Chapter III: Part 3

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Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists have bitterly opposed the army’s efforts to take over _all_ political power, or to seize control of their business enterprises.

Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn to a consideration of the events of the past decade.

THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION

The “Mukden incident” of September 18, 1931 marked the halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then convulsing Japan. Its violent phase lasted for eight months longer, until May 15, 1932.

We have already seen the first result of this struggle--the overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took up the reins of power in mid-December 1931. It proved to be the last one-party government to hold office during that decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Takahashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War.

Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye, Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against the “corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists.” More plots followed. Then, on May 15, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported by high army officers, who had planned to seize control of the government.

CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA

After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign policy. Japanese troops had spread over most of Manchuria. In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had occurred. In March the “independent” state of Manchoukuo was established. Far from being independent, it was really the plaything of Japan’s army extremists who had planned the “Mukden incident.”

Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally recognized Manchoukuo. Early in 1933, on basis of the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In March 1933 Japanese troops occupied Jehol province, and added it to Manchoukuo. In May these troops advanced to the gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced “demilitarization” of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China. Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations. For the time, her conquest of Manchuria had been made good in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world.

PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35)

The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was “peaceful” only by contrast with the years before and after. The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our using the term.

Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism, governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry, in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, who allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War Ministry. Araki’s successor carried out a partial “purge” of the army extremists.

KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET

There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935 Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm the political waters.

In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying to realize their goal of “state socialism.” They were building strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian industry. They met with opposition from business interests at home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence over these economic questions, the extremists forced the establishment inside the Cabinet of a Manchoukuo Affairs Board. Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan’s finances could not stand such a large and continuing investment drain to Manchoukuo.

On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara, the “Lawrence of Manchuria,” tried to detach five of the northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed into the background.

DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY

Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this “peaceful” period. But the moderates were reasserting their control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set for a moderate course. Even the parties’ strength was reviving. The climax of this trend came with the general election of February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan’s labor party elected eighteen Diet members, while three left-wing proletarians won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with much greater party influence, might now be formed.

But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936--known in Japan as the “2-26” affair.

THE “2-26” UPRISING

The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400 troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the outbreak.

A long death list had been prepared. Actually only three high officials were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance Minister; Admiral Saito, the former Premier, then Lord Privy Seal; and General Watanabe, who had been responsible for shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada escaped, but his brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of Tokyo both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince Saionji, the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks directed against them.

For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo. They were finally disarmed when it became clear that the revolt was not taking hold anywhere else. Once again, an attempt to seize the government had failed. Nevertheless, the uprising caused an important shift in the balance of political power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. Under succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led directly toward the war with China in 1937.

PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37)

The chief result of the “2-26” uprising was to give greater power over government policy to the army leaders. This power was not exercised by the extremists in person, because the military revolt had temporarily discredited them in the people’s eyes. A new set of army leaders adopted most of their platform, however, and succeeded in putting it across. The public strongly opposed the expansionist and military-fascist tendencies of the new program, but could do no more than delay its realization.

The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet headed by Hirota, a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It called for stronger pressure on China, expressed in demands for “Sino-Japanese cooperation.” The anti-Comintern pact was concluded with Germany in November 1936. On the home front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sections of heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped from supplying armaments for the defense services, threw their support to the enlarged arms program. On the other hand, popular opposition to the Hirota Cabinet grew steadily. Following strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota resigned in January 1937.

General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized Minseito and Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within two months he had carried through the economic planks of Hirota’s platform. Ikeda and Yuki, representing the business houses, took official posts in order to handle the financial problems. Premier Hayashi also instituted a Cabinet Planning Board, which became an economic general staff for the army program.

THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY

These rapid steps toward a “wartime economy” met with bitter opposition from the parties and even more from the public at large. A wide breach opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet and the people. When Hayashi dissolved the Diet, he was overwhelmingly defeated in the general election of April 1937. Out of 466 members in the Diet’s lower house, the government elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in office, but finally, on May 31, had to resign.

