Chapter X: Front Matter (10)

By the provisions of the treaty the United States guarantees and will maintain the independence of the Republic of Panama. There is granted to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of a strip ten miles wide and extending three nautical miles into the sea at either terminal, with all lands lying outside of the zone necessary for the construction of the canal or for its auxiliary works, and with the islands in the Bay of Panama. The cities of Panama and Colon are not embraced in the canal zone, but the United States assumes their sanitation and, in case of need, the maintenance of order therein; the United States enjoys within the granted limits all the rights, power, and authority which it would possess were it the sovereign of the territory to the exclusion of the exercise of sovereign rights by the republic. All railway and canal property rights belonging to Panama and needed for the canal pass to the United States, including any property of the respective companies in the cities of Panama and Colon; the works, property, and personnel of the canal and railways are exempted from taxation as well in the cities of Panama and Colon as in the canal zone and its dependencies. Free immigration of the personnel and importation of supplies for the construction and operation of the canal are granted. Provision is made for the use of military force and the building of fortifications by the United States for the protection of the transit. In other details, particularly as to the acquisition of the interests of the New Panama Canal Company and the Panama Railway by the United States and the condemnation of private property for the uses of the canal, the stipulations of the Hay-Herran treaty are closely followed, while the compensation to be given for these enlarged grants remains the same, being ten millions of dollars payable on exchange of ratifications; and, beginning nine years from that date, an annual payment of $250,000 during the life of the convention.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

WHITE HOUSE,
_December 7, 1903_.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMUNICATED TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS ON JANUARY 4, 1904

_To the Senate and House of Representatives:_

I lay before the Congress for its information a statement of my action up to this time in executing the act entitled “An act to provide for the construction of a canal connecting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,” approved June 28, 1902.

By the said act the President was authorized to secure for the United States the property of the Panama Canal Company and the perpetual control of a strip six miles wide across the Isthmus of Panama. It was further provided that “should the President be unable to obtain for the United States a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia ... within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms, then the President” should endeavor to provide for a canal by the Nicaragua route. The language quoted defines with exactness and precision what was to be done, and what as a matter of fact has been done. The President was authorized to go to the Nicaragua route only if within a reasonable time he could not obtain “control of the necessary territory of the Republic of Colombia.” This control has now been obtained; the provision of the act has been complied with; it is no longer possible under existing legislation to go to the Nicaragua route as an alternative.

This act marked the climax of the effort on the part of the United States to secure, so far as legislation was concerned, an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus. The effort to secure a treaty for this purpose with one of the Central American republics did not stand on the same footing with the effort to secure a treaty under any ordinary conditions. The proper position for the United States to assume in reference to this canal, and therefore to the governments of the Isthmus, had been clearly set forth by Secretary Cass in 1858. In my Annual Message I have already quoted what Secretary Cass said; but I repeat the quotation here, because the principle it states is fundamental:

While the rights of sovereignty of the States occupying this region
(Central America) should always be respected, we shall expect that
these rights be exercised in a spirit befitting the occasion and the
wants and circumstances that have arisen. Sovereignty has its duties
as well as its rights, and none of these local governments, even if
administered with more regard to the just demands of other nations
than they have been, would be permitted, in a spirit of Eastern
isolation, to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways
of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these
avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to
shut them, or, what is almost equivalent, to encumber them with such
unjust relations as would prevent their general use.

The principle thus enunciated by Secretary Cass was sound then and it is sound now. The United States has taken the position that no other government is to build the canal. In 1889, when France proposed to come to the aid of the French Panama Company by guaranteeing their bonds, the Senate of the United States in executive session, with only some three votes dissenting, passed a resolution as follows:

That the Government of the United States will look with serious
concern and disapproval upon any connection of any European
government with the construction or control of any ship canal across
the Isthmus of Darien or across Central America, and must regard
any such connection or control as injurious to the just rights and
interests of the United States and as a menace to their welfare.

Under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty it was explicitly provided that the United States should control, police, and protect the canal which was to be built, keeping it open for the vessels of all nations on equal terms. The United States thus assumed the position of guarantor of the canal and of its peaceful use by all the world. The guarantee included as a matter of course the building of the canal. The enterprise was recognized as responding to an international need; and it would be the veriest travesty on right and justice to treat the governments in possession of the Isthmus as having the right, in the language of Mr. Cass, “to close the gates of intercourse on the great highways of the world, and justify the act by the pretension that these avenues of trade and travel belong to them and that they choose to shut them.”

When this Government submitted to Colombia the Hay-Herran treaty three things were, therefore, already settled.

One was that the canal should be built. The time for delay, the time for permitting the attempt to be made by private enterprise, the time for permitting any government of anti-social spirit and of imperfect development to bar the work, was past. The United States had assumed in connection with the canal certain responsibilities not only to its own people, but to the civilized world, which imperatively demanded that there should no longer be delay in beginning the work.

