Chapter II

The original of this Letter with the answer, which is roughly written on the blank leaf, is, I believe, now in the library of Oriel College, Oxford. I am indebted for my copy to the kindness of the Rev. J. H. Newman, D.D., formerly of that College.

REV. SIR,

I had long resisted an Inclination to desire your Thoughts upon the difficulty mentioned in my last, till I considered that the trouble in answering it would be only carrying on the general purpose of your Life, and that I might claim the same right to your Instructions with others; notwithstanding which, I should not have mentioned it to you had I not thought (which is natural when one fancies one sees a thing clearly) that I could easily express it with clearness to others. However I should by no means have given you a second trouble upon the subject had I not had your particular leave. I thought proper just to mention these things that you might not suspect me to take advantage from your Civility to trouble you with any thing, but only such objections as seem to me of Weight, and which I cannot get rid of any other way. A disposition in our natures to be influenced by right motives is as absolutely necessary to render us moral Agents, as a Capacity to discern right motives is. These two are I think quite _distinct_ perceptions, the _former_ proceeding from a desire inseparable from a Conscious Being of its own happiness, the _latter_ being only our Understanding, or Faculty of seeing Truth. Since a _disposition_ to be influenced by right motives is a _sine qua non_ to Virtuous Actions, an Indifferency to right motives must _incapacitate_ us for Virtuous Actions, or render us in that particular not moral agents. I do indeed think that no Rational Creature is _strictly speaking Indifferent_ to Right Motives, but yet there seems to be somewhat which to all intents of the present question is the same, viz. _a stronger disposition to be influenced by contrary or wrong motives_, and this I take to be always the Case when any vice is committed. But since it may be said, as you hint, that this stronger disposition to be influenced by Vicious Motives may have been contracted by repeated Acts of Wickedness, we will pitch upon the _first Vicious Action_ any one is guilty of. No man would have committed this first Vicious Action if he had not had a _stronger_ (at least as strong) _disposition_ in him to be influenced by the _Motives of the Vicious Action_, than by the _motives of the contrary Virtuous Action_; from whence I infallibly conclude, that since every man has committed some first Vice, every man had, _antecedent_ to the commission of it, a _stronger disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ than the _Virtuous_ motive. My difficulty upon this is, that a _stronger natural disposition_ to be influenced by the Vicious than the Virtuous Motive (which every one has antecedent to his first vice), seems, to all purposes of the present question, to put the Man in the same condition as though he was _indifferent to the Virtuous Motive_; and since an _indifferency to the Virtuous Motive_ would have _incapacitated_ a Man from being a _moral Agent_, or _contracting guilt_, is not a _stronger disposition_ to be influenced by the _Vicious_ Motive as great an _Incapacity_? Suppose I have two diversions offered me, _both_ of which I could not enjoy, I like both of them, but yet have a _stronger_ inclination to one than to the other, I am not indeed strictly _indifferent_ to either, because I should be glad to _enjoy both_; but am I not exactly _in the same case_, _to all intents and purposes of acting_, as though I was _absolutely indifferent_ to that diversion which I have the _least_ inclination to? You suppose Man to be endued naturally with a _disposition to be influenced by Virtuous Motives_, and that _this Disposition is a sine qua non to Virtuous Actions_, both which I fully believe; but then you _omit_ to consider the natural Inclination to be influenced by Vicious Motives, which, _whenever a Vice is committed_, is at least _equally strong_ with the other, and in the first Vice _is not affected by Habits_, but is as _natural_, and as much _out of a man's power_ as the other. I am much obliged to your offer of writing to Mr. Laughton, which I shall very thankfully accept of, but am not certain when I shall go to Cambridge; however, I believe it will be about the middle of the next month.

I am, Rev. Sir, Your most obliged humble Servant,

J. BUTLER.

Oriel, Oct. the 6th.

THE ANSWER.

Your objection seems indeed very dexterous, and yet I really think that there is at bottom nothing in it. But of this you are to judge, not from my assertion, but from the reason I shall endeavour to give to it.

I think then, that a _disposition to be influenced by right motives_ being what we call _rationality_, there cannot be on the contrary (properly speaking) any such thing naturally in rational creatures as a _disposition to be influenced by wrong motives_. This can be nothing but mere _perverseness of will_; and whether even that can be said to amount to a disposition to be influenced by wrong motives, _formally_, and as such, may (I think) well be doubted. Men have by nature strong inclinations to certain objects. None of these inclinations are vicious, but vice consists in pursuing the inclination towards any object in certain circumstances, notwithstanding _reason_, or the natural disposition to be influenced by right motives, declares to the man's conscience at the same time (or would do, if he attended to it) that the object ought not to be pursued in those circumstances. Nevertheless, where the man commits the crime, the _natural disposition_ was only towards the _object_, not formally towards the doing it upon wrong motives; and generally the very essence of the crime consists in the liberty of the will forcibly overruling the _actual disposition towards being influenced by right motives_, and not at all (as you suppose) in the man's having any _natural disposition to be influenced by wrong motives_, as such.