Chapter V: Part II: The Eastern Question (2)
“In answer to these overtures,” Kinglake says, “the Government of the Queen disclaimed all notion of aiming at the possession of either Constantinople or any other of the Sultan’s possessions, and accepted the assurances to the like effect which were given by the Czar. It combated the opinion that the extinction of the Ottoman Empire was near at hand, and deprecated the discussions based on that supposition as tending directly to produce the very result against which they were meant to provide.”[64]
Then the Czar sent Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople, and entrusted to him the two following missions: viz., (_a_) to set forth a Russian claim on the Holy Places, and (_b_) that all orthodox Christians, who were subjects of Turkey, should be placed under the immediate protectorate of Russia.
The above second mission was planned by Russia owing to her deep sympathy with the Sclavonic races, who had adhered to the same religion although they were still under Turkish rule. But this bond was rapidly getting weaker, and the Christian inhabitants were determined to throw off, if possible, the Mahomedan yoke.
But the second demand of Russia, to my mind, was an unjust claim, because it would have considerably affected the independence or dignity of the Sultan.[65]
The English Ambassador in Turkey, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, a great opponent of Russia, advised the Porte to stand firm and resist to the utmost the second demand.[66] He and Lord Clarendon (the English Foreign Secretary), however, tried to persuade the Porte to agree to the first demand, but the Porte, with decided firmness, declined to accept this advice.
This was followed, on May 21, 1853, by the departure of Prince Menschikoff from Constantinople, with the threat that “he had come in his great coat, but would return in his uniform.” Russia then crossed the Pruth on July 2nd, and occupied the Danubian Principalities as a preliminary to her demands. On the same day of the Russian invasion the representatives of the Great Powers assembled at Vienna. This Congress drew up what is known as the “Vienna Note.” Russia acceded to the terms contained in the Note, but the Porte refused, and offered certain amendments. The Powers after a time accepted them, and forwarded them to Russia, who, however, rejected them.[67] The Conference then dissolved.
In October, 1853, the Porte declared war on Russia; and the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope sealed the Russian acquiescence to the declaration.
England and France allied themselves with Turkey against Russia, and declared war on March 28, 1854.
The siege of Sebastopol lasted for nearly a year, and its fall was followed by the Congress of Paris.[68] The plenipotentiaries of France, England, Russia, Turkey, Sardinia, Austria, and at last Prussia, assembled at Paris (February, 1856), and the “Treaty of Paris” was signed, by which the following matters were settled:—
1. The Great Powers “declare the Sublime Porte admitted to participate in the advantages of the public law and system (concert) of Europe. Their Majesties engage, each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; guarantee in common the strict observance of that engagement; and will, in consequence, consider any act tending to its violation, as a question of general interest” (Art. VII.).
2. “The Black Sea is neutralized; its waters and its ports thrown open to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the Powers possessing its coasts, or of any other Power” (Art. XI.), and, “The Black Sea being neutralized according to the terms of Article XI., the maintenance or establishment upon its coast of military maritime arsenals becomes alike unnecessary and purposeless; in consequence, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, engage not to establish or to maintain upon that coast any military maritime arsenal” (Art. XIII.).
The docks and fortifications at Sebastopol were destroyed by the Western Powers; but it was allowed that Russia and the Porte should keep up “the number of light vessels necessary for the service of the coast” (Art. XIV.), and merchant ships of all kinds were allowed freely to enter it.
3. All control over the mouth of the Danube was taken from Russia and entrusted to the authority of the Riverain Commission (Art. XVII.). “A Commission shall be established, and shall be composed of delegates of Austria, Bavaria, the Sublime Porte, and Würtemburg (one for each of those Powers), to whom shall be added commissioners from the three Danubian Principalities, whose nomination shall have been approved by the Porte. This Commission, which shall be permanent: (1) Shall prepare regulations of navigation and river police; (2) Shall remove the impediments, of whatever nature they may be, which still prevent the application to the Danube of the arrangements of the Treaty of Vienna; (3) Shall order and cause to be executed the necessary works throughout the whole course of the river; (4) Shall, after the dissolution of the European Commission, see to maintaining the mouths of the Danube and the neighbouring parts of the sea in a navigable state” (Art. XVII.).
4. A portion of Bessarabia on the left bank of the Danube was ceded by Russia in order to make the Turkish defence against Russia more easy, and more fully to secure the freedom of the navigation of the Danube (Art. XX.).
There is no doubt Russia was beaten by the combined alliance against her. She had entirely overreached herself and miscalculated the temper of the other Powers. She had thought that an Anglo-French alliance was impossible, and that Prussia and Austria would have remained neutral. Prussia indeed did maintain a neutrality at the commencement of the war, and the King of Prussia himself said, “I am resolved to maintain a position of complete neutrality, and to this I add with proud elevation that my people and myself are of one mind. They require absolute neutrality from me.”
Austria, however, only maintained a conditional neutrality. The Austrian Emperor, in replying to the Russian Ambassador, Count Orloff, said, “Then must Austria be equally free to act as her interest and dignity may direct,” if Russia was to cross the Danube, or seek to occupy fresh territory, or not evacuate the Principalities when the war was over.
Later on both Prussia and Austria formed a defensive alliance against Russia, and with the consent of the Porte, the Principalities were provisionally occupied by Austria.
