Chapter XI: General Outline of the Campaign Against Huerta

To get a clear conception of the strategic work achieved by the three divisions of the East, North and West, it is advisable to look at the map of Mexico.

Mexico is broadest at the American border and tapers exactly like a cornucopia at the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Mexico City lies in a valley 7,400 feet high, within twelve hours’ ride from Vera Cruz, and being the centre of all the railroads of Mexico, is therefore of the utmost strategical importance.

Huerta, from Mexico City, could reach all his troops anywhere in Mexico, either by rail or water. The Constitutionalists in Sonora were separated from the Northern division by a high range of mountains, and the Northern division from the Eastern division by another range. Zapata could not communicate very easily with the three northern divisions, and was not able to assist them directly.

STRATEGIC R.R. LINES.]

Huerta’s strategy consisted in keeping his soldiers in the large cities, at the border towns, always hugging the railroad lines. The federals very seldom attacked in the open, as the lack of horses detracted from their mobility.

The Western division had for its object the control of the railroad, starting from Nogales, through Hermosillo to Guaymas in Sonora, then to Culiacán, Mazatlán in Sinaloa, through San Blas, Tepic into the State of Jalisco, to the capital Guadalajara. Once Guadalajara was captured, the aim of the campaign was achieved, and Obregon had only to wait for the arrival and junction of the Northern and Eastern division near Celaya, to march to Mexico City. The difficulties encountered by the Western and Eastern divisions were trebled by a condition which did not exist in the case of the Northern division under Villa, the fact that the seaports on the Pacific and Atlantic which were always at the mercy of the federals, could feed and supply and augment the contingent of soldiers in the ports.

On the Pacific side, the Federals controlled Guaymas, Topolobampo, Altata, Mazatlán, San Blas and Manzanillo,--and on the Atlantic side they controlled Matamoros, Tampico, Tuxpan, Vera Cruz and Puerto Mexico.

The Western division, under Obregon, captured one by one all the border towns, and later most of the seaports,--and in spite of the fact that Guaymas stuck to the last, the Western division had so effectively cooped up the Federals in that port, that they were not interfering with their downward course towards Guadalajara. General Gonzalez acted on the same principle. He first captured the border towns, and then Victoria the capital of Tamaulipas. With the fall of Tampico, the Federals in San Luis Potosí were outflanked.

General Villa did the same. After he controlled the border cities, he concentrated all his energies on the capture of Torreon.

The three chiefs of divisions, East, North and West, co-operated with one another under the direction of Carranza. They were supplied with money, arms and ammunition by the organization created by Carranza in the different States, and directed by the efforts of the members of the provisional cabinet.

Zapata by his activity, aided by that of Genovevo de la O and several other chiefs in the South, forced Huerta to keep about forty thousand soldiers in the South.

The railroads created new strategic lines--

1st. From Nogales at the border, the railroad goes almost uninterruptedly through Sonora, Sinaloa and Tepic, with the exception of a gap between Tepic and Guadalajara.

2d. From Juarez the railroad runs through Chihuahua, Durango and Zacatecas into Aguascalientes.

3d. From Ciudad Porfirio Diaz through Coahuila into Nuevo Leon, and to San Luis Potosí, and from Monterrey to Tampico.

They represent the lines which had to be controlled by the three divisions. Then there were lines connecting Torreon with Saltillo and Monterrey,--and Aguascalientes with San Luis Potosí.

The assertion that either one of the three chiefs of the divisions was solely responsible for the success of the revolution is absurd and inexact.

Let us admit for instance, that Obregon had reached Guadalajara, and tried to march through Celaya to Mexico City alone, before Villa had taken Aguascalientes, or General Gutierrez taken San Luis Potosí. He would then have been attacked in the rear by the Federals.

In Villa’s case, if he had captured Aguascalientes and tried to march south to Mexico City, without waiting for Obregon to take Guadalajara, or General Gutierrez, San Luis Potosí, he would have also been attacked in the rear.

General Gonzalez in his turn, could not march south as long as San Luis Potosí was in the possession of Federals.

The three chiefs had to work together, and the utter defeat of either of the three separately, spelled disaster for the rest. It is fortunate for Mexico that this campaign should have created four strong soldiers “on horseback” for the danger to Mexico’s liberties always appeared with one man as the hero, who subsequently turned to be the “villain.” When there is more than one savior or liberator, they are apt to be so busy watching one another, that Mexico’s liberties are more likely to be respected.