Chapter XVI: Part 16

The approaches to Newbern were defended by a line of water batteries or forts communicating with extensive field fortifications. The lower fort is about six miles from the city; the next communicates with the unfinished batteries and breastworks; the others were distributed about equal distances along the shore. The line of fortifications attacked and stormed was some three miles in extent. At the river bank a hexagonal fort, or water battery, with a large bomb-proof and thirteen heavy guns, commanded in addition, the river approach. By means of pivot carriages the cannon could be turned upon an advancing land force, and even sweep the line of breastworks itself in case the garrison should be driven out. From the fort to the centre of the line a well-made breastwork extended, with a deep moat in front. At the centre was a bastion and sallyport, after which the breastwork was continued to the railroad embankment, which was used as a means of defence. Beyond the railroad, but completely protecting the right flank of the main battery, was a small battery, of irregular shape, communicating with a system of thirteen redans, or rifle-pits, each pair of which were constructed on a knoll rising between ravines, the conformation of the ground furnishing in itself a most admirable basis for field-works. The locality was chosen with rare judgment, and all that engineering skill could accomplish was done to make these fortifications an impassable barrier to hostile troops. From the railroad westward, a swift, deep brook, with muddy bottom, and a wide border of swamp on both sides, ran in front of the redans; and on the side of approach, the timber was so very heavy, that, when felled, it presented a barricade which would seem enough of itself to stop any army of French Zouaves. On the brow of each mound, brushwood had been piled with regularity to the height of four feet in front of the redans, rendering it extremely difficult to take them by assault from the front. The redans were constructed of heavy timbers, covered with at least five feet thickness of earth, while an interior ditch say three feet in depth gave complete protection to the garrison from volleys of musketry, or discharges of grape and canister shot.

Inside, the battery presented a most revolting appearance. Beneath the parapet, in the ditch, on the open ground under the gun-carriages, lay the dead and mangled bodies of rebels. On every side lay heaped the bleeding carcasses of artillery horses, killed by musket or rifle balls. Here and there a broken gun-carriage, or caisson, lay tilted into the mud. Stores of all kinds were scattered over the ground or trampled in the black mire. Muskets with broken stocks or bent barrels were thrown about in every direction. It was a scene of wild confusion on all sides.

It was not known with certainty that there was no other battery erected formidable as this still further up the road; but thinking it best to increase the panic which had seized upon the enemy, General Burnside ordered an advance. General Foster immediately sent forward the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth, Twenty-seventh, and the whole brigade by the straight road. In the charge on the rifle-pit about one hundred rebels, among them the Colonel of the Thirty-third North Carolina and a number of commissioned officers, were captured. When these were secured in an old brick-kiln and placed under guard, Generals Reno and Parke moved their brigades after General Foster’s, the former going before up the railroad track and the latter by the country road. The march to Newbern was unobstructed, the enemy having apparently all he could do to get away on any terms, and early in the afternoon the Union forces reached the bank of the river immediately opposite the city. Long before they came in sight of it, however, dense volumes of smoke were seen rising in that direction, and the suspicion that the place had been fired by the enemy was fully realized when its steeples and houses came in view. Newbern had been fired in seven different places, and if the wind had not mercifully subsided there would hardly have been a house left standing by nightfall. The splendid railroad bridge, seven hundred yards long, had been set on fire by a scow load of turpentine which had drifted against it, and the great structure was wrapped in one grand sheet of flame. Preparations were made by General Foster to move his forces across the river. This was accomplished by the assistance of a light draft stern-wheel steamer which had been captured with four or five small side-wheel boats by the naval gunboats, which by this time were quite up to the city wharves.

To the eastward of the city a very large rebel camp, with barracks and tents, was found deserted and taken possession of. Stragglers from different regiments wandered through the city and committed some acts of depredation; but were speedily checked by a strong Provost-Guard appointed by the commanding General.

The forts taken were Fort Dixie, 4 guns; 1 100-pound rifle and 3 32-pounders. Fort Thompson, 12 guns; 2 100-pound rifle and 10 32-pounders. Fort Ellis, 8 guns; 1 8-inch columbiad, 1 100-pounder, under casemate, and 6 32-pounders. Fort Lane, 4 guns; 2 100-pounders and 2 32-pounders. Two forts, at the foot of the city, mounting 2 guns each. Three guns on a car and two lying on the wharf.

The Federal loss was about 100 killed and 450 wounded. That of the rebels, who were protected by their fortifications, about 220 in killed and wounded. About 300 prisoners were taken by Lieutenant Hammond of the gunboat Hetzel, who was serving one of the guns of McCook’s battery.

NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The naval operations under Commander Rowan, were conducted with great skill and success. The navigation was impeded in every possible way by the rebels. Sunken vessels closed the main channels at all accessible points, while torpedoes, chevaux-de-frise and fire-rafts threatened destruction on every side. Captain Rowan hoisted his pennant on Thursday morning on board the steamer Delaware. At half-past eight A. M., the gunboats commenced shelling the woods in the vicinity of the proposed place of landing, taking stations at intervals along the shore to protect the advance of the troops. At half-past nine A. M., the troops commenced landing, and at the same time six naval boat howitzers with their crews, under the command of Lieutenant R. S. McCook, of the Stars and Stripes, were put on shore to assist the attacks. The army commenced to move up the beach at half-past eleven A. M., the debarkation of troops still continuing. In the mean time the vessels were slowly moving up, throwing shell in the woods beyond. At a quarter-past four, P. M., the first of the enemy’s batteries opened fire on the foremost of the gunboats, which was promptly returned at long range. The troops were now all disembarked, and steadily advancing without resistance. At sundown the firing was discontinued, and the fleet came to anchor in position to cover the troops on shore. At half-past six, A. M., Friday, 14th instant, there was heard a continuous firing of heavy guns and musketry inland, and immediately the fleet commenced throwing shells in advance of the position supposed to be held by the Union troops. The fleet steadily moved up, and gradually closed in towards the batteries. The lower fortifications were discovered to have been abandoned by the enemy.

