Chapter VIII: Introduction (1)

350. Part II of these regulations treats only of the basic principles of combat tactics as applied to infantry and to the special units, such as machine guns and mounted scouts, which form a part of infantry regiments and battalions.

The combat tactics of the arms combined are considered in Field Service Regulations.

351. Modern combat demands the highest order of training, discipline, leadership, and morale on the part of the infantry. Complicated maneuvers are impracticable; efficient leadership and a determination to win by simple and direct methods must be depended upon for success.

352. The duties of infantry are many and difficult. All infantry must be fit to cope with all conditions that may arise. Modern war requires but one kind of infantry--good infantry.

353. The infantry must take the offensive to gain decisive results. Both sides are therefore likely to attempt it, though not necessarily at the same time or in the same part of a long battle line.

In the local combats which make up the general battle the better endurance, use of ground, fire efficiency, discipline, and training will win. It is the duty of the infantry to win the local successes which enable the commanding general to win the battle.

354. The infantry must have the tenacity to hold every advantage gained, the individual and collective discipline and skill needed to master the enemy's fire, the determination to close with the enemy in attack, and to meet him with the bayonet in defense. Infantry must be trained to bear the heaviest burdens and losses, both of combat and march.

Good infantry can defeat an enemy greatly superior in numbers, but lacking in training, discipline, leadership, and morale.

355. It is impossible to establish fixed forms or to give general instructions that will cover all cases. Officers and noncommissioned officers must be so trained that they can apply suitable means and methods to each case as it arises. Study and practice are necessary to acquire proper facility in this respect. Theoretical instruction can not replace practical instruction; the former supplies correct ideas and gives to practical work an interest, purpose, and definiteness not otherwise obtainable.

356. After the mechanism of extended order drill has been learned with precision in the company, every exercise should be, as far as practicable, in the nature of a maneuver (combat exercise) against an _imaginary_, _outlined_, or _represented_ enemy.

Company extended order drill may be conducted without reference to a tactical situation, but a combat exercise, whatever may be the size of the unit employed, should be conducted under an assumed tactical situation.

357. An effective method of conducting a combat exercise is to outline the enemy with a few men equipped with flags. The umpire or inspector states the situation and the commander leads his troops with due regard to the assumptions made.

Changes in the situation, the results of reconnaissance, the character of artillery fire, etc., are made known to the commander when necessary by the umpire or inspector, who, in order to observe and influence the conduct of the exercise, remains in rear of the firing line. From this position he indicates, with the aid of prearranged signals, the character of the fire and movements of the hostile infantry. These signals are intended for the men outlining the enemy. These men repeat the signals; all officers and men engaged in the exercise and in sight of the outlined enemy are thus informed of the enemy's action and the exercise is conducted accordingly.

Assistant umpires, about one for each company in the firing line, may assist in indicating hostile fire and movements and in observing the conduct of the exercise.

An outlined enemy may be made to attack or defend.

Situations should be simple and natural. During or after the exercise the umpire or inspector should call attention to any improper movements or incorrect methods of execution. He will prohibit all movements of troops or individuals that would be impossible if the enemy were real. The slow progress of events to be expected on the battle field can hardly be simulated, but the umpire or inspector will prevent undue haste and will attempt to enforce a reasonably slow rate of progress.

The same exercise should not be repeated over the same ground and under the same situation. Such repetitions lead to the adoption of a fixed mode of attack or defense and develop mere drill masters. Fixed or prearranged systems are prohibited.

LEADERSHIP.

_General Considerations._

358. The art of leadership consists of applying sound tactical principles to concrete cases on the battle field.

Self-reliance, initiative, aggressiveness, and a conception of teamwork are the fundamental characteristics of successful leadership.

359. A correct grasp of the situation and a definite plan of action form the soundest basis for a successful combat.

A good plan once adopted and put into execution should not be abandoned unless it becomes clear that it can not succeed. Afterthoughts are dangerous, except as they aid in the execution of details in the original plan.

360. Combats that do not promise success or some real advantage to the general issue should be avoided; they cause unnecessary losses, impair the morale of one's own troops, and raise that of the enemy.

361. Complicated maneuvers are not likely to succeed in war. All plans and the methods adopted for carrying them into effect must be simple and direct.

