Chapter XII: Conclusion (2)

Balance, between state and federal powers, See 'Federal and State governments;' between judiciary and other branches of federal govt., 34 _et seq_.; between state legislatures and the Senate, 40; of the people against their representatives, 40; of presidential electors against the people, 40; between Executive and Congress, 41; between Senate and House of Representatives, real, 228.

Balances of the Constitution, ideal, 52; present state of, 53; at variance with inevitable tendency to exalt representative body, 311.

Bank of the U. S., 22.

Bicameral system, utility of a, 219 _et seq_.

Bill of Rights, and the Constitution of the U. S., 7.

Bills, introduced on Mondays, 66; early course of, in House, 67; all committed, 67; doubt in committing some, 67, 68; fate of committed, 69; passed under suspension of Rules, 111, 112; of private members in House of Commons, 120, 121.

Bismarck, Count, stands for govt. in Germany, 59, 208.

"Bland Silver Bill," 185.

Bright, John, 198.

British govt. by party, 117 _et seq_.

Buckle, on use of legislation, 295.

Budget, controlled, not originated, by British House of Commons, 137; preparation and submission of, by English Chancellor of Exchequer, 140-142; both originated and controlled by Congress, 148, 191.

Burke, Edmund, 209; on value of House of Commons, 227.

Cabinet, discords in first, 2; change in character of, 45 _et seq_.; real executive equality of, with President, 46, 257; diminishing power of, to control policy, 45, 47, 262, 269; parliamentary position of British, 95; British, a single Standing Committee, 117; irresponsibility of, in U. S., in matters of finance, 164; an integral part of the Executive, 257; limits to independence of, 258; relations of, to President, 258, 259; ministerial, rather than political, officers in U. S., 261, 264 _et seq_., 291; duties of, supervised by Standing Committees, 262; in the leading-strings of Congress, 262, 266; fixed terms of, 261, 264 _et seq_.; represent whom? 265, 266; party relations of, 269; easily evade many questions and commands of Congress, 271, 272; indistinct responsibility of, 282; history of responsibility of British, 286 _et seq_.; status of, in American constitutional system, 291.

Calhoun, J. C., 89, 218.

Call of States for bills, 66; of Standing Committees for reports, 72, 73.

Canning, George, 209.

Caucus, failure of congressional nominating, 247; legislative, disciplines parties in Congress, 326, 327; invention of, by Democrats, 327, 328; privacy and irresponsibility of legislative, 328, 329; methods and constraints of legislative, 329, 330; necessity for legislative, 330.

Centralization, present tendency towards, in federal govt. and Congress, 53, 315, 316; questions which seem to necessitate, 54.

Chairman of Standing Committees, govt. by, 102; elders of Congress, 102; relations of, to each other, 102, 103; limits to leadership of each of the, 205.

Chatham, Earl of, 209, 258.

Civil Rights Act, 33, n.

Civil Service Reform, and usurpations of Senate, 49, 236 _et seq_.; hindered by institutional causes in U. S., 285, 290; history of, in Great Britain, 285 et seq.; history of, in U. S., 289, 290; conditions precedent to, 290.

Clay, Henry, 89, 218, 252.

_Cloture_ in French Assembly, 126.

Cobden, Richard, 198.

Coinage Act of 1873, 185.

Commerce, federal power over, 30, 31; former control of appropriations for internal improvements by Committee on, 167.

Commission, legislative, proposed by J. S. Mill, 115, 129, 192; the most effective legislative, 192.

Committee, "Executive," proposed for House of Representatives, 114.

Committees, select, 67.

Committees, Standing, government by, 56; chairmen of, leaders of House, 60; chairmen of, do not consult or cooperate, 61; for every topic of legislation, 61; served by rules of House, 66, 71; number and uses of, 67, 68; consider all bills, 67; overlapping jurisdiction of, 68; cannot reject bills, 69; neglect of, to report, 69, 70; entire direction of legislation by, 70, 78; hasty consideration of reports of, by House, 71; four specially licensed, 71, 72; average time given to each of the, to report, 72; call of, for reports, 72, 73; hastening of business by the, 74 _et seq_.; control of debate by, 75 _et seq_.; arguments before the, 81-85; division of power amongst the, 92; both parties represented on, 99; appointed in House by Speaker, 103; history of rules of appointment of, 104; aided by Speaker, 108; Roman magistrates and the, 109; "little legislatures" made up of all sorts of men, 113; contrasted with single Standing Committee of Parliament, 116, 117; of House of Commons, 122; which control national income, 136; which create demands upon the Treasury, 167, 168; on expenditures, 175-177; multiplication of, by Congress, 176, n.; approachability of the, by lobbyists, 189, 190; choice of, in the Senate, 212, n.; supervision of the departments by the, 231, 262, 271, 272; may command, but cannot superintend, 271; part of the mechanism of Congress, 281; offset by legislative caucus, 326.

