Chapter X: Part II (6)

The charges brought by the _Diario Español_, and to which the above characteristic epistle was the reply, were endorsed to a greater or less extent by public opinion in Madrid. On the 12th of August, Mr Soulé, unable to attend the banquet given by the Press, had addressed to the committee of management a letter, in which occurred the following passage: “The heart of Young America, doubt it not, will palpitate with joy and delight at the breath of the perfumed breeze that shall waft to it across the ocean the acclamations of liberated Spain. May I be permitted to say, that mine is intoxicated with felicity by the hope that Europe, apathetic though it seem, will not suffer those germs of regeneration, which the sublime sacrifice of some of her sons has just so miraculously caused to sprout, to become debilitated, and to die.” It is charitably supposed, by those who credit the American minister’s participation in the events of the 28th August, that the intoxication referred to in this flowery and figurative paragraph had not entirely passed away at that date, and that the writer of the letter to the dining committee thought it his duty, as the representative of Young America, to contribute his aid to that germination of regeneration which apathetic Spain showed herself tardy in promoting. At the same time, there certainly are not wanting evil-disposed persons, who affirm that Mr Soulé has so concentrated his vision on his adopted country, that he can scarcely discern any other; that he looks with contempt upon the herd of slaves who range about Europe, and that to him it would be matter of indifference to see the Old World perish, so that the New World prospered—and, with it, his ambition. It has further been said that, neither prudent nor scrupulous in the means he employed, he condescended assiduously to court that Dowager Queen whose whole life has been a contradiction to the principles he professes, and to admit the society of a yet more illegitimate influence at the Spanish court. It has been declared, and believed by many, that Mr Soulé, knowing that the government of Espartero and O’Donnell was not one that he could either intimidate or buy, and beholding in its character an insurmountable obstacle to the attainment of the great object of his desires, resolved to work for its downfall by every means in his power, and that, notwithstanding his fervent sympathy with the welfare and liberties of Spain, he would have preferred either anarchy or despotism to the triumph of a system which, whilst maintaining those liberties, rendered more and more remote the prospect of realisation of that cherished project, whose accomplishment would introduce a new star “into the celestial vault of Young America,” and at the same time vastly add to the importance and popularity in the States of the American minister at Madrid. All these things have been said, and have found wide credence in this capital and elsewhere.

Enough, however, on this branch of the subject. The sum of ten million dollars, demanded by Mr Pierce to make head against the possible contingency of a war with Spain, having been refused him by the American Senate, the probabilities of such a war occurring are greatly diminished, and the Spanish government entertains little apprehension on that score. Upon the other hand, notwithstanding Mr Pierce’s declaration in his Message of the 1st August that the whole of the means which the constitution allows to the executive power should be employed to prevent the violation of law, treaties, and international right, contemplated by certain citizens of the United States, who, as the government was officially and positively informed, were fitting out an expedition for the invasion of Cuba—notwithstanding this assurance, I say, there appear grounds for fearing that, owing perhaps to the weakness of the executive arm in the States, the expedition in question will yet sail for the coveted shores of the Pearl of the Antilles. Whether, if attempted, it will meet the fate of that under Lopez, or whether it will succeed, not only in landing, but in holding its ground until it can receive those reinforcements which would probably flock to it from the Southern States, as soon as it became known there that it had occupied, and was maintaining, a position, is a matter of anxious uncertainty. The island is strongly garrisoned, but American riflemen are formidable opponents. The Spanish government feels confident of the result, and fully reckons on the fidelity and valour of the two or three and twenty thousand good troops now in Cuba. Where the Americans will be most deficient will doubtless be in cavalry and artillery. The Spaniards have a thousand dragoons, several batteries of field-artillery, and numerous large Paixhans guns garnishing the forts and batteries of the island. And although Spanish cavalry, judging from what we see here, is generally but indifferently mounted, it is abundantly able to cope with irregular infantry, and indeed would prove most formidable to the invaders, if they ventured forth from the shelter of forests and hedges, or from the broken ground favourable to sharp-shooters. As to the courage of the men, when well led, there is no doubt of that. Good leading, which they have rarely had, is all that Spaniards want to be as valiant troops as any in Europe. Only the other day, at Vicálvaro, with General Garrigó and other brave and determined officers at their head, regiments of dragoons repeatedly galloped up to the very mouths of batteries, which received them, at a few yards’ distance, with volleys of grape. Men who would do this, would hardly flinch from charging irregular riflemen, however accurate and deadly their fire. The Spanish artillery is considered the best arm in the service; it is certainly the one with which the most pains are taken, and which possesses the best-instructed officers. The infantry now in Cuba is about twenty thousand strong, well disciplined, in good condition, and accustomed to the climate. Were these forces, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, concentrated in the field against the American pirates, it is difficult to believe that the latter could succeed in getting together, or at least in landing, a force capable of resisting their attack. To speak positively on this point, however, it would be necessary to be somewhat in the confidence of the _filibusteros_, or at least to know more than is positively known of their resources, plans, and places of rendezvous. But even supposing that they muster more than we, in our imperfect information, think probable, it is to be borne in mind that the very best irregular troops, however formidable their valour and skill with their weapons may render them in small numbers, are far less to be feared when they act in large masses. Then the deficiency in discipline and drill tells heavily against them. I am far from underrating the indomitable pluck of the Americans, or their coolness or steadiness when in peril, and only desire to see those valuable qualities displayed in a better cause than the one to which we are assured they are shortly to be devoted. But in an open plain, or in the attack of a fortress, and when opposed to regular troops of average bravery, something more than pluck and coolness is required. Upon the other hand, it must not be forgotten, when we seek to strike the balance of chances, that the garrison of Cuba could not be brought entire into the field. Certain forts, and towns, and positions must be held, and although it is probable that many of these would be left to the keeping of the numerous volunteers that would take up arms the moment an invasion occurred, still portions of the garrison must be detached from the main body. An intelligent Spaniard, who has spent several years in Cuba, and but recently returned thence, gave it me as his opinion that from ten to twelve thousand men could be employed as the army of operation. He estimated the present garrison at rather under twenty thousand men effective for the field, which is somewhat less than the government estimate. The European Spaniards in the island he believed to be about fifty thousand, a large proportion Basques and Catalans, and who would readily enrol themselves as volunteers in case of peril, would prove formidable antagonists, and fight desperately for their homes and property. As to the native Cubans, many of them would be likely to join the Americans, if these were strong, and gained advantages at first starting; but if the invaders were worsted, the Cubans would fly to arms and vaunt their fidelity to Spain. The negroes, who have no wish to exchange Spanish for American masters, and who are aware of the many disadvantages under which even a free man of colour labours in the States, would all be ready to fight, if arms were given to them. The negro mode of fighting, as described to me by persons who are well acquainted with it, is peculiar and dangerous. They fire a volley, receive the enemy’s fire, throw away their muskets, and rush in with cutlass or poniard.