362. Order and cohesion must be maintained within the units if success is to be expected.

363. Officers must show themselves to be true leaders. They must act in accordance with the spirit of their orders and must require of their troops the strictest discipline on the field of battle.

364. The best results are obtained when leaders know the capacity and traits of those whom they command; hence in making detachments units should not be broken up, and a deployment that would cause an intermingling of the larger units in the firing line should be avoided.

365. Leading is difficult when troops are deployed. A high degree of training and discipline and the use of close order formations to the fullest extent possible are therefore required.

366. In order to lighten the severe physical strain inseparable from infantry service in campaign, constant efforts must be made to spare the troops unnecessary hardship and fatigue; but when necessity arises, the limit of endurance must be exacted.

367. When officers or men belonging to fighting troops leave their proper places to carry back, or to care for, wounded during the progress of the action, they are guilty of skulking. This offense must be repressed with the utmost vigor.

368. The complete equipment of the soldier is carried into action unless the weather or the physical condition of the men renders such measure a severe hardship. In any event, only the pack[2] will be laid aside. The determination of this question rests with the regimental commander. The complete equipment affords to men lying prone considerable protection against shrapnel.

[Footnote 2: The "pack" includes blanket, poncho, and shelter tent.]

369. The post of the commander must be such as will enable him to observe the progress of events and to communicate his orders. Subordinate commanders, in addition, must be in position to transmit the orders of superiors.

Before entering an action the commander should be as far to the front as possible in order that he personally may see the situation, order the deployment, and begin the action strictly in accordance with his own wishes.

During the action, he must, as a rule, leave to the local leaders the detailed conduct of the firing line, posting himself either with his own reserve or in such a position that he is in constant, direct, and easy communication with it.

A commander takes full and direct charge of his firing line only when the line has absorbed his whole command.

When their troops are victorious, all commanders should press forward in order to clinch the advantage gained and to use their reserves to the best advantage.

370. The latitude allowed to officers is in direct proportion to the size of their commands. Each should see to the general execution of his task, leaving to the proper subordinates the supervision of details, and interfering only when mistakes are made that threaten to seriously prejudice the general plan.

_Teamwork._

371. The comparatively wide fronts of deployed units increase the difficulties of control. Subordinates must therefore be given great latitude in the execution of their tasks. The success of the whole depends largely upon how well each subordinate coordinates his work with the general plan.

A great responsibility is necessarily thrown upon subordinates, but responsibility stimulates the right kind of an officer.

372. In a given situation it is far better _to do any intelligent thing_ consistent with the aggressive execution of the general plan, than to search hesitatingly for the ideal. This is the true rule of conduct for subordinates who are required to act upon their own initiative.

A subordinate who is reasonably sure that his intended action is such as would be ordered by the commander, were the latter present and in possession of the facts, has enough encouragement to go ahead confidently. He must possess the loyalty to carry out the plans of his superior and the keenness to recognize and to seize opportunities to further the general plan.

373. Independence must not become license. Regardless of the number of subordinates who are apparently supreme in their own restricted spheres, there is but one battle and but one supreme will to which all must conform.

Every subordinate must therefore work for the general result. He does all in his power to insure cooperation between the subdivisions under his command. He transmits important information to adjoining units or to superiors in rear and, with the assistance of information received, keeps himself and his subordinates duly posted as to the situation.

374. When circumstances render it impracticable to consult the authority issuing an order, officers should not hesitate to vary from such order when it is clearly based upon an incorrect view of the situation, is impossible of execution, or has been rendered impracticable on account of changes which have occurred since its promulgation. In the application of this rule the responsibility for mistakes rests upon the subordinate, but unwillingness to assume responsibility on proper occasions is indicative of weakness.

Superiors should be careful not to censure an apparent disobedience where the act was done in the proper spirit and to advance the general plan.

375. When the men of two or more units intermingle in the firing line, all officers and men submit at once to the senior. Officers and platoon guides seek to fill vacancies caused by casualties. Each seizes any opportunity to exercise the functions consistent with his grade, and all assist in the maintenance of order and control.

Every lull in the action should be utilized for as complete restoration of order in the firing line as the ground or other conditions permit.

376. Any officer or noncommissioned officer who becomes separated from his proper unit and can not rejoin must at once place himself and his command at the disposal of the nearest higher commander.