Commons, House of, represented by Ministers of Crown, 59, 244; character of debate in the, 94, 95; Cabinet's place and functions in the, 117 _et seq_.; private members' bills in the, 120, 121; committees of, 122; functions and character of Speaker of, 122; the, in session, 123; compared with French Chamber, 123, 128, 129; controls, does not originate, financial measures, 137; opposition of, to civil service reform, 285, 289; cross-examination of Ministers in, 300.

Conference Committees on appropriation bills, 157, 158, 280.

Congress, the centre and source of power, 11; early awkwardness of, 21, 44; made dominant and irresistible by doctrine of "implied powers," 23; check upon, by Judiciary, 35, 36; power of, over federal courts, 38; check upon, by President, 41; quick assumption of control by, 44, 45; enlarged powers of, created by efficiency of organization, 47; prominence of Senate in contests with executive, 47 _et seq_.; proper central object of constitutional study, 57; complex organization of, 58; without authoritative leaders, 59, 92, 205, 212, 315; embarrassments of new member in, 61 _et seq_.; work of, parceled out to Committees, 67; delays of each new, in getting to work, 72, 73; uninteresting character of debate in, 95, 96; means of financial control by, 147; supervision of expenditures by, 175, 179; difficulties of constituencies in controlling, 186-189; cause for distrust of, 186 et seq.; lobbying in, 189, 190; failure of presidential nominating caucus of, 247; does not breed administrators, 251, 252; and the Executive, party diversity between, 267; defective means of, for controlling executive action, 270 _et seq_., 302; and the Executive, absence of confidential cooperation between, 278; exactions of, upon the departments, 278, 279; diligence of, in legislation, 294, 297; necessity for discussion of administration by, 301 _et seq_.; informing function of, to be magnified, 303; grasps after new subjects of legislation, 304; freedom of action possible to, 304, 305; inferior to the Press as a critical authority, 306, 319; embarrassments of, in making its authority open and respectable, 312 _et seq_.; and Parliament succeeding Revolution settlement in Eng., 315; without adequate information, 315; tendency towards concentration of federal powers in hands of, 315, 316; irresponsibility of, 318; agreement and stability of majorities in, 324 _et seq_.; parties in, disciplined by caucus, 326, 327.

Conkling, Roscoe, resignation of, from Senate, 237.

Constituencies, difficulties of, in controlling Congress, 186-189.

Constitution, The, its wayward fortunes, 1; difficulties attending adoption of, 2; outward conformity to principles of, in former times, 3; present attitude of criticism toward, 5; its change of substance and persistency of form, 7; growth of, 7; elementary structure of, 8; in operation and in the books, 9, 10; "literary theory" of, 12; "implied powers" of, 22 _et seq_.; centre of all early political contests, 196 _et seq_.; questions of interpretation of, not now urgent, 202; practically amended without being constitutionally amended, 242; modeled after the English Constitution, 307 _et seq_.; Bagehot on multiplicity of authorities in, 309, 310; forms of, hold Congress back from making its power convenient and honest, 312.

Consultation between President and Senate, not real, 232 _et seq_.; means of, between President and Senate, 234.

Contingent Fund of Treasury Dept., fraudulent use of, 178.

Convention, Constitutional, of 1787, 268, 284, 307, 309.

Convention, national nominating, real functions of a, 245 _et seq_.; minority representation in composition of a, 246; conditions surrounding choice of a candidate by a, 250, 251; does not pick from Congress, 251, 252.

Cooley, Judge, on balance between state and federal govts., 17, 18; on checks upon federal encroachment, 33, 34; on judicial control of the Executive, 35; on the originality of the Constitution, 55, 56; incompleteness of constitutional view of, 56, 57.

"Courtesy" of the Senate, 238.

Criticism, necessity for a new, of constitutional methods, 53 _et seq_.; former methods of constitutional, 57; Congress central object of constitutional, 57; of legislation by Senate, 219.

Cromwell, Oliver, 207, 208.

Cushman, Samuel, 89.

Dale, Mr., on indifference of public opinion in U. S., 331.

Debate, time for, and conditions of, in House, 75 _et seq_.; importance of, 78; on Ways and Means and Appropriations, 78; absence of instinct of, in House, 79; relegated to Standing Committees, 81, 82; in Standing Committees, 81; value of, in Committees, 82; kind of, necessary, 85; physical limitations of, in House, 86 _et seq_.; in early Houses, 89, 90; uninteresting and uninstructive character of, in Congress, 95, 96, 101, 184, 185, 298; parliamentary, centres about Ministry, 95; necessity for, under responsible Cabinet govt., 119; in French Assembly, 125 _et seq_.; of appropriation bills, 154, 155, 183, 184; of all financial questions by Congress, 183; in Senate, 211, 216 _et seq_.; in Congress, directed at random, 298; chief use of public, in representative bodies, 299 _et seq_.; of administration, cannot be too much of, in Congress, 304.

Deficiency Bills, 159.

Democracy, limited in U. S. by Senate, 226.

Denmark, treaty with, in regard to St. Thomas, in Senate, 50, 51.