Second. While it was settled that the canal should be built without unnecessary or improper delay, it was no less clearly shown to be our purpose to deal not merely in a spirit of justice but in a spirit of generosity with the people through whose land we might build it. The Hay-Herran treaty, if it erred at all, erred in the direction of an overgenerosity toward the Colombian Government. In our anxiety to be fair we had gone to the very verge in yielding to a weak nation’s demands what that nation was helplessly unable to enforce from us against our will. The only criticisms made upon the Administration for the terms of the Hay-Herran treaty were for having granted too much to Colombia, not for failure to grant enough. Neither in the Congress nor in the public press, at the time that this treaty was formulated, was there complaint that it did not in the fullest and amplest manner guarantee to Colombia everything that she could by any color of title demand.

Nor is the fact to be lost sight of that the rejected treaty, while generously responding to the pecuniary demands of Colombia, in other respects merely provided for the construction of the canal in conformity with the express requirements of the act of the Congress of June 28, 1902. By that act, as heretofore quoted, the President was authorized to acquire from Colombia, for the purposes of the canal, “perpetual control” of a certain strip of land; and it was expressly required that the “control” thus to be obtained should include “jurisdiction” to make police and sanitary regulations and to establish such judicial tribunals as might be agreed on for their enforcement. These were conditions precedent prescribed by the Congress; and for their fulfilment suitable stipulations were embodied in the treaty. It has been stated in public prints that Colombia objected to these stipulations, on the ground that they involved a relinquishment of her “sovereignty”; but in the light of what has taken place, this alleged objection must be considered as an afterthought. In reality, the treaty, instead of requiring a cession of Colombia’s sovereignty over the canal strip, expressly acknowledged, confirmed, and preserved her sovereignty over it. The treaty in this respect simply proceeded on the lines on which all the negotiations leading up to the present situation have been conducted. In those negotiations the exercise by the United States, subject to the paramount rights of the local sovereign, of a substantial control over the canal and the immediately adjacent territory, has been treated as a fundamental part of any arrangement that might be made. It has formed an essential feature of all our plans, and its necessity is fully recognized in the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The Congress, in providing that such control should be secured, adopted no new principle, but only incorporated in its legislation a condition the importance and propriety of which were universally recognized. During all the years of negotiation and discussion that preceded the conclusion of the Hay-Herran treaty, Colombia never intimated that the requirement by the United States of control over the canal strip would render unattainable the construction of a canal by way of the Isthmus of Panama; nor were we advised, during the months when legislation of 1902 was pending before the Congress, that the terms which it embodied would render negotiations with Colombia impracticable. It is plain that no nation could construct and guarantee the neutrality of the canal with a less degree of control than was stipulated for in the Hay-Herran treaty. A refusal to grant such degree of control was necessarily a refusal to make any practicable treaty at all. Such refusal therefore squarely raised the question whether Colombia was entitled to bar the transit of the worlds traffic across the Isthmus.

That the canal itself was eagerly demanded by the people of the locality through which it was to pass, and that the people of this locality no less eagerly longed for its construction under American control, are shown by the unanimity of action in the new Panama Republic. Furthermore, Colombia, after having rejected the treaty in spite of our protests and warnings when it was in her power to accept it, has since shown the utmost eagerness to accept the same treaty if only the status quo could be restored. One of the men standing highest in the official circles of Colombia, on November 6, addressed the American minister at Bogota, saying that if the Government of the United States would land troops to preserve Colombian sovereignty and the transit, the Colombian Government would “declare martial law; and, by virtue of vested constitutional authority, when public order is disturbed, [would] approve by decree the ratification of the canal treaty as signed; or, if the Government of the United States prefers, [would] call extra session of the Congress—with new and friendly members—next May to approve the treaty.” Having these facts in view, there is no shadow of question that the Government of the United States proposed a treaty which was not merely just, but generous to Colombia, which our people regarded as erring, if at all, on the side of overgenerosity; which was hailed with delight by the people of the immediate locality through which the canal was to pass, who were most concerned as to the new order of things, and which the Colombian authorities now recognize as being so good that they are willing to promise its unconditional ratification if only we will desert those who have shown themselves our friends and restore to those who have shown themselves unfriendly the power to undo what they did. I pass by the question as to what assurance we have that they would now keep their pledge and not again refuse to ratify the treaty if they had the power; for, of course, I will not for one moment discuss the possibility of the United States committing an act of such baseness as to abandon the new Republic of Panama.

Third. Finally the Congress definitely settled where the canal was to be built. It was provided that a treaty should be made for building the canal across the Isthmus of Panama; and if, after reasonable time, it proved impossible to secure such treaty, that then we should go to Nicaragua. The treaty has been made; for it needs no argument to show that the intent of the Congress was to ensure a canal across Panama, and that whether the republic granting the title was called New Granada, Colombia, or Panama mattered not one whit. As events turned out, the question of “reasonable time” did not enter into the matter at all. Although, as the months went by, it became increasingly improbable that the Colombian Congress would ratify the treaty or take steps which would be equivalent thereto, yet all chance for such action on their part did not vanish until the Congress closed at the end of October; and within three days thereafter the revolution in Panama had broken out. Panama became an independent state, and the control of the territory necessary for building the canal then became obtainable. The condition under which alone we could have gone to Nicaragua thereby became impossible of fulfilment. If the pending treaty with Panama should not be ratified by the Senate this would not alter the fact that we could not go to Nicaragua. The Congress has decided the route, and there is no alternative under existing legislation.