Anyone having completed an assigned task must seek to rejoin his proper command. Failing in this, he should join the nearest troops engaged with the enemy.

377. Soldiers are taught the necessity of remaining with their companies, but those who become detached must join the nearest company and serve with it until the battle is over or reorganization is ordered.

_Orders._

378. Commands are deployed and enter the combat by the orders of the commander to the subordinate commanders.

The initial combat orders of the division are almost invariably written; those of the brigade are generally so. The written order is preferable and is used whenever time permits.

If time permits, subsequent orders are likewise written, either as field orders or messages.

379. The initial combat orders of regiments and smaller units are given verbally. For this purpose the subordinates for whom the orders are intended are assembled, if practicable, at a place from which the situation and plan can be explained.

Subsequent orders are verbal or in the form of verbal or written messages. Verbal messages should not be used unless they are short and unmistakable.

380. The initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him.

Whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all information of the enemy.

381. The combat order gives such information of the enemy and of neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates to understand the situation.

The general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of the subordinates.

Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander assigns tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory.

Such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains, ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns the combat itself.

Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared.

382. When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly _what_ is to be done by each subordinate, but not _how_ it is to be done. He should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and can not substitute another.

Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or the inability to formulate orders.

383. Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency a commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. In such case he should promptly inform the intermediate commander concerned.

_Communication._

384. Communication is maintained by means of staff officers, messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals, telegraph, or telephone.

385. The signal corps troops of the division establish lines of information from division to brigade headquarters. The further extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is exceptional.

386. Each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade and forward to the battalions. For this purpose the regiment uses the various means which may be furnished it. The staff and orderlies, regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and in messenger service. Orderlies carry signal flags.

387. Connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals. Other means can only be supplemental. Company musicians carry company flags and are practiced in signaling.

388. The artillery generally communicates with the firing line by means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies some unit in or near the front. The infantry keeps him informed as to the situation and affords him any reasonable assistance. When the infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect coordination through this representative is of great importance.

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE.

389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented.

390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus they suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning.

391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.

The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.

A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable.

392. Each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. The extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation of the columns.

393. Before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the enemy's position, the location of his flanks, the character of the terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of time.

It will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position.

394. It will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory information until after the action has begun. The delay that may be warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of the attack and the necessity for promptness. For example, in a meeting engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time and necessity for thorough reconnaissance.

395. In defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the enemy's line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his reconnaissance, etc.

Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy.

396. Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.

A firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or defense.

397. The fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility for reconnaissance and security.

To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense.

398. The commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. In any event, he sends out combat patrols as needed.

Where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section, he makes similar provision.

399. Battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when these can not be seen.

FIRE SUPERIORITY.

_PURPOSE AND NATURE._

400. In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it.

Attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable and without ruinous losses.

Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him.

401. To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's fire.

The volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several considerations:

(_a_) _The number of rifles employed._ On a given front the greatest volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. The maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard of front.

(_b_) The _rate_ of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces its accuracy.

(_c_) _The character of the target_ influences both volume and accuracy. Larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range increase the rate of fire; greater density increases the effect.

(_d_) _Training and discipline_ have an important bearing on the rate or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy.

The firing efficiency, of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse psychological influences.

(_e_) _Fire direction and control_ improve collective accuracy. The importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. Control exerts a powerful influence at all ranges.

_FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL._

_Opening Fire._

402. Beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used.

Long-range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circumstances. At other times such fire is of doubtful value.

403. In attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt must be repressed. Considerations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. The attacker's target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the enemy.

404. In defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only.

If the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire.

405. In unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight.

_Use of Ground._

406. The position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire.

The ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing.

Troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground, either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on another target.

407. The likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent upon its visibility. By skillful use of ground, a firing line may reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. Sky lines are particularly to be avoided.

_Choice of Target._

408. The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits.

409. Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Random changes to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing. Attention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent.

410. An opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small. In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce important results.

_The Range._

411. Beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand. The necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the range. Its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease, for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges, becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and aiming.

412. In attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections made as errors are observed. Mechanical range finders and ranging volleys are practicable at times.

In defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future use.

