Chapter III: Part 3

We shall have to consider how, in future, to preserve for war the character of the war of movement, all the more so since, in the World War, it has only been by the war of movement that we have reaped decisive results. It will, of course, be accompanied by many of the features of entrenched warfare, and, in consequence of the necessity of bringing up and setting in operation the numerous present-day methods of attack, it will be slow. An approximate illustration of this is furnished by the course of the operations in East Prussia and Lithuania and of the Germano-Austro-Hungarian offensive in Galicia and Poland in the summer of 1915, as well as by the campaigns in Serbia, Transylvania, and Roumania; and the rapid progress of operations in these instances furnishes convincing proof that the resolute will of a leader, combined with the valour of his troops, is capable of overcoming those difficulties which the bringing up of their numerous weapons of war entails upon a modern army. For this kind of warfare we ourselves had received just the appropriate training, and we were in fact superior to all the other armies. Such a form of warfare is decisive, and will always remain decisive; the years which we have spent in our trenches do not alter this fact in any way.

That spirit of the offensive which is peculiar to our army we must study to preserve by every means in our power. It has achieved striking results in this War, and has recently once again proved its effectiveness in the summer of 1917 in Eastern Galicia and in the defensive battles in North France and Flanders. But we must not lose sight of the fact that from time to time, at the beginning, a systematic adherence to offensive tactics, even where the situation rendered it more advisable to make full use of the strength which the effectiveness of present-day weapons gives to defensive tactics, cost us a heavy sacrifice. In any case the War has proved that the assertion often made in time of peace that the spade digs the grave of the offensive is not correct. This assertion may be compared with the saying which was current in the Prussian army, to its very great detriment, before the battle of Jena: "Skirmishing encourages the scoundrel in human nature." From the military point of view Goethe is right when he says: "For it is just where ideas are lacking that a phrase is most welcome." Catch-words are always prejudicial in their effect, and most of all so when it is a question of the blood of our sons and brothers. It was not only King Frederick who expressed his sense of the importance of selecting strong positions. Napoleon, the representative of the most uncompromising offensive, told the officers of his engineer-corps in 1806 that in the coming campaign against Prussia he intended that a very great quantity of earth should be shovelled up.[9] And Moltke writes[10]:

"The offensive is by no means merely tactical. A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from a strategic point of view that the opponent is compelled to attack us in them.... A strategical offensive consorts very well with a tactical defence."

It was, it is true, as early as 1865 that the Chief of the General Staff of the Prussian army wrote those words: "But he belonged to the number of those great and rare men in whose case a profound study of theory has almost been a substitute for practice."[11] Thus Königgrätz, Metz, and Sedan did not cause him to alter his views materially. Again, in 1874, he says:

"I am convinced that, as a result of the improvement of firearms, the tactical defensive has acquired a great advantage (from a local tactical point of view) over the offensive. It is true that in the campaign of 1870 we always took the offensive and that we attacked and captured the strongest positions of the enemy, but with what a sacrifice? It seems to me to be more advantageous only to proceed to an offensive after having repelled several attacks by the enemy."[12]

The Field-Marshal certainly did not overlook the fact that such an opportunity of this nature as presented itself to Napoleon at Austerlitz occurs but seldom and cannot be created at will. It is sufficient, then, to draw attention to the fact that any leader who has recourse to defence, wherever this is in conformity with the situation, is showing himself in full agreement with the greatest military leaders of the past.

War is, to quote the well-known phrase of Clausewitz, "the continuation of politics by other means." It has already been mentioned that it has resulted from the political and economic situation that we and our allies have had to wage battle on the two fronts under difficulties which had hitherto not been suspected and which have continually increased. It was this that gave rise to the peculiar form of the present War, as well as to the necessity, notwithstanding the power of the blows which we dealt, of continually husbanding the forces at our disposal. Hence the judgment pronounced by Clausewitz on the conduct of King Frederick in the year 1760 is fully applicable to our Supreme Command. He said[13]: "The whole campaign exhibits a husbanding of forces, accompanied by the greatest activity and skill." Numerous other comparisons with the Seven Years' War present themselves, only that as the theatre of war, in place of the Eastern and Central districts of Germany on which Frederick the Great fought, we must substitute Europe. Just as at that time Prussian regiments fought at Rossbach and a month later at Leuthen, so now our army corps and divisions have fought first in the West, then in the East, then in the Balkans, and _vice versa_. Just as Frederick the Great at that time held the inner line, so did we also in the World War. This has proved to be to our advantage (just as it proved to Frederick's advantage), even though the difficulties of the situation as a whole still remained. If, as we hope, policy succeeds in future in preventing the recurrence of such a menacing situation, or at any rate in producing the effect that we shall have greater freedom for violent and decisive blows in one direction, then the War will take a different shape and will be more like former wars.