In England Lord Aberdeen did his utmost to bring about a peace between Russia and Turkey, but it was a hopeless task. Lord Palmerston, on the other hand, described the aggressive policy of Russia as follows:—
“The policy and practice of the Russian Government has always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow—moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions succeed locally, the St. Petersburg Government adopts them as a _fait accompli_ which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified, in the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia.”[69] And Lord Palmerston wrote as follows to Lord Aberdeen (July 4, 1853), when the combined fleets of England and France were at Besika Bay:—“In the meantime, however, I hope you will allow the squadrons to be ordered to go up to the Bosphorus as soon as it is known at Constantinople that the Russians have entered the Principalities, and to be further at liberty to go into the Black Sea, if necessary or useful for the protection of Turkish territory. The advantages of such a course seem to be—
“First. That it would encourage and assist the Turks in those defensive arrangements and organizations which the present crisis may give the Turkish Government facilities for making, and the benefit of which, in strengthening Turkey against attack, will continue after the crisis is over.
“Secondly. It would essentially tend to prevent any further inroad on Turkish territory in Europe or in Asia, and it is manifest that any such further inroad would much increase the difficulties of a settlement.
“Thirdly. It would act as a wholesome check upon the Emperor and his advisers, and would stimulate Austria and Prussia to increased exertions to bring the Russian Government to reason.
“Fourthly. It would relieve England and France from the disagreeable, and not very creditable, position of waiting without venturing to enter the back door as friends, while the Russians have taken forcible possession of the front hall as enemies.
“If these orders are to be given, I would suggest that it is very important that they should be given without delay, so that we may be able, when these matters are discussed this week in Parliament, to say that such orders have been sent off. Of course they would at the same time be communicated to the Russian Government.”
But the Premier did not agree with Palmerston’s views.
The combined fleets, at the request of the Sultan, passed up to Constantinople (October 7, 1853). Palmerston then made two propositions to the Cabinet:—
“First. That instructions should be sent to Constantinople that, in the event of war having been declared, the two squadrons should enter the Black Sea, and should send word to the Russian admiral at Sebastopol that, in the existing state of things, any Russian ship of war found cruising in the Black Sea would be detained, and be given over to the Turkish Government.
“Secondly. That England and France should propose to the Sultan to conclude a convention to the effect that, whereas war has unfortunately broken out between Russia and Turkey, in consequence of differences created by unjust demands made upon Turkey by Russia, and by unwarrantable invasion of the Turkish territory by a Russian army; and whereas it is deemed by England and France to be an object of general European interest, and of special importance to them that the political independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be maintained inviolate against Russian aggression, the two Powers engage to furnish to the Sultan such naval assistance as may be necessary in existing circumstances for the defence of his empire; and they moreover engage to permit any of their respective subjects who may be willing to do so, to enter the military or naval service of the Sultan. In return, the Sultan is to engage that he will consult with England and France as to the terms and conditions of the new treaty which is to determine, on the conclusion of hostilities, the future relations of Russia and Turkey.”
But Lord Aberdeen in reply said:—
“I cannot say that I think the present state of the Russo-Turkish question would authorize such a proceeding on our part as that which you intend to propose.”
On November 1, 1853, Palmerston again said in concluding another letter to Lord Aberdeen:—
“It seems to me, then, that our course is plain, simple, and straight. That we must help Turkey out of her difficulties by negotiation, if possible; and that if negotiation fails, we must, by force of arms, carry her safely through her dangers.”
After the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Sinope, Palmerston wrote to Aberdeen as follows:—
“Will you allow me this opportunity of repeating in writing what I have more than once said verbally, on the state of things between Russia and Turkey? It appears to me that we have two objects in view: the one to put an end to the present war between these two Powers; the other to prevent, as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so, a recurrence of similar differences, and renewed dangers to the peace of Europe.
“Now it seems to me that, unless Turkey shall be laid prostrate at the feet of Russia by the disasters of the war—an event which England and France could not without dishonour permit—no peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless the Emperor consents to evacuate the Principalities, to abandon his demands, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of former treaties upon which he has founded the pretensions which have been the cause of existing difficulties.
“To bring the Emperor to agree to this, it is necessary to exert a considerable pressure upon him; and the quarter in which that pressure can at present be most easily brought to bear is the Black Sea and the countries bordering upon it. In the Black Sea, the combined English, French, and Turkish squadrons are indisputably superior to the Russian fleet, and are able to give the law to that fleet. What I would strongly recommend, therefore, is that which I proposed some months ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian Government and the Russian admiral at Sebastopol should be informed that so long as Russian troops occupy the Principalities, or hold a position in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian ships of war can be allowed to show themselves out of port in the Black Sea.
“You will say that this would be an active hostility towards Russia; but so is the declaration already made, that no Russian ships shall be permitted to make any landing or attack on any part of the Turkish territory. The only difference between the two declarations is that the one already made is incomplete and insufficient for its purpose, and that the one which I propose would be complete and sufficient. If the Russian fleet were shut up in Sebastopol, it is probable that the Turks would be able to make in Asia an impression that would tend to facilitate the conclusion of peace.
