Chapter VI: Part 6

XXX. But after all, this assurance contains in it a large portion of hyperbole; for I firmly believe, the majority of the princes of this day, are scrupulous about breaking the treaties they have entered into; although it be true, that at every turn, you will hear them reciprocally accusing each other of being the infringers of them; but it seldom happens, that either of the parties can so clearly make out the justice of his cause, as not to leave room for a difference of opinion on the subject. Thus they both go upon probabilities, and also upon the strength of probabilities, accuse each other. If either of them happens to be a person of so enlarged a conscience, as knowingly, and without scruple, to trample on all the obligations of equity, justice, and public faith, he endeavours notwithstanding to save appearances, and to seek some specious pretence for his behaviour. This shews, that he is ashamed of what he does, and would gladly hide the odium of his actions for fear of being pointed at, which would not happen, if breaking their words was so common among princes, and so little scrupled by them, as some would persuade us.

XXXI. I know very well, that an anonymous French author, asserted a few years ago, that Don Ferdinand the Catholic, being told that Louis the twelfth of France complained he had twice deceived him, replied, _By the Lord! the French man lies, for it was not twice, but ten times that I deceived him._ If such a thing ever happened, we may suppose, that our Don Ferdinand prided himself in perfidy. But these are mere gossips tales, and such as prudent people pay no regard to. I suppose, that before this joke or tale, could arrive at the ears of the French man who wrote it, from the mouth of Don Ferdinand, it must necessarily pass through the mouths of a hundred different people; and we may conclude, that out of that hundred, at least ninety of them were more capable of framing it, than Don Ferdinand was of uttering it.

XXXII. But admitting this was true, all that can be inferred from it is, that among a great number of princes of our times, here and there one of them, has without shame or blushing, practised lying and deceit in the affairs of state; whereas among the antients, this was very frequent and common; for all, or nearly all of them, seem to have stamped on their hearts, that sentence of Chorebus: _Dolus, an virtus, qius in hoste requirat?_ or some other like it.

SECT. IX.

XXXIII. But our surprize will cease at their acting in this manner, when we reflect, that that great philosopher and oracle of antiquity, the divine Plato, by his doctrine, taught, that it was lawful for those who had the management of public affairs, to lye, whenever it could be of use to the interests of the state. _Igitur rempublicam administrantibus præcipue, si quibus aliis, mentiri licet, vel hostium, vel civium, causa ad communem civitatis utilitatem. Reliquis autem à mendacio abstinendum est._ (lib. III. de Repub.) If the princes of antiquity had so able a master, and one of so great authority, what loss could they be at for want of a Machiavel?

XXXIV. It is true, that Plato only allowed lying to be lawful, in cases where it might be conducive to advance the public good; Machiavel advises it, whenever it can be useful to serve the particular interests of a tyrant. Thus Plato was a bad moralist, and Machiavel a bad man. But this difference in the character of the matters, does not prevent tyrants from making the same use of the doctrine of Plato, for the purpose of serving their particular conveniencies, that disinterested princes may do for the good of the public, because a tyrant, always endeavours to make the people believe, that every thing he does to advance his own grandeur, is transacted with a view of promoting their interest; and if at any time he is detected in a lye, he will pretend that he lyed for the public good, and quote the doctrine of Plato to justify his conduct; but in case this doctrine of Plato’s should appear too limited or confined for tyrants, as in truth it is, they may be supplied with a much more copious and enlarged system, in the writings of Plato’s disciple Aristotle.

XXXV. I do not mean to say, that Aristotle was an abettor of perverse policy, or that he wrote with a design of instructing tyrants in the methods by which they might make themselves absolute, and support themselves by tyrannic rule, but only mean to declare, that in the fifth book of his Politics, cap. 11. he did it without intending it, or without being aware that he was doing it. In this chapter, which is a pretty long one, not only those two famous maxims, _Oderint dum metuant, Divide ut imperes_, are exactly pointed out and applied; but all, or very near all the others, which are published by the Florentine author, in his book intitled Il Principe, are to be found in this chapter of Aristotle’s. I have never seen Machiavel’s book, but only the capital maxims of it, as they are cited by other authors; but hear Hermanus Conringius, who has read both that and Aristotle. He says, Nicholas Machiavel, that trumpeter of political arts, cannot, nor does not, teach his prince any arcana or secrets, for promoting or maintaining tyrannic dominion, which many hundred years before, had not been taught by Aristotle in his fifth book of Politics; and it is not improbable, but that cunning teacher and promoter of wickedness, transcribed from Aristotle, although he concealed the plagiary, all that he published in his own book; but there is a remarkable difference in the application the two masters make of their doctrine, which is, that Machiavel advises all princes without distinction, to pursue and practise what he teaches; whereas Aristotle declared more justly and frankly, his to be fit and necessary for tyrants only. (Conring. Introduct. ad Politic. Aristotelis, cap. III.)