Our business, therefore, is to maintain the fundamental ideas of war as they lived in the German army up to the year 1914, to soak them in the experiences of the present War, and to make the fullest technical use of these experiences, but to do all this without giving an entirely new direction to our thinking on strategy and tactics. We can only strive continually after perfection; we cannot attain it. Even King Frederick had to resign himself to this fact. In the Testament of 1768 he writes:

"The military art demands continual study, if one wishes to attain a thorough mastery of it. I am far from flattering myself that I have exhausted it. I am even of opinion that a human lifetime is not long enough in order to pursue it to the very end, because with every fresh campaign I have acquired new views as the result of new experiences, and because there still remain a multitude of things concerning which fate has not permitted me to collect any experience."

Even less than at the time of Frederick the Great, when conditions remained in all essential respects unchanged, and such alterations as occurred in the weapons of war were insignificant as compared with to-day, can we now tell whether the next campaign will not cause us to form new views. Napoleon once declared that one must alter one's tactics every ten years, if one wished to maintain one's superiority. We proceeded in accordance with this principle prior to the War. Our armaments were at the highest level of efficiency; our service regulations were entirely up to date and adapted to the most recent experiences of war, in particular the experience of the Russo-Japanese war. This in itself is an indication that the World War need not effect revolutionary changes; in fact it is impossible that it should do so. On the whole, our training was quite on the right lines. The wide scope which our regulations always allowed made it easy for the troops to adapt themselves to the needs resulting from the effect of modern weapons. Thus they adapted themselves to the entrenched warfare to which they were unaccustomed and which they disliked. The principles for attacking enemy positions and for the defence of one's own have, as we have already mentioned, been changed several times, in accordance with the conduct of the enemy and the nature and strength of his weapons. In matters of detail new experiences have been gleaned over and over again, but the fundamental tendency of our regulations has not really been affected. It has been proved they were right in everywhere giving precedence to mind over form, for that adaptability which had been inculcated in our whole army down to the man in the ranks proved decisive. It resulted in the fact that the spirit and the nature of this War were recognised in the army long before they were generally recognised at home.

It is true that during the long peace the army had become very inert in many respects. Innovations were only tardily adopted. Many tried to extract from the regulations a compromise between what was old and past and what was new and enduring. In this they overlooked the fact that even enduring things will constantly call for improvements. This applies also to the experiences afforded by this World War. They cannot continue indefinitely to be authoritative any more than the experiences of earlier wars, if only because the development of technical science both on the land and in the air can never come to a standstill. Above all, the individual must impress upon himself that a certain partiality must always attach to his own particular experiences. Our troops have exhibited a striking faculty of adapting themselves to circumstances, but the same cannot be said of all their officers; and this prolonged trench warfare in itself has a dangerous tendency to engender a one-sided view. It has also to be remembered that the conditions in the East and the West respectively were entirely different.

A certain inertia, however, in the case of such a great organism as is presented by the army, although it may prove a hindrance on occasion, has also its good side. A certain amount of conservatism is indispensable; it helps to secure a continuous progress, and not a progress by leaps and bounds. We have already shown that the fact that a thing is old is by no means necessarily a reason for discarding it; we have been able to point to many phenomena similar to those of the time of Moltke, Napoleon, nay, even of Frederick the Great. Of course these similarities are only evident when we consider the thing as a whole. The tactics of 1870-71 had become out of date long before the World War, and occasional reversions to them, such as occurred with us here and there before the War, will now have to be renounced once and for all. Within certain limits, however, the phenomena of war repeat themselves not infrequently, although the form is always altered, and they have to be duly adapted to present conditions.

[1] Vol. vii. _Feldzug_, 1812.

[2] _Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik_. V. _Der 18 August, 1870_, p. 407.

[3] Stegemann, _loc. cit._, i., 211.

[4] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 4. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 2 Kap.]

[5] Pierron, _Méthodes de guerre_, 1.

[6] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 155. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 2 Kap.]

[7] _On War_, vol. iii., p. 72. [_Vom Kriege. Skizzen zum VII. B._, 26 Kap.]

[8] _Betrachtungen über die Taktik_, etc.

[9] Foucart. _Jéna_.

[10] _Taktisch-Strategische Aufsätze_. Bemerkungen über den Einfluss der verbesserten Feuerwaffen.

[11] Dragomirow. _Skizzen des Oesterreichisch-Preussischen Krieges im Jahre 1866_.

[12] _Taktische Aufgaben_.

[13] Vol. x., _Strategische Beleuchtung mehrerer Feldzüge_. Friedrich der Grosse.

V

THE ARMY IN THE FUTURE

Although the effect of the World War has by no means been to revolutionise military art completely, none the less it is incumbent upon us to draw from it a number of lessons both as regards the further development of our army and also as regards our mode of training.