Departments, communications of, with Appropriation Committees concerning estimates, 160-164; present methods of book-keeping in the, 163; heads of, make interest with Appropriation Committees, 163; Senate's share in control of the, 231; and Congress, defective means of cooperation between, 270, 271; demoralizing relations of, with Congress, 277, 278; exactions of Congress upon, 278, 279; objects of suspicion because of their privacy, 299, 300.

Eaton, D. B., on civil service reform in Great Britain, 285.

Education, federal aid to, 29.

Election, Senate shielded by the method of its, 224; of President, real method of, 243 _et seq_.; virtual, by nominating conventions, 245.

Electors, presidential, balanced against people, 40; agents of nominating conventions, 245, 250; history of action of, 246, 247, 250.

Ellsworth, Oliver, on veto power, 52.

Embargo, the, 21.

English Constitution, likeness between the, and that of U. S., 7, 307 _et seq_.; character of, when Constitution of U. S. was formed, 307, 308, 310, 311.

Estimates, in House of Commons, 137; preparation of the federal, 148, 149; federal, go to Committee on Appropriations, 149; communications and conferences between Appropriation Committees and the departments concerning, 160-164; thoroughness of later, 163.

Exchequer, Chancellor of, preparation and submission to Commons of budget by, 140-142; represented by House Committee of Ways and Means, 170; financial policy of, compared with policy of House Committee of Ways and Means, 171-175.

Executive, 242-293; relations of, with Senate, 230 _et seq_.; really chosen by representative, deliberative body, 244; and legislative service divorced in U. S., 251-253; the President not all of the, 257; elements constituting the, in U. S., 259; functions bestowed upon the Secretaries, 260; and Congress, party diversity between, 267; Roger Sherman upon real character of, 268; and Congress, defective means of cooperation between, 270 _et seq_.; responsibility of, and civil service reform, 285 _et seq_.; suspected because not clearly visible through Congress, 299, 300; embarrassed by half-informed criticism, 305.

Expenditure, questions of, disconnected from questions of supply, 174, 175; supervision of, by Congress, 175-179.

Federal govt., the, early weakness and timidity of, 18, 19; growth in self-confidence and power of, 19, 20; first questions that engaged the attention of, 20; brought to every man's door, 25; supervision of elections by, 27; highest point of aggression of, 33; advantage of indirect taxation to, 133; necessity for two chambers in, 221, 222; possible paralysis of, in emergencies, 282; rapidly widening sphere of, 316, 317; weakness of our present, 318.

Federal and state govts., balance between, 13; object of balance between, 14; early conditions of balance between, 15; Hamilton on balance between, 16, 17; present inefficacy of balance between, 17; balance between, destroyed by doctrine of "implied powers," 23; balance between, dependent on federal judiciary, 24; balance between, prejudiced by internal improvements, 28, and by federal power over commerce, 30, 31; balance between, last pictured in "reconstruction," 32, 33.

_Federalist_, the, quoted, 16, 17.

Ferry, M. Jules, 248.

Fillmore, President, 259.

Finance, loose govt. practices concerning, 130, 131; comparatively unembarrassed character of American, 135; necessity for responsibility in direction of, 135; shifting character of federal, 135, 136; number of Committees controlling, in Congress, 136; administration of, in England, 137-146; administration of, in U. S., 146 _et seq_., 280; Senate Committee on, 169; confusion of public opinion in regard to action of Congress upon, 280.

Financial, officials, accessibility of English, in the Commons, 146, 147; officials, separation of, from Congress in the U. S., 147; officials, mere witnesses in U. S., 164; officials, irresponsibility of, for estimates in U. S., 164; system of U. S., contrasted with that of Eng., 180; system of U. S., incoherency of, 180, 181; policy of Congress, shifting character of, 181, 182; legislation, prominent place of, in congressional business, 183; questions, control of, by Committees in Senate, 212, n.; questions, confusion of public opinion regarding action of Congress upon, 280.

Fish, Secretary, and treaty with Denmark, 51.

Foreign relations, principal concern of federal govt. during first quarter century, 43; hand of Senate in, 49 _et seq_., 232 _et seq_.; no real consultation between President and Senate concerning, 232; Senate Committee on, 234.

France, public accounts, how kept in, 145; Ministry, how chosen in, 244.

French Assembly, organization of, 123; parties in, 124; proceedings of, 125 _et seq_.; compared with House of Representatives and House of Commons, 127-129.

French Revolution, 20, 43.

Froude, J. A., on political orators, 215.

Gallatin, Albert, 181.

George III., 187, 308, 309.

Gladstone, Wm. E., 59; on direct and indirect taxes, 134; 209, 322.

Government, by chairmen of Standing Committees, 102; by Standing Committees, contrasted with govt. by responsible Ministry, 116 _et seq_.; conditions of perfect party, 267, 268; "by declamation," 318.

Grant, President, and treaty with Denmark, 51; nominates Smythe, 235.

Green, J. R., on Parliament and public opinion under Geo. III., 187, 188; on temper and embarrassments of the Parliament succeeding the Revolution Settlement in England, 313, 314.

Grevy, President, 248.

Hall of House of Representatives, size of, 86 _et seq_.