“With regard to the conditions of peace, it seems to me that the only arrangement which could afford to Europe a fair security against future dangers arising out of the encroachments of Russia on Turkey, and the attempts of the Russian Government to interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, would be that arrangement which I have often suggested, namely, that the treaty to be concluded between Russia and Turkey should be an ordinary treaty of peace and friendship, of boundaries, commerce, and mutual protection of the subjects of the one party within the territories of the other; and that all the stipulations which might be required for the privileges of the Principalities and of Servia, and for the protection of the Christian religion and its churches and the Ottoman dominions by the Sultan and the five Powers. By such a treaty, Russia would be prevented from dealing single-handed with Turkey in regard to those matters on which she has, from time to time, endeavoured to fasten a quarrel on the Sultan.”
Lord Aberdeen’s reply was:—
“I confess I am not prepared to adopt the mode which you think most likely to restore peace.”
Lord Palmerston tendered his resignation on receiving this reply, but withdrew it ten days after when the Cabinet adopted his views.
On June 16, 1854, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Minister of War—“Our only chance of bringing Russia to terms is by _offensive_ and not by defensive operations. We and the French ought to go to the Crimea and take Sebastopol. If this blow were accompanied by successful operations in Georgia and Circassia, we might have a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year.”
Thus we see that the English policy during the Crimean crisis changed from peace tactics to defensive operations, and was subsequently turned into an offensive line of action which terminated in a brilliant triumph for England.
But how was Lord Palmerston able to carry out his war policy so vigorously? The answer is a very simple one. He was backed and urged on by the nation at large, who were incensed at the insolence of Russia. Thus he was able to pursue his plans, being encouraged and supported by a people who were well able to carry out what they resolved upon.
Kinglake said he (Lord Palmerston) “was gifted with the instinct which enables a man to read the heart of a nation.”
His judgment was rightly pronounced, for Palmerston saw the feelings of his national constituents and steered his course well and skilfully.[70]
What, then, was the national feeling of England at that time?
“In the present instance,” said the Prince Consort, “their (the English) feeling is something of this sort: The Emperor of Russia is a tyrant, the enemy of all liberty on the Continent, and the oppressor of Poland.” From these royal remarks, I do not think I shall be far wrong in saying that the growing tendency of the English people towards liberalism since the Reform Bill of 1832, and the teaching of William Wilberforce, had led them to consider Russia not only as a national enemy but as a general opponent of the rights of humanity and civilization. No wonder that a war became a necessity after this public manifestation.
At the end of the last chapter I stated that England had rapidly increased, in wealth and prosperity since the Repeal of the Corn Laws. Gladstone, in the House of Commons, stated that such was the vigour and elasticity of the English trade, that even after the disadvantage of a bad harvest, and under the pressure of war, the imports from day to day, and almost from hour to hour, were increasing, and that the very last papers laid on the table showed within the last three months of the year that there was an increase of £250,000 in the national exports.[71] This, then, was one of the reasons which enabled England to carry on this war so successfully.
Let us turn our attention for a short time to France, which at this period was undergoing considerable internal agitation. Republicanism was now abolished and Monarchy reigned in its stead in the hands of Napoleon III. (1852). There seemed every prospect of the French Monarchy being firmly re-established.
The French Emperor was very desirous of starting a European War for the purpose of securing his seat on the throne, and also for the aggrandizement of his country abroad.[72] The interests of his country, both religious and political, were opposed to those of Russia with regard to the Holy Places, while both England and France had a common interest in keeping the Ottoman Empire from Russia. This latter interest acted as a means of union between the two Powers, both of whom were ready at any moment to attack Russia, and the publication of the Czar’s memorable conversation with Sir H. Seymour still further cemented that union.
The result we have already seen. Russia was humiliated.
VI.
THE BLACK SEA CONFERENCE.
_French influence destroyed by the Franco-Prussian War—Russia annuls
the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris—Condition of Europe
prevents their enforcement by the Powers—London Conference; Russia
secures the Black Sea; England’s mistake—Alsace and Lorraine destroy
the balance of power._
Russia had convinced herself that the separation of England from France was not a sufficient guarantee to hinder the possibility of the alliance of the two Powers against her, because a common interest would unite them immediately. Russia now determined to crush down one of the two Powers, independently of the other, and was only waiting for an opportunity to do so.
In 1870 the Franco-Prussian War broke out through the question of the Spanish Succession. England maintained a strict neutrality, and this now seemed a glorious opportunity for Russia to carry out her long-cherished designs. She supported Prussia _morally_, in this way hoping to crush France, and then only England would be left to attack. The result proved favourable; France was defeated by Prussia, and this was followed by the fall of the Monarchy, and the proclamation of the Republic (September 14, 1870).
Russia now looked around, and at a glance saw the favourable position she occupied, and her strength. Austria had been weakened by the war with Prussia in 1866, Spain and Italy were convulsed with revolutions, Turkey was naturally weak; Prussia had suffered somewhat in 1866 with Austria, and with France in 1870. France herself had undoubtedly received a crushing blow, while England was worried over the Alabama claims with America.
Thus we see the balance of power was considerably shaken by the Franco-Prussian War, while an alliance among the Western states seemed impossible.