The long narrow shape of the island of Cuba, which bears a strong resemblance to a lizard with the head looking eastward, is favourable to its defenders, since it facilitates the cutting off of the invading force. It will be a great advantage if General Concha’s arrival takes place previously to any attack. He is the very man to command under such circumstances. Quick of eye and ready of resource, he will inspire the troops with confidence, and raise the courage of the Cubans. Amongst these he has, what no captain-general of Cuba in our time has had, a strong party—persons who are attached to him, like his mode of administration, prefer him to any other captain-general, and will stand by him to the utmost with all the influence and power they may possess. This is a principal reason why he readily and gladly accepted the destination towards which he is now steaming,—if indeed he has not arrived there, since his departure from Corunna took place upwards of a fortnight ago. The Spanish government—and indeed Spaniards generally, as far as my means of observation extend—entertain a sanguine belief that, with the troops at his command, and with the moral and physical support of the majority of the dwellers on the island, Concha will so handle the intruding annexionists as to make them heartily repent their unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression.

There are other points to be taken into consideration when we discuss the probable issue of the anticipated conflict. One of these, on which such conflicting testimony has been given that it is scarcely possible to form a decided opinion with respect to it, is the amount of support the Americans would find in the island itself. The Spaniards, as I have above intimated, think it would be unimportant. Ask a Yankee annexionist, and he will tell you that the whole island, with the exception of the European Spaniards resident in it, pines for release from the intolerable yoke of Spain, longs to hoist the Stripes and Stars, and to cling to the proud neck of the American eagle. I have been told by Americans of the numbers of letters received from inhabitants of Cuba, expressive of these sentiments, and imploring sympathy and assistance. But it must be observed that a few malcontents, or American settlers in the island, would suffice to circulate an immense number of such complaints and prayers. One may imagine, for instance, the consignees of the Black Warrior, after inditing their submissive and penitent letters to the governor-general, and their petition to the Queen of Spain for the remission of the fine, dipping their sharpest iron pen into the ink-bottle, and relieving their afflicted souls by throwing off screaming despatches to their friends in New York and New Orleans, inveighing against the tyranny of Spanish rule, and longing for the day when Cuba should join the Union. By those to whom such letters were welcome, they would naturally be made the most of; they would be handed about, talked of, and their contents verbally repeated, until it would seem as if a hundred letters had arrived instead of one. The Spaniards themselves admit that a part of the Creole population would be glad to see the island detached from Spain. To these I suppose we may safely add, as partisans of Cuba’s becoming a State of the Union, all the Anglo-Americans resident in the island. Beyond this, I am in possession of no trustworthy evidence; and when I say that only a small portion of the Creoles or native whites are disaffected to the Spanish government, I state it, as you will observe, on Spanish authority, but, at the same time, on the authority of Spaniards long resident in the island, particularly capable, by their position and intelligence, of forming a correct judgment, and the sole drawback to the value of whose opinion is the admissible supposition that it may be biassed by their natural wishes on the subject.

