Chapter IV: Part I: Events Leading to Magna Carta (2)

During these years, however, John temporarily relaxed the pressure on his feudal tenants. His doing so failed to gain back any of their goodwill, while he broadened the basis of future resistance by shifting his oppressions to the clergy and through them to the poor.

Some incidents of the autumn of 1212 require brief notice, as well from their own inherent interest as because they find an echo in the words of Magna Carta. Serious trouble had arisen with Wales. Llywelyn (who had married John’s natural daughter Joan, and had consolidated his power under protection of the English King) now seized the occasion to cross the border, while John was preparing his schemes for a new continental expedition. The King changed his plans, and prepared to lead his troops to Wales instead of France. A muster was summoned for September at Nottingham, and John went thither to meet them. Before tasting meat, as we are told in Roger of Wendover’s graphic narrative, he hanged twenty-eight Welsh hostages, boys of noble family, whom he held as sureties that Llywelyn would keep the peace.[5]

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Footnote 5:

R. Wendover, III. 239.

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Almost immediately thereafter, two messengers arrived simultaneously from Scotland and from Wales with unexpected tidings. John’s daughter, Joan, and the King of Scots, each independently warned him that his English barons were prepared to revolt, under shelter of the Pope’s absolution from their allegiance, and either to slay him or betray him to the Welsh. The King dared not afford them so good an opportunity. In a panic he disbanded the feudal levies; and, accompanied only by his mercenaries, moved slowly back to London.[6]

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Footnote 6:

W. Coventry, II. 207; R. Wendover, III. 239.

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Two of the barons, Robert Fitz-Walter, afterwards the Marshal of the army which, later on, opposed John at Runnymede, and Eustace de Vesci, showed their knowledge of John’s suspicions (if they did not justify them) by withdrawing secretly from his Court and taking to flight. The King caused them to be outlawed in their absence, and thereafter seized their estates and demolished their castles.[7]

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Footnote 7:

From their possible connection with the wording of the famous chapter
39 of Magna Carta, it may be worth while to quote the exact words in
which Ralph de Coggeshall, _Chronicon Anglicanum_, p. 165, describes
this event, which he places (probably wrongly) in the year 1213.—“Rex
Eustachium de Vesci et Robertum filium Walteri, in comitatibus tertio
requisitos, cum eorum fautoribus utlaghiari fecit, castra eorum
subvertit, praedia occupavit.”

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These events of September, 1212, rudely shook John out of the false sense of security in which he had wrapped himself a few months earlier. In the Spring of the same year, he had still seemed to enjoy the full tide of prosperity; and he must have been a bold prophet who dared to foretell, as Peter of Wakefield did foretell, the speedy downfall of the King—a prophecy the main purport of which (although not the details), was actually accomplished.[8]

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Footnote 8:

See Miss Norgate, _John Lackland_, 170, and authorities there cited.

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John’s apparent security was deceptive; he had underestimated the powers arrayed against him. Before the end of that year he had realized, in a sudden flash of illumination, that the Pope was too strong for him, circumstanced as he then was. It may well be that, if John’s throne had rested on a solid basis of his subjects’ love, he might have defied with impunity the thunders of Rome; but, although he was still an unrestrained despot, his despotism now rested on a hollow foundation. His barons, particularly the eager spirits of the north, refrained from open rebellion merely until a fit opportunity should be offered them. The papal excommunication of a King relieved his subjects of their oaths of allegiance, and this might render their deliberate revolt dangerous and perhaps fatal. At this critical juncture Innocent played his leading card, inviting the King of France to act as the executor of the sentence of excommunication against his brother King. John at once realized that the time had come to make his peace with Rome.

Perhaps we should admire the sudden inspiration which showed the King that his game had been played and lost, while we regret the humiliation of his surrender, and the former blindness which could not see a little way ahead.

On 13th May, 1213, John met Pandulf, the papal legate, and accepted unconditionally his demands, the same which he had refused contemptuously some months before. Full reparation was to be made to the Church. Stephen Langton was to be received as archbishop in all honour with his banished bishops, friends and kinsmen. All church property was to be restored, with compensation for damage done. One of the minor conditions of John’s absolution was the restoration to Eustace de Vesci and Robert Fitz-Walter of the estates which they persuaded Innocent had been forfeited because of their loyalty to Rome.[9]

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Footnote 9:

_Ibid._, 292–3.

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John’s humiliation did not stop even here. Two days later he resigned the Crowns of England and Ireland, and received them again as the Pope’s feudatory, promising to perform personal homage should occasion allow. Such was the price which the King was now ready to pay for the Pope’s active alliance against his enemies at home and abroad, the former submission having merely bought off the excommunication. John hoped thus to disentangle himself from his growing difficulties, and so to be free to avenge himself on his baronial enemies. The surrender of the Crown was embodied in a formal legal document which bears to be made by John, “with the common council of our barons.” Were these merely words of form? They may have been so when first used; yet two years later the envoys of the insurgent barons claimed at Rome that the credit (so they now represented it) for the whole transaction lay with them. Perhaps the barons did consent to the surrender, thinking that to make the Pope lord paramount of England would protect the inhabitants from the irresponsible tyranny of John; while John hoped (with better reason as events proved) that the Pope’s friendship would increase his ability to work his evil will upon his enemies. In any case, no active opposition or protest seems to have been raised by any one at the time of the surrender. This step, so repugnant to later writers, seems not to have been regarded by contemporaries as a disgrace. Matthew Paris, indeed, writing in the next generation, describes it as “a thing to be detested for all time”; but then events had ripened in Matthew’s day, and he was a keen politician rather than an impartial onlooker.[10]

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Footnote 10:

The late Cardinal Manning in an article in the _Contemporary Review_
for December, 1875 (since published in book form), on the Pope and
Magna Carta, insists, probably with reason, that contemporary opinion
saw nothing disgraceful in the surrender, rather the reverse.