When in August it began to appear probable that the Colombian Legislature would not ratify the treaty, it became incumbent upon me to consider well what the situation was and to be ready to advise the Congress as to what were the various alternatives of action open to us. There were several possibilities. One was that Colombia would at the last moment see the unwisdom of her position. That there might be nothing omitted, Secretary Hay, through the minister at Bogota, repeatedly warned Colombia that grave consequences might follow from her rejection of the treaty. Although it was a constantly diminishing chance, yet the possibility of ratification did not wholly pass away until the close of the session of the Colombian Congress.

A second alternative was that by the close of the session on the last day of October, without the ratification of the treaty by Colombia and without any steps taken by Panama, the American Congress on assembling early in November would be confronted with a situation in which there had been a failure to come to terms as to building the canal along the Panama route, and yet there had not been a lapse of a reasonable time—using the word reasonable in any proper sense—such as would justify the Administration going to the Nicaragua route. This situation seemed on the whole the most likely, and as a matter of fact I had made the original draft of my Message to the Congress with a view to its existence.

It was the opinion of eminent international jurists that in view of the fact that the great design of our guarantee under the treaty of 1846 was to dedicate the Isthmus to the purposes of interoceanic transit, and above all to secure the construction of an interoceanic canal, Colombia could not under existing conditions refuse to enter into a proper arrangement with the United States to that end, without violating the spirit and substantially repudiating the obligations of a treaty the full benefits of which she had enjoyed for over fifty years. My intention was to consult the Congress as to whether under such circumstances it would not be proper to announce that the canal was to be dug forthwith; that we would give the terms that we had offered and no others; and that if such terms were not agreed to we would enter into an arrangement with Panama direct, or take what other steps were needful in order to begin the enterprise.

A third possibility was that the people of the Isthmus, who had formerly constituted an independent state, and who until recently were united to Colombia only by a loose tie of federal relationship, might take the protection of their own vital interests into their own hands, reassert their former rights, declare their independence upon just grounds, and establish a government competent and willing to do its share in this great work for civilization. This third possibility is what actually occurred. Every one knew that it was a possibility, but it was not until toward the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent probability. Although the Administration, of course, had special means of knowledge, no such means were necessary in order to appreciate the possibility, and toward the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary outbreak and of its success. It was a matter of common notoriety. Quotations from the daily papers could be indefinitely multiplied to show this state of affairs; a very few will suffice. From Costa Rica on August 31 a special was sent to the Washington “Post,” running as follows:

SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA,
_August 31_

Travelers from Panama report the Isthmus alive with fires of a new
revolution. It is inspired, it is believed, by men who, in Panama
and Colon, have systematically engendered the pro-American feeling
to secure the building of the Isthmian Canal by the United States.

The Indians have risen, and the late followers of Gen. Benjamin
Herrera are mustering in the mountain villages, preparatory to
joining in an organized revolt, caused by the rejection of the canal
treaty.

Hundreds of stacks of arms, confiscated by the Colombian Government
at the close of the late revolution, have reappeared from some
mysterious source, and thousands of rifles that look suspiciously
like the Mausers the United States captured in Cuba are issuing to
the gathering forces from central points of distribution. With the
arms goes ammunition, fresh from factories, showing the movement is
not spasmodic, but is carefully planned.

* * * * *

The government forces in Panama and Colon, numbering less than
1,500 men, are reported to be a little more than friendly to the
revolutionary spirit. They have been ill paid since the revolution
closed, and their only hope of prompt payment is another war.

General Huertes, commander of the forces, who is ostensibly loyal
to the Bogota Government, is said to be secretly friendly to the
proposed revolution. At least, all his personal friends are open
in denunciation of the Bogota Government and the failure of the
Colombian Congress to ratify the canal treaty.

The consensus of opinion gathered from late arrivals from the
Isthmus is that the revolution is coming, and that it will succeed.

A special despatch to the Washington “Post,” under date of New York, September 1, runs as follows:

B. G. Duque, editor and proprietor of the “Panama Star and Herald,”
a resident of the Isthmus during the past twenty-seven years, who
arrived to-day in New York, declared that if the canal treaty fell
through a revolution would be likely to follow.

“There is a very strong feeling in Panama,” said Mr. Duque, “that
Colombia, in negotiating the sale of a canal concession in Panama,
is looking for profits that might just as well go to Panama herself.

“The Colombian Government, only the other day, suppressed a
newspaper that dared to speak of independence for Panama. A while
ago there was a secret plan afoot to cut loose from Colombia and
seek the protection of the United States.”

In the New York “Herald” of September 10 the following statement appeared:

Representatives of strong interests on the Isthmus of Panama, who
make their headquarters in this city, are considering a plan of
action to be undertaken in co-operation with men of similar views in
Panama and Colon to bring about a revolution and form an independent
government in Panama opposed to that in Bogota.