Hamilton, Alex., on balance between state and national govts., 16, 17; influence of, upon early policy of govt., 21; advocacy of protective duties, 22; announces doctrine of "implied powers," 22; 181, 259, 306, 307.

Hampden, John, 208.

Henry, Patrick, 209.

Hoar, G. F., Senator, on time for reporting given to Committees, 72; on suspension of the Rules in House, 111, 112.

House of Commons, _See_ 'Commons, House of.'

House of Lords, Bagehot on the, 220.

House of Representatives, _See_ 'Representatives, House of.'

Impeachment, 275, 276.

"Implied powers," enunciated by Hamilton, 22; sustained national bank, 22; McCulloch v. Maryland, 23; a vigorous principle of constitutional growth, 23; effect of, upon status of States, 23, 24; practical issue of doctrine of, 25 _et seq_.

Internal Improvements, 28; moral effect of, upon state policy, 29; history of policy of, 165-167; sums appropriated for, 167; character of opposition to, 197.

Jackson, President, 166, 204; why chosen President, 252; 259, 266.

James II., 213.

Jefferson, Thos., leads his party as President, 41, 204, 252.

Johnson, President, contest of, with Senate, 49.

Judiciary, power of, to control Executive, 34, 35; power of, to control Congress, 35, 36; change of party color in, 37; power of Congress over, 38, 39.

Judiciary Act of 1789, 39.

Kentucky, protest of, against Alien and Sedition Laws, 21.

Leaders, absence of authoritative, in Congress, 58, 92, 205, 212, 315; lacking in parties of U. S., 187; raised up by the constitutional struggles before the war, 199 _et seq_.; slavery and anti-slavery, 201, 202; no offices for political, in U. S., 203; training necessary for, 255, 256; political, authority of, in England, 323.

Leadership, conditions of political, in U. S., 204 _et seq_., 323; character of legislative, 206 _et seq_.; lack of, in Senate, 212, 213; the prize of, 214; lack of, in U. S. makes parties conglomerate, 324.

"Legal tender" decision, 33, n., 38.

Legislation, character of, determined by privileges of Committees and necessity for haste, 74; compromise character of, in Congress, 101; conglomerate and heterogeneous, 113, 325; part of President in, by virtue of veto power, 260, 266; and administration contrasted, 273, 274; Buckle on present value of, 295; nature of present task of, 295, 296; generates legislation, 297; not more important than administration, 297; general function of, 301, 302; tendency toward widening sphere of, 316, 317.

Legislative service divorced from Executive, in U. S., 251-253.

"Letter" of Secretary of Treasury to Congress, 149, 153.

Lincoln, President, 259, 283, n.

"Literary theory" of the Constitution, 12, 268, 284; marred by growth of federal powers, 30.

Lobbying in Congress, 189, 190.

Lodge, H. C., quoted with regard to Hamilton, 21, 22.

"Log-rolling," 169.

Lords, House of, Bagehot on, 220.

Louisiana, purchase of, 20, 43.

Lowell, J. R., on "government by declamation," 318.

Macaulay, criticism of legislative leadership by, 207.

Machiavelli, on responsibility of ministers, 275.

Maclay, Wm., Sketches of First Senate by, quoted, 24, n.

McMaster, J. B., quoted, 19.

Madison, President, 165, refuses to meet Senate, 234, n.

_Magna Carta_, and the Constitution of U. S., 7.

Member, the new, embarrassments of, in the House, 61 _et seq_.

Members, suppression of independence and ability amongst, in the House, by the Rules, 110.

Membership, of Senate, made up by promotions from House, 210; of Senate, biennially renewed in part, 228, 229.

Mill, J. S., "legislative commission" proposed by, 115, 129, 192.

Ministry, parliamentary debate centres around British, 95; disintegrate, in Congress, 102; parliamentary position of British, 95, 244; British, a single Standing Committee of Parliament, 117; necessity of public debate to British, 119; British, compared with French, 123, 124, 129; history of parliamentary responsibility of British, 286-288.

Monroe, President, 165, 252.

"Morning hours," 73.

_Nation_, the, letter to, on federal financial system, quoted, 191; on status of Cabinet, quoted, 269.

National sovereignty, growth of sentiment of, 31, 32; sentiment of, makes advent and issue of the war inevitable, 32.

Newcastle, Duke of, 286.

Nominations, the Senate and, 235; popular interest attaching to action of Senate on, 236, 237; of Presidents by conventions, virtual character of, 245.

North, Lord, 287, 308.

Northcote, Sir Stafford, 322.

Offices, political and non-political, 290, 291.

Orators, character of the ruling, of our race, 208 _et seq_.; natural leaders of a self-governing people, 209; Froude on political, 215; political, without authority or responsibility in U. S., 319 _et seq_.; political weight of, in England, 321-324.

Otis, James, 209.

Parties, vagueness of responsibility of, for legislation in U. S., 96-101; both, represented on Standing Committees, 99; in U. S., absence of responsible organization in, 187; in U. S., headless, conglomerate character of, 324; in Congress, discipline of, 326, 327; in Congress, kept together by caucus, 330.

