Chapter I: I Seek in men that love of their country, which I find so much (2)

XLVII. From what has been premised, it may be inferred, that no contingent can ever happen, in which an informant or voter can consistently shew favour, or be partial to any man, either in such an instance as we have just mentioned, or in any other whatever, judicial or extrajudicial; because as we have shewn, competitions between subjects of equal merit do not admit of it, and if the merits of the competitors are unequal, the injustice of such a proceeding is self-evident; consequently, to him who acts conscientiously, all recommendations or solicitations are useless and improper; for he will not be biassed by friendship, country, gratitude, school-alliances, religion, college-connections, or any other motives whatever. But the misfortune is, that in the practice of the world, we see but few examples of such disinterested and upright conduct, even in cases where the merits of candidates are unequal; but on the contrary, whenever an opposition is set on foot, the favourers of each candidate, are more occupied in canvassing suffrages, than in studying questions, and more busied in examining the connections of voters, than books of faculty. The abuse is carried to such a length, that sometimes a man’s acting with integrity is imputed to him as a crime. If a voter, who is solicited by a man of eminence, answers ingenuously, and excuses himself from complying with what is requested of him; they say he is a rough, ill-bred, unpolished man: if he does not yield to the solicitations of a benefactor, they call him ungrateful; and if he does not give way to the intreaties of a friend, they exclaim that he is callous to the feelings of friendship. Finally, it appears to me, that a more intolerable error than this cannot exist, for I have seen men much esteemed by the generality of mankind for their worth, who have always prostituted their votes to these or some other temporal motives; but in the name of reason, can a man have any friend so great or so good as God? Is there any benefactor, to whom we owe so much as to him? How shall we reconcile this? Can he be called a grateful, an honourable, or a good man, who can be wanting in his duty to his best friend and greatest benefactor, by acting unjustly to oblige a creature, to whom he owes this or that limited respect, and to whom also it is impossible he should owe any thing whatever, but what he owes principally, and in the first instance to God? In vain I have urged these arguments in various private conversations; and I believe it is in vain also, that I now use them with the public at large; but if they shall not be effectual to amend the abuse, they will at least serve to disburthen my mind, and give vent to my chagrin.

ON
TRUE AND FALSE
URBANITY.

SECT. I.

I. The signification of the word Urbanity is equivocal, so that when you read it in different authors who lived in distinct times, you will find, the sense they understood it in varied exceedingly. It’s immediate derivation is from the Latin word _Urbanus_, which springs from _urbs_ a city; but notwithstanding this, it did not imply city in general; for it’s meaning at first, was confined in an especial manner to signify the city of Rome.

II. The reason of this was, that the word _urbanus_ began to be first made use of, at the time that the Roman republic was in the zenith of it’s prosperity, and this may be evidently inferred, from Quintilian’s saying the word was new in the days of Cicero; _Cicero favorem, et urbanum nova credit._ It was then that the generical word _urbs_ began to be used by way of eminence, to signify the city of Rome, on account of it’s portentous grandeur; and with the same pace that Rome proceeded to domineer over the world, that sort of culture which the Romans looked upon as an excellence peculiar to themselves, proceeded to gain ground, and prevail in the city, and it was then that the Romans began to make use of the word _Urbanus_, to express that compound sort of cultivation that people received there, which seemed not to be confined to letters and sciences only, but also to comprehend manner and punctillo also; _homo urbanus_, _sermo urbanus_; and they used the word _urbanitas_, to express those accomplishments in an abstracted sense.

III. But all authors did not give the same extension to the cultivation implied by the word _urbanitas_. Cicero, as we know from his book _de claris oratoribus_, restrained it to a graceful manner of speaking, which was peculiar to the Romans.

IV. Quintilian thinks, the graceful manner of speaking, which was peculiar to the Romans, and which consisted in their proper choice of words, their just application of them, and the decent tone of their voices, did not comprehend the whole, but was only a part of the accomplishment that was meant to be expressed by the term Urbanity; and he assigns as another part appertaining to it, a tincture of erudition acquired by frequent conversation with learned men; _nam, et urbanitas dicitur, qua quidem significari sermonem præ se ferentem in verbis, et sono, et usu proprium quemdam gustum urbis, et sumptam ex conversatione doctorum tacitam eruditionem, denique cui contraria sit rusticitas_.

V. Domitius Marsus, an author who lived about mid-way between the days of Cicero and Quintilian, and who wrote a treatise upon Urbanity, which we are indebted to Quintilian for the knowledge of, strikes into a new track, and maintains Urbanity to consist in the keenness and force of a short pithy expression, which delights and inclines the hearer to be affected in the manner the speaker could wish; and which is well adapted to excite either resistance or assent, according to the circumstances of persons and things: _Urbanitas est virtus quædam in breve dictum coacta, et apta ad delectandos, movendosque in omnem affectum animos, maxime idonea ad resistendum, vel lacessendum, prout quæque res ac persona desiderant. (Quintilian ubi supra.)_ This definition is truly confused, and either explains nothing, or else, only explains a particular idea of the author, distinct from every thing that has hitherto been understood, respecting the meaning of the word Urbanity.

