Chapter II: Part 2

But now Method seems to Require Me to Rank all My Thoughts under certain Heads, and to search in Which of them _Truth_ or _Falshood_ properly Consists. Some of them are (as it were) the _Images_ of Things, and to these alone the Name of an _Idea_ properly belongs, as When I think upon a Man, A Chimera or Monster, Heaven, an Angel, or _God_. But there are others of them, that have _superadded Forms_ to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny. I know I have alwayes (when ever I think) some certain Thing as the _subject_ or _object_ of my Thought, but in this last sort of thoughts there is something _more_ which I Think upon then Barely the likeness of the Thing. And of these Thoughts some are called _Wills_ and _Affections_, and Others of them _Judgments_.

Now as touching _Ideas_, if they be Consider’d alone as they are in themselves, without _Respect_ to any other Things, they cannot Properly be _false_; for Whether I _Imagine_ a Goat or a Chimera, ’tis as _Certain_ that I _Imagine_ one as t’other. Also in the _Will_ and _Affections_ I need not Fear any _Falshood_, For tho I should _Wish_ for _evil Things_, or Things that are Not, it is not therefore _Not true_ that I Wish for them.

Wherefore there onely Remains my _Judgments_ of Things, in which I must take Care that I be not _deceived_. Now the Chief and most usual _Error_ that I discover in them is, That I _Judge_ Those _Ideas_ that are _within_ me to be _Conformable_ and like to certain things that are _without_ Me; for truely if I Consider those Ideas as certain _Modes_ of my _Thought_, without Respect to any other Thing, they will scarce afford me an Occasion of _Erring_.

Of these _Ideas_ some are _Innate_, some _Adventitious_, and some Others seem to Me as Created by my self; For that I understand what _A Thing_ Is, What is _Truth_, What a _Thought_, seems to Proceed meerly from my own _Nature_. But that I now _hear_ a Noise, _see_ the Sun, or _feel_ heat, _I_ have alwayes _Judged_ to Proceed from Things _External_. But Lastly, Mermaids, Griffins, and such like Monsters, are _made meerly_ by _My self_. And yet _I_ may well think all of them either _Adventitious_, or all of them _Innate_, or all of them _made by my self_, for I have not as yet discover’d their true _Original_.

But _I_ ought cheifly to search after those of them which _I_ count _Adventitious_, and which I consider as coming from _outward objects_, that I may know what reason I have to think them _like_ the things themselves, which they _represent_. Viz. _Nature so teaches Me_; and also I know that they _depend_ not on my _Will_, and therefore _not on me_; for they are often present with me against my inclinations, or (as they say) in spite of my teeth, as now whether _I will_ or _no_ I feel heat, and therefore I think that the _sense_ or _Idea_ of heat is propagated to me by a _thing_ really _distinct_ from _my self_, and that is by the _heat_ of the _Fire_ at which I sit; And nothing is more obvious then for me to judge that That thing should transmit its own _Likeness_ into me, rather then that any other thing should be transmitted by it. Which sort of arguments whether firme enough or not I shall now Trie.

When I here say, that _nature so teaches me_, I understand only, that I am as it were _willingly forced_ to beleive it, and not that ’tis _discover’d_ to me to be _true_ by any _natural light_; for these two differ very much. For whatever is discover’d to me by the _Light_ of _nature_ (as that it necessarily Follows _that I am_, because _I think_) cannot possibly be _doubted_; Because I am endowed with no other _Faculty_, in which I may put so great confidence, as I can in the _Light_ of _nature_; or _which_ can possibly tell me, that those things are _false_, which _natural light_ teaches me to be _true_; and as to my _natural Inclinations_, I have heretofore often judged my self led by them to the election of the _worst part_, when I was in the choosing _one_ of two Goods; and therefore I see no reason why I should ever _trust_ them in any other thing.

And then, tho these _Ideas depend not_ on my _will_, it does not therefore follow that they _necessarily proceed_ from _things external_. For as, Altho those _Inclinations_ (which I but now mention’d) are in me, yet they seem _distinct_ and _different_ from my _will_; so perhaps there may be in me some other _faculty_ (to me _unknown_) which may prove the _Efficient cause_ of these _Ideas_, as hitherto I have observed them to be formed in me whilst I _dream_, without the help of any _External Object_.

And last of all, tho they should _proceed_ from things which are _different_ from me, it does not therefore follow that they must be _like_ those things. For often times I have found the _thing_ and the _Idea differing_ much. As for example, I find in my self two divers _Ideas_ of the Sun, _one_ as _received_ by my _senses_ (and which cheifly I reckon among those I call adventitious) by which it appears to me very _smal_, * _another_ as taken from the arguments of Astronomers (that is to say, _consequentially collected_, or some other ways made by me from certain _natural notions_) by which ’tis rendred something bigger then the Globe of the Earth. Certainly both of these cannot be _like_ that sun which is _without me_, and my reason perswades me, that that _Idea_ is most _unlike_ the Sun, which seems to _proceed Immediately_ from it self.

All which things sufficiently prove, that I have hitherto (not from a _true judgement_, but from a _blind impulse_) beleived that there are certain things _different_ from my self, and which have sent their _Ideas_ or _Images_ into me by the Organs of my _senses_, or some other way.

But I have yet an other Way of inquiring, whether any of those Things (whose _Ideas_ I have _within_ Me) are Really Existent _without_ Me; And that is Thus: As those _Ideas_ are only _Modes_ of _Thinking_, I acknowledge no _Inequality_ between them, and they all proceed from me in the _same Manner_. But as _one_ Represents _one thing_, an _other_, an _other Thing_, ’tis Evident there is a _Great difference_ between them. * For without doubt, Those of them which Represent _Substances_ are something _More_, or (as I may say) have _More_ of _Objective Reallity_ in them, then those that Represent only _Modes_ or _Accidents_; and again, _That_ by Which I understand a _Mighty God_, _Eternal_, _Infinite_, _Omniscient_, _Omnipotent Creatour_ of all things besides himself, has certainly in it _more Objective Reallity_, then Those _Ideas_ by which _Finite Substances_ are Exhibited.