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Stephen Langton, now assured of a welcome to the high office into which he had been thrust against John’s will, landed at Dover and was received by the King at Winchester on 20th July, 1213. John swore on the Gospels to cherish and defend Holy Church, to restore the good laws of Edward, and to render to all men their rights, repeating practically the words of the coronation oath. In addition, he promised to make reparation for all property taken from the Church or churchmen. This oath, with its accompanying promise, was the condition on which he was to be absolved, provisionally by Langton, and more formally by a legate, to be sent from Rome specially for that purpose.

V. The Years of Crisis, 1213–15.

For a brief season after John had made his peace with Rome, he seemed to enjoy substantial fruits of his diplomacy. Once more the short-sighted character of his abilities was illustrated; a brief triumph led to a deeper fall. The King for the moment considered, with some show of reason, that he had regained the mastery of his enemies at home and abroad. Philip’s threatened invasion had to be abandoned; the people renewed their allegiance on the removal of the papal sentence; the barons had to reconcile themselves as best they could, awaiting a better opportunity to rebel. If John had confined himself to home affairs, he might have postponed the final explosion: he could not, however, reconcile himself to the loss of the great continental heritage of his ancestors. His attempts to recover Normandy and Anjou, partly by force of arms and partly by a great coalition, led to new exactions and new murmurings, while they ended in complete failure, which left him, discredited and penniless, at the mercy of the malcontents at home.

His projected campaign in Poitou would require all the levies he could raise. More than once John demanded, and his barons refused, their feudal service. Many excuses were put forward. At first they declined to follow a King who had not yet been fully absolved. Yet when Archbishop Stephen, on 20th July, 1213, removed the papal censure from John at Winchester, after exacting promises of good government, the northern barons still refused. Their new plea was that the tenure on which they held their lands did not compel them to serve abroad. They added that they were already exhausted by expeditions within England.[11]

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Footnote 11:

R. Coggeshall, p. 167.

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John took this as open defiance, and determined, with troops at his back (_per vim et arma_), to compel obedience.

Before his preparations were completed, an important assembly had met at St. Albans (on 4th August) to make sworn inquest as to the extent of damage done to churchmen during the years of John’s quarrel with Rome. The meeting is notable, not merely because of the reason of its summons, but also because of its composition. It is the earliest national council in which the principle of representation received recognition (so far as our records go).[12] Four lawful men, with the reeve, from each village or manor on the royal demesne, were present, but only, it must be remembered, in a very mean capacity—only to make a sworn inquest as to the amount of damage done. Such inquests by the humble representatives of the villages were quite common locally; the innovation lies in this, that their verdict was now given in a national assembly. Directions were issued in the King’s name from the same meeting, commanding sheriffs, foresters, and others to observe the laws of Henry I. and to abstain from unjust exactions, as they valued their limbs and lives.[13]

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Footnote 12:

Stubbs, _Const. Hist._, I. 566.

Footnote 13:

R. Wendover, III. 261-2.

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On 25th August, after John had set out with his mercenaries to punish by force of arms the refusal of his northern magnates to follow him to the Continent, as he held them bound to do in terms of their feudal obligations, Stephen Langton held a meeting with the great men of the south. Many bishops, abbots, priors and deans, together with some lay magnates of the southern counties, met him at St. Paul’s, London. The ostensible object of this assembly was to determine what use the Archbishop should make of his power to grant partial relaxation of the interdict still casting its blight over England—which could not be finally lifted until the legate arrived with fuller powers. If we may believe Roger of Wendover, more important business was transacted in the King’s absence. Stephen reminded the magnates that John’s absolution had been conditional on a promise of good government, and as a standard to guide them in judging what such government implied, he produced a copy of Henry I.’s Charter of Liberties. All present swore to “fight for those liberties, if it were needful, even unto death.” The Archbishop promised his help, “and a confederacy being thus made between them, the conference was dissolved.”[14]

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Footnote 14:

Roger of Wendover, III. 263-6. Blackstone (_Great Charter_,
Introduction, p. vi.), makes the apposite comment that it seems
unlikely that the discovery by the Archbishop of a charter probably
already well known “should be a matter of such novelty and triumph.”

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Stephen Langton, however, desired a peaceable solution if possible, and three days later we find him, after a somewhat hurried journey, at Northampton, on the 28th of August, striving earnestly, and with success, to avert civil war between John and the recalcitrant Crown tenants in the north.

