Chapter VI

REMONSTRANCE AGAINST DECREE OF PRIZE TRIBUNAL--SETTLEMENT OF PRIZE QUESTION BY THE EMPEROR--HIS MINISTERS REFUSE TO CONFORM TO IT--OBSTACLES THROWN IN THE WAY OF EQUIPMENT--MY SERVICES LIMITED TO THE DURATION OF WAR--MY REMONSTRANCE ON THIS BREACH OF FAITH--MINISTERS REFUSE TO PAY THE SQUADRON ANYTHING--A FRESH INSULT OFFERED TO ME--OFFER TO RESIGN THE COMMAND--MY RESIGNATION EVADED--LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER--LETTER TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE.

On the 1st of January, 1824, I communicated to the Minister of Marine the contents of a despatch received from Captain Haydon at Pernambuco, in which he apprised me of a plot on the part of the revolutionary Government to seize his person and take possession of the Imperial brig of war which he commanded; the latter intention having been openly advocated in the Assembly.

On the 6th, I addressed to the Minister of Marine the following remonstrance against the before-mentioned regulation of the Admiralty Court, that vessels captured within a certain distance of the shore should not be prize to the captor; this regulation being evidently intended as retrospective, with a view of nullifying the captures which had already been made:--

As I have before endeavoured, by anticipating evils, to prevent
their occurrence, so in the present instance, I feel it my duty to
His Imperial Majesty to place you, as Minister of Marine, on your
guard against countenancing any such measure in regard either to
the vessels captured in the blockade of Bahia, or to those taken
in the colonial possessions, and under the forts and batteries
of the enemy--and also in the case--if such there should be--of
vessels captured on the shores of Portugal.

It is quite clear that these cases of capture are distinct from
those in which protection is afforded by independent states to
belligerents approaching within a certain distance of neutral shores.
But you must be perfectly aware that, if enemy's ships are not to
be prize--if captured navigating near the shore no blockade can be
effective, as there will be no right to disturb them; besides which
the mass of the people engaged in a naval service will certainly not
encounter toil and hazard without remuneration of any kind beyond
their ordinary pay.

Should such a decree be really in contemplation, there is nothing
to hope from the naval service useful or creditable to the state;
and this opinion is founded on more than thirty years' unremitting
experience of seamen--that where there is no premium there is no
permanent zeal or exertion.

(Signed) COCHRANE & MARANHAÕ.

On the 10th of January, I communicated to the Government the contents of another despatch from Captain Haydon, at Pernambuco, reporting that the new Junta there had seized the Imperial ship of war, _Independencia ou morte_, and had removed the officer in command, at the same time threatening to treat Captain Haydon as a pirate.

The revolt was now becoming serious, and His Majesty--anxious to expedite the equipment of the squadron--on the 12th of February, 1824, sent for me to consult on the subject. Having told His Majesty the course which had been pursued by the prize tribunal, he said he would see justice done in spite of faction, and asked me to make a moderate valuation of the prize property taken in the late campaign, ascertaining, at the same time, if the seamen were willing to accept a specific sum in compensation of their claims? On asking His Majesty what assurance could be given that the administration would carry out such an arrangement, he replied that he would give me his own assurance, and ordering me to sit down beside him, wrote _with his own hand_ the following proposal--now in my possession:--

"_The Government is ready to pay to the squadron, the value of the
prizes which have been, or may be judged bad, the value thereof being
settled by arbitrators jointly chosen, and to pay the proprietors
their losses and damages; that in the number of the said prizes, the
frigate Imperatrice is not included, but the Government, as a
remuneration for her capture, will immediately give from the public
treasury the sum of 40,000 milreis to the captors; that the value of
the prizes already declared bad, shall be immediately paid, this
stipulation relating to all captures up to the present date, February
12th, and that henceforth captures shall be adjudged with more
dispatch, the Government being about to decree a provisional
arrangement, remedying all errors and omissions that may have
occurred._"

Nothing can be more clear than the above stipulations in His Majesty's own handwriting, to pay the squadron immediately the value of their prizes despite the Court of Admiralty, to pay 40,000 milreis for the _Imperatrice_, and that even the value of the prizes _adjudged bad_ should be paid, His Majesty thus rightly estimating the conduct and motives of the Court of Admiralty. _Not one of these conditions was ever complied with!_

On the 1st of March, His Majesty, through his minister, Francisco Villela Barbosa, informed me that he had assigned 40,000 milreis in recompense for the acquisition of the frigate _Imperatrice_; stating that, with regard to the other prizes made at Parà, they must be sentenced by the tribunal, in order that their value might be paid by the public treasury--the said treasury taking upon itself to satisfy all costs and damages on captures judged illegal; but that with regard to my assertion, that there were amongst them no illegal prizes, the Government could not itself decide the question.