A boat was dispatched to it and the stars and stripes planted on the ramparts. As they advanced, the upper batteries opened fire. The fire was returned with effect, the magazine of one exploding. Having proceeded in an extended line as far as the obstructions in the river would permit, the signal was made to follow the movements of the flag-ship, and the whole fleet advanced in order, concentrating their fire on Fort Thompson, mounting thirteen guns, on which rested the enemy’s land defences. The army, having driven them out of these defences, the forts were abandoned. Several of the vessels were slightly injured in passing the barricades of piles and torpedoes which had been placed in the river. The upper battery having been evacuated on the appearance of the combined forces, it was abandoned and subsequently blew up. They now steamed rapidly up to the city. Upon the approach of the Federals, several points of the city were fired by the enemy, where stores had been accumulated. Two small batteries, constructed of cotton bales, and mounting two guns each, were also fired by them. Two small steamers were captured, another having been burned. A large raft, composed of barrels of pitch and bales of cotton, which had been prepared to send down upon the fleet, was fired, and floating against the railroad bridge, set it on fire and destroyed it. In addition to the prizes, a quantity of pitch, tar, and a gunboat, and another vessel on the stocks, several vessels afloat, and an immense quantity of arms and munitions of war, fell into their hands.

Washington, Morehead City and Beaufort were in turn occupied by General Burnside’s forces without resistance, and the inhabitants generally evinced a friendly spirit. The commandant of Fort Macon having refused to surrender, preparations were immediately made to invest and capture that place.

THE CAPTURE OF NEW MADRID, MO.

MARCH 14, 1862.

Shortly before the evacuation of Columbus, General Pope, with a large force, was dispatched by the commander of the Department to besiege the town of New Madrid, on the Mississippi river, in the extreme south-eastern section of Missouri. This place had been strongly fortified by the rebels, and garrisoned by five regiments of infantry and several companies of artillery. The town is about seven miles below Island No. 10, but owing to a bend in the river, lies nearly west. Its possession was deemed important, in order to advance the Union forces down the Mississippi.

SECTION OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

SHOWING THE DISTANCES FROM NEW ORLEANS, AND THE ISLANDS BY THEIR
NUMBERS.
]

SECTION OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

SHOWING THE DISTANCES FROM NEW ORLEANS, AND THE ISLANDS BY THEIR
NUMBERS.
]

The enemy had one bastioned earthwork, mounting fourteen heavy guns, about half a mile below the town, and another irregular work at the upper end of the town, mounting seven pieces of heavy artillery, together with lines of intrenchments between them. Six gunboats carrying from four to eight heavy guns each, were anchored along the shore, between the upper and lower redoubts.

The country is perfectly level for miles around the place, and the river was so high just then, that the gunboats looked directly over the banks; and the approaches to the town for seven miles were commanded by direct and cross-fire from at least sixty guns of heavy calibre.

The column under General Pope left Commerce, Mo., on the 27th of February, and, after six days of hard marches through and over the interminable jungles of the great Mingo or Nigger Wool swamp, sat down before the town. They had scarcely been in camp a day before the river batteries opened upon them, forcing the right wing back a few hundred yards further from the river.

Trials and dangers now beset the Federal army, which would have discouraged less brave men. It would not have been difficult to carry the intrenchments, but it must have been attended with heavy loss, and they could not have been held half an hour exposed to the destructive fire of the gunboats. It therefore became necessary to bring down a few heavy guns by land to operate against those of the enemy. They were accordingly sent for; and meantime, forced reconnoissances were pushed over the whole ground, and into several parts of the town. Some brisk skirmishes resulted, in which the enemy invariably retreated precipitately. It was found impossible to induce them to trust any considerable force of their infantry outside of their intrenchments. While awaiting the arrival of the heavy guns, Colonel Plummer, of the Eleventh Missouri, was dispatched to Point Pleasant, eight miles below, with three regiments of infantry, three companies of cavalry, and a field battery of 10-pound Parrott and rifled guns, with orders to make a lodgment on the river bank; to line the bank with rifle-pits for a thousand men, and to establish his artillery in sunk batteries of single pieces between the rifle-pits. This arrangement was made in order to present the smallest possible marks to the shells of the gunboats, and to render futile the use of round shot from their heavy guns. Colonel Plummer, after some cannonading from the gunboats which he found there, succeeded in making a lodgment, constructing his batteries and rifle-pits, and occupying them in sufficient force to maintain them against any open assault.

