Chapter XII: How to End the Spy-Peril

"After this war," said Mr. Justice Ridley, in a passage already quoted, "we must make an end of spies."

"After this war," however, may be too late. I contend we should make an end of spies _now_, and with that end in view I would propose very strong measures--so strong that, I willingly admit, only very grave national peril would justify it. That peril, I contend, actually exists to-day, _and no steps we can take to minimise it can be regarded as excessive_.

At the present moment it is perfectly easy for any German agent to travel quite freely between England and the Continent. As we know, the Germans have in their possession a large number of stolen British and American passports. By means of these passports their agents can come and go between England and the Continent practically as they please, taking with them any information they can pick up. And, although the collecting of information has been made much more difficult by the additional precautions taken since the outbreak of war, information is still to be obtained by those who know where and how to look for it.

Now, the only channels by which this information can be conveyed abroad at present are, first by correspondence in invisible ink beneath an unsuspicious letter addressed to a neutral country--this was proved at the court-martial of the prisoner of war, Otto Luz, at the Douglas Internment Camp--secondly, by travellers between England and the Continent, and thirdly, by secret wireless stations communicating between our shores and the German ships--probably submarines--lying off the coast. All three of these channels of leakage must be stopped.

The first step should be the absolute closing of the sea routes from these shores to all persons, excepting those who are vouched for by the British Foreign Office. The second is a much closer and more persistent search for concealed wireless plants, and a third, a closer censorship upon outgoing mails to neutral countries. I happen to know that in certain instances censorship upon both cables and correspondence is quite inadequate.

As to the second proposal, there will be no two opinions. Wireless is already forbidden, and there is no hardship in taking steps to see that the law is obeyed. With regard to the first suggestion, I am well aware that many people will think it, as indeed it is, extremely drastic. It would, of course, cause great inconvenience, not only to British subjects, but to the subjects of neutral Powers with whom we are on the best of terms. It would seriously interfere with business which we have every wish should continue, and I should never suggest it unless I were convinced of the urgent need.

A correspondent who has just returned from Holland, where, says the _Evening News_, he saw British tradesmen doing business with German manufacturers, shows how easy it is for the Germans to send professional spies to England _via_ Flushing. A German permit will pass anyone over the Belgian frontier into Holland: a Belgian passport is not necessary, but such passports are issued by the local authorities. There is nothing to prevent a German commander getting a Belgian passport and issuing it to a German if it suits his purpose, while the present examination arrangements on the English side offer no obstacles to spies landing, especially from boats containing five or six hundred refugees.

The remedy is to make the landing test far more stringent, and to use responsible Belgians in the work. One can readily understand that the average Englishman, even though he spoke French and Flemish, would not be able to detect a German, speaking both languages, as being anything but a genuine Belgian. Such a man, however, would be readily detected by a Belgian; however well he spoke the languages, some trick of accent or pronunciation would be sure to "give him away." Thus our Belgian friends could do much to prevent the German spy getting into the country.

Assume that the spy is here; how are we to prevent him getting out?

By closing the sea routes to all who could not produce to our Foreign Office absolutely satisfactory guarantees of their _bona fides_. The ordinary passport system is not sufficient; the Foreign Office should demand, and see that it gets not only a photograph, but a very clear explanation of the business of every person who seeks to travel from England to the Continent, backed by unimpeachable references from responsible British individuals, banks, or firms.

In every single case of application for a passport it should be personal, and the most stringent enquiries should be made. I see no other means of putting an end to a danger which, whatever the official apologists may say, is still acute, and shows no signs of diminishing.

Under the best of conditions some leakage may take place. But our business is to see, by every means we can adopt, that the leakage is reduced to the smallest possible proportions.

Now, a few words as to the future. Let us look forward to the time when the war is over, and Europe is at peace again. Will it be necessary for us to take steps to prevent a recrudescence of this German espionage, or can we assume that there will be nothing of the kind again?

In the language of Mr. Justice Ridley, we have got to "make an end of spies" once and for all.

The spy system has gained a firm and, I believe, quite unshakeable footing in the German military system, and my own view is that directly the war is over the old game will begin all over again. Whatever may be the result of the war, we can take it for granted that Germany will cherish dreams of revenge, more especially against the "treacherous British," upon whom, at the present moment, she is pouring out all the vials of her concentrated hatred and malignity. She has been spending huge sums annually on her spy-system, and she will not readily give it up.

