Chapter VI: The Somme (1)

I. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

In so far as the principal or Western theatre of war is concerned the chief events of 1916--and they were events of stupendous magnitude--were the resolute attack on the French troops around Verdun and the most magnificent and successful defence by our allies. In all their warlike and heroic past the gallant French never fought such a fight, and even the greatest of their historic victories, such as Jena, Austerlitz and the like, pale in renown when compared to Verdun. After many German offensives west of Soissons and about Ypres, the enemy appears to have definitely made up his mind to relinquish the idea of seizing Calais and the Channel ports as hopeless, and by forcing the French lines at Verdun to revert to his original plan of reaching Paris--this time by another route. It was on the 21st February that this great battle commenced, and the hostile lines swayed to and fro for days and weeks as the tremendous struggle continued. Men died by thousands and thousands, but never were our allies broken; “on ne passe pas” was the war cry, and the enemy never got through the Frenchman’s line.

The battle of Verdun may have said to have lasted till the end of June, and there were not wanting many who murmured that we English were deserting our comrades and that some great attempt on our part should be made to bring aid to our exhausted allies in their desperate straits. We had, however, our work cut out to defend our own line, for our armies were not yet at full strength nor all our new soldiers fully trained for war. What could be done was done. The British line was extended, on the 23rd March, to include Souchez, and, as Sir Douglas Haig, the new Commander-in-Chief, pointed out, the principle of an offensive campaign during the summer was early decided on.

Preparations of a very extensive nature, however, had to be made: Haig was in close consultation and agreement with Joffre, but the date was dependent on many doubtful factors; the British armies were growing in numbers and the supply of munitions steadily increasing; also training was daily improving the new levies. On the other hand, the Germans were continuing to press their attacks at Verdun, and both there and on the Italian front, where the Austrian offensive was gaining ground, it was evident that the strain might become too great to be borne unless timely action was taken to relieve it. It was in June no secret throughout France or England that an attack by us on a great scale was in contemplation. The different units, brigades, divisions and so on were all preparing for a very big event, and were moving to the several points from which action was to take place. It was on the 1st July that the Battle of the Somme actually took place or rather began, and it started by a grand combined Anglo-French offensive on a twenty-five mile front, north and south of the river of that name. The Somme operations lasted many weeks and are divided in Haig’s description into three phases: firstly, the successes gained between the 1st of July and the 17th, during which the southern crest of the main plateau between Delville Wood and Bazentin le Petit was gained; secondly, a long and severe struggle for the mastery between the contending armies, which may be said to have resulted in our favour by the first week in September; and thirdly, the advance, which was pushed down the forward slope and extended so that the whole plateau was in our possession.

There are many works now available, as well as the despatches themselves, which will give a military student a good and clear description of all this fighting; but the short sketch given above must serve one who reads merely to understand what the Buffs were doing in France during this momentous period.

II. 6TH BATTALION--1916

The 6th and 7th Battalions were the first of those engaged on the Western front to take their parts upon the Somme, and we will now note their story since the conclusion of 1915, when the 6th was in trenches at Givenchy--very cold, and waist deep in water. The New Year opened with a bombardment, and there were eighteen casualties on the 2nd January. After a short spell out of the line, the battalion returned to the trenches and for the next three months went through a time that was probably the severest of the whole war: the trenches were almost filled with mud--indeed, in some cases men were actually drowned in it; the cold was intense; fighting was continuous and the wastage by casualties appalling. The enemy had a preponderance of artillery and an unbelievable number of that most nerve-shattering of all engines of war--the heavy minenwerfer (mine-thrower). Mines were blown, all and every day and night, by both sides alike, and the orders then in force were to occupy at once any craters made, if within sixty yards of our line.

There was a somewhat notable attack on one of these craters made by the Buffs on the 6th March, 1916, which unfortunately, however, proved a failure owing, as the brigadier reported, firstly to the heavy condition of the ground, and secondly because the enemy had assembled in some force, presumably with the object of driving us out of our craters; consequently very much more opposition was met with than was anticipated. A short narrative of this minor operation may give an idea of certain incidents that are liable to occur in trench warfare. A scheme had been drawn up and the necessary orders issued for an attempt to seize what was known as the “triangle” crater, as well as certain portions of the trenches in the immediate neighbourhood of the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which were on the 6th March, 1916, in the hands of the enemy. C Company The Buffs was detailed for this minor enterprise and it was divided into three distinct parties, which were to emerge from craters in our own possession. The attempt was commenced at 6 p.m., but in ten minutes two of the attacking parties were held up by a barrage of bombs and the third by heavy ground--the mud being found to be knee deep. The party on the left managed, indeed, to reach their objective, but the fact that the others were not up necessitated their retirement, and at five minutes to seven the company had to report that its advance was absolutely stopped. Half an hour later another attempt was made, notwithstanding the fact that in the interim the enemy had attacked in his turn. At 8.5 and again at 8.35 p.m. the Buffs called urgently for more ammunition and grenades. They also requested reinforcements, and a company of the 6th Royal West Kent was ordered up to their support. Meanwhile the 7th East Surrey Regiment, which was on the left, was attacked, and, though the assailants were driven off, much damage was done to their trenches. There were two more attacks on this regiment before eleven o’clock, but they were unsuccessful. By midnight the situation on the Buffs’ front was exactly similar to what it had been previous to the attack; the enemy had made several bombing attacks against our own craters, but they were successfully repulsed and during the remainder of the night the enemy was quiet.