VI. The moral philosophers, who have studied and laboured to explain the admirable ethics of Aristotle, have considered this word as equivalent to the Greek one _Eutrapelia_, which Aristotle made use of to express that virtue, which influences people to observe moderation in the tone of their voice, and their manner of expressing themselves; as vicious extremes in these particulars, were apt to degenerate into rusticity, or else, to be attended with scurrility and buffoonry; and these are the sentiments of our cardinal Aguirre and count Manuel Thesaurus.

VII. But neither the word urbanity, nor that of rusticity, which is its opposite, are made use of to express at present, what they were understood to imply formerly. They call him now-a-days, an agreeable or well-bred man, and not a man of urbanity, who speaks in a moderate and pleasing tone of voice, and who expresses himself in decent and opportune phrases; and he who delivers himself in an opposite manner, they do not call a rustic, but a coarse or an unpleasant man, or else describe him by phrases that are equivalent to those.

SECT. II.

VIII. But to come to the acceptation that is given to the word Urbanity in these present times, and to the sense in which it seems now to be generally understood in Spain, it signifies the same as _Cortesania_; but it is also true, that some give a more limited, and some a more extensive signification to this phrase. There are those who understand cortesane, or courteous, to mean the same as well-bred, and to express a man who in his commerce with other men, conducts himself with that decorum and ceremony which is prescribed by good education. But amongst those who define things with propriety, I believe a courteous man is understood to mean one, who, by his natural disposition, has a propensity in all his words and actions, to conduct himself with that temper and manner, that makes his conversation and company agreeable and pleasing to the rest of mankind. Taken in this sense, the Spanish word _Cortesania_, is equivalent to the French one _Politesse_, to the Italian one _Civilitá_, and to the Latin one _Comitas_.

IX. The derivation of the word _Cortesania_, is analogous to that of _Urbanitas_; for as this last was taken from the word _Urbs_, which according to the custom then in use, was looked upon to be applicable to the city of Rome, which was then the capital of a very great part of the world, the term Urbanity was understood to imply, that sort of cultivation which was then in vogue at Rome. Just so _Cortesania_, which in Spain is derived from _Corte_, or court, where it is generally supposed people behave with the greatest politeness is understood to imply that sort of good breeding which is generally practised there, and which we express by the term _Cortesania_.

X. Understanding then the word Urbanity in this sense, I shall define it in the following manner; _that it is a virtue, or virtuous habit, which directs and leads a man both in his words and actions in such a way, as makes his company and behaviour savoury, grateful, and engaging, to the rest of mankind_. I shall not embarrass myself, about whether some people think this definition too redundant, and that it seems to express more than the term Urbanity implies. I adjust the definition to the interpretation I myself put upon the term, and to the sense it is understood in, by those who have treated of the subject in the most approved manner. Those who give less extension to the word, may, if they please, define the thing in another manner. Disputes about definitions are mere nominal questions, and may not improperly be called playing upon words. Every one defines a thing, according to the acceptation he gives to the word that expresses it. If all men were to agree in the acceptation of a word, they would scarce ever differ in the definition of the object that is expressed by it; but the misfortune is, that the same word, excites in different people different ideas with respect to the meaning of it, and hence it is, that we see such a variety of definitions.

XI. There is no doubt, but that all the particulars which compose a courteous carriage, should lead to the attainment of a certain end, and should be calculated to induce a certain manner in all a man’s exterior behaviour, that should be free from any mixture of the indecent, the offensive, or the tiresome; but that on the contrary it should rather be combined, with the grateful, the decent, and the opportune.

XII. Urbanity, like all other moral virtues, is placed between two vicious extremes; one of which it is apt to run into by exceeding, and the other by deficiency, or not doing enough. The first is occasioned by that excessive complaisance which borders upon meanness; and the second, by a rigid unsavoury reserve, which has the appearance of rusticity.

SECT. III.

XIII. As there is no virtue, whose use is so general and common as than of Urbanity, so there is no one which is so much counterfeited and falsified by hypocrisy. There are men who by seldom finding themselves in a situation to exercise some particular virtues, are not very anxious about contriving means to imitate them by hypocrisy; but as Urbanity is a virtue that all men have opportunities of exercising, it is in the power of all men to counterfeit it by deceit. In truth, the hypocrites in the line of Urbanity are innumerable. All the world super-abound with expressions of submission and profound respect, with obsequious offers, and with exaggerated professions of esteem, with smiling countenances, whose essence consists in the command they have of their features, and in expressions of their lips, in which their hearts have not the least share; but on the contrary, are rather impressed with sentiments, that are quite opposite to those false appearances, and mock demonstrations.