But Now, it is evident by the _Light_ of _Nature_ that there must be _as much_ at least in the _Total efficient Cause_, as there is in the _Effect_ of _that Cause_; For from Whence can the _effect_ have its _Reallity_, but from the _Cause_? and how can the _Cause_ give it that _Reallity_, unless _it self have_ it?

And from hence it follows, that neither a _Thing_ can be made out of _Nothing_, Neither a Thing which is _more Perfect_ (that is, Which has in it self _more Reallity_) _proceed_ from That Which is _Less Perfect_.

And this is _Clearly_ True, not only in those _Effects_ whose _Actual_ or _Formal Reallity_ is Consider’d, But in Those _Ideas_ also, Whose _Objective Reallity_ is only Respected; That is to say, for Example of Illustration, it is not only impossible that a stone, Which _was not_, should now begin _to Be_, unless it were produced by _something_, in Which, Whatever goes to the Making a Stone, is either _Formally_ or _Virtually_; neither can _heat_ be Produced in any Thing, which before was _not hot_, but by a Thing which is at least of as equal a _degree_ of _Perfection_ as _heat_ is; But also ’tis Impossible that I should have an _Idea_ of Heat, or of a _Stone_, unless it were put into me by some _Cause_, in which there is at Least as much _Reallity_, as I Conceive there is in heat or a Stone. For tho that _Cause_ transfers none of its own _Actual_ or _Formal Reality_ into my _Idea_, I must not from thence conclude that ’tis _less real_; but I may think that the _nature_ of the _Idea_ it self is such, that of it self it requires no other _formal reality_, but what it has from my _thought_, of which ’tis a _mode_. But that this Idea has _this_ or _that objective reallity_, rather then any _other_, proceeds clearly from some _cause_, in which there ought to be at least as much _formal reallity_, as there is of _objective reallity_ in the _Idea_ it self. For if we suppose any thing in the _Idea_, which was not in its _cause_, it must of necessity have this from _nothing_; but (tho it be a most _Imperfect manner_ of _existing_, by which the thing is _objectively_ in the _Intellect_ by an _Idea_, yet) it is not _altogether nothing_, and therefore cannot proceed from _nothing_.

Neither ought I to doubt, seeing the _reallity_ which I perceive in my _Ideas_ is only an _objective reallity_, that therefore it must of necessity follow, that the same _reallity_ should be in the _causes_ of these _Ideas formally_. But I may conclude, that ’tis sufficient that this _reallity_ be in the very _causes_ only _objectively_. For as that _objective manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of an _Idea_, so that _formal manner_ of _being_ appertains to the very _nature_ of a _cause_ of _Ideas_, at least to the _first_ and _chiefest causes_ of them; For tho perhaps one _Idea_ may receive its birth from an other, yet we cannot proceed in _Infinitum_, but at last we must arrive at some _first Idea_, whose _cause_ is (as it were) an _Original copy_, in which all the _objective reallity_ of the _Idea_ is _formally contain’d_. So that I plainly discover by the _light_ of _nature_, that the _Ideas_, which are in me, are (as it were) _Pictures_, which may easily _come short_ of the _perfection_ of those things from whence they are taken, but cannot _contain_ any thing _greater_ or _more perfect_ then them: And the _longer_ and _more diligently_ I pry into these things, so much the more _clearly_ and _distinctly_ do I discover them to be _true_.

But what shall I conclude from hence? Thus, that if the _objective reallity_ of any of my _Ideas_ be _such_, that it cannot be in me either _formally_ or _eminently_, and that therefore I cannot be the _cause_ of _that Idea_, from hence it necessarily Follows, that _I alone_ do not only _exist_, but that some other thing, which is _cause_ of that _Idea_, does _exist also_.

But if I can find no _such Idea_ in me, I have no argument to perswade me of the _existence_ of any thing besides my self for I have diligently enquired, and hitherto I could discover no other _perswasive_.

Some of these _Ideas_ there are (besides that which represents _my self_ to _my self_, of which in this place I cannot doubt) which represent to me, one of them a _God_, others of them _Corporeal_ and _Inanimate_ things, some of them _Angels_, others _Animals_, and lastly some of them which exhibite to me _men like my self_.

As touching those that represent _Men_ or _Angels_ or _Animals_, I easily understand that they may be _made up_ of those _Ideas_ which I have of _my self_, of _Corporeal_ things, and of _God_, tho there were neither _man_ (but my self) nor _Angel_, nor _Animal_ in being.

And as to the _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things, I find nothing in them of that _perfection_, but it may proceed from my self; for if I look into them more narrowly, and examine them more particularly, as yesterday (_in the second Medit._) I did the _Idea_ of Wax, I find there are but few things which I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ in them, viz. _Magnitude_ or _extension_ in _Longitude_, _Latitude_, and _Profundity_, the _Figure_ or _shape_ which arises from the _termination_ of that _Extension_, the _Position_ or _place_ which divers _Figured Bodies_ have in _respect_ of each other, their _motion_ or _change of place_; to which may be added, their _substance_, _continuance_, and _number_; as to the other, such as are, _Light_, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smels_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, and _Cold_, with the other _tactile qualities_, I have but very _obscure_ and _confused thoughts_ of them, so that I know not, whether they are _true_ or _false_, that is to say, whether the _Ideas_ I have of them are the _Ideas_ of _things_ which _really are_, or _are not_. For altho _falshood formally_ and _properly_ so called, consists only in the _judgement_ (as before I have observed) yet there is an other sort of _material falshood_ in _Ideas_, when they represent a _thing_ as _really existent_, tho it does _not exist_; so, for example, the _Ideas_ I have of _heat_ and _cold_ are so _obscure_ and _confused_, that I cannot collect from them, whether _cold_ be a _privation_ of _heat_, or _heat_ a _privation_ of _cold_, or whether either of them be a _real quality_, or whether neither of them be _real_. And since every _Idea_ must be _like_ the thing it represents, if it be _true_ that _cold_ is nothing but the _privation_ of _heat_, that _Idea_ which represents it to me as a thing _real_ and _positive_ may deservedly be called _false_. The same may be apply’d to other Ideas.