Later in the month on two separate occasions the battalion was brought into the line from a hurriedly snatched two or three days’ rest at Bethune, in order to resist German assaults or make a hurried counter-attack.

Amongst the many individual acts of heroism was that of Corpl. Cotter who, though himself at the time severely and, later on in the same engagement, fatally wounded, directed a bombing attack, throwing bombs himself after both his legs had been shattered, and thus saving a trench from being rushed by the enemy. Another regimental hero to be remembered for all time. It was sad that this glorious corporal died in hospital at Lillers, but very gratifying to know that he lived long enough to learn that his gallantry had been recognized by the award of the V.C.

The following official announcement was published on the 31st March, 1916, in the list of winners of the Victoria Cross:--

“No. 6707 Lance-Corpl. (Acting Corporal) William R. Cotter, East Kent.--For most conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty. When his right leg had been blown off at the knee, and he had also been wounded in both arms, he made his way unaided for fifty yards to a crater, steadied the men who were holding it, controlled their fire, issued orders, and altered the dispositions of his men to meet a fresh counter-attack by the enemy. For two hours he held his position, and only allowed his wounds to be roughly dressed when the attack had quieted down. He could not be moved back for fourteen hours, and during all this time had a cheery word for all who passed him. There is no doubt that his magnificent courage helped greatly to save a critical situation.” His wonderful performance is still more remarkable on account of the fact that he had a glass eye. Unfortunately, he did not survive long to enjoy the great honour. At first he made good progress, but he died on the 14th of March.

For the following details of the hero’s life we are indebted to the _Folkestone Herald_:--

“Corporal Cotter was born at Folkestone thirty-four years ago,
being the eldest of six sons, all of whom entered the Navy
or Army. He joined the Buffs when he was about twenty years
old, and was on the Reserve at the outbreak of the War. Being
called up, he went to Canterbury, and was sent to France,
notwithstanding that he had a glass eye, having lost the sight
of his right eye through an accident some years ago. Excepting
two intervals, he had been at the front ever since, and right
up to March 6th he remained unwounded, although he had several
narrow escapes from being shot. His letters home were always of
a cheery type, and in the trenches he was one of the happiest
and best of men. He kept his comrades in good spirits, and he
was always ready to help the wounded or dying. Corporal Cotter
distinguished himself on several occasions in bayonet fighting,
and in December last he was recommended by his officers for
conspicuous bravery. He was then, it appeared, recommended for
the D.C.M.”

The 6th Battalion remained in the same sector until Easter, when it went back for a well-deserved rest near Lillers. Here it was refitted and reorganized and given plenty of hard work and hard training with a view to what was to come. It benefited much from the complete change; football and sports were indulged in, and at last there came some decent spring weather.

On the 19th July six officers were mentioned in despatches, but only two of them, Lea-Smith and Smeltzer, were alive. The names were Major Soames, D.S.O., Captains Furley and Smeltzer, and 2nd Lieuts. Brodie, Lea-Smith and Jelf.

During this month the battalion moved south to Amiens, and everybody knew where the ultimate destination would be. On the 28th the real warlike move took place. All surplus kit was left behind and a position finally taken up behind Albert, as the brigade was not to come into action just at first, but to form part of a reserve force. On the 30th three thousand Mills grenades were issued out and a move made to Bresle, from which place during the night tremendously heavy shelling from our guns was heard.

The 1st July was the opening day of the great Somme struggle and the Battle of Albert, 1916. Zero hour found the 6th just outside Lavieville, and when the moment came it marched through Millencourt and halted in a field north-west of that village--being, of course, in reserve. A great deal of firing was heard and some rumours caused a good deal of excitement: at first “all objectives had been gained,” and then “the assault on Ovillers had failed”--which latter was unfortunately fairly true, as the attack on this sector did not achieve much success on the first day. At 5 p.m. orders came to be ready to move at a moment’s notice into the intermediate line and the brigade actually moved off at 7 o’clock, finding the greatest difficulty in getting through the congested streets of the village of Millencourt, but at 8.15 orders were changed again and the 12th Division was now to relieve the 8th, which had suffered many casualties. This move was accomplished at night time, the Buffs, with the rest of the division, being all in the trenches by about 2.45 a.m. The 2nd of the month did not bring another important effort by our troops at this part of the line, though Ovillers was heavily bombarded.

