Chapter XX: Part 20

In the neighbourhood of Subiaco, the dictator faced the Samnites; nevertheless there was also an army stationed near Capua, to guard against the inroads into Campania. The dictator had remarked that the auspices had not been observed correctly; nor could he take new ones where he was, as the auspices were different in different places, some being good in Rome, others in the country of the enemy; he had therefore to go back to Rome, that he might take fresh ones in the Capitol. From this, or some other reason, he went to Rome, leaving the _Magister Equitum_, Q. Fabius, in command, with express orders not to act on the offensive. This prohibition may have been well grounded; but perhaps also he did not trust the younger man, or he may indeed have grudged him everything. The Samnites very soon discovered that the Romans were not allowed to fight, and they teased and harassed them the more; besides which, the inactivity of the Romans was dangerous, as the Latin peoples in their rear were ever ready to rise, if the Samnites would only lend a helping hand. On this, Fabius, with all the confidence of youth, resolved upon giving battle to the Samnites, and he won the victory; according to some, he even conquered twice. As the prohibition was looked upon in the army to have been an act of mere envy and jealousy, the _Magister Equitum_ sent in his report, not to Papirius Cursor, but to the senate direct. The booty he burned, to deprive the dictator of the _spolia_ for his triumph. In the city, people were certainly not less alarmed at the consequences, than they were glad of the victory. Papirius immediately returned to the camp, his quick journey being also a proof that the army could not have been far from Rome. Surrounded by his twenty-four lictors, he summoned the _Magister Equitum_ before his tribunal, and only asked him whether he had fought against his orders, or no? Everything was in readiness for the execution of Fabius; but the whole army put on such a threatening attitude, and men’s minds were so roused against Papirius, that he himself began to waver, and at the earnest prayer of the soldiers granted a respite until the following day. During the night, Fabius fled to Rome, and there he betook himself to the senate. But when the senators were met together, and Fabius was in the midst of them, Papirius himself made his appearance and wanted his victim. The senate showed more than once in after days, that it was not fond of Fabius; but at that time, the sympathy for the youthful hero was still general, and it was resolved to protect him. Papirius did not dare to use force. The matter indeed was not now so desperate, as Livy describes it; for the patricians had the free right to appeal from the dictator to the curies, a fact which we know from Verrius Flaccus. What Livy tells us about calling upon the tribunes, is either a mistake arising from the expression _provocatio ad populum_, or it meant the confirmation of the decree of the curies by the _Plebes_; so that, of course, the whole people had granted an amnesty to Fabius. Even then, Papirius was unwilling to give way; but the resolution of the two orders snatched his victim from him. That he was reconciled to Fabius, as Livy makes out, is impossible: Fabius laid down his office, and Papirius took another _Magister Equitum_. He returned, loaded with hatred, to the army; and to this circumstance the unlucky issue of a battle is attributed. This happened in the year 430.

Fabius is said to have gained the victory very much owing to his having ordered the _frena_ to be taken off the horses, and the cavalry to rush in this manner against the enemy. If we take _frena_ to mean bridles, this would indeed be absurd: the thing may, however, be explained from the bits found at Pompeii and Herculanum. The curbs and bits which the Romans use for their horses were exceedingly cruel; so that if, instead of these, they had now put on the more humane ones of the Greeks, which Xenophon describes, the horses, being thus eased, would naturally have pressed forward full of spirit and energy.