Supposing that, in the autumn of 1854, an American expedition, starting from Florida, or from one of the small islands in the Bahama channel, made a descent upon Cuba, were entirely worsted, and cut off or compelled to re-embark. How long a time would elapse before a third expedition were got ready? Would not the interval probably be shorter than the one between the Lopez expedition and the present date? The dogged tenacity of a certain class of Americans, when bent upon acquisition, is well known. And is it not probable that each expedition would exceed the preceding one in strength, until one went forth strong enough to triumph? The passage of the island from the feeble hands of bankrupt decrepid Spain into the strong ones of the young and vigorous Union, is a mere question of time, unless other nations interfere. Are any prepared to do so? England and France are of course the only powers to which Spain might look for aid to prevent her being robbed of her last valuable colony. And would she not look to them in vain, at least under present circumstances? I do not believe that the Spaniards reckon on such assistance. The reflecting portion of the nation—those who think upon the subject at all—seem convinced that the island must sooner or later pass from them. Some would be disposed to sell it, whilst it still has value, before the Americans feel so certain of getting it by other means that they will no longer feel disposed to disburse. Others, on the contrary, are for holding it to the last, burning the last cartridge before giving in, and, as a last desperate resource, emancipating the slaves. The most rational and profitable of the two courses would doubtless be the sale. And yet, owing to the ignorance and national conceit of a large number of Spaniards—who believe that the valour of Spanish troops must always suffice to guard Cuba, and who have not sufficient knowledge of the past and present history of the world to see that in the course of nature they must lose it—it would be difficult for any ministry to brave the storm of indignation that would here be raised by the sale of the island. It could, of course, under the present regime, be done only with the sanction of the Cortes; and perhaps the wisest thing the Espartero ministry could do would be to bring forward the subject when that body meets in November. To give advice to Spain is, I am aware, a delicate thing for foreign governments to do, but the men at present at the head of affairs here are not likely to mistake the motive, or to take offence at a well-intended counsel. If England and France be quite decided to take no steps towards the preservation of Cuba to Spain, and if the government of this country be not already perfectly aware of that decision, it would be but right to give it the information, so that it might fairly and fully appreciate its position and chances, and not delude itself with vain hopes, never to be realised, of ultimate succour from powerful allies.