His line of argument is worthy of especial note. The King, he urged, must not levy war on his subjects before he had obtained a legal judgment against them. The substance of this advice should be compared with the terms of chapter 39 of Magna Carta. John resented the interference of Stephen in lay matters, and continued his march to Nottingham; but threats of fresh excommunications caused him at length to consent to substitute legal process for violence, and to appoint a day for the trial of the defaulters before the _Curia Regis_—a trial which never took place.[15]

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Footnote 15:

R. Wendover, III. 262-3.

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John apparently continued his journey as far north as Durham, but returned to meet the new papal legate Nicholas, to whom he performed the promised homage and repeated the formal act of surrender in St. Paul’s on 3rd October.[16] Having thus completed his alliance with the Pope, he was confident of worsting his enemies in France and England. As most, if not all, of the great magnates were against him, he saw that it would be well to strengthen his position by support of the class beneath them in the feudal scheme of society. Perhaps it was this that led John to broaden the basis of the national assembly. The great Council which met at Oxford on 15th November, 1213, was made notable by the presence, in addition to the Crown tenants, of representatives of the various counties. The sheriffs, in the words of the King’s writs, were to cause to assemble all knights already summoned (that is, the Crown tenants) and four discreet men of each county “_ad loquendum nobiscum de negotiis regni nostri_.” Miss Norgate[17] lays stress on the fact that these writs were issued after the death of the great Justiciar Geoffrey Fitz-Peter, and before any successor had been appointed. John, she argues, acted on his own initiative, and is thus entitled to the credit of being the first statesman to introduce representatives of the counties into the national assembly. The importance of this precedent need not be obscured by the selfish nature of the motives to which it was due. Knights who were tenants of mesne lords (Miss Norgate says “yeomen”) were invited to act as a counterpoise to the barons. This innovation anticipated the line of progress afterwards followed by de Montfort and Edward I. Compared with it, the often-praised provisions of chapter 14 of Magna Carta must be regarded as antiquated and even reactionary.

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Footnote 16:

The charter recording this act may be read in _New Rymer_, I. 115. It
was sealed not in perishable wax, but in solid gold.

Footnote 17:

_John Lackland_, 195.

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In the early spring of 1214, John considered his home troubles ended, and that he was now free to use against France the coalition formed by his diplomacy. He went abroad early in February, leaving Peter des Roches, the unpopular Bishop of Winchester, to keep the peace as Justiciar, and to guard his interests, in concert with the papal legate. Although deserted by the northern barons, John relied partly on his mercenaries, but chiefly on the Emperor Otto and his other powerful allies. Fortune, always fickle, favoured him at first, only to ruin all his schemes more completely in the end. The crash came on Sunday, 27th July, 1214, when the King of France triumphed over the allies at the decisive battle of Bouvines. Three months later, John was compelled to sign a five years’ truce with Philip, abandoning all pretensions to recover his continental dominions.

He had left enemies at home more dangerous than those who conquered him at Bouvines—enemies who had been watching with trembling eagerness the vicissitudes of his fortunes abroad. His earlier successes struck dismay into the malcontents in England, apprehensive of the probable sequel to his triumphant return home. They waited with anxiety, but not in idleness, the culmination of his campaign, wisely refraining from open rebellion until news reached them of his failure or success. Meanwhile, they quietly organized their programme of reform and their measures of resistance. John’s strenuous endeavours to exact money and service, while failing to fill his Exchequer as he hoped, had ripened dormant hostility into an active confederacy organized for resistance. When England learned the result of the battle, the barons felt that the moment for action had arrived.

Even while abroad, John had not relaxed his efforts to wring exactions from England. Without consent or warning, he had imposed a scutage at the unprecedented rate of three marks on the knight’s fee. Writs for its collection had been issued on 26th May, 1214, an exception being indeed allowed for tenants personally present in the King’s army in Poitou. The northern barons, who had already refused to serve in person, now refused likewise to pay the scutage. This repudiation was couched in words particularly bold and sweeping; they denied liability to follow the King not merely to Poitou, but to any part of the Continent.[18]

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Footnote 18:

See W. Coventry, II. 217, _dicentes se propter terras quas in Anglia
tenent non debere regem extra regnum sequi nec ipsum euntem scutagio
juvare_. The legality of this contention is discussed _infra_, pp.
83-6.

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When John returned, in the middle of October, 1214, he found himself confronted with a crisis unique in English history. During his absence, the opponents of his misrule had drawn together, formulated their grievances, and matured their plans. The embarrassments on the Continent which weakened the King, heartened the opposition. The northern barons took the lead. Their cup of wrath, which had long been filling, overflowed when the scutage of three marks was imposed. Within a fortnight of his landing, John held an interview with the malcontents at Bury St. Edmunds (on 4th November, 1214).[19] No compromise was arrived at. John pressed for payment of the scutage, and the barons refused.

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Footnote 19:

See Miss Norgate, _John Lackland_, p. 221.

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It seems probable that, after John’s retiral, a conference of a more private nature was held at which, under cloak of attending the Abbey for prayer, a conspiracy against John was sworn. Roger of Wendover gives a graphic account of what happened. The magnates came together “as if for prayers; but there was something else in the matter, for after they had held much secret discourse, there was brought forth in their midst the charter of King Henry I., which the same barons had received in London ... from Archbishop Stephen of Canterbury.”[20] A solemn oath was taken to withdraw their fealty (a threat actually carried into effect on 5th May of the following year), and to wage war on the King, unless he granted their liberties; and a date—soon after Christmas—was fixed for making their formal demands. Meanwhile they separated to prepare for war. The King also realized that a resort to arms was imminent. While endeavouring to collect mercenaries, he tried unsuccessfully to sow dissension among his opponents. In especial, he hoped to buy off the hostility of the Church by a separate charter which he issued on 21st November. This professes to be granted “of the common consent of our barons.” Its object was to gratify the Church by turning canonical election from a sham into a reality. The election of prelates, great and small, should henceforward be really free in all cathedral and conventual churches and monasteries, saving to the Crown the right of wardship during vacancies. John promised never to deny or delay his consent to an election, and conferred powers on the electors, if he should do so, to proceed without him. The King was bitterly disappointed in his hope that by this bribe he would bring over the national Church from the barons’ side to his own.