From the point of view of organisation it must first of all be realised that no organisation can possibly cover all the possible contingencies of war, and that, therefore, it is of the first importance to make it as elastic and adaptable as possible. In the course of the World War the attempt to preserve the original formations, and thereby to secure the continuous influence of the leaders over their troops, was found to be impossible of realisation, or at any rate it had to be restricted to the divisions. The latter became strategic units and were correspondingly developed; the army corps became in many cases an army-group, and the number of its divisions underwent constant fluctuation. The question of the expediency of the triple division of the higher units was relegated forthwith to the background in face of the imperative demands of the War. This is by no means a novel experience. Napoleon never hesitated to alter the number of divisions in his army corps. The latter were made up in accordance with the demands of the situation, the personality of the leader, and the number of subordinate units which were available.

The War has demonstrated the necessity of equipping the infantry with a larger number of machine-guns than was provided for by us in time of peace. In defensive warfare, as we have already pointed out, the tendency has been more and more to husband the reserves of men, and to wage the battle in the foremost line by mechanical means, machine-guns and mines, backed up by the artillery. The field artillery, whose duty it was to work in the closest co-operation with the infantry, required not so much an absolute increase in the number of batteries as an increase in the number of batteries of howitzers. On the other hand, in the case of the garrison artillery, the engineers, the bomb-throwing companies, the railway, telegraph, and motor troops, and the flying corps, a considerable increase has proved to be necessary. It will not be necessary to increase the numbers of the cavalry in the future; but the cavalry will doubtless have to be kept at its present strength, which will perhaps make it possible in a future war to manage with a smaller force of reserve cavalry, so that the men and horses will be available for other purposes. In face of modern firearms and mass-armies the cavalry is very much restricted in its opportunities for reconnaissance, and to a large extent it has been superseded by the aeroplane. None the less, this long entrenched war, and the fact that in the course of it this valuable weapon has only been employed in the same way as the infantry, must not lead us to form false conclusions. At the beginning of the War, in the West and, later on, in the East (especially in Lithuania), our cavalry have performed very valuable services, and the same may be said in regard to the campaign against Roumania. As soon as the War was carried into the open country, the cavalry at once asserted its importance. It becomes indispensable both as a supplement to aircraft in reconnaissance at close quarters and also as a mobile defensive weapon. Moreover, it is essential to have a swiftly-moving arm which can be rapidly transferred from one place to another. At the same time, in the training of the cavalry in time of peace, due attention must be paid to trench-warfare, and far more attention must be devoted to fighting on foot than has hitherto been the case.

In our great manœuvres the conditions of this World War can only partially be represented. The manœuvres will, of course, be more adapted to the present-day mode of fighting, and since, on our drilling-grounds, trench-digging is only rarely feasible, we shall practise it in the manœuvres, provided that it is in accordance with the situation which has been arranged, and provided that it can be effected without injury to the fields. In other respects, however, it will not be possible to organise our great manœuvres in the future in conformity with the conditions which prevailed in the great majority of cases in this War. We cannot in our peace manœuvres furnish a representation of trench-warfare on a large scale. All that we can do is to practise attacks on a field-position oftener than has hitherto been the case. Their number and extent, however, must always be comparatively limited by a consideration of the expense which they involve. Hence all that we can do is to give the companies and battalions a thorough training in trench-warfare and make them familiar with all the circumstances which it engenders. In the case of our frontier forces, the requisite training could be combined to a large extent with the construction of new fortifications. This would incidentally effect an economy of civilian labour. Also portions of the troops stationed in the interior of the country might be dispatched temporarily to the frontier for this purpose. It will always be our task to see that we preserve correct views in respect to trench-warfare, but that at the same time we do not give it the predominant place in our training. The predominant place--it cannot be insisted on too often--belongs to the war of movement, though in a somewhat different form from that with which we were familiar before the War.

In this connection there should be a greater insistence, in our peace training, upon the dragging out of operations which is inevitable in war, provided, that is to say, that this can be done without prejudice to the freshness of the troops and the initiative of their leaders. As early as 1861 Moltke wrote[1]:

"If manœuvres are not to engender false notions, full consideration must be given to the ground and the dimensions. The whole course of the battle will thereby become different and slower."

These words, which were written long before 1866, have received very little attention. In an order of King William issued after the Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat he says:

"I must remind you that the attack on an enemy position must first be prepared for by the artillery and by well-directed rifle-fire.... I certainly accord the fullest recognition to the brave assault of the infantry, for whom hitherto no task has seemed too difficult, but I also expect that the intelligence of the officers shall enable them in future to reap the same successes at a much less considerable sacrifice, by dint of a skilful exploitation of the ground, a more thorough preparation for the attack, and the employment of suitable formations."