XIV. What, then, should Urbanity be implanted in the heart? Without doubt it should, or it is at least from thence that it ought to derive its origin. If it was otherwise, how could it be a virtue? Reason tells us, that there is an honest complaisance due from one man to another; and whatever reason dictates should be esteemed a virtue. But how can a lying, deceitful, and affected complaisance be a virtue? It is evident it cannot. Urbanity then should arise from the bottom of the soul. What does not do that, is not Urbanity, but hypocrisy that counterfeits it. An honest soul, stands in no need of fiction to assist it in the observance of all those attentions which compose good-breeding, because it is naturally inclined to the observance of them, left alone to itself. By an innate propensity, accompanied by the light of reason, such a one will never, upon any occasion, be found wanting in the respect that is due to his superiors, nor in the condescension he should shew to his equals, nor in the affability he should practice with his inferiors, nor in the good-will and gracious manner, with which he should manifest to all men, both in words and deeds, these laudable dispositions of his mind, and his love of human society.

XV. I am not ignorant, that Urbanity is commonly understood to consist in our external testification of respect and benevolence to those with whom we converse. But if this testification, is not accompanied with the affections of the mind that are expressed by it, it becomes deceitful, and cannot possibly constitute that sort of urbanity, which consists in a virtuous habit; for in order to constitute such a one, it would be necessary that the testification should be sincere, which amounts to the same as saying, that there is essentially included in urbanity, the existence of those sentiments, which are expressed by courteous words and actions.

SECT. IV.

XVI. It is certain, that courts are the great public schools of true Urbanity; but they have mixed so much false in those schools in the practice of it, that some have been led to think, it has nearly obscured the true, of which, there seems to be scarce any thing left but the mere appearance. I believe, that without disparagement to any other courts we ever heard of, those of antient Rome, and modern Paris, may be esteemed the most cultivated and polite that have been known in the world. After mentioning this, let us hear what two authors say who were well versed in the practice of them both. The first is Juvenal, who clearly gives us to understand, that he who could not lie and flatter should withdraw from court, as there were no hopes of his getting any thing by his attendance there--

_Quid Romæ faciam? Mentiri nescio; librum_
_Si malus est, nequeo laudare, &c._

XVII. The second is the abbot Boileau, a famous preacher at Paris in the reign of Louis the Fourteenth. This eminent man, in a treatise he published, entitled _Choice Thoughts or Reflexions_, drew such a picture of the court of Versailles, as shews the Urbanity exercised there, had degenerated not only into dissimulation, but even into treachery, although he admits, this was not the practice of every one who attended it. These are his words:

XVIII. “What are the manners and behaviour of a courtier? Why they consist in flattering his enemies while he is afraid of their power; and in endeavouring to destroy them whenever he finds an opportunity for doing it; in being civil to, and making use of his friends when he stands in need of their assistance, and in turning his back upon them when they can be of no further service to him; in seeking out powerful protectors, whom he fawns on, and idolizes exteriorly, and frequently despises in secret.

XIX. “Courtly Urbanity, consists in converting dissimulation and deceit, into the law or rule of a man’s actions; and representing all sorts of people in such colours, as your interest dictates to you that you should paint them; in bearing slights and disappointments with a forced reserve, and in awaiting with a strained appearance of modesty and composure, the favours of Fortune.

XX. “In a court, for the most part there is no sincerity, but almost every thing you see there, is compounded of hypocrisy, deceit, and malevolence; for example, in peoples doing underhand ill offices to each other; in contriving and laying snares that nobody can be aware of; in bearing painful and mortifying disgusts with a smiling countenance; and in hiding under an apparent shew of modesty, the pride of Lucifer. It is very common in a court, for a man not to be permitted to love whom he likes, to do what he should, nor to speak what he thinks. It is necessary to keep silence, in order to conceal your sentiments, and it is also necessary, to acquire a facility at changing them. You must applaud, abuse, love, abhor, speak, and live, not according to your own liking or inclination, but in conformity to the arbitrary will and caprice of other people.

XXI. “In what do the other manners and mode of a man’s conducting himself consist in a courtier? Why in dissembling injuries, and in revenging them; in flattering his enemies, and in destroying them; in promising every thing for the sake of obtaining a dignity or promotion, and in performing none of these promises after he has got it; in repaying favours with words, services with plausible assurances, and debts with threatenings. At court, they in the same breath implore and execrate Fortune, applaud and despise merit; and they also disguise the truth, under an ostentatious appearance of frankness.”

XXII. I believe there is a great deal of this sort of dissimulation all over the world; but it is natural to suppose, there is more of it practised in courts than in other places, for the incitements to the exercise of the before-mentioned vices, are generally stronger there, than they are found to be out of those circles. There is not a passion nor an appetite, which there a man does not seem within reach of indulging, and the objects which stimulate his desires, shine forth there also in their greatest splendor. The ambitious man fancies himself on the point of grasping honours, and the covetous one riches. The pretenders are vying with each other, the emulous contending with the emulous, and the envious with the envied. There the success of the unworthy man, is staring the neglected deserving one in the face, and there the hands of the unskilful artist fully employed, is exhibiting a disgusting spectacle, to the able one who has nothing to do. And although a modest man who only views this at a great distance, or who only hears it from report, may reason upon it, and contain himself like a philosopher, still, when the mortifying prospect is so near him, he can scarce speak of the thing with temper, nor look upon it without falling into a passion. Thus it is almost morally impossible, that the hearts of the neglected men should not be in a continual state of fermentation, and their feelings in a tumultuous agitation, which is attended, not so much with the corruption of the men themselves, as with that of their manners.