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Footnote 20:

R. Wendover, III. 293.

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John was probably well aware of what took place at St. Edmunds after he had left, and he also knew that the close of the year was the time fixed for the making of demands. He held what must have been an anxious Christmas at Worcester (always a favourite resting-place of this King), but tarried only for a day, hastening to the Temple, London, where the proximity of the Tower would give him a feeling of security. There, on 6th January, 1215, a deputation from the insurgents met him without disguising that their demands were backed by force. These demands, they told him, included the confirmation of the laws of King Edward, with the liberties set forth in Henry’s Charter.

On the advice of the Archbishop and the Marshal, who acted as mediators, John asked a truce till Easter, which was granted in return for the promise that he would then give reasonable satisfaction. The Archbishop, the Marshal, and the Bishop of Ely were named as the King’s securities.

On 15th January, John re-issued the Charter to the Church, and demanded a renewal of homage from all his subjects. The sheriffs in each county were instructed to administer the oath in a specially stringent form; all Englishmen must now swear to “stand by him against all men.” Meanwhile emissaries were dispatched by both sides to Rome. Eustace de Vesci, as spokesman of the malcontents, asked Innocent, as overlord of England, to compel John to restore the ancient liberties, and claimed consideration on the ground that John’s surrender to the Pope had been made under pressure put on the King by them—all to no effect. John thought to propitiate the Pope by taking the cross, a politic measure (the date of which is given by one authority as 2nd February, and by another as 4th March), which would also serve to protect him against personal violence, and which afforded him, as is well illustrated by several chapters of Magna Carta, a fertile excuse for delay in remedying abuses. In April, the northern barons, convinced that the moment for action had arrived, met in arms at Stamford, and after Easter (when the truce had expired) marched southward to Brackley, in Northampton. There they were met, on 27th April, by the Archbishop and the Marshal, as emissaries from the King, who demanded what they wanted. They received in reply, and took back with them to John, a certain schedule, which consisted for the most part of ancient laws and customs of the realm, with an added threat that if the King did not immediately adhibit his seal the rebels would constrain him by seizing his castles, lands, and goods.[21]

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Footnote 21:

R. Wendover, III. 298.

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This schedule may be regarded as a rough draft of the document more fully drawn out six weeks later, commonly known as the Articles of the Barons.[22]

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Footnote 22:

Is it not possible that the so-called “unknown charter of Liberties”
(see _infra_ under Part V. and Appendix) was the very schedule
mentioned by Wendover? It was drawn up in the form of a charter, so as
to be ready for the immediate imprint of the seal they demanded.

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John’s answer, when he read these demands, was emphatic. “Why do not the barons, with these unjust exactions, ask my kingdom?” Then furious, he declared with an oath that he would never grant them such liberties, whereby he would make himself a slave.[23]

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Footnote 23:

R. Wendover, III. 298.

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On 5th May the barons formally renounced allegiance[24] and chose as commander, Robert Fitz-Walter, who styled himself piously and grandiloquently, “Marshal of the army of God and Holy Church.”

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Footnote 24:

Blackstone, _Great Charter_, p. xiii., citing the _Annals of
Dunstable_ (p. 43), says they were absolved at Wallingford by a Canon
of Durham.

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The insurgents, still shivering on the brink of civil war, delayed to march southwards. Much would depend on the attitude of London, with its wealth and central position; and John bade high for the support of its citizens. On 9th May a new charter[25] was granted to the Londoners, who now received a long-coveted privilege, the right to elect their mayor annually and to remove him at the year’s end. This marked the culmination of a long series of progressive grants in their favour. Previously the mayor had held office for life, and Henry Fitz-Aylwin, the earliest holder of the office (appointed perhaps in 1191), had died in 1213.

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Footnote 25:

The Charter appears _Rot. Chart._, p. 207. _Cf._ under chapter 13
_infra_, where the rights of the Londoners are discussed.

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Apparently no price was paid for this charter; but John doubtless expected in return the grateful support of the Londoners, exactly as he had expected the support of churchmen when he twice granted a charter in their favour. In both instances he was disappointed. Next day he made, probably as a measure of delay, an offer of arbitration to the barons. In the full tide of military preparations, he issued a writ in these words: "Know that we have conceded to our barons who are against us that we shall not take or disseise them or their men, nor go against them _per vim vel per arma_, unless by the law of our land, or by the judgment of their peers _in curia nostra_, until consideration shall have been made by four whom we shall choose on our part and four whom they shall choose on their part, and the lord Pope who shall be oversman over them"—words worthy of careful comparison with those used in chapter 39 of Magna Carta. The offer could not be taken seriously, since it left the decision of every vital issue virtually to the Pope, whom the barons distrusted.[26]

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Footnote 26:

The writ is given in _Rot. Pat._, 1. 141, and also in _New Rymer_, I.
128.

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Another royal writ, of two days later date, shows a rapid change of policy, doubtless due to the contemptuous rejection of arbitration. On 12th May, John ordered the sheriffs to do precisely what he had offered not to do. They were told to take violent measures against the rebels without waiting for a “judgment of peers” or other formality. Lands, goods, and chattels of the King’s enemies were to be seized and applied to his benefit.[27]

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Footnote 27:

For writ, see _Rot. Claus._, 204.