Parton, on purposes of a national parliament, 250, 251.

Party, govt. by, practical necessity for, 97 _et seq_.; organization, outside Congress, 98; inside Congress, 99; choice of Speaker by, 107; govt. by, perfected in British system, 117 _et seq_.; diversity between Executive and Congress, 267; conditions of govt. by, 267, 268; relations of President and Cabinet, 269; insignificance of Cabinet, 270; leaders in England, weight and position of, 322.

Peel, Sir Robt., 209; on questions asked Prime Minister in the Commons, 300.

Pension Act, in 48th Congress, 79-81.

"Permanent appropriations," 152, 153.

Pitt, Wm., 209; elected to rule Commons, 249.

Political discretion of President and Congress, 34, 35.

Power, diffusion of, in Congress, 92, 206; irresponsible, 92, 93, 314; _and accountability_, 283, 284.

Presidency, tendency to raise governors of States to the, 253.

President, the, and Supreme Court, relations between, 35; independence and influence of, 41; declining prestige of office of, 43; belittled by growth of congressional power, 43; and Cabinet, division of labor between, 45, 46; veto power of, 52, 260; and Senate, no real consultation between, 232 _et seq_.; irresponsible dictation of Senate to, 238, 239; functional contrast of, with English Prime Minister, 249; conditions surrounding choice of a, by convention, 250, 251; character of usual functions of, 254; not all of the Executive, 257; relations of, to Cabinet, 258, 259; De Tocqueville on position of, 266, n.; party relations of, 269; party insignificance of, 270; and Congress, defective means of cooperation between, 270, 271.

President of French Assembly, functions and powers of, 125, 126.

Presidents, character and influence of the early, 41; decline of character of, along with crystallization of electoral system, 42; real method of electing, 243 _et seq_.

Press, the, political influence of, in U. S., 305, 306, 319-321; in England, subordinate to political leaders, 321.

Previous Question, 75, 90; in the Senate, 211, n., 218.

Prime Minister, method of selecting a, in England and France, 248; and President, contrast between, 249; questions asked the, in House of Commons, 300.

Printing, prerogatives of Committee on, 71, 72; of unspoken speeches, 91.

"Private bill day," 73.

Protective policy of Committee of Ways and Means, 172-174.

Public life, conditions of, in U. S., 195 _et seq_.; in England, 214; attractiveness of leadership in, 214.

Public opinion, not instructed by congressional debate, 101; difficulties of, in understanding and controlling Congress, 186-189; not led in U. S., 187; distrust of Congress by, 188; confusion of, with regard to congressional policy, 280; instruction of, important duty of representative assembly, 297 _et seq_.; information of, by inquisitive public body, 300, 301; leaders of English, 322; paralysis of, in U. S., 331.

Pulteney, 286, 287.

Randolph, John, 89; interview of, with Treasury officials, 162, 163.

"Reconstruction," reflected altered condition of balance between state and federal govts., 32, 33.

"Record," Congressional, unspoken speeches in, 91; little read, 94.

Reform Bill of 1832 in England, 220.

Reichstag, consent of, necessary to policy in Germany, 59.

Reports, of Standing Committees, time given to, 72; backed by neither party, 96; thoroughly considered in early Congresses, 106; of Committee on Appropriations, privileges of, 153, 154; of Conference Committees, extraordinary privilege of, 158; annual, of Treasury, referred to Committee of Ways and Means, 170, 171; of Committee on Appropriations preferred to reports of Committee of Ways and Means, 174.

Representative assemblies, duties and means of, in instructing public opinion, 298 _et seq_.; supremacy of, in every system of self-government, 311.

Representative government, government by advocacy, 208.

Representatives, House of, 58-192; position of Speaker in, 59, 103-108; led by chairmen of Standing Committees, 60; multiplicity of leaders in, 61; rules of, restrain individual activity, 63; introduction of bills in, 64; bills in, introduced on Mondays, 66; early course of bills in, 67, 68; daily course of business in, 73; press of time in business of, 74, 90; conditions of debate in, 75 _et seq_.; absence of instinct of debate in, 79; best discussion impossible in, 86; hall of, 86, 87; debate in, in former times, 89; compared with Roman assembly, 109; concentration of federal power in, 110; suspension of rules of, to pass bills, 111, 112; compared with British Commons, 116 _et seq_.; with English and French chambers, 129; disintegrate character of, 210; "latent unity" of, with Senate, 224.

Responsibility, of administrators, to representative chamber for inefficiency, 274, 276, 277; of ministers Machiavelli on, 275; scattering of, by federal constitutional system, 281; _with power_, 283, 284; of Executive, and civil service reform, 285 _et seq_.; history of ministerial, in England, 286 _et seq_.

Resumption Act of 1875, 185.

Revenue, controlled by House Committee of Ways and Means and Senate Committee on Finance, 169; policy of Committee of Ways and Means and of English Chancellor of Exchequer, 171-175; subordinate to Supply in Congress, 174, 175.