The war took such a turn, that the Samnites were in great distress, and repented of having taken up arms. They obtained a truce on engaging to furnish a sum for the pay and clothing of the Roman troops; and then began to treat, believing that they might have a peace, if they agreed to the first demands of the Romans, which were the occupation of Naples, and the recognition of the colony of Fregellæ. But there is no doubt that the Romans now put forth very different claims: they also required the evacuation of Lucania and Apulia, stipulating, as they always did in such a peace, that the other party should place themselves in the same disadvantage, as if they had been quite beaten. This was one of the maxims which made the Romans a great nation. The peace was not brought about: the war was renewed; and the Romans now carried it on with great vigour. Fabius became consul, led his army into Apulia, and conquered Luceria and many other towns of the Apulians and Samnites; his repeated victories forced the Samnites to retreat from Fregellæ, and to make a stand against him. The other Roman army also had good luck; so that the whole of the following campaign was crowned with success, and the Samnites at length came to the resolution of seeking for peace at any price. They now turned their wrath against the man who was looked upon as the life and soul of the whole campaign, Papius Brutulus, of the very clan from which, two hundred years afterwards, C. Papius Mutilus sprang. The Romans again granted a truce, for which the Samnites had to make great sacrifices. We are indebted to the _excerpta_ from Dionysius for our knowledge of these transactions. The Samnites offered to do all they could; they would punish those who had been the authors of the hostilities. The Romans, however, had indeed demanded the giving up of Papius Brutulus. The resolution which the latter conceived, shows him to have been a great man: he had lived for his people, so long as they wanted to be great; life had no more value for him when their hearts had failed them, and he made away with it, that his fellow-citizens might be able to say, that the author of the war had atoned for it. This is one of the greatest deeds which were done of old, greater than that of Cato. The Samnites, to their shame, sent his corpse to Rome.--As the Romans had the first time already gone further than in their demands before the war; so they now again went beyond the conditions which had then been made, and asked the Samnites to acknowledge their hegemony, as Appian expresses it, that is, _majestatem populi Romani comiter colere_. The ambassadors of the Samnites had appealed to their clemency; they had declared that they would agree to everything, if the Romans really would not abate any of their pretensions; but as for the acknowledging of Rome’s supremacy, that alone they could not decree; it was only their community which could. The consequence of such an acknowledgment of supremacy was a sort of pupilage with regard to other states: the Samnites would therefore have had to give up their alliance with the Tarentines and the Lucanians; Roman commissioners would have had the power of visiting them, and enquiring whether the treaty was duly kept. This was more than the Samnite people would put up with. They had now lost their leader, had suffered shame, had suppliantly prayed for an honourable peace, and all in vain: it was resolved with one consent, to die rather, than to make such a peace. Thus the Romans had this time carried their maxim too far. The consequence of this was, that the Samnites exerted their might to the utmost, and actually began the war in Apulia on account of the importance of that country in a physical point of view. Luceria, with the Roman garrison, was besieged by the Samnites: it had originally been a town of their own, but had been taken from them by the Apulians. The Romans also now changed their mode of warfare: as the chief force of the Samnites was stationed at Apulia, they too resolved to concentrate the whole of their might. They had already before that betaken themselves to Apulia, and indeed had gained allies there, but without acquiring a firm footing. They were therefore obliged to force their way through the Vestinians; yet this they deemed hazardous, as they ran the risk of getting likewise into a war with the Marsians, Marrucinians and Pelignians. But here the unhappy jealousy which these had of the people of their own race would have come to their aid; and even other nations also to whom the Romans were obnoxious, such as the Æquians, and the Campanians themselves, wished well to the Samnites, but did not want them to gain a decisive victory. These petty nations imagined that the Romans and the Samnites would wear themselves out against each other, and that this would be an advantage to them. At the tidings that Luceria was besieged, the two consular armies forthwith prepared to march into Apulia, and resolved upon taking the nearest road; that is to say, they intended to cut their way through Samnium, the Samnites having become contemptible to them. The way they went was perhaps the same as that by which A. Cornelius Cossus had marched, being the road from Capua to Luceria by Beneventum. The general of the Samnites, C. Pontius, one of the greatest men of ancient times, had foreseen this. He left before Luceria just what was necessary for the blockade, and encamped on the road by which the Romans were advancing near Caudium, the capital of the Caudine Samnites: this town afterwards vanished from the face of the earth, in order that the shame of the Romans might be buried. The Romans descended by a defile into the valley; on the other side, another defile rose high and steep: having nowhere encountered any enemy, as yet, they marched on quite carelessly. The army had come down the first defile in a long column; but when the head of it had begun to ascend the opposite pass, they found it blocked up with stones and felled trees. It is probable that the Samnites had prepared themselves in the same way as the Tyrolese in 1809, who fastened large trunks of trees with ropes, and laid masses of rock behind them, so that when the enemy were in the valley, they cut the ropes, and the rocks crushed the army. With this the mention of the stones in Livy seems to tally. According to his account, the Romans then behaved in the most cowardly manner: he says that they endeavoured to retrace their steps, but that when they found that the defile on the other side was now likewise stopped up, they sat down and encamped in the valley. This is absurd. Those who are thus hemmed in, try and cut their way through like madmen. Surely a great battle was fought and lost by the Romans, as Cicero tells us in plain words (_cum male apud Caudium pugnatum esset_); Appian, of whom we have here only fragments, says that those superior officers, who besides the consuls had remained alive, signed the peace. He mentions twelve tribunes; but, as in a complete army there were twenty-four, it would follow that twelve had been killed, or at least, badly wounded. Zonaras also speaks of a lost battle, and of the taking of the camp. Livy, with incomprehensible vanity, positively insists upon it as a fact that no battle was fought near Caudium: he describes the Romans as cowards, in order to disguise the disgrace of a defeat. What further happened, is shrouded in great darkness; the results of my inquiries are as follows. According to Livy’s story, the consuls merely _promised_ that the Roman people would make peace, and nothing had been done besides; it is evidently his wish not to represent the Romans as faithless; he states, that half of the Roman knights (six hundred) were given as hostages. But the true state of the case is quite different. Appian, who borrows from Dionysius, tells us that the hostages had been given, ἕως ἅπας ὁ δῆμος τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπιψηφίσῃ, that is to say, until the curies and the tribes had decreed the peace. The conditions were reasonable. C. Pontius, in the heyday of his success, not knowing how to make use of it, invited his father, Herennius Pontius, a friend of the people of Tarentum, and of Archytas[141] in particular, to the camp, that he might ask him how he should treat the Romans. The old man answered that he ought to butcher them all; and when the son replied, that this would indeed be too barbarous, he is said to have been told by his father, that he ought to let them go, without touching a hair of their head, so as to lay the Romans under obligations by this kindness. But the Romans would at that time have laughed at such εὐήθεια. This account can only have had this meaning. Herennius wanted to say, “The only thing to be done is extermination. How can you ask? If you ask, why then, dismiss them at once!” But Pontius was a highminded man, he had a strong Italian feeling, and it was impossible for him to annihilate the army of a people which protected Italy against invading foreigners, particularly the Gauls and Carthaginians: he doubted not but that a lasting peace might be made with the Romans, if one could only lay hold of them. By great good luck, we know the conditions of it from the fragments. The consuls and all the commanders pledged their word of honour that the people would ratify the peace; until then, the knights, who were sons of the first families, remained as hostages. The _status quo ante bellum_ was to be restored; all the places which had belonged to the Samnites were to be given back to them; the colonists were also of course to be withdrawn from Fregellæ; and the old alliance of equality between the Romans and Samnites was to be renewed. There is no trace of any indemnification in money, or of disgraceful conditions: the Romans might themselves march off; but they were to leave their arms, all their stores, their military chest, their baggage, their waggons, horses, &c., behind. This is the common Italian international law. That the Romans passed under the yoke, is related as a _superbia_ of the Samnites; but this is quite accounted for by the circumstances of the case. The Samnites had fairly surrounded them with pallisades, some of which were now pulled down, and a gateway made of them, through which the Romans passed singly and unarmed. This had often been done, and was a thing of course. Pontius, however, was so far from being cruel, that, according to Appian, he gave the Romans, when they marched off, beasts of burthen for their wounded, and provisions enough to last for their journey home. Never was a great victory used more fairly. Now comes the question, whether the peace was ratified by the Roman people; and thereupon is based such a serious charge, that Livy throws it into the shade. The proof of the ratification is the fact that the tribunes of the people were given up to the Samnites; they either had confirmed the resolution of the curies concerning the peace, or they had brought a motion in due form before the _Plebes_. A tribune of the people could not pass one night outside the precincts of the city; so that they could not have been among those, who, being with the army, had settled the peace. The only other possible way of accounting for it would be, that the tribune had by an express resolution been sent to the army; yet even this could only be supposed to have taken place with a view to the ratification. The peace was necessary, in order to get back the hostages. For this reason, the perfidy was committed of ratifying the peace, which was afterwards to be broken under the pretext, that the consuls and the tribunes who had moved it before the senate and the _Plebes_, were traitors, and should be given up to the Samnites. This is the most infamous transaction in the Roman history, and the Romans had indeed good reasons to disguise it. To slur it over, Livy has falsified the account of the whole of the following year, stating, that the Romans had then recovered the hostages at the conquest of Luceria; for in such a violation of the peace they would certainly have been killed long before. The peace is also plainly to be seen from its consequences: the next year, we find the Samnites in possession of Luceria and Fregellæ. We are indeed told that the latter was conquered; yet this may be false, or the colonists were not willing to relinquish their abodes, and the Romans left the Samnites at liberty to make the conquest. At all events, they got possession of the place, which was of great importance in case of the war breaking out anew. Fregellæ covers the Latin road which leads from Tusculum through the country of the Hernicans to the upper Liris and Campania: in this manner, the Romans had now only the road by Terracina, Lautulæ, and the lower Liris, near Minturnæ; moreover, if a Roman army was posted in Campania, and another marched by Subiaco to Apulia, the communication between the two hosts was thus cut off. Still more important was the occupation afterwards of Sora by the Samnites; as well for the reasons just mentioned, as because they thereby acquired a base for their operations. The disaster at Caudium dates from the year 433 according to Cato. Here ends the first period of this war.[142]