XXXVI. But let the truth prevail. I say the same of both Aristotle and Machiavel, which is, that neither of them were the inventors of systems of perverse policy; for that they copied them, from the actions of the kings of Persia and Egypt; from the Archelaus’s and Philips of Macedon; from the Phalaris’s, the Agathocles’s, the Hierones, and Dionysius’s of Sicily; from the Perianders, from the Pisistratus’s, and other political pests of Greece.

SECT. X.

XXXVII. Nor can I perceive such profundity or acuteness, in these so much applauded maxims, either of Aristotle, or Machiavel, as may render it worth the while of a politician of special perspicuity, to bestow much time in reading or studying them; as a moderate understanding, without their help, will enable a man to acquire all they teach; nor is there any thing necessary to carry them into execution, but a hardened and a perverted heart.

XXXVIII. The maxim, that a tyrant must be supported by making himself feared, and not trust to the love of his subjects, is as clear as day-light; for how can those, whom he is continually oppressing with a hard slavery, have any love for him? And it follows of course, that he must treat them as he would enemies, and endeavour to keep them poor, as every one knows, that the more you impoverish your enemy, the more you deprive him of the means of injuring you.

XXXIX. It is also an immediate consequence deducible from the same principle, that it will be proper for him to put more confidence in strangers, than his own subjects; for who but a stupid person, would confide in one, who he knows is fired with indignation against him? The necessity of keeping a number of emissaries in such a situation, to inform him of the words and actions of those whom he suspects are not his friends, would occur to every rustic, and is what is daily practised by rustics in their way; for if one of these suspects any man to be his enemy, he is continually observing his conduct, watching his motions, and as far as he is able, prying into his designs. The advantages of religious and virtuous appearances, to command respect, are manifest to every young girl; and the art of fomenting discords, and encouraging opposite factions in a state, in order to preserve the balance of power equal between them, may be learned from the tumblers and rope-dancers, who support themselves, by keeping the weights at the opposite ends of their poles in equilibrio.

XL. It was said of Catherine of Medicis, who with the nicest caution, and greatest vigilance, continued to put this contrivance in practice for a long time, that she studied Machiavel every day, and that she had always his book in her hand, or else laying by her, which occasioned a satyrical writer to call it the New Testament of the queen; but perhaps this was said of her, on account of her being obliged to have recourse to the before-named arts. But in order to do this, what necessity was there for her having such a master at her elbow? The posture and situation of affairs, pointed out sufficiently to a person of the abilities and penetration of that queen, the utility of dispensing some favours to the heretics, and by conciliating their good-will, causing their weight to serve as a counterpoize to the power of the catholics, of whom she was jealous and apprehensive, but always taking care at the same time to declare and profess, that in point of faith she was a catholic, to prevent the affections of that party from being weaned and estranged from her.

XLI. There have not been wanting those, who have attributed the same policy to Constantine the Great, who, at the same time that he was favouring Christianity, kept Gentiles in his ministry, and filled posts of importance with them. But this we should suppose was an act of necessity, because it was incumbent on him to proceed with caution, in so great and arduous a work, as that of the conversion of the whole Roman empire. If he had endeavoured to beat down Paganism at a blow, and by open force and violence, he might possibly never have been able to accomplished it.

SECT. XI.

XLII. I say the same, of all the other rules of practices of tyrannic and deceitful policy. What ability or penetration does it require, to invade with an armed force, the territories of a neighbouring prince or republic, and surprize some of the fortified towns of those, who thinking themselves secure, and relying upon the faith of an established peace, are off their guard, and not prepared to resist the attack? To accomplish this, requires nothing more, than for a man to become compleatly callous to the fear of God, and to have lost all sense of shame of the world. To find a plausible pretence for doing it, is the most easy thing imaginable, for a child of ten years old, is never at a loss for such a one, whenever he is disposed from motives of interest, or through fickleness, to break a little friendship or connexion he has engaged in.

XLIII. The barbarous maxim, of getting rid of brothers or relations, to remove the most dangerous apprehensions of, or incitements to, insurrections, does not require ingenuity to execute it, but cruelty only. We see the Ottoman emperors have practised it in a variety of ways; some have taken away the lives of their brothers and relations, others have deprived them of sight, and others of liberty, by shutting them up in close confinement. They were all equally apprized of the importance of preventing the danger, but they were not all equally fierce and cruel. Thus in proportion to the degrees of their barbarity, or their fears, their rigour in the practice of the maxim, was greater or less. Mahomed the third, when he mounted the throne, not satisfied with putting to death his whole twenty-one brothers, ordered ten Sultanas, likewise, who were then pregnant, to be thrown into the sea and drowned; whereas others, have contented themselves with confining those who were related to them in a prison, with reasonable accommodations appertaining to it. This great difference in their conduct, did not proceed from their distinct political ideas, but from the diversity of their tempers and dispositions.