There is much indignation on the Isthmus on account of the failure
of the canal treaty, which is ascribed to the authorities at Bogota.
This opinion is believed to be shared by a majority of the Isthmians
of all shades of political belief, and they think it is to their
best interest for a new republic to be formed on the Isthmus,
which may negotiate directly with the United States a new treaty
which will permit the digging of the Panama Canal under favorable
conditions.

In the New York “Times,” under date of September 13, there appeared from Bogota the following statement:

A proposal made by Señor Perez y Sotos to ask the Executive to
appoint an anti-secessionist governor in Panama has been approved
by the Senate. Speakers in the Senate said that Señor Obaldía, who
was recently appointed Governor of Panama, and who is favorable to
a canal treaty, was a menace to the national integrity. Senator
Marroquín protested against the action of the Senate.

President Marroquín succeeded later in calming the Congressmen.
It appears that he was able to give them satisfactory reasons for
Governor Obaldía’s appointment. He appears to realize the imminent
peril of the Isthmus of Panama declaring its independence.

Señor Deroux, representative for a Panama constituency, recently
delivered a sensational speech in the House. Among other things he
said:

“In Panama the bishops, governors, magistrates, military
chiefs, and their subordinates have been and are foreign to
the department. It seems that the government, with surprising
tenacity, wishes to exclude the Isthmus from all participation in
public affairs. As regards international dangers in the Isthmus,
all I can say is that if these dangers exist they are due to the
conduct of the national government, which is in the direction of
reaction.

“If the Colombian Government will not take action with a view to
preventing disaster, the responsibility will rest with it alone.”

In the New York “Herald” of October 26 it was reported that a revolutionary expedition of about 70 men had actually landed on the Isthmus. In the Washington “Post” of October 29 it was reported from Panama that in view of the impending trouble on the Isthmus the Bogota Government had gathered troops in sufficient numbers to at once put down an attempt at secession. In the New York “Herald” of October 30 it was announced from Panama that Bogota was hurrying troops to the Isthmus to put down the projected revolt. In the New York “Herald” of November 2 it was announced that in Bogota the Congress had indorsed the energetic measures taken to meet the situation on the Isthmus and that 6,000 men were about to be sent thither.

Quotations like the above could be multiplied indefinitely. Suffice it to say that it was notorious that revolutionary trouble of a serious nature was impending upon the Isthmus. But it was not necessary to rely exclusively upon such general means of information. On October 15 Commander Hubbard, of the navy, notified the Navy Department that, though things were quiet on the Isthmus, a revolution had broken out in the State of Cauca. On October 16, at the request of Lieutenant-General Young, I saw Capt. C. B. Humphrey and Lieut. Grayson Mallet-Prevost Murphy, who had just returned from a four months’ tour through the northern portions of Venezuela and Colombia. They stopped in Panama on their return in the latter part of September. At the time they were sent down there had been no thought of their going to Panama, and their visit to the Isthmus was but an unpremeditated incident of their return journey; nor had they been spoken to by any one at Washington regarding the possibility of a revolt. Until they landed at Colon they had no knowledge that a revolution was impending, save what they had gained from the newspapers. What they saw in Panama so impressed them that they reported thereon to Lieutenant-General Young, according to his memorandum—

that while on the Isthmus they became satisfied beyond question that, owing largely to the dissatisfaction because of the failure of Colombia to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty, a revolutionary party was in course of organization having for its object the separation of the State of Panama from Colombia, the leader being Dr. Richard Arango, a former governor of Panama; that when they were on the Isthmus arms and ammunition were being smuggled into the city of Colon in piano boxes, merchandise crates, etc., the small arms received being principally the Gras French rifle, the Remington, and the Mauser; that nearly every citizen in Panama had some sort of rifle or gun in his possession, with ammunition therefor; that in the city of Panama there had been organized a fire brigade which was really intended for a revolutionary military organization; that there were representatives of the revolutionary organization at all-important points on the Isthmus; that in Panama, Colon, and the other principal places of the Isthmus police forces had been organized which were in reality revolutionary forces; that the people on the Isthmus seemed to be unanimous in their sentiment against the Bogota Government, and their disgust over the failure of that government to ratify the treaty providing for the construction of the canal, and that a revolution might be expected immediately upon the adjournment of the Colombian Congress without ratification of the treaty.

Lieutenant-General Young regarded their report as of such importance as to make it advisable that I should personally see these officers. They told me what they had already reported to the Lieutenant-General, adding that on the Isthmus the excitement was seething, and that the Colombian troops were reported to be disaffected. In response to a question of mine they informed me that it was the general belief that the revolution might break out at any moment, and if it did not happen before, would doubtless take place immediately after the closing of the Colombian Congress (at the end of October) if the canal treaty were not ratified. They were certain that the revolution would occur, and before leaving the Isthmus had made their own reckoning as to the time, which they had set down as being probably from three to four weeks after their leaving. The reason they set this as the probable inside limit of time was that they reckoned that it would be at least three or four weeks—say not until October 20—before a sufficient quantity of arms and munitions would have been landed.