_Distribution of Fire and Target._

413. The purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible, but at all events to keep down the enemy's fire and render it harmless. To accomplish this the target must be covered with fire throughout its whole extent. Troops who are not fired upon will fire with nearly peace-time accuracy.

The target is roughly divided and a part is assigned to each unit. No part of the target is neglected. In attack, by a system of overlapping in assigning targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept under fire even during a rush.

_Observation._

414. The correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy.

415. Observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being properly conducted. If the enemy's fire is losing in accuracy and effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. If the enemy's fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either volume or accuracy, or both.

_Discipline._

416. Discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the distinguishing mark of trained troops.

417. The discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the men. In the company, therefore, communication must be by simple signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and convey the correct meaning.

_Expenditure of Ammunition._

418. In attack the supply is more limited than in defense. Better judgment must be exercised in expenditure. Ordinarily, troops in the firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the surplus brought by reinforcements.

419. When a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition must be expended without hesitation. Several hours of firing may be necessary to gain fire superiority. True economy can be practiced only by closing on the enemy before first opening fire and thereafter suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at.

_Supporting Artillery._

420. Artillery fire is the principal aid to the infantry in gaining and keeping fire superiority, not only by its hits, but by the moral effect it produces on the enemy.

421. In attack, artillery assists the forward movement of the infantry. It keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it, destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from using its weapons effectively.

In defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy's attack reaches a decisive stage and assists in checking the attack, joining its fire power to that of the defending infantry.

422. Troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. The few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness of the enemy's infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease firing.

Casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until the opposing infantry lines are less than 200 yards apart.

423. When the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[3] informs the artillery commander. The latter usually increases the range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy's foremost line.

[Footnote 3: With a 4-foot white and red regimental signal flag.]

_Fire of Position._

424. Infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so as to assist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the main firing line.

Machine guns serve a like purpose.

In a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the terrain permits and reserve infantry is available.

DEPLOYMENT.

425. Troops are massed preparatory to deployment when the nature of their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the column or to clear the road. Otherwise, in the deployment of large commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or massed, and whether forming for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior to deploying.

The rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in forming the firing line.

426. In deploying the division each brigade is assigned a definite task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments until it is advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. In a similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion before issuing orders for its deployment.

427. Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his orders promptly.

428. Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance to front and flank; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground he guards against surprise.

429. The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the firing line.

430. In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line.

431. To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning, while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by driblets.

432. When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a fire well directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men room for the free use of their rifles.

If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in proportion to the front occupied.

433. In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a density of one man per yard of front occupied.

Where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased intervals.

434. A relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary.

435. The length of the firing line that the whole force may employ depends upon the density of the line and the _strength in rear_ required by the situation.

Supports and reserves constitute the strength in rear.

In a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes mentioned above.

436. In the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit, depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve.

A small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle requires much. Therefore, depending upon circumstances, the original deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from 1 to 10 men per yard. Against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible.

437. The density of the whole deployment increases with the size of the command, because the larger the command the greater the necessity for reserves. Thus, a battalion acting alone may attack with two men per yard of front, but a regiment, with three battalions, may only double the front of the one battalion.

438. By the assignment of divisions or larger units to parts of a line of battle several miles long, a series of semi-independent battle, or local combat, districts are created.

The general deployment for a long line of battle comprising several battle districts is not directly considered in these regulations. The deployments treated of herein are those of the infantry within such districts.

The density of deployment in these districts may vary greatly, depending upon the activity expected in each. Within these battle districts, as well as in smaller forces acting alone, parts of the line temporarily of less importance may be held weakly, in order to economize troops and to have more at the decisive point.

439. The front that a unit may occupy when deployed depends also upon whether its flanks are secured. If both flanks are secured by other troops, the unit may increase its front materially by reducing its reserve or supports. If only one flank is so secured, the front may still be somewhat increased, but the exposed flank must be guarded by posting the supports or reserve toward that flank.

Natural obstacles that secure the flanks have practically the same effect upon deployment.

440. Except when assigned as supports or reserve, regiments in the brigade, battalions in the regiment, and companies in the battalion are, when practicable, deployed side by side.