Assuredly no Spanish government was ever more in want than is the present one of the pecuniary supplies which the sale of Cuba would place at its disposal. The state of the finances of the country is lamentable, and ministers are the more to be pitied, since their embarrassed position is the consequence of no fault of theirs, but of the scandalous misrule and malversation of several preceding governments, and especially of that of Sartorius. The Spanish and English newspapers have already supplied many details on this head. I will content myself with throwing together a few of the principal and most striking facts. When the present government assumed office, it found an empty treasury, and, even worse than that, the resources on which it might have reckoned for advances were already anticipated. There was no money anywhere. The Sartorius-Domenech-Collantes ministry had made a clean sweep of everything. The forced loan decreed on the 19th May, and which was to be paid during the months of June and July, had not flowed in with that gratifying rapidity announced by the organs of the _Polaco_ cabinet; but nevertheless about four hundred and seventy thousand pounds sterling had been collected, out of nearly two millions, which it was estimated that it should yield. Of the £470,000, about £140, or thirteen thousand reals, remained in the treasury. The confusion in the public accounts rendered necessary the appointment of commissioners to investigate them, and to report the real state of the finances. The labours of these commissioners brought to light a whole system of iniquity and of downright robbery. The most shameful jobs had been perpetrated; funds set apart for particular purposes, and which could not legally be otherwise employed, had been misappropriated; enormous amounts had been expended in secret-service money, of which no account was to be found; everything the government had to pay was in arrears, and all they had to receive was in advance. The result of the examination was to exhibit a balance against the treasury amounting to seven millions sterling, of two and a half millions of which the payment was urgent. To meet this heavy deficiency, equal to half a year’s revenue, the new ministry had literally nothing but their good intentions and recognised honesty—excellent things, but not always convertible into specie. The consequences of the revolution added to their embarrassments. Nothing was to be obtained from the provincial treasuries, which were found to be nearly all empty, some of them having been drained to the last real by the departed ministers; whilst in other cases there is reason to conclude that the local juntas, formed during the revolution, had spent the money. During the latter half of July, every place had its junta, legislating as it thought fit, taking off taxes, admitting foreign goods free of duty, sapping the foundations of the revenue. The effects of this on the revenue for the month of July was a diminution of a quarter of a million sterling, or fully one-fifth. Although, early in August, the juntas were prohibited from passing laws and altering the established system of the country, whilst since then many of them have altogether dissolved themselves, fears are entertained that for some months the revenue will continue below what it is in ordinary times. The period of revolution was a jubilee for the smuggler. At some points of the frontier he was suddenly converted into a fair trader by the abolition, decreed by juntas, of all import duties. But, amidst the confusion consequent on the revolution, he nowhere had any difficulty in carrying on his commerce. From Gibraltar, from Portugal, from France, foreign goods poured in, to the exhaustion of the smuggling depôts in those three countries. Those large illicit importations must for some time to come have a serious effect on the custom-house revenue. It is predicted that the falling-off in the whole revenue for August will be even greater than in that for July. This appears to me doubtful, although nearly certain in the item of custom duties; and on the other hand, we may hope the expenditure will be less under an honest and economical government—whose economy, however, has not, in every instance, been as rigorous as itself, I fully believe, earnestly desired. The difficulties environing a government that is borne into power in Spain on the billows of a revolution like that of 1854, are not to be imagined by any who have not witnessed them. To form some faint idea of them, one must be acquainted with the ramifications and extent of the _empleomania_—mania for place—which is the great curse of Spain, and which, when one beholds the extent to which it is carried, makes him almost despair of the improvement of the nation. It were reasonable to suppose that when Espartero and his colleagues took office, under as difficult circumstances, certainly, as any set of men that ever accepted it, even here, they would be allowed to give their whole time and undivided attention to the necessities of the country, to the getting rid of abuses, to the introduction of proper economics, to the adoption of measures calculated to improve the wretched financial situation. Not so: the idea of their supporters evidently was that their first duty was the portioning out of places, not only to old friends, but to many new ones—_libéraux du lendemain_. From the day they took office down to the present date, ministers have been besieged, pestered, overwhelmed, by a stream of applicants eager to live upon the budget. Espartero, from his popularity and influence, was the chief victim of these cormorants. For a very long time his anterooms were thronged from early morning till late at night, by persons who could not go away, who _would_ see the general, although perhaps the request they had to make had no possible connection with his department, and should have been addressed to some other minister, to the intendant of the palace, the captain-general of the province, or the civil governor of Madrid. Sometimes, when there were thirty or forty persons waiting at the door of his cabinet, all deaf to the remonstrances of weary _aides-de-camp_, he would come out himself, as if in despair at ever obtaining repose, despatch them all, one after the other, as quickly as might be, and then retreat with his secretary into his private room, giving orders that nobody should be admitted, to try to get two or three hours’ uninterrupted work before the usual hour for the sitting of the council arrived. And then the host of letters—nearly all prayers and petitions, setting forth the services and sufferings of the writers, and their strong claims to place or patronage! The supplicants were of all kinds and classes; from the colonel who thought his merits would not be over-rewarded by a brigadier’s embroideries, from the aspirant to some fat berth of many thousand reals a year, down to the suitor for a porter’s place or a sergeant’s stripes, and even to individuals desirous of being appointed _quitamanchas_, grease-spot extractors (fact) to the palace, and who could think of no more fitting person to apply to than the prime-minister. Ah this greedy mob pestered, and still pester, the president of the council, and in a less degree the other ministers, with their daily applications. The craving after place is disgusting to behold, and extends, with a few honourable exceptions, through all classes. As to patriotism in Spain, I have the utmost difficulty, after witnessing what has followed upon this revolution, in crediting its existence, except in the breasts of a small minority of the population. Patriotism here appears to consist in turning out one party in order that another may step into the enjoyment of the good things it possessed. It is truly sickening to hear the selfish cuckoo-song of the seekers after places, to hear them vaunt their past services, and tell of their sufferings for the liberal cause during the eleven long years that succeeded 1843—sufferings consisting, for the most part, when they come to be inquired into, simply in exclusion from those loaves and fishes for a share of which they now hungrily plead. With a certain and too-numerous class of Spaniards, a man is a patriot and a martyr by the mere fact of his drawing nothing from the treasury. There were many persons who really had done great service to the triumphant cause; men who had risked their lives, laboured hard, and been forward and most useful in the hour of danger. These men, on account both of their merits and of their abilities, had not to solicit, but were at once placed in high and responsible situations. For each one appointed, how many malcontents were made! Of these malcontents some must be conciliated; others had claims which deserved attention, and which they had not sufficient self-denial and love for their country altogether to withdraw. Under these circumstances, how was it possible for the government to economise as it should and might have done? The pressure brought to bear upon it, the influences exerted, were more than it could resist, and many a place was given that ought to have been suppressed in the interest of Spain’s exhausted treasury. It gives small hope for the future of a country when one sees even the best of her sons doing nothing without hope of reward, nothing for the pure and disinterested love of their native land. And to this rule, in Spain, I fear there are but few exceptions.