XXIII. But notwithstanding all that has been alledged, we ought to conclude, that the two before-named authors exaggerated the evils they meant to reprehend. There is a great deal of bad in courts, but there is also some good to be found in them. The complaints that merit is neglected, are frequently nothing more than sighs, which express the grief and disappointments of the heart from whence they proceed. The same man who laments political mismanagement, while he is not permitted to go beyond the porch of the favourite’s house, when he has once gained admittance into it, begins to applaud his conduct, as he ascends the steps leading to his levee-room; which is a proof that what he meant by mismanagement and a bad conducted government, was such a one as he got nothing under, and that what he understands by a good one, is such a one as is advantageous to him. I have at all times heard the administration ill spoken of, but if we come to enquire by whom, we shall find it is chiefly done, by importunate candidates for places and employments, who are unable to attain what they never deserved, and by litigious suitors, who were justly disappointed of success in their vexatious attempts, and who have been condemned to pay costs, for commencing unjust prosecutions; by delinquents who have been legally mulcted for their misdeeds; by ignorant people who have passed for men of understanding, and who without having studied in any other school, than that of a coffee-house or a club-room, have presumed to give positive opinions, upon the most important and difficult political and military questions; and finally, by weak people, who fancy that a good government can effect impossibilities, and that they are able to make all the subjects of a state, happy and contented.

XXIV. Neither my genius, nor my destiny have allowed me to have much intercourse with ministers in high stations; but I have heard sincere judicious men, who have known many of them well, speak of them, in terms very different from those they have been spoken of by the vulgar; and who have expressed a different opinion, both of their abilities and their intentions, from that which has been commonly propagated. Nor indeed is it credible, that princes, who generally know men’s political characters better than private people, should make choice of men for their ministers, who are either incapable, or wickedly disposed. If in case that they should have been mistaken in the opinion they entertained of them, and they find upon trying them, that they are not equal to conduct the business they have confided to their management, they may easily remove them. Thus it is utterly improbable to me, that a man destitute of all merit, should for any length of time, occupy a post of great importance, or have the ear of his sovereign.

XXV. With respect to inferior ministers, such for example, as the principal people and magistrates in the provinces, I have had a great deal of experience, and protest, that for the most part, I have found them to be the best sort of men to be met with in the country. I say for the most part, for it cannot be denied, that among this class, there are men to be found that are not very upright, and more than a little addicted to avarice. And by what I find the principal directors, lawyers, and magistrates in the country to be, I judge of those about the court; and it seems natural to me, that the higher the sphere of life is in which people move, they are the more stimulated by motives of honour, and less likely to descend to, or be guilty of mean actions.

SECT. V.

XXVI. Neither do I believe above half that is said, of the neglect that is shewn to merit, and the abandoned situation it finds itself in at court; for the number of candidates for preferment that may be found there, who have no merit at all, would upon enquiry appear to be very considerable, and that among them, you will meet with mischief-makers, together with crafty, deceitful, and treacherous people, whose bad practices and characters, it is almost beyond the power of language to describe; who are a sort of imps of Satan, that for the most part serve the Devil without pay; and are a kind of galley slaves upon earth, who join to that slavery, being the galley boatswains mates, or drivers of each other, whose oar, and whose scourge, are never out of their hands, for fear of their not being the first to arrive at the desired port, and to accomplish what they had in view. They are a species of idolaters of Fortune, who sacrifice as victims to that deity, their companions, their relations, their friends, and their benefactors; and in the end themselves also, or their own souls. What have we not to expect, or what have we not to fear from men of this character?

XXVII. I have been three times at court, but either from my natural incuriosity, or because my stay there each time was but short, I came away as ignorant of the practices of a court, as I went; and only took particular notice of one circumstance, which is relative to the subject I am now treating of. I saw there, as in other places, Urbanity degenerate into that fulsome kind of ceremony, which may be termed cringing complaisance. Accident furnished me with numberless opportunities of seeing such things; and I have frequently observed two people who have usually met together in their walks, and who, as I have been informed, had a tolerable indifference for each other, and even looked upon one another with reciprocal contempt; I say I have seen these people upon their meeting, strive which should excel in expressions of the love, veneration and respect they bore to each other. There was scarce a word came out of their mouths, which was not accompanied with some affected gestures. Their eyes cast glances of tender devotion on each other, and milk and honey flowed from their lips; but at the same time their affectation was so palpable, that any man of the least discernment, might have perceived the disagreement there was, between their hearts and their appearances. I laughed inwardly at them both, and I believe they also in their hearts, laughed mutually at each other.