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The barons, rejecting all offers, marched by Northampton, Bedford, and Ware, towards the capital. London, in spite of the charter received eight days earlier, boldly threw in its lot with the insurgents, to whom it opened its gates on 17th May.[28] The example of London was quickly followed by other towns and by many hesitating nobles. The confederates felt strong enough to issue letters to all who still adhered to the King, bidding them forsake him on pain of forfeiture.

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Footnote 28:

Some authorities give 24th May as the date. It must have been the
17th; since _New Rymer_, p. 121, under the date of 18th May, prints a
writ of John, informing Rowland Blaot of the surrender of London to
the barons. This was followed on 20th May (_N.R._, p. 121) by another
royal writ, ordering all bailiffs and other faithful, to molest the
Londoners in every way possible.

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John found himself, for the moment, without power of effective resistance; and, probably with the view of gaining time rather than of committing himself irretrievably to any abatement of his prerogatives, agreed to meet his opponents. As a preliminary to this, on 8th June he issued a safe-conduct for the barons’ representatives to meet him at Staines within the three days following. This was apparently too short notice, as on 10th June, John, now at Windsor, granted an extension of the time and safe-conduct till Monday, 15th June. William the Marshal and other envoys were dispatched from Windsor to the barons in London with what was practically a message of surrender. The barons were told that John “would freely accede to the laws and liberties which they asked,” if they would appoint a place and day for a meeting. The intermediaries, in the words of Roger of Wendover,[29] "without guile carried back to the barons the message which had been guilefully imposed on them"—implying that John meant to make no promises, except such as were insincere. Yet the barons, _immenso fluctuantes gaudio_, fixed as the time of meeting the last day of the extended truce, Monday, 15th June, at a certain meadow between Staines and Windsor, known as Runnymede.

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Footnote 29:

III. 301.

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VI. Runnymede, and after.

On 15th June the King and the Barons met. On the side of the insurgents appeared a great host; on the monarch’s, merely a small band of magnates, loyal to the person of the King, but only half-hearted, at the best, in his support. Their names may be read in the preamble to the Charter: the chief among them, Stephen Langton, still nominally neutral, was known to be in full sympathy with the rebels.

Dr. Stubbs,[30] maintaining that the whole baronage of England was implicated in these stirring events, gives a masterly analysis of its more conspicuous members into four great groups: (1) the Northumbrani or Norenses of the chroniclers, names famous in the northern counties, who had been the first to raise the standard of open revolt, and retained the lead throughout; (2) the other nobles from all parts of England, who had shown themselves ready from an early date to co-operate with the Northerners—“the great baronial families that had been wise enough to cast away the feudal aspirations of their forefathers, and the rising houses which had sprung from the ministerial nobility”; (3) the moderate party who, ready to worship the rising sun, deserted John after London had joined the rebels, including even the King’s half-brother (the Earl of Salisbury), the loyal Marshal, Hubert de Burgh, and other ministers of the Crown, whose names may be read in the preamble to the Charter; and (4) the tools of John’s misgovernment, mostly men of foreign birth, tied to John by motives of interest as well as by personal loyalty, since their differences with the baronial leaders lay too deep for reconciliation, most of whom are branded by name in Magna Carta as for ever incapable of holding office in the realm. These men of desperate fortunes alone remained whole-hearted on John’s side when the crisis came.[31]

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Footnote 30:

_Const. Hist._, I. 581-3.

Footnote 31:

The individual names may be read in Stubbs, _Ibid._; and readers in
search of biographical knowledge are referred to Bémont, _Chartes_,
39–40, and for fuller, though less reliable information, to Thomson,
_Magna Charta_, 270–322.

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When the conference began, the fourth group was not near John, being otherwise occupied in the command of castle garrisons or of troops actually in the field; the third group, a small one, was with him; and the first and second groups were, in their imposing strength, arrayed against him.

Unfortunately, the vagueness of contemporary accounts prevents us from reproducing with certainty the progress of negotiations on that eventful 15th of June and the few days following. Some inferences, however, may be drawn from the words of the completed Charter itself and from those of several closely related documents. One of these, the Articles of the Barons,[32] is sometimes supposed to be identical in its terms with the Schedule which had been already presented to the King’s emissaries, at Brackley, on the 27th of April.[33] It is more probable, however, that during the seven eventful weeks which had since elapsed, the original demands had been somewhat modified. It is not unlikely that the interval had been employed in making the terms of the suggested agreement more full and specific. The Schedule of April was probably only a rough draft of the Articles as we know them, and these formed in their turn the new draft on which the completed Charter was based. Articles and Charter are alike authenticated with the impress of the King’s great seal, an indisputable proof that the terms of each of them actually received his official consent.

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Footnote 32:

See Appendix.

Footnote 33:

See _supra_, p. 40.

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This fact affords a strong presumption that an interval must have elapsed between the King’s acceptance of the first and the final completion of the second; since it would have been absurd to seal what was practically a draft at the same time as the principal instrument. The probability of such an interval must not be lost sight of in any attempt to reconstruct in chronological sequence the stages of the negotiations at Runnymede.

A few undoubted facts form a starting-point on which inferences may be based. John’s headquarters were fixed at Windsor from Monday, 15th June, to the afternoon of Tuesday the 23rd. On each of these nine days (with the possible exception of the 16th and 17th) he visited Runnymede to confer with the barons.[34]

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Footnote 34:

So far there can be no doubt. Either on the _Close Rolls_ or on the
_Patent Rolls_ (q.v.) copies of one or more writs are preserved dated
from Windsor on each of these days, and also one or more dated from
Runnymede on 15th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd June.