The Romans now cancelled the peace, giving up to the Samnites the consuls and the other commanders who had sworn to it. By doing this, they strove to free themselves from the penalty of perjury; and it was with this view perhaps, that they had even the hypocrisy to cause the resolution concerning the peace to be passed by the tribes, and not by the centuries, so as to exclude the auguries, and to withdraw the case from the cognisance of the sacred law. Livy, on the giving up of the tribunes, takes the opportunity of making a most silly declamation. They, not less than the consuls, were to meet their fate; and when so deep was the disgrace of their nation, they could hardly look upon this as such a great calamity. Moreover, we are told that the consul Postumius had kicked the _fetialis_ who is said to have given him up to the Caudinians, with the remark, that the Romans might now carry on the war with justice, as he was a Samnite citizen, and had violated the international laws. This sounds quite absurd; yet the thing is possible. We know from Velleius Paterculus, that isopolity had been concluded with part of the Samnites before the war; perhaps, they were these very Caudinians, and as now, on being exiled, every Roman might assume the right of citizenship in such a state, Postumius, according to the forms of international law, might have claimed the right of citizenship among them for himself. By means of such a detestable farce, he thinks to call down the vengeance of heaven upon the Samnites. However this may be, the peace was faithlessly broken; in opposition to which the generosity of C. Pontius stands out in noble contrast, who let all the prisoners go free, saying, that in that case the Romans ought to send all the legions back to Caudium, that the affair might be restored _in integrum_; individuals were not his enemies. This shows C. Pontius to have been an extraordinary man, and the Samnites a people of high moral feeling.

