Chapter XXIV: Conclusion (1)

The fall of Ulundi was looked upon by some as the finishing touch to the Zulu power and the end of the war, while others considered peace ensured only and completely by the capture of the king. Much, however, remained to be done before Natal could be thought of as at peace with her neighbours and herself, and what has been commonly called the “Settlement of Zululand,” was a task which required the gravest consideration and the most careful handling.

Sir Garnet Wolseley’s first act in this direction was to call together as many of the principal Zulu chiefs and officials as could be found, and to address them upon the situation. This meeting took place at Ulundi on the 1st of September, the day after the captive king’s departure for Port Durnford. About 200 Zulus, including two of Cetshwayo’s brothers, and his prime minister Mnyamana, had responded to the summons; and seating themselves in rows four deep, with the principal chiefs in front, a few paces from the flagstaff at Sir G. Wolseley’s tent, waited in perfect silence. When Sir Garnet, with his staff, at last appeared, he addressed the assembled chiefs through Mr. John Shepstone, who accompanied him as interpreter. He informed them that it was six years that very day since Cetshwayo was crowned king of the Zulus, and that he was now carried away never to return. This, he told them, was in consequence of his having broken his coronation promises, and having failed to make and keep such laws amongst his people as the Queen of England could approve, therefore his kingdom was taken from him; and would now be divided amongst a number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences were to be punished by fines; no standing army would be allowed, nor the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu; nor would any stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased, provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could obtain the consent of the girl’s parents, and “smelling out” for witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and conquest, Zululand now belonged to her; but she had already enough land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them, and the Zulus were even forbidden to encourage their settling amongst them.

To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as resident, to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be proved.

At the conclusion of the General’s discourse he produced a document, the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land, to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a similar one himself.

The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the signature which they could not form.

For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement.

“The so-called settlement of Zululand,” says _The Cape Times_, on September 16th, “is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal, if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness, forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the Queen’s own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn.... But whatever John Dunn’s merits may be, his appointment as Chief Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their society in preference to that of such women as a white man should love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England in a nation of savages. The settlement of Zululand means simply the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal, flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It is a miserable delusion....”

The “engagements” into which the Zulu chiefs entered are:

“1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated.

“2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire.

“3. I will not import or allow to be imported into my territory by any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms or ammunition from any part whatsoever, or any goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated; and I will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise, knowingly obtained thereby.

“4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence and after the hearing of witnesses; and I will not tolerate the employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out, or any practices of witchcraft.

“5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice, when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly made to such government; and the escape into my territory of persons accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.

“6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated.

“7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory shall be according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the British Government.

“8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my territory.

“9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief, and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested elsewhere.

“10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the approval of such British Resident.

“11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern, order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my people.”

The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, and published in _The Guardian_ of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean of ’Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we quote it verbatim:

THE DEANERY, ’MARITZBURG, NATAL,
_September 27th, 1879_.

SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet,
as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the
attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope
you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you
some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years’
residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from
experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have
passed their lives in the midst of a highly organised society,
to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one
which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South
Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is
the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at
the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately
to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in
the possession of firearms. When the Diamond Fields were first
opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the
Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives
flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa,
hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in
rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can,
and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for
hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and
know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting
prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by
any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed
any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But
the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain firearms, so
got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them.
Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to
talk of fighting; the leaven had been put in and the whole lump
worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government
is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule;
its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the
recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus
also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with
contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus
themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that
they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always
placed restrictions on the natives possessing firearms, and, so
far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives
returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly
loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed
by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after
having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to
disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a
tax on the possession of firearms generally, granting privileges
to members of volunteer corps, etc. In that way, without drawing
invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young
men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and
if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from
keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to
what extent they were armed.