XLIV. As we are now treating on this subject, this seems a proper occasion, for taking notice of a common error and opinion, which prevails among many people with respect to the Ottoman emperors, viz. that the bloody maxim of sacrificing their own brothers to their safety, in order to their possessing the throne in security, is peculiar to the Ottoman race. This barbarous and atrocious policy, is much more ancient than the stock of Ottoman princes, and was more generally practised by other royal families than by them. Plutarch, speaking of those kings who were the successors of Alexander, and among whom the vast conquests of that hero were divided, says, that cruel maxim was so universally adopted by their descendants, that they considered it as an invariable political axiom, and as a self-evident first principle, indispensably necessary to be adhered to, and which followed of course, with as much certainty as geometrical postulata. _Fratrum parricidia, ut petitiones geometræ fumunt, sic concedebantur, habitanturque, communis quædam petitio ad securitatem, & Regia._ Plutarch. in Demetrio.

XLV. I do not know whether the soil and climate of Asia is not more naturally adapted for the production of these political monsters, than that of Europe, for we have seen in all times, the princes of the Asiatic regions, more addicted to pursue tyrannic and cruel maxims than those of Europe. By confining one’s attention immediately to the present times, what appears to me is, that the Europeans, who for the most part have some knowledge of Machiavel, commonly found their governments upon principles of justice and moderation; and that the oriental people, who do not know that there ever was such a man as Machiavel in the world, most frequently, practise the very same perverse maxims, which this master of wickedness taught; and I think the Chinese, are the only orientals who are an exception to this general rule.

SECT. XII.

XLVI. I would not have it understood by what I have said, that I think the reading of Machiavel would not be pernicious; for it would without doubt be so to many, and especially if their dispositions incline them to the side of ambition. There have been, and ever will be, an infinite number of tyrants, who never heard of, or read Machiavel’s book, intituled The Prince; but that book may probably have made tyrants of many, who never would have been such without perusing it; and it would have the same effect in the hands of a weak prince, that the mouth of an evil counsellor would have applied to his ear.

XLVII. One of the most atrocious and treacherous acts ever recorded in history, and one that has made the greatest noise in the world, was, the unworthy putting to death of the great Pompey, which was occasioned intirely, by young Ptolemy who was then king of Egypt, having at the time it was committed, a Machiavel by his side, in the person of the depraved Theodotus.

XLVIII. Pompey, after being routed in the battle of Pharsalia, and becoming a fugitive from Cæsar and his fortune, thought no asylum could be more convenient and safe for him, than the kingdom of Egypt; because the prince who then reigned there, was indebted to him, for the great favour of having reinstated his father on that throne, from whence he had been cast down by his own subjects. On the confidence of this service, he steered for Alexandria, and upon entering the port, sent to inform the king of his arrival, and beg that protection from him, which he had so just a right to demand. The king summoned a council to deliberate on the matter, in which the majority of votes, were for doing what was honourable and right, and gave it as their opinion, that the unfortunate hero should be entertained and protected. But Theodotus, who had got the ascendency over the young king, and who had more influence with him than every body else, suggested to him, that he should not only not grant Pompey his protection, but that he should take away his life also.

XLIX. But let us hear from Lucan, the reasons of convenience, on which that depraved politician grounded his advice for perpetrating so horrid and atrocious an act of treachery, in order, that by comparing them with those of Machiavel, we may discern, whether the principles of the Florentine master were well understood in those times. But it is proper to observe, that Lucan makes the eunuch Photinus the author of the advice, instead of Theodotus; whereas other writers do not make Photinus the adviser, but assisted by the general Aquilas, the executor of the wickedness; and some others again, attribute to this last, a great part, if not the whole of the suggestion.

L. But whether Theodotus, Aquilas, or Photinus, was the first who suggested the treacherous cruelty, is not material to the main question. The arguments used with Ptolemy, to incite him to the deed, were as follow: That great as his father’s obligations were to Pompey, he ought to consider, that he owed more to himself than he did to him; that Fortune had declared itself in favour of Cæsar, and against Pompey, and that it would be the height of imprudence to take part with that side, to whom Fortune was averse; that although it was true, the affording Pompey an asylum had the appearance of an honest action, still, princes ought not to attend to what was honest, but to what was useful; that the monarch, who is desirous of confining his operations within the limits of justice, is more a slave of the laws, than a master of his dominions; that the supreme power is paramount to all law, nor can it acknowledge any subjection; that it was beyond a doubt, the affording Pompey protection in his kingdom, would soon bring on him, the invincible arms of Cæsar, and the power of the whole Roman empire; against which attack, he would be unable to make the slightest resistance; that he already, as far as his ability went, had complied with his obligations to Pompey, by wishing that he might be victorious; but now that Cæsar had won the day, he ought to attach himself to die conqueror, and endeavour to court his favour, by taking away the life of Pompey; that pursuing the medium, of neither receiving nor destroying him, would be the worst resolution they could take, for that by such a determination, they would lose the useful, without attaining the honest; that Cæsar would always look upon him as an enemy, who having had it in his power, should neglect to destroy his rival, although all the rest of the world should regard him as ungrateful, for refusing to protect his benefactor. It was also suggested, that it would not be difficult to assign a religious motive for destroying Pompey, and to cover the cruelty of the action under that pretence; for it might be alledged, that he was sacrificed to the goddess of Fortune, who had already declared herself adverse to the unhappy hero; that this sacrifice seemed not only to be dictated by religion, but justice also; for that protecting Pompey under such circumstances, in the kingdom of Egypt, and in the manner he wished, would infallibly, by provoking the indignation of Cæsar, bring on it ruin and desolation, and that he ought therefore to be proceeded against with fire and sword, as against an avowed enemy of the state.