In 1870 Western Europe was startled by Prince Gortchakoff’s declaration that the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, were null and void. “He declared it would no longer be submitted to by his Imperial master.”[73]
England naturally felt very indignant, but was practically helpless, as she was unable to get any ally from among the Western Powers, and she felt unable to cope singly with Russia. The Government were perplexed, and the Premier, Mr. W. E. Gladstone, sent Lord Odo Russell to the German Chancellor to ask his advice on the subject, and to inform him that “the question was of such a nature that England, with or without allies, would have to go to war with Russia.”
Prince Bismarck, who was afraid of a Franco-Russian alliance, and wished to conciliate the Russian Emperor, recommended that a conference should be held in St. Petersburg. The English Government objected to this, so a Conference was held in London where the following provisions were agreed to:—
“Article I. Articles XI., XIII., and XIV., of the Treaty of Paris, 1856, are abrogated.
“Article II. The principle of the closing of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus is maintained, with power to his Imperial Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time of peace to the vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers, in case the Sublime Porte should judge it necessary in order to secure the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris.
“Article III. The Black Sea remains, as heretofore, open to the mercantile marine of all nations.
“Article IV. The Commission managing the navigation of the Danube “is maintained in its present composition” for a further period of twelve years.
“Article VIII. The high contracting parties renew and confirm all the stipulations of 1856, which are not annulled or modified by the present treaty.”
This treaty resulted in what Russia wished, viz., the opening of the Black Sea to Russian war ships—a right which she had held previous to the Crimean War.
Mr. Disraeli (afterwards Lord Beaconsfield) vigorously attacked the Gladstonian policy by saying that “the neutral character of the Black Sea is the essence of the Treaty of Paris, and that that, in fact, was the question for which we had struggled and made great sacrifice and endured these sufferings which never can be forgotten,” and the “point upon which the negotiations for peace (at Vienna, 1855) was broken off was the neutral character of the Black Sea.”[74]
In answer to this attack Mr. Gladstone replied, “I do not speak from direct communication with Lord Clarendon, but I have been told since his death that he never attached a value to that neutralization. Again I do not speak from direct communication, but I have been told that Lord Palmerston always looked upon the neutralization as an arrangement which might be maintained and held together for a limited number of years, but which, from its character, it was impossible to maintain as a permanent condition for a great settlement of Europe.”
However, Russia had regained what she had lost at the close of the Crimean War by skilful diplomacy. She now was perfectly at liberty to keep her fleet in the Black Sea, and to refortify Sebastopol and Keotch to such an extent as to render them impregnable.
She felt gratified at the result of the Franco-Prussian War, and on hearing that Prussia had annexed Alsace and Lorraine. General Ignatieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, hastened to the German Ambassador, Count Karserling, and said, “Permit me to congratulate you, and _thank you_; for you it is a prodigious mistake, but on Russia you have conferred the greatest possible boon.” At the time of the annexation of the two French provinces, Germany thought that they would prove of the greatest value to the German Empire, but this idea proved a mistake, and since then Russia has used, and still uses them, as a pivot on which the Eastern Question turns.
Frederick III.’s idea of selling back Alsace and Lorraine would no doubt prove a great benefit, not only to the German nation, but also to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.
Yet, though Bismarck defeated Napoleon III. in a sanguinary war, Prince Gortschakoff had beaten all the signitary powers at the Treaty of Paris by one stroke of the pen, and the greatest gainer, in the Franco-Prussian War was not Germany but Russia. Verily, indeed, is it once more proved that the Pen is mightier than the Sword.
VII.
THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1878.
_Bulgarian atrocities—The Andrassy Note; England destroys its
effect—The Berlin Memorandum; England opposes it—Russia prepares for
a Turkish war—Conference of Constantinople—New Turkish
Constitution—Russo-Turkish War—Treaty of San Stefano—Intervention of
the Powers—The Berlin Congress—Final treaty of peace._
The Slavs migrated to the Balkan Peninsula as early as 450 A.D., and Bosnia remained the only Slavonic part of the Turkish Empire where a native nobility owned the land and a peasantry tilled it for them.
Having been defeated by the Turks, the nobility became Mahommedans to save their patrimony, while the peasantry, having nothing to lose, remained Christians; but the tyranny of their nobility at length obliged the Turks to put an end to the Feudal System in Bosnia (1850–1851).
In August, 1875, Herzegovina (the southwestern district of Bosnia) revolted against the Sultan, being aided by a strong natural position and receiving the assistance of both Servia and Montenegro.
While this revolt was going on the Bulgarians also rose in rebellion against the Sultan (1876), but were put down by the Turkish Government, although not without shameful cruelties and outrages being committed by the Turkish troops and militia, which caused great indignation throughout Europe,[75] and specially so in Russia. This, therefore, gave the latter country a good opportunity of claiming to be a general protector of the Christians in Turkey.
The Austro-Hungarian Minister, Count Andrassy, on behalf of Austria, Germany, and Russia, drew up a Note in which five[76] chief concessions were insisted upon from the Porte as necessary for the pacification of the revolted provinces.
Lord Derby, on behalf of the English Government, signed[77] it, but added that the integrity[78] of the Ottoman Empire was to be respected. Here the Czar caught a key-note of the English policy, and he played on it afterwards to his own advantage.
The Porte accepted the conditions of the Note, but the rebels did not trust the Turkish promises, so the insurrections continued.