That His Majesty gave the order for payment of 40,000 milreis, as compensation for the _Imperatrice_, there is no doubt; _but not a shilling of the amount was ever paid by his ministers, nevertheless even within the past few months the present Brazilian Ministry has charged that sum against me, as having been received and not accounted for!_ It is quite possible, that, in ignorance of the practices common amongst their predecessors of 1824, the present ministers of Brazil may imagine that the orders of His Majesty were complied with; but if so, the 40,000 milreis never reached me or the squadron. Had it done so, nothing can be more easy than to find my receipt for the amount, which I defy them to do.

Considering our difficulties in a fair way of now being settled, I willingly undertook to conciliate the seamen, and having made the low calculation of _Rs_. 650.000 milreis--a sum scarcely one-fourth the value of the prize property--reported to the Minister of Marine the willingness of the squadron generally to accept 600,000 dollars (about £.120,000) in compensation of their full rights; agreeing, moreover, to give up all claim on the Imperial Government on payment of one-half, and security for the remainder.

Notwithstanding this easy mode of arrangement, solely brought about by my personal influence with the men, not a milrea was allotted, His Majesty's ministers deliberately evading the Imperial wishes and promises. On the contrary, the more His Majesty was determined to do the squadron justice the more was the Portuguese faction in the ministry bent on frustrating the Imperial intentions--notwithstanding that, by the revolutionary proceedings in the North, the integrity of the empire was at stake. I may indeed go farther and state with great truth, that whilst His Majesty was most anxious for our speedy departure, in order to suppress the revolution at Pernambuco, his ministers were, day by day, addressing to me letters on the most insignificant subjects, with the apparent object of delaying the squadron by official frivolities, the necessity of replying to which would prevent my attention to the fulfilment of the Imperial wish. The best proof of this is the fact which will be apparent in the course of this chapter, viz.--that although the province of Pernambuco was in open revolt, the Administration contrived to delay the sailing of the squadron for _six months_ beyond the events just narrated.

On the 24th of February, the following extraordinary _portaria_ was transmitted to me by the Minister of Marine:--

Desiring to give a further testimony of the high estimation in which
the Marquis of Maranhaõ, First Admiral of the National and Imperial
Armada, is held, by reason of the distinguished services which he
has rendered to the state, and which it is hoped that he will
continue to render for the independence of Brazil, I deem it proper
to name him Commander-in-Chief of all the naval forces of the empire
_during the present war_. The Supreme Military Council is hereby
informed thereof, and will cause this decree to be executed.

Palace of Rio Janeiro, the 23rd of February, 1824. Third of the
Independence of the Empire, with the Rubrica of His Imperial
Majesty.

FRANCISCO VILLELA BARBOSA,

Secretariat of State,

27th February, 1824.

(Signed) ANASTASIO DE BRITO,

Acting Chief Secretary.

The audacity of this _portaria_--setting aside the stipulations of His Majesty and his late ministers in my commission, thus rendering it null and void without my consent--was only equalled by its hypocrisy. As a "_further testimony_ of the high estimation in which I was held," &c.--His Majesty's ministers were graciously pleased to annul my commission, in order that they might get rid of me at a moment's warning!

The document transmitted to me _did not_ bear the Rubrica of the Emperor, though falsely asserted so to do. If the reader will take the trouble to compare it with my two commissions, he will agree with me in the inference that it was written by Barbosa without the Emperor's knowledge or consent, with the object of terminating my command--the Imperial patents notwithstanding, as will be evident from the expression, "_during the present war;_" the war being _already ended_ by my expulsion of the Portuguese fleet and army.