LI. I ask now, if Nicholas Machiavel, placed at the ear of the king of Egypt in that conjuncture, and under the like circumstances, could have said more? Thus there always were Machiavels, and they were always pernicious and did mischief, when concerned in the administration of public affairs, not only to the people at large, but most commonly to the princes themselves, whose exaltation or security they endeavoured to promote, by the practice and adoption of impious and cruel maxims.

LII. I believe, that although all who read the relation we have just been discussing, will abominate the advice of Theodotus, as base, tyrannical, violent, inhuman, and atrocious; there are many of those who attend to nothing but temporal convenience, will think it salutary; but observe, that instead of this, it was extremely hurtful and injurious. They perpetrated the murder of the great Pompey, by adding to the act of cruelty, another of treachery, which was coaxing him to come ashore, by an assurance, that the king had engaged his royal word that his life should be safe. What was the result of all this? That Ptolemy obtained the hoped for friendship of Cæsar? That Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, were rewarded for the great service they had done him, by freeing him for ever from the apprehension of so formidable an enemy as Pompey? No, nothing of this sort fell out in consequence of the base act; but it happened, that in a few days after, Ptolemy in a most tragical manner, lost his kingdom and his life, and that the three authors and executors of the murder of Pompey, Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, died miserably; which consequences are produced, either by impious maxims tending naturally to bring on misfortunes, or by the interposition of the Supreme Providence, which superintends and watches over human affairs, and with an especial design, fulminates his wrath on the authors of such wickedness, in a manner, that serves to make them scarecrows to terrify, as well as examples to warn others.

SECT. XIII.

LIII. I am fully persuaded, that if the case on which the council of king Ptolemy deliberated, had been referred to the politicians of our Europe, and in our age, that not one of them would have advised the putting to death of Pompey; but it is likely there would have been very few of them so generous, as to recommend the receiving and protecting him. In truth, although not only generous, but hazardous resolutions, may be appendages to the punctilios of princes, and may spring from that source, they are very rarely suggested to them by their counsellors. Thus, if a point of this sort was to be discussed by the council of a king now-a-days, the consideration of the danger of protecting Pompey on the one hand, and the scandal of sacrificing him to the resentment of Cæsar on the other, would most probably have determined them to pursue the middle way, of neither entertaining nor injuring him, and would have left to his own election, the choice of another asylum, and to his fortune, the good or bad exit from his troubles; nor do I doubt but that in the court of Ptolemy there were some, and possibly the major part, of this opinion. Notwithstanding this, if I had been a member of that council, I should have given my vote for the most benign, not only as the most honest, but the most useful and beneficial resolve they could have fallen upon; and I even think, it would have had great weight with the king, if any one of those who assisted at it, had recommended to him the protection of Pompey, for the reasons, supported with some such arguments as follow, which altogether I shall call

A declamation on behalf of Pompey.

LIV. Whoever tells you, sir, that from an apprehension of Cæsar, you should destroy Pompey, would persuade you to fear men more than the gods. I will suppose Cæsar to be so unjust, as to be capable of thanking you for putting Pompey to death, and of being irritated against you for not doing it. This same act of flattery to Cæsar, is so palpable an offence against heaven, that he who advises you to it, cannot possibly entertain a doubt of its being such; for if he should tell you, that by such a conduct you would conform to the will of the gods, who have declared themselves favourable to Cæsar, he would advance a sophistry unworthy to be heard in so august and solemn an assembly; for what delirium is it to imagine, that we may continue to oppress those, who groan under the weight of adverse fortune, upon a pretence, of co-operating with the Supreme Providence? According to this mode of reasoning, it would be right to give a sick man poison instead of medicine, instead of binding up the sores of the wounded, to cut and stab him afresh, and instead of succouring the poor, to take from him the little he has. The gods are able to make people unhappy, for this is a prerogative annexed to their sovereign power, which they sometimes exert, by way of exercising the patience and constancy of those they afflict, and with a view of affording to others an opportunity of manifesting their clemency, and of administering to the misfortunes of the distressed. Thus he who lends a compassionate hand to assist those whom the gods have thought fit to make unhappy, does not counteract their dispensations, but rather shews a compliance with, and an obedience to, the immutable principles of their laws.