A careful investigation and calm review of the present state of the finances of Spain, leave upon the mind a strong doubt as to whether a national bankruptcy can possibly be avoided. I have exposed the misery of the treasury, as left by the ministry of Sartorius—seven millions sterling deficiency, and not as many pence in the coffers of the State for the pressing necessities of the new government. With some difficulty, and by the aid of the signature of the San Fernando Bank, the finance minister has obtained about fifty thousand pounds sterling, secured on colonial revenues. Of course, a very short time will see the last of that small sum; and what is then to be done, in presence of a revenue which it is expected, with good show of reason, will, for some time to come, be below an average? Economise, it may be said; but economy is not to be effected, on an important scale, at a few days’ notice. It is probably in the army that reform and reduction, if made, would most rapidly be felt. It is said to be the intention of the minister of war greatly to reduce it; and no opportunity can be better than the present, for when all the men who, in virtue of the boon of two years’ remission of service lately granted to the whole army, have completed their time, shall have received their discharge, the military forces of Spain will probably be smaller than they ever have been since the beginning of the Carlist war. The expense of the Spanish army is about three millions sterling—an enormous burthen on the scanty revenue. There are other burthens more difficult to diminish. The system pursued in this country of turning out numbers of public officers and employés when a new government comes in, to make room for its friends and supporters, has loaded Spain with pensions, half-pay, and retired allowances. These amount to a million and a half sterling. How is this load to be lightened? But very gradually, it is evident;—by filling up vacant places with pensioned men, whose pensions thereupon cease. To abolish all those pensions not due to long service or ill-health would be to condemn thousands of families to starvation, and to raise a storm that no government could withstand. Such a sweeping measure would not be just, nor is it practicable. A reform of the tariff is an obvious and most effectual means of improving the financial position. Let the government reduce the duties on foreign manufactured cottons to twenty per cent _ad valorem_. The importations (chiefly contraband) of that class of merchandise at present amounts, as I am informed, to about three millions sterling. A twenty-per-cent duty would demolish the smuggler, and yield the revenue six hundred thousand pounds a year. Would it not then be possible for Spain to get a small loan on reasonable terms, the coupons being accepted, as soon as due, in payment of custom-house duties, and an arrangement, or the promise of an early one, being at the same time made with respect to the amount of coupons which Bravo Murillo laid upon the shelf? It is, however, unnecessary to answer this question until we have reduced the duty. Here, again, great difficulties present themselves, and jealous interests bar the way. Catalonia and the smugglers would be in arms the very moment such a measure was promulgated. Catalonia, which produces (I speak from experience of its goods) wretched wares at exorbitant prices, has long been the great impediment to Spain’s prosperity, or at least improvement. That one province pretends to make the whole country buy its inferior merchandise in preference to that of England and France; and this pretension it enforces, to the great profit and contentment of the contraband trader. Time and a strong government are needed to bring about that reduction of duties on foreign manufactures which would prove so great a benefit to Spain, and to its revenue. And at present, time is wanting. Something must be done quickly. As things now stand, it is hard to tell whence is to come the money for the next dividend on the home and foreign debt. At this date but a small portion of the last dividend due on the home debt has been paid. It has been suggested that much will depend on the composition of the constituent Cortes. If the country elects representatives who will support the present government, and so give confidence in its duration and strength, it is thought that capitalists will perhaps be found to come to its aid. But if the good sense of Spanish electors prove unequal to the emergency—if they return a Chamber composed of a mixture of demagogues and of partisans of reaction, and not containing a good working majority in favour of the policy of moderate progress, which is that of the Espartero-O’Donnell cabinet—there is nothing but fresh trouble in store for Spain, and the question of finance will then appear almost hopeless.

Whilst contemplating the gloomy, or at least uncertain, prospects of the Spanish treasury, I am forcibly reminded of Cuba and of American proposals for its purchase. I have not heard a statement of the exact amount the States are disposed to give; but I have been assured, on no mean authority, that it would suffice to pay off the whole of the debt, home and foreign, and that a handsome surplus would still remain for roads and railways. Besides these advantages, Cuba, once sold, Spain might safely reduce her fleet and army, for she would then have no reason to apprehend war with the United States, as she at present has none to anticipate aggression or interference on the part of any European power. Relieved of her heaviest burthens, and blessed with an honest government (if indeed it be possible that such endure in a country upon which the curse of misgovernment seems to rest), Spain might soon and easily forget the loss of that cherished colony, whose retention, under present circumstances, is more a question of pride than of profit, and to whose loss without compensation, she must, I fear, by the force of events, be prepared sooner or later to submit.

VEDETTE.

_Printed by William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh._

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Footnote 1:

_Of the Plurality of Worlds; an Essay. Also a Dialogue on the same
subject._ Second Edition. Parker and Son, 1854.

_More Worlds than One, the Creed of the Philosopher, and the Hope of
the Christian_, By Sir DAVID BREWSTER, K.H., D.C.L. Murray, 1854.