And now I see no necessity why I should assigne any other _Author_ of these _Ideas_ but _my self_; for if they are _false_, that is, represent things that _are not_, I know by the _light_ of _nature_ that they proceed from _nothing_; that is to say, I harbour them upon no other account, but because my _nature_ is _deficient_ in something, and _imperfect_. But if they are _true_, yet seeing I discover so little _reality_ in them, that that very _reality_ scarce _seems_ to _be realy_, I see no reason why I my self should not be the _Author_ of them.

But also some of those very _Ideas_ of _Corporeal_ things which are _clear_ and _distinct_, I may seem to have borrow’d from the _Idea_ I have of _my self_, viz. _Substance_, _duration_, _number_, and the like; For when I conceive a _stone_ to be a _substance_ (that is, _a thing apt of it self to exist_) and also that I _my self_ am a _substance_, tho I conceive _my self_ a _thinking substance_ and _not extended_, and the _stone_ an _extended substance_ and _not thinking_, by which there is a great _diversity_ between both the _conceptions_, yet they _agree_ in this, that they are _both substances_. So when I conceive my self as _now_ in being, and also remember, that _heretofore_ I _have been_; and since I have _divers_ thoughts, which I can _number_ or _count_; from hence it is that I come by the notions of _duration_ and _number_; which afterwards I apply to other things.

As to those other things, of which the _Idea_ of a _body_ is made up, as _extension_, _figure_, _place_ and _motion_, they are not _formally_ in me, seeing I am only a _thinking thing_; yet seeing they are only certain _modes_ of _substance_, and I my self also am a _substance_, they may seem to be in me _eminently_.

* Wherefore there only Remains the _Idea_ of a _God_, wherein I must consider whether there be not something included, which cannot possibly have its _original_ from me. By the word _God_, I mean a certain _Infinite Substance_, _Independent_, _Omniscient_, _Almighty_, by whom both _I my self_, and every thing else that _is_ (if any thing do _Actualy exist_) was created. All which _Attributes_ are of such an _high nature_, that the more attentively I consider them, the less I conceive my self possible to be the _Author_ of these notions.

From what therefore has been said I must conclude that there is a _God_; for tho the _Idea_ of _substance_ may arise in me, because that I my self am a _substance_, yet I could not have the _Idea_ of an _Infinite substance_ (seeing I my self am _finite_) unless it proceeded from a _substance_ which is _really Infinite_. Neither ought I to think that I have no _true Idea_ of _Infinity_, or that I perceive it only by the _negation_ of what is _finite_, as I conceive _rest_ and _darkness_ by the _negation_ or _absence_ of _motion_ or _light_. But on the contrary I plainly understand, that there is _more reality_ in an _Infinite substance_, then in a _Finite_; and that therefore the _perception_ of an _Infinite_ (as _God_) is _antecedent_ to the _notion_ I have of a _finite_ (as _my self_). For how should I know that I _doubt_ or _desire_, that is to say, that I _want_ something, and that I am _not altogether perfect_, unless I had the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_, by _comparing_ my self to which I may discover my own _Imperfections_.

Neither can it be said that this _Idea_ of _God_ is _false Materialiter_, and that therefore it _proceeds_ from _nothing_, as before I observed of the _Ideas_ of _heat_ and _cold_, _&c._ For on the contrary, seeing this _notion_ is most _clear_ and _distinct_, and contains in it self more _objective reality_ then any other _Idea_, none can be more _true_ in it self, nor in which less _suspition_ of _falshood_ can be found. This _Idea_ (I say) of a _being infinitely perfect_ is most _true_, for tho it may be supposed that such a _being_ does _not exist_, yet it cannot be supposed that the _Idea_ of such a _being_ exhibites to me nothing _real_, as before I have said of the _Idea_ of _cold_. This _Idea_ also is most _clear_ and _distinct_, for whatever I perceive _clearly_ and _distinctly_ to be _real_, and _true_, and _perfect_, is wholy _contain’d_ in this _Idea_ of _God_.

Neither can it be objected, that I cannot _comprehend_ an _Infinite_, or that there are innumerable other things in _God_, which I can neither _conceive_, nor in the least _think upon_; for it is of the _very nature_ of an _Infinite_ not to be _apprehendable_ by _me_ who am _finite_. And ’tis sufficient to me to prove this my _Idea_ of _God_ to be the most _true_, the most _clear_, and the most _distinct Idea_ of all those _Ideas_ I have, upon this _account_, that I understand that _God_ is _not to be understood_, and that I judge that whatever I _clearly_ perceive and know _Implys_ any _perfection_, as also perhaps other innumerable _perfections_, which I am ignorant of, are in _God_ either _formally_ or _eminently_.

_Doubt._ But perhaps _I am_ something _more_ then I take my self to _be_, and perhaps all these _perfections_ which I attribute to _God_, are _potentially_ in me, tho at present they do not shew themselves, and break into action. For I am now fully experienced that my _Knowledge_ may be _encreased_, and I see nothing that hinders why it may not _encrease_ by degrees in _Infinitum_, nor why by my _knowledge_ so _encreased_ I may not attain to the other _perfections_ of _God_; nor lastly, why the _power_ or _aptitude_ of _having_ these perfections may not be sufficient to produce the _Idea_ of them in _me_.

_Solution._ But none of these will do; for first, tho it be true that my _Knowledge_ is capable of being _increased_, and that many things are in me _potentially_, which _actually_ are not, yet none of these go to the making an _Idea_ of _God_, in which I conceive nothing _potentially_, for tis a certain argument of _imperfection_ that a thing _may be encreased Gradually_. Moreover, tho my knowledge may be _more_ and _more encreased_, yet I know that it can never be _actually Infinite_, for it can never arrive to that _height_ of _perfection_, which admits not of an _higher degree_. But I conceive God to be _actually_ so _Infinite_, that nothing can be _added_ to his _perfections_. And lastly, I perceive that the _objective being_ of an _Idea_ cannot be _produced_ only by the _potential being_ of a _thing_ (which in proper speech is _nothing_) but requires an _actual_ or _formal being_ to its _production_.