At 1.15 a.m. on the 3rd, however, orders came that this village would be attacked by the 35th and 37th Brigades at 3.15 a.m., after an hour’s intense bombardment. The order of battle for the 37th Brigade was 6th Battalion The Queen’s on the right, supported by two companies of the Buffs; 6th Battalion Royal West Kent on the left, supported by two companies of the Buffs; the 7th East Surrey Regiment in support. After a few casualties, sustained by reason of the usual retaliation to our bombardment, the Queen’s and West Kents attacked. Very heavy machine-gun flanking fire met the Kentish men from the left and the Queen’s from the right. A Company of the Buffs “went over” by platoons about 3.30 a.m., and the first wave suffered few casualties until the German wire was reached; but the succeeding waves of this company, and those of C Company also, suffered heavily in their advance. The few men that succeeded in getting into the German trenches, under 2nd Lieut. Farmer, at once commenced to bomb the dug-outs. Eyewitnesses report that the accuracy and regularity of this advance was remarkable, and reminded them of field-day work. Two communication trenches were found to be blocked. Owing to casualties amongst bomb-carriers the supply of these necessities was soon exhausted, and casualties were inflicted by German bombs. Finding at length that it was impossible to remain any longer in the trench, 2nd Lieut. Farmer collected all the men around him and brought them back to the English lines. The intense enemy machine-gun fire held up also the attack on the right, and B and D Companies did not go into the struggle. The German artillery maintained a heavy fire on our trenches with great accuracy and weight.

About 7.30 a.m. a message was received that the 10th Corps was making another attack, preceded by artillery preparation, at 8.15 a.m. If successful, the 35th Infantry Brigade would co-operate. A message was also received that if the 37th should again attack, the 6th Buffs were to lead it with the two companies that had not suffered, and that they would be supported by the Queen’s. However, it was decided that no further efforts should be made on this sector for that day; the East Surrey took over the front-line trenches and the brigade settled down to be shelled. During the night a number of wounded were brought in. The casualties of the 3rd July were, for the 6th Battalion The Buffs: killed, Captain J. C. T. Leigh and 2nd Lieuts. H. G. Cox and S. T. Hinkley; wounded, Captain Child, Lieut. W. W. Chapman, 2nd Lieuts. Free, Carter and Madden; missing, Lieut. G. W. M. Burton and 2nd Lieut. L. H. Batson, both of whom it was afterwards ascertained had been killed. Total casualties, 11 officers and 263 other ranks.

It sometimes most unfortunately occurs that in war all casualties cannot be discovered and collected. A man may be killed outright or he may be wounded, perhaps in such a way as to prevent his crawling or staggering away. Every effort is always made to retrieve and bring away the sufferers, and it is most distressing to think this cannot always be done. After the fight on the 3rd, the Buffs, together with the rest of the brigade, had a comparatively quiet time, but on the 7th 2nd Lieut. Bond left the trenches with a patrol. He reported on the German wire as being in bad condition, and he brought in five wounded men who had been lying out, poor fellows, ever since the early morning of the 3rd. Lieut. Lea-Smith was killed by a chance shell during the morning of the 7th. The battalion did not go into the trenches again till the 27th July, when the whole brigade took its place in the Ovillers section once more after being hastily refitted and brought up to strength.

What is described by Sir Douglas Haig as the first phase of the great fight was now over, and the discovery had been made that the enemy was in an immensely strong position, fortified, line behind line, to an extent perhaps never before known in war, unless it be compared with Wellington’s lines at Torres-Vedras, which Massena never dared to assault. On the 3rd August, the Battle of Pozieres Ridge being then in full swing, orders were issued for an attack to be delivered by the 6th Battalion The Buffs on a certain German strong point and for it to be carried out in conjunction with the 36th Brigade on the right; this brigade was to assail what was known as the Ration Trench, which communicated with the strong point in question. The attack was to be launched at 11.15 p.m. B Company was on the left, D Company on the right and A and C Companies in reserve. About 9 o’clock the enemy shelled our trenches heavily, but some French ·75 guns were turned on the German batteries with gas shells and completely stopped their fire. Had it not been for this timely action, due to the initiative of Lt.-Colonel Cope, commanding the Buffs, the casualties would probably have been very severe. At 11 p.m. 2nd Lieut. Hanmer and a party of bombers crept out under the barrage to be ready to bomb an enemy’s machine gun should it open upon our men when they advanced.

Punctually to the hour ordered B Company went over the parapet and was immediately joined by D, the barrage lifting at the same moment. D Company then went through B to take the trench on the left of the strong point, but during its advance eased off a bit too much to its right; so A Company was brought up from the reserve and soon after C Company also, and these two took and consolidated the objective and, together with a company of Royal Engineers, pushed on a bit further; but when dawn came B Company found itself in the Ration Trench. However, touch was secured with the 36th Brigade, and the Buffs had done their job. Lieut. A. J. Hanmer did most gallant work during this action. He won the M.C., but was so severely wounded that he died of his injuries on the 7th October.

2nd Lieut. Routley and a Sussex officer made a reconnaissance as far as Mouquet Farm. The enemy tried a counter-attack from this place, but it melted away before our Lewis guns. Two German officers and 87 other ranks, mostly Prussian infantry, were unearthed from the dug-outs of the captured works. The battalion was relieved, about 11 a.m. on the 4th, by the 6th West Kent, and went back to huts in Martinsart Wood, having lost 4 officers wounded and 114 casualties of other ranks.

On the 10th August a somewhat curious accident occurred. In the early morning our 60-pounder trench mortars bombarded a German sap with good effect. 2nd Lieut. McDermott crossed over to it when the bombardment lifted. After he had dropped a Stokes Mortar bomb down a dug-out the Germans all fled. It was therefore arranged to take this sap after some bombs had been got up. These were duly carried up and stacked ready for use, and Captain Ward and Lieut. Sir R. Onslow were ready to conduct operations. About 2.30 our trench mortars opened fire again by way of preparation, but unfortunately one shot fell short, right into the middle of our stack of bombs, exploding about 1,500 of them and wounding both the officers named and an orderly. As the bombs were lost the affair had to be given up.