Similarly, at the beginning of the present War, many of the engagements might have developed more tranquilly and systematically and at less cost of life, and at the same time have reaped more decisive results. None the less, we may rejoice that the following words of Clausewitz are completely applicable to our infantry: "Happy the army in which an untimely boldness frequently manifests itself; it is an exuberant growth which shows a rich soil."[2] We must endeavour to maintain, by every means in our power, this splendid vigour in attack of our infantry. The infantry must not expect the artillery to do everything; just as little, of course, must it attack prematurely in such a manner as to render it impossible for the artillery to exercise its full effectiveness at the right moment. Hence it will be an important duty of the commanding officers in future peace manœuvres to see that their troops preserve clear notions concerning the seriousness, the scope, and the duration of present-day warfare, and at the same time to emphasise continually the effectiveness of modern arms. Co-operation between the infantry and the artillery must in any event be ensured. A good means of achieving this would be to effect a mutual interchange between the officers in command of the infantry and the artillery respectively.

Generally speaking, we must devote more attention to tactics on a large scale, and less to strategy. Above all, even in sham fights and cavalry manœuvres, the important thing is not to spin out great strategic theories, but to develop the power of forming a just conception of purely tactical situations on a simple plan, and to practise the technique of command. Operations on a large scale must be left for the tours of the General Staff--especially the Great General Staff. Certainly it is desirable that just conceptions regarding operations on a large scale should also be instilled into the generality of the officers' corps; but in this respect the study of the World War and lectures upon it will afford a rich field of instruction and inspiration. The greatest possible simplicity, such as war demands, must also prevail in regard to the exercises practised on the drilling-ground.

Our traditional drill must in any event remain the permanent imperishable foundation of our training.

"Its importance consists in the fact that it inspires the soldier with a sense of the urgent necessity to obey his officer. The habit of obedience which is developed by means of military service helps to produce this effect."[3]

The War has confirmed in the fullest degree the value of drill. We have to thank our permanent military training schools for the discipline which has made it possible to solve the most difficult problems of attack and defence with an array of masses of troops. It is the result of these schools that the German soldier has not recoiled before any task. The best proof of this is the half-reluctant recognition which it has extracted from the enemy.

In regard to the autumn battle of 1915, in Champagne, General Cherfils writes[4]:

"The French soldier detaches himself from his officer far too readily. Each one goes where he wills. Thus it came about that our infantry lost in a moment territory which they had just won with great difficulty, and, moreover, they left on it a half of their man-power. The German is a true soldier. Discipline has become a part of his flesh and blood. That is his greatest source of strength."

The _France Militaire_ writes[5] with respect to the Anglo-French offensive on the Somme in July, 1916:

"The great homogeneity of the German army is evident from the fact that it was possible for the German command to withdraw some twenty different battalions from at least ten divisions, in order that they might oppose these improvised formations to the Anglo-French offensive. And these troops were drawn from all portions of the front. This was, to be sure, only an emergency measure. The Germans certainly would not have had recourse to it if it had not been necessary, and we must try not to bring ourselves into a similar situation, and we must always bear in mind that the maintenance of the formations is an element of victory. At the same time, it is a sign of great homogeneity and of a splendid co-operation between the various commands that it was possible for the Germans to undertake such a manœuvre on such an extensive scale and in the space of a few hours.

"The opponents of a long term of active military service and of thorough preparation in time of peace should consider the following facts: A militia army with an abridged term of training may perform heroic deeds, the regiments may exhibit a high standard of cohesion, but such an army will lose all its strength if circumstances compel it to break up its principal units, and to blend these together. It is only where uniformity of training has penetrated into the lowest ranks, and where a thorough military training has been established, that such venturesome undertakings are feasible."

In the case of the numerous new formations which the enormous increase of our army in the course of the War has rendered necessary, we have always endeavoured, as far as was possible, to compose these new bodies of troops in such a way, and to furnish them with such a thorough training, as would give them the solidity of the old troops. In August, 1914, in the case of the newly-formed Reserve-Corps, we had to endeavour to dispense with these advantages. In their case, the period of training was not really adequate to transform them into thoroughly efficient battle-troops. The experience of the officers, very few of whom were on the active list at the time, with all their good will, was not really adequate, and the same was true in many cases in respect of their physical fitness. This applies equally to a large proportion of the men in the ranks, that is to say, of the young war-volunteers. They had excellent qualities, and were filled with the purest patriotic enthusiasm; but this could not compensate for the lack of soldierly discipline and physical hardening which can be acquired only in the course of a thorough military training. These new troops could not be equal to coping with the difficult conditions which prevailed at Ypres. They have only gradually, in the course of the War, and as a result of the subsequent improvement of their officers' corps, been brought up to the level of the old troops. The Prussian Landwehr of 1813 furnished an illustration of exactly the same thing. They broke down, at the beginning of the campaign, at Goldberg, Kulm, and in the pursuit after the battle of Katzbach; it was not until Wartenburg and Möckern, and after they had been very much diminished in the process, that they had become thoroughly efficient troops.

Scharnhorst, their creator, had not originally contemplated the employment of the Landwehr as a troop of the first line. It was only necessity which led to the enrolment of the Landwehr among the field-troops; just as in August, 1914, necessity compelled the German command to throw in on the right wing of the Western army troops which were not yet fully trained.