Of all which forementioned things there is nothing that is not _evident_ by the _light_ of _reason_ to any one that will diligently consider them. Yet because that (when I am careless, and the _Images_ of _sensible_ things _blind_ my _understanding_) I do not so easily call to mind the reasons, why the _Idea_ of a _being more perfect_ then _my self_ should of necessity proceed from a _being_ which is _really more perfect_; It will be requisite to enquire further, whether _I_, who have this _Idea_, can possibly _be_, unless _such_ a _being_ did _exist_. To which end let me aske, _from whence_ should I _be_? From _my self_? or from my _Parents_? or from any other thing _less perfect_ then _God_? for nothing can be thought or supposed _more perfect_, or _equally perfect_ with _God_.

But first, If _I_ were from my self, I should neither _doubt_, nor _desire_, nor _want_ any thing, for I should have given my self all those _perfections_, of which I have any _Idea_, and consequently I my self should be _God_; and I cannot think that those things I _want_, are to be acquired with _greater difficulty_ then those things I _have_; but on the contrary, ’tis manifest, that it were much more _difficult_ that _I_ (that is, _a substance_ that _thinks_) should _arise_ out of _nothing_, then that I should _acquire_ the _knowledge_ of many things whereof I am _Ignorant_, which is only the _accident_ of that _substance_. And certainly if I had that _greater thing_ (viz _being_) from my self, I should not have _denyed_ my self (not only, those things which may be easier acquired, but also) All those things, which I perceived are contain’d in the _Idea_ of a _God_; and the reason is, for that no other things _seem_ to me to be _more difficultly_ done, and certainly if they were _Really more difficult_, they would _seem_ more _difficult_ to me (if whatever _I have_, I _have_ from my self) for in those things I should find my _Power_ put to a stop.

Neither can I Evade the force of these Arguments by supposing my self to _have alwaies Been, what now I am_, and that therefore I need not seek for an _Author_ of my _Being_. For the _Duration_ or _Continuance_ of my life may be _divided_ into _Innumerable Parts_, each of which does not at all _depend_ on the _Other Parts_; Therefore it will not follow, that because _a while ago, I was_, I must of necessity _now Be_. I say, this will not follow, Unless, I suppose some _Cause_ to _Create me_ (as it were) _anew_ for _this_ Moment (that is, _Conserve me_). For ’tis evident to one that Considers the Nature of _Duration_, that the same _Power_ and _Action_ is requisite to the _Conservation_ of a Thing each _Moment_ of its _Being_, as there is to the _Creation_ of that Thing _anew_, if it did _not exist_. So that ’tis one of those _Principles_ which are _Evident_ by the _Light_ of _Nature_: that the _Act_ of _Conservation_ differs only _Ratione_ (as the Philosophers term it) from the _Act of Creation_.

Wherefore I ought to ask my self this Question, whether _I_, who _now_ Am; have any _Power_ to _Cause_ my self to _Be hereafter_? (for had I any such _power_, I should certainly _know_ of it, seeing I am nothing but a _Thinking Thing_, or at least at present I onely treat of that part of me, which is a _Thing_ that _Thinks_) to which, I answer, that I can discover no such _Power_ in Me; And consequently, I evidently know that _I depend_ on some _Other being distinct_ from _my self_.

But what if _I_ say that perhaps this _Being_ is not _God_, but that _I_ am produced either by my _Parents_, or some other _Causes less perfect_ then _God_? In answer to which let me consider (as _I_ have said before) that ’tis _manifest_ that whatever is in the _effect, so much_ at least ought to be in the _cause_; and therefore seeing _I_ am a thing that _thinks_, and have in me an _Idea_ of _God_, it will confessedly follow, that whatever sort of _cause_ I assign of my _own Being_, it also must be a _Thinking Thing_, and must have an _Idea_ of all those _Perfections_, which I attribute to _God_; Of which _Cause_ it may be again Asked, whether it be _from it self_, or from any other _Cause_? If _from it self_, ’tis evident (from what has been said) that it must be _God_; For seeing it has the _Power_ of _Existing of it self_, without doubt it has also the _power_ of _actually Possessing_ all those _Perfections_ whereof it has an _Idea_ in it self, that is, all those _Perfections_ which I conceive in _God_. But if it Be from an _other Cause_, it may again be asked of that _Cause_ whether it be _of it self_, or from an _other_; Till at length We arrive at the _Last Cause_ of All, Which will Be _God_. For ’tis evident, that this _Enquiry_ will not admit of _Progressus in Infinitum_, especially when at Present I treat not only of that Cause which at _first made_ Me; But chiefly of that which _conserves_ me in this _Instant_ time.

Neither can it be supposed that many _partial Causes_ have _concurred_ to the making Me, and that I received the _Idea_ of one of _Gods perfections_ from _One_ of them, and from an _other_ of them the _Idea_ of an _other_; and that therefore all these Perfections are to be found _scattered_ in the World, but not all of them _Joyn’d_ in any one which may Be _God_. For on the contrary, _Unity_, _Simplicity_, or the _inseparability_ of All Gods Attributes is one of the _chief Perfections_ which I conceive in Him; and certainly the _Idea_ of the _Unity_ of the _Divine Perfections_ could not be _created_ in me by any other _cause_, then by _That_, from whence I have received the _Ideas_ of his other _perfections_; For ’tis Impossible to make me conceive these _perfections_, _conjunct_ and _inseparable_, unless he should also make me know what _perfections_ these _are_.

Lastly as touching my _having_ my _Being_ from my _Parents_. Tho whatever Thoughts I have heretofore harbour’d of Them were _True_, yet certainly they _contribute_ nothing to my _conservation_, neither proceed I from them as _I am_ a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, for they have onely _predisposed_ that _material Thing_, wherein _I_, that is, _my mind_ (_which_ only at present I take for _my self_) _Inhabits_. Wherefore I cannot _now_ Question that I am sprung from them. But I must of necessity conclude that because _I am_, and because I have an _Idea_ of a _Being most perfect_, that is, of _God_, it evidently follows that _there is a God_.