On the 12th August the brigadier was informed that the attack on this portion of our line was to be in future of the nature of a holding one, and was not to be pushed home if much opposition was encountered. On this day news from England came that Captain Farmer and 2nd Lieut. Bond had been awarded the M.C., Corpl. Tamblin the D.C.M., and that there were Military Medals for Sgt. Fox and Ptes. Anderson, Blackshaw, Browning, Hughes, Luchford and Setterfield.

On the 14th August the brigade marched away from the Somme area to the northward and did not return to this district till the 29th September. It relieved the 34th Brigade in the neighbourhood of Beaumetz and Betrencourt, which are villages some seven miles or so south-west of Arras. Except for some trench-mortar activity this sector was fairly quiet. The battalion was here for about six weeks and then returned to the Somme, where by this time the British line had been very considerably advanced. The 1st October found the 37th Brigade about Lonqueval, whence it passed into a reserve line south of Guedecourt.

The ground was now so bad and the roads north of this part of the Somme so inferior that transport became a great difficulty, and troops had to rely almost entirely on pack animals for the supply of the necessary food and warlike stores. Indeed, an attack arranged for the 4th October had to be postponed for forty-eight hours on account of rain and bad weather. On the 6th of the month the Buffs were in the front line of their brigade.

Then an operation order was issued commencing with the words: “The general advance of the Allies will be resumed.” This order was, as usual, clear and minute as to detail, and it gave both a first and a second objective. The Buffs were on the right of their brigade and the Royal West Kent on the left. Of the Buffs themselves, A Company was on the right, B in the centre and C on the left, and each of these companies was given its own individual objective. D Company sent three platoons as carrying party to the other three companies, while its fourth was directed to construct a strong point. The attack was ordered to be carried out in four waves at fifty yards interval; each platoon extended to two yards interval, bayonets to be fixed and magazines charged. Each man carried 220 rounds of small-arm ammunition, and the carrying parties had a further supply. The artillery was to lift every minute and fifty yards at a time. Arrangements were made to signal to the contact aeroplanes. The zero hour was fixed at 1.45 p.m. on the 7th October, but the enemy must have known what was coming, for an hour before that the Buffs were heavily shelled, and at 1.30 the Germans opened a tremendous machine-gun fire and shrapnel barrage on the front trenches. However, at the correct moment the attack opened, and it was met with an excessively heavy machine-gun and rifle fire which came from an unexpected quarter. This held up C Company, but A and B reached the first objective, suffering, however, somewhat severely. On trying to advance further they were completely stopped by the German machine guns, as were the West Kent on their left. About twenty men of A Company succeeded in joining the 61st Brigade on the right and they advanced with it; this brigade attained its objective. The first objective gained by our men was bravely held all the day until relieved at midnight by the 6th Battalion The Queen’s. Throughout the afternoon the lines had been subjected to a great deal of bombing from the high ground above them and to enfilade fire from the flanks. Lt.-Colonel Cope was severely wounded, and Captain T. Pagen, R.A.M.C., was killed in attempting to go to his assistance. The battalion, forty strong, was taken out of action by the adjutant, Captain Page, the only officer who was not either killed or wounded. It was for no slight reasons that the 6th Buffs were stopped in their advance. Eight officers were killed: Lieut. P. R. Hatch, 2nd Lieuts. A. E. S. Ommanney, G. S. M. Norrie, E. G. Routley, Loft, D. A. Harnett and R. B. N. Moss, and Captain Pagen, R.A.M.C.; and twelve wounded: Lt.-Colonel Cope, D.S.O., Lieuts. Cumberbatch, Bond and Chapman, 2nd Lieuts. Kidd, Woolbridge, Taylor, Springay-Mason, Turk, Taylor and Jacobs. There were 347 casualties amongst the rank and file--killed, wounded and missing. Yes, the 7th October, 1916, was another dreadful day in the long history of the regiment, as well as in the short one of its 6th Battalion, but the ancient honour showed no sign of deterioration at this Battle of the Transloy Ridges.

Now reduced to a mere skeleton of a battalion, though drafts began to arrive almost daily after the 16th of the month, it was necessary after a few days’ rest near Lonqueval to remove it, on the 21st October, to the quieter sector of Reviere, in the district from which it had come to the Somme at the end of September.

There was a certain amount of official correspondence about this great fight, as there always is when full success is not gained by British efforts; it seems clear that the artillery barrage was not strong enough to keep down the hostile fire, that our front line was not continuous, but had gaps in it, and that the ground was not suitable for forming for attack.

Major Dawson assumed the acting command of the battalion, rendered vacant by Lt.-Colonel Cope becoming a casualty.

III. 7TH BATTALION--1916

The commencement of the year 1916 found the 7th Battalion in billets at Dernancourt. Early in January Lt.-Colonel Elmslie was invalided, and Major Birch took his job until the arrival of the new commander, Lt.-Colonel A. L. Ransome, of the Dorsetshire Regiment. In February the battalion moved to St. Gratien, where it remained for fifteen days, being employed in making the Daours-Contay railway; and then, in March, it took over a position south of Maricourt about Corbie and Suzanne, where it remained till the end of the month.

