was, is now, and ever will be the spirit, intention, and effect of slavery, when not disfigured by its abuse.

We have in vain looked through these “Elements” for some proposal of the author to meet such cases as those of savages, and of those degenerating and deteriorating poor, in all countries, known to be so from the fact that they ever strive to live by their wits. And here we may remark that it is evident the system of alms-giving must terminate when the capitalists shall find the amount of alms beyond their surplus revenue; and no one will deny that the whole system has a direct tendency towards a general bankruptcy. We therefore ask Dr. Wayland to make a proposal that shall be a permanent and effectual remedy in the cases under consideration.

Now, very few will say, but that if society can find out some humane plan by which beggars and thieves can be forced, if force be necessary, to yield a product of labour equal to the supply of their necessary wants, the ordinances of God will not sanction the act.

From imperfection, perhaps, in the organization of society, we not only see individuals branching off, and taking a downward road, but also, in all old countries, from the very stimulus of nature, a constant tendency to such an increase of population as lessens the value of labour by overstocking the demand, whereby its product becomes less than is required for the supply of individual wants. The consequences resulting from these facts, so ruinous to individual morals and happiness, often become national evils and the causes of national deterioration. But, under the Levitical law, and in all countries with similar provisions, the effect has been, and ever will be, a division of such population into a separate caste,—not national deterioration.

With a view to remedy the evils to which we have invited the attention of the Rev. Dr. Wayland, Sismondi, book vii. chap. 9, has proposed, that inasmuch, as he says, the low wages of the labouring poor redound wholly to the pecuniary benefit of the capitalists who employ them, those capitalists shall be charged by law with their support, when wages become too low to supply the necessary wants of the labourer; at the same time bestowing power on the capitalists to prevent all marriages when the labourer can give no evidence of a prospect of increased means of subsistence, satisfactory to the capitalist, that he will not be burdened with the support of the offspring. We are, by no means, the advocates of Sismondi’s proposed arrangement. But if the labourers, since in some sense they may be considered freemen, give their consent to it, we do not perceive that it would be “at variance with the ordinances of God.”

The author of these “Elements” and Sismondi, we believe, differed little, if any, on the subject of the abolition of slavery touching the negro race. Will he say, the proposal of that philosopher to benefit the condition of the labouring poor, if carried into effect as suggested, would be “at variance with the ordinances of God?” Yet, all the world perceive that it is a mere modification of slavery, containing conditions more obnoxious to human nature than appertains to any condition of slavery now known beyond the African shores.

Man has ever been found to advance in moral improvement civilization, and a stable and healthy increase of population, only in proportion as they have been taught to supply their necessary wants by the products of individual labour. This is what first distinguishes civilized from savage life. The savage relies wholly upon the elements, the casualties that bring him advantage, and the spontaneous productions of nature. The idea of supplying his wants through the products of labour never enters the mind. And will it be denied that, even in civilized countries, they who solely rely upon begging, trick, and dishonesty, for their support, are always found to be deteriorating, both in morals and in their physical ability, rapidly receding from all the characteristics of civilization, in the direction towards savage life. Indeed, a tendency to move in the same direction is often perceptible among those who only partially supply the wants of civilized support by the product of individual labour, and rely upon their wits for the remainder, thus, to some extent, becoming the plunderers of society. We would have been happy to have found the causes why these things are so, as well as to have found the remedy, in “The Elements of Moral Science.”

But let us contemplate, for a moment, a certain class of freemen, the lazaroni of Italy, who exist, merely, upon one small dish of macaroni, daily issued to them from the Hospital of St. Lazarus. We are all familiar with the condition of these people. Let us compare theirs with what would be the condition of the beggars and thieves of some other countries, were they placed under the control of some salutary power, whereby their necessary wants would be supplied by the product of their individual labour. We need not ask which condition is most “at variance with the ordinances of God!”

Dr. Wayland has retained, for his last witness, the old trite charge that slavery impoverishes the soil; that, therefore, it constantly “migrates from the old to new regions,” “where alone the accumulated manure of centuries” can “sustain a system at variance with the laws of nature.” “Hence,” he says, “slavery in this country is acknowledged to have impoverished many of our most valuable districts.”