The Samnites maintained great advantages, although not any lasting ones; the Romans, on the other hand, made immense exertions, and fell back upon their former plan of operations in attacking Samnium on the side of Apulia, and on the western frontier. Q. Publilius Philo and L. Papirius Cursor became consuls. The latter went to Apulia; the former is said to have successfully given battle again on the road which had been so disastrous in 433, and to have fought his way through to Papirius, who was stationed near Arpi. This is not very likely; yet we cannot decide on it. The Romans took up a position at Arpi, which was friendly to them, and from thence besieged Luceria. There, it is stated, Pontius was shut up with seven thousand Samnites, and the six hundred hostages; being obliged to capitulate, he had to pass under the yoke. This account is evidently a mere figment of vanity.

Diodorus is very deserving of attention with regard to these times. We do not know from what source he has borrowed; perhaps from Fabius, perhaps from Timæus: the latter is very possible. Timæus may have treated of this period as an introduction to his history of Pyrrhus, or else in his Siceliote and Italiote histories. The notices of Diodorus are very remarkable, though extremely scattered and unequal; sometimes he drops the thread of his subject, being on the whole a very wretched writer, sometimes he takes it up again; names of places are met with in him, which we do not know at all, some of these evidently misspelt, others, perhaps, written by mistake, or simply unknown to us.--The account of Livy for the year 434 (but the consuls, at that time, came into office in September, so that it belongs to the spring of 435), Diodorus places in the year 439; and this is much more likely, as Luceria can hardly have been twice conquered. The consuls perhaps confined themselves to making preparations for the struggle, and reducing to obedience the allies who had become mutinous. The greatest efforts of the Romans were now in Apulia. They subdued most of the peoples of that country, inasmuch as in 436, and 437, there was a truce between them and the Samnites through the mediation of the Tarentines, who were very much bent on having peace restored, being afraid that the Romans might permanently settle in their neighbourhood. The truce of that time was the curse of the Samnites; we may be sure that C. Pontius, owing to the jealousy of the other cantons, had not then the chief command. The Romans had now the upperhand already. In the year 438, the war breaks out again with extraordinary fury; it is full of the most remarkable turns and changes of fortune: the ever memorable campaign of the year 1757 was indeed more brilliant; yet the one which we have before us, may not unaptly be compared with it. The Samnites got hold of Sora by treachery; we see therefore that they again tried to spread their rule at the upper Liris, according to the same plan which they had followed from the very first. The Romans, on the other hand, with that lion-hearted intrepidity which distinguished both nations in this war, besieged Saticula near Capua, that they might gain ground against Samnium, and confound the Samnites by a diversion. The details I pass over. A Roman army was already in the heart of Samnium, the other in Apulia; both were nearly surrounded, and the tidings of their danger came to Rome. The Samnites having strengthened themselves on the Liris, the Romans saw that the whole of this movement was to cut off Campania from Rome; and they sent in the greatest haste a contingent under the dictator Q. Fabius into the defile of Lautulæ, from whence it was to join the army in Campania. Yet even Fabius was not invincible. The Samnites crossed the mountains in the rear of Fundi, and posted themselves in the narrow pass, the real Thermopylæ of the country; the Romans seem to have fallen in with them quite unawares, and were signally beaten and routed. This is told in plain words by Diodorus (438 or 439); the _Magister Equitum_, Q. Aulius, allowed himself to be cut down by the enemy. This victory made a wonderful change in the state of affairs. The Samnites overran Latium; Satricum joined them; the peoples far and near either broke out into actual rebellion, or showed themselves to be disaffected. How it happened that fortune turned round, is a point as to which Livy leaves us in the dark; for he has only slightly alluded to the preceding defeats. The Samnites besieged a town which Diodorus calls Kinna (we do not know what place this is); the Romans, while relieving it, utterly discomfited the enemy, and again subjected the towns which had fallen off. Among those who had thus revolted were the Ausonians, or Auruncians, at the mouth of the Liris; they may have tried to keep neutral: some of them, being also perhaps the most compromised, now displayed a degree of baseness which one would not have deemed possible. Twelve Auruncians come to the Romans, and give up to them their cities, which are thereupon destroyed by Rome, a measure which excites the horror of Livy, though as a matter of policy it was quite right. The more embarrassing their circumstances were, the more terrible they had to make themselves to their subjects, as they could not reckon on their attachment. _Deleta Ausonum gens vix certo defectionis crimine_, says Livy; that we cannot know so positively. The disposition to revolt spread as far as Præneste: that the insurrection of this town is to be placed in this year, may be gathered from Livy; as in his account of the year 449, he says of the Prænestine Q. Anicius, who was at that time plebeian ædile, _qui paucis annis ante hostis fuerat_. Most of these people, however, only went far enough to hurt themselves, without doing any good to the Samnites: they none of them had the slightest wish that the supremacy of Rome should pass over to these, and they rather chose to abide in their sorry independence, apart between the two. Had they been wise, they would have sought for a union with Rome; and Rome right gladly would have welcomed them. It is a pity that Livy omits these painful accounts, and that he does not explain how the two Roman armies extricated themselves from the danger; this must needs have happened, and the Samnites have thus had their advantage wrested from them. Livy himself says, _omnes circa populi defecerant_; the notice of the army of relief under Fabius, we owe to Diodorus alone. With careful examination, we may very nearly ascertain the whole extent of the defection. According to Diodorus, Capua had revolted; according to Livy, it was merely suspected, and the leaders of the conspiracy committed suicide. The former story is the more likely one; so that in consequence of that rebellion, a Roman army under C. Mænius, who was appointed as _Prætor rei gerendi causa_, marched to Campania, and reconquered the town.