The Czar then, with Gortschakoff, met Bismarck and Andrassy at Berlin, and, together, they drew up the “Berlin Memorandum,”[79] in which the three Powers asked the Sultan to grant an armistice for two months in order that the demands of the insurgents might receive a fair consideration. Italy and France added their voices, but England refused[80] to sign the Memorandum and sent a powerful squadron to Besika Bay, expecting that the Sultan would refuse the Memorandum because it would endanger the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. This “Berlin Memorandum” displays the skilful way in which Russia, under the clever guidance of the Czar and his Minister Gortschakoff, carried on negotiation. She was only seeking a _pretence_[81] for a single-handed war policy with Turkey, and in order to do this she proposed measures at Berlin which she knew would prove objectionable to England. Germany, who dreaded a special alliance between France and Russia, was obliged to agree to these measures, thus becoming a tool of Russia, who wanted to make England first deviate from the Treaties of Paris and London, and, if possible, to break down the balance of power in Europe which she herself had already done by her withdrawal from the Black Sea clauses in the Treaty of Paris. England fell into the snare together with the other Powers. She objected to the Berlin Memorandum, refused to sign, and sent a fleet to Besika Bay in support of her objection. This was just what Russia desired.
A new Sultan now ascended the throne, and Russian influence declined while that of England increased.
In July, 1876, Prince Milan of Servia, and Prince Mikita of Montenegro, declared war against Turkey, having open assistance from Russia. The rebels, however, were subjugated by the Turks.
In November, 1876, Alexander II. of Russia, made a public declaration that “if Turkey did not give due guarantees for the better government of her Christian subjects he would force them to do so, either in concert with his allies or by independent action.”
The European Powers, in consequence of this proclamation, proposed a Conference at Constantinople to settle the matter. The Czar, seeing that the Conference was inevitable, agreed to it. The representatives met, and, as was to be expected, asked nearly the same conditions as had been contained in the “Andrassy Note.”
The promulgation of a new Constitution for the Ottoman Empire was the result of the Conference, much to the disappointment of Russia, who did not expect that any such result would be arrived at. Thus, in order to stop any further reforms or concessions being made by Turkey, she succeeded in removing from power the author of the new Constitution, viz., Midhat Pasha, who was an important personage in Turkish politics.
The following little story shows the skilful way in which the Turkish Minister was removed from power by the agency of Russia:—
“During the Conference, the day after the Turks had proclaimed their new Constitution, General Ignatieff met Sir W. White.
“‘Have you read the Constitution?’ asked Ignatieff. ‘No,’ said the Englishman; ‘what does it matter? It is not serious.’ ‘But,’ said Ignatieff, ‘you must really read one Article;’ and so saying he pointed out the Article which set forth that all provisions to the contrary notwithstanding the Sultan was to retain an absolute right to banish from the capital any person whose presence might seem objectionable to him. ‘Mark my words,’ said Ignatieff, ‘the first man to be exiled under that clause will be Midhat Pasha, the author of the Constitution.’
“The prediction was fulfilled to the letter. Meeting Ignatieff some time after, Sir W. White recalled the prophecy and its fulfilment. ‘Oh! yes,’ said the general, carelessly; ‘I arranged that.’ ‘But you had left Constantinople before Midhat’s exile.’ ‘Certainly, but I arranged it just before I left.’ ‘How?’ ‘It was very simple; the weather was stormy in the Black Sea, and I could not leave for some days after the departure of my colleague. I went on board my steamer and anchored exactly opposite the Sultan’s palace. I did not go and bid him farewell, but waited. In a day or two, as I anticipated, there came an _aide-de-camp_ from the Sultan to express his regret and surprise that I, whom he had known better than any of the Ambassadors, should be departing without paying him a farewell visit. I replied that, of course, I should have been delighted to have paid my respects to His Majesty, but that it was no longer necessary. I had paid my farewell visit to Midhat Pasha, as, under the Constitution, it was to him, not the Sultan, that such an act of respect was due. Almost immediately after arriving in Russia I heard of the exile of Midhat. My parting shot had secured his downfall.’”[82]
The Conference failed, and Russia declared war against Turkey, for now she had obtained what she had been striving for during the diplomatic transactions, viz., a pretence for a single-handed policy with regard to Turkey, and, secondly, she had obtained sufficient time for making all necessary war preparations. Now, although she had already got back what she had lost in the Crimean War (through the Franco-Prussian War), yet she was determined to obtain what she had intended to take at the Crimean War, viz., Constantinople.
A large Russian army crossed the Pruth (April, 1877), and encamped before Constantinople. In Asia Kars was captured. This led to the Treaty of San Stefano.
By this treaty the Ottoman Empire in Europe was completely abrogated. It recognized the independence of Servia, Montenegro, and Roumania; Bulgaria was created, and its boundaries now extended to the Black and Ægean Seas, embracing several valuable harbours. Although the latter country still remained tributary to Turkey, yet Russia had the appointment of a Christian prince in her hands. It has now to have a separate administration, to be supervised by Russian commissioners, and was also to be garrisoned by Russian troops.