Revolution, English, of 1688, character of Parliament succeeding the, 313.

Revolution, French, 20, 43.

Rivers and Harbors, Committee on, 165; prerogatives of Committee on, 167; Committee on, and "log-rolling," 168.

Rockingham, Lord, 287.

Roman assembly and House of Representatives, 109.

Rosebery, Lord, on the Senate, 228.

Rules of House, restrict individual activity of members of House, 63; support privileges of Standing Committees, 66, 71, 74; complexity of, 73, 74; principle of, 74; readopted biennially, 104; repress independence and ability, 110; oligarchy of Committee on, 111; suspension of, to pass bills, 111, 112.

St. Thomas, treaty with Denmark regarding island of, 50, 51.

Secession, character of contest over, 198, 199.

Senate, the, 193-241; overt character of contests of, with President, 48; efforts of, to control nominations, 49; usurpations of, and civil service reform, 49; semi-executive powers of, in regard to foreign policy, 49 _et seq_.; and treaty with Denmark, 50; and Alabama claims, 51; thoroughness of discussion in, 94; amendment of appropriation bills by, 155, 156; usual estimates of, 193, 194; character and composition of, 194, 195; conditions of public life, shaping character of, 195 _et seq_.; a select House of Representatives, 210; contrasts of, with the House, 211; organized like the House, 212; choice of Committees in, 212; absence of leadership in, 213 _et seq_.; character of debate in, 216 _et seq_.; equality of, with House of Representatives, 223; and House of Representatives, "latent unity" between, 224; not a class chamber, 225; limits democracy in Constitution, 226; dignity and remove from popular heat of, 227; a real check upon the House, 228; liability of, to biennial change in membership, 228, 229; "slow and steady" forms of, 230; share of, in control of executive departments, 231; and President, no real consultation between, 232 _et seq_.; and President, means of consultation between, 234; and nominations, 235, _et seq_.; "courtesy" of, 238; irresponsible dictation of, to President, 238.

Sherman, Roger, 268.

Silver Bill, the Bland, 185.

Slavery, character of contest over, 198-202, _passim_.

Smith, Robt., Secretary of Treasury, 162.

Smythe, nominated Minister to St. Petersburg by Pres. Grant, 235.

Speaker, of House of Representatives, appoints leaders of House, 60; prerogatives of, 103-108; appoints Standing Committees, 103; history of appointing power of, 104; power of appointing of, renewed with Rules, 105; chosen by party vote, 107; personal character of, 107; use of power by, in constituting and aiding Committees, 108; concentration of power in hands of, 110, 111; of House of Commons, functions and character of, 122.

Stages of national political growth, before civil war, 200; since, 202.

"Star Route" trials, 178, n.

State and federal governments, balance between, _See_ 'Federal and state governments.'

States, the, disadvantages of direct taxation to, 133.

Sumner, Chas., Chairman Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 235.

Sumner, Prof. W. G., on task of legislator, 296.

Sunderland, Earl of, 314.

Supervision of elections by federal govt., 27.

Supply, Committee of, in House of Commons, 137-139; vital character of votes of, in House of Commons, 139; Committee of, in House of Representatives, 154; questions of, take precedence of questions of revenue in Congress, 174.

Surpluses, 173, 174, 179.

Suspension of Rules, bills passed under a, in House, 111, 112.

Swiss Constitution and bicameral system, 221.

Tariff of 1833, character of contest over, 198.

Taxation, sensitiveness of people concerning, 131; direct and indirect, 132, 133; Mr. Gladstone on direct and indirect, 134; direct, by States, indirect, by federal govt., 133.

Telegraph lines, constitutional interpretation in connection with, 30, 31.

Tenure of Office Act, 49, 277.

Terms of office, short, 255; of the Secretaries, 261, 264 _et seq_.

Tocqueville, De, on position of President, 266, n.

Townshend, Chas., 207, 208.

Treasury, accessibility of heads of British, in the Commons, 146, 147; "Letter" from Secretary of, 149; annual reports of, referred to Committee of Ways and Means, 170; character of annual reports of, 170, 171; Secretary of, duties of, 263; non-political character of functions of Secretary of, 264.

"Tribune" of French Assembly, 127, 128.

Turgot, M., on bicameral system of U. S., 220.

Van Buren, Martin, 259.

Veto, power of, 52, 260.

Vice-President, the, 240, 241.

Victorian Parliament, two chambers of, 223.

Virginia, protest of, against Alien and Sedition Laws, 21.

Walpole, Sir Robt., 208, 286.

War, change wrought by the civil, in constitutional methods and in constitutional criticism, 5 _et seq_.; the civil, a struggle between nationality and principles of disintegration, 32; opened a new period of public life in U. S., 195.

Washington, antagonisms in first Cabinet of, 2; influence of the Executive under, 41, 246, 252, 259.