* Now it only remains for me to examine, how I have received this _Idea_ of _God_. For I have neither received it by _means_ of _my Senses_, neither comes it to me _without_ my _Forethought_, as the _Ideas_ of _sensible_ things use to do, when such things _Work_ on the Organs of my _Sense_, or at least _seem_ so to work; Neither is this _Idea_ framed by _my self_, for I can neither _detract from_, nor _add_ any thing _thereto_. Wherefore I have only to conclude that it is _Innate_, even as the _Idea_ of me _my self_ is _Natural_ to my self.

And truly ’tis not to be Admired that _God_ in Creating me should _Imprint_ this _Idea_ in me, that it may there remain as a _stamp impressed_ by the _Workman God_ on _me_ his _Work_, neither is it requisite that this _stamp_ should be a Thing _different_ from the _Work_ it self, but ’tis very Credible (from hence only that _God Created_ me) that I am made as it were according to his _likeness_ and _Image_, and that the same _likeness_, in which the _Idea_ of God is contain’d, is _perceived_ by Me with the _same faculty_, with which I _perceive my Self_; That is to say, whilst _I reflect_ upon my self, _I_ do not only _perceive_ that I am an _Imperfect_ thing, having my _dependance_ upon some other thing, and that I am a Thing that Desires _more_ and _better_ things _Indefinitely_; But also at the same time I understand, that _He_ on whom I _depend_ contains in him all those _wish’d for things_ (not only _Indefinitely_ and _Potentially_, but) _Really_, _Indefinitely_; and that therefore he is _God_. The whole stress of which * Argument lies thus, because I know it Impossible for Me to Be of the same Nature I am, _Viz._ Having the _Idea_ of a _God_ in me, unless really there were a _God_, a _God_ (I say) that very _same God_, whose _Idea I_ have in my _Mind_ (that is, Having all those _perfections_, which I cannot _comprehend_, but can as it were _think upon them_) and who is not _subject_ to any _Defects_.

By which ’tis evident that _God_ is no _Deceiver_; for ’tis manifest by the _Light_ of _Nature_, that all _fraud_ and _deceit_ depends on some _defect_. But before I prosecute this any farther, or pry into other _Truthes_ which may be deduced from this, I am willing here to stop, and dwell upon the Contemplation of this _God_, to Consider with my self His _Divine Attributes_, to behold, admire, and adore the Loveliness of this _Immense light_, as much as possibly I am able to accomplish with my _dark_ Understanding. For as by _Faith_ we _believe_ that the greatest _happiness_ of the _next Life_ consists alone in the _Contemplation_ of the _Divine Majesty_, so we _find_ by _Experience_ that now we receive from thence the greatest _pleasure_, whereof we are capable in _this Life_; Tho it be much more _Imperfect_ then that in the _Next_.

MEDITAT. IV.

_Of Truth and Falshood._

Of late it has been so common with me to withdraw _my Mind_ from my _sences_, and I have so throughly consider’d how few things there are appertaining to _Bodies_ that are _truly_ perceived, and that there are more Things touching _Mans mind_, and yet more concerning _God_, which are _well known_; that now without any difficulty _I_ can turn my Thoughts from things _sensible_, to those which are only _Intelligible_, and _Abstracted_ from _Matter_. And truely _I_ have a much more _distinct Idea_ of a _Mans mind_ (as it is a _Thinking Thing_, having no _Corporeal Dimensions_ of _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, nor having any other _Corporeal Quality_) then the _Idea_ of any _Corporeal Thing_ can be. And when I reflect upon my self, and consider how that I _doubt_, that is, am an _imperfect dependent Being_, I from hence Collect such a _clear_ and _distinct Idea_ of an _Independent perfect Being_, which is _God_, and from hence only that _I have such an Idea_, that is, because _I_ that have this _Idea_ do _my self Exist_; I do so _clearly_ conclude that _God also Exists_, and that on him my _Being depends_ each Minute; That I am Confident nothing can be known more _Evidently_ and _Certainly_ by _Humane Understanding_.

And now _I_ seem to perceive a _Method_ by which, (from this Contemplation of the _true God_, in whom the Treasures of _Knowledge_ and _Wisdome_ are Hidden) _I_ may attain the _Knowledge_ of other Things.

And first, _I_ know ’tis impossible that this _God_ should _deceive_ me; For in all _cheating_ and _deceipt_ there is something of _imperfection_; and tho to be _able_ to _deceive_ may seem to be an Argument of _ingenuity_ and _power_, yet without doubt to _have_ the _Will_ of _deceiving_ is a sign of _Malice_ and _Weakness_, and therefore is not _Incident_ to _God_.

I have also found in my self a _Judicative faculty_, which certainly (as all other things I possess) I have received from _God_; and seeing he will not _deceive_ me, he has surely given me such a _Judgement_, that I can _never Err_, whilst I make a _Right Use_ of it. Of which truth I can make no doubt, unless it seems, that From hence it will follow, That therefore _I can never Err_; for if whatever I have, I have from _God_, and if he gave me no _Faculty_ of _Erring_, I may seem not to be _able to Err_. And truly so it is whilst I think upon _God_, and wholly convert my self to the _consideration_ of him, I find no occasion of _Error_ or _Deceit_; but yet when I return to the _Contemplation_ of _my self_, I find my self liable to _Innumerable Errors_. Enquiring into the _cause_ of which, I find in my self an _Idea_, not only a _real_ and _positive one_ of a _God_, that is, of a _Being infinitely perfect_, but also (as I may so speak) a _Negative Idea_ of _Nothing_; that is to say, I am so constituted between God and Nothing or between a perfect _Being_ and _No-being_, that as I am _Created_ by the _Highest Being_, I have nothing in Me by which I may be _deceived_ or drawn into _Error_; but as I pertake in a manner of _Nothing_, or of a _No-Being_, that is, as I my self am _not_ the _Highest Being_, and as I _want_ many _perfections_, ’tis no Wonder that I should be _Deceived_.