In Bosnia, Crete, Thessaly, and Epirus a certain amount of reform was to be introduced by the Porte under the supervision of Russia. It was also enacted that the part of Bessarabia taken from Russia in 1856 should be ceded back to her, to which Lord Palmerston attached great value, “because,” he said, “it is not of local, but of European interest.” Kars, Batoum, and other adjoining districts in Asia were added to Russia, by which cession she undoubtedly held the strongholds of Armenia. Turkey had to pay Russia three hundred million roubles.
The results of this treaty may be described as follows: It was nothing less than (1) “To take all the European dominions of the Ottoman Empire from the Porte and put them under the administration of Russia;” (2) “to make the Black Sea as much a Russian lake as the Caspian;” (3) to give Russia a firm hold of the Mediterranean, and thereby imperil the naval supremacy of England in that quarter.
Naturally, England could not accept the Treaty of San Stefano without some alterations. Lord Derby resigned on the refusal of his demand that the treaty should be laid before Parliament, and Lord Salisbury sent out a vigorous circular which showed the injustice towards other races of a large Bulgaria establishing Slav supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula under Russian influence; also the loss of the ports of Bourgas and Batoum by the Turks would give Russia command of the Black Sea trade, while the cession of Kars to her would also influence Turkey’s Asiatic possessions. This would also affect the English interests in the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the Suez Canal, which were in the Ottoman keeping, and therefore was a matter of extreme solicitude for England. She would be willing, however, to join in general stipulations made by the joint Powers, but would not submit to Prince Gortschakoffs commands. Again, an unpaid pecuniary debt owing to Russia by Turkey would give the former dangerous power.
The following words occur in the first despatch of the English Government to Russia:—
“The course on which the Russian Government has entered involves graver and more serious consideration. It is in contravention of the stipulation of the Treaty of Paris (March 30, 1856), by which Russia and the other signatory Powers engaged, each on its own part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. At the close of the Conference of London of 1871, the above plenipotentiary, in common with those of the other Powers, signed a declaration affirming it to be an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagement of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting parties by means of an amicable arrangement. In taking action against Turkey on his own part, and having recourse to arms without further consultation with his allies, the Emperor of Russia has separated himself from the European concert hitherto maintained, and has at the same time departed from the rule to which he himself had solemnly recorded his consent.”[83]
The English Government addressed a second despatch to Russia, stating that the English Government is “of opinion that any treaty concluded by the Governments of Russia and the Porte affecting the treaties of 1856 and 1871 must be a European treaty, and would not be valid without the assent of the Powers who were parties to those treaties.”
The Russian Minister’s (Gortschakoff’s) reply was received at last: “We repeat the assurance that we do not intend to settle by ourselves European questions having reference to the peace which is to be made.”
Then the English Government sent another despatch to Russia and the other foreign Courts, and it was communicated through an English Ambassador at St. Petersburg that the Russian Emperor “stated categorically that questions bearing on European interests will be concerted with European Powers, and he had given Her Majesty’s Government clear and positive assurance to this effect.”
At length Austria, with the full appreciation of Russia, invited England to a Conference at Berlin for the object of establishing “an European agreement as to the modifications which it might become necessary to introduce in existing treaties in order to make them harmonize with the present situation.”
The English Government, however, stipulated beforehand “that it would be desirable to have it understood in the first place that all questions dealt with in the San Stefano Treaty between Russia and Turkey” should be fully considered in the Congress, and “that no alteration in the condition of things previously established by treaty should be acknowledged as valid until it has received the consent of the Powers.”
Russia replied that “the preliminary treaty of peace between Russia and Turkey will be textually committed to the Great Powers before the meeting of the Congress, and that in the Congress itself each Power will have full liberty of assent and of its free action” (“_la pleine liberté de ses appréciations et de son action_”).
This was a diplomatic triumph for England, and the treaty was formally submitted to the Congress. But there were certain facts which must not escape our notice, for just before the publication of the Treaty of San Stefano the excitement in England had attained its zenith. Russia, perceiving this, and hearing that England was quite ready to take up arms against her, took the utmost precautions not to injure English interests; so a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or any other circumstance which might excite the enmity of England, were omitted in the San Stefano Treaty.
When this became known in England the excitement abated somewhat; and, seeing this, Russia consented to submit the treaty to the Congress.
The Congress was opened at Berlin, under the presidency of the German Chancellor, Bismarck; and Beaconsfield firmly stood his ground at the Congress, previously calling out the reserve forces and summoning seven thousand Indian troops to Malta. Austria began to arm. Russia now could not be obstinate.
The following conditions were fixed and drawn up by the Congress:—
_Bulgaria._
Article I. Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary principality under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan; it will have a Christian Government and a national militia.
Article III. The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the population and confirmed by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the Great European Powers may be elected Prince of Bulgaria.
In case of a vacancy in the princely dignity, the election of the new prince shall take place under the same conditions and with the same forms.
_Eastern Roumelia._
Article XIII. A province is formed south of the Balkans which will take the name of “Eastern Roumelia,” and will remain under the direct political and military authority of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, under conditions of administrative autonomy. It shall have a Christian Governor-general.
Article XVII. The Governor-general of Eastern Roumelia shall be nominated by the Sublime Porte, with the assent of the Powers, for a term of five years.
_Crete, &c._
Article XXIII. The Sublime Porte undertakes to scrupulously apply to the island of Crete the Organic Law of 1868, with such modifications as may be considered equitable.