The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was shown quite unmistakably in this election--even more unmistakably than in the earlier election of February 1936. At that time, the extremists had defeated the will of the people by the “2-26” uprising. This time they used new methods.

Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored--at least to all outward appearances. Party members were included in the Cabinet, and Prince Konoye was made the symbol of unity. But the party men chosen for Cabinet posts were in sympathy with the military-fascist program, and in any case held only minor offices. The chief Ministries were cornered by the army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them.

But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell the widespread suspicion of the army’s aims. It was necessary to quiet opposition voices, reestablish the army’s prestige and really get somewhere with the “controlled economy” plans.

How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye Cabinet entered office, Japan was at war with China.

XII. War with China

Few of Japan’s leaders expected that the war with China would last for years. Their original plans called for a short campaign of five or six months. North China, Shanghai and Nanking would be occupied. Chiang Kai-shek’s crack divisions would be destroyed in the Shanghai-Nanking operations. By Christmas, at the latest, a dictated peace could be imposed at Nanking.

VICTORIES WITHOUT PEACE

On the military side, these calculations proved surprisingly accurate. The victorious Japanese troops _were_ entering Nanking in mid-December. And all the strategic railways in North China _were_ under Japan’s control. But these military successes did not lead to the expected peace settlement. China’s national unity held firm, and Chinese resistance continued. If Japan wished to dictate peace terms, she would have to wage further battle.

This she proceeded to do. Two big campaigns were fought during 1938. In May, after a bitter struggle in Shantung province, Japan’s northern and southern armies were able to join forces. In October, after an exhausting advance up the Yangtze River, the Japanese captured Hankow. A lightning blow in the south led to the occupation of Canton.

China’s main cities, and much of her railway system, were now in Japanese hands. But still there was no sign of peace. By the end of 1938, it was clear that, despite her military triumphs, Japan had not won victory. The war had lasted eighteen months, instead of six. In lives and money, it had cost Japan far more than the original reckoning. And the end was not in sight.

What was happening at home during these first eighteen months of the war? Three main trends were clear. First, all popular opposition to the war was suppressed. Second, the military took over conduct of affairs in China, allowing the Cabinet little or no say. And third, a “controlled economy” was set up, although the army leaders did not succeed in getting it into their hands. The business houses either pared down the controls, or decided how they were to be applied.

MAKING THE PUBLIC TOE THE LINE

Various measures to gain public support of the war were adopted. The most spectacular was a campaign for “national spiritual mobilization.” It began on September 11, 1937 with a patriotic rally in Tokyo, addressed by the Premier and other Cabinet Ministers and broadcast throughout the country. In the Diet the parties expressed their support of the war. Even Japan’s labor party, which had elected 36 Diet members in April 1937, swung behind the war policy. The authorities were not content, however. In December 1937, the Home Ministry carried out large-scale police raids, in which hundreds of persons were arrested. Two left-wing labor and party groups, both headed by Kanju Kato, were disbanded without notice. Kato himself, who had been elected to the Diet by a proletarian constituency in Tokyo, was jailed. The arrests also included Baroness Ishimoto, a noted feminist leader, and a great many liberals and pacifists.

All sections of Japan’s ruling circles were united in this program of suppressing popular opposition to the war. There was more scope for disagreement, however, over how the war in China should be conducted. But in this dispute the army held all the points of vantage, and soon reigned supreme.

THE ARMY WINS A FREE HAND IN CHINA

Control of military and naval operations in and off China was given in November 1937 to Imperial Headquarters. This special organ included all the high army and navy officers. Since it decided military policy under the direct authority of the Emperor, it neatly sidetracked Cabinet control. Non-military phases of policy in China, however, were not so easily disposed of. Here the army used a technique which it had tried and tested in Manchuria. In September 1938 army leaders forced the establishment of a China Affairs Board, set up within the Cabinet but run by military men. Through this board the army kept economic and political affairs in China pretty well under its thumb, despite some continued opposition from the Foreign Ministry. In the broader field of international policy the struggle for power was more acute. It still continues, although the army eventually became strong enough to put through the alliance with Germany and Italy.