XXVIII. I saw once two lawyers accost each other, with such extreme expressions of tenderness, that a Portuguese might have learned from them, phrases and gestures for feats of gallantry. Both these people had places at court, on which account they could not avoid seeing each other pretty frequently; and there was no friendship between them; notwithstanding which, their expressions were like those of the most cordial friends, who had met together after a long absence.

XXXIX. Having expressed to some people who were used to the court, how disgusting this appeared to me, they answered that this was behaving in the court stile; but would not any one who hears this, conclude the court was nothing but a comic theatre, where all the world act the part of enamoratos; although to speak the truth, it was only in spirits of inferior order, that I noted this amorous kind of farrago. In those of more elevated hearts and minds, if they don’t owe the thing to their own genius and disposition, the education of a court produces a better effect, and exhibits people of a more noble behaviour, and such as is proper to, and expressive of true urbanity. I say I have observed in such, affability, sweetness, expressions of benevolence, and offers of kind services; all which were tendered with propriety, and in a decent generous manner, free from affected exaggerations, but animated at the same time, and expressed with so natural an air, that the articulations of the tongue, were indications of the emotions of the mind, and the feelings of the heart.

XXX. Cato, as Tully tells us, said, he wondered how two augurs whenever they met, could refrain from laughing at each other; as they both well knew, that their whole art was a mere imposture. I think the saying may be applied to two fulsomely complaisant courtiers; for I do not see how those who have once saluted each other in this cringing and affected way, can upon meeting again, forbear laughing in each others faces, as they both know, that all the hyperbolical professions of their esteem, affection, and readiness to oblige, mean nothing, and that this is all a mere common-place farrago or rhapsody, quite destitute of truth or reality.

XXXI. I have said, that in the lesser towns I have visited, I have not observed so much by a great deal, of this ridiculous parade. It is true, that you will find in them, some few people who walk about the streets with incense in their hands, to offer up to, and idolize all those, whom they fancy can be of any service to them; but they are looked upon like what they are, not as men of worth, but as men of craft, whose incense smells savoury in the nostrils of none but fools. This sort of behaviour about the court, frequently passes for good-breeding; but in these other places it is condemned as meanness.

SECT. VI.

XXXII. I am persuaded that solid and brilliant urbanity, has much more of the natural than the acquired in its composition. A good, sound, and unembarrassed mind, accompanied with discretion, which is gentle without meanness, and is disposed by genius and inclination to conform to every thing that is not contrary to reason, to which dispositions there is annexed a clear understanding, or native prudence, which dictates to a man how he should speak and act, according to the different circumstances and situations in which he finds himself, will, without studying in any school, acquit himself well, and appear agreeable in his commerce with mankind. It is true, that he will be deficient in his knowledge of those forms, modes, and ceremonies, which people study in courts, and which are changed by caprice at every turn; but in the first place, natural advantages, which always are intrinsically valuable, and which will ever operate, will supply upon ordinary occasions, the want of studied forms; and secondly, a modest and candid confession, to those you happen to be in company with, of your ignorance of political forms and ceremonies, on account of your having been born and bred in the provinces where they are not generally practised, will be a sufficient excuse for your transgression of those forms, and even your doing this, will appear better in the eyes of reasonable people, than your observing a strained and scrupulous attention to them.

XXXIII. I have availed myself many times of this resource at court; where I have made no scruple to declare, that I was born and bred in a small country town; and that I early entered myself a member of a religious order, whose principal care it was, to seclude its sons, and especially in their youth, from all commerce with the world. That my genius naturally disposed me to abhor bustle, and avoid great concourses of people; and excepting three years that I was a student at Salamanca, which may not improperly be termed three years of solitude, on account of the heads of our college not permitting their young members to have the least intercourse with secular people; I say excepting these three years, I have lived all the rest of my life, in Galicia and Asturias, which are provinces at a great distance from court; and besides all this, I have a natural dislike to studying ceremonies; but I am aware however, that not only the substance, but the forms of them also, are necessary to political society; although I do not consider that as an important form, which consists of rules that are established to-day, and changed to-morrow, just as whim and caprice dictate; some of which forms, or modes, prevail in one country, and are different in another; but I mean to speak of those forms or modes only, which reason dictates should be observed in all times, and in all places. From the before-named declaration, it may be easily conceived how little I understand of courtly ceremonies; notwithstanding which, with the assistance of the above frank confession, I never found myself the least embarrassed, and I perceived, nothing I said or did appeared disagreeable to those I conversed with, but that rather on the contrary, my natural behaviour seemed pleasing to them.

XXXIV. Men of sublime spirits and elevated understanding, possess a natural privilege to dispense with formalities whenever they think proper; just as musicians of great genius are allowed upon many occasions, to depart from the common rules of their art; their doing which, hardly ever renders the music ungrateful to the ear; so men who are endowed with great talents, and display a manifest superiority in conversation, may dispense with the ordinary and common methods of speaking, without ever offending the ears of their auditors. Natural advantages shine forth with a greater lustre, and are more solid, and more pleasing than borrowed acquisitions. Thus the world are well satisfied, to accept the first in the room of the last, and look upon themselves as over-paid for the loss of the one, by the introduction of the other in its stead.