We are not aware how far Dr. Wayland has founded this statement upon facts drawn from his own observation. Has he done so at all; or has he, carelessly and without reflection, adopted it from the assertions of others notoriously destitute of ability to form an opinion with accuracy, or else too deeply prejudiced to give their opinion any value? Does he wish us to infer that the plough and the hoe, in the hands of a slave, communicate some peculiar poison to the soil; and by reason of which “the ground shall not henceforth yield her strength?” Will he please explain how the effect of which he complains is produced? If he finds it merely in the mode of cultivation, we then inquire whether the same mode would not produce the same effect, even if the plough and hoe were held by freemen? If so, then it is evident that “the impoverishment of many of our most valuable districts” is not the result of slavery, but of a bad mode of cultivation. Or, will the doctor contend that if those valuable districts had been cultivated by free hired men, the evils from negligence in the labourer would be remedied? “He that is a hireling fleeth, because he is a hireling, and careth not for the sheep.” _John_ x. 13.

Dr. Wayland will not deny that the “heathen round about,” of whom the Jews were permitted to buy slaves, were a slave-holding people; but we have no account that their country was impoverished thereby. The Canaanites, whom the Israelites drove out from Palestine, were slaveholders; yet the country was represented as very fertile, even to “overflowing with milk and honey.” The Danites found “Laish very good,” _Judg._ xviii. 9. And the children of Judah “found fat pasture and good” about Gedar. 1 _Chron._ iv. 40. “_For they of Ham had dwelt there of old!_”

For many centuries, slavery extended over every part of Europe, yet history gives us no account of the ruin of the soil. In Greece and Rome, the numbers of slaves were extended to millions beyond any number these States possess; but their historians failed to discover their destructive influence on the fertility of those countries.

Before the impoverishment of the soil can, with any force, be adduced as proof against slavery, it must be proved to be a necessary consequence; which, we apprehend, will be a difficult labour, since the sluggishness and the idleness of the Canaanites, and of the nations round about, left their country overflowing with milk and honey, abounding in fat pastures and good, notwithstanding their population were, to a large extent, slaves,—since, also, the servile cultivation of the soil in Greece and Rome did not impoverish it; and since slavery, which everywhere abounded in Europe, never produced that effect.

If Dr. Wayland will discover the legitimate cause of this impoverishment of the soil in the Slave States, and teach the planters a better mode of cultivation, we doubt not he will receive their thanks, and deserve well of his country, as a public benefactor.

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LESSON VII.

Dr. Wayland says:

P. 209. “The moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery.”

P. 210. “The moral principles of the gospel are directly subversive of the principles of slavery.” * * * “If the gospel be diametrically opposed to the _principles_ of slavery, it must be opposed to the _practice_ of slavery; and, therefore, were the principles of the gospel fully adopted, slavery could not exist.”

Dr. Wayland having conceived himself to possess a distinct faculty, which reveals to him, with unerring truthfulness, whatever is right and all that is wrong, may be expected to consider himself fully able to decide, in his own way, what instruction God intended to convey to us, on the subject of slavery, through the books of Divine revelation; yet, we cannot but imagine that St. Paul would be somewhat astonished, if presented with the doctor’s decision for his approval, and that he would cry out:

“Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant? To his own master, he standeth, or falleth: yea, he will be holden up; for God is able to make him stand.”

But although we cannot boast of possessing this unerring moral guide, which, of late years, seems to be so common a possession among that class who ardently desire us to believe that they have monopolized all the knowledge of God’s will on the subject of slavery, yet we may venture a remark on the logical accuracy of Dr. Wayland’s argument.

It seems to be a postulate in his mind that the gospel is diametrically opposed to, and subversive of, the principles of slavery. We do not complain of this syllogistic mode; but we do complain, as we have done before, that his postulate is not an axiom, a self-evident truth, or made equal thereto by the open and clear declarations of Christ or his apostles. This defect cannot be remedied by ever so many suppositions, nor by deductions therefrom. Nor will those of a different faith from Dr. Wayland, on the subject of “conscience,” or “moral sense,” be satisfied to receive the declarations of this his “distinct faculty” as the fixed decrees of eternal truth. His assertions and arguments may be very convincing to those who think they possess this distinct faculty, especially if their education and prejudices tend to the same conclusion.

