Chapter VIII: On the Russian Army.101 (2)

According to the ordinance of 1845, they were to be raised to 20 regiments of cavalry, and of 884 men each; and, in addition, they were to furnish an escort for the Emperor at Petersburg, and one division (I suppose 2 sotni) for the active Polish army.

Counting upon the old state of things before 1845, the total was 108 sotni and 24 guns.

6. The Cossacks of the Ural Mountains: 12 regiments of cavalry, of 5 sotni each, making altogether 60 sotni.

7. The Cossacks of Orenbourg: 10 regiments of cavalry, of 6 sotni each, and 3 batteries of horse artillery; total 60 sotni and 24 guns.

8. The Cossacks of the Line of Siberia, who must not be confounded with the Cossacks of the towns in that country: 9 regiments of cavalry, and 3 batteries of horse artillery; total 54 (?) sotni and 24 guns.

9. The Cossacks of the frontiers of China: 8 sotni.

10. The Cossacks of Astrakhan: 3 regiments of cavalry, and 1 battery of horse artillery; 18 sotni and 8 guns.

11. The town Cossacks of Siberia: 8 regiments of infantry (? battalions).

The number of the Cossack infantry is very uncertain, because the force of the Siberian battalions is unknown.

The most important question for Europe to inquire is, as to how many of these Cossacks are available during a European war like the present? On this point the following calculation must of course be only approximative.

1. If Russia continues the war of the Caucasus on its present footing.—In this case the Cossacks of the Don, 9 or 10 regiments of which are ordinarily employed in the Caucasus, would only offer of—

Disposable troops 38,000 cavalry 100 pieces of artillery.
Cossacks of Danube 1,700 ” ”
Cossacks of Ural 5,000 ” ”
Cossacks of Orenbourg 5,000 ” 10 ”
------ ---
Total 49,700 ” 110 ”

2. If Russia restricted herself to a purely defensive war in the Caucasus, and abandoned her more advanced posts, without leaving her frontiers undefended, there might be added 2000 men of the Don, 2000 Tchernomorski or Black Sea Cossacks, 4000 Cossacks of the Line; altogether 10,000 additional men.

The total force available would then be 60,000 cavalry and 110 guns. In each of these cases 20,000 to 30,000 cavalry of the new formation might be drawn from Siberia, and directed successively to the theatre of war.

There are, besides, a number of irregular troops not of Russian origin, but organized after the manner of the Cossacks; and although their military importance is not great, I will enumerate them.

Many of the tribes that will be mentioned have long served under the Russian banner, as anciently the Gauls served in the armies of Cæsar. Their motive has been not attachment to the Russians, but fear of them. Long habit and traditions of submission have much modified their state of feeling, and has at last made these people pretty faithful servants of the Russian government; as, for example, the Bashkírs, who used formerly to have constant sanguinary collisions with the Cossacks of the Ural Mountains. _There are other tribes who now serve the Russians, because they are forced to do so, and who would willingly fight against them, if they had not a conviction of their own inferiority._

Other tribes would suffer the supremacy of Russia pretty patiently, if that power was not so severe in making them respect the rights of property, and if she did not prevent their indulging their old habits of levying blackmail on their neighbours, and the merchants and travellers who pass through their territory.

It is therefore evidently not from any great benefits to be derived from their military organization, but in order to watch them, that they are brought into close relations with the Cossack troops charged with the defence of the Russian authority in the countries inhabited by them.

The following is a concise account of these nations:—

(A.) The Tatars of Crimea. These feeble remains of the ancient
sovereigns of Southern Russia belong to that horde whose Khans
had formerly more than once penetrated as far as the Oka, and
never at the head of less than 150,000 cavalry. They now furnish
to the Imperial Guard a squadron of fine irregular troops.

(B.) The warlike tribes of the Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia.
They furnish to the Russian government auxiliary troops for
the wars in those countries. These troops are very useful,
although dependence cannot be always placed on them; but for
wars beyond their own country, any number might be obtained by
voluntary enlistment. They furnish to the Russian army—

1. A squadron of the guard forming the personal escort of
the Emperor, and constituting, with a squadron of the
Cossacks of the Line, “the Tcherkess Guards.”