XXXV. I was even about to say, that the establishment of ceremonies of urbanity, was only calculated for people of middling or inferior geniuses, and was meant as a succedaneum for a discretion so superior to that which the others we have mentioned possess, as to be capable of dictating of itself, the rule of deportment one man should observe to another. I believe it happens in this, with very little difference, the same that it happens in all material movements. There are men, who naturally and without any teaching, have a grace and air in all their actions, in the motions of their hands, and their feet, in the bending their bodies, and inclining their heads, in the casting downwards and lifting up their eyes, and in whom in every motion and gesture, all is done with such a native grace, that it enamours those who behold them; and is that sort of excellence, which is described by Tibullus to have been possessed by Sulpicia:

_Illam quid quid agit, quoquo vestigia flectit,_
_Componit furtim, subsequiturque decor._

I should consider it as very useless and unnecessary, to prescribe rules for the carriage and actions of such sort of people. Let precepts be kept for the use of those who are naturally aukward, and let them be tried to see whether by art, they can mend this defect of nature.

XXXVI. It is only with respect to two sorts of people, that no body is allowed to be exempt from observing ceremony, and they are princes and women. The first, from time immemorial, have instituted ceremonies as essential appendages to majesty. The second, from education and habit, have been taught, and accustomed to regard as the substance, what in reality is an accidental or visionary entity, and even to prefer this visionary or accidental entity, to the substance itself. Thus they are apt to disesteem the most discreet and agreeable man in the world, and to give the preference to one of much inferior talents, because he is well instructed in fashionable formalities, and is a strict observer of them. I except from this number, the women of superior abilities, who know as well as any body, how to distinguish, and do justice to true merit.

SECT. VII.

XXXVII. Whether this native grace is an integrant part of, or an ornament to that urbanity, which seasons and adorns men’s words and actions, it is certain, that study and art can never supply the defect of it.

XXXVIII. This is that sort of perfection, which Plutarch extols in Agesilaus, and by the help of which, he observes, that although he was but a little man, and his figure rather contemptible, he in his old age, appeared more amiable and engaging, than any of the handsome young fellows. _Dicitur autem pusillus fuisse, et specie aspernanda; cæterum hilaritas ejus omnibus horis, et urbanitas aliena ab omni, vel vocis, vel vultus morositate, et acerbitate, amabiliorem eum ad senectutem usque præbuit omnibus formosis._

XXXIX. This is that species of seasoning of which Quintilian speaks, when he says, that it makes the same sentence seem to come better from the mouth of one man than another: _Inest proprius quibusdam decor in habitu, atque vultu, ut eadem illa minus, dicente alio, videantur urbana esse._

XL. This is that kind of ornament, which Cicero called the colour, or blazon of urbanity, and instances Brutus, as one who was tinged with it in great perfection, but when he came to explain or describe this blazon, he defined it to have consisted of a mysterious _je ne scai quoi_. These are his words, taken from his dialogue _De claris Oratoribus: et Brutus, quis est, inquit, tandem urbanitatis color? Nescio, inquam, tantum esse quendam scio._ Which last expression, I am obliged to decipher by the sentence _Je ne scai quoi_, as I can find no other that is equivalent to it. This native grace, or if you please to call it by the figurative name Cicero has expressed it by, this colouring of urbanity, is composed of many particulars. For example, the neatness of the articulation, the good tone, and the harmonious flexibility of the voice, the graceful attitude of the body, the well regulated movements of the action, the amiable modesty of the carriage or manner, and the striking or lively expression of the eyes, are the parts, which constitute the whole of this grace.

XLI. It is easy to perceive, that all the before-mentioned are gifts of nature; which can never be acquired by study, or supplied by instruction. Many people have hoped to succeed, by attempting to imitate those, in whom these natural gifts are resplendent, or to speak more properly, are a part of their nature; but the very means they employ to give themselves a pleasing and agreeable air, cause them to appear ridiculous. That which is a grace in the original, has often an apish look in the copy. The imitation of natural endowments, seldom amounts to more, than a contemptible mock semblance of them. The affectation in these attempts is glaring and palpable, and all affectation is surfeiting.

XLII. I shall only state two limitations, or exceptions, to the possibility of acquiring those parts of gracefulness, which consist in the position of the body, and the motion of its members; and shall admit in the first place, that these may in some measure be acquired by imitation; but when? why when people do not think of acquiring them, and are not sensible that they do acquire them; that is in their infant state. It is then that nature is so pliant and flexible, that like soft wax, it may be easily molded to any shape, and made to receive any impression; and hence it is, that we frequently see children in their ordinary actions and motions, greatly resemble their parents.