No time was lost in remonstrating against this insidious decree. After pointing out to the Minister of Marine the agreements which had been made with me by the late ministers, and ratified by the Imperial sign manual, I addressed His Excellency as follows:--

The late decree inserted in the Gazette of February 28th, instead of
increasing my official rank and authority--as it professes to do--in
effect circumscribes it, because _there was no limitation of time_ in
the offer which I accepted from His Imperial Majesty. But by this
decree, my official rank and authority are limited to the duration of
the present war. Now, if I could believe that the idea of this
limitation originated with his Imperial Majesty himself, I should
respectfully and silently acquiesce; but being satisfied--from the
gracious manner in which he has been pleased to act towards me on all
occasions--that it did not so originate, I can only consider it an
intimation of an opinion prevalent in the councils of the state, that
myself and services can very well be done without, as soon as the
independence of Brazil shall be decided or peace restored.

As no man can be expected to dedicate his professional services
to a foreign country, without having a prospect of some recompence
more durable than that which such a limitation as is expressed in the
document in question seems to indicate, I am naturally led to inquire
whether it is the intention of His Majesty's advisers that, on the
termination of the present war, _my pay is to cease with my
authority?_ or whether I am to receive any permanent reward for
services, _the consequences of which will be permanent to Brazil?_
Because--if no recompence is to be received for public services
--however important and lasting in their effects those services may
be--it is a duty to myself and family to consider how far I am
justified in farther devoting my time to a service from which so
little future benefit is to be expected; a consideration the more
interesting to me, in consequence of repeated solicitations from the
Chilian Government to resume my rank and command in that state.

In saying thus much, you may consider me of a mercenary
disposition; but I have received from Brazil _no recompence whatever_,
beyond the honours conferred by His Imperial Majesty. If
you will peruse the accompanying papers, you will find that when I
left Chili I had disbursed of my own monies, 66,000 dollars, to keep
the Chilian squadron from starving, which sum, in consequence of
my leaving Chili, and accepting the offers of His Imperial Majesty,
has not been repaid. This amount His Majesty and his ministers
agreed to repay on my acceptance of the command; but I declined
to seek reimbursement at the expense of Brazil, "unless I
should perform greater services to the Empire than I had rendered
to Chili; but in the event of such services being rendered to
Brazil, and of Chili continuing its refusal to pay me, then--and
not otherwise--I should hope for indemnification." To this
stipulation the late ministers gave their assent.

It is no proof of an avaricious disposition that I at once
acquiesced in the proposition of His Imperial Majesty, that 40,000
dollars only for the _Imperatrice_, which is not one-third of her value,
should be apportioned to her captors.

(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.

I might have added that the squadron had received _no emoluments of any kind whatever_, notwithstanding the spontaneous stipulations of His Imperial Majesty to pay everything, there not being even an indication of handing over to them the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for the frigate captured at Parà. On the contrary, I had been condemned in costs and damages to a great amount for having captured Portuguese vessels in pursuance of His Majesty's orders; so that had the Court of Admiralty been in a position to enforce these, I should not only be unpaid but be mulcted of a very large sum, as the price of having accepted the command of the Brazilian navy!

So far from the 40,000 dollars awarded by His Majesty for the capture of the frigate _Imperatrice_ having been paid according to the Imperial directions, I received from the Minister of Marine a letter dated February 27th, implying that the above sum--one third the value of the vessel--was when paid, to be considered as the _sole_ reward of the squadron. This violation of His Majesty's agreement was at once repudiated, and an explanatory letter from the Minister of Marine--almost as ambiguous as the former--assured me that I had misconstrued his intention, which, however, was not the case, for the 40,000 dollars were never paid.

On the 19th of March, a direct insult was offered me by Severiano da Costa, now first minister, by an intimation to attend in the Imperial chapel for the purpose of assisting at the ceremony of swearing to the Constitution, but I was distinctly told that I should not be permitted to swear; the reason no doubt being, that, by a clause therein contained, military officers who swore to it, could not be dismissed without trial, and sentence of court martial; so that the not permitting me to swear--coupled with Barbosa's _portaria_ limiting my command to the duration of the war--indirectly gave power to the Administration to dismiss me at their option, whenever they might deem it expedient so to do. That such desire would arise the moment an opportunity might present itself, was certain, nor should I have waited for its expression, but from respectful attachment to His Majesty, and from the expectation of obtaining justice for the squadron, which relied on me for procuring satisfaction of their claims.