2. A regiment of 6 squadrons serving in the army of Poland.

3. An infantry regiment of Georgian militia to reinforce
the military cordon established against the Lesghins,
beyond the Alezan, a river of Kakhetia, in Georgia.
Total of these:—2 battalions and 7 squadrons.

(C.) The Bashkírs and Metschériacks. They inhabit in part as
nomades Perm and Orenbourg, and belong to the army of the
Cossacks of Orenbourg. In 1813 many of these served in Germany.

(D.) The Buriates and the Toungouses:—5 regiments of cavalry.

They form part of the Cossack force on the Chinese frontier.

Russia might march forward a large portion of these irregular troops, but they are yet so little civilized that the Russian government does not like to bring them to the West, because their want of discipline and obedience in fighting would make them rather an impediment than an advantage on the field of battle. They are, however, of some importance, as they might be used to replace the best corps of Cossacks in the East and in the Caucasus, while the latter were moved away to the West.

The native cavalry of the Caucasus alone, on account of their great courage and address, would offer a precious auxiliary force to the Russian army in wars on her western frontier, if they could be brought to fight under her banner.[115]

The regiments of irregular cavalry among the Russians are principally intended to serve for a war of skirmishers. Their chief business is to provide for the security of the Russian army, and its means of communication, by protecting the baggage and the convoys of prisoners. They are also very useful in carrying orders, and forming relays for correspondence; and, lastly, are of the greatest importance in annoying the enemy with constant skirmishes.

They show great skill and a liking for these various duties, which are not only in perfect harmony with their military habits, but which give them frequent opportunities of plunder. It is said that during the years 1812-1814 they established themselves, privately, a chain of Cossack posts, from the Seine to the Don, to pass along their booty; and without some such plan it is difficult to understand how during those campaigns they could have sent so many precious objects home from the West to offer to the image of “the Mother Mary,” or “the beautiful Minka,” of the Don, as they called their favourite image of the Virgin.

In most armies the duties of providing for the safety of the army are regulated in a very precise order, with vigorous dispositions relative to the organization and employment of patrols, guards of the camp, and piquets. The Cossacks know none of these arrangements. They surround on all sides the corps of troops which they are told to protect, and by the delicacy of their senses, and their instinctive quickness, it is possible for the Russian regular troops to give themselves up to a more complete security than any Western armies provided with the most intelligent officers and sergeants. Suvórof called the Cossacks “the eye of the army;” and he might have said that they were also its ears and its antennæ.

The irregular troops are of the more utility in the Russian army, because the regular corps do not show much aptitude for the minor duties of the military service. There is therefore in the Russian army the most rigorous division of labour that was ever seen in any army; to the regular troops are allotted the labours of war, and to the irregular troops those of general surveillance. The Cossack has no equal for surprises and skirmishes. No cavalry in Europe could make such marches as they constantly perform, without ruining their horses. In Europe they often carried with them a pack-horse; but even without this they performed incredible feats, and fifty miles is with them an ordinary day’s journey. Of the 3500 men of regular troops who were sent on the expedition to Khiva in 1840, only 1000 returned. Of 1200 Cossacks who made part of that same expedition only 60 perished; and of 2000 or 3000 Kirgúiz who accompanied it the loss was still less. If on the one hand this was the result of their familiarity with the steppes and the climate of these countries, on the other hand it was partly owing to their fitness for making forced marches.

The Cossack, who is generally a strong man, appears to be too heavy for his horse, but this is not really the case. The Cossack horse is a wonderful animal to endure fatigue. He has a good head, a ewe neck, a large arm, short legs, broad chest, and a sound hoof. His back often seems too long; but it is said[116] that he is often found with two ribs more than ordinary horses. In winter he seeks his pasture in the snows of the steppes, and thus learns to be very hardy; and he can do an immense deal of work when he is fed on oaten bread or barley, wheat, straw, or good or bad hay, all of which he will eat. He is very active in climbing mountains, and swimming rivers. At Marshal Munich’s assault on the lines of Perecop the Cossacks arrived at the top of the rampart as soon as the first men of the infantry. The Cossack horse is accustomed to eat at all hours of the day; and his master continually feeds him whenever he has an opportunity. If he stops but for a moment, even under the fire of cannon in time of war, the Cossack always feeds his horse with something; and the horse never refuses any food, either on account of its bad quality or the time at which it is given. “He alone” (I use the words of Haxthausen) “who has had the pain to see his fine and faithful horse refuse his oats after the fatigue of a battle; he who has counted with anguish the minutes in time of war which have been allowed him to feed his horse, and which have passed without the horse being able to eat; he who has seen his beautiful steed, accustomed to delicate food, become day by day more thin and feeble from bad nourishment and forced marches, such a soldier can alone understand how precious in the Cossack horse are his strong stomach and power of endurance.”[117]