XLIII. In Galicia where I was born, there are many people who understand Spanish perfectly well, who speak it in a drawling sort of a way, and by leaving out now and then a letter, are apt to lose the exact and proper pronunciation. Many have attributed this defect, to the imperfect organization of the tongues of the people of Galicia, produced by the influence of the climate; but it is no such thing, for this vicious pronunciation, is derived from the bad habit of speaking they contract in their infancy; and it is evident that it proceeds from thence, because many Galician children who have been carried from home when they were very young, and have been afterwards brought up and educated at Castile, some of whom I have seen, pronounce the Castilian language with as much clearness and readiness, as the natives of that province themselves. It is not many years ago, that there was a celebrated actress, who was born in a small village in Galicia, and who was carried to court by her uncle at four years old, and was there trained up to the stage, and who was greatly admired for her neat and ready pronunciation.

XLIV. The second limitation and exception I admit to the position I have advanced, is, that both a vicious pronunciation, and an aukwardness of motion and manner, may be greatly corrected and amended, even after people are grown to a state of maturity, and especially when these defects proceed from bad habits contracted in their youth. But in order to accomplish this, there is need of great perseverance and application. Even an inveterate bad habit, may be torn up by the roots by applying vast force and exertion to eradicate it; but when the fibres of the root, are inserted into the profundities of nature, all endeavours are vain.

SECT. VIII.

XLV. Although Urbanity, with respect to the most brilliant and beautiful parts of it, which we describe by the term gracefulness, as we have before observed, depends very little upon study or instruction, still in all its substantial and essential parts, it admits of precepts and rules; so that any man who has been taught, or has made himself acquainted with them, may perfectly understand in what this appearance of Urbanity consists.

XLVI. People very frequently, and in many ways offend against the laws of Urbanity; and I have seen those, who have had a reasonable good education, who have notwithstanding that, been frequently guilty of offending against the rules of good-breeding. All those imperfections, are the very reverse of Urbanity, which tend to make people disagreeable in their conversation, and when in company with other men troublesome or disgusting in their behaviour; and this explanation, suits well with the definition we at first gave of Urbanity. But which are these imperfections? To this I shall answer, that they are many, and that I will proceed to point some of the most striking ones out, which I apprehend will be the most instructive part of this essay, as enumerating the most glaring imperfections that tend to make people disagreeable and troublesome in conversation, will have the same effect, as prescribing rules that should be observed, to render their company pleasing and desirable to society. As I proceed, the reader may accompany me, and examine his political conscience as we go on, in order to discover whether any of the faults or failings I point out, are applicable to himself.

SECT. IX.

_Loquacity._

XLVII. I consider talkative people as a sort of tyrants of conversation; for according to my opinion, who admit of a limited species of reason in brutes, talking is a faculty more peculiar to man than reasoning; and engrossing all the conversation to a man’s self is a most arbitrary proceeding. He who is always desirous of being heard, and is impatient of attending to any one else, usurps a privilege to himself, which should be enjoyed in general by all mankind, as a prerogative proper to their being. But what fruit can be gathered from his torrent of words? None, except the tiring and disgusting his hearers may be called a fruit, who after they are rid of him, make amends for the silence he had imposed on them, by speaking of him with derision and contempt. No time is worse employed, than that which is consumed in hearing talkative people; who are generally men without discretion or reflection, for if they had any, they would be more reserved and keep within reasonable bounds, in order to avoid making themselves contemptible; and if they want reflection, they must want judgement also, and how can he who wants judgement talk with propriety? Or what benefit can result to those who listen to an extravagant prating man, except that of his affording them an opportunity for the meritorious exercise of their patience? Thus what Theocritus said of the verbose fluency of Anaximenes, may be applied to all talkative people; that he considered them as a luxuriant river of words, in the whole stock of whose waters, you could not find one drop of understanding: _Verborum flumen, mentis gutta._

XLVIII. What flows from such tongues, may be compared to vomitings of the soul; or to the sickly discharges from an unsound mind, which throws up before it has digested them, all the mental species or aliment it has received. They would have that pass for a faculty or power of explaining themselves, which in reality is nothing more than the want of a retentive faculty, or the power of keeping down what is in them. I would describe this malady, by calling it a relaxation of the rational faculty; whereas others might be apt to say, that is not the case, for the species are thrown up, for want of space to contain them in the part destined for their reception.

XLIX. Let no man plume himself too much, upon his being well attended to or applauded when he first begins to speak in public; for this may be a favourable tempting breeze, that may encourage him to loose the sails of loquacity; but although it may be a favourable and a tempting one, it may be a breeze of but short duration. Conversation is the food of the soul, but the cravings of the soul, are as various, as delicate, and as capricious as those of the body. The most noble diet persisted in for too long a time, becomes satiating, and loathsome. Thus the oratory of him, who for a certain space shall be listened to with pleasure by his hearers, may become tiresome to them after a while, and they would not attend to what he said, if he persisted in talking too long. The planets a man should consult the aspect of, to know when he should enter deep, or go but a little way into the gulph of conversation, are the eyes of his auditors; their pleasing serenity, or lowering appearances, should be the signs, that should either encourage him to spread all the sails of rhetoric and make great way; or else should warn him of the hazard and risque of proceeding any further, and that for the present it would be most prudent for him to lay-by, and wait a more safe and favourable opportunity to pursue his course.