THE ECONOMIC WAR MACHINE

The third main trend of which we spoke was the establishment of a wartime “controlled economy” in Japan. The state took over more and more control of the economic life of the country. Both army and businessmen agreed that such control was necessary, but bitterly disagreed as to how it should be applied. On the whole, the businessmen managed to keep the most important economic regulations in their own hands.

The fiercest political struggle during 1938 was waged over the National Mobilization Bill. Drafted by the Planning Board under army influence, this measure called for drastic economic conscription. The government was to have practically unlimited control of social and economic life, including finance, industry, trade, labor and the press. With respect to labor, the bill provided for compulsory allocation of workers to their jobs, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and empowered the government to fix wages, hours and working conditions.

This bill met with determined opposition in the Diet. Army supporters, using pressure and intimidation, including terroristic attacks on Diet members and on party headquarters in Tokyo, pushed it through. Nevertheless, the opposition did force certain modifications in the original plan. Premier Konoye pledged that it would be applied only during a wartime emergency and not invoked in the Sino-Japanese conflict, which was still referred to in Japan as an “incident.” The Premier also agreed to appoint a majority of Diet members to the National Mobilization Council. This Council was to be consulted before Imperial ordinances applying various sections of the bill were issued.

But on May 5, 1938, despite Konoye’s pledge to the Diet, several of the main provisions of the bill _were_ applied, and new ordinances issued since have put many others into effect. Before Premier Konoye’s resignation in January 1939, a broad series of control measures was in operation. Foreign exchange was strictly licensed. To make up the huge war budgets the government had taken over control of capital, and restricted new investment to a list of so-called “essential” industries. It also rigidly regulated trade, limiting the export and import of several hundred commodities. It put the labor control provisions of the National Mobilization Act into effect. In June 1938 it instituted nation-wide price control for certain commodities, and has since steadily increased the list of such goods. The Home Ministry enrolled several thousand “economic police” officers to enforce the price schedules and other features of the economic program.

THE MEN AT THE CONTROLS

But despite the sweeping nature of these provisions, the business houses managed to keep a fair amount of independence. Their own men took key positions in many of the agencies that were enforcing the control measures. In the field of capital investment, they could still tip the scales. They successfully resisted army pressure for outright state control and operation of industry. Nationalization of the vital electric power industry, for instance, over which they fought long and bitterly, was finally put through only part way, and has been a subject of continued dispute.

So it was not the military leaders alone, but the military leaders in an uneasy partnership with the businessmen and the party heads, who carried out the wartime economic program. The army fascists charted the program, it is true, but they were not allowed to run it in their own sweet way. The army ruled in China, as it had in Manchuria. But it was not the unchallenged dictator at home. There, it shared power with “big business.” And big business, despite war restrictions, still operated its own enterprises and still reaped its dividends.

STALEMATE IN CHINA

A Cabinet under Prince Konoye had held office throughout the first phase of the war in China. It resigned in January 1939, when China’s refusal to accept a dictated peace had become unmistakable. For Japan now no longer won spectacular victories. A stalemate had developed, and the war had become a war of attrition. This second phase of the war lasted for another eighteen months--until June 1940, when Hitler’s victories in Europe shifted the balance of power in the Far East.

The costs to Japan of this second period were no less than before. She had to maintain the same number of troops in China, totaling 800,000 or 1,000,000. Heavy fighting was taking place almost continuously. But the hostilities, ranging from Canton to Inner Mongolia, led to no decisive results. In some cases Japan occupied new cities, such as Nanchang, Nanning and Ichang. In other cases Japanese offensives were disastrously routed. Chinese guerrillas, ranging far and wide, limited Japan’s area of effective control, even in the so-called “occupied” territory. Moreover, the economic gains were not as great as the army had expected. Sales of Japanese goods to China steadily increased, but imports of Chinese raw materials either declined or rose very slowly.