After repeated and persistent cannonading from the gunboats, the enemy found it impossible to dislodge him. He maintained his position, and effectually blockaded the river to transports, during the whole siege. Meantime, the enemy continued every day to reinforce New Madrid, until, on the 12th, they had nine thousand infantry, besides a considerable force of artillery and nine gunboats. The fleet was commanded by Commodore Hollins, the land forces by Generals McCown, Stewart and Gantt. On the 11th, the Federal siege guns were delivered to Colonel Bissell for his engineer regiment, who had been sent to Cairo. They were at once shipped to Sykestown, reached New Madrid at sunset on the 12th, and were placed in battery during the same night, within eight hundred yards of the enemy’s main work, commanding the river above it. They opened fire at daylight on the 13th, just thirty-four hours after they were received at Cairo.

A brigade, consisting of the Tenth and Sixteenth Illinois, under Colonel Morgan, of the Tenth, was detailed to cover the construction of the battery, and to work in the trenches. It was supported by Stanley’s division, consisting of the Twenty-seventh and Thirty-ninth Ohio, under Colonel Groesbeck, and the Forty-third and Sixty-third Ohio, under Colonel Smith. Captain Mower, First United States infantry, with companies A and H of his regiment, was placed in charge of the siege guns.

The enemy’s pickets and grand guards were driven in by Colonel Morgan, from the ground selected for the battery. The work was prosecuted in silence, and with the utmost rapidity, until at three o’clock, A. M., two small redoubts connected by a curtain, and mounting four heavy guns were completed, together with rifle-pits in front and on the flanks for two regiments of infantry. The batteries opened as soon as the day dawned, and were replied to in front and on the flanks by the whole of the enemy’s heavy artillery on land and water.

The Union guns were served by Captain Mower with vigor and skill. In a few hours they disabled several of the gunboats, and dismounted three of the heavy guns in the enemy’s main work. Shortly after the Union batteries opened, one of the 24-pound guns was struck in the muzzle by a round shot from the enemy’s batteries and disabled.

The cannonading was continued furiously all day by the gunboats and land batteries of the enemy, but without producing any impression. Meantime the Union trenches were being extended and advanced toward the bank of the river. General Paine now made a demonstration against the rebel intrenchments on the left, supported by Palmer’s division. The enemy’s pickets and grand guards were driven in, and the skirmishers forced their way close to the main ditch.

A furious thunder storm began about eleven o’clock that night, and continued almost without interruption until morning. Just before daylight, General Stanley was relieved in his trenches with his division by General Hamilton. A few minutes after daylight, a flag of truce approached the batteries, bearing information that the enemy had evacuated his works. Small parties were at once advanced by General Hamilton to ascertain the truth of this report; and Captain Mower, First United States infantry, with companies A and H of that regiment, were sent forward to plant the United States flag over the abandoned works.

The enemy had made a hasty and precipitate flight. Their dead were found unburied, their suppers stood untouched on the tables—candles were burning in the tents. Private baggage of officers and knapsacks of the men were left behind. Neither provisions nor ammunition were carried off—everything gave evidence of a panic. Artillery, field batteries and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three pieces; magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character; several thousand stands of inferior small arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges; tents for an army of ten thousand men; horses, mules, wagons, intrenching tools, etc., were among the spoils.

Their flight was so sudden that they abandoned their pickets, and gave no intimation to the forces at Island No. 10.

The Union loss was fifty-one killed and wounded. The enemy’s loss could not be ascertained. A number of his dead were left unburied, and over a hundred new graves were found.

ISLAND No. 10.

When the necessity of an early evacuation of Columbus became apparent to the rebel leaders, they commenced the fortification of Island No. 10, in the Mississippi river, forty-five miles below Columbus and twenty-six from Hickman. It is located 250 miles below St. Louis and 997 from New Orleans; and when chosen by the secessionists it was deemed impregnable. The earthworks were constructed with great skill, and well calculated to resist any assault which could be made from the river above, while they held undisputed control of the navigation below, and had at their command a formidable fleet of gunboats. New Madrid, on the Missouri shore of the river, a few miles below, was fortified and garrisoned by rebel troops, and they had easy communication and abundant facilities for supplies and reinforcements, if needed.

The energy and perseverance of General Pope, which enabled him, despite the most serious obstacles, to invest and capture the town of New Madrid, was the first note of warning received by the rebels at Island No. 10 that their position was no longer tenable.

The topography of the peninsula on the Tennessee shore, immediately back of the island, where most of the rebel forces were located, is very peculiar; and if the disadvantages of position which the course of events gradually unfolded could have been foreseen, the site would never have been selected. Commencing at a point about a mile and a half above the island is a range of high land, which extends back south-eastwardly to Reelfoot Lake, a distance of four miles. This lake, in the rear of the peninsula, is fifteen miles in length, and terminates in a swamp, which extends south of Tiptonville, a town on the river bank, below the peninsula. The swamp at that time varied in width from one and a half to eight miles, its narrowest point being four miles above Tiptonville, where the rebels had prepared a corduroy road and bridge, as a means of escape from their position, should retreat by land become necessary.

On the 15th of March, the gun and mortar-boats comprising the fleet of Commodore Foote commenced the investment and bombardment of Island No. 10, and the rebel batteries and camps at the adjacent peninsula on the Tennessee shore.

The fleet consisted of eleven gunboats, and twelve mortar-boats, each of the latter carrying one immense mortar, throwing a shell of two hundred and twenty pounds weight a distance of from two to three miles. The Commodore engaged the rebel batteries almost daily for three weeks, deeming it imprudent to risk the destruction of his vessels by close action, as any misfortune to them would have placed all the towns on the Upper Mississippi at the mercy of the armed steamers of the enemy.