The incidents worthy of note at this time were not very numerous, and the important move of the spring was to Picquigny, where strenuous preparation for the coming great battle was continuously and methodically engaged in: dummy trenches were laid out on a replica of the ground over which the men were to attack, and one full-dress rehearsal for the brigade took place with contact aeroplanes and flares, the Commander-in-Chief being present. This special preparation went on till the 10th June, when the battalion started for the line itself, and it is not too much to say that the soldiers were remarkable for keenness and zeal. There is always more of excitement and dash in an offensive than in the somewhat tame and monotonous business of a passive defence, though quite as much heroism can be exhibited in the one as in the other. “Let us get at them” is, at any rate, a more popular sentiment than “Stand fast, here they come.”

From the 11th June onward all work was concentrated in preparing assembly trenches, communication trenches and dumps for the forthcoming attack. The battalion was at Bray sur Somme on the 17th June and remained there till the last day of the month, when it marched into its assembly trench in Lapree Wood ready for the assault. It may be remembered that on this day, the 30th June, 1916, the 6th Battalion was at Bresle, about nine miles away.

On the great 1st of July the 55th Brigade, a unit of which was the 7th Battalion The Buffs, to whose part in the struggle we will now refer, held the line in front of Carnoy, and its objective was a trench about two hundred yards north of the Montauban-Fricourt road. Zero hour was 7.30 a.m., and the following was the order of battle for the attack: the 7th Queen’s were on the left, the 8th East Surrey on the right, the 7th Buffs in support, with the special task of clearing the Carnoy craters, and the 7th Royal West Kent were in reserve. At 7 a.m. our barrage became intense and remained so till 7.22, at which time all guns of the Trench Mortar battery opened for eight minutes, and at the zero hour the whole brigade went forward to the assault. Local conditions necessitated the breaking up of the Buffs for several and separate duties: two platoons of B Company, under 2nd Lieut. Tatam, were to clear the Carnoy mine craters; two platoons of the same company to assist the assaulting battalions by clearing up captured trenches or ground;[15] C Company to consolidate and garrison a certain trench called the Pommiers Trench. Two platoons of D Company to act as carrying parties. Two platoons of A Company to garrison two selected localities in rear of the Pommiers Trench.

The Carnoy mine craters took six hours to clear, and six hours’ very heavy fighting it was, carried out under 2nd Lieut. Tatam, whose excellent work was rewarded by a M.C. C Company was soon called away to aid the East Surreys, as were later on two platoons of A Company. In fact, these two platoons of A, together with one of C Company, under Lieuts. Dyson and Budds respectively, reached the final objective and held that part of it allotted to the East Surrey Regiment until relieved by other troops. Again it became necessary about noon to send up half D Company to make good part of the final objective of the 7th Queen’s. This was done successfully, but the company lost its commander, Captain G. T. Neame, during the operation.

There is no doubt that during the whole operation, which was carried out more or less as planned, our troops encountered far more opposition than was anticipated; particularly was this the case at the craters, to attack which only two platoons were originally assigned, a number of men quite inadequate. The whole position, indeed, proved to be a very strong one, consisting of four lines.

The battalion lost the following casualties on this day:--

_Killed_: Captain G. T. Neame; Lieuts. P. G. Norbury and E.
H. A. Goss; and 2nd Lieut. J. F. Baddeley and 48 other ranks.

_Wounded_: Captain C. K. Black; 2nd Lieut. H. Owen and 144
other ranks; and 7 missing.

The Buffs remained in the front-line trenches till the night of the 4th/5th July and were heavily shelled, the enemy relaxing nothing of his activity and energy in this respect. The Pommiers line had been consolidated and it was now the special mark of the German gunners. The battalion reached Bronfay Farm about 3.30 a.m. on the 5th after a very strenuous four days. The 5th was spent in resting, and the 6th in necessary reorganization.

The time allowed in the back area was not a long one, however, and, on the 12th July, the Buffs moved by companies via Maricourt to relieve a battalion of the Liverpool Regiment about Maltz Horn Farm, which is in the immediate vicinity of Trones Wood and marked the extreme right of the English line. Here the French were on the right of the battalion, and as the enemy still held Trones Wood and, as an old German communication trench running at right angles to the front was now held by us, it was necessary to have sentries facing both ways. On the 13th July orders came that the 55th Infantry Brigade was to attack this wood, and the following order was arranged for the Battle of Bazentin Ridge in so far as the brigade was concerned: the 7th West Kent to attack the southern half of the wood from the south; the 7th Queen’s to attack the northern half from the west; the 7th Buffs, less B Company, to remain in Maltz Horn Trench, mentioned above as running at right angles to this line--one platoon to attack a certain strong point.

B Company was lent to the 7th Queen’s, attacked with them and suffered very severe losses. 8th East Surrey to be in reserve.