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Two crucial stages in these negotiations were clearly reached on Monday the 15th (the date borne by Magna Carta itself) and on Friday the 19th (the day on which John in more than one writ stated that peace had been concluded). What happened exactly on each of these two days is, however, to some extent, matter of conjecture. It is here maintained, with some confidence, that on Monday the substance of the barons’ demands was provisionally accepted and that the Articles were then sealed; while on Friday this arrangement was finally confirmed and Magna Carta itself, in several duplicates, was sealed.

To justify these inferences, a more detailed examination of the evidence available will be necessary. The earliest meeting between John and the baronial leaders, all authorities are agreed, took place on Monday, 15th June, probably in the early morning. The barons undoubtedly came to the conference provided with an accurate list of those grievances which they were determined to have redressed. On the previous 27th of April the rebels had sent a written Schedule to the King, along with a demand that he should signify his acceptance by affixing his seal;[35] they are not likely to have been less fully prepared on 15th June.

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Footnote 35:

R. Wendover, III. 298.

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John, on his part, would naturally try a policy of evasions and delays; and, when these were clearly useless, would then endeavour to secure modifications of the terms offered. These tactics met with no success. His opponents demanded a plain acceptance of their plainly expressed demands. Before nightfall, John, overawed by their firmness and by the numbers of the armed force behind them, was constrained to surrender. Leaving minor points of detail to be subsequently adjusted, he provisionally accepted the substance of the long list of reforms put before him by the barons, on the understanding that they would renew their allegiance and give him some security that they would keep the peace. In proof of this bargain, the heads of the agreement were rapidly engrossed on parchment to the number of forty-nine, and the great seal was impressed on the wax of the label, where it may still be seen.[36]

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Footnote 36:

In the British Museum. See _infra_ under Part V.

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The parchment containing these Articles of the Barons may have been the identical Schedule actually prepared by the rebel leaders previous to the meeting; but, more probably, it was written out at Runnymede during the conference on the 15th (or between two conferences on that day) by one of the clerks of the royal Chancery. This is more in keeping with its heading (written in the same hand, and apparently at the same time as the body of the deed), _Ista sunt capitula quae barones petunt et dominus rex concedit_.

Likely enough, it followed closely the words of the baronial Schedule; but it may have contained some slight modifications in favour of the Crown. One such, at least, was inserted, apparently as an afterthought (on the intervention of the King perhaps, or one of his friends); articles 45 and 46, as originally conceived, have been subsequently connected by a rude bracket, and a qualifying proviso added which practically bestowed on the Archbishop the powers of an arbitrator to determine whether both articles should be altered in favour of the Crown or no.[37] The entire document is in a running hand, and appears to have been rapidly though carefully written. Its engrossment upon parchment with a quill pen must have occupied several hours; but a diligent copyist would not find it beyond his powers to complete the task in one day.

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Footnote 37:

Cf. Blackstone, _Great Charter_, xvii.: "subjoined in a more hasty
hand, ... as if added at the instance of the King’s commissioners upon
more mature deliberation."

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Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday were consumed in further negotiations as to matters of detail; in reducing the heads of agreement already accepted to the more binding form of a feudal charter; and in engrossing several copies for greater security. Everything was, however, ready for a final settlement on Friday the 19th. At the conference held on that day the conclusion of the final concord probably included several steps; among others, the nomination by the opposition, with the King’s tacit acquiescence, of twenty-five barons to act as Executors under chapter 61,[38] the solemn sealing and delivery of several original copies of the Great Charter in its final form, the taking of an oath by all parties to abide by its provisions, and the issue of the first batch of writs of instructions to the sheriffs.

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Footnote 38:

See _infra_ under that chapter.

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Blackstone[39] thinks that the barons on that day renewed their oaths of fealty and homage. It is more probable that, until John had actually carried out the more pressing reforms promised in Magna Carta, they refused formally to swear allegiance, undertaking, however, in the hearing of the two archbishops and other prelates, that they would keep the peace and furnish security to that effect in any form that John might name, except only by delivery of their castles or of hostages.[40]

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Footnote 39:

_Great Charter_, p. xxiv.

Footnote 40:

See Protest of Archbishops _infra_, p. 52.

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The statement that Friday, 19th June, was the day on which peace was finally concluded rests on unmistakable evidence. On 21st June, John wrote from Windsor to William of Cantilupe, one of his captains, instructing him not to enforce payment of any unpaid balances of “tenseries”[41] demanded since the preceding Friday, “on which day peace was made between the King and his barons.”[42]

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Footnote 41:

Mr. Round explains this word in a learned appendix (_Geoffrey de
Mandeville_, p. 414) to mean “blackmail,” _i.e._ “money extorted under
pretence of protection or defence.”

Footnote 42:

See _Rot. Claus._, p. 225 (17 John membrane 31). The evidence of this
writ does not stand alone. In another writ on the same membrane of the
_Close Rolls_, dated 19th June, John informs his half-brother, the
Earl of Salisbury, that he has concluded peace, and instructs him to
restore certain lands and castles immediately, as this had been made a
condition of peace. See also the writ to Stephen Harengod _infra_, p.
49.