In view of all these facts I directed the Navy Department to issue instructions such as would ensure our having ships within easy reach of the Isthmus in the event of need arising. Orders were given on October 19 to the _Boston_ to proceed to San Juan del Sur, Nicaragua; to the _Dixie_ to prepare to sail from League Island; and to the _Atlanta_ to proceed to Guantanamo. On October 30 the _Nashville_ was ordered to proceed to Colon. On November 2, when, the Colombian Congress having adjourned, it was evident that the outbreak was imminent, and when it was announced that both sides were making ready forces whose meeting would mean bloodshed and disorder, the Colombian troops having been embarked on vessels, the following instructions were sent to the commanders of the _Boston_, _Nashville_, and _Dixie_:

Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption is
threatened by armed force, occupy the line of railroad. Prevent
landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either government or
insurgent, at any point within 50 miles of Panama. Government force
reported approaching the Isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing
if, in your judgment, the landing would precipitate a conflict.

These orders were delivered in pursuance of the policy on which our Government had repeatedly acted. This policy was exhibited in the following orders, given under somewhat similar circumstances last year, and the year before, and the year before that. The first two telegrams are from the Department of State to the consul at Panama:

JULY _25, 1900_

You are directed to protest against any act of hostility which may
involve or imperil the safe and peaceful transit of persons or
property across the Isthmus of Panama. The bombardment of Panama
would have this effect, and the United States must insist upon the
neutrality of the Isthmus as guaranteed by the treaty.

NOVEMBER _20, 1901_

Notify all parties molesting or interfering with free transit
across the Isthmus that such interference must cease and that the
United States will prevent the interruption of traffic upon the
railroad. Consult with captain of the _Iowa_, who will be instructed
to land marines, if necessary, for the protection of the railroad,
in accordance with the treaty rights and obligations of the United
States. Desirable to avoid bloodshed, if possible.

The next three telegrams are from and to the Secretary of the Navy:

SEPTEMBER _12, 1902_

RANGER, _Panama_:

United States guarantees perfect neutrality of Isthmus and that a
free transit from sea to sea be not interrupted or embarrassed....
Any transportation of troops which might contravene these provisions
of treaty should not be sanctioned by you nor should use of road be
permitted which might convert the line of transit into theatre of
hostility.

MOODY.

COLON,
_September 20, 1902_

SECRETARY NAVY, _Washington_:

Everything is conceded. The United States guards and guarantees
traffic and the line of transit. To-day I permitted the exchange of
Colombian troops from Panama to Colon, about 1,000 men each way, the
troops without arms in train guarded by American naval force in the
same manner as other passengers; arms and ammunition in separate
train, guarded also by naval force in the same manner as other
freight.

MCLEAN.

PANAMA,
_October 3, 1902_

SECRETARY NAVY,
_Washington, D. C._:

Have sent this communication to the American consul at Panama:

“Inform Governor while trains running under United States protection
I must decline transportation any combatants, ammunition, arms,
which might cause interruption traffic or convert line of transit
into theatre hostilities.”

CASEY.

On November 3 Commander Hubbard responded to the above-quoted telegram of November 2, 1903, saying that before the telegram had been received 400 Colombian troops from Cartagena had landed at Colon; that there had been no revolution on the Isthmus, but that the situation was most critical if the revolutionary leaders should act. On this same date the Associated Press in Washington received a bulletin stating that a revolutionary outbreak had occurred. When this was brought to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Loomis, he prepared the following cablegram to the consul-general at Panama and the consul at Colon:

Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully
informed.

Before this telegram was sent, however, one was received from Consul Malmros at Colon, running as follows:

Revolution imminent. Government force on the Isthmus about 500
men. Their official promised support revolution. Fire department,
Panama, 441, are well organized and favor revolution. Government
vessel, _Cartagena_, with about 400 men, arrived early to-day with
new commander-in-chief, Tobar. Was not expected until November 10.
Tobar’s arrival is not probable to stop revolution.

This cablegram was received at 2.35 P.M., and at 3.40 P.M. Mr. Loomis sent the telegram which he had already prepared to both Panama and Colon. Apparently, however, the consul-general at Panama had not received the information embodied in the Associated Press bulletin, upon which the Assistant Secretary of State based his dispatch; for his answer was that there was no uprising, although the situation was critical, this answer being received at 8.15 P.M. Immediately afterward he sent another dispatch, which was received at 9.50 P.M., saying that the uprising had occurred, and had been successful, with no bloodshed. The Colombian gunboat _Bogota_ next day began to shell the city of Panama, with the result of killing one Chinaman. The consul-general was directed to notify her to stop firing. Meanwhile, on November 4, Commander Hubbard notified the Department that he had landed a force to protect the lives and property of American citizens against the threats of the Colombian soldiery.