To have accepted an invitation of this public nature, under circumstances so insulting, was out of the question. I therefore joined Lady Cochrane at the island of Governador, and sent an excuse to the minister expressive of my regret at being prevented by unavoidable circumstances from sharing in the honour of the august ceremony.

In consequence of the insulting conduct of the Administration, and the impossibility of obtaining compensation for the squadron, notwithstanding His Majesty's orders to that effect, I made up my mind to quit a service in which the authority of the adverse Ministry was superior to that of the Sovereign. Accordingly, on the 20th of March, I addressed to the Minister of Marine a letter, from which the subjoined is an extract:--

If I thought that the course pursued towards me was dictated by His
Imperial Majesty, it would be impossible for me to remain an hour
longer in his service, and I should feel it my duty, at the earliest
possible moment, to lay my commission at his feet. If I have not done
so before--from the treatment which, in common with the navy, I have
experienced--it has been solely from an anxious desire to promote His
Majesty's real interests. Indeed, to struggle against prejudices, and
at the same time against those in power, whose prepossessions are at
variance with the interests of His Majesty, and the tranquillity and
independence of Brazil, is a task to which I am by no means equal. I
am, therefore, perfectly willing to resign the situation I hold,
rather than contend against difficulties which appear to me
insurmountable. I have only to add, that it will give me extreme
satisfaction to find that Your Excellency is enabled to rear an
effective marine out of the materials which constituted the fabric of
the old marine of Portugal--or any Brazilian marine at all, without
beginning on principles totally opposite to those which have been
pursued since my return to this port.

(Signed) COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.

This proffer of resignation was met by an assurance that I had misconstrued both the acts and intentions of the Administration, and the expression of a hope that I would not think of abandoning Brazil for which I had done so much. The real fact was, that although the Administration was endeavouring to delay the expedition for the suppression of revolution in the North, they were afraid of its results, dreading that a _republican_ Government might be established, as was indeed imminent. It was only from a conviction of not being able to meet such an emergency, otherwise than through my instrumentality--that my resignation was not accepted.

Determined to pursue the course I had now begun, I addressed the following letter to the prime minister:--

Rio de Janeiro, March 30, 1824.

Most Excellent Sir,

The late Prime Minister, José Bonifacio de Andrada
e Silva, was pleased to express a desire that I should communicate
directly with him in all extraordinary difficulties with respect
to the naval service. If I have not had recourse to your Excellency
until the present juncture, it has not been from any doubt of your
readiness to accord me similar indulgence, but because the evils
of which I had to complain were so palpable, that I conceived a
remedy would--of necessity be applied in the ordinary course of
things. But now that a system is adopted which must very soon
bring the naval service of His Imperial Majesty to utter insignificance
and ruin, I can no longer abstain from calling on your
Excellency as Minister of State for the internal affairs of the
empire, to interfere before it is too late.

Here follow complaints of the wretched state of the squadron--its
want of repairs--the neglect of pay--the illegal imprisonment of
officers for months without trial and on untenable grounds, &c. &c.

By the promises held out last year of punctuality in payment, and of
other rewards, foreign officers and seamen were induced to enter the
service--believing in the good faith of the Government. The
result--in the short period that has elapsed--has been the complete
expulsion of the enemy's forces, naval and military; all of whom
would have been still in arms against the independence of Brazil, had
it not been for the assistance of the foreign officers and seamen.

In the course of these important services, various captures were
made and sent for adjudication to Rio de Janeiro, under the
authority of His Imperial Majesty's orders to make war on the
subjects and property of Portugal. The captures made in prosecution
of the war were--according to the engagements under which the
expedition proceeded--to be the reward of the captors in return for
the benefits derived by the empire for their exertions.

Judge then, Sir, of the astonishment of the officers and seamen
at finding on their return to this port eight months afterwards, that
the Court of Admiralty (chiefly composed of natives of Portugal)
pretended to be ignorant whether the nation was at war or peace!
Under this plea they have avoided the adjudication of the
prizes--have
thrown every impediment in the way of the captors--by giving
sentences equally contrary to law, common sense and justice.