With this year ends the second period of the war: the year 440 is the turning point. When the battle near Lautulæ and its results had raised the Samnites to the highest pinnacle of their power, the Romans succeeded in gaining Fortune over to their side again; for on the whole, they never showed themselves greater than after a disaster, even as Horace says, _Merses profundo pulchrior evenit_: they never lost their heads, but after the battle at the Alia. With such determination, one is sure to conquer the world; whoever, with singleness of purpose and sterling qualities, is conscious of his own strength, and resolutely makes head against his antagonist, in every case has already won the game. As early as in the next year, Rome paralysed her enemies by her invincibility; at home indeed she suffered dreadfully from these exertions, but abroad she was unconquerable.

The year 440 was the twelfth of the war. The Samnites had as yet lost nothing but the insignificant towns of Saticula and Luceria, and they still possessed Fregellæ. But now, though they were indeed successful in some detached undertakings, the scale soon turned in favour of the Romans. This is the third period of the war. In 441, the Romans conquered Fregellæ, Atina, Nola (a very important acquisition, not so much in a military, as in a political and financial point of view, as they now gained the rich and blissful country east and north of Vesuvius), and Sora; Nuceria also, between Vesuvius and Salernum, yielded itself up, but afterwards fell off again. They now waged the war against Samnium like a siege, in which the trenches are brought nearer and nearer, until the body of the place is reached. According to Livy, Luceria had previously fallen off, and was now recovered; but it is my belief that it had not indeed been taken before, and that this account is a fiction got up to throw back the disgrace of Caudium on the Samnites: here the story of the actual siege is twice told. The Romans now formed the resolution of leaving a garrison in Luceria, and they sent thither two thousand five hundred colonists. These, on the district which was assigned to them, had to defend their persons and their property: they were a permanent garrison, the vacancies of which were filled up by their children, and they constituted a much surer defence than cohorts would have done. This plan of founding a colony at such a distance was looked upon with misgiving even by the boldest; but boldness was the right thing: the colony kept its ground, and the passes of Apulia were now Roman. On the Liris also the Romans gain a footing, carrying out the system of a regular siege by parallels which they push on further and further: they restore Sora; build quite a new town, Interamnum; fortify Fregellæ, Casinum, Saticula, and Suessa Aurunca, to overawe the enemy; Cales they had already occupied before. Thus every inlet by the Latin road was shut: it was a girdle of fortresses, like that of Vauban’s on the French frontier. Some dim traces there are, which show that the Romans now feared that the Tarentines might in good earnest take part in the war. Tarentum was a naval power, although not like Athens of old. The Tarentines had hitherto only given subsidies; they now sent a fleet to Agrigentum under the command of a Spartan prince, which, as the Greek accounts will have it, was to put the affairs of Syracuse in order (Ol. 116, 3.): but it was either actually destined against Rome, or the Romans expected that it would be. They therefore build a fleet, and appoint _duumviri navales classis ornandæ reficiendæque causa_, who were independent of the consuls; and moreover, they found a colony in the Pontian isles, where there was a good harbour. These islands were very conveniently situated for annoying the coast, and so they were afraid that the Tarentines might settle on them. Thus circumspect were the Romans in all things! Having now a firm base in the fortresses, they transferred the war into the north of Samnium, into the country of the Pentrians.

In this campaign, the army of the consul C. Junius Bubulcus fell into great danger. Guerillas sprang up; so that the communication was cut off, and the troops had much trouble to provide for their subsistence in a country which was quite hostile and desolate. They now heard that the Samnites had driven their cattle into the mountains; and when they tried to get this booty, they were surprised by the enemy, and it was only with considerable loss that they cut their way through. In this battle, the consul had vowed to _Salus_ a temple, the one[143] for which C. Fabius Pictor made an excellent painting. Here we have the opinion of a judge and lover of art; I have discovered it in a fragment, where perhaps no one would look for it.[144] This was on the whole the age of the fine arts in Rome: to this period belongs that most beautiful figure of the she-wolf (457). We know besides that other pictures also were at that time offered as votive gifts in the temples; there were statues erected to C. Mænius and to C. Marcius; and Sp. Carvilius caused a colossus to be set up on the Capitoline hill, so that it could be seen from the Alban Mount. From this we may make out with certainty the hill on which the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter stood. In after days, Rome fell into imitating Greece: her inventive powers had died away. This gives important hints for the history of the fine arts.