Before any step whatever had been taken by the United States troops to restore order, the commander of the newly landed Colombian troops had indulged in wanton and violent threats against American citizens, which created serious apprehension. As Commander Hubbard reported in his letter of November 5, this officer and his troops practically began war against the United States, and only the forbearance and coolness of our officers and men prevented bloodshed. The letter of Commander Hubbard is of such interest that it deserves quotation in full, and runs as follows:

U. S. S. NASHVILLE, THIRD RATE,
_Colon, U. S. Colombia, November 5, 1903_

SIR: Pending a complete report of the occurrences of the last
three days in Colon, Colombia, I most respectfully invite the
Department’s attention to those of the date of Wednesday, November
4, which amounted to practically the making of war against the
United States by the officer in command of the Colombian troops in
Colon. At 1 o’clock P.M. on that date I was summoned on shore by a
preconcerted signal, and on landing met the United States consul,
vice-consul, and Colonel Shaler, the general superintendent of the
Panama Railroad. The consul informed me that he had received notice
from the officer commanding the Colombian troops, Colonel Torres,
through the prefect of Colon, to the effect that if the Colombian
officers, Generals Tobal and Amaya, who had been seized in Panama on
the evening of the 3d of November by the Independents and held as
prisoners, were not released by 2 o’clock P.M., he, Torres, would
open fire on the town of Colon and kill every United States citizen
in the place, and my advice and action were requested. I advised
that all the United States citizens should take refuge in the shed
of the Panama Railroad Company, a stone building susceptible of
being put into good state for defence, and that I would immediately
land such body of men with extra arms for arming the citizens, as
the complement of the ship would permit. This was agreed to, and I
immediately returned on board, arriving at 1.15 P.M. The order for
landing was immediately given, and at 1.30 P.M. the boats left the
ship with a party of 42 men under the command of Lieut.-Commander
H. M. Witzel, with Midshipman J. P. Jackson as second in command.
Time being pressing I gave verbal orders to Mr. Witzel to take the
building above referred to, to put it into the best state of defence
possible, and protect the lives of the citizens assembled there—not
firing unless fired upon. The women and children took refuge on
the German steamer _Marcomania_ and Panama Railroad steamer _City
of Washington_, both ready to haul out from dock if necessary. The
_Nashville_ I got under way and patrolled with her along the water
front close in and ready to use either small-arm or shrapnel fire.
The Colombians surrounded the building of the railroad company
almost immediately after we had taken possession, and for about
one and a half hours their attitude was most threatening, it being
seemingly their purpose to provoke an attack. Happily our men were
cool and steady, and, while the tension was very great, no shot was
fired. At about 3.15 P.M. Colonel Torres came into the building for
an interview and expressed himself as most friendly to Americans,
claiming that the whole affair was a misapprehension and that he
would like to send the alcalde of Colon to Panama to see General
Tobal and have him direct the discontinuance of the show of force.
A special train was furnished and safe conduct guaranteed. At about
5.30 P.M. Colonel Torres made the proposition of withdrawing his
troops to Monkey Hill, if I would withdraw the _Nashville’s_ force
and leave the town in possession of the police until the return of
the alcalde on the morning of the 5th. After an interview with the
United States consul and Colonel Shaler as to the probability of
good faith in the matter, I decided to accept the proposition and
brought my men on board, the disparity in numbers between my force
and that of the Colombians, nearly ten to one, making me desirous of
avoiding a conflict so long as the object in view, the protection of
American citizens, was not imperiled.

I am positive that the determined attitude of our men, their
coolness and evident intention of standing their ground, had a most
salutary and decisive effect on the immediate situation, and was the
initial step in the ultimate abandoning of Colon by these troops and
their return to Cartagena the following day. Lieutenant-Commander
Witzel is entitled to much praise for his admirable work in command
on the spot.

I feel that I can not sufficiently strongly represent to the
Department the grossness of this outrage and the insult to our
dignity, even apart from the savagery of the threat.

Very respectfully,

JOHN HUBBARD,
_Commander, U. S. Navy,
Commanding_.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
_Navy Department, Washington, D. C._

In his letter of November 8 Commander Hubbard sets forth the facts more in detail:

U. S. S. NASHVILLE, THIRD RATE,
_Porto Bello, U. S. Colombia, November 8, 1903_

SIR: 1. I have the honor to make the following report of the
occurrences which took place at Colon and Panama in the interval
between the arrival of the _Nashville_ at Colon on the evening of
November 2, 1903, and the evening of November 5, 1903, when by the
arrival of the U. S. S. _Dixie_ at Colon I was relieved as senior
officer by Commander F. H. Delano, U. S. Navy.