The rebels had eighty guns of heavy calibre in the batteries on the island and the adjacent peninsula, while the iron-clad ram Manassas, and a fleet of twenty vessels—gunboats, steamers and transports, were moored under their guns, prepared to act as opportunity or emergency might require.

One or more gunboats would advance to attack a shore battery from the right hand of the river—or engage the water battery on the island, approaching from the left bank. The mortars kept continually changing positions, generally hugging the shore on the left bank where the rebel batteries could not reach them, as they were covered by a promontory, or neck of land, made by the bend of the river; and their fire was kept up so unceasingly, that frequently a mortar-shell was thrown every hour during the night.

At two o’clock on the morning of April 1, a most daring enterprise on the part of Colonel Roberts, of the Forty-second Illinois regiment, was crowned with success. Taking advantage of a severe storm while the elements were raging furiously, and a dreadful hurricane, accompanied with thunder and lightning, was sweeping the earth and driving the vessels from their moorings, he started with forty picked men, in six yawl boats, and with muffled oars rowed towards the upper water battery on Island No. 10, keeping close to the edge of the river bank. The boats, favored by the intense darkness, approached within a few rods of the battery, when a blinding sheet of lightning flashed across the water, revealing the adventurous party to the enemy’s sentinels. The dark object looming out from the storm alarmed the sentinels, who fired wildly and at random, fleeing with the first discharge. The Union boats made no reply. A few minutes more brought them to the slope of the earthworks, and the men at once sprung over the parapet. In less than five minutes the huge guns on the battery were securely spiked. They were all of large calibre, consisting of two 64, two 80-pounders and one splendid 9-inch pivot gun. Their desperate work accomplished, the boats returned safely to the fleet, having performed a perilous exploit with wonderful success.

CAPTURE OF ISLAND No. 10 AND THE REBEL ARMY.

After the surrender of the forts at New Madrid, Colonel Bissell’s engineer regiment was engaged for four days unspiking guns, changing batteries, and establishing new works. Then they were sent over by General Pope to ascertain whether it would be practicable to establish batteries opposite Island No. 10, and enfilade the rebel works on the Tennessee shore. They spent three days in the swamps, living in their canoes with negroes, but found the project impracticable. Colonel Bissell, however, stated that he could by hard labor get steamboats and flatboats through the woods and bayous, and by that means avoid the batteries on the island, and bring the vessels to New Madrid, whence General Pope’s army could be transported to a point nearly opposite, and take all the enemy’s works in the rear.

General Pope at once gave him a _carte blanche_, and he sent to Cairo for four steamboats, six flats, and such guns as could be spared. They sent the steamers W. B. Terry, John Trio, Gilmore, and Emma, with the barges, a quantity of lumber, etc., and one eight-inch columbiad and three thirty-two pounders. Tools were not needed, for the regiment carried everything, from the heaviest ropes and screws down to fine steel drills for unspiking guns.

The route was about twelve miles long, of which two traversed were through thick timber, and the remaining ten narrow, crooked bayous, choked up with brush and small trees. They cut their way through, the track being fifty feet wide, of which thirty feet was required for the hulls of the boats. The timber was cut four feet below the surface of the water. In one short stretch they cut seventy-five trees, not one less than two feet through. The machines were rigged from rafts and flats, and each worked by about twenty men. In the first place three large launches went ahead to cut out and clear away the underbrush and driftwood; then three rafts followed, on which were the axemen, followed by the saws, two large barges, and one of the steamboats. Very large lines were provided to run from the capstan of the steamboat and haul out by snatchblocks what the men could not handle. Men were engaged all the time in the fleet which followed, converting the flatboats into floating batteries.

BOMBARDMENT OF ISLAND NO. 10.

1. Rebel Floating Battery.—2. Rebel Gunboats and Rams.—3. Federal
Gunboats.—4. Point Pleasant.—5. Island No. 10.—6. Smith’s
Landing.—7. Mortar Boats.
]

From the starting point on the river to the levee the distance is about five hundred feet; here the water was shallow and the route full of stumps. It took one whole day to pass this point. Then they cut in the levee. Here the fall was over two feet, and the rush of water tremendous. The largest boat was dropped through with five lines out ahead. Then a corn field, overflowed from a cut in the levee, where a channel was cut by the swift water, and floated them onward nearly a quarter of a mile to the woods. Here was great labor—two straight and long miles to the nearest point in the bayou. It took eight days to get through this distance. Then came Wilson’s Bayou, East Bayou, and St. John’s Bayou, which empties into the Mississippi at New Madrid. It sometimes took twenty men a whole day to get out a half sunken tree across the bayou; and as none of the rafts or flats could get by, this always detained the whole fleet. The water, after they got in the woods, was about six feet deep, with a gentle current setting across the peninsula. In the East Bayou the current was tremendous, and the boats had to be checked down with heavy head lines. Here they found some obstructions, caused by heaps of driftwood, but a few sturdy blows dislodged some of the logs and sent the whole mass floating down the current.

While the engineers were engaged in this herculean enterprise, the gunboat Carondelet ran safely by the rebel batteries on the island, and reached New Madrid on the night of April 4th. On the succeeding night another boat, the Pittsburg, ran the gauntlet of the enemy’s fire unscathed, in time to convoy the transports as they entered the river.