By which I understand that _Error_ * (as it is _Error_) is not any _real Being_ dependant on _God_, but it is only a _Defect_; And that therefore to make me _Err_ there is not requisite a _faculty_ of _Erring_ given me by _God_, but only it so happens that I _Err_ meerly because the _Judicative faculty_, which he has given me, is not _Infinite_.

But yet this Account is not fully _satisfactory_; for _Error_ is not only a meer _Negation_, but ’tis a _Privation_, or a _want_ of a certain _Knowledge_, which _ought_ (as it were) to be in me. And when I consider the _Nature_ of _God_, it seems impossible that he should give me any _faculty_ which is not _perfect_ in its _kind_, or which should _want_ any of its _due perfections_; for if by how much the more _skilful_ the _Workman_ is, by so much the _Perfecter Works_ proceed from him. What can be made by the _Great Maker_ of all things which is not _fully perfect_? For I cannot Doubt but _God_ may _Create_ me so that I may _never_ be _deceived_, neither can I doubt but that he _Wills_ whatever is _Best_; Is it therefore _better_ for me to be _deceived_, or not to be _deceived?_

These things when I Consider more heedfully, it comes into my Mind, First, that ’tis no cause of Admiration that _God_ should do Things whereof I can give no account, nor must I therefore doubt his _Being_, because there are many things done by him, and I not comprehend _Why_ or _How_ they are done; for seeing I now know that my _Nature_ is very _Weak_ and _Finite_, and that the _Nature_ of _God_ is _Immense_, _Incomprehensible_, _Infinite_; from hence I must fully, understand, that he can do numberless things, the _Causes_ whereof lie _hidden_ to Me. Upon which account only I esteem all those Causes which are Drawn from the End (viz. _Final Causes_) as of no use in _Natural Philosophy_, for I cannot without Rashness Think my self _able_ to Discover _Gods_ Designes.

I perceive this also, that whenever we endeavour to know whether the _Works_ of _God_ are _perfect_, we must not Respect any _one kind_ of Creature _singly_, but the _Whole Universe_ of _Beings_; for perhaps what (if considered _alone_) may Deservedly seem _Imperfect_, yet (as it is a _part_ of the _World_) is most _perfect_; and tho since I have _doubted_ of all things, I have discover’d nothing _certainly_ to _Exist_, but _my self_, and _God_, yet since I have Consider’d the _Omnipotency_ of _God_, I cannot deny, but that many other things _are made_ (or at least, _may be made_) by him, so that I my self _may be_ a _part_ of this _Universe_.

Furthermore, coming nigher to my self, and enquiring what these _Errors_ of mine, are (which are the Only Arguments of my _Imperfection_) * I find them to _depend_ on _two concurring Causes_, on my _faculty_ of _Knowing_, and on my _faculty_ of _Choosing_ or _Freedome_ of my _Will_, that is to say, from my _Understanding_, and my _Will together_. For by my _Understanding alone_ I only perceive _Ideas_, whereon I make _Judgments_, wherein (_precisely_ so taken) there can be no _Error, properly_ so called; for tho perhaps there may be numberless things, whose _Ideas_ I have _not_ in Me, yet I am not _properly_ to be said _Deprived_ of them, but only _negatively wanting_ them; and I cannot prove that _God ought_ to have given me a _greater faculty_ of _Knowing_. And tho I understand him to be a _skilful Workman_, yet I cannot Think, that he _ought_ to have put all those _perfections_ in _each_ Work of his _singly_, with which he might have _endowed some_ of them.

Neither can I complain that _God_ has not given me a _Will_, or _Freedom_ of _Choise_, _large_ and _perfect_ enough; for I have experienced that ’tis _Circumscribed_ by _no Bounds_.

And ’tis worth our taking notice, that I have no other thing in me so _perfect_ and so _Great_, but I Understand that there may be _Perfecter_ and _Greater_, for if (for Example) I consider the _Faculty_ of _Understanding_, I presently perceive that in me ’tis very _small_ and _Finite_, and also at the same time I form to my self an _Idea_ of an other _Understanding_ not only _much Greater_, but the _Greatest_ and _Infinite_, which I perceive to belong to _God_. In the same manner if I enquire into _memory_ or _imagination_ or any other faculties, I find them in my self _Weak_ and _Circumscribed_, but in _God_ I Understand them to be _Infinite_, there is therefore only my _Will_ or _Freedome_ of _Choice_, which I find to be _so Great_, that I cannot frame to my self an _Idea_ of _One Greater_, so that ’tis by this _chiefly_ by which I Understand my self to Bear the _likeness_ and _Image_ of _God_. For tho the _Will_ in _God_ be without comparison _Greater_ then Mine, both as to the _Knowledge_ and _Power_ which are _Joyn’d_ therewith, which make it more _strong_ and _Effective_, and also as to the _Object_ thereof, for _God_ can apply himself to _more_ things then I can. Yet being taken _Formally_ and _Precisely Gods Will_ seems _no greater_ then Mine. For the _Freedome_ of _Will_ consists only in this, that we can _Do_, or _not Do_ such a Thing (that is, _affirm_ or _deny_, _prosecute_ or _avoid_) or rather in this Only, that we are _so carried_ to a Thing which is _proposed_ by Our _Intellect_ to _Affirm_ or _Deny_, _Prosecute_ or _Shun_, that we are _sensible_, that we are _not Determin’d_ to the _Choice_ or _Aversion_ thereof, by any _outward Force_.

Neither is it Requisite to make one _Free_ that he should have an _Inclination_ to _both_ sides. For on the contrary, by how much the more _strongly_ I am inclined to _one_ side (whether it be that I _evidently perceive_ therein Good or Evil, or Whether it be that _God has so disposed_ my _Inward Thoughts_) By so much the _more Free_ am I in my _Choice_.