Ways and Means, debate of, 78; "Brahmins" of Committee of, 111; chairmen of, federal Chancellors of Exchequer, 134; preference of Committee of, for indirect taxation, 134; Committee of, in House of Commons, 139-144; weight of votes of Committee of, in Commons, 142; House Committee of, formerly controlled appropriations, 161; character of Committee of, 170; policy of Committee of, compared with policy of English Chancellor of Exchequer, 171-175; reports of, deferred to reports of Committee on Appropriations, 174, 183, 184.

"Ways and Means Bills," 143, 144.

Webster, Daniel, 89, 204, 218, 252, 259.

William the Silent, 207, 208.

William III., 313, 314.

Windham, Wm., 207, 208.

Year, British financial, 140; federal financial, 148.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] These are Mr. Bagehot's words with reference to the British constitutional system. See his _English Constitution_ (last American edition), p. 69.

[2] _Works_, vol. vi., p. 467: "Letter to Jno. Taylor." The words and sentences omitted in the quotation contain Mr. Adams's opinions as to the value of the several balances, some of which he thinks of doubtful utility, and others of which he, without hesitation, pronounces altogether pernicious.

[3] _Federalist_, No. 17.

[4] Cooley's _Principles of Const. Law_, p. 143.

[5] McMaster, _Hist. of the People of the U. S._, vol. i., p. 564.

[6] Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_ (Am. Statesmen Series), p. 85.

[7] Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_, p. 105.

[8] Its final and most masterly exposition, by C. J. Marshall, may be seen in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 316.

[9] The following passage from William Maclay's _Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United States_ (pp. 292-3) illustrates how clearly the results of this were forecast by sagacious men from the first: "The system laid down by these gentlemen (the Federalists) was as follows, or rather the development of the designs of a certain party: The general power to carry the Constitution into effect by a constructive interpretation would extend to every case that Congress may deem necessary or expedient.... The laws of the United States will be held paramount to all "state" laws, claims, and even constitutions. The supreme power is with the general government to decide in this, as in everything else, for the States have neglected to secure any umpire or mode of decision in case of difference between them. Nor is there any point in the Constitution for them to rally under. They may give an opinion, but the opinions of the general government must prevail.... Any direct and open act would be termed usurpation. But whether the gradual influence and encroachments of the general government may not gradually swallow up the state governments, is another matter."

[10] Pensacola Tel. Co. _v_. West. Union, 96 U. S. 1, 9. (Quoted by Judge Cooley in his _Principles of Constitutional Law_.)

[11] 18 Stat., part 3, 336. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339.

[12] Sect. 5515 Rev. Stats. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371. Equally extensive of federal powers is that "legal tender" decision (Juilliard _v_. Greenman) of March, 1884, which argues the existence of a right to issue an irredeemable paper currency from the Constitution's grant of other rights characteristic of sovereignty, and from the possession of a similar right by other governments. But this involves no restriction of state powers; and perhaps there ought to be offset against it that other decision (several cases, October, 1883), which denies constitutional sanction to the Civil Rights Act.

[13] _Principles of Constitutional Law_, pp. 143, 144.

[14] Marbury _v_. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137.

[15] Cooley's _Principles_, p. 157.

[16] For an incisive account of the whole affair, see an article Entitled "The Session," _No. Am. Review_, vol. cxi., pp. 48, 49.

[17] 7 Wall. 506.

[18] For a brilliant account of the senatorial history of these two treaties, see the article entitled "The Session," _No. Am. Rev._, vol. cviii. (1869), p. 626 _et seq._

[19] In an article entitled "The Conduct of Business in Congress" (_North American Review_, vol. cxxviii. p. 113), to which I am indebted for many details of the sketch in the text.

[20] No Committee is entitled, when called, to occupy more than the morning hours of two successive days with the measures which it has prepared; though if its second morning hour expire while the House is actually considering one of its bills, that single measure may hold over from morning hour to morning hour until it is disposed of.

[21] Quoted from an exceedingly life-like and picturesque description of the House which appeared in the New York _Nation_ for April 4, 1878.

[22] _No. Am. Rev._, vol. xxvi., p. 162.

[23] _Id._, the same article.

[24] "Glances at Congress," _Dem. Rev._, March, 1839.

[25] _Autobiography_, pp. 264, 265.

[26] _The National Budget, etc._ (English Citizen Series), p. 146. In what I have to say of the English system, I follow this volume, pp. 146-149, and another volume of the same admirable series, entitled _Central Government_, pp. 36-47, most of my quotations being from the latter.

[27] See an article entitled "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," by the late President Garfield, _North American Review_, vol cxxviii. pp 578 _et seq._

[28] Senator Hoar's article, already several times quoted.

[29] Adams's _John Randolph_. American Statesman Series, pp. 210, 211.

[30] On one occasion "the House passed thirty-seven pension bills at one sitting. The Senate, on its part, by unanimous consent, took up and passed in about ten minutes seven bills providing for public buildings in different States, appropriating an aggregate of $1,200,000 in this short time. A recent House feat was one in which a bill, allowing 1,300 war claims in a lump, was passed. It contained one hundred and nineteen pages full of little claims, amounting in all to $291,000; and a member, in deprecating criticism on this disposition of them, said that the Committee had received ten huge bags full of such claims, which had been adjudicated by the Treasury officials, and it was a physical impossibility to examine them."--N. Y. _Sun_, 1881.