At 7 p.m. one platoon of D Company, under 2nd Lieut. Scott, attacked the strong point mentioned above. A bombing party moved along the trench and entered it by a tunnel, but, on its entry, the enemy was encountered in strength and its force appeared to increase, reinforcements apparently coming in from the direction of the wood. The consequence was that Scott withdrew his party and reorganized it. He then proceeded to attack his objective over the open by parties from the flanks, but he was met by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire and was compelled to withdraw with loss. Verbal messages came over the telephone about 10 p.m. that the holding of Maltz Horn Trench, the defensive flank, was of the first importance and the line was not to be thinned in order to attack the strong point again. Nevertheless, attacks were continued on the morning of the 14th, and about 9 a.m. the point was evacuated by the enemy, and patrols were sent forward down the trench which led to Guillemont. No opposition was met with, as the enemy was retiring towards that place. Touch was then established with the 54th Brigade, and in the evening of the 14th the battalion (less the company attached to the Queen’s) was lent to this brigade and remained with it in the front line, after their own had been relieved, until the early morning of the 18th, when it was withdrawn to Grovetown Camp; there it stayed till the 21st, on which date it was withdrawn temporarily from the Somme fighting and entrained at Mericourt for Longpré and later to St. Omer. From there it marched to Recquinghem, and finally to Hondeghem, about half-way between St. Omer and Ypres. A fairly quiet life was now the portion of this battalion for a few weeks, spent at first in the line near Bois Grenier, and afterwards resting at Monchy Breton, near the little town of St. Pol, reorganizing and training, always training, and absorbing fresh drafts from England.

At the end of September the battalion moved south again for the great struggle at Thiepval. This village is about a mile from the River Ancre, on the eastern bank, which is here very high and steep. Indeed, the place is quite four hundred feet above the stream. It had been taken from the Germans on the 26th September, and on that same date the Royal West Kent Regiment (of the 55th Brigade) had reached Crucifix Corner, though the Buffs were only at Hedauville but were still on the march, so that the battalion bivouacked that night somewhat nearer the scene of action. On the morning of the 27th, starting at 5.30, it moved by platoons to Crucifix Corner, where the men got into dug-outs and there remained till the afternoon of the 29th, when it relieved the 8th Suffolk Regiment, A and C Companies proceeding to Wood Post, and B and D to the old German line. One platoon of A Company acted as carrying party to Thiepval for the 8th East Surrey Regiment. At 7 a.m. on the following day came the S.O.S. signal from the northern edge of the Schwaben Redoubt and the Buffs were ordered to stand by in readiness. The Schwaben Redoubt was in shape roughly an oval and certainly not a square, though the terms north face, west face, etc., are used for convenience in the following narrative of the fight there. It was somewhere about five hundred yards long and two hundred broad, and the original parapets were so knocked about by the 1st October that they were mere mounds and ditches with shelving sides. For defence they had to be roughly and rapidly improved and adapted as occasion required, but on account of the constant bombardment it was impossible to shape them up properly.

What had happened in this place was that the enemy, making a somewhat sudden and resolute attack, had driven the defenders back from the southern face of the work, considerably weakened one of the East Surrey companies and captured the whole of the western face. Counter-attacks were immediately organized and, in connection with this, D Company of the Buffs was, at 9.35 a.m., sent up to occupy the northern defences of the village of Thiepval, and at 1.25 this company got orders to send two platoons to act in conjunction with the East Surrey in attacking and capturing the Schwaben Redoubt. These two platoons were given definite objectives and the zero hour was fixed at 4 p.m.

A Company moved up to Thiepval and reported to the O.C. 8th East Surrey. At 9.15 in the evening, the attack on the west face having failed, and that on the north one having succeeded, it was found that the Surrey battalion had suffered too much loss to be of much further use, and the rest of the Buffs went forward to take over the redoubt, together with the western defences of the village.

Soon after midnight came a short message from 2nd Lieut. Carman, who commanded the two platoons of D Company that had gone forward to attack with the Surrey men. It was to the effect that his men were almost entirely wiped out directly the starting-point was left.

One of the most difficult periods the battalion ever had to face during the war commenced with the month of October. The commanding officer held a consultation with the chief of the East Surrey and they decided that B Company of the Buffs (Captain Brice) should take over the whole of the front line occupied by the Surrey men, and this relief was completed by 5.45 a.m. on the 1st October. At 12.50 B Company was able to report that Point R.19.d.45 was taken and touch got with the Royal West Kent, so now the Buffs held part of the northern and part of the southern face of the redoubt, and the West Kent held the country down to the River Ancre.

It may be remarked that the contending forces were a good deal mixed in the Schwaben Redoubt on the 1st October. In fact, about half-past eight o’clock a German officer and twenty-six men emerged from a dug-out and gave themselves up to Captain Brice’s men. The curious situation led to very extensive use of bombs on both sides. B Company was ordered to work the northern face with bombing parties, and great attempts were made to clear the Redoubt by these means throughout the day, but no substantial improvement was made. C Company relieved B on the 2nd and was itself relieved next day, and still an indecisive bombing fight went on, alternating with rather heavy shelling. At noon on the 4th October it was decided that the only way to clear the redoubt of the enemy was by bombing, and bombing alone, and in still greater intensity and continuity. Orders came that this mode of fighting was to go on day and night with the greatest vigour, and that bomb-stops were to be made down all communication trenches which led northward.