On the 6th of April the two gunboats attacked and destroyed four batteries erected by the rebels on the Tennessee shore. On the 7th, by daylight, the divisions of Generals Paine and Stanley were marched to Tiptonville, fifteen miles down the river from New Madrid. The rebels had retreated in that direction the afternoon before, and it was thought that they were endeavoring to cross over Reelfoot lake. The troops were pushed forward with all possible speed, and at night encamped at Tiptonville and Merriwether’s, while a strong force was posted at the only point where by any possibility the rebels could cross the lake, some four miles from the town. Squads of rebel soldiers kept in sight of the Union pickets during the night, and at times would come boldly up and surrender themselves as prisoners of war. At daylight General Pope and staff, and Assistant Secretary of War Scott, went down to the locality, and General Pope assumed the full command. It was expected that some resistance would be made, and no one surmised that the enemy, who it was learned had marched over from Island No. 10, had concluded to give himself up. But shortly after sunrise General Pope received a message from the General commanding the Confederates, stating that he had surrendered the island and fortifications to Commodore Foote the night before, and that the forces under his command were ready to follow the “fortunes of war;” and he requested General Pope to receive and march them into camp. General Pope gave directions for the Confederate troops to come into camp and go through the formula. Accordingly about four thousand rebels were marched in and stacked their arms.

On the same day Island No. 10 was surrendered to Commodore Foote, with all its war material; and all the gunboats and transports fell into the hands of the victors.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER, VA.

MARCH 22, 23, 1862.

On the 21st of March, General Shields, commanding a division of the Fifth Army Corps of the Potomac, under General Banks, was stationed at Winchester, with a force of about seven thousand men. General Jackson, with a rebel force of ten thousand men, and twenty-eight pieces of artillery, was then at Strasburg, ten miles distant, closely scrutinizing the movements of the Federal army, and only awaiting the arrival of General Johnston, his superior, who was daily expected with a much larger force. With these united, they expected to strike a telling blow on the army of General Banks, and thus prevent any combined action on his part with General McClellan.

Not anticipating an immediate attack from General Jackson, General Banks had just left Winchester for Harper’s Ferry, and General Williams’ division had marched the same day towards Centreville. Of these movements the rebel General was duly notified, as his numerous spies within the Federal lines lost no opportunity of supplying the enemy with full details of all the actions of the Federal commanders.

Though looking for reinforcements from Generals Longstreet and Smith, Jackson determined to attack Shields’ troops;—but his attempt to surprise them was frustrated by the vigilance of that officer. Apprehensive that the enemy designed an early advance, General Shields had just completed a hasty reconnoissance to Strasburg, by which he obtained important information of Jackson’s numbers and intentions. This induced him to withdraw most of his men to a position two miles north-east of Winchester, while his pickets extended five miles beyond, on the Strasburg road. The enemy were led to believe that the town was open to their occupation, and that the greater portion of the Federal troops had been withdrawn from the vicinity.

On Saturday afternoon, March 22, about a quarter-past two o’clock, the Federal advanced pickets on the Strasburg road discovered the rebel cavalry, under Colonel Ashby, about half a mile beyond them, reconnoitering the woods on both sides of the turnpike, and steadily advancing. The pickets consisted of a few men of the Fourteenth Indiana infantry at that point, and they fell back half a mile to the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles from Winchester. Steadily did the troopers advance as the Union men wheeled to aim and fire. The first volley sent many rebels reeling from their saddles, and threw the rest into confusion. Before they could be again rallied for a charge, the gallant little band of infantry was beyond their power, without having lost a man killed or wounded. General Shields hearing of the advance of the rebel cavalry, ordered four advanced companies of infantry to rally to the support of the pickets, and hold the rebels in check till he could move down the division. These companies were one from the Maryland First, one from the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, one from the Forty-sixth Pennsylvania, and one from the Twenty-eighth New York. Their regiments had marched away under General Williams.

A battery of artillery was also sent forward, and General Shields, after ordering out the division, rode to the front, accompanied by his staff. While engaged in directing the fire of the artillery, a shell from the rebel battery of four guns, which now began to play on them, burst near him, and a splinter from it struck him in the left arm, just above the elbow, fracturing the bone and creating a painful wound. But without heeding it he gave a fresh order to the artillery, and continued on the field till satisfied that all was right.

The Federal division began to arrive in force on the field towards dark; the rebels, perceiving this, did not push their advance, but halted about three miles from Winchester for the night, lighted their camp fires and bivouacked, while the opposing army lay between them and the town.

About ten o’clock on Sunday, reinforcements of five regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery having arrived from Strasburg, under General Garnett, were welcomed by vociferous and prolonged cheers from their lines. The attack was not long delayed. The enemy advanced his army, which now consisted of sixteen regiments of infantry, numbering eleven thousand men; five batteries of artillery, with a total of twenty-eight field pieces, and three battalions of horse, under Ashby and Stewart. His line of battle extended about a mile on the right of the village of Kernstown, and a mile and three-quarters on the left of it. The village lay on the road between the rebel right and centre. There is a mud road branching from the turnpike a mile or so from Winchester to the right of the road going towards Strasburg. This road passed through the left of the enemy’s centre, and was one of their points of defence. Beyond that is a grove of trees, and farther on, a ridge of hills with a stone wall about breast-high running along its summit. This was the rebel line of offence and defence on the right of the Union line.