Similar laws adapted to local requirements, excepting as regards the exemption from taxation granted to Crete, shall also be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe for which no special organization has been provided by the present treaty.
_Bosnia and Herzegovina._
Article XXV. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary.
_Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania._
Article XXVI. The independence of Montenegro, Servia, and Roumania is recognized by the Sublime Porte, and by all the high contracting parties, subject to the conditions set forth in the following:—
In Montenegro the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality whatsoever.
The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be assured to all persons belonging to Montenegro, as well as to foreigners; and no hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different communions or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs.
Article XLV. The principality of Roumania restores to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia that portion of Bessarabian territory detached from Russia by the Treaty of Paris of 1856.
_Cessions in Asia._
Article LVIII. The Sublime Porte cedes to the Russian Empire in Asia the territories of Ardahan, Kars, and Batoum, together with the latter port.
Article XIX. His Majesty the Emperor declares that it is his intention to constitute Batoum a free port, essentially commercial.
Article LX. The valley of Alaxhkerd and the town of Bayazid, ceded to Russia, are restored to Turkey.
The Sublime Porte cedes to Persia the town and territory of Khotou for its delimitation of the frontiers of Turkey and of Persia.[84]
_The Anglo-Turkish Convention._
Article I. Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them, shall be retained by Russia, and if any attempt shall be made at any future time by Russia to take possession of any further territories of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in Asia, as fixed by the Definitive Treaty of Peace, England engages to join His Imperial Majesty the Sultan in defending them by force of arms.
In order to enable England to make necessary provision for executing her engagement, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan further consents to assign the island of Cyprus to be occupied and administrated by England.
Beaconsfield having thus attained “peace with honour” for England, returned, and in a speech[85] in the House, said, “They are not movements of war, they are operations of peace and civilization; we have no reason to fear war. Her Majesty has fleets and armies which are second to none.”
VIII.
REMARKS UPON THE TREATY OF BERLIN.
_The position of affairs—The Salisbury-Schouvaloft Memorandum and its
disastrous effect on the negotiations at Berlin—Russia’s
gain—England and Austria the guardians of Turkey—Austria’s vigorous
and straightforward Balkan policy—Thwarted in Servia but triumphant
in Bulgaria—Relations of Greece to Austria—Solution of the Crete
question—Neutrality of Belgium threatened—Importance of
Constantinople to Russia; the Anglo-Turkish Convention—England’s
feeble policy in Asia Minor—The question of Egypt—A new route to
India by railway from the Mediterranean to Persian Gulf—England’s
relation to Constantinople._
Let us now review and make a few remarks on the Treaty of Berlin.
Firstly, the whole treaty seems to me to be virtually a repetition[86] and revision of the conditions of the European concert in the Eastern question.
Prince Bismarck’s opinion was that the Treaty of San Stefano meant to alter “the state of things as fixed by former European Conventions,” consequently the Berlin Congress followed for “the free discussion of the Cabinets’ signatories of the treaties of 1856 and 1871.”
The Treaties of Paris and London being still in force, and owing to the rise of a new nationality and the redistribution of territory, these treaties were altered and amended by the Congress.
Before we criticize the Treaty of Berlin we ought to bear two things in our mind. (1) At the Conference of Paris, 1856, England, France, and Turkey were victorious, while Russia was conquered. (2) At the Berlin Congress, 1878, Russia was victorious over Turkey, while England and France were neutral.
In both meetings it was asserted and claimed that the Powers collectively had the right of settling the Eastern Question as against Russia’s single-handed interference, England leading the van with fair words but selfish interests.
On Russia concluding the San Stefano Treaty with Turkey, England said that, according to the conditions of the Treaty of Paris, the Great Powers of Europe “engaged each on its own part to respect the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire,” and consequently Turkish affairs produced a general interest throughout Europe.
Russia had committed a serious breach of “the law of nations” by a treaty single-handed with Turkey. When the European Congress at Berlin was consented to by Russia, England said that the Treaty of San Stefano was not valid without the consent of the signatory Powers of the Treaties of Paris and London. She also demanded from Russia that, “in the Congress itself, each Power should have full liberty of assent and free action.” These demands seemed perfectly reasonable. However, England, before the Berlin meeting, contracted a secret agreement with Russia, in which the modifications asked for by England in the Treaty of San Stefano were specified. This agreement did not leave out the bringing in of other changes by mutual consent, but, if these failed, tended to be a mutual engagement by the ambassadors of Russia and Great Britain as to their general behaviour and conduct at the Congress. This secret agreement between the two Powers practically blocked the full liberty of the other Powers and the full amount of good they might otherwise have done. England had been one of the first to attack Russia for committing a breach of the Treaties of Paris and London; yet she overlooked the fact that she herself had morally broken the same treaties by her secret negotiation with Russia, the other Powers not being at the time cognizant of the fact.
Once more Russia, by the Black Sea Conference, had gained full freedom on the Black Sea, now she had regained the part of Bessarabia which she had lost during the Crimean War, the principal object of which was to drive Russia from the banks of the Danube. The above-mentioned territory was ceded to Russia through the influence of Lord Salisbury, who had secretly promised Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador, that he would support the Russian demand with regard to that land.