To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine
ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but
we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for
thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep,
or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel
with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that
it has been found convenient to carry on the war from Natal;
but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony
in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any
justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of
Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The
Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True,
they were not governing themselves very well in that State;
neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We
did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of
engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers.
Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must
read between the lines of that engagement—_i.e._ the promises
of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact
was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been overtrading
in that republic; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the
brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names,
but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were
brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed;
farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and
resold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply
repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers
were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had
we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in
a few months they might probably have sought our assistance,
and then we could have annexed them without their having a
grievance; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them,
for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and
Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers
arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had
had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers
in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone,
the Secretary for Natal Affairs, according to his wont, always
temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were
right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself
at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo
became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe
he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us
in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim,
he who hesitates does not fight; but before he had quieted down
Sir B. Frere interfered with his _ultimatum_, and Cetywayo stood
grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was
to be a great savage; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful,
influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress,
and such men must fail; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He
has never attacked a neighbour, white or black; he has defended
his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has
been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost
everyone he spoke to encouraged him to go to war; but I am afraid
he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when
will not Englishmen advise war? No argument was used, except
the one that Cetywayo might overrun Natal at any moment; but he
had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger
than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do
not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river
which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection,
as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross
it, lest it should rise in their rear; and in the winter, our
dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies
are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover,
though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo’s force
did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they
were 60,000 or 80,000 strong; but if you casually inquire of any
officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly
dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, “No, quite
the contrary.” I have again and again inquired of traders as to
the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired
of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo’s
regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very
outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to
this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle
in his view of our position; and certainly I cannot admit,
because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified
in going to war with him.

But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to
be arranged? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos,
the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not
intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes,
and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on
the farms; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, etc. The
same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the
border; but Natal is the one exception to this rule; in this
colony we live intermingled; and a few years ago we were regarded
as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the
Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold,
might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and
others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876,
however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was
bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed
weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved.
During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South
Africa; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms,
or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes; but
the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them
compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into
account.

Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a
source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of
Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true
to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I
think, recognised in Natal. They are these: 1. The natives are
not, like Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent;
consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more
than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as
it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern
his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the
magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his
chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has
become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will
not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters
into their daily life. 2. Natives who have resided amongst white
men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot
develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they
stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually
they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so
they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state
they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one,
no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few
customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle
amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are
able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others,
in the increase of their families. 3. They are naturally fond of
trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as
they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the
Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural
bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer
trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are
unwilling to separate from the white man. 4. The natives never
go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear;
but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans,
and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years
I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the
slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders,
and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced,
therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and
to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the
Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object.
It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the
native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the
benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North
American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in
South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him,
but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and
the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir’s
labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant
in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix
up the races therefore, and to some extent at least the problem
of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the
defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our
natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle,
etc., were in the colony, so they made common cause with us, and
showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore,
to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must
intermingle them. It was Alexander’s principle and the Roman
rule; the present European families have been founded on this
method—so we must go on mingling, not separating.

I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s conditions of peace,
as published in _The Natal Witness_. They are universally
condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British Residents,
and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It
is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to
annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet’s arrangements.
If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid
to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of
cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not
taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have
carried off more than we have.[180] The test of submission is
obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to
give up their guns. The test of the Queen’s authority in South
Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetywayo offered to pay a
hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men
in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle,
their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they
were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British
Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax
of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wish
it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at £1.
We estimate the population at three-and-a-half persons to a hut,
and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives
on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our
habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could
readily pay £1 per hut, or, say £36,000 per annum. Cetywayo’s
Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a
heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well
as civilised persons, understand that they must support their
Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice
of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon
one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to
be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our
natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then
having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the
offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The
conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the
utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house
should be established at the one port or landing-place, 3. The
alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white
man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long as the
land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no
improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order—2
is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another
at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and
the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched
upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can
give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that
wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring
them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active
and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be
resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders,
the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and
the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and
at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this
settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely
to last, and everyone expects, after a short interval, more
bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be
thrown on the Colony, as the Government has not been consulted on
the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus,
to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for
there will be another £3,000,000 or more to be voted yet; but
during the whole time meat was 8d. and bread 4d. per pound. 1s.
6d. per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a
soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources
of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to
a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will;
it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts
of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all
may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by
the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the
newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left
home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the
Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is
looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to
the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do
not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church
must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an
Englishman, to one who largely guides the counsels of the nation,
to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being
done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my
thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most
respectfully,
JAMES GREEN,
_Dean of ’Maritzburg_.