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It has been taken for granted by many historians that the peace was finally concluded, and the Great Charter actually sealed and issued on the 15th, not on the 19th.[43] The fact that all four copies of Magna Carta still extant bear this date seems to have been regarded as absolutely conclusive on this point. Experts in diplomatics, however, have long been aware that elaborate charters and other documents, which occupied a considerable time in preparation, usually bore the date, not of their actual execution, but of the day on which were concluded the transactions of which they form the record. Legal instruments were thus commonly ante-dated (as it would be reckoned according to modern legal practice). Thus it is far from safe to infer from Magna Carta’s mention of its own date that the great seal was actually adhibited on the 15th June.

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Footnote 43:

Blackstone, however (_Great Charter_, xv.), speaks of a “conference
which lasted for several days, and did not come to a conclusion till
Friday, the 19th June.”

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Such presumption as exists points the other way. The Great Charter is a lengthy and elaborate document, and it is barely possible that any one of the four originals known to us could have been engrossed (to say nothing of the adjustment of the substance and form) within one day. Not only is it much longer than the Articles on which it is founded; but even the most casual comparison will convince any unbiassed mind of the slower rate of engrossment of the Charter. All four copies show marks of great deliberation, while those at Lincoln and Salisbury in particular are exquisite models of leisurely and elaborate penmanship. The highly finished initial letters of the first line and other ornamental features may be instructively compared with the plain, business-like, rapid hand of the Articles. How many additional copies now lost were once in existence bearing the same date, it is impossible to say; but each of those still extant may well have occupied four days in the writing.[44]

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Footnote 44:

Miss Norgate, _John Lackland_, p. 234, acquiesces in the view
generally received, fixing Monday as the day on which the final
concord was arrived at, but she relies for evidence on a more than
doubtful interpretation of what is undoubtedly an error in the copy of
a writ by King John appearing on the _Patent Rolls_. This writ, which
as copied in the _Rolls_ bears to be dated 18th June (erroneously as
will immediately be shown), is addressed to Stephen Harengod (in terms
closely resembling those of the writ already cited from the _Close
Rolls_ addressed to William of Cantilupe), announcing _inter alia_
that terms of peace had been agreed upon “last Friday.” Miss Norgate
contends with reason that there must be a mistake somewhere, since on
the Friday preceding the 18th, negotiations had not even begun. She is
confident that "the ‘die Veneris’ which occurs three times in the writ
is in each case an unquestionable, though unaccountable, error for
‘die Lunae.’" Yet, it is unlikely that a scribe writing three days
after so momentous an event could have mistaken the day of the week.
It is infinitely more probable that in writing xxiij. he formed the
second “x” so carelessly that it was mistaken by the enrolling clerk
for a “v.” The correct date is thus the 23rd, and the reference is to
Friday the 19th. This presumption becomes a certainty by comparison
with the words of the writ to William of Cantilupe, dated the 21st (of
the existence of which Miss Norgate was probably not aware).

A comparison between the two documents shows few changes of importance in the tenor.[45]

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Footnote 45:

Blackstone, _Great Charter_, xviii., has given a careful analysis of
the points of difference.

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The one outstanding addition is the insertion, in an emphatic form, both at the beginning and at the end of the Charter, of a general declaration in favour of the freedom and rights of the Church. The inference seems to be that a new influence was brought to bear, between the preparation of the draft and that of the Charter. It was the Archbishop of Canterbury and his friends who thus converted the original baronial manifesto into something more nearly resembling a declaration of rights for the nation at large. One or two minor alterations seem slightly to benefit the Crown,[46] while several others, rightly viewed, suggest an influence at work unfavourable to the towns and trading classes.[47]

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Footnote 46:

_E.g._ chapters 48 and 52. For alterations directed against the
trading classes, see chapters 12, 13, 35, and 41 _infra_.

Footnote 47:

Miss Norgate, _John Lackland_, 233, takes a different view, holding
that the influence of Stephen Langton dates from an earlier period.
The original articles “are obviously not the composition of the barons
mustered under Robert Fitz-Walter,” who could never have risen to “the
lofty conception embodied in the Charter—the conception of a contract
between King and people which should secure equal rights to every
class and every individual in the nation.” The correctness of this
estimate is discussed _infra_.

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In addition to the various originals of the Charter issued under the great seal, chapter 62 provides that authenticated copies should be made and certified as correct by “Letters Testimonial,” under the seals of the two archbishops with the legate and the bishops. This was done, but the exact date of their issue is unknown.[48]

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Footnote 48:

No specimen of these Letters Testimonial is known to exist, but a copy
is preserved on folio 234 of the _Red Book of the Exchequer_. See
Appendix.

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The same Friday which thus saw the completion of negotiations saw also the issue of the first batch of letters of instructions to the various sheriffs, telling them that a firm peace had been concluded, by God’s grace, between John and the barons and freemen of the kingdom, as they might hear and see by the Charter which had been made, and which was to be published throughout the district, and firmly observed. Each sheriff was further commanded to cause all in his bailiwick to make oath according to the form of the Charter to the twenty-five barons or their attorneys, and further, to see to the appointment of twelve knights of the county in full County Court, in order that they might declare upon oath all evil customs requiring to be reformed, as well of sheriffs as of their servants, foresters, and others.[49] This was held to apply chiefly to the redress of forest grievances.

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Footnote 49:

See _Rot. Pat._, I. 180, and _Select Charters_, 306–7.