The Romans had conquered a great part of the country of the Samnites; and if the war had been continued in this way, they would in a few years have attained their object of concluding peace on the terms which these had rejected previous to the battle of Caudium. But now we have before us the striking spectacle of the way in which the nations of ancient Italy were isolated from each other. By this time, it was already the fourteenth year of the war, and with the exception of the Tarentines, no people had as yet taken part with the Samnites: the northern confederacy had until then been at enmity with them, or at least neutral; and the Etruscans had resolved not to stir, from fear perhaps of the Gauls. According to an account in Polybius, the Romans had about this time made a treaty with the Gauls; in all likelihood, that they might use them in case of need against the Etruscans. Owing to these circumstances, Samnium had been brought to the lowest ebb; and it was now only that the Etruscans, headed by the Vulsinians, declared against Rome; so that she was under the necessity of carrying on a double war. We may safely suppose that this taking up of arms did not, as Livy represents it, coincide by mere chance with the end of the Samnite war, but that it was brought about by the Samnites. The Samnites were somewhat relieved by it; yet the Romans did not for all that leave them alone, but they still went on with their offensive war. To describe these operations in detail, would lead too far, although the incidents are remarkable enough; as to the Etruscan war, I put off its history until I have done with that of the Samnites, so as not to break the thread of the narrative. Interrupted by armistices, it was of different length for different towns; with Vulsinii, it lasted thirty years.

How low the Samnites had sunk, may be seen from the fact that a consular army was too strong for them. It took Bovianum, next to Maluentum, their most thriving town; which, like all the Samnite places (unlike those of the Etruscans), was fortified by nature only, to which it likewise owed an _arx_. The fate of Bovianum gives one a notion how the Samnite places fared. Three times the Romans took this town; and thus we may understand how it was, that it had become so small in Strabo’s time. This was also the case in the thirty years’ war with Magdeburg, which, after its conquest and destruction by Tilly, was reduced from 30,000 inhabitants to 3,000; only the cathedral and some few houses were still standing, and huts were built over the ruins. Whilst the Romans were fighting in Etruria, the Samnites had evidently formed the intention of carrying out the great plan which renders the third Samnite war so remarkable, of transferring their forces to those countries, and of encountering the Romans on a foreign soil: the people there were in need of a brave and practised army, and the Samnites were willing to let them have one. But in the third year already, the largest of the Etruscan towns concluded a truce with the Romans, and the hopes, which were founded on that diversion, fell to the ground. The expeditions of the Romans against Samnium now became real wars to the knife; as they had not the least prospect of gaining a firm footing there, so long as a Samnite was yet alive. Their armies could only hold the ground on which they stood, and they had to suffer from the want of all the means of subsistence: wherever they came, every soul had fled to the woods. It was in an expedition of this kind, that the consul C. Junius Bubullus got into such great danger. When Q. Fabius afterwards was in Etruria, another Roman army was surrounded in Samnium, and the consul wounded: at Rome a contingent was levied, and a dictator appointed. He was to be elected by the senate; the curies had to confirm him, and to invest him with the _imperium_; and a consul was then to proclaim him. The choice fell upon Papirius Cursor. One of the consuls being blockaded in Samnium, the duty of proclaiming him devolved on Fabius; and to the latter the senate sent a deputation, entreating him to perform the proclamation, as it was expected that he would object to it. But Fabius, like a man, got the better of his feelings, and did it. Papirius answered the hopes of the nation: he rescued the beleaguered army and defeated the Samnites.

When at the end of three years, the Romans had made peace with the Etruscans,--at least with part of them,--they again threw themselves with all their might upon the Samnites; and now the smaller nations began to see what would be the consequences of Rome’s unchecked victories. The northern confederacy, with the exception perhaps of the Vestinians, was drawn into the interest of the Samnites. But now the time was past: twelve years earlier, this would have led to the downfall of Rome. Something like this may be found in the history of the French revolution. These people thought that their kinsmen were now sufficiently weakened, so that they might lend them their aid without any risk. The Hernicans also now take the part of the Samnites; and, as it seems, the Æquians likewise, at least so far as to favour them. In 446, Fabius turned against Samnium, and gained a great victory near Allifæ. The exertions of the Samnites had been extraordinary: they had made use of the years during which the Etruscan war lasted, to reconquer Sora and Arpinum, consequently to occupy again the Latin road, and from thence to act upon the neighbouring peoples. Their efforts were not only directed to the raising of large levies. There is mention at this period, of a peculiar ornament of their troops, gold and silver targets; by which we are to understand brazen shields with gold and silver emblems, like those which have been found at Pompeii among the armour of Campanian gladiators, evidently of Greek workmanship. This very circumstance leads one to believe that they had subsidies from Tarentum; for the country of the Samnites was by this time thoroughly wasted. The Tarentines may have furnished the clothing and pay of the soldiers, from which we may also infer that the Samnites had μισθοφόροι. The Tarentines might do this so much the more readily, as the Samnites kept the Lucanians in check.