The Cossacks now have trumpets, and under the cover of cannon spread themselves out like a swarm, dashing upon the enemy when any one of their number, and not their officer only, sees a favourable opportunity and gives the signal. They dislike to face fire-arms, because, M. Haxthausen says, they only come out to fight for plunder, but sometimes they will do a daring exploit in hope of a cross, as they are very vain, and love decorations even more than the Russians. Their superstition is remarkable; they believe in all sorts of auguries; which, although also the case with the Russian soldier, in him is neutralized by military discipline. The Cossacks, fighting singly, have no esprit-de-corps to counteract their natural feelings, and the crossing of a hare with them may lose an engagement. The meeting of a priest is also considered very unlucky.

To sum up: it may be said that at present, with regard at least to the Cossacks of the Don, the horse is better than his master. They were of great use in the wars of Napoleon, when they were still a frontier people, continually exercised in war at home, and possessed of a democratic constitution, which allowed only merit to raise its head.

Since that time the advance of the Russian frontiers to the South has given the Cossacks internal peace and security, and their old constitution has been either taken away or made a dead letter. Thus, with the loss of their liberty, they have become indifferent soldiers and idle agriculturists.

Russian military men have not, I believe, a high opinion of the Don Cossacks, and although they still acknowledge their utility in guarding regular troops, and relieving them from many laborious duties, are well aware how much they have lost of their ancient martial spirit. I believe the opinion of our own military authorities is, that they are not very formidable in the field, and before Sevastopol have shown little inclination to run any great risks.

Had they stood at all firmly at the affair of Balaclava, not a man of our unfortunate light cavalry could have been saved. When our men were returning from that fearful ride of death, they saw swarms of Cossacks, several thousand in number, descend from the hills to intercept their return. They thought all was over with them, as they quickened their pace to charge; but the Cossacks shrank from the encounter, opened to the right and left, and let them pass in safety.[118]

RECAPITULATION OF EFFECTIVE COSSACKS.

+-------------------------+----------------------------------------+
| | ENUMERATION OF THEIR FORCE. |
| +--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| Names of the | | | | |
| Cossack Corps. |Regiment| | | |
| | of | Sotni |Battalions.|Batteries.|
| |Cavalry.|Cavalry.| | |
+-------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| 1. Army of the Don | 58 | 348 | | 14 |
| 2. ” Azof | | | | |
| 3. ” Danube | 2 | 12 | | |
| 4. ” Black Sea| 12 | 74 | 9 | 4 |
| 5. ” Caucasus | 18 | 108 | | 3 |
| 6. ” Oural | 12 | 60 | | |
| 7. ” Orenburg | 10 | 60 | | 3 |
| 8. ” Siberia | 9 | 54 | | 3 |
| 9. ” frontiers| | 8 | | |
| of China| | | | |
|10. ” Astrakhan| 3 | 18 | | 1 |
|11. ” Siberia | | | 24 | |
| +--------+--------+-----------+----------+
| Total | 124 | 742 | 33 | 28 |
+-------------------------+--------+--------+-----------+----------+