_The Planets: Are they Inhabited Worlds?_ Museum of Science and Art.
By DIONYSIUS LARDNER, D.C.L., Chapters i., ii., iii., iv. Walton and
Maberly, 1854.

Footnote 2:

_Works_, vol. xi. p. 198 (Bishop Heber’s edition). The following is
the entire sentence of which the above is the commencing section:
“Whatever we talk, things are as they are—not as we grant, dispute, or
hope; depending on neither our affirmative nor negative, but upon the
rate and value which God sets upon things.”

Footnote 3:

_Dialogue_, p. 37.

Footnote 4:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 59.

Footnote 5:

_Dialogue_, pp. 5, 6.

Footnote 6:

_Daily News._

Footnote 7:

_Essay_, p. 120.

Footnote 8:

_Ante_, p. 300, No. cccclxvii.

Footnote 9:

_Essay_, p. 202.

Footnote 10:

Ibid., pp. 134–136.

Footnote 11:

Ibid., p. 137.

Footnote 12:

One or two of these “Discourses,” all of which were delivered in the
Tron Church, Glasgow, at noon on the week day, were heard by the
writer of this paper, then a boy. He had to wait nearly four hours
before he could gain admission as one of a crowd, in which he was
nearly crushed to death. It was with no little effort that the great
preacher could find his way to his pulpit. As soon as his fervid
eloquence began to stream from it, the intense enthusiasm of the
auditory became almost irrestrainable; and in that enthusiasm the
writer, young as he was, fully participated. He has never since
witnessed anything equal to the scene.

Footnote 13:

_Essay_, pp. 193, 194.

Footnote 14:

In the “Dialogue,” Dr Whewell states that it was not till after the
publication of his “Essay” that he became acquainted with the fact of
the coincidence of his views, on the subject of Geology, with those of
Mr Hugh Miller, in his “First Impressions of England,” with reference
to astronomical objections to Revelation.

Footnote 15:

Ibid., chap. vii., § 1, p. 206.

Footnote 16:

Ibid., chap. vi., § 27, p. 190.

Footnote 17:

_Essay_, pp. 191, 192.

Footnote 18:

Ibid., p. 148.

Footnote 19:

Ibid., pp. 151, 152.

Footnote 20:

Ibid., p. 154.

Footnote 21:

Ibid., p. 166.

Footnote 22:

Ibid., p. 155.

Footnote 23:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 52.

Footnote 24:

_Essay_, p. 188.

Footnote 25:

_Essay_, pp. 198–199.

Footnote 26:

Ibid., p. 203.

Footnote 27:

_Ante_, p. 289.

Footnote 28:

_Essay_, p. 194.

Footnote 29:

_Essay_, p. 195.

Footnote 30:

Ibid., p. 196.

Footnote 31:

Even of monkeys, there have been found fossil remains.

Footnote 32:

_Essay_, p. 197.

Footnote 33:

_Essay_, p. 198.

Footnote 34:

Ibid., pp. 199, 200.

Footnote 35:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 237, (we quote from the first edition).

Footnote 36:

Ibid., p. 230.

Footnote 37:

Ibid., p. 240.

Footnote 38:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 202.

Footnote 39:

Ibid., p. 199.

Footnote 40:

In fact, in a note to page 247, Sir David thus slily alludes to those
“conjectures” of Dr Whewell in his _Bridgewater Treatise_, to which we
have referred (_ante_, pp. 290, 291):—“A very different opinion is
stated by Dr Whewell, in his _Bridgewater Treatise_;” adding, after
citing the passages, “the rest of the chapter, ‘_On the vastness of
the Universe_,’ is well worthy of the perusal of the reader, and forms
a striking contrast with the opinions of the Essayist.”—This is
perfectly fair.

Footnote 41:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 98.

Footnote 42:

Ibid., p. 108.

Footnote 43:

Ibid., p. 166.

Footnote 44:

_More Worlds than One_, pp. 180, 183.

Footnote 45:

Ibid., p. 185.

Footnote 46:

_Essay_, ch. vii. sec. 17, p. 221.

Footnote 47:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 248.

Footnote 48:

_Essay_, chap. x. sec. 10, pp. 308, 309; chap. xii. sec. 1, p. 359.

Footnote 49:

_More Worlds than One_, pp. 178, 179.

Footnote 50:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 18.

Footnote 51:

_Dialogue_, pp. 62–64.

Footnote 52:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 131.

Footnote 53:

Ibid.

Footnote 54:

Ibid., p. 138.

Footnote 55:

Ibid., p. 139.

Footnote 56:

Ibid., p. 140.

Footnote 57:

_More Worlds than One_, pp. 141–142.

Footnote 58:

Ibid., p. 151.

Footnote 59:

Ibid., p. 152.

Footnote 60:

Ibid., p. 153.