Great quantities of goods in the captured ships have decayed or
wholly perished from lapse of time--great quantities more have
been stolen--whilst whole cargoes, by the arbitrary authority of an
auditor, have been given up without trial, to pretended owners,
without even the decency of communication to the captors or their
agents. In short, nothing has been done in furtherance of the
gracious directions of His Majesty, given on the 12th ultimo, that
the prize affairs should be instantly adjusted.

It is certainly a hardship to the Portuguese gentlemen in the
Court of Admiralty, to be under the necessity of condemning
property that belonged to their countrymen, friends, and relations;
but if they have undertaken the duties of such an office, they ought
not to be permitted to weigh their private feelings against their
public duty--nor to bring upon the whole Government that character
of bad faith, which has been so disgraceful, and has proved so
injurious to all the Governments which have hitherto been
established in South America.

Even the payment of wages was not made to the _Pedro Primiero_
till nearly three months after her return, when the seamen--
irritated by the evasion of their dues--had nearly all abandoned the
ship; and if the crews of the _Nitherohy_ and _Carolina_ did not follow
their example on their return to port, it was entirely owing to my
perseverance before their arrival in procuring this tardy justice.

It was a maxim of the Emperor Napoleon, that "no events are
trifling with regard to nations and sovereigns, their destinies
being controlled by the most inconsiderable circumstances,"--
though circumstances which have the effect of causing the Imperial
marine to be abandoned, ought not--in a national point of view--to
be regarded as inconsiderable; but whether this be of importance
or not, the consequences of such abandonment by men who have so
faithfully performed their duty, will be far from beneficial to those
short sighted and vain individuals who imagine that the employment
of foreign officers is an obstacle to their own advancement.
If the present foreign officers are compelled to abandon their
situations an explanation must be given of the cause, and public
indignation must inevitably fall on the unreflecting heads of the
prejudiced or selfish authors of such impolitic injustice.

I have heard it stated, as a motive for the delay in condemning
the prizes, that the Government--in case of a treaty of peace--
might be called upon to refund the value to the original owners.
But, Sir, let me ask such wretched statesmen, what would have
been the situation of Brazil, if foreign officers and seamen had
refused to enter the service--as would have been the case, had no
prize money been promised? In that case, it is true, the vessels
in question would not have been taken--but it is equally true that
the enemy's troops would not have been starved into the evacuation
of Bahia, nor their squadron have been intimidated to flee from
these shores. Military warfare would still have raged in the
interior, and the hostile fleet might now have been engaged in the
blockade of Rio de Janeiro itself. Would it not be infinitely better
that the Government should have to pay the value of these prizes
even twice over--than that such calamities should not have been
averted?

But how can it be argued that the Government may be required
to restore to the enemy prizes lawfully taken in war? Is it possible
that the victors can be compelled to make humiliating terms with
the vanquished? Certainly not--unless the means by which victory
was obtained are insanely sacrificed, by permitting the squadron to
go to ruin and decay. The results which have been obtained could
not have been accomplished by any other measures than those
adopted by the wisdom of His Imperial Majesty. Is it then
justifiable, to suffer the engagements which produced such results
to be evaded and set at nought? Still more monstrous--decrees
have been passed, both by the Auditor of Marine and the Court of
Admiralty, to punish the captors for the execution of their duty,
and by means of pains and penalties to deter them from the performance
of it in future.

It is even more unjust and inconsistent, that although His
Majesty's late ministers held out that ships of war were to be prize
to the captors, they are now declared to be the property of the state!
Do those narrow-minded persons who prompted such a decree,
imagine this to be a saving to the country? or do they expect that
seamen--especially foreign seamen--will fight heartily on such
terms? The power which the British navy has acquired arises
from the wisdom of the government in making the interests of the
officers and men identical with the interests of the state, which
gives bounties and premiums even in addition to the full value of
the prizes; whilst the insignificance and inefficiency of the navies
of governments which adopt opposite principles, sufficiently
indicate whether such liberality, or the want of it, is the best policy
in maritime affairs.