The zeal of reformers, after the defeats of the year 1806, undoubtedly contributed to make the difference between the old and the new in the Prussian army appear much greater than it actually was. Scharnhorst and his disciples frequently overshot the mark deliberately, in order to attain their purpose, for they were under the necessity of overcoming a host of prejudices on the part of those who adhered to the externals of the Frederician tradition, and not to its inner significance. This, however, does not in any way alter the fact that it was really the resuscitated old Prussian army, though filled with an entirely new spirit, that we have to thank for the liberation of 1813. It was the same much-abused officers' corps, the "Junkers" of the year 1806, who led to victory an army the best parts of which were composed of veteran soldiers. The great achievements of the army of 1813 in the face of the enemy were due to the excellence of its _cadres_, and the same was the case a century later. The achievements of the War of Liberation, like our ability to hold out in the World War, were only rendered possible by the fact that a sufficient number of experienced officers and veteran soldiers were available, for even the men of the home and reserve regiments of 1813 had for the most part already served in the old army.

The value of the so-called "Krümper" system introduced by Scharnhorst has been hitherto very much exaggerated. It can by no means be described as a successful attempt to manage with a short term of service on a large scale. The principle of it was the creation of a war reserve which should always be available, by means of a constant furloughing of a number of men to the districts from which the regiments had been drawn and the insertion of recruits in their place. Nevertheless, in the brief period between 1808 and 1813 (during which, moreover, the mobilisation of half the standing army for the auxiliary corps which had to be supplied for Napoleon's campaign of 1812 against Russia was a disturbing factor) this system proved incapable of furnishing anything like such a strong war reserve as that which in 1813 made it possible, in addition to filling up the ranks of the regular troops, to create fifty-two reserve battalions, which were assembled in regiments during the truce. By far the greater part of the imposing reserve force which was available in the provinces consisted of soldiers who had received their training in the old army and had been subjected to its rigid discipline.

The words of Camille Rousset[6] in reference to Napoleon's new formations of the year 1813 are more or less true of every improvised army:

"If the Battle of the Katzbach had been fought by stout men and thoroughly trained soldiers, it is possible that Macdonald would not have been defeated, or at any rate would have suffered only such a reverse as could have been made good again; fought as it was with young men and with soldiers whose training dated from yesterday, it became the beginning of a catastrophe. No clearer demonstration has ever been furnished of the power of physical and moral energy, of fortitude of body and spirit in the face of inclemency of the weather, hunger and thirst, and all the sufferings of war, the power, in fact, of that stoicism which is no sudden phenomenon, but the gradual and unconscious result of military training, which is in fact nothing else than a heightened sense of honour and duty."

The American Civil War of the sixties of last century would not have lasted four years if the Union had had at its disposal an efficient fighting army with which to overcome the Southern States. Both the militia and the volunteer levies broke down. Only after a long time did they become really efficient fighting troops.

Lord Kitchener's creation of a strong English army during the World War was unquestionably an immense achievement. He built up twelve divisions out of the six regular divisions existing before the War, and twenty-eight divisions out of the fourteen very imperfectly organised territorial divisions. This doubling of the hitherto existing English army was then supplemented by the thirty so-called Kitchener divisions. All these new formations, before they were put into the line, went through a long period of training, first at home and afterwards behind the front in France. The long entrenched warfare afforded the possibility for this. They were only by degrees sent into the fighting lines. Not until the beginning of 1916 were the English in a position to take over longer sections of the front, which had hitherto been held by the French. They were subsequently reinforced in France, and at the beginning of 1917 their lines were extended still further towards the south. Thus, though the great English army of the World War is a new creation, it is anything but a loose and hasty improvisation. The experience which could be derived from military history in respect to improvised armies was, on the contrary, thoroughly taken into consideration by Kitchener in accomplishing his task. The advocates of a shorter term of service than existed among us before the War cannot in any case instance the Kitchener divisions as a justification of their views, any more than they can do so in the case of our own new formations during the War or those of earlier times. Moreover, it has to be considered that the Kitchener divisions were trained exclusively for the simple tasks of trench-warfare. The English army is by no means fit for a war of movement. Captured English officers have admitted this fact. Their higher officers lack the necessary knowledge, which can be acquired only by long training and by regarding it as a life-task. Napoleon said, not without reason, "It is possible to capture a strong position by means of a young army, but not to conduct a campaign to a victorious conclusion."