But if what President Wayland says about slavery be true, then to hold slaves is a most heinous sin; and he who does so, and never repents, can never visit Paul in heaven. He necessarily is placed on a parallel with the thief and robber; and Dr. Channing has been bold enough to say so.

But has Paul ever hinted to us any such thing as that the holding of slaves is a sin? Yet he gives us instruction on the subject and relations of slavery. What excuse had St. Paul for not telling us what the Rev. Dr. Wayland now tells us, if what he has told us be true? And if it be true, what are we to think of Paul’s verity, when he asserts that he has “not shunned to declare all the counsel of God?”

Did Jesus Christ ever hint such an idea as Dr. Wayland’s? What are we to understand, when he addresses God, the Father, and says, “I have given unto them the words thou gavest me, and they have received them?” What are we to deduce from his remark on a slaveholder, and who notified him of that fact, when he says to his disciples, “Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel?” What impression was this remark calculated to produce on the minds of the disciples? Does Dr. Wayland found his assertion on _Luke_ xvii. 7–10? or does he agree with Paley that Christ privately condemned slavery to the apostles, and that they kept such condemnation secret to themselves, to prevent opposition to the introduction of Christianity, and left the most wicked sin of slave-holding to be found out by a mere innuendo? Or does Dr. Wayland claim, through the aid of his distinct moral faculty infallibly teaching him the truth, to have received some new light on the subject of slavery, which the FATHER deemed not prudent to be intrusted to the SON, and, therefore, now more lucid and authoritative than what was revealed to the apostles?

The Archbishop Secker has made a remark which appears to us conclusive, and also exactly to fit the case. In his Fifth Lecture on the Catechism, he says:—

“Supposing the Scripture a true revelation, so far as it goes; how shall we know, if it be a full and complete one too, in all things necessary? I answer: Since our Saviour had the Spirit without measure, and the writers of Scripture had as large a measure of it as their commission to instruct the world required, it is impossible that, in so many discourses concerning the terms of salvation as the New Testament contains, they should all have omitted any _one thing_ necessary to the great end which they had in view. And what was not necessary when the Scripture was completed, cannot have become so since. For the faith was, once for all, ‘delivered to the saints,’ _Jude_ 3; and ‘other foundation can no man lay,’ 1 _Cor._ iii. 11, than what was laid then. The sacred penmen themselves could teach no other doctrine than Christ appointed them; and he hath appointed no one since to make addition to it.”

But it may be proper to take some further notice how the author of these “Elements” attempts to prove the truth of the proposition that “the moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery.” He says, “God can make known to us his will, either directly or indirectly.”

He may, in express terms, command or forbid a thing; this will be directly;—or he may command certain duties, or impose certain obligations, with which some certain course of conduct is inconsistent; in which case the inconsistent course of conduct will be indirectly forbidden.

We have not followed Dr. Wayland’s exact words, because we found them somewhat confused, and rather ambiguous. We prefer to have the case clearly stated, and we then accept the terms, and repeat the question, “Has God imposed obligations on man which are inconsistent with the existence of domestic slavery?”

In proof that he has, Dr. Wayland presents the Christian duty “to preach the gospel to all nations and men, without respect to circumstances or condition.” We agree that such is our duty, so far as we may have the power; and it appears to us strange how that duty can interfere with the existence of slavery, because the practical fact is, slavery brings hundreds of thousands of negroes into a condition whereby the duty may be performed, and many thereby do come to some knowledge of the gospel, who would, otherwise, have none.

Every Christian slaveholder feels it to be his duty. Is it denied that this duty is ever performed?

But if it is incompatible with the institution of slavery for the slave to be taught Christianity, then Christianity and slavery can never co-exist in the same person. Therefore, Dr. Wayland must prove that no slave can be a Christian, before this argument can have weight.

The man who owns a slave has a trust; he who has a child has one also. In both cases the trustee may do as he did who “dug in the earth and hid his lord’s money.” We cheerfully deliver them up to the lash of Dr. Wayland.

The author of the “Elements of Moral Science” next presents the marriage contract, and seems desirous to have us suppose that its obligations are incompatible with slavery. His words are—

“He has taught us that the conjugal relation is established by himself; that husband and wife are joined together by God; and that man may not put them asunder. The marriage contract is a contract for life, and is dissoluble only for one cause, that of conjugal infidelity. Any system that interferes with this contract, and claims to make it any thing else than what God has made it, is in violation of his law.”