After the battle at Allifæ, there were found among the prisoners some Hernicans likewise. This was looked upon by the Romans as high treason, and they demanded that those who were guilty of it should be given up. The Romans generally treated their prisoners with great severity. Hannibal used his enemies cruelly, that he might exterminate them; and his allies kindly, in order to gain them over: the Romans did just the reverse. They followed the system of compelling the enemy to acknowledge their supremacy; and when that was done, it was not their plan to destroy them root and branch: on the contrary, they at that time rather wished to bring all the Italians into virtual subjection, and then by degrees to convert them into Romans. But whilst they did not wish to annihilate their rivals, they held, on the other hand, the principle of so thoroughly intimidating the smaller nations that were averse to their sway, that they would not dare to fall away any more. They therefore let the Samnite prisoners be ransomed, it being an Italian international right, that a man could buy his freedom for a certain sum; those who were not Samnites, they sold for slaves; and the Hernicans, as traitors, were even distributed among the municipal towns for trial. Three of the towns must have taken no share in the war; but Anagnia, Frusino, and the rest, as Livy says, demur to the conditions offered them, which were, to make their submission, and to ransom the prisoners. The expression _cæteri_ in Livy shows, that at that period the Hernicans must have been a greater nation than in the days of old, when they consisted of no more than five peoples. The Hernicans now took up arms. Rome was glad of it: for by the fortresses in the south they were cut off from getting Samnite aid; and they were now enemies of so little importance, that after a battle they bought a truce for thirty days. This happened quite seasonably for the Romans, their other army under Postumius being surrounded in Samnium, and very hard pressed; Marcius therefore advanced by forced marches, and made his appearance before matters had come to extremity. The Samnites fought bravely; but the consul who was hemmed in, broke through them, took their camp, and thereby gained the victory. After this and another battle, a truce was concluded for three months, during which the Romans had time to crush the Hernicans. Proud Anagnia, which then ranked as an independent state, like Thebes in Bœotia, lost its political existence, and became a municipal town of the second class, without any intercourse with the foreigner, but with sympolity, that is to say, _connubium_ and _commercium_ (with Rome); this place moreover and Frusino were deprived of their principal magistrates, and received every year from the prætor at Rome a provost to administer justice. The other Hernicans, who submitted to the laws of Rome, retained their political existence; but as subjects. This reduction of the Hernicans was of the greatest importance for Rome, as the alliance with them had become very burthensome. Nor is it unlikely that the Romans had already tried before to bring in some alterations, and that this had in fact excited the Hernicans to revolt.

The peace with the Samnites was broken again, and now the Romans overran for five months the whole of Samnium; according to Diodorus, they roamed about like hell-hounds, and wasted the country most ruthlessly, destroying everything alive that they met with, as Ibrahim Pacha did in the ill-fated Morea: on the side of the Samnites, the war had now become a mere guerilla struggle. After this carnage, the Romans themselves had to fly from such a waste: yet the Samnites were still untamed. In the following year, both the Roman armies were again in the heart of Samnium, opposed by two valiant native hosts. The Roman consul Postumius had fought an unsuccessful battle near Tifernum, and his colleague was likewise engaged with the enemy near Bovianum. This campaign bears a great resemblance to that of 1815. Postumius, instead of falling back upon his base of operations, broke up on hearing the news of the other battle; and in the evening, after the two armies had been fighting the whole of the day, he came up just in time to gain a complete victory which decided the war. The Samnite general Statius Gellius was taken prisoner. The Samnites could no longer make a stand in the field: the Romans reconquered Nuceria and the towns in the country of the Volscians, Sora, Arpinum, and others. The next year passed away in an armistice, during which the Samnites had to feed a Roman army in their country. At the end of this period, when the war, according to Diodorus, had lasted twenty-two years and a half, dating from the beginning of the hostilities with Palæopolis, peace was concluded at last.

Its conditions have come down to us in a fragment of Dionysius. The Samnites acknowledged the _majestas populi Romani_; so that they were not allowed to conclude any treaties, and had to withdraw their garrisons from the countries which had been formerly subjected by them. How far their frontiers were altered, is difficult to make out. The Volscian land, of course, remained to the Romans; but it is a question whether Salernum and Buxentum became Roman. This cannot be decided with certainty: it is most likely, as the Romans from henceforth seem to be in immediate connexion with the Lucanians; and it is also probable that the Frentanians remained quite isolated. If so, the territory of Samnium was considerably reduced on both coasts, and then it was also severed from Tarentum. The claims to the posts on the Liris, Fregellæ, and other places, were of course abandoned. Lucania is now again independent, after having become subject to Samnium during the war: the Roman party once more got the upperhand, and thus by degrees the country fell under the power of Rome.

The peace, however, did not last so much as five years, the nature of its conditions rendering this impossible. The Samnite war was followed by the reduction of the Æquians, who were still attached to their independence. The Romans, by a short but fierce war, forced them into a union with their own state. As the Æquians dwelt in villages built on hills, they were not so easy to be got at; and in consequence they received the right of Roman citizenship under favourable conditions. Hereupon the Romans established a colony at Carseoli in the country of the Æquians, and another at Alba on the lake Fucinus; the former was meant against Samnium, the latter revealed to the Marsians and to the other northern cantons the secret, that they also were to become subjects of the Romans. All the passes which lead through the Apennines, were now shut up. The Marsians rose; but peace was very soon concluded: the Romans wisely granted them very favourable conditions, by which that warlike nation was entirely gained over, and became one of the most faithful of allies. This happened in the year 451.