2. At the time of the arrival of the _Nashville_ at Colon at 5.30
P.M. on November 2 everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There was
talk of proclaiming the independence of Panama, but no definite
action had been taken and there had been no disturbance of peace and
order. At daylight on the morning of November 3 it was found that a
vessel which had come in during the night was the Colombian gunboat
_Cartagena_ carrying between 400 and 500 troops. I had her boarded
and learned that these troops were for the garrison at Panama.
Inasmuch as the Independent party had not acted and the Government
of Colombia was at the time in undisputed control of the Province of
Panama, I did not feel, in the absence of any instructions, that I
was justified in preventing the landing of these troops, and at 8.30
o’clock they were disembarked. The commanding officers, Generals
Amaya and Tobal, with four others, immediately went over to Panama
to make arrangements for receiving and quartering their troops,
leaving the command in charge of an officer whom I later learned
to be Colonel Torres. The Department’s message addressed to the
care of the United States consul I received at 10.30 A.M.; it was
delivered to one of the ship’s boats while I was at the consul’s and
not to the consul as addressed. The message was said to have been
received at the cable office at 9.30 A.M. Immediately on deciphering
the message I went on shore to see what arrangements the railroad
company had made for the transportation of these troops to Panama,
and learned that the company would not transport them except on
request of the Governor of Panama, and that the prefect at Colon
and the officer left in command of the troops had been so notified
by the general superintendent of the Panama Railroad Company. I
remained at the company’s office until it was sure that no action
on my part would be needed to prevent the transportation of the
troops that afternoon, when I returned on board and cabled the
Department the situation of affairs. At about 5.30 P.M. I again went
on shore, and received notice from the general superintendent of the
railroad that he had received the request for the transportation
of the troops and that they would leave on the 8 A.M. train on the
following day. I immediately went to see the general superintendent,
and learned that it had just been announced that a provisional
government had been established at Panama—that Generals Amaya and
Tobal, the Governor of Panama, and four officers, who had gone to
Panama in the morning, had been seized and were held as prisoners;
that they had an organized force of 1,500 troops and wished the
government troops in Colon to be sent over. This I declined to
permit, and verbally prohibited the general superintendent from
giving transportation to the troops of either party.

It being then late in the evening, I sent early in the morning of
November 4 written notification to the general superintendent of
the Panama Railroad, to the prefect of Colon, and to the officer
left in command of the Colombian troops, later ascertained to be
Colonel Torres, that I had prohibited the transportation of troops
in either direction, in order to preserve the free and uninterrupted
transit of the Isthmus. Copies of these letters are hereto appended;
also copy of my notification to the consul. Except to a few people,
nothing was known in Colon of the proceedings in Panama until the
arrival of the train at 10.45 on the morning of the 4th. Some
propositions were, I was later told, made to Colonel Torres by
the representatives of the new Government at Colon, with a view
to inducing him to re-embark in the _Cartagena_ and return to the
port of Cartagena, and it was in answer to this proposition that
Colonel Torres made the threat and took the action reported in my
letter No. 96, of November 5, 1903. The _Cartagena_ left the port
just after the threat was made, and I did not deem it expedient to
attempt to detain her, as such action would certainly, in the then
state of affairs, have precipitated a conflict on shore which I
was not prepared to meet. It is my understanding that she returned
to Cartagena. After the withdrawal of the Colombian troops on the
evening of November 4, and the return of the _Nashville’s_ force on
board, as reported in my letter No. 96, there was no disturbance
on shore, and the night passed quietly. On the morning of the 5th
I discovered that the commander of the Colombian troops had not
withdrawn so far from the town as he had agreed, but was occupying
buildings near the outskirts of the town. I immediately inquired
into the matter and learned that he had some trivial excuse for
not carrying out his agreement, and also that it was his intention
to occupy Colon again on the arrival of the alcalde due at 10.45
A.M., unless General Tobal sent word by the alcalde that he,
Colonel Torres, should withdraw. That General Tobal had declined
to give any instructions I was cognizant of, and the situation at
once became quite as serious as on the day previous. I immediately
landed an armed force, reoccupied the same building; also landed
two 1-pounders and mounted them on platform cars behind protection
of cotton bales, and then in company with the United States consul
had an interview with Colonel Torres, in the course of which I
informed him that I had relanded my men because he had not kept
his agreement; that I had no interest in the affairs of either
party; that my attitude was strictly neutral; that the troops of
neither side should be transported; that my sole purpose in landing
was to protect the lives and property of American citizens if
threatened, as they had been threatened, and to maintain the free
and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus, and that purpose I should
maintain by force if necessary. I also strongly advised that in the
interests of peace, and to prevent the possibility of a conflict
that could not but be regrettable, he should carry out his agreement
of the previous evening and withdraw to Monkey Hill.

Colonel Torres’s only reply was that it was unhealthy at Monkey
Hill, a reiteration of his love of Americans, and persistence in
his intention to occupy Colon, should General Tobal not give him
directions to the contrary.

On the return of the alcalde at about 11 A.M. the Colombian troops
marched into Colon, but did not assume the threatening demeanor
of the previous day. The American women and children again went
on board the _Marcomania_ and _City of Washington_, and through
the British vice-consul I offered protection to British subjects
as directed in the Department’s cablegram. A copy of the British
vice-consul’s acknowledgment is hereto appended. The _Nashville_ I
got under way as on the previous day and moved close in to protect
the water front. During the afternoon several propositions were made
to Colonel Torres by the representatives of the new government,
and he was finally persuaded by them to embark on the Royal Mail
steamer _Orinoco_ with all his troops and return to Cartagena. The
_Orinoco_ left her dock with the troops—474 all told—at 7.35 P.M.
The _Dixie_ arrived and anchored at 7.05 P.M., when I went on board
and acquainted the commanding officer with the situation. A portion
of the marine battalion was landed and the _Nashville’s_ force
withdrawn.