The most advanced regiment on the Union side was the Eighth Ohio, of General Tyler’s brigade. The rebels made a furious onslaught about half-past ten o’clock, A. M., on Thursday, with the intention of turning the right flank. The Ohio Eighth met them with a deadly fire of rifles. Five times did the enemy emerge from the woods and from behind their stone parapet with vastly superior numbers, and strive in vain to accomplish their object. The Union left wing, consisting of the Thirteenth Indiana, Seventh Ohio and a battery of the Fourth regular artillery, under Captain Jenks, had a feint made on it, while the real attack of the enemy was being directed against the Union right wing. The feint on the left was a heavy fire of artillery posted on both sides of the village and the turnpike, which, however, did trifling damage. The Union battery replied, silencing those of the enemy, though the firing was well maintained for a long time on both sides. The Union centre consisted of the Fourteenth Indiana, the Eighth and Sixty-seventh Ohio, and the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania. Two artillery batteries belonging to the First Ohio artillery, and the cavalry, consisting of the First Michigan and First Ohio, were drawn up in the rear. The Union right wing was made up of the Fifth and Eighth Ohio regiments and a battery of the First Virginia regiment. The reserves consisted of the Twelfth Indiana, the Thirty-ninth Illinois and a squadron of the Michigan cavalry. General Shields was unable to appear on the field in person, and the command consequently devolved upon Acting Brigadier Kimble, who led the centre. The right was commanded by Acting Brigadier General Tyler, while Colonel Sullivan directed the operations on the left.

The battle raged along the whole line with great fury from eleven A. M. till half-past two P. M., when General Shields, who received accounts of the progress of the fight on his couch, ordered the right, where the contest raged the hottest, to charge upon the enemy. That was an awful charge. The left of the enemy prepared desperately to repel the gallant troops, but their rush was irresistible. Previous to this the Union line of battle had been somewhat changed. The Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania reinforced its right, and also a battery of artillery. The whole Union force now engaged was about six thousand men, while that of the enemy was at the lowest estimate eight thousand. The rebels had also changed their line, and extending both their wings, presented a concave front. They had reinforced their left wing, and the charge to be made by the Union right was all important in its consequences. On it, at three o’clock, depended the fate of the entire battle. Tyler led the charge, sword in hand. The rebels fired from the woods with artillery and small arms, while the Federals advanced against their murderous showers of lead and iron, returning few shots and reserving their fire.

SPLENDID CHARGE OF THE RIGHT WING, UNDER GENERAL TYLER.
]

Up to this time the armies had not been much nearer to each other than three hundred yards, unless in some few instances. The wood was soon cleared at the point of the bayonet, the Unionists discharging their pieces at twenty and even five yards distance from the rebels, and then dashing at them with the bayonet.

The rebels fought well. They contested the ground foot by foot, and marked every yard of their retreat with blood. They retired behind the stone wall, on the ridge, but the Unionists jumped over, and drove them in the greatest confusion and with fearful slaughter upon their centre. The panic was contagious. Kimble ordered a charge along the whole line, and for a short time the fighting was desperate. The roar of the cannon was no longer heard, unless in occasional bursts, but the rattle of musketry was more deafening than ever.

The rout of the rebels had fairly commenced; two of their guns and four caissons were taken, and though many of them turned and fired again and again at the pursuing host, many more threw away muskets and bayonets without hesitation. Darkness and the extreme fatigue of the Union troops, however, saved them for the time, and the Federals retired about two miles and bivouacked.

At daybreak General Shields ordered the rebel position to be attacked, and the enemy, after replying by a few shots from his artillery, continued his retreat. Meantime General Banks, who had been at Harper’s Ferry, arrived, and taking command of the troops in person, continued the pursuit with about ten thousand men, and pressed the rebels beyond Middleburg, cutting off many stragglers. The object was to capture his whole force, if possible. General Williams, with his forces, arrived on the field, too late to participate in the action. They joined in the chase.

The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was six hundred. The number of prisoners taken was three hundred.

The Union loss in killed was one hundred, and about four hundred wounded. Though the enemy had a much larger force, four pieces of cannon more than the Federals, the selection of fighting ground, and every other advantage, yet all the trophies of the occasion belong to the Union army.

The rebels had an Irish battalion of one hundred and fifty men, of whom forty were killed on the field, and many of the rest wounded. Their commander, Captain Jones, was captured, having lost both eyes by a bullet.

The loss on the Union side was heaviest in the Eighty-fourth Pennsylvania regiment. Of the five companies of three hundred men, in all, engaged, they lost Colonel Murray, a brave officer; one captain, one lieutenant, twenty-three privates and non-commissioned officers killed, and sixty-three wounded. The loss in the Eighth and Fifth Ohio regiments was about seventy-five and sixty, respectively, killed and wounded.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thorburn, of the Third Virginia, was among the wounded. These were the only field officers killed or wounded in the Union forces.

The battle-field after the struggle was a terrible sight. The night was dark and cold. After the battle the ambulances were busily engaged removing the wounded. The enemy carried off most of their wounded and some of their dead. The wounded were intermingled with the dead, and their sufferings before they were removed to the hospitals were heart-rending. The next day was spent in burying the dead. The ghastly aspect of the field after the wounded were removed, and before the dead were interred, was appalling.

BATTLE OF PITTSBURG LANDING.

APRIL 6–7, 1862.