Having said thus much on public matters, I shall very briefly
trouble you with respect to myself, by stating that, as regards all
which does not depend on the uncontrolled exercise of the Imperial
functions--there has been no respect paid to the written stipulations
entered into with me on accepting the command of the Brazilian
navy, and that since my return from freeing the Northern provinces
and uniting them to the Empire, every promise--written and verbal--has
been evaded or set at nought, which facts I am prepared to
prove beyond the possibility of contradiction.

My nature is not suspicious, nor did I ever become doubtful of
promises and professions of friendship till after the third year of
my connection with Chili--when, having swept every ship of war
belonging to the enemy from the Pacific, the Chilian ministers
imagined that they could dispense with my services. They had
not, indeed, the candour which I have experienced here, for, after
appointing me to a command without limitation as to time, _they did
not publicly restrict the duration of that command to the earliest
moment that they could dispense with me_. It was their
plan--while
openly professing kindness and gratitude--to endeavour, by secret
artifices, to render me odious to the public, and to transfer to me
the responsibility which they themselves incurred by bringing the
navy to ruin, and causing the seamen to abandon it, by withholding
their pay, and even the provisions necessary for their subsistence.
As for the rest, my remonstrances against such conduct were treated
in Chili just as my representations have been treated here. Like
causes will ever produce similar effects; but as there was no hostile
or Spanish party in the Chilian state, four years elapsed before
the mischiefs could be accomplished, which, by the machinations of
the Portuguese faction, have been here effected in the short space
of four months.

Truths are often disagreeable to those who are not in the habit
of hearing them, and doubly offensive after long experience of the
homage of blind obedience and subserviency. I have, nevertheless,
always felt it my duty to the Governments under which I have
served, not to abstain from uttering truths under any dread of
offence, because I have ever been impressed with the conviction
that speaking truth is not only the most honourable mode of
proceeding, but that the time seldom fails to arrive when those who
are warned of a wrong line of conduct feel grateful to the man--who
at the risk of personal inconvenience, or even punishment--dared
to apprise them of their danger.

In England--where mischiefs were heaped upon me for _opposing a
ministerial vote of parliamentary thanks to an undeserving
officer_--the people at once saw the propriety of my conduct, and the
Government has since virtually admitted its justice. In Chili, the
ministers who hated me, because they knew me to be aware of their
deceitful and dishonest acts, were succeeded by others who have
solicited my return. And the worthy and excellent Supreme Director
(O'Higgins, whom those ministers, by their wickedness and folly,
brought to ruin) found at last, and acknowledged--but too late to
attend to my warnings--that I had acted towards him, in all cases,
with honour and fidelity.

The error and fate of the excellent and eminent person whom I
have just named--affords a proof of the folly and danger of the
notion--that ministers who have forfeited the confidence of the
public by breach of faith and evil acts, can be upheld by military
force against public opinion, especially in Governments recently
constituted. The people respected their Supreme Director; but
when he marshalled his troops to uphold his evil ministers, he fell
with them. Had he adopted the policy of Cromwell, and delivered
to justice those who merited punishment, he would have saved
himself.

Permit me to say, in conclusion, that the Ministers of His Imperial
Majesty are identified with the Court of Admiralty, and with
the officers whom they maintain in the different departments.
Let them--I repeat--take heed that the operation of similar causes
does not produce like effects; for if the conduct of these individuals
shall cause the naval service to be abandoned, and shall thereby--as
a necessary consequence--occasion great disasters to the Empire,
I am convinced that in a short period, all the troops in Rio de
Janeiro will not be able to repress the storm that will be raised
against the factious Portuguese.

It is my fervent hope--that His Imperial Majesty, by gloriously
adhering to the cause of independence and to Brazil, will save and
unite the largest portion of his royal patrimony in defiance of the
blind efforts of Portugal, and in spite of the cunning intrigues of the
Portuguese faction here, to prolong civil war, and create dismemberment
and disunion.

I have the honour to be,

&c. &c.
COCHRANE AND MARANHAÕ.

His Excellency Joao Severiano Maciel de Costa,
Chief Minister of State, &c. &c.

One effect of the preceding letter was--that the Court of Admiralty requested my consent to give up certain prize property, the object being to construe my acquiescence as regarded a small portion--into a precedent for giving up the remainder. This was firmly refused on the ground of its being a fraud on the captors.