I certainly cherish the hope that after the war we shall be spared the flood of German immigration that, quite apart from all questions of espionage, has, in past years, done so much harm to England by unloading on our crowded labour market a horde of ill-paid and wage-cutting workers, many of whom were trade spies, and who have done much to drive the British employee out of the positions which, by every natural and political law, he ought to hold. This has been made possible to a great extent by subsidies from German rivals anxious to get hold of British trade secrets. The German clerk will never be the welcome figure he has been in the past with certain British firms who have regarded nothing but cheapness in the appointment of their staffs. Still, we may be certain that, welcome or unwelcome, the German will be with us again; as a rule, he is sufficiently thick-skinned to care very little whether he is wanted or not, provided he "gets there." He will be a potential danger, and his activities must be at once firmly restricted.

With this end in view the French system of the registration and taxation of every alien coming to reside in this country ought to be insisted upon. Many worthy people seem to think that there is something highly objectionable in a precaution which is taken by every European country except Britain. As a matter of fact, there is nothing of the kind. Every Briton, in ordinary times, who goes to Germany is registered by the police; there is no hardship and no inconvenience about it, and no reason whatever why the person whose motives are above suspicion should object to it. The same is true of Russia, where the passport system is strict; yet, once you have registered, you are free to do pretty much as you please, so long as you do not attempt to interfere in political matters, which are surely no concern of the foreigner. Germans should be the last people in the world to object to a policy of registration and supervision in this country, and to do them justice the reputable Germans would never think of protesting.

Another essential precaution would be that every alien coming to reside in this country must produce his papers. There is no hardship in this; the honest foreigner never makes any trouble about showing his papers at any time. In every country save Great Britain everyone has to possess such papers, and there is no reason why he should not produce them when he goes from his own to another country. By a system of papers and registration, the police would be enabled at any moment to lay their hands on doubtful characters, quite apart from spies.

It is also to be sincerely hoped that the Lord Chamberlain's Department will request, as the _Globe_ has justly demanded, that City financiers who have been accustomed to make use in this country, without the Royal licence or the King's permission, of German titles of nobility, will discontinue this practice when they become "naturalised." We should then have fewer pinchbeck "Barons" among us than at present.

Evidence has been accumulating during the past few years, and came to a head with the case of the German consul at Sunderland, that naturalisation in the great majority of cases is a perfect farce. The "naturalised" are still "Germans at heart." Naturalisation is usually adopted either for spying or for business purposes, and to suppose that the mere fact makes a German into anything else is to argue a pitiful ignorance of human nature, and particularly of the German nature. There is in this, of course, no reproach; we should think as little of a German who forsook the cause of his country as of an Englishman who turned renegade. The Germans are an intensely patriotic people, and we may honour them for it, but we do not want to help them to further exercise their patriotism at our expense.

Notable changes in the law relating to the naturalisation of aliens were made by the new British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, which came into force on January 1st, 1915. Among the most important of these is the power given to the Home Secretary to revoke certificates of naturalisation obtained by means of false declarations.

The Naturalisation Act of 1870 is now repealed. That Act contained no definition of the classes of people who are to be regarded as natural-born British subjects. This omission is rectified in the new Act, by which such persons are defined as follows:--

(a) Any person born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance; and

(b) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions whose father was
a British subject at the time of that person's birth, and either
was born within His Majesty's allegiance, or was a person to whom a
certificate of naturalisation had been granted; and

(c) Any person born on board a British ship, whether in foreign
territorial waters or not.

I regard section (c) as far too sweeping; it seems to imply that even the children of German emigrants born while their parents are travelling, say to America, on board a British vessel become British subjects, even though they may never set foot on British territory during the whole of their lives! In such a case, naturalisation will mean absolutely nothing to the person concerned, while it is conceivable that his claim to be a British subject might involve us in awkward entanglements. A person born on a foreign ship will not be regarded as a British subject merely because the ship was in British territorial waters at the time of the birth.

Children of British subjects, whether born before or after the passing of the Act, will be deemed to have been born within the King's allegiance if born in a place where "by capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance or other lawful means His Majesty exercises jurisdiction over British subjects."

The qualifications for naturalisation are extended under the new Act.