441. In the deployment, battalions establish the firing line, each furnishing its own support.

In each unit larger than the battalion a reserve is held out, its strength depending upon circumstances. In general, the reserve is employed by the commander to meet or improve conditions brought about by the action of the firing line. It must not be too weak or too split up. It must be posted where the commander believes it will be needed for decisive action, or where he desires to bring about such action. When necessary, parts of it reenforce or prolong the firing line.

ATTACK.

442. An attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and properly used.

To gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as both sides will probably hold a strong firing line.

443. With large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. However, if the enemy is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results.

444. Owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable except in large forces.

445. If the attack can be so directed that, while the front is covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less obliquely (an enveloping attack) the advantages gained are a longer line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the enemy's diverging fire.

446. An envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a very decided superiority in numbers.

447. The enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. The advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its preponderance of rifles and its converging fire.

448. Cooperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is essential to success. Both should be pushed vigorously and simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire.

The envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves. The two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. The troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and practical manner.

The enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in small forces.

_DEPLOYMENT FOR ATTACK._

449. Where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it may be necessary to make the deployment 2 miles or more from the hostile position.

The foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. If the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering troops must drive them back.

450. To enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and to deploy at night. In such case the area in which the deployment is to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops before dark.

The deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground has been studied by daylight. The deployment gains little unless it establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's main position. (See Night Operations.)

451. Each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for advancing in close order. In the firing line, intervals of 25 to 50 yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. In the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be pointed out on the ground.

452. The reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand at the decisive stage. It is posted with reference to the attack, or to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept intact.

Supports are considered in paragraphs 225 to 228, inclusive, and 298 to 302, inclusive.

_ADVANCING THE ATTACK._

453. The firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it is justified in opening fire. It can not combat the enemy's artillery, and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range rifle fire. Hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing position at the shortest range possible.

Formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered in paragraphs 212 to 220, inclusive. These and other methods of crossing such zones should be studied and practiced.

454. The best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the enemy's view.

455. Each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain ground.

The position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in paragraphs 306 to 308, inclusive.

456. It will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the attack to pass through deployed artillery. This should be done so as to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. As far as practicable, advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. An understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had, so as to effect the movement to the best advantage.

457. In advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or to clear the foreground of the enemy. Fire on the hostile main position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing line can join in the fire.

_THE FIRE ATTACK._

458. At the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire for a long time. The object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction rushing.

459. To advance without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the apparent success barren of results.

460. Diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the firing line can advance.

461. The men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn back in daylight.

If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.

Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with difficulty.

462. Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or diverted from their true missions on this account.

463. Paragraphs 309 to 317, inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire attack.

_THE CHARGE._

464. Fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him.

The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide.

465. The defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the charge begins. On the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat. Hence the distance over which the charge may be made will vary between wide limits. It may be from 25 to 400 yards.

The charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises success; otherwise the full advantage of victory will be lost.

466. The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order, before the charge is made. Subordinate commanders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge signal that fact to the commander. It may be necessary for them to wait until other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the necessary reserves arrive.

At the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and reserves rush forward. See paragraphs 318 and 319.

The charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units participating therein, but, once committed to the assault, battalions should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment.

467. Before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. Local reserves joining the firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong impetus. Too dense a mass should be avoided.

468. The line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable, and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in, unless it is very apparent that it can do no good.

469. To arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable value.

470. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is any prospect of success. Under exceptional conditions a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be signaled to the rear.

471. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the promise of success.

472. If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others.

473. The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. If the captured position is part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once.

The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counterattack.

474. If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy.

475. If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available.

See Night Operations.

_PURSUIT._

476. To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable.

477. The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found.

The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly re-form, and become a new reserve.

478. If the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity.

479. After the pursuit from the immediate battle field, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned.

480. Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit.

_ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS._

481. Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire.

482. If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles.

483. If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night Operations.)

484. In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods.

_HOLDING ATTACK._

485. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.

The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack.

486. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves.

487. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear.

488. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed.

DEFENSE.

_POSITIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS._

489. The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission.

A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description.

490. The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.

The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected.

491. When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.

The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available.

492. Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire.

493. The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See Intrenchments.)

494. In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc.

_DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE._

495. The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops.

496. If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.

Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line.