The companies were by this time terribly depleted, and the brigade gave orders that all positions were to be held, but no further advance made. This was at 3.45 p.m., and it was not till 11.40 p.m. that the welcome news came that at 6 o’clock in the morning the 8th Norfolks would attack with bombing parties along the western face of the redoubt, Stokes and Vickers guns co-operating. At 3.30 a.m. on the 5th October, therefore, Norfolk bombing parties arrived at Thiepval in search of guides, and, these being supplied, they went on. The Buffs had received the simple orders to hold their own and nobly was that order obeyed: the conditions were terrible; heavy rain had reduced the shell-pitted ground to a sea of mud and it was thick with dead; German heavy artillery was concentrated on the position and bombing attacks were constant; but not an inch of ground was given up. The brothers A. S. and C. D. Hayfield and the regimental doctor, Captain McCullum Orme, particularly distinguished themselves. A. S. Hayfield was unhappily mortally wounded, another very fine officer being lost to the army. News came in the morning that the battalion was to be relieved in the afternoon and, by 5.15, this relief was effected. At 2.30 next morning (the 6th October) the battalion arrived by motor buses at Hedauville and the next day to Candas, which is not far from Doullens. The 1st-6th October was a terrible time and not to be forgotten by the survivors. The estimated casualty list being: one officer killed, 2nd Lieut. D. M. Taylor; one died of wounds, 2nd Lieut. A. S. Hayfield; and nine others wounded. 26 men killed, 152 wounded and 23 missing.

Up to the 14th there came a rest, with training and the usual football and amusements, and then a three days’ march back to Albert and into the Fabeck and High Trenches from the 22nd to the 26th. This proved a very strenuous tour and involved some casualties, a few being from shell-shock. We will leave the history of the 7th Battalion here. The great Somme struggle was considered at an end on the 18th November, and up to this date trench work and rest at Albert came each in their turn. It is pleasant to note, however, that the 7th November brought the M.C. to Captain Brice, 2nd Lieut. C. D. Hayfield and Captain Orme, R.A.M.C., and the D.C.M. to Sgts. Stewart and Steel.

IV. 8TH BATTALION--1916

The story of the 8th Battalion for the first half of the year 1916 is that of practically all the infantry units on the Western front. Tours of trench work alternated as a rule with periods of so-called rest. The misery of the former depended, as regards intensity, on the period of the year. When the weather was fine, rats and lice were the chief enemies in addition to the recognized foe; when the weather was bad, then wet and frozen extremities were added. There were always a few casualties in killed and wounded, and even the cheeriest-hearted were bound to find a turn of trench work a bit depressing. When it was the turn for rest, men crowded into leaky barns, 80 to 100 in each, sleeping one above another in tiers. Training and instruction of new drafts from England gave plenty of occupation, but in addition there were amusements, football, running and other sports by day, and entertainments by night in many cases. There were also baths.

At the beginning of January the battalion was at La Panne. On the 6th the Buffs were transferred to the 17th Infantry Brigade, still in the 24th Division, and on that day they entrained for their new divisional area about Poperinghe. The 14th of the month saw them in trenches near Ypres, where plenty of work in the way of digging, draining and revetting awaited the men. The 26th of January brought a welcome visit from the 1st Battalion which was still in the Ypres area. Lt.-Colonel Lucas, at the commencement of the war adjutant of the 1st Battalion, took over command of the 8th on the 16th March from Major Cunningham, a staff officer, who had relieved Lt.-Colonel Trueman a month earlier, Trueman having been taken into hospital.

The 4th June brought the birthday honour list; Lieut. C. Lindsay received the M.C., R.S.M. Brooker and Pte. Peet the D.C.M., Ptes. Buzzard and Hall the M.M., whilst 2nd Lieut. Shafto heard a week later that he also had the M.C.

On the 17th June, about midnight, there arose a cry of “gas,” and the S.O.S. signal went up from the Royal Fusiliers who were on the left of the Buffs and, almost at once, a brisk bombardment broke on our front line. The gas itself arrived three or four minutes after the warning and lasted half an hour. However, it missed our companies in the front line, but spread somewhat over the reserves and headquarters.

On the 22nd June, after some rehearsal work at Bulford Camp, the battalion marched, via Bailleul, to St. Jans Capelle, where it was billeted in farms and continued its rehearsals. About this time Corpl. C. Batchelor was awarded the M.M. for his conduct during the recent gas attack.

Although they may not very greatly or directly influence the winning of the war, raids were found to be of great use in fostering a manly and martial spirit amongst our soldiers. There is something about perfectly passive defence which makes for despondency and depression, but a raid on the enemy evokes a spirit of enterprise. These are perhaps very minor military enterprises in many cases and no description of them will be found in the military despatches, but they are naturally of intense interest to all concerned and show the enemy that the spirit of those opposite them is quite undismayed.

On the 28th June, then, a detachment of the Buffs under 2nd Lieuts. Anderson and Temple, to prove the value of the rehearsals, carried out a raid on the German trenches at a point known as Ash Road Barrier, which is near Ploegsteert. The men moved out in two parties so as to be in position outside our wire at 11.31 p.m., at which moment an intense bombardment commenced, directed on the points to be assaulted. Under cover of this the men crept forward, the guns lifting fifty yards at a time. Unfortunately the thing failed as a surprise, but Anderson’s party succeeded in entering the enemy’s front-line trench and then, after a bomb engagement, the raiding party withdrew successfully, bringing back with them all their wounded and some much-treasured trophies for the folks at home. The left party found the enemy’s wire in front of them still uncut and it withdrew when the recall signal sounded, leaving one dead man. Lieut. Hall commanded the covering party, and Captain C. D. Gullick the whole operation. Three officers and a hundred men went over the top. Four men were killed and twenty wounded, and it is probable that the German loss was about the same.