LV. To insinuate to you, in order to make Pompey a delinquent, that by seeking an asylum here, he sought the ruin of your kingdom, amounts to the same thing, as saying he meditates burning the temple, who from the fury of his enemies, takes refuge at the altars of it. Pompey does not pretend to compel, but only intreats you; neither, in his intreaty, does he point out the bounds to which you should extend your protection to him; nor although he should point them out, could any consequences be deduced from thence to your disadvantage; for that cannot take away from you, neither now, nor at any time after he shall have put himself into your hands, the right of deliberating upon, and after a just estimation of your power, your obligation, and your risk, of determining to act by him, as the urgency of your affairs may make it necessary. Furthermore, if you reflect, you will find that he has a right to demand your protection, although it may be dangerous for you to afford it him. You owe to him the sceptre you now sway, which he restored to your father; nor is the probable hazard of the same crown, which was certainly restored to you, an adequate recompence to the man who restored it.

LVI. Having hitherto endeavoured to shew, that it would be just and right to protect Pompey; my next argument shall be to prove, that it would be convenient and advantageous also; although I am very well aware, that in the eyes of an ordinary politician, this will appear an extravagant paradox.

LVII. I shall begin with asking, what opinion ought we to entertain of Cæsar, to think that he would look with benign eyes, and a grateful heart, on a horrible act of perfidy, although it was committed to disincumber him of that enemy, who has already disputed, and may perhaps contend again with him for the empire? It seems to me, sir, that this is the light in which it is laboured to represent Cæsar to you; but if he truly is not such a sort of man, the treachery which Theodotus proposes to you, will be very useless; but I will add, that although he is that sort of man, you will not avoid, but rather augment the danger of losing your crown, by being guilty of it. If Cæsar is blinded by the passion of ambition to such an extreme degree, that it would excite him, for the sake of gratifying it, to trample every sort of duty and obligation under foot; this vile piece of service, will not exempt or protect you from his despoiling you of your kingdom; his ambition, if this is his only idol, will prompt him to extend his dominion by all possible ways and means, whether just or unjust; and the opulent kingdom of Egypt, is not so contemptible an acquisition, that an ambitious man will forbear to seize it, for the sake of rewarding a perfidious one with its possession.

LVII. The worst is, that by following the advice of Theodotus, you will furnish Cæsar with a specious pretence for usurping your kingdom; and therefore I say, that so far from avoiding the danger of losing it, by adopting his plan, you would increase the risk. That Cæsar is very sagacious and penetrating, is well known to all the world; and although he might be glad to hear that Pompey was put to death; after the deed was executed, he would affect to lament it. He, in appearance at least, would detest the treachery of receiving Pompey into Egypt, under a promise of security upon the royal word, for the purpose of taking away his life. From this equivocal or critical state of Cæsar’s mind, there might be but a short transition to his taking the resolution of depriving you of your crown, and perhaps your life also. He might do it for the sake of gratifying his ambition, and endeavouring to persuade the world, that he was actuated by no other motive than that of punishing the treacherous murderer of Pompey; and although he might foresee, the Romans would never believe that this was his motive; he well knows they would applaud the action, as they idolized Pompey while living, and will adore his memory when dead. Other nations, who on account of their being less penetrating, may not see into the artful policy of Cæsar, will only contemplate in your ruin, a punishment correspondent to your crime, and will admire the heroic justice of Cæsar, who chastised the wicked act, although the commission of it was never so convenient to him. Consider, sir, whether Cæsar will lose so fine an opportunity of flattering the Roman people, of recommending himself to the world for a just man, and of adding to the Imperial crown he is fabricating, the precious gem of this kingdom.

LIX. We know that Cæsar, in all his actions and designs, has proposed to himself Alexander of Macedon as the only example he would wish to imitate. We are informed, that having in a temple of Spain, seen a statue of that hero, it raised in his imagination a contemplation of his glory, and caused him to shed tears of envy. Attend now, sir, to what I am about to say to you. Immediately after Darius was defeated by Alexander in the battle of Arbela, that unhappy king, who was become a fugitive from the conqueror, was treacherously murdered by Bessus the governor of Bactria, who thought by putting him to death, that he should gain the favour of Alexander. But what followed? Why, that Alexander caused him to be arrested, and torn to pieces by his own immediate order as some tell us, or as others say, delivered him to Oxathres the brother of Darius, to be dealt with as he thought proper. Consider, sir, how great an affinity there is between the battles of Arbela and Pharsalia, between the fortunes of Pompey and Darius, and between the genius and tempers of Cæsar and Alexander. How much is it to be dreaded, that if you act by Pompey, as Bessus did by Darius, that Cæsar will do by you, as Alexander did by Bessus? He will find himself precisely in the same circumstances of Alexander, and will, without doubt, be strangely flattered with the idea of imitating him, and especially in an action, which he knows was applauded by all the world. We find ourselves also in the city of Alexandria, which was founded by, and took its name from, Alexander; and even this circumstance, may contribute to augment your danger, because, if ever he should think fit to visit this city, it would revive in his imagination the idea of its founder.