THE ETRUSCAN WAR. OTHER EVENTS DOWN TO THE THIRD SAMNITE WAR.

In the meanwhile, the Etruscan war had broken out in the year 444. A distinguishing characteristic of the Etruscans is the good faith with which they observed truces; and to this quality it must be attributed that the people of Tarquinii did not take any advantage of the circumstances of the Samnite war. Yet the victory of the Samnites near Lautulæ seems to have given them the first impulse. The union of the Etruscan towns was hard to accomplish; for at that time, not to speak of Cære, which had concluded peace for a hundred years, there were nine states which had to take that common step, although their interests were quite different.[145] The people of Tarquinii, for instance, had nothing to fear from the Gauls; but other states were threatened by them. When they were still considering, the tables had already turned, victory having in the meanwhile come back again to the Romans,--one reason more for the Etruscans to begin the war. Thus in 442, the Romans already looked upon an Etruscan war as unavoidable, and therefore appointed a dictator: yet the preparations of the Etruscans took up so much time that the whole of the following year passed away very quietly. It was only in the second year, that they commenced hostilities; but they found the Romans prepared. Their army was, however, considerable; and they acted on the offensive, a power which they may have acquired in their fierce wars with the Gauls. The Romans sent Q. Æmilius to Etruria, as the Etruscans were besieging the Roman border fortress Sutrium. The mountains of Viterbo had since the Gallic war been the frontier towards Etruria: they are now a bare ridge of hills; they were then covered with a thick forest. This is the _Silva Ciminia_ of which Livy gives such a romantic description. It was nothing but the natural barrier between two nations which were unfriendly, and did not wish to have much intercourse: such a border may purposely be allowed to be overgrown with wood, and to become a wilderness. Such is the boundary between Austrian Croatia and Bosnia, where, since the memory of man, the wood has been left to itself, except that there are some wretched roads in it here and there. This forest was by no means on the scale of a _Silva Hercynia_, to which Livy likens it; but according to his own account, just broad enough for the Romans to take about a couple of hours to march through it. Sutrium and Nepete were the real border strongholds of the Romans; but always against Vulsinii, not against Tarquinii and Falerii: there the country was quite open, and had intercourse with Rome. The Roman consul now made his appearance to relieve Sutrium. Livy gives a very lively description of the battle; we see from him, that the Romans long kept back their strong reserve. This they often did to the very latest moment, allowing the troops engaged to shed their blood to the last drop: by this means, they gained many a victory. Thus it happened also this time: after having fought the whole day with the Etruscans, they conquered in the evening by bringing up the reserve. Livy says that in this battle the Etruscans had more men killed, while the Romans had the greater number of wounded; the reason of which is this, that the Romans fought with the _pilum_ and the sword, but the Etruscans, who were armed after the Greek fashion, used the lance: these had also a large body of light troops. Even if we should listen to this account of Livy, we cannot believe in the result, that the Etruscans had been completely beaten; as in the following year, they were still encamped before Sutrium, and Fabius came forth to its relief. As their army was very great, Fabius thought it hazardous, as well as unnecessary, to attack them; for in truth, bold as the Romans were, on the whole, they were rather circumspect: they did not like to open a campaign with a battle.

Livy’s description of these wars is an immense exaggeration, which is the more to be wondered at, as his other histories of the Fabian house are so very exact. Fabius Pictor wrote not more than a hundred years after these events; and he is such an excellent writer, that we cannot lay the blame to him. There can be no doubt that Fabius was followed by Diodorus, whose account is here quite plain and credible, and not in any way to be reconciled with that of Livy: from whom the latter has taken his, heaven knows. According to Livy, the Etruscans in three battles must have lost a hundred thousand men; and not to speak of numbers at all, his description of the siege of Sutrium is quite incredible. Perhaps the only foundation there is for the first battle of Fabius in Livy, is, that by a very clever march he threw Roman troops and provisions into Sutrium. But when the Etruscans did not even then raise the siege, Fabius conceived the plan, which seemed foolhardy in the Romans, of invading Etruria itself across the Ciminian forest. The announcement of it spread terror in Rome. It seemed inevitable that the army would get between two Etruscan hosts; the Etruscans of Sutrium might cut off its direct retreat, and their return was only possible by going a great way round through Umbria, which was likewise a difficult country to pass. The senate deemed the undertaking so hazardous, that they sent five delegates, and two tribunes of the people, to dissuade him from it;--the tribunes accompanied the delegates, evidently to arrest him, if he should refuse to obey;--but Fabius had started in all haste, and, when the commissioners reached him, he already stood a conqueror in the midst of Etruria, just like Prince Eugene, by whom the order not to fight was read after the battle. Fabius in fact had pushed his army in advance, but had himself remained behind with the cavalry; then, leaving his camp standing, he undertook a great reconnoitring, and by this deceived the Etruscans during the day; towards sunset, he now followed his army and unexpectedly crossed the mountain. According to Diodorus, if we adopt the right reading,[146] Fabius, on the contrary, had invaded Etruria by going all the way round through Umbria, and had thus taken the Etruscans in the rear: in that case, the march across the Ciminian forest would be pure invention.