+---+-----------------------------------------------------------------+
| | ENUMERATION OF THEIR FORCE. |
| +-------------------------+----------------+----------------------+
| | Pieces. | Approximative | |
| +--------+---------+------+ Force, | |
| |Cavalry.|Infantry.|Total.| without | OBSERVATIONS. |
| | | | | Artillery. | |
+---+--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+
| 1.| 112 | | 112 | 42,000 cavalry | |
| 2.| | | | |{The Army of Azof is |
| | | | | |{ entirely employed to|
| | | | | |{ man the gun-boats on|
| | | | | |{ the Sea of Azof. |
| 3.| | | | 1,700 cavalry | |
| 4.| 24 | 8 | 32 |{ 9,000 infantry| |
| | | | |{ 9,000 cavalry | |
| 5.| 24 | | 24 | 16,000 cavalry | |
| 6.| | | | 7,500 cavalry | |
| 7.| 24 | | 24 | 7,500 cavalry | |
| 8.| 24 | | 24 | 6,500 cavalry | |
| 9.| | | | 1,000 cavalry | |
|10.| 8 | | 8 | 2,000 cavalry | |
|11.| | | | 24,000 infantry| |
| +--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+
| | 216 | 8 | 224 |126,200 men | 93,200 cavalry. |
| | | | | | 33,000 infantry. |
+---+--------+---------+------+----------------+----------------------+

Taken from M. Haxthausen, vol. iii.

I have now given a short account of the forces, regular and irregular, composing the whole Russian army, which is, perhaps, the most stupendous military engine which the world has ever yet seen.

While the nations of Europe have been disarming, Russia has been augmenting her forces, and spending a very large proportion of her revenue in storing up weapons of destruction. Peaceful avocations have been discouraged by her, and men of peace looked upon with contempt. She knows no titles but military ones; and rewards no virtues except those calculated to support her despotism. She has resisted the natural influence of Europe upon her people, and kept them in poverty-stricken isolation; by her stupendous military force she prevents the further disarming of the nations of Europe. In proportion as they approach the Russian frontier, they are obliged to keep up larger armies, and waste more of their revenues on fortresses and military preparations. The threatening aspect of the Russian army towards its neighbours will be more distinctly seen if we look at it according to its division into the active, mobilized army, always assembled in Poland, with its reserves behind it to the eastward, and the local troops, which have been already mentioned.

Every regiment is divided into a certain number of battalions for active service, ready immediately to enter the field, and others which form the reserve or dépôt, whose duty it is to instruct recruits, and, like the Prussian landwehr, to form skeleton battalions for veterans, and those absent on “indefinite leave.” The artillery is arranged in the same manner. The active troops, distributed in corps, are completely organized, with staff, engineers, train-equipage, and parks of artillery; and even all the necessary horses are kept ready, in time of peace, for entering instantly upon a campaign. To use the words of M. Haxthausen, writing before the present war, “there is no army in the world, with the exception of the Austrian army in Italy, that up to 1848 was always so completely ready for war as the great, active army of Russia in Poland.”

The composition of this army is given in the following table, taken from M. Haxthausen, and its effective force is stated by him as follows (see p. 134):—

After a deduction of 50 soldiers for the train, the musicians, and the superior officers, every battalion of infantry counts about 1000 combatants, _i. e._, soldiers and non-commissioned officers; and the battalions of riflemen, 653 men.[119]

The number of officers is 22 for each battalion; and the musicians, besides the band, which is very numerous in many regiments, are generally about 25. As there are 8 battalions of riflemen, the Grand Army counts—

360 battalions of 1050 men each = 378,000 men.
8 battalions of 700 men each = 5,600 ”
-------
Total of infantry combatants 383,600 men.
Absent on “indefinite leave” 51,500 ”
-------
Nominal total 332,100 infantry.

A further deduction must be made for deaths, discharges, deserters, reducing the battalions to about 700 men, which is believed to be their real numbers, from which no further deduction need be made. This will leave 260,000 infantry combatants really under arms.

A squadron of cavalry contains, on an average, 190 combatants in time of war, and therefore—

Men.
460 squadrons of regular cavalry, at 190 men each = 87,400
10 per squadron on leave = 4,600
------
Leaves 82,800

of regular cavalry, always ready to march.

The above deduction will be more than sufficient, if there be allowed a loss of 27 or 28 men in each squadron before it can arrive at the frontier. The lowest force, then, of regular cavalry immediately disposable for the army of operation is about 70,000 men. No deduction need be made from the artillery, which, on the contrary, must be increased by the artillery of the Cossacks. The reserves are divided into two levies, of which the details are given in the note.[120] They amount—the first levy, to 98,000 men and 192 guns; and the second levy to 115,000 men and 280 guns.

RECAPITULATION of the DIVISIONS of TROOPS composing the GRAND ARMY, according to data of the Year 1852.