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Apparently, four days elapsed before similar letters, accompanied by copies of the Charter, could be sent to every sheriff. During the same few days, several writs (some of which have already been mentioned) were dispatched to military commanders with orders to stop hostilities. A few writs, dated mostly 25th June, show that some obnoxious sheriffs had been removed to make way for better men. Hubert de Burgh, a moderate though loyal adherent, and a man generally respected, was appointed Justiciar in room of the hated Peter des Roches. On 27th June, another writ directed the sheriffs and the elected knights to punish, by forfeiture of lands and chattels, all those who refused to swear to the twenty-five Executors within a fortnight. All these various instructions may be regarded as forming part of the settlement of the 19th of June, and were dispatched with the greatest rapidity possible.

Even after the settlement arrived at on Friday, some minor points of dispute remained. The barons refused to be satisfied without substantial security that the reforms and restorations agreed on would be carried out by the King; they demanded that both the city of London and the Tower of London should be left completely under their control as pledges of John’s good faith, until 15th August, or longer, if the reforms had not then been completed. John obtained a slight modification of these demands; he surrendered the city of London to his opponents, as they asked; but placed the Tower in the neutral custody of the Archbishop of Canterbury. These conditions were embodied in a supplementary treaty, which describes itself as _Conventio facta inter Regem Angliae et barones ejusdem regni_.[50] If the barons distrusted John, he was equally distrustful of them, demanding the security they had promised for fulfilment of their part of the original compact. He now asked a formal charter in his favour that they would observe the peace and their oaths of homage, which they point-blank refused to grant. The King appealed to the prelates without effect. The archbishops, with several suffragans, however, put a formal protest on record of the barons’ promise and subsequent refusal to keep it.[51]

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Footnote 50:

_New Rymer_, I. 133. See Appendix. It is undated, but must be later
than the letters to sheriffs concerning election of twelve knights, to
which it alludes.

Footnote 51:

_Rot. Pat._, p. 181. As we have to depend for our knowledge of this
important protest on one copy, engrossed on the back of a membrane of
an official roll (No. 18 of John’s 17th year), it is possible to doubt
its genuineness; but it is unlikely to be purely a forgery.

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The two archbishops and their brother prelates entered a second protest of a different nature. They seem to have become alarmed by the drastic measures adopted or likely to be adopted, founded on the verdicts of the twelve knights elected in each county to carry into effect the various clauses of the Great Charter directed against abuses of the Forest laws. Apparently, it was feared that reforms of a sweeping nature would result, and practically abolish the royal forests altogether. Accordingly, they placed their protest formally on record—acting undoubtedly in the interests of the Crown, feeling that as mediators they were bound in some measure to see fairplay. They objected to a strained construction of the words of the Charter, holding that the articles in question ought to be understood as limited; all customs necessary for the preservation of the forests should remain in force.[52]

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Footnote 52:

See _Rot. Pat._ and _New Rymer_, I. 134.

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The provisions referred to were, as is now well known, chapters 47, 48, and 53 of Magna Carta itself, and not, as Roger of Wendover states, a separate Forest Charter.[53] That writer was led into this unfortunate error by confusing the charter granted by King John with its re-issue by his son in 1217, when provisions for the reform of the forest law _were_ framed into a separate supplementary charter. From Roger’s time onwards, the charters of Henry III. were reproduced in all texts and treatises, in place of the real charter actually granted by John. Sir William Blackstone was the first commentator to discover this grievous error, and he clearly emphasized the grave differences between the terms granted by John and those of his son, showing in particular that the former king granted no separate Forest Charter at all.[54]

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Footnote 53:

See R. Wendover, III. 302-318.

Footnote 54:

_Great Charter_, p. xxi.

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Before the conferences at Runnymede came to an end, confidence in the good intentions of the twenty-five Executors, drawn it must be remembered entirely from the section of the baronage most extreme in their views and most unfriendly to John, seems to have been completely lost. If we may believe Matthew Paris,[55] a second body or committee of thirty-eight barons was nominated, representing other and more moderate sections of the baronage, to act as a check on the otherwise all-powerful oligarchy of twenty-five despots. If this second committee was ever really appointed, no details have been preserved as to the date of its selection, or as to the exact powers entrusted to it.

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Footnote 55:

_Chron. Maj._, II. 605-6.

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If the rebel leaders expected to arrive at a permanent settlement of their disputes when they came to meet the King on the morning of the 15th day of June, it must have been evident to all before the 23rd, that John only made the bargain in order to gain time and strength to break it. Three weeks, indeed, before John granted Magna Carta, he had begun his preparations for its repudiation. In a letter of 29th May, addressed to the Pope, there may still be read his own explanation of the causes of quarrel, and how he urged, with the low cunning peculiar to him, that the hostility of the rebels prevented the fulfilment of his vow of crusade. In conclusion, he expressed his willingness to abide by the Pope’s decision on all matters at issue.

John, then, at Runnymede was merely waiting for two events which would put him in a position to throw off the mask—the favourable answer he confidently expected from the Pope, and the arrival of foreign troops. Meanwhile, delay was doubly in his favour; since the combination formed against him was certain, in a short time, to break up. It was, in the happy phrase of Dr. Stubbs,[56] a mere “coalition,” not an "organic union"—a coalition, too, in momentary danger of dissolving into its original factors. The barons were without sufficient sinews of war to carry a protracted struggle to a successful issue. Very soon, both sides to the treaty of peace were preparing for war. The northern barons, anticipating the King in direct breach of the compact, began to fortify their castles. John, in equally bad faith, wrote for foreign allies, whilst he anxiously awaited the Pope’s answer to his appeal.

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Footnote 56:

Stubbs, _Const. Hist._, II. 3.

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