When the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson reached Washington and Richmond there was depression among the secessionists and great rejoicing at the North. The news of these events was followed directly by the capture of Nashville and New Madrid, and it became certain to the Confederate leaders that Island No. 10 must soon surrender. Under these untoward events it became imperative that a new strategic point should be at once established beyond reach of the gunboats, that had already produced so much mischief. Beauregard, then in command, selected Corinth as the most promising point for his operations, and a position which would render any attempt of the Federals to cut him off from western Tennessee, or the eastern and southern States, extremely difficult of success. He called on the Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama for help, and a prompt response was made. First came Polk from Columbus, then Bragg from Mobile and Pensacola, followed by General A. S. Johnston from Murfreesborough, who took command. After selecting their new line of defence, they commenced fortifying it and diligently concentrated their forces. Generals Hardee, Breckinridge, Sterling Price and Hindman soon came in, and the fortifications made rapid progress.

Corinth is a very important strategical point. It is situated in a branch of the Apalachian range, which diverges from the Alleghany mountains, and forms the uplands and gold-bearing regions of Georgia and Alabama. The village is nearly surrounded by an irregular circle of hills, rising in the north, about four miles distant, with the State line between Tennessee and Mississippi crossing their summit. The Mobile and Ohio railway intersects this ridge through a cut seventy-five feet in depth. Similar cuts, of lesser depth, penetrate the hills on the east, west and south, where the railways enter. Beyond these hills, in the direction of Pittsburg and Savannah, the ground becomes more level, and is generally low and swampy. The topography of the region renders Corinth susceptible of strong defences. The village was formerly called Farmington, and is so mentioned in the gazetteers. It is a post village of Tishomingo county, Mississippi, distant two hundred and sixty-two miles north-east from Jackson, the capital of the State. There were not half a dozen stores in the village, and its population was relatively small. Tishomingo county forms the north-eastern extremity of Mississippi, bordering on Tennessee and Alabama. The Tombigbee river rises in the county; the Tennessee flows along the north-east border, and it is drained by Tuscumbia creek. A large portion of the county is covered with forests of oak, hickory, walnut and pine.

The principal military value of this place consists in the fact that the railroads from Memphis on the west, Columbus, on the north, and Mobile on the south, cross at this point.

About the middle of March Grant’s victorious army at Nashville was sent by Halleck to occupy first Savannah, and then Pittsburg Landing, preparatory to the arrival of Buell’s Kentucky army, when Halleck intended himself to take the field and move on Corinth.

Pittsburg Landing is situated in Hardin county, Tenn., on the west side of the Tennessee river. It is in itself of little importance, being close to Savannah, which is a flourishing post village of Hardin county, situated on the eastern side of the river. The Landing is about one hundred and twenty miles from Nashville; nearly one hundred miles from Columbia, on the Nashville and Decatur railroad; by a turnpike road, crossing the river at a ferry, about twenty-five miles from Corinth. The country is very wild, the surface rising on both sides of the river in a gradual ascent.

Savannah is the capital of Hardin county. Previous to the rebellion it had been a place of considerable business note. The population in 1853 was only eight hundred, but it had been greatly increased. The area of the county is about six hundred and fifty miles. The Tennessee river flows through it, dividing it into nearly equal parts. The river is navigable for steamboats through the entire county, which has a population of over ten thousand persons, nine-tenths of whom are free.

General Grant proceeded at once to Savannah, where his headquarters were established. The divisions of his army were sent gradually to Pittsburg, and had not all arrived when the assault was made. No defences had been erected, and the possibility of an attack from the Confederates had not been for a moment entertained. On the 5th of April Buell left Nashville and arrived at Savannah the same day. The division of his army under Nelson was on the battle field on the sixth, at five P. M.

The Confederates had for some time intended to attack Grant before Buell could join him, and on hearing of his near approach they hastened the action, without waiting for their own reinforcements. This bold movement was made just one day too late.

POSITION OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS.

Pittsburg Landing is simply a narrow ravine, down which a road passes to the river bank, between high bluffs on either side. There is no town whatever. Two log huts comprise all the signs of habitation visible. Back from the river is a rolling country, cut up with numerous ravines, partially under cultivation, but the greater portion is thickly wooded with large patches of underbrush. From the Landing a road leads directly to Corinth, twenty miles distant. A mile or two out, this road forks; one branch is known as the lower Corinth road; the other, the Corinth ridge road. A short distance out, another road curves off to the left, crosses Lick Creek, and leads back to the river at Hamburg, some miles up the stream. On the right, two separate roads lead off to Purdy, and another, a new one, runs across Snake Creek to Crump’s Landing on the river below. Besides these, the whole country that composed the battle-field was cut up with roads leading to different camps.

On and between these roads, at distances of from two to five miles from Pittsburg Landing, lay several divisions of Major-General Grant’s army on Sunday morning. The advance line was formed by three divisions—Brigadier-General Sherman’s, Brigadier-General Prentiss’ and Major-General McClernand’s. Between these and the Landing lay the forces of Brigadier-General Hurlbut and Major-General Smith, who, being absent from severe illness, left his command to Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace.

The Union advance line, beginning at the extreme left, was thus formed:—On the Hamburg road, just north of the crossing of Lick creek, and under bluffs on the opposite bank that commanded the position, lay Colonel D. Stuart’s brigade of General Sherman’s division. Some three or four miles distant from this brigade, on the lower Corinth road, between that and the road to Purdy, lay the remaining brigades of Sherman’s division, McDowell’s forming the extreme right of the whole advance line. Hildebrand’s came next to it, and Buckland’s following. Next to Buckland’s brigade, though rather behind a portion of Sherman’s, lay Major-General McClernand’s division, and between it and Stuart’s brigade, already mentioned as forming the extreme left, Brigadier-General Prentiss’ division completed the line.