STEPPING ON WESTERN TOES

At the same time Japan’s interference with the interests of the Western powers in China became much more direct, and created serious friction. Difficulties were most acute at Tientsin, Shanghai and Amoy. The Japanese army imposed various restrictions. It kept Western shipping off the Yangtze River above Shanghai, and the Pearl River below Canton. Western traders had to face many practices--tariffs, exchange controls, import and export controls--which were put into effect especially to hamper their trade. The Japanese enforced a blockade of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin, and stripped British citizens for examination before allowing them to enter or leave their Concession. Although the Western powers resented these Japanese actions, they limited their opposition mainly to protests. In July 1939 the United States abrogated its trade treaty with Japan, but did not follow up this step by imposing trade penalties.

THREE JAPANESE WAR CABINETS

Difficulties on Japan’s home front mounted steadily during the second phase of the war. The strain was shown in many ways. One was the rapidity with which Cabinets succeeded one another. The first Konoye Cabinet, as we have seen, had held office for nineteen months--from June 1937 to January 1939. In the second period (January 1939 to July 1940), there were no less than three Cabinets. Their average length of life was only six months. These Cabinets, with their Premiers, held office as follows:

1. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, January 5, 1939 to August 29, 1939

2. General Nobuyuki Abe, August 30, 1939 to January 15, 1940

3. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, January 16, 1940 to July 16, 1940.

HIRANUMA AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT

Many of the decisive events of this period were closely related to the Cabinet changes. Hiranuma, for example, was forced out of office by the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939. During that summer the Hiranuma Cabinet had been dickering with Germany over the details of a proposed military pact, while the Japanese army had been fighting a minor war with the Soviet Union on the Outer Mongolian frontier. So the Soviet-German pact came as a stunning blow to Tokyo, and for a time feelings against Germany ran high. The army extremists, who had strongly advocated an alliance with Germany, were discredited along with Hiranuma. Consequently, extremist influence was not so great in the next two Cabinets, headed by General Abe and Admiral Yonai.

ABE AND THE PRICE OF RICE

The Abe Cabinet was overthrown five months later for reasons entirely different, but equally significant. Here the issue turned mainly on Japan’s growing economic difficulties. During the winter of 1939-40 a rice shortage developed, and “bootleg” prices soared toward 50 yen per _koku_ (the five bushel unit)--dangerously close to the level which stimulated the “rice riots” of 1918. In September 1938 the Abe Cabinet had fixed ceilings on all prices. When the rice shortage developed, it had to back down on its own ruling. In November it raised the official price from 38 to 43 yen per _koku_. By this time, however, the farmers had already sold their crops, and the gains were reaped by the rice dealers.

Outspoken criticisms were expected in the Diet and, rather than meet them, the Abe Cabinet resigned in mid-January. The incoming Yonai Cabinet had to face the music. One outspoken member of the Minseito party, Takao Saito, challenged not only economic conditions, but the war itself. His striking speech of February 2, 1940 attacked Wang Ching-wei’s proposed regime (Japan’s puppet government) in China as nothing more than a “central government in name.” After casting doubt on the prospects of achieving the “new order in East Asia,” he asked what the Japanese people had received in return for their great sacrifices in the war. Even more serious, in the eyes of Japan’s army leaders, was Saito’s declaration that, in view of China’s large territory and army, it “is doubtful whether Japan can overthrow” Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. A critical electric power “famine” which developed at this time, and forced many factories to shut down, underlined the truth in Saito’s remarks. The Japanese people backed Saito so strongly that several months passed before the authorities dared to expel him from the Diet.

YONAI TRAILS TOO FAR BEHIND NAZI PUSH

But Hitler’s military victories in the spring of 1940, and especially the defeat of France, swiftly altered Japan’s position in the Far East. The “moderation” which the Abe and Yonai Cabinets had shown in foreign policy suddenly vanished. Intense pressure was brought to bear on the French authorities in the Far East. In June the French Ambassador at Tokyo agreed to stop shipments of goods to China over the Indo-China Railway. Less than a month later, the British government also bowed to the Japanese demand that the Burma Road be closed for three months. But these gains were not enough for the extremist elements within Japan. They had received a fresh impetus from Hitler’s successes, and were prepared to move far more boldly both on the home and foreign fronts. The War Minister, maneuvering for the set-up of an equally bold and impetuous Cabinet, suddenly offered his resignation. Thus, on July 16, 1940, the Yonai Cabinet crumbled.