In regard to the abridgment and simplification of our Infantry Regulations there may be various opinions. The War certainly furnishes a great deal of instruction on this subject. Military drill in itself is, however, prejudicial to war-efficiency, and consequently a hindrance to true preparation for war, only when it is carried to excess, that is to say, when the insistence upon formal drill is pushed beyond the limits of the Regulations. Provided that this is avoided, military drill--the War has proved it beyond any doubt--is entirely beneficial as regards training for active service. In regard to the latter, in a short time and by equally simple means, the same degree of subordination cannot be enforced under all conditions; for though undoubtedly much of what the infantry soldier has to learn in respect to the use of the rifle in warfare may be drilled into him, yet the Regulation of 1906 (No. 158) expressly indicates as the aim of the individual training of the rifleman that "the soldier should be trained to become an intellectually self-reliant and technically conscientious rifleman," for on one point there can be no doubt, namely, that training with a view to actual fighting must always take the first place, great as is the value of rigorous drilling in achieving this end. This training engenders in the troops the habit of doing their best, and hence of doing it even in the face of danger. It helps them, too, to acquire that "proud and distinguished appearance" which was insisted upon by Prince Frederick Charles.

Here as everywhere, the real question is how much importance is to be conceded to formal drill. The important thing to be kept in mind is that drill is to be considered, not as an end in itself, but only as a means to an end. It is inevitable that it should happen from time to time that a few individual pedants, who, moreover, have not kept the prospect of war steadily in view, should go astray. It will be the duty of the superior officers in charge of these matters to see that these deviations do not lead us too far away from the proper goal of all training. It will be their duty to see that it does not happen that--to use a phrase of Scharnhorst--"the mechanical heads triumph," and they must constantly bear in mind that success in war falls only to him who is capable of emancipating himself from the bonds of custom when the occasion demands.

We must not carry too far our cult of tradition. Blind adherence to tradition in the place of a living continuous development is an evil. A great and proud tradition is a wonderfully invigorating thing in an army, and nothing can take the place of it, but it ought not to be nurtured for its own sake, but for the sake of the firmness and stability which it gives to the army as a whole.

The years of exhaustion which followed the great war-period at the beginning of the nineteenth century were not calculated to inspire a warlike spirit in the Prussian army and to shape its training with a view to the needs of war. Hence a pronounced tendency in the direction of review tactics very soon manifested itself. This phenomenon has frequently occurred after wars of long duration, and it is easily understandable. But it is all the more important that we should be on our guard against its reappearance. The ambition of Frederick the Great to see that "admirable discipline" of his troops, which had become relaxed in the course of the Seven Years' War, once more restored allowed him to overlook many an extravagance which the resurgent drill-devil provoked in the army. His own thoughts, as his later writings prove, were always concerned with the needs of actual war and the most glorious side of the soldierly profession, but his generals became more and more immersed in the minor arts of the drilling-ground. The uneventful course of the Bavarian War of Succession was not calculated to diminish the pedantry of peace drill.

The tendency in the direction of review tactics, which again became predominant in the first decades following the War of Liberation, had begun to manifest itself in a peculiar way during the war, even in the Prussian army, and first of all in the Guards. It was our brotherhood in arms with the Russians which resulted in the marked predominance of parade drill (as though it were not a means to an end, but in itself the end of training), and with it a tendency to triviality. The manœuvres in the environments of Berlin were, under Frederick William III., merely spectacles; they degenerated for the most part into mere military sports. The Tsar Alexander and his brothers all took the same unspeakable delight in military pedantry, and it could not but happen that, in view of the intimate ties of blood and friendship which existed between the Courts of Petrograd and Berlin, similar tendencies should have been transmitted to Prussia. Thus that training which had been originally derived from Prussian models, though endowed with greater rigour after the manner of the Tsar Paul, which, moreover, was organised entirely with a view to outward show in a manner quite opposed to the old Prussian models, was reintroduced into Prussia in this distorted form.

Under Scharnhorst's general rules for manœuvres on a large scale, pre-arrangement of the course the manœuvres were to take was declared to be inadmissible; but, after the great war-period, parade manœuvres, the critical moments of which were exactly planned out beforehand, were once again revived. The brief and concise Regulations of 1812 seemed to those in charge of military affairs too simple for peace-time. General Krauseneck, a distinguished collaborator in the drawing-up of the Regulations and afterwards Chief of the General Staff, discovered, when he took over the command of a division in 1821, that quite a number of supplementary orders had been added, and he found himself compelled to protest against them. He writes[7]:

"We had never doubted that time and the experience of war might entail alterations, and that simplifications might be effected, but we never dreamed that the Regulations--in which we had aimed at the greatest possible brevity and clearness, as one of the most essential requirements--would, after a war which had been conducted to a glorious conclusion, be criticised as insufficiently detailed and precise. It is not only useless, it is harmful, to aim at excessive hair-splitting preciseness in the case of every order, and to strive after uniformity with a scrupulousness that borders on pedantry. Such a uniformity can never be attained, and, even if it could be attained, it would not repay the trouble and energy expended upon it."

General Krauseneck was of opinion that uniformity in matters of detail was rather injurious than otherwise, and he insisted that the greatest possible freedom as regards the means for attaining the desired end had the result of infusing spirit and energy into the men.