By the Berlin Treaty England and Austria were invested with a special responsibility for protecting the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against Russian aggression—England in Asia Minor, and Austria in the Balkans.
If Russia attacked through Asia Minor the English interests would be imperilled; and by the disappearance of the Balkan States, then Austria would be open to Russian immediate attacks—a consummation which would be little desired by that Power.
This responsibility has undoubtedly from that time engrossed the attention of Austria and Hungary. She has had to encounter several difficulties. Bessarabia was no longer a Turkish province, and had been ceded to Russia by the Salisbury-Schouvaloff memorandum. Also there, was no possibility of the Balkan States being confederated owing to the different races, language, and feelings of the nationality.
In September, 1879, Bismarck visited Vienna and concluded an Austro-German defensive alliance against the alliance of France and Russia. Bismarck, however, described the German policy in the following terse manner: “Fight by all means, if you feel yourself strong enough to beat Russia single-handed. France and Germany will see all fair, and you can hardly expect anybody effectually to help you.”
Notwithstanding these rather unfavourable circumstances, and her financial difficulties as well, still the policy of Austria is at the present time carried on straightforwardly and vigorously, and the duty with which she charged herself at the Berlin Treaty is ably done, and is well backed up by the five million Magyars who inhabit Hungary and the adjoining provinces. This nation had been cruelly put under Austria by Russia (1848–49), and consequently their hatred against Russia was deeply rooted.
At present, therefore, Russia’s schemes with regard to Constantinople have been frustrated, and Austria holds the lead in the Balkan Peninsula race.
Austria was asked to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to secure peace and order there. She did so, and, notwithstanding an armed resistance, entered and fulfilled her promise. She is now strengthening her hold on these states by stationary garrisons of soldiers in different parts, and also Jesuits, who exercise a moral influence over the people. The affairs of Servia have also deeply occupied the attention of the Austrian Government. She captured King Milan, and used him as a tool for her own purposes. Russia, however, desired to get hold of Servia through the ex-queen.
Intrigues at the Servian Court were numerous, and at last the miserable divorce of the king and queen leaked out. The present young king ascended the throne. This was a blow to the Austrian influence.
Bulgaria had been declared an independent country by the Berlin Treaty. On this state the question of supremacy between Russia and Austria in the Balkans hangs to a great degree. In 1855 Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were united into a single state. This revolution occasioned very great displeasure in Russia, and under her influence Prince Alexander was kidnapped and compelled to abdicate, and Prince Ferdinand of Coburg was elected as the ruling prince.
Although of German extraction, he is an Austrian by allegiance, and a Roman Catholic. He was originally an officer in the Hungarian army. There seems to me no doubt that his election was illegal, because, in the first place, by the Berlin Treaty the ruling prince must belong to the Greek Church.
Prince Ferdinand was quite ready to submit his claim for decision to the Great Powers, and abide by the result. All the Powers except England and Austria declared that he had no claim to the crown, but the two had their own way, and he ascended the Bulgarian throne—another repulse and blow to Russian influence. Prince Alexander meanwhile was given a post in the Austro-Hungarian army. Only recently, to show the friendly spirit that exists between Austria and Bulgaria, a loan has been concluded and advanced by the former to the latter.
Undoubtedly Austria committed a slight mistake in her policy with regard to Greece. She had arrogantly displayed her fleet and strength at Salonika, which no doubt was a source of irritation to Greece. Her best policy would have been kindness and consideration, not forcible means, for the prosperity of Austria was to a certain extent dependent on her treatment of neighbouring countries, and, together with the Great Powers she was to a certain extent dependent upon Greece’s action. The latter, therefore, was a necessary bulwark against Russian encroachments, and was thus of primary importance to England, France, and Italy. If, therefore, the Turks were driven from Europe, Greece would occupy the place of Turkey with regard to Russia, and would be the only obstacle to Russian Mediterranean advance. “I would never permit,” said the Czar Nicholas, “such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful state.” Truly Greece might well be called the Belgium of the Mediterranean!
By the Berlin Treaty the Porte was advised to cede Thessaly and Epirus to Greece. This was done, and as the Greeks were noted for being good traders and sailors, great progress and improvement was made in their newly acquired territory.
It is difficult to see the reason why the Berlin Congress did not advise the Porte to cede Crete to Greece. If the island was left alone it would be harmless, and exercise no influence on the naval supremacy of the Mediterranean.
However, an occupation of Crete by a European Power would to a great extent change the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, destroy European tranquillity and peace, the Levant would be in the hands of the Cretan occupiers. Again, its position would completely command the Ægean Sea, and if properly fortified might be rendered almost impregnable. Its natural wealth, population, and general productiveness afford ample resources both in times of war and peace; in fact, it might be very well termed the Second Gate to the Black Sea.
Therefore it seems to me the best policy to let this important island remain in a neutral state by an agreement between the Great Powers, and the sooner it is agreed to the better it would be for the peace of Europe generally.
In my opinion it would have been better to have placed it under Grecian rule for the following reasons:—
(1) Because Greece herself was a neutral nation. (2) They were a commercial people, and peaceful, which would have a beneficial effect upon the island. (3) More than half of the Cretan population are of Grecian extraction.
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Japan and the Pacific, and a Japanese View of the Eastern QuestionChapter V: Part II: The Eastern Question (2)
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