LX. I very well know, that although Cæsar should be the man we have hitherto supposed him, still the protection of Pompey is not free from danger. The Roman legions, in search of this illustrious fugitive, will naturally present themselves to our imagination, destroying with warlike fury, the country that harbours him. But if, in whatever course we pursue, we must unavoidably encounter rocks and quicksands, what does human prudence dictate in such a case? that we should do what’s right and just, and leave the event to the disposal of the gods. It is beyond a doubt, that the power of Cæsar is great; but his fortune is no less dependant on heaven than ours, and the ray of Jupiter pays no more respect to the proud palace, than to the humble cabin. Thus those to whom heaven is most propitious, are likely to be most successful.

LXI. Nor need we depend solely for our security on the special providence of the gods, as we have resources in the ordinary course of human events, and in the common influence of second causes. Cæsar is yet at a great distance, and as he will have much to settle both in Italy and Greece, in order to secure the fruits of his late victory, it will be probably some time before he will find himself at leisure to visit Egypt. During that interval, we may be employed in modeling and disciplining our troops; they are not few in number, and we may add new recruits to them; and to make the Egyptian troops equal to the best in the world, nothing more is necessary, than that they should be properly trained, and be commanded by a good general; because when we had such a one in the person of our famous Sesostris, they conquered and triumphed over the principal regions of Asia, as the ruins of the columns that prince erected, and which time has thrown down, testify. Nobody disputes Pompey’s being, if not the greatest soldier in the world, at least equal to the greatest. His victories have acquired him the epithet of great, which is a title Cæsar never attained. We have then in him, the general we want; nor ought his reputation to be lessened by the victory Cæsar lately obtained over him; for besides his commanding a motley army, collected from, and composed of various nations, he was but little or ill obeyed in that war; and this is an evil, for which we have a remedy in our own power, by committing the whole military government to the discretion and direction of Pompey. If he finds himself not in a condition or situation to attack with a prospect of victory, he will stand on the defensive, and preserve his troops, which is the conduct he wished to have pursued in Greece. We may also hope for many advantages from time; as in the interval of our recess, succours may arrive to Pompey from all the world; for the whole Roman empire, except the troops immediately in his pay, are enemies to Cæsar; and although we should not be able to assemble an army, capable of resisting Cæsar, his success will not be quite certain. The whole Roman republic which commands the world, groans with affliction, under the intolerable sensation, occasioned by the suppression of their liberty; and it would be very extraordinary, if among the millions of people of which it is composed, there should not be found some one desperate enough, to sacrifice his own life, for the sake of redeeming his country. Every man who arrives at despising, or setting no value on his own life, may have that of Cæsar in his power; for one concealed poignard, or one disguised dose of poison administered at his table, would be more dangerous and fatal to him, than fifty thousand lances in the open field. The instances of Romans, who have offered themselves voluntary victims to the idol of fame, or the good of their country, are numerous; and perhaps Cæsar at this time, has some one near his person, waiting for an opportunity to repeat the same sacrifice.

LXII. There remains to us also another crutch of hope whereon to rest, that is, the unwholesomeness of our climate. The air of Ægypt, which is very unsalutary to the natives, is much more so to strangers. The soldiers of Cæsar were born under, and have served in climates, which were very different from ours. How natural then is it to suppose, that by being detained some time in this country, the visitation of an epidemical disorder may either demolish or incapacitate them!

LXIII. If by all, or any of these means, which are very probable ones, you should be enabled to protect and preserve Pompey, you would make yourself, sir, the most glorious prince in the world. The Romans would adore you, as the vindicator and defender of their liberty, and would look upon this kingdom, as the only temple which has afforded sanctuary to, and preserved their idol. Other nations will applaud your generous gratitude, and seeing how faithfully you have behaved to your benefactor, there is no prince whatever, who will not be ready and desirous to render you his services. What you may expect from Pompey, is not in my power to express, nor in my imagination to conceive.

LXIV. But admitting, sir, that these well founded hopes should be frustrated, and that heaven should continue to prosper the arms of Cæsar, that Fortune should regulate the motions of its inconstant wheel, so as that it shall always turn in his favour; that we should see the Roman legions batter down the walls of Alexandria, and afterwards be witnesses to the demolition of those of Memphis, and behold all the other cities of Lower Ægypt in danger of being destroyed; and that in consequence of this, we find ourselves under an absolute necessity of capitulating with Cæsar; which is the greatest difficulty and distress, to which we can be driven by Fortune; but please to observe, sir, that although you should be reduced to this necessity, you would even then find your affairs in a better state, than there is any probability of your finding them, provided you follow the advice that has been given you by Theodotus. Cæsar would require you to deliver up Pompey, and it is most likely would offer you in return, the restitution of all he has conquered; for the whole country that is inundated by the Nile, would be of but little value to him, compared to the possession of a person, who by a thousand accidents, might have it in his power to overturn his whole empire. You might then make this exchange, and remain master of your kingdom, and might justify yourself to all the world, by pleading the hard law of necessity as an excuse for what you did. But what infatuation, what madness would it be, sir, for you to persuade yourself, that it would be right at this time to put Pompey treacherously to death, without more advantage to yourself, than what you might obtain hereafter, by delivering him up without infamy? I have said without more advantage, and I ought to add to it with greater danger. If you commit so base an action, it is probable that Cæsar, either from motives of virtue, or excited to it by hypocrisy, will punish you severely. If you think him generous, you must conclude that he will be extremely irritated against you, both for your cruelty, and your ingratitude, and because you offered him a provoking indignity, by supposing him capable of accepting a treachery for a compliment; and because also, you deprived him of a precious opportunity, of manifesting his clemency to Pompey in distress. If you consider him only as an ambitious and profound politician, you may suppose he will act the same part from motives of dissimulation, that he would have acted from motives of generosity, and to gain credit with the world, would treat you as a delinquent. You will have none of this to apprehend, when, forced to it by necessity, you find yourself obliged to deliver up Pompey, because in this last case, the reasons for treating you in the manner we have just been describing will not exist, and because also it was never known, that Cæsar failed to preserve the faith of his engagements, or that he treated with cruelty, those he had vanquished.