Fortunately it was not to happen that the "mechanical heads" should triumph once again in the Prussian army, as Scharnhorst had feared. The conditions had been completely altered since 1806. The introduction of universal service entailed on the officer educational duties which had not fallen to him in the old army. Also, although the army did not have an opportunity of gaining new experience of war on a large scale, the dangerous tendencies with which it had become infected were none the less successfully overcome. In this connection valuable service was rendered by the Prince of Prussia. His clear understanding in regard to military matters enabled him to form a very just estimate of the limits within which a rational training by means of drill ought to be confined, and this at a time when a one-sided training, with a view principally to the requirements of parades, seemed still to be completely in the ascendent. In notes which he made in the year 1840,[8] the Prince laid down principles which still hold good at the present day. He wrote: "The sole purpose of the drilling-ground is, in my opinion, to achieve order. If the spirit of order exists in a troop, it is possible to do anything with it; without order nothing is possible." The parade step, and the preparatory practice for it, the Prince held to be indispensable, "if," he says, "we are to have troops and not a mere assembled mob." Thus the Prince assigned to the parade the importance which properly belongs to it, and to which it can justly lay claim even at the present day. A very careful training by means of drill is an indispensable preparation. Therefore, in the same notes, the Prince says further in regard to drill: "Uniformity is indispensable. Why should one be permitted to do his task well, and another to do it badly? ... Either we intend to have a trained troop or else a mob of undisciplined men. That is a point which must be settled." Further he says that the objectionable term "Trillen" is constantly applied to what is really no more than soldierly discipline, as opposed to rustic clownishness. The future Emperor expressed very finely his firm and unshakable confidence in the efficiency of the army for purposes of war when he said that suspicions ought not to be entertained concerning the spirit of the army merely because, in addition to its actual achievements, it presented a handsome outward appearance. "Any one who has had to do with the army for twenty years will have only one opinion on this head, namely, that the spirit and the will of the army are above all praise, and that such an _esprit de corps_ exists in it as never before."

It was not prejudice in favour of what was old and accustomed, nor mere routine, that caused the German army to preserve its "handsome outward appearance," but the recognition, based upon history, that any negligence in this respect constitutes a serious danger. Archduke Albert of Austria, in 1869, drew attention to the existence of such a danger in "the efforts of a subversive Press to turn to ridicule the discipline and strict regulations which are indispensable in every army."[9] In the fifties of last century the stimulating influence of Prince Frederick Charles made itself felt in the Prussian army. It was particularly effective, because here was the case of a royal prince who made it his aim to plan the training and education of the soldier directly with a view to actual warfare. The Prince succeeded in overcoming a far too narrow-minded preference for parade-drill and the affectations of the drilling-ground, although he insisted that a certain stiffness was in harmony both with our traditions and with our national character, and was also a good means of instilling discipline.

"It is the warlike spirit that decides," wrote the Prince in 1858,[10]" not the tactical form. The form must be elastic; it must not exercise compulsion in a certain direction. Every epoch has had its special tactical forms, and these have been connected with the warlike spirit of the age and with the nature of its equipment for war.... The more developed the warlike spirit in the individual soldier, the greater will be the energy of the whole mass, and the less will be the influence of the tactical form."

The importance which Prince Frederick Charles attached to the mutual relations between the leader and the troops is evident from the following words which he wrote in the year 1860. He says[11]:

"The general is the loved and respected chief, not a scolding, punishing task-master. When he addresses his troops (which he should do only seldom) all hearts beat faster. He must know how to touch those chords which produce a fine ring. He is pleasant and friendly with all his subordinates, and the more so according as they are the farther removed from him in rank. He has always a friendly word and a sympathetic greeting for the man in the ranks. Although they seldom see him at his work, and then only accidentally and when he rides past them, they none the less delight in his near presence and they are proud of him. He has rendered both the men and their officers susceptible to the inspiration which his presence, his glance, his words, and his bearing must infuse into them on the day of battle, and which must result in a trebling of their efforts. If then, in the fulness of their enthusiasm, they ask him eagerly, 'Sire, where is it your will that we should die?' then and only then has he succeeded in making the right impression upon them in time of peace."

That this impression was actually produced in our army in the sense which the Prince intended has been proved by the World War, for never was the question which he desired uttered with a more sublime devotion than it has been by our troops during this War.

There has been much talk in Germany of the so-called trench-spirit, and of the fine comradeship between officers and men. But it has been overlooked that this comradeship, based upon the loyal solicitude of the officers for their men, existed also before the War. It was merely expressed in a different way. The officer must make a difference in his behaviour towards the younger troops, who have to be trained and disciplined, and his behaviour towards the fully-trained and, in particular, the older men, whom he has to lead against the enemy. Moreover, it is only natural that, in the face of death, a greater equality should prevail between superiors and subordinates. But the officer stands just as much above his subordinates in the trenches as elsewhere. The lack of officers after the heavy losses in August, 1914, made itself very seriously felt, and even men who had been brave hitherto failed occasionally when the enemy fire suddenly deprived them of their leaders. Good relations between officers and men will and must remain after the War, but they must not be such as to be prejudicial to the authority of the superior officer. Our young men, who have outgrown paternal discipline in the course of the War and have rendered splendid services before their time, will stand in very special need of the rigorous training afforded by the army.