After a few days’ careful training in the area north of Meteren this battalion left Bailleul by train for Longueau, which is two miles east of Amiens, and then fifteen miles back along the line to Le Mesge. This journey was memorable not only because it took our people into the vicinity of the great battle which was then raging, but also because of the tremendous reception given to the soldiers by the good folk of Amiens. This city is, of course, on the Somme river and was within sound of the guns. Had the enemy succeeded in some of their counter-attacks during the long and continuous struggle which was going on, Amiens would have been the first important city to feel his cruelty: the people were first of all Frenchmen, but they were Amiens citizens as well. They were hearing daily of the gallant deeds of their English friends almost at their doors, and they received those soldiers, who were on their way to join in the struggle, as perhaps only the French know how. After a week spent in training at the business of the attack, the brigade proceeded by train to Mericourt and marched to Morlancourt, some four miles south of Albert.

On the 6th of August the brigade got orders to take over the line between Guillemont and Delville Wood and elaborate arrangements were made accordingly, but they were altered at the last moment, and on the 9th the battalion found itself in reserve on the Carnoy-Montaubin road where, on the following day, an unfortunate accident occurred: something went wrong with the working of one of our own artillery guns which began firing short, so that our Battalion Headquarters found itself being shelled by our own gunners and a few casualties occurred before the matter was reported by a pigeon message. The 12th August brought an unusually severe hostile shelling. On this day two poor wounded fellows who had been lying out for three days were brought in by B Company, and, in an attempt to bring in a third, Ptes. Jordan and Stevenson were themselves wounded by a machine gun from Guillemont. On the night of the 17th troops moved into the assembly trenches ready for the morrow.

On both the 30th July and on the 7th August, before the arrival of the 17th Brigade, the village of Guillemont had been entered by British troops, but in each case they had ultimately to withdraw again because of the failure of simultaneous attacks on the flanks of the place. It being obvious to the higher command that this position could not be taken as an isolated operation, arrangements had been made by both French and English commanders for a series of combined attacks in progressive stages on Maurepas, Falfemont Farm, Guillemont, Leuze Wood and Ginchy; and, with this in view, each unit had been given its particular objective which it was to endeavour to gain on the 18th August, starting at 2.45 p.m.

As far as the Buffs were concerned their orders were clear, and, with the elaborate and carefully prepared trench maps, easy to understand: two platoons of A Company under 2nd Lieut. D. Grant were to seize what was known as the Machine Gun House and convert it into a strong point, wherewith to assist the advance of the Rifle Brigade; the battalion bombers were to bomb out from the posts they had occupied to fill in the gap between the Machine Gun House and the left flank of the Rifle Brigade, which was attacking on the right of the Buffs. A third platoon of A Company was to be at the disposal of Grant as supports. C Company (Captain C. D. Gullick), with half B in close support, was to attack what was then known as the “Z.Z.” trench and to form a strong point. Remainder of B to be at the disposal of Captain Gullick. The battalion reserve to consist of D Company, the remaining platoon of A and one company of the Royal Fusiliers. These were in what was called Trones Trench.

At 2.45 the attack commenced and the 8th Battalion plunged into the Battle of Delville Wood. C Company, with half B, rushed out of their trenches and, keeping close under the barrage, successfully reached their objective with very few casualties, although 2nd Lieut. W. J. L. Peacock was killed about half-way across. On reaching the hostile trench, our men found the enemy completely unprepared. One man indeed was stark naked, and the greater part of the garrison surrendered at once. One officer with a machine gun and crew certainly made a fight of it, but the gun was captured and turned on the Germans. Captain Hodgson brought up the remainder of his company to reinforce and actually suffered more casualties than the assaulting party. He found himself in command, for Gullick had been hit several times and was very badly wounded. Two platoons of the Royal Fusiliers followed our men and consolidation at once commenced, a good deep trench being quickly made. A few dug-outs were found, but they were choked with German dead. 2nd Lieut. Grant and his party got safely across, and Machine Gun House was occupied, but the trench thereby was found to be strongly held. Lieut. Harrington, who had the right bombing party, was attacked by some Germans who had hidden in some shell holes with their bombs, but he succeeded in killing or driving them away and soon joined up with Grant. The left bombing party met with considerable resistance as they worked up the trench to where C Company’s right flank should have rested. However, the men managed to capture the machine gun which was causing most of the annoyance. Machine Gun House was quickly consolidated and the communication and other trenches greatly improved. During this action communications were kept up with remarkable completeness by runners.

It may be well to note here that the Medical Officer, Captain Rankin, had been wounded in the face and part of his dressing station had been blown in, but he continued to work for several hours until ordered by the commanding officer to report himself wounded.

The casualties on this occasion were: 1 officer and 38 other ranks killed; 6 officers and 297 other ranks wounded and 16 other ranks missing; and the list included all the officers of C Company and all the company sergeant-majors, Dumbleton being among the slain.