LXV. Nor should we omit, that Cæsar’s good opinion of your personal conduct to Pompey, may co-operate with his virtue, and have an influence on his policy. Cæsar is not ignorant, that you have always been well affected to Pompey and his cause, and when Cæsar finds Pompey has perished by your hands, he will readily conclude, that you would have dealt the same treatment to him, and with a better will, provided the victor had been the vanquished. Consider now, what sort of an opinion Cæsar must entertain of you, when he reflects, that your not committing the same treachery by him, is owing to his fortune, and not your good-will, but that in spite of your malevolent disposition, his fortune has insured his safety.

LXVI. The arguments, sir, with which I have proved, that without attending to the justice of the case, it was more for your interest to protect than to destroy Pompey, will serve to prove, that it will be more beneficial to you to entertain him than to send him away. The sending him away, will not oblige Cæsar, but will offend Pompey, and will also make you appear ungrateful in the eyes of the whole world. Pompey driven from this coast, will become a wanderer by sea and by land, in search of some safe hole or corner, wherein to hide himself, till the desperation of one, or the conspiracy of many, shall deprive Cæsar of his life; and in all probability, it will not be long, before this contingent happens. If this event should fall out, Pompey would then be master in much greater security than he ever was, of all that Cæsar at present enjoys. Consider now, if this should ever be the case, what you would have reason to expect from his hands for driving him out of your kingdom, after he had fixed the crown on the head of your father. Cæsar while he rules, as he is not ignorant that you are disaffected to him, will always consider you as an enemy, who only wants power or resolution to act openly as such. The service of your abandoning Pompey, will not oblige him, and will debase you, for he cannot fail to see clearly, that you did it through fear. His dislike to you will continue, and you will add to it, his contempt and disesteem.

LXVII. Further, if you receive and entertain Pompey benignly, you may in consequence of doing it, give yourself credit to a certain amount, for having both Pompey and Cæsar in some degree under your influence, Pompey, in virtue of having him within your dominions; and Cæsar, because he would be disposed to grant you very advantageous conditions, to prevail on you to deliver Pompey up. But I would not have it understood, that I mean to recommend this, as what you ought to do; for my opinion is, that you should absolutely risk every thing to preserve Pompey, because you owe every thing to him. This is what true virtue dictates; but the predicament we are in at present, is that of consulting and considering, the reasons of state and policy for receiving Pompey with a determination of defending him, and at the same time not to extend that defence so far as to endanger the loss of your kingdom. It is true, this would not be doing enough to entitle you to the applause of the world as a generous man; but it would be sufficient to prevent your being condemned as an unjust one. You would save your honour, and not neglect your interest; and the judgment of heaven, with respect to such a conduct, would coincide with that of the world. Pompey would find himself under great obligations to you: Cæsar might perhaps be irritated against you; but the emotions of his anger, would soon give way to his own convenience, and even to yours. If the gods, as they are able to do, should prosper our arms under the command of Pompey, all the world will respect your person, your virtue, and your power; and in spite of all Cæsar can do, after you have sustained the losses enumerated, which will be sufficient to excuse your conduct in the eye of the world, you will at last, by delivering up Pompey, be able to repair all your damage.