This proposition is bad; it is too verbose to be either definite or correct. There are many things that will interfere with the provisions of this proposition, and yet not be in violation of the laws of God. Suppose one of President Wayland’s pupils has married a wife, and yet commits a crime. He is arrested, and the president is his judge. When about to pronounce sentence of imprisonment for life, the pupil reads to his judge the foregoing paragraph, and argues that he cannot receive such sentence, because it will interfere with the marriage contract, and, therefore, be in violation of the laws of God.

We trust some will deem this a sufficient refutation of the proposition.

But if we take the proposition as its author has left it, we have yet to learn that any slaveholder will object to it; although it may be he will differ with them on the subject of what constitutes Christian marriage, among pagan negroes or their pagan descendants.

Will the reverend moralist determine that a promiscuous intercourse is the conjugal relation established by God himself; that such is the marriage contract which no man may put asunder? Will he decide that an attempt to regulate the conduct of men, bond or free, who manifest such a state of morals, is in violation of the laws of God? Who are his pupils, when he shall say that an attempt to enforce the laws of God, in practice among men, is a violation of them?

So far as our experience goes, masters universally manifest a desire to have their negroes marry, and to live with their wives and children, in conformity to Christian rules. And one reason, if no other, is very obvious. The master wishes to secure the peace and tranquillity of his household. And we take this occasion to inform Dr. Wayland and his coadjutors, that a very large proportion of the punishments that are awarded slaves are for violations of what, perhaps, he may call the marriage contract, so anxious is the master to inculcate the obligations of marriage among them.

It is true, some slaves of a higher order of physical and moral improvement, influenced by the habits and customs of their masters, habituate themselves to a cohabitation with one companion for life; and, in all such cases, the master invariably gives countenance to their wishes; indeed, in some instances, masters have deemed them worthy of having their wishes sanctioned and solemnized by the ceremonies of the church ritual. And in all such cases, superior consideration and advantages are always bestowed, not only in reward of their merit, but as an encouragement for others.

The African negro has no idea of marriage as a sacred ordinance of God. Many of the tribes worship a_Fetish_, which is a personification of their gross notions of procreation; but it inculcates no idea like that of marriage; and we have known the posterity of that people, four or five generations removed from the African native, as firmly attached to those strange habits as if they had been constitutional. Negroes, who have only arrived to such a state of mental and moral development, would find it somewhat difficult to comprehend what the Christian church implied by the marriage covenant! Therefore, where there was no reason to believe that its duties were understood, or that their habits and conduct would be influenced by it any longer than until they should take some new notion, a ceremony of any high order has been thought to do injury. A rule, often broken, ceases to be venerated. And we feel quite sure that some Christians would deem it quite improper to permit those to join in any sacred ceremony which neither their physical nor mental development would permit them to comprehend or obey, whether freemen or slaves.

In the articles drawn up at Ratisbon by Melancthon, we find, Article 16, _De Sacram. Matrimo._:

“The sacrament of matrimony belongs only to Christians. It is a holy and constant union of one single man with one single woman, confirmed by the blessing and consecration of Jesus Christ.”

And St. Paul says, _Eph._ v. 32, of matrimony: “This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the Church.”

We know not whether the author of the “Elements” believes, with Melancthon, that matrimony is a Christian sacrament or not. We believe the majority of modern Protestants do not so consider it, although Luther says, _De Matrimonio_:

“Matrimony is called a sacrament, because it is the type of a very noble and very holy thing. Hence the married ought to consider and respect the dignity of this sacrament.”

Question:—Would Melancthon, or Luther, or the author of these “Elements,” consent to perform the marriage ceremony, joining, in the holy bonds of matrimony, two negroes, who neither understood the Christian duties it imposed, and of whom it was well known that they would not regard the contract as binding any longer than their fancy or passions might dictate. A Christian sacrament is not only a sign of Christian grace, but the seal of its insurance to us, and the instrument of the Holy Ghost, whereby faith is conferred, as a Divine gift, upon the soul. We feel it a Christian duty to “not give that which is holy to dogs,” nor “cast pearls before swine.” Is Dr. Wayland of the same opinion?