Footnote 61:

Ibid., pp. 44–47.

Footnote 62:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 47.

Footnote 63:

Azoic signifies those primary rocks which contain no traces of organic
life, no remains of plants or animals.

Footnote 64:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 52.

Footnote 65:

Ibid., p. 206.

Footnote 66:

_More Worlds than One_, pp. 206, 207.

Footnote 67:

A thirtieth planetoid was discovered by Mr Hind since the publication
of the second edition of the _Essay_.

Footnote 68:

LARDNER, _Museum of Science and Art_, vol. i. p. 156.

Footnote 69:

_Dial._, p. 60.

Footnote 70:

Ibid., p. 28.

Footnote 71:

_Museum_, &c., vol. i. p. 64.

Footnote 72:

P. 271. Her distance from us is 240,000 miles; and our Essayist, by
the way, tells us (chap. x. §7) that “a railroad-carriage, at its
ordinary rate of travelling, would reach her in _a month_.” We should
not like to travel by the Lunar Express, but should prefer the
parliamentary train, and hope, starting from the Hanwell station, to
get to the terminus in a couple of years or so. Good Bishop Wilkins
intended to be taken up by birds of flight trained for the purpose.
When the Duchess of Newcastle asked him where he intended to bait by
the way, he answered, “Your Grace is the last person to ask me the
question, having built so many _castles in the air_!”

Footnote 73:

_Essay_, p. 272.

Footnote 74:

Pp. 80, 81.

Footnote 75:

_Museum_, &c., vol. iii. p. 48.

Footnote 76:

P. 108.

Footnote 77:

P. 24.

Footnote 78:

_Museum_, &c., vol. iii. p. 109.

Footnote 79:

P. 112.

Footnote 80:

Ibid., vol. i. p. 63.

Footnote 81:

_More Worlds than One_, pp. 97, 101.

Footnote 82:

Pp. 99, 100.

Footnote 83:

_Essay_, p. 278.

Footnote 84:

_Essay_, p. 281, 289.

Footnote 85:

Brewster, p. 60.

Footnote 86:

To descend, for a moment, to details. Sir David Brewster will not
allow himself to be driven to elect between the icy or watery
constituency of Jupiter. He declares direct experiment to have proved
that it is neither; that if Jupiter were a sphere of water, the light
reflected from his surface, when in his quadratures, must contain, as
it does _not_, a large portion of polarised light; and if his crust
consist of mountains, precipices, and rocks of ice, some of whose
faces must occasionally reflect the incident light at nearly the
polarising angle, the polarisation of their light would be distinctly
indicated. The Essayist, in his _Dialogue_, “doubts whether the remark
is applicable; for Jupiter’s watery or icy mass must be clothed in a
thick stratum of air, and aqueous vapour, and clouds. But even were
the planet free from clouds, the parts of the planet’s surface from
which polarised light would be reflected, would be only as points
compared with the whole surface; and the common light reflected from
the whole surface would quite overwhelm and obliterate the polarised
light.”—_Dial._ p. 64. We cite this as a sample of the ingenuity of
both disputants, in a point of scientific contact. Whether Sir David’s
conjectural polarised light be or be not thus obliterated, in our view
the item in dispute is quite lost in the general question, and the
great principles on which its solution depends. If driven to elect
between ice and water, asks Sir David playfully, “may we not, upon
good grounds, prefer the probable _ice_ to the possible water, and
accommodate the inhabitants of Jupiter with very comfortable quarters,
in huts of snow and houses of crystal, warmed by subterranean heat,
and lighted with the hydrogen of its waters, and its cinders not
wholly deprived of their bitumen?”—Pp. 236, 237. The answer of his
opponent would be obvious.

Footnote 87:

Brewster, p. 61.

Footnote 88:

Ibid., p. 62.

Footnote 89:

Ibid., pp. 65, 66.

Footnote 90:

Ibid., pp. 68, 69.

Footnote 91:

_Dial._, p. 6.

Footnote 92:

Ibid., p. 23.

Footnote 93:

_Dial._, p. 76.

Footnote 94:

_Museum_, &c., vol. i. p. 35.

Footnote 95:

_Dial._, p. 23.

Footnote 96:

Lord Byron—Hebrew Melodies. “The philosopher will scan,” says Sir
David, at the close of his eloquent Treatise, “with a new sense, the
lofty spheres in which he is to study.”—P. 259.

Footnote 97:

Pp. 164, 165.

Footnote 98:

Isaiah, xlv. 9.

Footnote 99:

Isaiah, lv. 8, 9.

Footnote 100:

_Essay_, p. 244.

Footnote 101:

Pp. vii.–viii.

Footnote 102:

_Essay_, pp. 243, 244.

Footnote 103:

See them specified, p. 251.

Footnote 104:

_Cosmos_, iii. 373.

Footnote 105:

Ch. viii., _passim_.