[31] Congress, though constantly erecting new Committees, never gives up old ones, no matter how useless they may have become by subtraction of duties. Thus there is not only the superseded Committee on Public Expenditures but the Committee on Manufactures also, which, when a part of the one-time Committee on Commerce and Manufactures, had plenty to do, but which, since the creation of a distinct Committee on Commerce, has had nothing to do, having now, together with the Committees on Agriculture and Indian Affairs, no duties assigned to it by the rules. It remains to be seen whether the Committee on Commerce will suffer a like eclipse because of the gift of its principal duties to the new Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

[32] See the report of this Committee, which was under the chairmanship of Senator Windom.

An illustration of what the House Committees find by special effort may be seen in the revelations of the investigation of the expenses of the notorious "Star Route Trials" made by the Forty-eighth Congress's Committee on Expenditures in the department of Justice.

[33] See General Garfield's article, already once quoted, _North American Review_, vol. cxxviii. p. 533.

[34] _Essays on Parliamentary Reform._

[35] Green's _History of the English People_, vol. iv., pp. 202, 203.

[36] "G. B." in N. Y. _Nation_, Nov. 30, 1882.

[37] An attempt was once made to bring the previous question into the practices of the Senate, but it failed of success, and so that imperative form of cutting off all further discussion has fortunately never found a place there.

[38] As regards all financial measures indeed committee supervision is specially thorough in the Senate. "All amendments to general appropriation bills reported from the Committees of the Senate, proposing new items of appropriation, shall, one day before they are offered, be referred to the Committee on Appropriations, and all general appropriation bills shall be referred to said Committee; and in like manner amendments to bills making appropriations for rivers and harbors shall be again referred to the Committee to which such bills shall be referred."--Senate Rule 30.

[39] The twenty-nine Standing Committees of the Senate are, however, chosen by ballot, not appointed by the Vice-President, who is an appendage, not a member, of the Senate.

[40] In the Birmingham Town Hall, November 3, 1882. I quote from the report of the _London Times_.

[41] "No Senator shall speak more than twice, in any one debate, on the same day, without leave of the Senate."--Senate Rule 4.

[42] These quotations from Bagehot are taken from various parts of the fifth chapter of his _English Constitution_.

[43] These are the words of Lord Rosebery--testimony from the oldest and most celebrated second chamber that exists.

[44] There seems to have been at one time a tendency towards a better practice. In 1813 the Senate sought to revive the early custom, in accordance with which the President delivered his messages in person, by requesting the attendance of the President to consult upon foreign affairs; but Mr. Madison declined.

[45] _North American Review_, vol. 108, p. 625.

[46] _English Constitution_, chap, viii., p. 293.

[47] _Atlantic Monthly_, vol. xxv., p. 148.

[48] Something like this has been actually proposed by Mr. Albert Stickney, in his interesting and incisive essay, _A True Republic_.

[49] State, Treasury, War, Navy.

[50] As quoted in _Macmillan's Magazine_, vol. vii., p. 67.

[51] I quote from an excellent handbook, _The United States Government_, by Lamphere.

[52] "In America the President cannot prevent any law from being passed, nor can he evade the obligation of enforcing it His sincere and zealous cooperation is no doubt useful, but it is not indispensable, in the carrying on of public affairs. All his important acts are directly or indirectly submitted to the legislature, and of his own free authority he can do but little. It is, therefore, his weakness, and not his power, which enables him to remain in opposition to Congress. In Europe, harmony must reign between the Crown and the other branches of the legislature, because a collision between them may prove serious; in America, this harmony is not indispensable, because such a collision is impossible."--De Tocqueville, i. p. 124.

[53] _Westminster Review_, vol. lxvi., p. 193.

[54] Tenure of Office Act, already discussed.

[55] These "ifs" are abundantly supported by the executive acts of the war-time. The Constitution had then to stand aside that President Lincoln might be as prompt as the seeming necessities of the time.

[56] _Central Government_ (Eng. Citizen Series), II. D. Traill, p. 20.

[57] Professor Sumner's _Andrew Jackson_ (American Statesmen Series), p. 226. "Finally," adds Prof. S., "the methods and machinery of democratic republican self-government--caucuses, primaries, committees, and conventions--lend themselves perhaps more easily than any other methods and machinery to the uses of selfish cliques which seek political influence for interested purposes."

[58] Bagehot: _Essay on Sir Robert Peel_, p. 24.

[59] H. C. Lodge's _Alexander Hamilton_ (Am. Statesmen Series), pp. 60, 61.

[60] Bagehot, _Eng. Const._, p. 293.

[61] Bagehot, _Eng. Const._, p. 296.

[62] Green: _Hist. of the English People_ (Harpers' ed.), iv., pp 58, 59.

[63] _Statesman's Manual_, i. p. 244.

[64] Mr. Dale, of Birmingham.

End of Project Gutenberg's Congressional Government, by Woodrow Wilson

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