LXVIII. This speech appeared to me proper to introduce here, not only for the entertainment of the reader, but for his benefit and caution also; for having in this discourse set forth so many maxims and examples of tyrannic policy, I was apprehensive, that some people of weak understandings, might persuade themselves, it would be convenient and useful to practise them, if I did not at the same time, together with the poison, administer the antidote, and shew by such an example, that the violent expedients which Machiavelianism proposes as convenient, are in general hurtful and pernicious, or at least insecure and not to be relied on, and that in the very cases in which they are represented to be necessary, there are others that might be hit upon, which would answer the purpose much better, and which would admit of reconciling the useful with the honest, provided there is an upright will to adopt them, and a clear understanding to search out and apply them; so that what they call refined policy, is nothing more than a political dross or scum, and the production of gross geniuses, who do not search deeper than the superficies of things. The Machiavelians, seldom attend to more than the immediate effect of the blow their malice meditates, without reflecting, that the political machine is many times disposed to move in such a variety of directions, that it often runs back on, and crushes him who first set it in motion. I have said before, and I repeat it again, that the instances of perverse politicians who have been happy for any length of time, are very few, and that those few, have seldom been blessed with more than a transient ray of the splendor of fortune; and have been almost all shipwrecked by a sudden change of the wind, when they thought themselves sailing on with a favourable gale, and in the most prosperous manner. What infatuation then is it, to pursue a course, where all the rocks in the track of it, are stained with the blood of unhappy sufferers? Or who, with any reasonable expectation of success, can hope to make his fortune, by following and adopting the maxims of Machiavel, knowing the author of them lived poor and despised, and died miserable and abhorred? Perhaps this impious politician, may not improperly be compared to the unhappy Phlegyas described by Virgil, who was not undeceived, till his being convinced of the delusion he had been under could be of no service to him, and who with bitter expressions of lamentation, and in a hideous tone of voice, proclaimed the error of his detestable maxims, to the whole miserable group of the damned:

_--Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes_
_Admonet, & magna testatur voce per umbras:_
_Discite justitiam, moniti, & non temnere Divos._

AMBITION IN SOVEREIGNS.

SECT. I.

I. The most unjust adoration the world bestows, is that which is given to, and received by conquering Princes, they being only deserving of the public hatred; while living, mankind pay them a forced obedience, and when dead a courteous applause; the first is necessity, the second folly.

II. What is a conqueror but a scourge, which the divine anger has sent among us for our chastisement? What, but an animated pestilence, both to his own kingdom, and those of the Princes his neighbours also; a malignant star, which rules and influences nought but murders, robberies, desolations, and conflagrations; a comet, which equally threatens the destruction of cottages and of palaces; and, to sum up the whole, a man who is the enemy of all other men, because in the prosecution of his ambitious views, he would deprive all mankind of their liberty, and take from many their lives and fortunes?

III. In this, as in many other things, I admire the superior judgment of the Chinese. Isaac Vossius affirms, that in the annals of those people, they do not celebrate warlike, but pacific Princes; neither do they triumph in future ages, or acquire the applauses of posterity, who have by their arms added new dominions to the state, but those who have governed with justice and moderation the territories which descended to them by inheritance. This is applauding with judgment.

IV. I don’t deny, that valour, military skill, and other endowments peculiar to conquerors, are estimable; but only mean to inculcate, that when they are accompanied with a tyrannic use, they cause those who make such an application of them, to become objects of abhorrence and detestation. There never was any man eminent for feats of wickedness, who was not endued with great qualities of body and mind; at least, they are rarely deficient in those of robustness, industry, and bravery: but who, on this account, would employ himself in celebrating, or becoming the panegyrist of malefactors?

V. It is not comparison, but identity, which I mean to propound and enforce; for truly those great heroes, who are so celebrated by the trumpets of fame, were in reality nothing better than malefactors in a high form. If I was to set about writing a catalogue of the most famous rogues who have figured on the theatre of the world, I should place at the head of it, Alexander the Great, and Julius Cæsar.

VI. No one had a juster sense of his situation in this respect, nor made a more candid acknowledgment of his profession and occupation, than Antigonus King of Asia. When he was in the zenith of his conquests, a philosopher dedicated a book to him which he had just finished, the subject-matter of which was, an encomium on the virtue of justice. As soon as Antigonus read the title of the book, he smiled, and said, “It is certainly very _à propos_, to dedicate a treatise in commemoration of the virtue of justice to me, who am robbing all the world of every thing I can.”

VII. And although, neither Alexander, nor Cæsar, ever made so candid a confession, they manifested sufficiently, that they were stung with the remorse, and affected with the bitings of their own consciences. The first, shewed the influence these feelings had over him, in the instance of the temper and forbearance, with which he suffered the pirate who fell into his hands, to upbraid him with being a greater and more scandalous pirate than himself; for if Alexander had not been conscious that the man spoke truth, the consequence of his boldness would have been very terrible to him. The second displayed it, in his perplexities at the crisis of passing the Rubicon; it being most probable, that intrepid soul was not withheld so much by the contemplation of the dangerous undertaking he was going to engage in, as by the sense of the crime he was about to commit.

SECT. II.

VIII. In reality, conquering Princes are so totally bad, that they are not even good to themselves. They are bad neighbours, as is notorious; they are bad to their subjects, who in the end are equal sufferers with the others; because by the excessive contributions that are extorted from them, they are drained of their property, and in the obstinate wars in which their Princes engage, are deprived of their lives. It is true they conquer; but ten battles gained cost more men to a nation than two or three lost. If we were to add to this, the loss incurred in consequence of the neglect and decay of arts, manufactures, commerce, and agriculture; at winding up the bottom you will find, that with the exception of a few military men, who have been exceedingly fortunate and successful, or whose services have been liberally rewarded, and also with that of a few others, who have enriched themselves by plunder, or the spoils of their own country; the conquerors are left in as bad a situation as the vanquished.