Neither truly do _Gods Grace_ or _Natural Knowledge_ take away from my _Liberty_, but rather _encrease_ and _strengthen_ it. For that _indifference_ which I find in my self, when no Reason inclines me _more_ to _one side_, then to _the other_, is the _meanest_ sort of _Liberty_, and is so far from being a sign of _perfection_, that it only argues a _defect_ or _negation_ of _Knowledge_; for if I should always _Clearly see_ what were _True_ and _Good_ I should never _deliberate_ in my _Judgement_ or _Choice_, and Consequently, tho I were _perfectly Free_, yet I should never be _Indifferent_.

From all which, I perceive that neither the _Power_ of _Willing precisely_ so taken, which I have from _God_, is the _Cause_ of my _Errors_, it being most _full_ and _perfect_ in its kind; Neither also the _Power_ of _Understanding_, for whatever I _Understand_ (since ’tis from God that I _Understand_ it) I _understand aright_, nor can I be therein _Deceived_.

From _Whence_ therefore proceed all my _Errors_? To which, I answer, that they proceed from _hence_ only, that seeing the _Will_ expatiates it self _farther_ then the _Understanding_, I keep it not within the _same bounds_ with my _Understanding_, but often extend it to those things which I _Understand not_, to which things it being _Indifferent_, it easily Declines from what is _True_ and _Good_; and consequently I am _Deceived_ and _Commit sin_. * Thus, for example, when lately I felt my self to enquire, Whether any thing doth _Exist_, and found that from my setting _my self_ to Examine such a thing, it evidently follows that I _my self Exist_, I could not but _Judge_, what I so _clearly Understood_, to be _true_, not that I was _forced_ thereto by any _outward impulse_, but because a _strong Propension_ in my _Will_ did follow this _Great Light_ in my _Understanding_, so that I believed it so much the more _freely_ and _willingly_, by how much the less _indifferent_ I was thereto. But now I understand, not only, that I _Exist_ as I am a _Thing_ that _Thinks_, but I also meet with a certain _Idea_ of a _Corporeal Nature_, and it so happens that I _doubt_, whether that _Thinking Nature_ that is in me be _Different_ from that _Corporeal Nature_, or Whether they are _both the same_: but in this _I_ suppose that _I_ have found no Argument to _incline_ me _either ways_, and therefore _I_ am _Indifferent_ to _affirm_ or _deny either_, or to _Judge nothing_ of _either_; But this _indifferency_ extends it self not only to those things of which I am _clearly ignorant_, but generally to all those things which are _not_ so very _evidently known_ to me at the Time when my _Will Deliberates_ of them; for tho never so probable _Guesses incline_ me to _one_ side, yet the Knowing that they are only _Conjectures_, and not indubitable _reasons_, is enough to Draw my _Assent_ to the _Contrary_ Part. Which Lately _I_ have sufficiently experienced, when _I_ supposed all those things (which formerly _I_ assented to as most _True_) as very _False_, for this _Reason_ only that _I_ found my self _able_ to doubt of them in some manner.

If I abstain from _passing_ my _Judgment_, when I do _not clearly_ and _distinctly_ enough perceive what is _Truth_, ’tis evident that I do _well_, and that I am _not deceived_: But if I _affirm_ or _deny_, then ’tis that I _abuse_ the _freedome_ of my _will_, and if I turn my self to that part which is _false_, I am _deceived_; but if I _embrace_ the _contrary_ Part, ’tis but _by chance_ that I light on the _Truth_, yet I shall not therefore be Blameless, for ’tis Manifest by the _light_ of _Nature_ that the _Perception_ of the _Understanding ought_ to preceed the _Determination_ of the _Will_. And ’tis in this _abuse_ of _Free-Will_ that That _Privation_ consists, which Constitutes _Error_; I say there is a _Privation_ in the _Action_ as it proceeds from Me, but not in the _Faculty_ which I have received from _God_; nor in the _Action_ as it _depends_ on _him_.

Neither have I any Reason to Complain that God has not given me a _larger Intellective Faculty_, or more _Natural Light_, for ’tis a necessary Incident to a _finite Understanding_ that it should not Understand _All_ things, and ’tis Incident to a _Created Understanding_ to be _Finite_: and I have more Reason to thank him for what he has _bestowed_ upon me (tho he _owed_ me nothing) then to think my self _Robbed_ by him of those things which he _never gave me_.

Nor have I Reason to Complain that he has given me a _Will_ larger then my _Understanding_: for seeing the _Will_ Consists in _one_ thing only, and as it were in an _Indivisible_ (viz. to _Will_, or _not to Will_) it seems contrary to its nature that it should be _less_ then ’tis; and certainly by how much the _Greater_ it is, so much the more _Thankful_ I ought to be to _him_; that Gave it me.

Neither can I Complain that God _concurrs_ with me in the Production of those _Voluntary Actions_ or _Judgements_ in which I am _deceived_: for those _Acts_ as they _depend_ on _God_ are altogether _True_ and _Good_; and I am in some measure _more perfect_ in that I can _so Act_, then if I could _not_: for that _Privation_, in which the _Ratio Formalis_ of _Falshood_ and _Sin_ consists, wants not the _Concourse_ of _God_; For it is _not A Thing_, and having respect to him as its _Cause_, ought not to be called _Privation_, but _Negation_; for certainly ’tis no _Imperfection_ in _God_, that he has given me a _freedome_ of _Assenting_ or _not Assenting_ to some things, the _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge whereof he has not _Imparted_ to my _Understanding_; but certainly ’tis an _Imperfection_ in me, that I _abuse_ this _liberty_, and _pass_ my _Judgement_ on those things which I do _not Rightly_ Understand.