Back of this line, within a mile of the Landing, lay Hurlbut’s division, stretching across the Corinth road, with W. H. L. Wallace’s to his right. Such was the position of the Union troops at Pittsburg Landing at daybreak on Sunday morning. Major-General Lew. Wallace’s division arrived at about half-past seven o’clock that day.

Nearly four miles intervened between the different parts of Sherman’s division. McClernand’s lay partially behind Sherman, and there was a gap between him and Prentiss, which the rebels did not fail speedily to find. The extreme left was commanded by unguarded heights, easily approached from Corinth.

The secession army was commanded by General Johnston; Beauregard was second in command. The three army corps were led by Hardee, Polk, and Bragg. Breckinridge commanded the reserve.

On the evening of Friday, April 4, there had been a preliminary skirmish with the enemy’s advance. Rumors reached the Union camp that some officers had been taken prisoners by a considerable rebel force, near the lines, and that pickets had been firing. A brigade, the Seventieth, Seventy-second and Forty-eighth Ohio regiments, was sent out to ascertain the facts. They came upon a party of rebels, perhaps a thousand strong, and after a sharp action drove them off, losing Major Crocket, of the Seventy-second Ohio, and two lieutenants from the Seventieth were taken prisoners. In return the Union party took sixteen prisoners, and drove the rebels back to a battery which they had placed undiscovered at no great distance from the Federal lines. General Lew. Wallace’s troops, at Crump’s Landing, were ordered out under arms; they marched to Adamsville, half way between the river and Purdy, to hold position there and resist any attack in that direction. The long rainy night passed drearily and uncomfortably, but no further hostile demonstrations were made, and it was generally supposed that the affair had been an ordinary picket fight, presaging nothing more. On Saturday there was more skirmishing along the advanced lines.

The secession leaders at Corinth knew that they largely outnumbered Grant, and that no measures had been taken to strengthen the position at Pittsburg Landing; they knew equally well, that when Buell’s entire Kentucky army was added to Grant’s forces, they could not possibly expect to hold their important position at Corinth. Their only hope lay in attacking Grant before Buell arrived, and defeating his troops in detail.

During Friday and Saturday the enemy had marched out of Corinth, about seventy thousand strong, in three lines of battle; the first and second extending from Owl Creek on the left to Lick Creek on the right—a distance of about three miles, supported by the third and the reserve. The first line, under Major-General Hardee, was constituted of his corps, augmented on his right by Gladden’s brigade, of Major-General Bragg’s corps, deployed in line of battle, with their respective artillery, following immediately by the main road to Pittsburg, and the cavalry in rear of the wings. The second line, composed of the other troop of Bragg’s corps, followed Hardee at a distance of five hundred yards, in the same order as the first. The army corps under General Polk followed the second line, at the distance of about eight hundred yards, in lines of brigades, deployed with their batteries in rear of each brigade, moving by the Pittsburg road, the left wing supported by cavalry. The reserve, under Brigadier-General Breckinridge, followed closely the third line, in the same order, its right wing supported by cavalry.

THE BATTLE ON SUNDAY.

As if in beautiful contrast with the terrible scenes that were soon to follow, the holy Sabbath-day which dawned on the sixth of April was one of unusual loveliness. The soft spring sunshine lay upon the green slopes, breaking up their delicate green with a thousand fleeting shadows flung downward by the young leaves. A gentle, pleasant wind shook the budding branches, and happy birds were singing their love-tunes in the underbrush, a touching prelude to the stern battle music that soon put them to flight. A few fleecy clouds wreathed themselves along the serene blue of the sky, and floated idly over the battle field, casting transparent shadows now in some green hollow, then upon a hill slope, till the whole field smiled like an Eden—smiled even after the cannon belched their thunders over it. While the morning dew was yet on the grass, the enemy began pouring the fire and smoke of a most deadly strife over this lovely scene.

The attack commenced so suddenly and with such bitter violence, that the enemy’s artillery was brought to bear on the outer camps almost simultaneously with the arrival of the pickets they had driven in.

The divisions of Sherman and Prentiss, composed in a great part of inexperienced troops, were selected and compelled to meet the first shock of the enemy’s onset. Much confusion and panic was occasioned by the sudden and unexpected attack, from which neither corps was able fully to recover during the day. Both commanders exerted themselves with bravery and skill in the trying crisis, and were soon enabled to bring the greater part of their troops into line of battle, and check the advance of the Confederate forces, which were then devastating the Federal camps.

It is impossible to describe the fearful scenes that followed the first wild onset of the enemy. Many of the sick and wounded, and the more tardy officers and men were shot in their tents and left for dead, lying through the whole of this fearful struggle, gasping in their agony. On Monday evening some of these poor fellows were found in the riddled tents, scarcely able to ask for the drink for which they were perishing.

But the Union forces were not long held at this terrible disadvantage. As the enemy advanced in force on Sherman’s centre, and a battery opened fire in the woods, shelling the Federal camp, the Unionists were in a condition to respond with emphasis. Taylor’s and Waterhouse’s batteries met this first regular attack.