But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the invasion of our soil, and the violation of our sanctuary, committed by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We “requested” the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons of the offenders. We declined this proposal and repeated our request, which suddenly became a “demand” when it appeared in the ultimatum, and as such remained.

It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But they were not, so we went to war.

And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo’s sons had fallen in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him? By the military authorities he could only be treated like any other prisoner of war, and released unharmed amongst the other Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil prisoners.

This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired justice to be done, but, apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel, for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England’s noblest blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial, and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. “Doubtless,” remarks _The Natal Colonist_ of October 27th, “the legal adviser of the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which there was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’... It is a miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair.... The charge which, as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which has desolated so many homes, and cost millions of money, completely breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would justify war or not; and even though we knew it was only a pretext, seeing that it only took place long after war had been determined on, and preparations for it had been begun to be made.”

“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and the release of Sirayo’s son.”[181]

With this humiliating fact we must close our record of the Zulu War. In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure, or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now completed.

THE END.

CHARLES DICKENS AND EVANS, CRYSTAL PALACE PRESS.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879. P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.)

[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”

[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal.

[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe, although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter elsewhere.

[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.

[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in Zululand.

[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would be interesting to see the letter as originally received.

[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high treason.

[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.

[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of arms.

[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document, which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer treaties with the natives.

[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in _one_ year, in the bishopric of Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at _once_, at Toulouse; 500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one _Christian_ judge boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in sixteen years, 800 witches!

In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.

[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30.

[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.

[15] See Field Force Order, 1873.

[16] In the Zulu language the word _abantwana_ (children) is a general one, including both women and children.

[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit of an enemy to be fought.

[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by one of those concerned, in a letter to _The Natal Times_ of that date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot, took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have some more.”

2. _The Natal Government Gazette_, December 9th, 1873, contains the following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G., as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over the native population, or have acted _bonâ fide_ for the purposes and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts, matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.”

[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one. Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary; when will they let me go?” was his continual question.

[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.

[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony.

[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by English law.

[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849.

[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge.

[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to, however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover, they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory; whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.

[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned.

[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over which he has been placed by the Government.

[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August 6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home _en route_ to England.

[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind, to go to England, and see a civilised country.

[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and habitations, although they are very particular about their food, utensils, and other matters.

[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the captives.

[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,” will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen, and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official individual and by formal permission.

[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs), who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.

[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874.

[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a slightly imaginary character.

[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.

[37] Author’s italics.

[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.

[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin Pine.

[40] Three at last.

[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.

[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own staff.

[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial” interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done, would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his earnest support.

[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes, and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said to be _kept alive_ by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How “a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.

[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe.

[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.

[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the statements were made.

[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J. Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop _ex parte_, without the _safety of publicity_ and the opportunity of cross-examination. Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching cross-examination by experienced advocates.

[49] One of the original four.

[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr. Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that _nevertheless_ Mr. Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon the people.

[51] Author’s italics.

[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their land from Boer encroachments.

[53] SAND RIVER TREATY.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing, buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children, called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers, and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety which used to be called _publica fama_.”—_From an article by Lord Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879_, p. 265.

[54] A native chief.

[55] Written in October, 1879.

[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather, through the course of many years, during which we have restrained the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory, by promises that we would see justice done.—_Author._) But it is neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness, and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners, but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity. I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences, or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements with us and endanger our security.”

[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at the time.

[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special Correspondent of _The Cape Argus_, and to have since reaffirmed his statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir T. Shepstone’s supporters.

[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.

[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.

[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.

[62] That claimed by the Boers.

[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).