+----------------------------+-------------------------------------------
| | Infantry.
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
| |Divisions.|Brigades.|Regiments.|Battalions.
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
|Corps of the Guard | 3 | 6 | 12 | 37
|Corps of Grenadiers | 3 | 6 | 12 | 37
|6 Corps of Infantry | 18 | 36 | 72 | 294
|1st Corps Cavalry in reserve| | | |
|2nd Corps Cavalry in reserve| | | |
|With a division of Light | | | |
| Cavalry of reserve | | | |
| +----------+---------+----------+-----------
| TOTAL TEN CORPS | 24 | 48 | 96 | 368
+----------------------------+----------+---------+----------+-----------

-----------------------------------------------------
Cavalry.
----------+---------+----------+---------------------
Divisions.|Brigades.|Regiments.| Squads.
| | +---------+-----------
| | |Regulars.|Irregulars.
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------
3 | 6 | 12 | 60 | 17½
1 | 2 | 4 | 32 |
6 | 12 | 24 | 192 | ?
3 | 6 | 12 | 80 |
2 | 4 | 8 | 80 |
1 | 2 | 4 | 24 |
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------
16 | 32 | 64 | 468 | 17½
----------+---------+----------+---------+-----------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Artillery.
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
Divisions.|Brigades.|Batteries.| Horse | Foot |Heavy|Light|Total.
| | |Artillery.|Artillery.|Guns.|Guns.|
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
1 | 5 | 15½ | 44 | 72 | 56 | 60 | 116
1 | 4 | 14 | 16 | 72 | 48 | 40 | 88
6 | 24 | 84 | 96 | 576 | 192 | 480 | 672
1 | | 6 | 48 | | 16 | 32 | 48
1 | | 6 | 48 | | 16 | 32 | 48
1 | | 3 | 24 | | | 24 | 24
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------
11 | 33 | 128½ | 276 | 720 | 328 | 668 | 996
----------+---------+----------+----------+----------+-----+-----+------

-------------------------------+
Engineers. |
----------------------+--------+
Battalions of Sappers.|Mounted.|
----------------------+--------+
1 | 2 |
1 | |
6 | |
| |
| 2 |
| |
----------------------+--------+
8 | 4 |
----------------------+--------+

Taken from M. Haxthausen, vol. iii. p. 288.

There is attached to each corps a “brigade du train,” who are
non-combatants. The Engineers attached have their proper place
in the Brigades of Engineers.

The regiments of Cossacks and their batteries were even in time
of peace incorporated in the Grand Army; but their number used
to vary.

Such were the numbers of the Russian active army in Poland in 1848; and it was further increased in 1850. At that time (the end of 1850) the active army of operation, according to the official account, consisted as follows:—

Men. Guns.
Disposable army 486,000 996
First levy of reserve 98,000 192
Second levy 115,000 280
------- ----
Total 699,000 1468

To which must be added the engineers, the train, and the irregular corps.

Of course, as has been observed, the whole disposition of the army has been altered since the present war began. The Moscow corps has been moved to the Caucasus; the Polish corps have been moved south, and the Grenadiers have taken their place; and the reserves have, I believe, been all called out, and probably consumed in replacing those who have fallen in the last two years.

So that when we look at the Russian forces now assembled in the Caucasus, the Crimea, and the German and Baltic frontiers, we see the whole of the Russian army, including its reserves, which cannot be easily augmented. Each man that falls now becomes of great importance to the Emperor; for the conscription is becoming more and more difficult, and bearing with increased severity upon all the interests of the empire. The age at which conscripts are taken is now raised to thirty-seven;[121] and the sons of aged or widowed parents, who have hitherto been exempted, are to serve, and be formed into separate corps. I believe that in the manufacturing establishments in Russia as many as 25 per cent. of the workmen have lately been carried off for the conscription.

The difficulties of Russia are increasing every day; and it is hardly possible for her to carry on the war for another six months, if with our change of Ministry we likewise have a change of system, and if at home and in the Crimea our superior officials, both military and civil, have anything like that intelligence, activity, intrepidity, and single-minded love of their country displayed by the common soldiers and regimental officers of our army, who have hitherto been the only bulwarks to save us from national disgrace.