L. But even these appearances may be fallacious and deceiving, and more especially to persons of high rank and authority; for the dependants of such, not only flatter them with their tongues, but with their eyes also. Why should I confine their adulation to the expressions of their tongues and their eyes, when they convert their whole bodies, and every limb and member of them, to instruments of delusion and flattery? for with certain fawning movements, and certain mysterious gestures of complaisance and admiration, they attend to and applaud all that is said or done by a man in power, on whom they are in any shape depending. He at the same time, big with his own cleverness, and his chops watering with approbation of himself, with the drivel running out at both corners of his mouth, vents his oratory, and talks whatever comes uppermost, be it good or bad, in a full persuasion, that the words of Apollo of Delphos were never listened to with more attention, or more respect. But, unhappy man, how do you deceive yourself! for you tire every body, and you disgust every body; and, the worst is, that those who had been just listening to you with such seeming applause, as soon as your back is turned, to relieve themselves from the pain the forced tribute of their adulation to you gave them, vent themselves in repeated bursts of laughter and derision at your folly. Great people may believe what I say, and be convinced that this is the way of the world; and they may also believe me when I tell them, that power in the hands of a weak man, only tends to make him appear more ridiculous; and that in the hands of a discreet one, if he is not extremely so, it tends in a great measure to cast a blemish on his understanding.

SECT. X.

_Lying._

LI. What can be more obnoxious to urbanity than lying? What man of understanding is there whom it does not offend? Or to whom is it not disgusting? and how can deceit cease to be injurious? All the utility, all the delight that can be obtained by conversation, is destroyed by a lie. If he, with whom I converse, tells me lies, of what service will the information I receive from him be to me? for if I do not believe him, all he says will only tend to irritate me; and if I do, to fill me with errors. If I am not assured he tells me truth, what satisfaction can I have in attending to him? For his conversation, so far from affording me entertainment or instruction, will set my mind on the rack, and cause me to waver, and continue in a painful state of doubt, and also perplex me, to find out reasons for believing or disbelieving what he has told me.

LII. Conversation is a species of traffic, in which mankind exchange informations and ideas with each other; and what better name can we give to him, than that of a cheat and a deceiver, who in this commerce, passes false informations and ideas for true ones; and ought we not also to treat him as a prevaricator, who is unworthy of being admitted into human society?

LIII. I have always been amazed at, and have always condemned, the indulgence and toleration that lying people find in the world. I have already exclaimed against this practice in my Essay on the Impurity of Lying, and must beg leave to refer the reader thither for a more full discussion of the point; but it has occurred to me since I wrote that Essay, that it is probable, this toleration may have arisen from the great extension of the vice of lying; and that the number of those who find themselves interested in this indulgence, is much greater, than that of those who find themselves injured by it; and that perhaps they tolerate lying in one another, because the toleration is necessary and useful to both parties. If the sincere part of the world consists of but few people, they cannot, without being guilty of great rashness, attempt to wage war against the many; but they at least may remonstrate, and with temper complain of the disgust they receive, from the indulgence that is shewn to lying. I ingenuously confess for myself, that I look upon him as a man of but little sincerity, who hears a lie with much seeming composure, and without expressing any signs of his dislike of it; although I must confess at the time I say this, that a frank manifestation of our dislike of the practice, cannot so easily be shewn, unless it is to our equals or our inferiors.

LIV. There is a species of lie, that passes in the world for humour and pleasantry, which I would punish as a crime. Whenever there happens to be a person in company who is noted for being an exceeding credulous man, it frequently happens, that some one or other tells a very incredible story, for the sake of exposing the easy faith of such a person, and of shewing, how apt he is to swallow absurdities and improbabilities for truth. This is received as a piece of wit, and all the by-standers laugh and applaud the ingenuity and invention of him who told the lie, and they all regale themselves at the expence of the innocent credulous person. But I consider this as an abuse; for does the simple and easy credulity of any person give others a right to insult him? admitting that his excessive credulity proceeds from the scantiness of his understanding; are we peradventure only obliged to be civil to, and treat with urbanity, the discreet and the acute? If God has blessed you with more talents than another man, would it not be an insolent abuse of them, if you made that person an object of your scorn, and played upon him, and treated him with the same derision and contempt that you would treat a monkey? Would this be using him like your neighbour? Or would it be applying your talents to the end and purpose, for which God was pleased to endow you with them?

LV. But the truth is, that excessive credulity proceeds more from goodness of heart, than from want of discretion. I have seen men who were very simple, and at the same time very penetrating. The same rectitude of heart, which excites a man of simplicity of manners to conduct himself without deceit, inclines him to think, that other people conduct themselves upon the same principle. It often happens, that a lie is believed by one person because he is an ingenuous man; and discredited by another, because he is a simpleton. The case is, that the first, excited by the goodness of his disposition, sets himself about finding out grounds of probability for what he has heard, and by his penetration discovers such. The other, who is only influenced by the dictates of his malice, never seeks after any such thing; and although he should seek after it, his stupidity would not permit him to discover it.