The officer must be "of that ruling race who exert a controlling influence, even if momentarily they are not within sight or hearing."[12] Field-Marshal Count Schwerin once declared that Fear and Love were the two instruments by which the soldier must be governed, and then added--and with manifest justice as applied to his time--that unfortunately Fear had to perform the lion's share. The case has, however, unquestionably been reversed as regards our age. Prince Frederick Charles, even in his day, would have nothing to do with the "scolding and punishing taskmaster."[13] Without dependence on the personality of the superior officer (though, of course, this presupposes a wholesome rigour in the latter), without enthusiasm for the work in hand, the results of military training will be merely superficial. The World War has demonstrated how very important it is that we should preserve all that military discipline which has proved its efficacy, but that at the same time we should enlist the services of the best men for this task.

"It is unjust to depreciate the reserves from the industrial districts and the big towns as compared with those from the rural districts. The latter may perhaps be endowed with greater physical fitness and endurance, but as regards those aptitudes in regard to present-day methods of warfare and the use of modern technical weapons for the purposes of war, which must be possessed even by the man in the ranks, the urban population, in view of their quicker intelligence, will undoubtedly possess certain advantages."[14]

If, before the War, certain prejudices on this head existed in the officers' corps, they have perished as the result of the War, equally with many others. It is our duty to concede full recognition to the human personality in all our troops. Present-day social conditions, no less than the achievements of our national army as a whole in the course of the War, demand this. A national army cannot be other than a democratic organisation. The task of the officers is in high degree a social task--social, that is to say, in an aristocratic sense; for what has rendered our army so efficient has been precisely the thoroughly aristocratic organisation of the officers' corps upon a democratic basis.

Prince Bülow says very justly in reference to Scharnhorst's army reforms:

"Through the material of the national army, an institution of a democratic nature, runs a thread of the modern aristocracy. The happy thought of making entry into the corps of officers contingent upon election by the corps of officers made it possible in the structure of the national army to take account of the structure of the nation. Probably nothing in the past, as in the present, has to such a degree assured the superiority of our army as the fact that the leading position, which is the natural due of those who rank highest in intellect and education, has been retained by them in the army.... The World War has shown that devotion and contempt of death are the common heritage of every German soldier. But it has also been a song of praise of mutual confidence between officers and men, such as the world has never seen.... The spirit of German militarism, as Prussia first developed it and Germany adopted it, is every whit as monarchical as it is aristocratic and democratic, and it would cease to be German and the mighty expression of German imperial military power and military efficiency if it were to change. If our enemies, to whom with God's help our militarism will bring defeat, abuse it, we know that we must preserve it, for to us it means victory and the future of Germany."[15]

The War has brought about an almost complete fusion of the officers' corps of the active army with the officers on the reserve list. We had fully recognised the importance of the tasks which, in case of war, must fall to the officers of the Reserves and the Landwehr, and for more than a decade prior to the War we had devoted special care to their training. This precaution has reached a rich reward. During the War, wherever the conditions made it possible, this training has been continued--especially in the case of the younger officers who had recently obtained their captaincies--by means of numerous courses of instruction organised behind the front. Though very satisfactory results were achieved by this means, it ought none the less to be borne in mind that only in connection with the officers' corps of the active army and under its guidance were the officers of the reserve able to render such valuable services to the Fatherland. The long duration of the War brought it about that the memory of their civilian calling became more and more effaced. They were completely absorbed into the organic entity of the troop; they became professional soldiers equally with the men; they acquired a training which they had lacked in peace-time, when their adoption of the profession of arms had been only an incidental experience. To the professional knowledge, which they gained in an increasing degree, was added all that intelligence and energy which characterise the German whenever he occupies a responsible position in a civilian calling. Thus the officers of the reserve soon exhibited no longer any difference from the officers of the active army. They may have exhibited less familiarity with routine duties, but this was equally the case with the younger officers of the standing army, who lacked for this purpose the necessary experience of active service, brilliant as was the example which they furnished to their troops during battle.

Moreover our regiments were commanded by staff officers who were considerably younger both in years and in experience of military service than was customary before the War in the case of these positions. We shall not see such young commanders in time of peace. This will not be prejudicial to the army, for in time of peace the qualities demanded from the commander of a regiment, in respect to the training of the officers' corps and the inner consolidation of the troop, are somewhat different from those required in time of war. In time of peace we need for this position fully-matured and self-assured personalities. On the other hand, it is just the officers occupying the middle status of regimental and battalion commanders who have been subjected to a severe strain in this War, a fact which should warn us not to allow officers to occupy these positions in peace-time after they have reached a certain age.