XIII. Shadow Over Asia

Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940, the flood that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached a new high. Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no longer to be confined to China. The goal was now a “Greater East Asia,” including all the rich colonial territories in southern Asiatic waters. At home, also, the pace quickened. The army leaders moved toward full suppression of the parties, and a reduction of the Diet’s powers. Obstacles to foreign expansion and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and slowed down the fascist advance.

In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reaching moves. On September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen, Japan was allotted “Greater East Asia” for her “living space.” This sphere, however, was not yet under Japanese control. It had to be won. So the second move was a step in the direction of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China.

In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted a limited number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the French colony of Indo-China. These troops were the entering wedge. Then Japan pushed her control southward to Saigon. Early in 1941, Tokyo dictated a settlement of the Thailand-Indo-China conflict, which she hoped would eventually yield her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And Saigon, we should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore.

A HARD ROW TO HOE

In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet’s expansionist program--like that of its predecessors--did not enjoy easy going. For the war in China was still not won. In November 1940 Japan formally recognized Wang Ching-wei’s Nanking regime (the puppet government she herself had created). But this step merely spotlighted Japan’s failure to secure peace in China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations with the Soviet Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the British and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served as an eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singapore, strategic key to southeast Asia.

THE HOME FRONT

On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even firmer dictatorial control. All political parties “voluntarily” dissolved in the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to curb the Diet’s influence by amending the Election Law to give fewer people votes. And the extremists began to organize a mass fascist party, with local units throughout the country.

These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken criticism marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in 1940-41. The “near neighbor” groups, set up by the new fascist party, gave the authorities a means of checking up closely on popular opinion, and taking measures to suppress opposition as soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties were piling up, and the need for repression was becoming greater. Rationing of sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended to rice early in 1941.

A HORSE TRADE

But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling circles, was not settled by the Konoye government’s actions. On the contrary, it continued as strong as ever. A characteristic “deal” indicated the lines along which the struggle was being fought. The military-fascist groups were unwilling to permit a general election, due in 1941, to take place. On the other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise the Election Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In January 1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run on without an election for one year, and to support the government’s program in the meantime.

EXPANSION OR DEFEAT?

In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed itself to a policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. Since 1937 Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the war in China, or twice the total national debt in 1936. She had suffered more than a million casualties, in killed, wounded and diseased. In return for these great losses, she expected vast gains.

Thus “Greater East Asia” became the avowed goal of Japan’s foreign policy. To Japan’s rulers, it represented the full flowering of the “bloc economy” idea. They now considered not only Manchuria and China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary for such a bloc. The raw materials of southeast Asia, especially the oil, tin and rubber of the Indies and Malaya, were needed to make up the deficiencies of a “Japan-China-Manchoukuo” bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan would not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still lack high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless, with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control, Japan believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to secure the foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed in the world market.

Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East Asiatic bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible, they concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright German victory in Europe, however, the difficulties which confront Tokyo’s advance toward mastery of East Asia are still formidable.

For Japan’s economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial production has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off, and reserves of foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, and relations with the Soviet Union are uncertain. The British Empire and the United States, which stand guard over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of Japan’s foreign trade. By moving against them in that region, Japan might risk everything gained thus far. For the first time, she would be staking her future on a war with powers that control the seas and access to world markets. She would be facing all the dangers that she successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18.

Japan’s geographical location, close to the scene of action in the Far East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic deficiencies have been, and continue to be, her main source of weakness. The ratio between these two controlling factors may well determine the immediate future. Is Japan’s new Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, or is it to suffer its first great defeat?

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Shadow over AsiaChapter III: Part 3

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