Footnote 106:

_Dial._, pp. 20–23.

Footnote 107:

_More Worlds than One_, Ch. vi., _passim_.

Footnote 108:

_More Worlds than One_, Ch. viii., _passim_.

Footnote 109:

Ibid., p. 164.

Footnote 110:

Ibid., p. 119.

Footnote 111:

_Essay_, p. 257.

Footnote 112:

_Lect. on Astron._, 2d edit. (1849.)

Footnote 113:

Pp. ix. x.

Footnote 114:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 176.

Footnote 115:

_Essay_, p. 211.

Footnote 116:

_Essay_, pp. 235–236.

Footnote 117:

_Dial._, p. 18.

Footnote 118:

_Essay_, p. 214.

Footnote 119:

Ibid., p. 216.

Footnote 120:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 215.

Footnote 121:

_Essay_, p. 298.

Footnote 122:

_More Worlds than One_, p. 315, and note.

Footnote 123:

Ibid., p. 315.

Footnote 124:

Romans, i. 22.

Footnote 125:

Matthew, vii. 26.

Footnote 126:

_Dialogue_, p. 74.

Footnote 127:

Isaiah, lxiv. 4; 1 Cor., ii. 9.

Footnote 128:

John, xiv. 2, 23.

Footnote 129:

_Dialogue_, p. 42.

Footnote 130:

_Wisdom of God in the Worlds of Creation_, vol. iii. p. 265.

Footnote 131:

_Monthly Magazine_, A.D. 1798—art. “Walpoliana.”

Footnote 132:

Matthew, vii. 24.

Footnote 133:

This must evidently mean Loufti Pasha, who was grand vizier from A.D.
1539 to 1541.

Footnote 134:

This passage may be admitted as a proof that the tribute of children
was not regularly exacted from the population of the capital. The
difficulty Mohammed the Second found in repeopling Constantinople
explains the exemption.

Footnote 135:

_Glasgow Records_, ii. 341.

Footnote 136:

Ibid., p. 343.

Footnote 137:

Ibid., p. 422.

Footnote 138:

“Gladios, pugiones sicas machæras rhomphæas acinaces fustes, præsertim
si præferrati vel plumbati sint, veruta missilia tela sclopos tormenta
bombardas balistas ac arma ulla bellica nemo discipulus
gestato.”—_Fasti Aberdonienses_, 242. The Glasgow list is less
formidable: “Nemo gladium pugionem tormenta bellica aut aliud quodvis
armorum et telorum genus gestet; sed apud præfectum omnia
deponat.”—_Instituta_, 49.

Footnote 139:

_Instituta Univ. Glasg._, p. 519, 520.

Footnote 140:

_Fasti Univ. Glasg._, p. 548.

Footnote 141:

_Hist. Univ. Paris_, iv. 266.

Footnote 142:

_Fasti_, p. 400.

Footnote 143:

Ibid., p. 400.

Footnote 144:

There was an attempt to _enforce_ returns upon religious and
educational statistics, but, in the words of the Report, “It was,
however, considered doubtful whether, upon a rigid construction, the
Census Act rendered it compulsory upon parties to afford information
upon these particulars; and the inquiry was, therefore, pursued as a
purely voluntary investigation.”—_Report_, No. 1.

Footnote 145:

“The weight of the schedules, blank enumeration-books, and other forms
despatched from the Central Office, exceeded fifty-two
tons.”—_Report_, No. 1.

Footnote 146:

LAYARD. Alexander the Great, after he had transferred his seat of
empire to the East, so fully appreciated the importance of those great
works that he ordered them to be cleansed and repaired, and
superintended the work in person, steering his boat with his own hand
through the channels. Similar operations undertaken now would again
restore to Mesopotamia its old fertility, and fit Babylon, not only
for regaining her place as the emporium of the Eastern world, but for
becoming the great entrepot of commerce between the West and East,
which will ere long, in consequence of the introduction of railways,
again flow into its old overland route by Palmyra, through the
deserts, from the Levant to the head of the Persian Gulf.

Footnote 147:

Ctesias and other writers speak of the Bactrian and Indian expedition
of Ninus and Semiramis; and in connection with this it is important to
notice, that upon the obelisk discovered at Nimroud—which belongs to
the period of the earliest palace, having been erected by the son of
the founder of that building—are represented the Bactrian camel, the
elephant, and the rhinoceros—(all animals from India and Central
Asia)—brought as tribute by a conquered people to the Assyrian king.

Footnote 148:

The Hon. James Thomason, late Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West
Provinces, who lingered too long in India, chiefly in the hope to have
been present on the occasion above commemorated.

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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES

● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained. ● Used numbers for footnotes, placing them all at the end of the last chapter. ● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_. ● The caret (^) serves as a superscript indicator, applicable to individual characters (like 2^d) and even entire phrases (like 1^{st}).