3. On the evening of November 4 Major William M. Black and Lieut.
Mark Brooke, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army, came to Colon from
Culebra and volunteered their services, which were accepted, and
they rendered very efficient help on the following day.

4. I beg to assure the Department that I had no part whatever in
the negotiations that were carried on between Colonel Torres and
the representatives of the provisional government; that I landed
an armed force only when the lives of American citizens were
threatened, and withdrew this force as soon as there seemed to be
no grounds for further apprehension of injury to American lives or
property; that I relanded an armed force because of the failure of
Colonel Torres to carry out his agreement to withdraw and announced
intention of returning, and that my attitude throughout was strictly
neutral as between the two parties, my only purpose being to
protect the lives and property of American citizens and to preserve
the free and uninterrupted transit of the Isthmus.

Very respectfully,
(Signed) JOHN HUBBARD,
_Commander, U. S. Navy, Commanding_.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
_Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department,
Washington, D. C._

This plain official account of the occurrences of November 4 shows that, instead of there having been too much prevision by the American Government for the maintenance of order and the protection of life and property on the Isthmus, the orders for the movement of the American warships had been too long delayed; so long, in fact, that there were but forty-two marines and sailors available to land and protect the lives of American men and women. It was only the coolness and gallantry with which this little band of men wearing the American uniform faced ten times their number of armed foes, bent on carrying out the atrocious threat of the Colombian commander, that prevented a murderous catastrophe. At Panama, when the revolution broke out, there was no American man-of-war and no American troops or sailors. At Colon, Commander Hubbard acted with entire impartiality toward both sides, preventing any movement, whether by the Colombians or the Panamans, which would tend to produce bloodshed. On November 9 he prevented a body of the revolutionists from landing at Colon. Throughout he behaved in the most creditable manner. In the New York “Evening Post,” under date of Panama, December 8, there is an article from a special correspondent, which sets forth in detail the unbearable oppression of the Colombian Government in Panama. In this article is an interesting interview with a native Panaman, which runs in part as follows:

... We looked upon the building of the canal as a matter of life or death to us. We wanted that because it meant, with the United States in control of it, peace and prosperity for us. President Marroquin appointed an Isthmian to be governor of Panama; and we looked upon that as of happy augury. Soon we heard that the canal treaty was not likely to be approved at Bogota; next we heard that our Isthmian Governor, Obaldía, who had scarcely assumed power, was to be superseded by a soldier from Bogota....

Notwithstanding all that Colombia has drained us of in the way of revenues, she did not bridge for us a single river, nor make a single roadway, nor erect a single college where our children could be educated, nor do anything at all to advance our industries.... Well, when the new generals came we seized them, arrested them, and the town of Panama was in joy. Not a protest was made, except the shots fired from the Colombian gunboat _Bogota_, which killed one Chinese lying in his bed. We were willing to encounter the Colombian troops at Colon and fight it out; but the commander of the United States cruiser _Nashville_ forbade Superintendent Shaler to allow the railroad to transport troops for either party. That is our story.

* * * * *

I call especial attention to the concluding portion of this interview, which states the willingness of the Panama people to fight the Colombian troops and the refusal of Commander Hubbard to permit them to use the railroad and therefore to get into a position where the fight could take place. It thus clearly appears that the fact that there was no bloodshed on the Isthmus was directly due—and only due—to the prompt and firm enforcement by the United States of its traditional policy. During the past forty years revolutions and attempts at revolution have succeeded one another with monotonous regularity on the Isthmus, and again and again United States sailors and marines have been landed as they were landed in this instance and under similar instructions to protect the transit. One of these revolutions resulted in three years of warfare; and the aggregate of bloodshed and misery caused by them has been incalculable. The fact that in this last revolution not a life was lost, save that of the man killed by the shells of the Colombian gunboat, and no property destroyed, was due to the action which I have described. We, in effect, policed the Isthmus in the interest of its inhabitants and of our own national needs, and for the good of the entire civilized world. Failure to act as the Administration acted would have meant great waste of life, great suffering, great destruction of property; all of which was avoided by the firmness and prudence with which Commander Hubbard carried out his orders and prevented either party from attacking the other. Our action was for the peace both of Colombia and of Panama. It is earnestly to be hoped that there will be no unwise conduct on our part which may encourage Colombia to embark on a war which can not result in her regaining control of the Isthmus, but which may cause much bloodshed and suffering.

I hesitate to refer to the injurious insinuations which have been made of complicity by this government in the revolutionary movement in Panama. They are as destitute of foundation as of propriety. The only excuse for my mentioning them is the fear lest unthinking persons might mistake for acquiescence the silence of mere self-respect. I think proper to say, therefore, that no one connected with this Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or encouraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, and that save from the reports of our military and naval officers, given above, no one connected with this Government had any previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance with public affairs.