Yet I see that ’tis Possible with _God_ to effect that (tho I should remain _Free_, and of a _Finite Knowledge_) I should _never Err_, that is, if he had endowed my _Understanding_ with a _clear_ and _distinct_ Knowledge of all things whereof I should ever have an _Occasion_ of _deliberating_; or if he had only so firmly fix’d in my Mind, that I should never forget, this, _That I must never Judge of a thing which I do not clearly and distinctly Understand_; Either of which things had _God_ done, I easily perceive that _I_ (as consider’d in my self) should be _more perfect_ then now I am, yet nevertheless I cannot deny but that there _may be a greater perfection_ in the _whole Universe_ of Things, for that some of its parts are Obnoxious to _Errors_, and some not, then if they were all _alike_. And I have no Reason to Complain, that it has pleased God, that I should _Act_ on the _Stage_ of this _World_ a _Part_ not the _chief_ and _most perfect_ of all; Or that I should not be able to abstain from _Error_ in the _first way_ above specifi’d, which depends upon the _Evident Knowledge_ of those things whereof _I deliberate_; Yet that I may abstain from _Error_ by the _other means_ abovemention’d, which depends only on this, _That I Judge not of any Thing, the truth whereof is not Evident._ For tho I have experienced in my self this _Infirmity_, that I cannot _always_ be intent upon _one_ and the _same_ Knowledge, yet _I_ may by a _continued_ and _often repeated_ Meditation bring this to pass, that as often as _I_ have use of this Rule _I_ may Remember it, by which means I may Get (as it were) an _habit_ of _not erring_.

In which thing seeing, the _greatest_ and _chief perfection_ of _Man_ consists, _I_ repute my self to have gain’d much by this days _Meditation_, for that therein _I_ have discover’d the _Cause_ of _Error_, _and Falshood_; which certainly can be no other then what _I_ have now Declared; for whenever in Passing my Judgement, _I_ bridle my _Will_ so that it extend it self _only_ to those things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, it is impossible that I can _Err_. For doubtless All _clear_ and _distinct_ Perception is _something_, and therefore cannot _proceed_ from _Nothing_, but must necessarily have _God_ for its _Author_ (_God_, I say, Who is _infinitely Perfect_, and who _cannot Deceive_) and therefore it Must be _True_.

Nor have I this Day learnt only what I must _beware off_ that I be not _deceived_, but also what I must _Do_ to Discover _Truth_, for _That_ I shall certainly find, if I fully Apply my self to those things _only_, which I _perfectly_ understand; and if I distinguish between those and what I apprehend but _confusedly_ and _obscurely_; Both which hereafter I shall endeavour.

MEDITAT. V.

_~Of the Essence~ of Things ~Material~. And herein Again of ~God~. And that he does ~Exist~._

There are yet remaining many Things concerning _Gods Attributes_, and many things concerning the _nature_ of _my self_ or of my _Mind_, which ought to be searched into: but these perhaps I shall set upon at some other Opportunity. And at Present nothing seems to me more requisite (feeling I have discover’d what I must _avoid_, and what I must _Do_ for the _Attaining_ of _Truth_) then that I imploy my Endeavours to free my self from those doubts into which I have lately fallen, and that I try whether I can have any certainty of Material Things.

But before I enquire whether there be any such things _Really Existent without_ Me, I ought to consider the _Ideas_ of those things, as they are in my Thoughts and try which of them are _Distinct_, which _confused_.

In which search I find that I _distinctly imagine Quantity_, that which Philosophers commonly call _continued_, that is to say, the _Extension_ of that _Quantity_ or thing _continued_ into _Length_, _Breadth_, and _Thickness_, I can _count_ in it divers Parts, to which parts I can assign _Bigness_, _Figure_, _Position_, and _Local Motion_, to which _Local Motion_ I can assign _Duration_. Neither are only these _Generals_ plainly discover’d and known by Me, but also by attentive Consideration, I perceive Innumerable _particulars_ concerning the _Shapes_, _Number_, and _Motion_ of These Bodies; The _Truth_ whereof is so _evident_, and _agreeable_ to my _Nature_, that when I first discover’d them, I seemed not so much to have _Learnt_ any thing that is _new_, as to have only _remembred_ what I have known _before_, or only to have thought on those things which were in me _before_, tho this be the first time that I have examin’d them so _diligently_.

One thing there is worthy my Consideration, which is, that I find in my self innumerable _Ideas_ of certain things, which tho perhaps they _exist no where without_ Me, yet they cannot Be said to be _Nothing_; and tho they are _Thought_ upon by me at my _will_ and _pleasure_, yet they are not _made_ by _Me_, but have their own _True_ and _Immutable Natures_. As when, for example, * I _Imagine_ a _Triangle_, tho perhaps such a _Figure Exists no where_ out of my _Thoughts_, nor ever _will Exist_, yet the _Nature_ thereof is _determinate_, and its _Essence_ or Form is _Immutable_ and _Eternal_, which is neither _made_ by me, nor _depends_ on my mind, as appears for that many _properties_ may be _demonstrated_ of this Triangle, _viz._ That its three Angles are equal to two right ones, that to its Greatest Angle the Greatest side is subtended, and such like, which I now _clearly_ know whether _I will or not_, tho before _I_ never thought on them, when I _imagine_ a Triangle, and consequently they could not be invented by Me. And ’tis nothing to the purpose for me to say, that perhaps this _Idea_ of a Triangle came to me by the Organs of _sense_, because I have sometimes seen bodies of a _Triangular Shape_; for I can think of Innumerable other _Figures_, which I cannot suspect to have come in through my _senses_, and yet I can _Demonstrate_ various _properties_ of them, as well as of a _Triangle_, which certainly are all _true_, seeing I know them _clearly_, and therefore they are _something_, and not a meer _Nothing_, for ’tis Evident that _what is true is something_.

And now I have sufficiently Demonstrated, that _what I clearly perceive, is True_; And tho I had _not demonstrated_ it, yet such is the _Nature_ of my _Mind_, that I could not but give my _Assent_ to what I _so_ perceive, at least, as long as I _so_ perceive it; and I remember (heretofore when I most of all relied on _sensible Objects_) that I held those _Truths_ for the most _certain_ which I _evidently_ perceived, such as are concerning _Figures_, _Numbers_, with other parts of _Arithmetick_, and _Geometry_, as also whatever relates to _pure_ and _abstracted Mathematicks_.